Features
Sri Lanka’s ancient hydraulic civilisation and birth of Sinhala Buddhist nationalism
by Satyajith Andradi
Sri Lanka continues to be in the grips of many high profile crises of recent origin such as the COVID–19 pandemic, chronic difficulties in servicing foreign debts, shortages of essential items such as food and fuel, skyrocketing cost of living, and crop failures due to the ban of chemical fertilisers, to name a few . However, the national question, which has tormented the country for decades, continues to be one of her biggest problems, if not the greatest.
Sinhala Buddhist nationalism features prominently in any discourse on Sri Lanka’s national question. Its detractors often derogatorily call it by terms such as Sinhala Buddhist imperialism, Sinhala Buddhist chauvinism, and Sinhala Buddhist racism, whilst its protagonists call it Sinhala Buddhist patriotism or simply patriotism. Meanwhile, somewhat esoteric and ephemeral terms such as Sinhala Buddhist majoritarianism, kinguistic nationalism, and ethnocracy are used for it in learned discourse. Further, Sinhala Buddhist nationalism is very often discussed with reference to personages of Sri Lanka’s ancient history such as Dutugemunu and Elara. Hence, it is useful to trace the genesis and early phases of development of Sinhala Buddhist nationalism during Sri Lanka’s ancient past, in order to enhance our understanding of the subject.
Sri Lanka’s ancient agrarian revolution powered by irrigation engineering
As in our own age, in the distant past too, various races migrated from one land to another for various reasons such as the search for greener pastures and the forced eviction by intruding tribes. From about the sixth century BC, Sri Lanka too, which until then was thinly populated by primitive hunter gatherers, experienced an influx of migrants from overseas. Some of them, who had a knack for agriculture, settled in the arid north central plains of the island, which were covered with wooded forests and shrub jungles, as those one could still see in places such as Wilpattu. As direct rain water was often inadequate and undependable for growing paddy, these pioneer settlers cultivated the art of conserving water by building small artificial reservoirs called tanks, and convert the hostile arid terrain into paddy fields with the water thus conserved. Thereby they were able to establish a firm foothold in pre-historic Sri Lanka. These rough, tough, and enterprising pioneer settlers came to be known as ‘Sihala’ or Sinhalese, whose founding fathers were, according to legends, Vijaya and his band of seven hundred followers, who came to Sri Lanka from northern India. Other migrant tribes, either perished in this hostile physical environment, like the traders devoured by Kuveni, or got suppressed and assimilated by the dominant Sinhalese. This was a social process, which had some affinity to the process of natural selection in the biological world – a case of social Darwinism, so to speak. The Sinhalese went on to build progressively bigger tanks, weirs, canals, and complex irrigation systems connecting all such innovative creations with rivers which flowed from the distant wet mountains. As a result, the erstwhile wild and hostile terrain of Sri Lanka’s north central plains were converted into a vast blue and green tapestry of thousands of artificial lakes and lush paddy fields studded with dagobas of immaculate white. The formidable physical challenges posed by the nature were surmounted with an audacious human response. This monumental transformation, which took place more than thousand years ago, inspired many people of modern times. A notable person amongst them was the British planter, archaeologist, and author John Still ( 1880 – 1941 ) of Jungle Tide fame, who in turn drew the insightful attention of Arnold Toynbee, the eminent scholar of comparative history and civilizations ( Arnold J Toynbee; A study of history ; abridgement by D C Somervell ). The agrarian revolution powered by advanced irrigation systems was the bedrock, the backbone, and the material basis of the fully-fledged hydraulic civilization of ancient Sri Lanka. The elaborate social, political, cultural and religious institutions of that civilisation constituted, as Marx would say, its superstructure.
The birth of the ancient agrarian revolution based on irrigation engineering pre-dates the arrival of Buddhism in the island in the third century BC. The medium sized tank ‘Abhaya Wewa’, which is also known as Basawak Kulama, in Anuradhapura, built in the fourth century BC by king Pandukabhaya, proves the point. The next important tank, Tissa Wewa, was built in Anuradhapura during the reign of Devanampiyatissa ( 250 BC – 210 BC ). Irrigation engineering witnessed a quantum leap during the reign of the great Vasabha ( 67 AD – 111 AD ). During his reign, in addition to many large tanks, the Elahera canal was built. This canal diverted the waters of the Ambanganga, a tributary of the Mahaweli river originating from the Matale hills, to the tanks in the arid north central plains. The next great period of tank building was the reign of Mahasena ( 274 AD – 301 AD ), during which many tanks including the giant Minneriya Wewa was constructed. Mahasena’s achievements were equaled or surpassed during the reign of Dhatusena ( 455 AD – 473 AD ), during which huge tanks such as the Kalawewa and the Yoda Wewa were constructed, damming the Kala Oya and the Malwathu Oya respectively. However, the greatest irrigation engineering feat during the reign of Dhatusena was the construction of the Yoda Ela, also known as Jayaganga, a fifty four mile long canal which carried water from the Kalawewa to the Tissawewa in Anuradhapura. Further significant additions to the irrigation infrastructure were made during the reigns of Moggallana II ( 531 AD – 551 AD ) and Aggabodhi II ( AD 604 – AD 614 ). The former constructed the huge Nachchaduwa Wewa near Anuradhapura, augmented the Nuwara Wewa in Anuradhapura ( History of Ceylon, University of Ceylon: editor; S. Paranavitana ) and built the Padaviya tank by damming the Ma Oya (K M De Silva; A History of Sri Lanka ), whist the latter constructed the Kantale, Giritale, and Kaudulla tanks. Thereafter, the expansion of the irrigation systems seems to have subsided for several centuries till the time of Parakramabahu the Great ( 1153 – 1186 ). This king is considered to be the greatest tank builder of Sri Lanka (ibid ). The massive Parakrama Samudraya in Polonnaruwa, which was created by combining three tanks including the Topawewa, is undoubtedly his finest achievement in the field of tank building. It has to be been noted no other king after him built major tanks.
The ancient agrarian revolution powered by irrigation engineering had many important economic, social, political, religious, and cultural implications and outcome. On the economic sphere, it phenomenally increased the extent of arable land by making it possible to bring vast swathes of erstwhile arid forest land under the plough through irrigation. Further, it would have, most probably, facilitated a significant migration from small scale peasant subsistence farming to more productive large scale farming. Anyway, the obvious economic outcome of the ancient agrarian revolution was the generation of ever increasing agricultural surpluses over and about what was needed to feed the peasants and other agricultural labourers. These massive economic surpluses enabled the kings and their ruling elites to invest enormous resources in the expansion of the irrigation infrastructure, in maintaining the irrigation technocracy and the royal bureaucracy, in building impressive Buddhist monuments such as the great stupas, in patronizing outstanding Buddhist scholarship of international repute, and in constructing awe inspiring secular monuments such as Kasyapa’s Sigiriya rock fortress and royal palace.
On the social and political spheres, the elaborate irrigation systems stretching across vast swathes of farmlands, inexorably led to centralized control of agriculture through irrigation management. The technocrat who controlled the spills and the sluices of the tanks and weirs came to dominate the peasant who ploughed the fields, sowed the seeds, and harvested the crops. This entailed the ascendency of the state bureaucracy including the irrigation engineering technocracy, which in turn called for a unified and highly centralized state.
Pandukabhaya and birth of Sinhala state
It was mentioned earlier that the first significant tank was built by Pandukabhaya in the fourth century BC. It is interesting to note that he was also the first ruler of the Anuradhapura kingdom. Prior to him, the main Sinhala presence in Sri Lanka constituted a conglomerate of Sinhala settlements situated between the Kala Oya and the Malvattu Oya, loosely connected by tribal and family ties. It is evident that Pandukabhaya forcefully subjugated these semi-autonomous settlements and united them under his leadership. Thus the first Sinhala state was born. No doubt, this was in response to a historical necessity of the agrarian revolution, which called for an efficient centralized state. Certainly, this nascent state had nothing to do with Sinhala Buddhist nationalism or patriotism. In the first place, Buddhism was yet to be introduced to Sri Lanka. Further, the Sinhala state was yet to perceive a real threat from non – Sinhalese. It was young, vibrant and self- confident. It was, in modern parlance, an absolute monarchy.
Devamanpiyatissa and the birth of the Sinhala- Buddhist state
Buddhism was introduced to Sri Lanka by the great Mauryan emperor Asoka during the reign of Devamanpiyatissa ( 250 – 210 ) at a time when the ancient agrarian revolution was in full swing. As already mentioned, it was during this period that the Tissa Wewa was built. The peaceful conversion of the country to Buddhism received unreserved royal patronage. The nascent Sinhala state became a Sinhala Buddhist state. Numerous lands and viharas were gifted to the Maha Sanga. These included the Thuparama dagoba, and the spacious Mahamegha park in Anuradhapura, in which the sacred Bodhi tree Sri Maha Bodhi was planted. This signaled the establishment of the Mahaviharaya, the centre of Theravada Buddhist Church in Sri Lanka. No doubt, the doctrine of the Buddha, which laid down a well –structured spiritual path to freedom from existential suffering through the taming of the senses, struck a chord with the well-structured thinking of the Sinhalese irrigation engineers, which provided a path to freedom from material want by taming wild and hostile nature, with technological innovations.
Like Pandukabhaya’s Sinhala state, the nascent Sinhala Buddhist state during Devanampiyatissa’s had nothing to do with Sinhala Buddhist nationalism or patriotism. It did not perceive a real threat from non – Sinhalese or non-Buddhists. Like Pandukabhaya’s state, it was young, vibrant and self- confident.
The Sinhala Buddhist state under siege
Devanampiyatissa’s Sinhala Buddhist kingdom was in state of blissful harmony, arguably unparalled in Sri Lanka’s long history. However, this state of affairs was to be dramatically disrupted after a short period of time due to game-changing external and internal interventions. The major external challenge came from Tamil adventurers from south India bent on plundering the growing wealth of Sri Lanka’s hydraulic civilization. The main internal challenge came from the growing Mahayana tendencies amongst sections Sri Lanka’s Maha Sangha, which had traditionally been the custodian and standard bearer of Theravada Buddhism in Sri Lanka and abroad. Sinhala Buddhist Nationalism was born as a response to these challenges from within and without.
The first major challenge to the young Sinhala Buddhist state emerged thirty years after the death of Devanampiyatissa. Sena and Guttika, two Tamil brothers engaged in horse trading, captured the Anuradhapura kingdom and reigned for twenty two years. A few years after the Sinhalese regained the kingdom, the second successful invasion from South India was launched. This was led by the Chola prince Elara, who reigned in Anuradhapura for forty four years. The Sinhalese under Dutugemunu vanquished Elara and regained the kingdom. Dutugemunu’s reign ( 161 BC – 137 BC ) was a watershed in the Sri Lanka’s history. The island, which hitherto consisted of several kingdoms, was unified under his leadership. The Sinhala Buddhist state became, in present day parlance, a unitary state. However, less than four decades after Dutugemunu’s death, Anuradhapura was captured and occupied again by south Indian Tamils from 103 BC to 89 BC. They were expelled by Vattagamini ( Valagamba ) , who reigned from 89 BC to 77 BC. Thereafter, for more than five hundred years, Sri Lanka was free from foreign occupation. It was during this period that her ancient irrigation witnessed its first great flowering. However, it was during this period that the serious internal threats to the Sinhala Buddhist state emerged. They came in the form of Mahayana challenges to the uncontested supremacy of the Mahavihara led Theravada Buddhist Church, which was a main pillar of the Sinhala Buddhist state. The initial threat came in the first century BC with the establishment of the rival Abhayagiri monastery by Valagamba, which harboured dissenters. The immediate response of the Theravada Buddhist Church to this was the writing down of the Tripitaka at Aluvihara during that king’s reign. The next threat, which was of a much greater magnitude, was the intrusion of Mahayana thinking in the form of Vaitulyavada in the third century AD, during the reign of Mahasena ( 274 AD – 301 AD ), with the fanatical support of that monarch. This was somewhat contemporaneous with the rise of Mahayana in south India under the guidance of great masters such as Nagarjuna. Anyway, the Theravada Buddhist Church eventually prevailed by winning back the king to its side with great difficulty.
The long peace of half a millennium, which commenced with the reign of Valagamba, ended with the invasion from south India in 429 AD. This resulted in the reign of six Tamils kings in Anuradhapura for twenty seven years, until Dhatusena liberated the country from the foreign yoke. Thereafter, the country did not experience invasions from abroad for about four centuries. Ancient Sri Lankan irrigation witnessed its second great flowering. However, during ninth and tenth centuries, Sri Lanka got caught up in the geo-political rivalries amongst south Indian Tamil kingdoms of Pallavas, Pandyas and Cholas. At that time the Hindu Tamil civilization of south India was in its ascendency, whilst the aging Sinhala Buddhist civilization was in a state of stagnation, if not decay. The end result was the conquest of Anuradhapura and the north central plains of Sri Lanka by the Cholas in the closing decade of the tenth century. This dealt a crippling blow to Sri Lanka’s ancient hydraulic civilization. The Sinhalese were, under Vijayabahu I, able to expel the Cholas from the Island in 1070, and under Parakramabahu the Great, revive the ancient hydraulic civilization. Sri Lanka’s ancient irrigation witnessed its third and last flowering. However, the revival was short lived. The invasion by the marauding Kerala army of Magha of Kalinga in 1215 dealt the death blow to the ancient hydraulic civilization. The Sinhalese, who had populated the north central plains since sixth century BC, migrated en masse to the south west and the central hills. The irrigation works were abandoned and went into disrepair. The hostile arid jungles, which were banished by Sinhalese pioneers, returned to the north central plains with a vengeance. The ancient hydraulic civilization of the Sinhalese, which had flourished for more than one thousand five hundred years, came to an end.
The ancient hydraulic civilization and Sinhala Buddhist Nationalism
Sinhala Buddhist Nationalism, like many other –isms, constitute an ideology; an outlook. As already mentioned, it was born as a response to the external and internal challenges to the ancient Sinhala Buddhist state, which was an integrate part of the ancient hydraulic civilization. But, how do we conceptualise this ideology of Sri Lanka’s distant past? Fortunately, the ancient chronicles – Dipavamsa, Mahavamsa, and Chulavamsa, and the last two chapters of the Pujavaliya, come to our assistance. However, it should be cautioned that the ideologies contained in these ancient documents represent , more likely, the views held by their respective authors and their contemporary societies than by the personages of their narratives.
It seems that the internal threat to the Theravada Buddhism by Mahasena’s aggressive promotion of Vaitulyavada prompted the writing of the two oldest exiting chronicles of Sri Lanka – the Dipavamsa, written in the fourth century AD, and the Mahavamsa, composed in the sixth century AD. The fact that the narratives of both works end with the death of Mahasena points in that direction. Anyway, both emphasize that the island was freed from the Yakkas by the Buddha to make way for the Sinhalese settlers and the establishment of the Buddhist doctrine. This amounts to an imprimatur for Sinhala Buddhist exclusivity in Sri Lanka, which goes back, at least, as far as the fourth and sixth centuries. However, the treatment of the Sinhala king Dutugemunu and the Tamil king Elara by the two authors differ significantly. For instance, whilst the Dipavamsa devotes a mere twelve verses to Dutugemunu, the Mahavansa devotes eleven out of its thirty two chapters to him. Clearly, Dutugemunu is the favourite king of the author of the Mahavamsa. Further, whilst both chronicles admire Elara as an incomparably just king, the Dipavamsa, unlike the Mahavamsa, takes note of his outstanding spiritual qualities. More strikingly, the Mahavamsa, in chapter twenty five seeks to lend a Buddhist imprimatur to Dutugemunu’s war with Elara. This is certainly inconsistent with the letter and spirit of the Metta Sutta, as much as the crusades of medieval Christendom authorized by the papacy was inconsistent with the letter and spirit of Jesus’ utterance ” Put your sword in its place, for all who take the sword will perish by the sword” ( Matthew 26; 52 ). In fact, the Mahavamsa’s stance on the Dutugemunu- Elara war is reminiscent of the ideas on ‘just war’ advocated by St. Augustine and the Bhagavad Gita. Most probably, the south Indian invasions of the fifth century prompted the sixth century author of Mahavamsa to take a more militant Sinhala Buddhist stance than the fourth century author of the Dipavamsa.
The first part of the Chulavamsa, which was most probably composed in the early part of the thirteenth century, provides useful information about the period from the death of Mahasena to the end of the ancient hydraulic civilization. The last two chapters ( chapters 33 and 34 ) of the Pujavaliya briefly covers this period in addition to history up to the death of Mahasena. The Pujavaliya was composed in the mid thirteenth century, shortly after the collapse of the hydraulic civilization. Whilst the three chronicles were composed in Pali, the Pujavaliya was written in Sinhala.
The Chulavamsa and the Pujavaliya, in comparison with the Dipavamsa and the Mahavamsa, take a more hostile approach towards non – Sinhala Buddhist actors. For instance, unlike the Dipavamsa and the Mahavamsa, the Pujavaliya perceives Elara merely as a malevolent personage bent on destroying the Buddhist Church. The more virulent Tamil invasions from the ninth century onwards, would have contributed towards this more aggressive Sinhala Buddhist nationalism.
We have seen how the dynamics of the ancient hydraulic civilization gave birth Sinhala Buddhist Nationalism. The hydraulic civilization itself perished as a result of the devastating invasion of Magha of Kalinga. However, Sinhala Buddhist Nationalism did not perish with that civilization. On the contrary, it has continued to live as a potent ideology of Sri Lanka, right up to the present day.
Of the several MOUs signed by the President of Sri Lanka during Prime Minister Modi’s visit to Sri Lanka, the most consequential in respect of implications to Sri Lanka is the one associated with the Defence Cooperation. Neither the public nor the Parliament is aware of its contents. What the public could glean about the scope of this vital MOU are from articles written by concerned citizens, like the one by Dr. Dayan Jayatilleka in the Daily FT of April 10, 2025. The source of his material is from statements made by the President during political rallies relating to the Defence Cooperation MOU. One such statement is cited below. This reflects a seismic shift in respect of Sri Lanka’s relations not only with India, but also with other Nation-States, that is disturbing to say the least, because of its implications on Sri Lanka’s autonomy to act independently as a sovereign Nation-State and define its own destiny; a status Sri Lanka defended for nearly 2500 years despite repeated interruptions over the years.
SECURING ASSISTANCE
Justifying the need for Defence Cooperation with India, President Dissanayake is reported to have stated the following at an election meeting in Galle:
“We need security in this region. We need to safeguard the security of this region. We should secure the assistance of those who have greater technological capacities in defence, greater skills in defence. If not, how can a country move forward? …. For 76 years the world developed rapidly in science and technology. The world developed rapidly in military science. Now, what should we do? We must secure the assistance of those states which have accepted new science and technology. Don’t we have to do that”? (Ibid).
There are two pivotal issues that arise from the President’s comments. The first is discarding the principle of SELF-RELIANCE (SR). SR is the bedrock of Sri Lanka’s civilizational values. The inspiration to rely on one’s SELF to evolve answers to inscrutable questions or to challenges that present themselves as insurmountable comes from the single-minded approach adopted by Lord Buddha in his search for liberation. His attempts to seek the assistance of others failed him. It was the relentless determination to find the answers himself to what he was looking for, that enabled him to realise his goal; a goal that has benefited mankind.
The role model set by him was what inspired the spirit of SELF RELIANCE that enabled Sri Lanka to create a civilisation that was unique over millennia. It was not created by military conquest. It was not created by developing “military science”. The monuments left behind are a testimony to the ingenuity and skills of the People of Sri Lanka. It was they, who developed the technologies needed for the Sri Lankan nation to lead a life of peace and contentment.
Throughout Sri Lanka’s history, its sovereignty has been repeatedly violated and its territory vandalised by invading armies. Whenever such invasions occurred, liberation and freedom came from military strategies developed and adopted by those within by relying on SR. They did not go running to sign MOUs seeking assistance from militarily powerful nations. On the other hand, whenever our Rulers sought the assistance of external powers, such as the Dutch, to get rid of the Portuguese who had invaded the country, the Dutch ended up colonising the whole country for nearly 150 years until they lost it to the British, who in turn colonised for a further 150 years. The Defence Cooperation MOU with India has the potential to repeat that history.
SAFEGUARDING REGIONAL SECURITY
The President has stated: “We need security in this region. We need to safeguard the security of this region”. If this is a policy of this government, in what way could Sri Lanka contribute towards the “security of this region”? Is there a clear understanding as to how Sri Lanka and India are going to undertake safeguarding the security of the region? Whatever it may be, there is no doubt that the contribution Sri Lanka can afford to make is insignificant compared with what India would be making because it is in India’s self-interest as an aspiring Global Power to make the region secure. Furthermore, because of this disparity, the MOU would entitle India to enforce its will as to how regional security is exercised. Does this not amount to sacrificing Sri Lanka’s strategic autonomy?
If it did, would it not compel Sri Lanka to be under the hegemony of India; a condition that would only bolster the security of India based on India’s notion that the security of India depends on the security of Sri Lanka, meaning a weakened Sri Lanka under the control of India? On the other hand, if Sri Lanka exercises its independence and acts in pursuit of its own self-interests, and such actions do not mesh with that of India in its pursuit of becoming a global power, there would be consequences.
Therefore, any arrangement that compromises the independence of Sri Lanka and its ability to exercise its Self- Reliance has to be mindful of India’s interests. This does not mean that Sri Lanka should not heed India’s concerns and interests. Instead, it only means pursuing Sri Lanka’s interests while being conscious of India’s sensibilities, as it was with the Chinese “research vessel”. However, under a Defence Cooperation MOU, it would be India that would decide the parameters as to whether to permit entry of foreign vessels or not; a constraint that would compromise Sri Lanka autonomy to pursue its self-interests.
IMPACT on FOREIGN POLICY
An alignment with a power that the President describes as: “We sincerely applaud the way India has positioned itself not only as a regional power, but also as global power” (Ibid), means Sri Lanka has decided to disassociate itself with its long cherished position of being Non-Aligned as a founding member of Non-Aligned Movement, that morphed recently into being Neutral in the context of emerging Great Power rivalries in this region. By aligning exclusively with a country that is positioning itself to be a global power and at the cost of distancing itself in its relations with other Global Powers, comes not only at a cost that Sri Lanka cannot afford to bear in the background of overdue debt to them, but also a degree of dependence that is unknown and unfamiliar to independent Sri Lanka.
The need to seek exclusive relations with India is in the hope that India would assist Sri Lanka in case such a need arises because Sri Lanka does not have the needed “military science” to defend itself, not realising that there is no free lunch; a fact attested by Sri Lanka’s own history. The President and this Government must accept the hard reality that Sri Lanka or any other small country can ever hope to match the degree of “military science” capabilities that Global Powers possess. At the end of the day, it is a smart strategy that matters more than the stacks of military hardware by countries such as Sri Lanka; a fact demonstrated by David’s sling shot against the might of Goliath.
For instance, Sun Tzu, in “The Art of War”, states: “What is essential for leaders, generals, and ministers in running countries and governing armies is no more than … peak efficiency of knowledge and strategy is to make conflict altogether unnecessary. To overcome others’ armies without fighting is the best of skills”. It is clear from the wisdom of the ages that effective intelligence gathering and appropriate strategy is far more relevant for the security of a Nation such as Sri Lanka than relying on the unrealistic notion of military science to ensure its security.
CONCLUSION
During an election rally, the President is reported to have stated that there is a need not only to “safeguard security for the region”, but also that Sri Lanka “must secure the assistance of those states which have accepted this new military science technology” if Sri Lanka is to move forward. These objectives are to be incorporated in a Defence Cooperation MOU with India.
How Sri Lanka is to contribute to “safeguarding the security of the region”, or what form and type of the assistance Sri Lanka expects from India, is not made public. Despite such lacunae, the implication of any form of Defence Cooperation exclusively with a country such as India that is “positioning” itself to be a global Power or one that is already recognised as a Global Power, is bound to affect Sri Lanka’s relations not only with other Global Powers but also with other countries as well.
Furthermore, exclusive alignment with one Power means that Sri Lanka has decided to ditch not only the principle of Non-Alignment and its concepts that it championed for decades, but also, more appropriately, Neutrality, in the emerging context of Great Power rivalries in the region. Such exclusive arrangements for assistance with one country compel Sri Lanka to be in the vortex of India and its interests, the consequence of which for Sri Lanka is to be a vassal State of India.
The nearly 2,500-year old history of Sri Lanka has been to resist and defend such attempts. Throughout its history Sri Lanka has relied on its own strengths and abilities and created the spirit of Self-Reliance modeled on the example set by the founder of the religion of the majority of Sri Lanka. That is to develop its own strategies to create a unique civilization in which its People enjoyed peace and contentment. However, there were occasions when weak leaders abandoned the rewards of Self-Reliance and sought the assistance of the Dutch to overcome the threat of Portuguese occupation, and ended up being colonized for over nearly 150 years. The planned Defence Cooperation MOU with India could very well be a repeat of that history; an outcome that would permanently ensure India’s security.
The attempt to seek external assistance to “move forward” is founded on the misguided concept that without the military and technological strength of external agents, Sri Lanka cannot move forward. In view of the fact that countries such as Sri Lanka cannot ever hope to match the capabilities of those who have advanced military technologies, the choice left to Sri Lanka is to be guided by the wisdom of the ages cited above, and develop “efficiency of knowledge and strategy”.
That means, the compelling need for Sri Lanka to develop its Intelligence and strategic capabilities to a very much higher level than what exists today so that Sri Lanka is in a position to make conflict both internal or external unnecessary. The importance of strategy over Military capabilities is starkly made evident by the experience of the US in Vietnam. Notwithstanding the fact that the US possesses the most advanced military hardware in the world, the US lost the war in Vietnam because of a wrong strategy. The US relied totally on the capabilities of their military hardware and forgot the strategy of David’s slingshot. The hope is that the President is made aware of these lessons of history.
by Neville Ladduwahetty
Professor Basil Laliputhra Tennekoon, Emeritus Professor of Civil Engineering at the University of Moratuwa, was called to rest on 30 March 2025 at the age of 82. He was educated at S. Thomas’ College, Mt. Lavinia, where he won the Miller Mathematics Prize in 1960, an achievement that gets one’s name on a board in the college hall. The prize is named after Rev. Edward Miller, the fifth warden of the school, who had read mathematics at Cambridge. Young Tennekoon fulfilled this early promise, obtaining first class honours in civil engineering from the University of Peradeniya in 1965. There were many Thomians who entered the engineering faculty with him, including Shanthi Kumar Rasaratnam (now holding an MBE for services to water engineering in the UK), Mano Ponniah (who later played first class cricket for Cambridge and All-Ceylon), and Gerard Rodrigo (subsequently a Marxist development economist).
Lal Tennekoon went on to complete his PhD at Cambridge University in 1970, on the behaviour of foundations on sandy soils. Other notable Peradeniya graduates/academics who completed PhDs in Cambridge around this time included Alagiah Thurairajah (1962, on shear properties of soils), Munidasa Ranaweera (1969, on the finite element method applied to limit analysis) and Vickramabahu Karunaratne (1970, on plasma physics) – halcyon days for Peradeniya engineering, no doubt. For six years after his PhD, Tennekoon was attached to the Faculty of Engineering at Peradeniya, teaching at both undergraduate and postgraduate levels. He joined the Katubedda Campus of the University of Sri Lanka in 1975 and became a Professor of Civil Engineering at the University of Moratuwa in 1984 and Senior Professor in 1994. Moratuwa was fortunate to obtain his services. When I once suggested that his moving to Moratuwa was a result of “the best people gravitating to the best places”, his rejoinder was that he would have found it difficult, after he got married to Preethi, to keep pace with Thurairajah’s work ethic in the Peradeniya soil mechanics lab!
He guided the fortunes of the Civil Engineering Department as its Head from 1980 to 1985, during which time the annual undergraduate intake was increased from 50 to 100, and a new civil engineering complex was constructed to accommodate that increase. He also steered the Faculty of Engineering as its Dean for 10 months in 1994/1995, when there was sharp division in the university regarding the continuation of the NDT programme within the Faculty.
Professor Tennekoon’s main research interests were based around the problems facing the geotechnical engineers of this country. These were in the areas of: (i) Shallow foundations in low lying areas containing peat and organic clays; (ii) Pile foundations terminating on rock; (iii) Landslides and the stabilisation of slopes; and (iv) Site Investigations for all types of civil engineering structures. He also chaired the Moratuwa University’s Senate Research Committee from around 1998 to 2002 and was responsible for setting up the Research Awards Scheme, which contributed significantly to raising research quality at the university.
Over his illustrious career, he provided assistance to many development projects in the country during their planning, design and construction stages, in the collection and interpretation of geotechnical data. Notable contributions have been in (i) the Environmental Improvement Project for the city of Colombo; (ii) the Southern Highway Project from Colombo to Matara; (iii) the Beira Lake Restoration Project; and (iv) several multi-storeyed building projects such as Ceylinco Celestial Towers, Crescat Towers, HNB Tower, Bank of Ceylon Tower, Central Bank Tower and Havelock City Project. He worked closely with Geotech (Pvt) Ltd, where his close friend Eng. Parakrama Jayasinghe was Managing Director. At times he enlisted the services of his colleagues, most of them his juniors. The consideration paid by this senior engineer to the disciplinary competencies of his younger associates only served to increase our own reciprocal respect for him.
Professor Tennekoon served as the principal author for the development of two standards for the Institute of Construction Training and Development (ICTAD), in which his research findings were also incorporated. The two standards were in the areas of ‘Site Investigation’, and ‘Pile foundations end bearing on rock’; and were published by the Sri Lanka Standards Institution (SLSI). He was a Founder Member of the Sri Lanka Geotechnical Society (SLGS) in 1987; and held its Presidency from 1994 to 2000. He was recognised for his contributions to the Geotechnical Engineering profession in Sri Lanka by the SLGS at an International Conference organised by the Society in 2007. The Institution of Engineers Sri Lanka bestowed on him an Award for Excellence in 2008. He was elected a Fellow of the National Academy of Sciences of Sri Lanka in 2013.
In April 2003, Professor Tennekoon was invited by the Government of Sri Lanka to be part of a team for implementing the World Bank funded project for the Improvement of Relevance and Quality of Undergraduate Education (IRQUE). This was a 6-year project where the major component was the establishment of a Quality Enhancement Fund (QEF). This was to be a strategy in which quality and relevance were to be improved through the entire university system by the implementation of a competitive funding scheme. Professor Tennekoon was responsible for the implementation of this QEF component, which often involved choosing between competing study programmes. His dispassionate judgment and clinical impartiality ensured the smooth operation of this project; it also endeared him to virtually the entire university community in Sri Lanka. Some of us wondered whether he was deserting his primary calling to engineering through this involvement, but he was only broadening his horizons. He later became passionate about outcome based engineering education, and chaired the Accreditation Board of the Institution of Engineers, Sri Lanka, responsible for accrediting engineering programmes under the Washington Accord.
Twenty eight years ago, Lal Tennekoon suffered a massive heart attack and was in the intensive care unit for many days. His loving wife Preethi and his children Layanthi and Banuka rarely left the hospital premises, at times camping out on its staircases, as I recall. Theirs was clearly a very loving family. How fortunate that we all got him back from the brink of death. From a private communication he circulated to some of us soon after, I am aware that he was extremely grateful to all who attended on, ministered to and prayed for him. He himself looked after his wife caringly, eschewing all professional and other engagements, towards the end of her life. Preethi’s demise hastened his own.
Professor Lal Tennekoon was an illustrious but utterly unpretentious and much loved academic; a greatly sought after and highly respected geotechnical consultant; and a passionate advocate for outcome based engineering education. His twin concerns for practice oriented research on the one hand and engineering education on the other, continue to be nurtured by those he engaged with. His geotechnical expertise endures in the careers of his one-time students, all now emeritus or full professors themselves – Professor Anuruddha Puswewala (rock mechanics); Professor Athula Kulathilake (slope stability); Professor Saman Thilakasiri (piled foundations); Professor Udeni Nawagamuwa (environmental geotechnics); and Professor Nalin de Silva (shallow foundations).
Professor Priyan Dias (a student and later colleague of Professor Lal Tennekoon)
(Continued from yesterday)
China and Sri Lanka discovered that their interests were closely aligned in the evolving post-war strategic landscape. China served as a vital diplomatic shield for Sri Lanka, particularly in countering UN resolutions amid international scrutiny over its actions. For China, Sri Lanka was a crucial link in the Belt and Road Initiative, serving as a strategic hub for infrastructure investment in the Indian Ocean region.
Since 2009, Sino-Sri Lanka relations have expanded rapidly across multiple sectors. China has emerged as Sri Lanka’s leading source of foreign direct investment (FDI), funding large-scale infrastructure projects such as the Hambantota Port, Mattala Airport, the Southern Expressway, the Norochcholai coal power plant, and a $500 million expansion of Colombo’s South Harbour. In May 2013, the two countries signed a Strategic Cooperative Partnership (SCP), encompassing trade, investment, financial assistance, and strategic cooperation. The geopolitical implications of these developments are evident in projects like the Trincomalee-based Sri Lankan Air Force maintenance workshop awarded to a Chinese firm.
These initiatives triggered reactions from regional powers, particularly India and Japan, which view them as components of China’s expanding “Maritime Silk Road” and “String of Pearls” strategy in the Indian Ocean. India and the United States have formally conveyed concerns to Sri Lankan authorities about the strategic implications of China’s involvement in the Hambantota Harbour and Colombo Port City projects. Sri Lanka’s foreign policy has shown little strategic foresight and diplomatic acumen in managing this delicate situation.
Foreign policy Dilemmas of Yahapalanaya: Breakthroughs and Vacillations
The domestic context of foreign policy shifted once again when the National Unity Government (NUG), commonly known as Yahapalana government, came to power following the Presidential election on January 8, 2015. The blatant democracy backsliding since 2009, coupled with misuse of power, widespread corruption and state extravagance, gust a political wind—originating within civil society—that ultimately unseated the seemingly invincible Mahinda Rajapaksa regime. A new discourse on democracy and good governance emerged, shaping the narrative in guiding political development. Soon after coming to power, the Yahapalana government introduced the 19th Amendment to the Constitution on April 28, 2015, as an initial step toward broad democratic reforms. The amendment imposed checks on the President’s executive powers and included certain provisions to promote good governance. The country’s political atmosphere changed markedly after the unseating of the Mahinda Rajapaksa regime.
As far as foreign policy is concerned, the Yahapalana government signaled its willingness to engage more constructively with the international community, particularly the United Nations, departing from the confrontational approach of its predecessor. This shift was evident in several key developments. In March 2015, the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) visited Sri Lanka, followed by the UN Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances (WGEID) in November—the latter marking its first visit in 16 years. The government’s changed approach was most notably demonstrated at the 30th Session of the UN Human Rights Council, where Sri Lanka collaborated with other Council members to co-sponsor the resolution Promoting Reconciliation, Accountability, and Human Rights in Sri Lanka, which was adopted by consensus.
The initial steps taken by the Yahapalana
government in democracy building and good governance helped restore democratic credibility of Sri Lanka before the international community. The focus on good governance, accountability, and anti-corruption resonated with Western countries that champion these principles in the international arena. In addition to the 19th Amendment to the Constitution, there were other initiatives in that direction. The right to information was incorporated into the Fundamental Rights Chapter of the Constitution, making it a judicially enforceable right. A key milestone in this regard was the enactment of the Right to Information Act, which, after a prolonged gestation period, was finally implemented in February 2017. Meanwhile, the process of drafting a new constitution began with the transformation of Parliament into a Constituent Assembly. A Steering Committee was established, which submitted its interim report on September 26, 2017.
The international pressure that was mounting on Sri Lanka before 2015 was eased significantly due to the Yahapalana government’s approach to national reconciliation. This approach was built on four key main pillars: truth-seeking, the right to justice, reparation, and non-recurrence. As an initial step, the government appointed the Consultation Task Force on Reconciliation Mechanisms (CTFRM) on January 26, 2016.
Amid changing domestic dynamics, Sri Lanka’s foreign policy priorities were redefined, particularly in relation to its three geopolitical spheres. The Indian Ocean once again became a priority in foreign policy, reflected in the establishment of the Indian Ocean Secretariat under the Prime Minister’s purview. Recognising shifts in the regional and global balance of power—across South Asia, the Indian Ocean, and beyond—the Yahapalana government sought to restore balance in its foreign policy. India, an emerging blue-water naval power, is Sri Lanka’s closest neighbour. China, a rising superpower with an expanding naval presence in the Indian Ocean, remains Sri Lanka’s principal source of foreign direct investment. Meanwhile, the United States, the dominant naval power in the region, continues to play a crucial role. Sri Lanka’s economic ties also shaped its foreign policy calculus. While India is its second-largest trading partner, China remains a major investor. At the same time, Western markets continue to be vital for Sri Lanka’s exports, with 27% of total exports going to the United States, 27% to the EU, and 10% to Britain. India is Sri Lanka’s second largest trading partner.
Sri Lanka has preferred to be in the Indian Ocean framework rather than the broader Indo-Pacific construct. Recognising the strategic volatility of the region, the Yahapalanaya government maintained that the dominance of the Indian Ocean by any single power would be detrimental to Sri Lanka’s national interests. At this critical juncture, a small island state like Sri Lanka cannot afford to be a passive observer. Sri Lanka has consistently championed a peaceful and stable maritime environment. Ensuring freedom of navigation and securing sea lanes of communication remain central to this vision.
The Yahapalana Government prioritized economic diplomacy. Recognising the global shift in economic and financial power toward ‘emerging Asia’, the government understood that the Indian Ocean was becoming a focal point of global economic influence. In this context, a key policy challenge was determining how best to leverage Sri Lanka’s strategic location and human capital to integrate into Asia’s economic growth.
Sri Lanka’s deepening economic crisis, particularly its mounting debt repayment challenges, had profound implications for its foreign policy under the Yahapalana government. In an effort to mitigate its balance of payment problem, the government signed a controversial agreement in August 2017 with China Merchants Port Holdings (CM Port), leasing a 70% stake in the Hambantota Port for 99 years in exchange for $1.12 billion. This deal not only underscored Sri Lanka’s growing dependence on Chinese investment to manage its financial distress but also highlighted the complex interplay between economic crisis and strategic foreign policy decisions. While the agreement carried significant political and geopolitical ramifications, Sri Lanka’s options at the time appeared severely limited.
Although the Yahapalana government prioritised economic diplomacy, its track record in this area was not impressive. Efforts to revive the economy through foreign investment yielded underwhelming results. The government worked hard to secure Sri Lanka’s qualification for the U.S. Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) compact grant. Ultimately, in April 2019—toward the end of its tenure—MCC offered Sri Lanka a $480 million outright grant to upgrade urban transport, modernise the land registration system, and build rural roads connecting highways. Similarly, the Yahapalana government entered into an agreement with the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) for a Light Rail Transit (LRT) project under highly concessional terms. However, the project failed to take off before the 2019 presidential election.
The Yahapalana government’s indecision and delays were evident in the development of the East Container Terminal (ECT). After prolonged uncertainty, the Sri Lanka Ports Authority (SLPA) finally signed a tripartite agreement with the governments of Japan and India in May 2019 to develop the terminal. However, before finalising the restructuring of the India-Japan joint venture and the capital infusion plan, the Yahapalana government collapsed. The government’s hesitation in making critical policy decisions, even after initiating processes with major international partners, has eroded Sri Lanka’s credibility on the global stage.
Given the significance of the Tamil Diaspora in the international public sphere, engaging with them remained a key challenge in Sri Lanka’s post-war foreign policy. Successive Sri Lankan governments, both during and after the war, struggled to establish a constructive dialogue with the Tamil Diaspora, largely due to their failure to recognise its diversity. As Foreign Minister of the Yahapalana Government (2015–2017), Mangala Samaraweera made a concerted effort to engage with the Diaspora, particularly the Global Tamil Forum (GTF), aiming to integrate them into Sri Lanka’s national reconciliation process. However, his initiative remained largely personal and lacked broader government support. Following his departure from the Foreign Ministry in mid-2017, the effort lost momentum.
The Yahapalana government struggled to sustain its initial momentum in promoting democracy and good governance, ultimately failing to maintain a consistent policy direction. Indecision and frequent policy reversals came to define its domestic governance. A key example was its approach to transitional justice. While the government initially demonstrated enthusiasm for establishing the Office on Missing Persons (OMP), this commitment soon waned. By the time the Consultation Task Force on Reconciliation Mechanisms (CTFRM) submitted its final report in November 2016, the initial drive had significantly diminished. Notably, neither the President nor the Prime Minister attended the report’s handover, signaling a lack of political will. After prolonged delays, the OMP was finally established in March 2018—almost two years after its initial proposal, highlighting the government’s slow and inconsistent approach to key reforms.
Divisions within the government emerged before its second year in office, preventing a unified stance on key policies, including foreign affairs. On critical issues, the President, Prime Minister, and Foreign Minister often voiced conflicting positions, creating confusion. This persistent inconsistency left the international community uncertain and bewildered.
The rift between the President and the Prime Minister of the Yahapalana Government reached a crisis point on October 26, 2018, when the President dismissed the Prime Minister and appointed Mahinda Rajapaksa in his place. The Supreme Court later ruled the President’s actions unconstitutional and reversed his decisions. However, this exposed the underlying tensions within the Yahapalana Government, turning a hidden cold war into an open conflict that paralysed the country’s public administration. Meanwhile, the Central Bank bond scam inflicted irreparable damage on the government’s anti-corruption credibility. The faltering pace of democratic reforms, economic stagnation, and infighting within the political leadership created a bleak political atmosphere. In this context, the carefully coordinated suicide bombings on April 21, 2019, carried out by a little-known Islamic terrorist group, shifted the national discourse from democracy and good governance to security and strong leadership.
by Gamini Keerawella
(To be continued)
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