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Midweek Review

Sri Lanka: Quest for Justice, Rule of Law and Democratic Rights

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By Shamindra Ferdinando

With an eye on the 46th session of the Geneva-based United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) later this month, the highly influential Global Tamil Forum (GTF), Centre for Human Rights and Global Justice, New York University, Sri Lanka Campaign for Peace and Justice and The Canadian Tamil Congress have brought in ‘big guns’ for a combined onslaught on Sri Lanka this week.

Among the participants, at a two-hour webinar, titled ‘Sri Lanka: Quest for Justice, Rule of Law and Democratic Rights’, scheduled for Friday, Feb. 12 (UK 1:30 pm; Europe/South Africa 3.30 pm; India/Sri Lanka 7:00 pm IST; Canada/US 8:30 am; Australia 12.30 am) are former UN Assistant Secretary General, Charles Petrie, former Special Rapporteur on the promotion of truth, justice, reparation and guarantee of non-recurrence, Pablo de Greiff and former US Ambassador-at-Large for Global Criminal Justice, Stephen J. Rapp.

The panelists includes Tamil National Alliance (TNA) lawmaker M.A. Sumanthiran, PC, former Commissioner of HRCSL Ambika Satkunanathan, Centre for Policy Alternatives (CPA) representative Attorney-at-Law Bhavani Fonseka, civil society activist. Shreen Saroor, and Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC) representative, Attorney-at-Law, Ameer Faaiz. Melissa Dring, of the Sri Lanka Campaign for Peace and Justice, is the moderator.

Their project has received a tremendous boost with the US returning to the Geneva body. The US quit UNHRC in June 2018.

The TNA, in late 2001, recognized the LTTE as the sole representative of the Tamil community. The LTTE held that privileged status in the eyes of the TNA, until Sri Lanka brought the war to a successful conclusion, in May 2009. The TNA is a direct beneficiary of the LTTE’s demise. Of course, Sumanthiran cannot be entirely held responsible for TNA’s actions as he joined the one-time LTTE mouthpiece, as a National List MP, in April 2010.

 

Why back Fonseka?

Sumanthiran entered Parliament a couple of months after the TNA wholeheartedly backed war-winning Army Commander Gen. Sarath Fonseka’s presidential candidature. Perhaps, Sumanthiran should explain on Feb 12, as to why the TNA, having accused the Army, Fonseka led with such efficiency, till the crushing of the formidable Tigers militarily, of genocide and then backed him to the hilt at the presidential poll that came soon afterwards. The TNA cannot conveniently ignore the fact that all Northern and Eastern electoral districts overwhelmingly voted for Fonseka though he lost the overall contest by a staggering 1.8 mn votes. Why did Tamils vote for Fonseka after accusing him, and his men, of genocide after they crushed the LTTE, which many pundits repeatedly claimed the Lankan security forces were incapable of achieving?

Participation of Petrie, Pablo de Greiff and Rapp, in Friday’s webinar, is of extreme importance. Petrie headed an ‘Internal Review Panel on UN actions in Sri Lanka’ that dealt with the final phase of the conflict, in his capacity as Special Rapporteur; De Greiff visited Sri Lanka on four occasions, between 2015 and 2019, and Rapp visited Colombo twice, in 2012 and 2014.

The Petrie report conveniently forgot how India formed half a dozen armed groups in the ‘80s to terrorize Sri Lanka, just to teach the then JRJ a lesson for being overtly pro-West and perhaps for derogatively comparing Mrs. Bandaranaike and her son, Anura with Mrs Gandhi and her son Sanjay. The Indian intervention was meant to pave the way for the deployment of her Army in the Northern and Eastern regions. The Indian project went awry. India ended up losing nearly 1,500 officers, and men, here, in less than three years. In addition, double that number received injuries. The military mission was aborted in March 1990. A year later, the LTTE assassinated Rajiv Gandhi, who, in his capacity as the Indian Prime Minister authorized the deployment of the Indian Army here. Can India ever absolve herself of the crime of causing massive chaos and destruction to this country as a result of her diabolical project here? The Petrie report also ignored how the LTTE scuttled the last bid to negotiate a settlement by quitting peace talks in April 2003. The LTTE’s abrupt move jeopardized the survival of UNP leader Ranil Wickremesinghe’s government and paved the way for its ouster in the following year.

Those who really value justice, rule of law, as well as democratic rights, should examine the Indian intervention here, too. Petrie and de Greiff should use the opportunity to explain the UN’s failure in the ‘80s to thwart the murderous Indian project. The UN played along in a devious plot to destabilise Sri Lanka, over the years. The UN’s response to the LTTE, during the Vanni offensive is no exception. The issue is whether the use of ‘human shields’, by the LTTE, could have been averted if the UN took tangible measures against the LTTE, especially in the wake of its detention of Tamil UN employees, accused of helping civilians to flee the Vanni west.

 

Did Petrie probe abductions of

UN workers?

 Did Petrie inquire into the abductions after the revelation of secret UN powwow with the LTTE, led to the UN confirmation of the incident at daily UN media briefings, in New York, by the Secretary General’s Spokesperson Montas (The Island expose of UN employees abducted by LTTE: UN HQ admits Colombo Office kept it in the dark – The Island, April 28, 2007) Beginning April 20, 2007 (LTTE detains UN workers). The Island published several news items on the issue. The TNA, or those who issued media statements at the drop of a hat, remained conveniently silent. The TNA’s decision to remain quiet is understandable due to its close working relationship with the LTTE. Many an eyebrow was raised when the European Union election monitors openly accused the Tigers of helping the TNA to win 22 seats in the North and East, in 2004, by stuffing ballot boxes on its behalf. In the following year, the TNA, on behalf of the LTTE, ordered Northern Tamils to boycott the November presidential election. CPA’s Executive Director, Dr. Paikiasothy Saravanamuttu, is the only civil society leader to criticize the LTTE-TNA move.

The LTTE and the TNA set the stage for an all-out war. The LTTE commenced claymore attacks, in early Dec 2005. In January 2006, the LTTE blasted a Navy Fast Attack Craft (FAC) off Trincomalee; in late, April 2006 they made an abortive bid to assassinate Fonseka, and in early Oct 2006 an attempt was made on Defence Secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s life. The LTTE lost the Eastern Province, eight months later.

The TNA, as well as some sections of the international community remained strongly confident of the LTTE’s military superiority, until it was evicted from Kilinochchi. The LTTE lost Kilinochchi in early January, less than two weeks after Canada-based veteran political and defence analyst D.B.S. Jeyaraj asserted that the LTTE was on the verge of reversing territorial gains made by the Army. The rest is history.

None of those who are harping today about the loss of civilian life bothered to publicly appeal to the LTTE to let go of its human shields. The TNA certainly owed an explanation why it remained silent over the LTTE taking cover behind the civilian population. Against the backdrop of the UN mollycoddling the LTTE, Prabhakaran forced Tamil civilians to follow the retreating LTTE fighting cadre from the western part of the Vanni region across the Kandy-Jaffna A9 road towards the Mullaitivu coast.

 

Oslo’s missive to Basil

 The then Norwegian Ambassador, Tore Hattrem, acknowledged the rapidly developing crisis in the eastern part of the Vanni region, in a letter to Presidential Advisor, Basil Rajapaksa, as the Army stepped-up operations. Hattrem’s missive to Rajapaksa revealed their serious concerns over Prabhakaran’s refusal to give up human shields. The Island, some time ago, published the hitherto unknown Norwegian note, headlined ‘Offer/Proposal to the LTTE’, and personally signed by Ambassador Hattrem. The Norwegian envoy was writing to Basil Rajapaksa on behalf of those countries trying to negotiate a ceasefire between the government and the LTTE, to facilitate the release of civilians, held hostage by the latter.

The following is the text of Ambassador Hattrem’s letter, dated Feb. 16, 2009, addressed to Basil Rajapaksa: “I refer to our telephone conversation today. The proposal to the LTTE on how to release the civilian population, now trapped in the LTTE controlled area, has been transmitted to the LTTE through several channels. So far, there has been, regrettably, no response from the LTTE and it doesn’t seem to be likely that the LTTE will agree with this in the near future.

How many civilians perished during the Vanni offensive? The UN Secretary General’s Panel of Experts (PoE) report, released on March 31, 2011, having faulted the Army, on three major counts, alleged the massacre of at least 40,000 civilians. Let me reproduce the relevant paragraph, bearing no 137, verbatim: “In the limited surveys that have been carried out in the aftermath of the conflict, the percentage of people reporting dead relatives is high. A number of credible sources have estimated that there could have been as many as 40,000 civilian deaths. Two years after the end of the war, there is no reliable figure for civilian deaths, but multiple sources of information indicate that a range of up to 40,000 civilian deaths cannot be ruled out at this stage. Only a proper investigation can lead to the identification of all of the victims and to the formulation of an accurate figure for the total number of civilian deaths.”

The PoE arrived at the figure on the basis of information provided by persons whose identities would remain confidential till 2031 (20 years since the release of POE report in March 2011). The UN has strangely guaranteed confidentiality of ‘sources’ even after the lapse of the mandatory 20-year period. Perhaps, Petrie and Pablo de Greiff should explain how the UN pushed ahead with subsequent actions against Sri Lanka, based purely on still unverified accusations made by ghost accusers. In other words, Sri Lanka was convicted by the PoE report after a kangaroo court trial. How convenient?

Having failed to obtain the anticipated response to its public call for submissions, the PoE had no option but to extend the deadline to Dec 31, 2010. The PoE posted a notice in English on the UN website on Oct 27, 2010 calling for submissions on or before Dec 15, 2010. Sinhala and Tamil versions of the notice too, were subsequently posted. The PoE received 4,000 submissions from 2,300 persons. None of them were verified at any stage of the Geneva process, leading to yet bizarre Sri Lanka co-sponsoring of the Geneva Resolution on Oct 1, 2015 against itself.

When the writer raised the issue with the UN, as well as the then UNDP Resident Representative in Colombo, Subinay Nandy, whether the UN would do away with the confidentiality clause to facilitate the UNHRC probe, the Colombo mission issued the following statement after having consulted UN headquarters. The UN said: “The High Commissioner for Human Rights will now be making arrangements for a comprehensive investigation requested by the UNHRC and the issue of the confidentiality clause will need to be considered at a later stage,” (UN to revive 20-year confidentiality clause ‘at a later stage’- The Island April 7, 2014). The UN never did. Sri Lanka never exploited the matter.

The US, the British, as well as the EU, too, in spite of their push for an international war crimes probe, recently ruled out the possibility of them calling for a review of the confidentiality clause (EU, too, won’t call for review of 20-year UN confidentiality clause The Island April 9, 2014).

Successive governments, and even those interested in defending the country, never really bothered to examine undisputed facts that were in Sri Lanka’s favour. The incumbent administration is no exception to this type of inexcusable lapses at great cost to the country.

 

PoE contradicts own claims

 Interestingly, the PoE report contradicted its own claim of 40,000 killings. Unlike the unsubstantiated claim of 40,000 deaths, the paragraph bearing No 134 dealt with the issue on the basis of reliable sources acceptable to the UN.

It would be pertinent to reproduce the relevant section verbatim: “The United Nations Country Team is one source of information; in a document that was never released publicly, it estimated a total figure of 7,721 killed and 18,479 injured from August 2008 up to 13 May 2009, after which it became too difficult to count. In early February 2009, the United Nations started a process of compiling casualty figures, although efforts were hindered by lack of access. An internal ‘Crisis Operating Group’ was formed to collect reliable information regarding civilian casualties and other humanitarian concerns. In order to calculate a total casualty figure, the group took figures from RDHS as the baseline, using reports from national staff of the United Nations and NGOs, inside the Vanni, the ICRC, religious authorities and other sources to cross-check and verify the baseline. The methodology was quite conservative: if an incident could not be verified by these sources or could have been double counted, it was dismissed. Figures emanating from sources that could be perceived as biased, such as Tamil Net, were dismissed, as were Government sources outside the Vanni.”

Amnesty International (AI) in Sept. 2011, launched its own report, titled: ‘When will they get justice? Failures of Sri Lanka’s Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission.’ The report estimated the number of civilian deaths, due to military action, as over 10,000. AI based its assertion on eyewitness testimony and information from aid workers.

AI, too, guaranteed confidentiality of its ‘sources.’ Perhaps for want of close cooperation among those who had wanted to drag Sri Lanka before an international tribunal, they contradicted themselves in respect of the primary charge. Interestingly, none of those, except British Labour Party MP Siobhan McDonagh (Mitcham and Morden-Labour) propagating lies, regarding civilian deaths, dared to blatantly lie in Parliament about losses suffered by the LTTE. McDonagh estimated the number of LTTE cadres killed, in fighting, from January 1, 2009, to May 19, 2009, at 60,000. Successive governments didn’t even bother to raise the Labour MP’s lie with the UK though The Island pointed out the need to clarify matters. The absurd claim was made during the third week of Sept 2011, in Parliament. Sri Lanka never realized the need to inquire into the possibility of British parliamentarians’ relationship with the Tamil Diaspora. In fact, some politicians had benefited from their relationship. The GTF hired former MP for Enfield, North Joan Ryan, as its policy advisor. Of course, the GTF had the backing of all major political parties, with key politicians participating in its inauguration in the UK Parliament, in Feb 2010, in the wake of the LTTE’s demise.

Let us hope Friday’s webinar responds to Lord Naseby disclosure pertaining to loss of lives, based on confidential cables from British High Commission in Colombo (January-May 2009) and US Defence Advisor Lt. Col. Lawrence Smith’s declaration in June 2011 (two months after the release of the PoE report). Both contradicted the position taken by British and the US. Sri Lanka never made a genuine effort to build-up a proper defence in Geneva. Sri Lanka shirked high profile opportunities to exploit startling revelations made by Wikileaks. The British are yet to release all confidential cables that dealt with the Vanni offensive, though Lord Naseby managed to secure some, following legal intervention made by him. That took over two years as the UK tried to withhold information which could have helped the UNHRC to ascertain the truth and Sri Lanka being absolved of these totally exaggerated accusations by interested parties against her.

 

A cable from Geneva

 A cable, dated July 15, 2009, signed by the then Geneva-based US Ambassador Clint Williamson cleared the Army of crimes against humanity during the Vanni offensive. The cable, addressed to the US State Department, had been based on a confidential conversation between Ambassador Williamson and the then ICRC head of operations for South Asia, Jacque de Maio, on July 9, 2009. Ambassador Williamson wrote: “The Army was determined not to let the LTTE escape from its shrinking territory, even though this meant the civilians being kept hostage by the LTTE were at an increasing risk. So, de Maio said, while one could safely say that there were ‘serious, widespread violations of international humanitarian law,’ by the Sri Lankan forces, it didn’t amount to genocide. He could cite examples of where the Army had stopped shelling when the ICRC informed them it was killing civilians. In fact, the Army actually could have won the military battle faster, with higher civilian casualties, yet they chose a slower approach which led to a greater number of Sri Lankan military deaths. He concluded, however, by asserting that the GoSL recognized its obligation to protect civilians, despite the approach leading to higher military casualties.”

The Army lost 2,400 personnel during the January-May 2009 period. The losses were the worst suffered by the Army during the Eelam War IV (Aug 2006-May 2009). Frontline fighting formations lost a further 70 personnel, who were categorized as missing in action, in 2009. Deaths due to reasons other than combat during the same period were placed at 334. Thousands were injured. The losses suffered on the Vanni east front, during the first five months of 2009, was over 100 per cent, when compared with battlefield losses in the previous year. For the whole of 2008, the Army lost 2,174 killed and 43 missing in action.

Army Chief General Shavendra Silva told the writer that the Sri Lankan military had the wherewithal to decimate the LTTE in a far shorter period, if not for the human shields. “We paid a heavy price for being mindful of the civilian presence among the LTTE cadres. Restricted use of long range weapons, as well as air support on the Vanni east front, caused quite a bit of problems.”

The US slapped a travel ban on General Silva, in Feb 2020, over his role as the GoC of the celebrated 58 Division (which started as Task Force 1). The US move is an affront to the war-winning armed forces, who achieved their arduous task against all odds and the political leadership that backed them to the hilt, irrespective of threats to try them, too, for war crimes. Unfortunately, even the utterly unsubstantiated action against Gen. Shavendra Silva hadn’t jolted the government, as well as those genuinely interested in defending the country, to re-examine the accountability issue.

Sri Lanka’s pathetic and continuing failure has allowed Western powers to use the LTTE rump and Tamil Diaspora in a high profile project to overwhelm the country.

 



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Midweek Review

Sri Lanka conflict: ICRC footprint

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Sri Lanka, 1991: Bodies of government soldiers transported from Jaffna by the ICRC await the last stage of their journey before being handed over to the Sri Lanka Navy (ICRC wording)

For some strange reason Sri Lanka never asked the international community to examine a report released by the UN Country Team that dealt with the situation in the Vanni from Aug 2008 to May 13, 2009. That report, prepared with the help of the ICRC and the national staff of the UN and NGOs, placed the number of dead during this period at 7,221 and wounded 18,479 (both civilians and LTTE). The UN findings contradicted the Report of the UN Secretary General’s Panel of Experts (PoE), which was more like a handpicked kangaroo court out to hang Sri Lanka on Accountability (section 134). As to how it plucked the figure of an estimated number of dead at 40,000 civilians (section 137) out of nowhere, when Amnesty International placed the number of dead at 10,000, is anybody’s guess.

By Shamindra Ferdinando

Humanity in War: Frontline photography since 1860’, an ICRC publication that dealt with wars and conflicts, included two photographs of Sri Lanka’s war against separatist terrorists.

The Island recently received a 247-page book from Ruwanthi Jayasundare, Head of Communication at the International Committee of the Red Cross – ICRC, Colombo. One of the pictures taken in 2007, in the eastern Batticaloa district, depicted the scene in a camp for the displaced.

Dominic Sansoni captured that scene at a time the military had been making steady progress in the Eastern theatre of operations where major battles erupted in August 2006. Incidentally, Dominic is the son of the late Edward Claude Sansoni (18 November 1904 – 1979), the 32nd Chief Justice of Sri Lanka, then Ceylon. Justice Sansoni, during his retirement, also presided over a Presidential Commission of Inquiry that looked into the incidents which took place between 13th August and 15th September 1977, soon after the UNP was swept into power with a record 5/6th majority in Parliament, and findings of that Commission, released in 1980, might be a dispassionate eye-opener to the roots of the ethnic conflict.

The other picture (published in this page) that had been taken by Alfred Grimm, for the ICRC, in 1991, at an undisclosed location, illustrated the severe difficulties experienced by the military on the northern front.

Having lost the overland Main Supply Route (MSR) to the Jaffna peninsula to the LTTE, the year before, within months after the Indian Army completed its withdrawal in March 1990 (July 1987 to March 1990), the Army had to depend on the ICRC to arrange transfer of bodies of officers and men killed in action from LTTE-held areas to government controlled regions in the North and East.

That pathetic picture of coffins placed on a dilapidated jetty before being loaded to a vessel carrying the ICRC flag aptly reflects the much repeated adage that a picture paints a thousand words. A senior retired Navy officer asserted that the picture could have been taken at the Point Pedro jetty that had been under LTTE control at that time. Obviously, the ICRC preferred to use PPD to please the LTTE as the neighbouring Kankesanthurai harbor had been under Navy control throughout the war.

In some instances, the LTTE refused to arrange the transfer of bodies overland. Instead, the group insisted on the ICRC’s involvement as part of its overall strategy meant to humiliate the military, struggling to cope with the onslaughts.

Alfred Grimm’s still image explained the developing precarious situation in the northern theatre of operations, at that time, in the wake of the Army losing all detachments north of Vavuniya, right up to Elephant Pass, on the Kandy-Jaffna A 9 road. It would be pertinent to mention that the Army had to launch the largest single amphibious operation ‘Balawegaya,’ in 1991, to thwart an LTTE attempt to overrun the Elephant Pass base after laying siege to it. There hadn’t been such a large operation until the combined armed forces brought the war to a successful conclusion on the banks of the Nanthikadal lagoon in 2009.

In the Jaffna peninsula, the entire military deployment was restricted to the Palaly-Kankesanthurai sector and the Jaffna Fort at a time the international community believed the LTTE could ultimately overwhelm the government forces. Having been in touch with the ICRC since its initial deployment here during the late President Ranasinghe Premadasa’s tenure (1989-1993), the writer felt the Geneva-headquartered organisation, too, believed the LTTE couldn’t be defeated militarily by our security forces.

The Interim Secretariat for Truth and Reconciliation Mechanism (ISTRAM), busy in building required legal and policy framework, operational procedures and guidelines for the proposed Commission for Truth, Unity and Reconciliation (CTUR), should examine the gradual development of the conflict in proper context to ensure a precise narrative.

Fifteen years after the end of the conflict, ISTRAM faces a daunting task, especially against the backdrop of various interested parties seeking to influence the overall process. The crux of the problem is, in the absence of a proper government strategy, all stakeholders seemed to be bent on holding the military and police responsible for alleged atrocities perpetrated during the conflict, while numerous wily deadly acts, committed by terrorists, are hardly ever mentioned, even though even the US Federal Bureau of Investigation called the LTTE the most ruthless terrorist organisation.

Canada, playing politics with voters of Sri Lankan Tamil origin, has, without any inquiry whatsoever, blindly declared that the country committed genocide during the conflict All major political parties there have bent backwards to appease the Tamil electorate and they are going to increase pressure on Sri Lanka as the next Canadian federal election approaches. The election is scheduled for Oct 20, 2025, or before, and already the Tamil electorate is exploiting the situation to tarnish Sri Lanka even more with their wild allegations that are lapped up by Canadian politicians with an eye on Tamil votes.

The recent attack on Canadian Tamil Congress (CTC) office, in Canada, by obvious terrorist sympathisers, for them having been part of a Tamil Diaspora team that met former President Mahinda Rajapaksa, and continuing controversy over a statement attributed to incumbent Canadian High Commissioner here, Eric Walsh, by the President of the Canada branch of the Tamil National Alliance (TNA), over the Himalayan Declaration, propagated by the Global Tamil Forum (GTF), underscored how important the Tamil Canadian vote is for unscrupulous politicians.

The recent declaration by Canada’s Conservative Party leader, Pierre Poilievre, that he would take Sri Lanka to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and appoint lawyers to pursue charges against “accused” war criminals in the International Criminal Court (ICC), should be examined against above apt background.

Obviously, most of these people are only out for revenge from those who defeated LTTE terrorism, in the battlefield, and not reconciliation by any stretch of the imagination, as happened in South Africa, where despite white rulers having treated blacks worse than animals under apartheid rule, the black and other oppressed people there were willing to forgive and forget things done to them far worse than anything that happened in Sri Lanka.

Premadasa invites ICRC

Let us examine the deployment of ICRC here in late 1989. By then, the JVP terror campaign had run out of steam. A few months after the arrival of ICRC here, the Army captured and executed JVP leader Rohana Wijeweera. At that time, the Indian Army, too, was deployed in the North East and controversy was brewing over President Premadasa’s declaration that India should immediately call off its Sri Lanka mission.

President Premadasa invited the ICRC to meet humanitarian needs caused by the second JVP terrorist campaign and equally murderous government response to it at a time President Premadasa was having a honeymoon (May 1989-June 1990) with Velupillai Prabhakaran.

Just months after the ICRC’s arrival, the government eradicated the JVP, but fighting erupted in the north in June, 1990, paving the way for the group to expand its operations to cover the entire country. The ICRC deployment covered the area under government control as well as the LTTE-held area. The ICRC played a significant role with President Premadasa’s government in disarray in the wake of the LTTE’s resumed violent campaign to divide Sri Lanka was making rapid progress.

By then the Indian Army had left our shores following a spat between President Premadasa and then Indian Premier Rajiv Gandhi.

A case in point is the ICRC’s high profile intervention to declare a demilitarised zone in the area covering the Jaffna Fort and the Jaffna hospital in the last week of July 1990, several weeks after the LTTE launched Eelam War II. The LTTE made repeated attempts to overrun the isolated Jaffna Fort, at that time held by the Sixth battalion of the Sinha Regiment. The ICRC pushed for a tripartite agreement involving the government, the LTTE and the ICRC on the basis that such an understanding could prevent the battle for the Dutch-built Jaffna Fort from jeopardizing the lives of those seeking treatment at the premier medical institution in the peninsula, as well as its staff.

However, the audacious LTTE disregarded the ICRC. Prabhakaran sensed an impending significant battlefield victory. The LTTE fought hard to force the beleaguered troops to surrender. Finally, President Premadasa authorised the military to break the siege on the Jaffna Fort. The ICRC hadn’t been happy with that move but what no one really anticipated was Premadasa’s government quirky decision to vacate the Jaffna Fort two weeks after having ended the siege at great cost. Nearly 50 officers and men made the supreme sacrifice and over 100 were wounded in that operation to break the siege. Did they die in vain? What made Premadasa to vacate the Jaffna Fort in late Sept 1990? The Army moved to Jaffna Fort in 1985 as Indian trained terrorists intensified attacks in the Jaffna peninsula. Don’t forget half a dozen terrorist groups, including the LTTE operated at that time.

By the time of Eelam war 11 entered its fourth year in 1993, the ICRC had quite a substantial presence in the North-East.

ICRC negotiating for policemen’s release

The LTTE massacred several hundred policemen after they were ordered to surrender to the Tigers by President Premadasa’s government. However, some of them, approximately 50, including several Tamil law enforcement personnel, were held in detention camps in the north. Some of them were lucky to communicate with their families, through the ICRC.

Dominique Dufour, who succeeded ICRC head in Colombo, Wettach Pierre ,in late 1992, on a number of occasions provided useful information regarding policemen in captivity. Dufour was willing to be quoted and once explained to the writer, at his Colombo office, the ICRC’s efforts to help the detained men communicate with their loved ones against the backdrop of disagreement between the LTTE and the government regarding the families visiting the captives. During Wettach Pierre’s tenure, the ICRC made a determined bid to take families of captives to the north in a ship. According to Dufour, there had been 39 policemen and one soldier (Languishing in Tiger captivity: The forgotten 39, The Sunday Island, Oct 11, 1992).

The ICRC’s role here should be examined, taking into consideration Sri Lanka’s readiness to secure assistance provided by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and Medecins Sans Frontieres, in addition to several other relief organisations. The UNHCR launched its mission here in 1987, two years before the arrival of the ICRC on the invitation of President Premadasa. The MSF first positioned personnel here in 1986, the year before the signing of the Indo-Lanka accord that paved the way for the deployment of the Indian Army. The MSF called off its Sri Lanka mission in March 2004 in the wake of the signing of the secretly arranged Ceasefire Agreement between Sri Lanka and the LTTE by the Norwegians. It was signed by then Premier Ranil Wickremesinghe without the approval of President Chandrika Kumaratunga, even though she was the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces. But, the MSF returned nine months later, after the tsunami disaster struck Sri Lanka, and remained till the end of 2005.

The MSF re-deployed in the war zone in 2007 and remained here till 2012. On the part of Sri Lanka, there had never been an effort to block foreign assistance reaching the Tamil community in the North-East. In fact, successive governments went out of their way to ensure the supplies reached civilians though they knew the LTTE siphoned a significant portion of the relief sent.

ISTRAM must be aware of ground realities in those days – one such instance had been the UNHCR’s efforts to arrange food convoys across the Jaffna lagoon, using the Sangupiddy ferry.

The then UNHCR’s senior protection officer in Colombo, Dr. Peter Nicolaus, explained to this writer their negotiations with the LTTE to open a supply route, via the Jaffna lagoon, at that time the scene of frequent clashes between Sea Tigers and Navy patrols launched from the Nagathivanthurai naval detachment. The Sunday Island received a briefing after Dr. Nicolaus and UNHCR’s regional legal advisor Bo Schack on Dec 09, 1992, discussed the issue with Anton Balasingham, the LTTE’s theoretician and Yogiratnam Yogi in Jaffna (Major role for international relief organizations in NE war, The Sunday Island, January 3, 1993).

None of those shedding crocodile tears for the Tamil community today dared at least to appeal to the LTTE not to block food convoys. Instead, they cooperated with the LTTE efforts to compel the military to give up control over civilian entry/exit points, namely the Elephant Pass causeway, the Sandupiddy-Pooneryn ferry, Kilali route and Kombadi and Orriyan points.

The LTTE later informed the senior Jaffna-based UNHCR officer that food convoys couldn’t be allowed through Sangupiddy unless the government vacated the area to facilitate the international relief effort.

The government, if it is so keen to establish the truth should undertake a thorough examination of developments throughout the conflict.

The high-handed LTTE refused to drop its prerequisite (vacation of Pooneryn-Sangupiddy area by government troops) even after Western powers intervened. In Feb 1992 Dr. Nicolaus told the writer that UNHCR gave up their efforts, disclosing the UN organisation went to the extent of offering to send a delegation from Geneva or New York to Jaffna to discuss the issue at hand (Opening ‘safe passage’ to Jaffna peninsula: Despite appeals Tigers refuse to negotiate with UNHCR, The Island, February 18, 1993).

Later, the LTTE indicated its willingness to drop any perquisites for the opening of a safe passage and participate in negotiations. Dr. Nicolaus confirmed this development. However, at the end the ferry remained non-operational while the Navy and Sea Tigers battled it out in the Jaffna lagoon.

In early Nov 1993, the LTTE smashed through Pooneryn and Nagathivanthurai defences, thereby ended the siege on the Jaffna peninsula (Re-opening of Pooneryn ferry: Tigers drop Army pull-out call, The Island March 21, 1993). The Navy abandoned Nagathevanthurai.

ICRC’s role during Eelam War IV

Sri Lanka never made an honest attempt to build a proper defence against war crimes accusations. In the absence of a cohesive bi-partisan strategy on our part, those campaigning against the war-winning country built a strong case on the basis of repeating the widespread lies that Sri Lanka waged a war without eyewitnesses. Successive governments never bothered to at least examine how the wartime presence of major international NGOs and the UN could have easily countered those allegations as they bore witness as to how the war was conducted.

ISTRAM should examine all relevant factors, especially records of international NGOs and Indian medical teams deployed in the East during the last phase of the offensive against the LTTE on the Vanni east front. It would be silly to entirely depend on claims and allegations made by those who are still smarting from the battlefield defeat of the world’s most ruthless terrorist outfit with conventional fighting capabilities at the hands of the security forces despite overt and covert help extended to them by the West and Western-funded NGOs operating from Colombo. They literally built up the LTTE image to the level of invincibility.

Special attention should be paid to the World Food Programme (WFP) records and that of the ICRC as they proved the existence of a sea supply route to Puthamathalan, the last LTTE-held area in the Mullaithivu district. As soon as the land supply route to Mullaithivu had been closed due to intense fighting, the government, the ICRC and WFP launched an operation on February 10, 2009, to move supplies by sea and then use the same vessel to evacuate the wounded to Pulmoddai where they were handed over to the Indian medical team.

The final ICRC vessel reached Puthumathalan on May 09, 2009, just 10 days before Prabhakaran was killed on the banks of the Nanthikadal lagoon. Actually, the war ended on the previous day when the Army brought the entire Mullaithivu district under its control. Prabhakaran, his wife Mathivathani, daughter Duvaraga and younger son Balachandran had been hiding within the Army controlled area as the Army declared the war over. Prabhakaran’s eldest son Charles Anthony was killed in a separate confrontation just before the Army declared the end of war.

It would be the responsibility of ISTRAM to establish the total amount of food, medicine and other supplies moved to the LTTE-held area overland and by sea during January 1, 2009, to May 09, 2009. That would help establish how Sri Lanka allowed the international community to facilitate supplies, though there could have been shortcomings.

The ICRC (international staff) also had access to Puthumathalan until May 09, 2009 whereas the UN (international staff) maintained presence in the war zone till January 29, 2009, and those wounded civilians evacuated from Puthamathalan under ICRC supervision were handed over to Pulmoddai-based Indian medical team.

Unfortunately, Sri Lanka never argued its case properly before the international community. Let us hope ISTRAM succeeds in reaching consensus on the Sri Lanka narrative.

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Midweek Review

Message from a Cell Death

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By Lynn Ockersz

‘Death couldn’t be proud’…

Nor could wily despots,

Maliciously gloat,

Over the cruel snuffing out,

Of a resplendent flame,

In a cold, Arctic cell,

Ironically in the land,

Of Tolstoy and Dostoyevsky,

But this light heralds anew,

Evergreen political values,

Of Liberty, Equality and Fraternity,

Not omitting Human Dignity,

But his inspirational life,

Will speak to us down the ages,

Constantly reminding humans,

That the Sword of the tyrant,

Could never prevail,

Against an unyielding conscience…

That Socrates, the exemplary sage,

Will always upstage Machiavelli.

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Midweek Review

Groundwork for Truth, Unity and Reconciliation Commission underway

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Director General of ISTRM Dr. Asana Gunawansa, PC, addresses a stakeholder forum while Head of the Secretariat’s Policy Division Dr. Yuvi Thangarajah (on his right), Prof. G. L. Peiris, MP, and Emeritus Professor of Law Savitri Goonesekere look on (pic courtesy PMD)

Dr. Elias Joseph Jeyarajah, represented the Global Tamil Forum (GTF) at the recent launch of district level workshops for ‘National Conversation’ based on the Himalaya Declaration. The first inter-religious coordination committee promoting conversations on the merits of the Himalaya Declaration was held in Kurunegala on February 09.

In spite of opposition from various quarters, particularly an influential section of Tamil Diaspora, the organizers went ahead with the project. The participation of US-based Dr. Jeyarajah, one of the eight-member group that met President Ranil Wickremesinghe in Colombo in early December last year underscored the importance of the occasion.

Dr. Elias Joseph Jeyarajah

A spokesperson said: “It was the first of the five planned workshops meant to train 150 interfaith clergy and civil society members as coordinators. They will be the key resource persons who will facilitate the planned 25 districts’ conversations, in the coming months. These workshops will all be two-day workshops, spread around the country. Next one will be in Kandy, then in Batticaloa, Matara and Vavuniya.”

About 30 persons received training at the Kurunegala workshop. Participants at Kurunegala workshop included those from neighbouring Puttalam and Anuradhapura districts. The participants comprised clergy from Buddhist, Hindu, Muslim, Catholic and Christian religions and civil society members.

Sangha for Better Sri Lanka (SBSL) that participated in the GTF-led initiative in December last year subsequent to Nepal talks was represented at the Kurunagala workshop by Ven. Madampagama Assaji Tissa Thera, Ven. Prof. Pallekande Rathnasara Thera, Ven. Kithalagama Hemasara Nayake Thera and Ven. Siyambalagaswewa Wimalasara Thera.

In addition to the above mentioned persons, Visaka Dharmadasa and staff from Association for War Affected Women (AWAW) participated, backed by professional facilitators Indika Perera, Dr. Dayani Panagoda, and Nagaratnam Vijayskanthan who also provided translations.

Dr Elias said “It was wonderful to witness the continuation of the Nagarkot (Nepal) dialogue. Heard very favourable comments about Himalaya Declaration from most participants.” It would be pertinent to mention that Dr. Elias, during the war and after, campaigned extensively against Sri Lanka.

Each district will be represented by five inter-religious persons and a civil society member – in total six per district. Therefore, from the 25 districts there will be 150 coordinators. Once all five workshops are completed, the national conversation would begin, the spokesperson said.

By Shamindra Ferdinando

The Interim Secretariat for Truth and Reconciliation Mechanism (ISTRM) faces a daunting challenge in securing support for the Bill for establishing a Commission for Truth, Unity and Reconciliation (CTUR).

A meeting called by ISTRM, at the second floor of the Chartered Bank Building ,on February 09, 2024, to garner support for the vital Bill, revealed the deep discontent among an influential section of the stakeholders.

Former External Affairs Prof. G. L. Peiris, MP (now aligned with the main Opposition Samagi Jana Balawegaya), Emeritus Professor of Law Savitri Goonesekere, ex-member of the Consultation Task Force on Reconciliation Mechanisms, and one-time member of Office of Missing Persons (OMP) Mirak Raheem, as well as Executive Director of the National Peace Council (NPC) Dr. Jehan Perera, pointed out the deficiencies and weaknesses in the latest process against the backdrop of past failures.

Prof. Goonesekere was severely critical of the criminal justice system and the failure on the part of successive governments to address legitimate grievances of the people whereas Raheem underscored the responsibility on the part of the government to win the confidence of those affected by the conflict. Rahim didn’t mince his words as he pointed out that the government efforts lack credibility.

They commented on the Bill after Director General of ISTRM Dr. Asanga Gunawansa, PC, and Head of the Secretariat’s Policy Division Dr. Yuvi Thangarajah explained the ongoing process meant to create an environment conducive for the CTUR to commence investigations as soon as President Ranil Wickremesinghe appointed it on the recommendation of the Constitutional Council (Wickremesinghe is annoyed with the 10-mmeber CC over some key appointments, including that of the IGP. A dispute between the President and the CC can cause a debilitating constitutional crisis ahead of the forthcoming presidential poll.).

Journalist Nilantha Illangamuwa and Nilanthan Niruthan of the Centre for Law and Warfare expressed their views on the Bill, with the former frowning on the NGO agenda.

Dr. Gunawansa’s declaration of the government’s readiness to withdraw the Bill that had been submitted by Foreign Minister Ali Sabry, PC, in consultation with President Wickremesinghe, in case discussions with various stakeholders proved the need for significant changes, triggered quite a sharp response from Prof. Peiris, the only lawmaker at the meeting.

Prof. Peiris questioned the rationale in gazetting what Dr. Gunawansa called a concept paper. The internationally renowned law academic declared that an assurance to introduce amendments at committee stage of the Bill couldn’t be accepted against the backdrop of the disgraceful conduct on the part of Speaker Mahinda Yapa Abeywardena and the government parliamentary group in passing the ‘Online Safety Bill’ without accommodating specific recommendations made by the Supreme Court, he alleged.

Regardless of the absence of consensus among the participants regarding the CTUR Bill, the discussion helped the ISRTM to comprehend the issues at hand and perhaps may influence Dr. Gunawansa’s team to re-examine the Bill. Several civil society representatives, in addition to those mentioned above, and an official of ONUR (Office for National Unity and Reconciliation), promised to submit their comments in respect of the CTUR Bill. The Office of Missing Persons (Parliament passed OMP Act on August 11, 2016) and Office for Reparations (The Office for Reparations Act No. 34 of, 2018 was enacted and came into operation on October 22nd, 2018. This was the second statute adopted by Sri Lanka in line with the Geneva dictates. The first was the OMP Act).

Since then the Yahapalana government co-sponsored a disgraceful accountability resolution against one’s own country at the Geneva-based United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) on Oct 01, 2015, altogether Sri Lanka has seven Acts, the seventh being the ONUR Act passed recently.

Dr. Wasantha Bandara, an outspoken critic of the Geneva-led process, has alleged that the enactment of CTUR law would put in place a treacherous system that could be used to subject senior military officers, both retired and serving under foreign jurisdictions. However, Dr. Gunawansa, without making a direct reference to Dr. Bandara’s concerns, declared that there was absolutely no basis for such an allegation.

However, on the basis of still unsubstantiated accountability allegations not subjected to judicial process at any level, notably the US and Canada, have unilaterally taken punitive measures against selected Sri Lankan political and military leaders, possibly under perceived feelings of superiority because their Westerners, the same way they are behaving towards the hapless Palestinian Arabs, who are being butchered day and night. But here they have conveniently not resorted to any action against war-winning Army Commander Field Marshal Sarath Fonseka other than the US denying visa to the Sinha Regiment veteran. So like kissing Western justice, it appears to go by favour.

Post-war Tamil Diaspora clash

The writer brought the recent arson attack on Canadian Tamil Congress (CTC) office in Canada to the notice of ISTRM as it was carried out by elements opposed to the Global Tamil Forum (GTF) entering into a fresh dialogue with Sri Lanka on the basis of what is widely referred to as the Himalayan Declaration with the backing of a section of the Buddhist monks (Sangha for Better Sri Lanka).

The CTC-backed GTF initiative (Dec 7-15, 2023 visit) received significant support but an influential and violent section of the Tamil Diaspora reacted angrily. They were especially piqued by the visiting delegation paying a courtesy call on wartime President Mahinda Rajapaksa. The result was the attack on the CTC office on January 27th. The incident shook the Canadian Tamils of Sri Lankan origin and caused concern among the Tamil Diaspora.

The bone of contention is Raj Thavaratnasingham of the CTC joining US, UK and Australia based representatives to promote what GTF spokesperson Suren Surendiran described as a national conversation involving all communities.

In spite of the Canadian High Commissioner in Colombo Eric Walsh declaring Canadian support for the latest initiative, Minister of Crown-Indigenous Relations Gary Anandasangaree condemned the GTF-CTC effort.

The Tamil Guardian in a report, titled ‘A betrayal beyond belief’ – Tamil Canadians vent their fury at CTC after meeting with Rajapaksa,’ quoted Anandasangaree as having said: “The recent engagement by the Global Tamil Forum and the Canadian Tamil Congress with former President Mahinda Rajapaksa is deplorable.

According to the report posted on Dec 18, 2023, the Member of Parliament for Scarborough Rouge Park questioned why the Tamil Diaspora delegation met Mahinda Rajapaksa against the backdrop of both him and ex-President Gotabaya Rajapaksa being sanctioned by Canada for gross and systematic violations of human rights.

President of the Tamil National Alliance (TNA) Canada branch Thangavelu, in an e-mail sent to the Canadian Minister, about a week after the attack on the CTC office, has questioned the failure on his part to denounce what he called a despicable and cowardly act.

Thangavelu pointed out several matters to the Canadian Minister. (1) Those responsible for arson attack on the CTC office called its members Tamil traitors for backing the Himalayan Declaration that has received the backing of a significant section of the Buddhist clergy (2) alleged lawmaker Anandasangaree joined Canada-based LTTE rump (3) Anandasangaree’s comments to the Tamil Guardian were not acceptable (4) challenged Anandasangaree’s claim that the CTC declared it represented the Tamil Diaspora (5) reminded Anandasangaree how those LTTE remnants campaigned against him at the 2015 general election. Calling them ultra-Tamil nationalists, Thangavelu recalled how they campaigned for a Punjabi, whereas the CTC threw its full weight behind Anandasangaree (6) disruption caused by pro-LTTE elements at an indoor meeting organized by Canada TNA on Nov 20, 2021 where the main speakers were TNA MPs M.A. Sumamthiran and Shanakiyan R. Rasamanickam. Thangavelu identified Deva Subapathy of the National Council of Canadian Tamils as the person who directed the attack (7) international community under any circumstances wouldn’t intervene in Sri Lanka to carve out a separate Tamil Eelam State (8) referring to the South African complaint to the International Court of Justice over Israeli military campaign may constitute genocide, the TNA Canada Chief questioned the rationale in trying to drag Sri Lanka before ICJ and International Criminal Court (ICC) as the country was not a signatory to the Rome Statue that created the ICC and (8) the threat of fresh Sinhala colonization in predominately Tamil speaking areas, particularly in the East where the Tamil community is a minority.

Anandasangaree has chosen not to respond to Thangavelu’s e-mail so far. Perhaps our High Commissioner in Ottawa Harsha Kumara Navaratne should try to arrange Anandasangaree to visit Colombo in the near future. The Canadian Minister should seek to play a positive role in post war national reconciliation here than being trapped in the vote banks of immigrant communities.

India’s culpability and other matters

The writer drew attention of the ISTRM to the necessity to amend the Bill as it didn’t take into consideration the covert Indian intervention that caused terrorism here, leading to a conventional conflict and the presence of the Indian Army in the Northern and Eastern regions of Sri Lanka during July 1987-March 1990.

The gathering was told that the truth seeking process would be meaningless unless the period during which India trained thousands of Sri Lankan youth in India during Indira Gandhi’s tenure as the Premier received attention.

The attempt made by Indian trained Sri Lankan terrorists to assassinate Maldivian President Maumoon Abdul Gayoom in early Nov 1988 was also highlighted to underscore the importance of a wider investigation as successive Sri Lankan governments made some desperate and foolish efforts to reach consensus with thd Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) during the conflict. The writer recalled how President Ranasinghe Premadasa, during the 1989-1990 period, funded terrorists to the tune of Rs 125 mn, and millions worth of arms, ammunition and equipment.

ISTRM must realize that killings occurred during the raid on the Maldives, the killing of former Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in South India, in May 1991, and the killings during the deployment of the Indian Army here as well as the killings ordered by India in the run-up to the July 29, 1987 Indo-Lanka peace accord, cannot be ignored.

If ISTRM bothered to speak with sitting TNA MP Dharmalingam Siddharthan, he would tell them how TELO (Tamil Eelam Liberation Organization), another group trained by India, assassinated his father V. Dharmalingam, and his colleague M. Alalasundaram, both Jaffna District MPs, on the night of Sept 2/3, 1985. MP Dharmalingham, in an interview with the writer, in 1997, alleged that the TELO abducted and killed two MPs at the behest of Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) in the aftermath of the failed Thimpu talks to put the blame on the LTTE.

Dr. Yuvi Thangarajah, the co-author of ‘The Politics of the North-East: part of the Sri Lanka Strategic Conflict Assessment 2005 (2000 – 2005)’ the current head of the ISTRM’s Policy Division can direct the investigation in the right direction.

The report produced by Yuvi Thangarajah and Liz Philipson, with the financial backing of the governments of the Netherlands, Sweden, the UK and Northern Ireland, Asia Foundation and the World Bank, dealt with the LTTE that believed in its strength to achieve its objectives through military means. Dr. Thangarajah, having dealt with the issues at a time the LTTE wielded immense conventional military capacity witnessed the eradication of that power within less than three years (2006 August-May 2009). Now the academic can play a significant role in shaping the investigation, if he really wanted to or allow the probe to disregard important matters.

The writer brought the following events/developments to the notice of ISTRM: (1) the releasing of approximately 12,000 combatants taken into custody after the collapse of the LTTE on the banks of the Nanthikadal lagoon in April-May 2009 (2) why presidential pardon shouldn’t be granted to those who had been convicted by courts and others (3) the TNA’s responsibility for LTTE’s atrocities, including recruitment of child soldiers and violence in the North-East after the R. Sampanthan’s political party in 2001 recognized the LTTE as the sole representative of the Tamil speaking people (4) killings carried out by the LTTE exploiting its relationship with the government. A case in point is the unsuspecting SLAF airlifting LTTE gunmen from Mullaithivu to Colombo who carried out the assassination of TULF leader Appapillai Amirthalingam and Vettivelu Yogeswaran, both MPs (5) thousands of persons listed as missing here receiving foreign passports, in most cases with new identities and (6) How many Tamils perished in fighting among various groups during the conflict as well as total number of LTTE cadres executed by the organization on charges of treason.

It would be the responsibility of the government to ensure a comprehensive investigation that would establish the truth. ISTRM should consider what former Indian High Commissioner J.N. Dixit revealed in 2004 ‘Makers of India’s Foreign Policy: Raja Ram Mohun Roy to Yashwant Sinha.

Dixit found fault with Indian Premier Indira Gandhi on two foreign policy decisions. One of them was the Indian intervention here. Dixit declared that her active support (it meant recruiting, arming, training and deploying thousands of Sri Lankan Tamil youth across the Palk Strait) to Sri Lankan terrorists (he called them militants) was based on the principle that she could not afford the emergence of Tamil separatism in India by refusing to support the aspirations of Sri Lankan Tamils.

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