Midweek Review

Sri Lanka: Quest for Justice, Rule of Law and Democratic Rights

Published

6 years ago

2021/02/10

By Shamindra Ferdinando

With an eye on the 46th session of the Geneva-based United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) later this month, the highly influential Global Tamil Forum (GTF), Centre for Human Rights and Global Justice, New York University, Sri Lanka Campaign for Peace and Justice and The Canadian Tamil Congress have brought in ‘big guns’ for a combined onslaught on Sri Lanka this week.

Among the participants, at a two-hour webinar, titled ‘Sri Lanka: Quest for Justice, Rule of Law and Democratic Rights’, scheduled for Friday, Feb. 12 (UK 1:30 pm; Europe/South Africa 3.30 pm; India/Sri Lanka 7:00 pm IST; Canada/US 8:30 am; Australia 12.30 am) are former UN Assistant Secretary General, Charles Petrie, former Special Rapporteur on the promotion of truth, justice, reparation and guarantee of non-recurrence, Pablo de Greiff and former US Ambassador-at-Large for Global Criminal Justice, Stephen J. Rapp.

The panelists includes Tamil National Alliance (TNA) lawmaker M.A. Sumanthiran, PC, former Commissioner of HRCSL Ambika Satkunanathan, Centre for Policy Alternatives (CPA) representative Attorney-at-Law Bhavani Fonseka, civil society activist. Shreen Saroor, and Sri Lanka Muslim Congress (SLMC) representative, Attorney-at-Law, Ameer Faaiz. Melissa Dring, of the Sri Lanka Campaign for Peace and Justice, is the moderator.

Their project has received a tremendous boost with the US returning to the Geneva body. The US quit UNHRC in June 2018.

The TNA, in late 2001, recognized the LTTE as the sole representative of the Tamil community. The LTTE held that privileged status in the eyes of the TNA, until Sri Lanka brought the war to a successful conclusion, in May 2009. The TNA is a direct beneficiary of the LTTE’s demise. Of course, Sumanthiran cannot be entirely held responsible for TNA’s actions as he joined the one-time LTTE mouthpiece, as a National List MP, in April 2010.

Why back Fonseka?

Sumanthiran entered Parliament a couple of months after the TNA wholeheartedly backed war-winning Army Commander Gen. Sarath Fonseka’s presidential candidature. Perhaps, Sumanthiran should explain on Feb 12, as to why the TNA, having accused the Army, Fonseka led with such efficiency, till the crushing of the formidable Tigers militarily, of genocide and then backed him to the hilt at the presidential poll that came soon afterwards. The TNA cannot conveniently ignore the fact that all Northern and Eastern electoral districts overwhelmingly voted for Fonseka though he lost the overall contest by a staggering 1.8 mn votes. Why did Tamils vote for Fonseka after accusing him, and his men, of genocide after they crushed the LTTE, which many pundits repeatedly claimed the Lankan security forces were incapable of achieving?

Participation of Petrie, Pablo de Greiff and Rapp, in Friday’s webinar, is of extreme importance. Petrie headed an ‘Internal Review Panel on UN actions in Sri Lanka’ that dealt with the final phase of the conflict, in his capacity as Special Rapporteur; De Greiff visited Sri Lanka on four occasions, between 2015 and 2019, and Rapp visited Colombo twice, in 2012 and 2014.

The Petrie report conveniently forgot how India formed half a dozen armed groups in the ‘80s to terrorize Sri Lanka, just to teach the then JRJ a lesson for being overtly pro-West and perhaps for derogatively comparing Mrs. Bandaranaike and her son, Anura with Mrs Gandhi and her son Sanjay. The Indian intervention was meant to pave the way for the deployment of her Army in the Northern and Eastern regions. The Indian project went awry. India ended up losing nearly 1,500 officers, and men, here, in less than three years. In addition, double that number received injuries. The military mission was aborted in March 1990. A year later, the LTTE assassinated Rajiv Gandhi, who, in his capacity as the Indian Prime Minister authorized the deployment of the Indian Army here. Can India ever absolve herself of the crime of causing massive chaos and destruction to this country as a result of her diabolical project here? The Petrie report also ignored how the LTTE scuttled the last bid to negotiate a settlement by quitting peace talks in April 2003. The LTTE’s abrupt move jeopardized the survival of UNP leader Ranil Wickremesinghe’s government and paved the way for its ouster in the following year.

Those who really value justice, rule of law, as well as democratic rights, should examine the Indian intervention here, too. Petrie and de Greiff should use the opportunity to explain the UN’s failure in the ‘80s to thwart the murderous Indian project. The UN played along in a devious plot to destabilise Sri Lanka, over the years. The UN’s response to the LTTE, during the Vanni offensive is no exception. The issue is whether the use of ‘human shields’, by the LTTE, could have been averted if the UN took tangible measures against the LTTE, especially in the wake of its detention of Tamil UN employees, accused of helping civilians to flee the Vanni west.

Did Petrie probe abductions of

UN workers?

Did Petrie inquire into the abductions after the revelation of secret UN powwow with the LTTE, led to the UN confirmation of the incident at daily UN media briefings, in New York, by the Secretary General’s Spokesperson Montas (The Island expose of UN employees abducted by LTTE: UN HQ admits Colombo Office kept it in the dark – The Island, April 28, 2007) Beginning April 20, 2007 (LTTE detains UN workers). The Island published several news items on the issue. The TNA, or those who issued media statements at the drop of a hat, remained conveniently silent. The TNA’s decision to remain quiet is understandable due to its close working relationship with the LTTE. Many an eyebrow was raised when the European Union election monitors openly accused the Tigers of helping the TNA to win 22 seats in the North and East, in 2004, by stuffing ballot boxes on its behalf. In the following year, the TNA, on behalf of the LTTE, ordered Northern Tamils to boycott the November presidential election. CPA’s Executive Director, Dr. Paikiasothy Saravanamuttu, is the only civil society leader to criticize the LTTE-TNA move.

The LTTE and the TNA set the stage for an all-out war. The LTTE commenced claymore attacks, in early Dec 2005. In January 2006, the LTTE blasted a Navy Fast Attack Craft (FAC) off Trincomalee; in late, April 2006 they made an abortive bid to assassinate Fonseka, and in early Oct 2006 an attempt was made on Defence Secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s life. The LTTE lost the Eastern Province, eight months later.

The TNA, as well as some sections of the international community remained strongly confident of the LTTE’s military superiority, until it was evicted from Kilinochchi. The LTTE lost Kilinochchi in early January, less than two weeks after Canada-based veteran political and defence analyst D.B.S. Jeyaraj asserted that the LTTE was on the verge of reversing territorial gains made by the Army. The rest is history.

None of those who are harping today about the loss of civilian life bothered to publicly appeal to the LTTE to let go of its human shields. The TNA certainly owed an explanation why it remained silent over the LTTE taking cover behind the civilian population. Against the backdrop of the UN mollycoddling the LTTE, Prabhakaran forced Tamil civilians to follow the retreating LTTE fighting cadre from the western part of the Vanni region across the Kandy-Jaffna A9 road towards the Mullaitivu coast.

Oslo’s missive to Basil

The then Norwegian Ambassador, Tore Hattrem, acknowledged the rapidly developing crisis in the eastern part of the Vanni region, in a letter to Presidential Advisor, Basil Rajapaksa, as the Army stepped-up operations. Hattrem’s missive to Rajapaksa revealed their serious concerns over Prabhakaran’s refusal to give up human shields. The Island, some time ago, published the hitherto unknown Norwegian note, headlined ‘Offer/Proposal to the LTTE’, and personally signed by Ambassador Hattrem. The Norwegian envoy was writing to Basil Rajapaksa on behalf of those countries trying to negotiate a ceasefire between the government and the LTTE, to facilitate the release of civilians, held hostage by the latter.

The following is the text of Ambassador Hattrem’s letter, dated Feb. 16, 2009, addressed to Basil Rajapaksa: “I refer to our telephone conversation today. The proposal to the LTTE on how to release the civilian population, now trapped in the LTTE controlled area, has been transmitted to the LTTE through several channels. So far, there has been, regrettably, no response from the LTTE and it doesn’t seem to be likely that the LTTE will agree with this in the near future.“

How many civilians perished during the Vanni offensive? The UN Secretary General’s Panel of Experts (PoE) report, released on March 31, 2011, having faulted the Army, on three major counts, alleged the massacre of at least 40,000 civilians. Let me reproduce the relevant paragraph, bearing no 137, verbatim: “In the limited surveys that have been carried out in the aftermath of the conflict, the percentage of people reporting dead relatives is high. A number of credible sources have estimated that there could have been as many as 40,000 civilian deaths. Two years after the end of the war, there is no reliable figure for civilian deaths, but multiple sources of information indicate that a range of up to 40,000 civilian deaths cannot be ruled out at this stage. Only a proper investigation can lead to the identification of all of the victims and to the formulation of an accurate figure for the total number of civilian deaths.”

The PoE arrived at the figure on the basis of information provided by persons whose identities would remain confidential till 2031 (20 years since the release of POE report in March 2011). The UN has strangely guaranteed confidentiality of ‘sources’ even after the lapse of the mandatory 20-year period. Perhaps, Petrie and Pablo de Greiff should explain how the UN pushed ahead with subsequent actions against Sri Lanka, based purely on still unverified accusations made by ghost accusers. In other words, Sri Lanka was convicted by the PoE report after a kangaroo court trial. How convenient?

Having failed to obtain the anticipated response to its public call for submissions, the PoE had no option but to extend the deadline to Dec 31, 2010. The PoE posted a notice in English on the UN website on Oct 27, 2010 calling for submissions on or before Dec 15, 2010. Sinhala and Tamil versions of the notice too, were subsequently posted. The PoE received 4,000 submissions from 2,300 persons. None of them were verified at any stage of the Geneva process, leading to yet bizarre Sri Lanka co-sponsoring of the Geneva Resolution on Oct 1, 2015 against itself.

When the writer raised the issue with the UN, as well as the then UNDP Resident Representative in Colombo, Subinay Nandy, whether the UN would do away with the confidentiality clause to facilitate the UNHRC probe, the Colombo mission issued the following statement after having consulted UN headquarters. The UN said: “The High Commissioner for Human Rights will now be making arrangements for a comprehensive investigation requested by the UNHRC and the issue of the confidentiality clause will need to be considered at a later stage,” (UN to revive 20-year confidentiality clause ‘at a later stage’- The Island April 7, 2014). The UN never did. Sri Lanka never exploited the matter.

The US, the British, as well as the EU, too, in spite of their push for an international war crimes probe, recently ruled out the possibility of them calling for a review of the confidentiality clause (EU, too, won’t call for review of 20-year UN confidentiality clause – The Island April 9, 2014).

Successive governments, and even those interested in defending the country, never really bothered to examine undisputed facts that were in Sri Lanka’s favour. The incumbent administration is no exception to this type of inexcusable lapses at great cost to the country.

PoE contradicts own claims

Interestingly, the PoE report contradicted its own claim of 40,000 killings. Unlike the unsubstantiated claim of 40,000 deaths, the paragraph bearing No 134 dealt with the issue on the basis of reliable sources acceptable to the UN.

It would be pertinent to reproduce the relevant section verbatim: “The United Nations Country Team is one source of information; in a document that was never released publicly, it estimated a total figure of 7,721 killed and 18,479 injured from August 2008 up to 13 May 2009, after which it became too difficult to count. In early February 2009, the United Nations started a process of compiling casualty figures, although efforts were hindered by lack of access. An internal ‘Crisis Operating Group’ was formed to collect reliable information regarding civilian casualties and other humanitarian concerns. In order to calculate a total casualty figure, the group took figures from RDHS as the baseline, using reports from national staff of the United Nations and NGOs, inside the Vanni, the ICRC, religious authorities and other sources to cross-check and verify the baseline. The methodology was quite conservative: if an incident could not be verified by these sources or could have been double counted, it was dismissed. Figures emanating from sources that could be perceived as biased, such as Tamil Net, were dismissed, as were Government sources outside the Vanni.”

Amnesty International (AI) in Sept. 2011, launched its own report, titled: ‘When will they get justice? Failures of Sri Lanka’s Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission.’ The report estimated the number of civilian deaths, due to military action, as over 10,000. AI based its assertion on eyewitness testimony and information from aid workers.

AI, too, guaranteed confidentiality of its ‘sources.’ Perhaps for want of close cooperation among those who had wanted to drag Sri Lanka before an international tribunal, they contradicted themselves in respect of the primary charge. Interestingly, none of those, except British Labour Party MP Siobhan McDonagh (Mitcham and Morden-Labour) propagating lies, regarding civilian deaths, dared to blatantly lie in Parliament about losses suffered by the LTTE. McDonagh estimated the number of LTTE cadres killed, in fighting, from January 1, 2009, to May 19, 2009, at 60,000. Successive governments didn’t even bother to raise the Labour MP’s lie with the UK though The Island pointed out the need to clarify matters. The absurd claim was made during the third week of Sept 2011, in Parliament. Sri Lanka never realized the need to inquire into the possibility of British parliamentarians’ relationship with the Tamil Diaspora. In fact, some politicians had benefited from their relationship. The GTF hired former MP for Enfield, North Joan Ryan, as its policy advisor. Of course, the GTF had the backing of all major political parties, with key politicians participating in its inauguration in the UK Parliament, in Feb 2010, in the wake of the LTTE’s demise.

Let us hope Friday’s webinar responds to Lord Naseby disclosure pertaining to loss of lives, based on confidential cables from British High Commission in Colombo (January-May 2009) and US Defence Advisor Lt. Col. Lawrence Smith’s declaration in June 2011 (two months after the release of the PoE report). Both contradicted the position taken by British and the US. Sri Lanka never made a genuine effort to build-up a proper defence in Geneva. Sri Lanka shirked high profile opportunities to exploit startling revelations made by Wikileaks. The British are yet to release all confidential cables that dealt with the Vanni offensive, though Lord Naseby managed to secure some, following legal intervention made by him. That took over two years as the UK tried to withhold information which could have helped the UNHRC to ascertain the truth and Sri Lanka being absolved of these totally exaggerated accusations by interested parties against her.

A cable from Geneva

A cable, dated July 15, 2009, signed by the then Geneva-based US Ambassador Clint Williamson cleared the Army of crimes against humanity during the Vanni offensive. The cable, addressed to the US State Department, had been based on a confidential conversation between Ambassador Williamson and the then ICRC head of operations for South Asia, Jacque de Maio, on July 9, 2009. Ambassador Williamson wrote: “The Army was determined not to let the LTTE escape from its shrinking territory, even though this meant the civilians being kept hostage by the LTTE were at an increasing risk. So, de Maio said, while one could safely say that there were ‘serious, widespread violations of international humanitarian law,’ by the Sri Lankan forces, it didn’t amount to genocide. He could cite examples of where the Army had stopped shelling when the ICRC informed them it was killing civilians. In fact, the Army actually could have won the military battle faster, with higher civilian casualties, yet they chose a slower approach which led to a greater number of Sri Lankan military deaths. He concluded, however, by asserting that the GoSL recognized its obligation to protect civilians, despite the approach leading to higher military casualties.”

The Army lost 2,400 personnel during the January-May 2009 period. The losses were the worst suffered by the Army during the Eelam War IV (Aug 2006-May 2009). Frontline fighting formations lost a further 70 personnel, who were categorized as missing in action, in 2009. Deaths due to reasons other than combat during the same period were placed at 334. Thousands were injured. The losses suffered on the Vanni east front, during the first five months of 2009, was over 100 per cent, when compared with battlefield losses in the previous year. For the whole of 2008, the Army lost 2,174 killed and 43 missing in action.

Army Chief General Shavendra Silva told the writer that the Sri Lankan military had the wherewithal to decimate the LTTE in a far shorter period, if not for the human shields. “We paid a heavy price for being mindful of the civilian presence among the LTTE cadres. Restricted use of long range weapons, as well as air support on the Vanni east front, caused quite a bit of problems.”

The US slapped a travel ban on General Silva, in Feb 2020, over his role as the GoC of the celebrated 58 Division (which started as Task Force 1). The US move is an affront to the war-winning armed forces, who achieved their arduous task against all odds and the political leadership that backed them to the hilt, irrespective of threats to try them, too, for war crimes. Unfortunately, even the utterly unsubstantiated action against Gen. Shavendra Silva hadn’t jolted the government, as well as those genuinely interested in defending the country, to re-examine the accountability issue.

Sri Lanka’s pathetic and continuing failure has allowed Western powers to use the LTTE rump and Tamil Diaspora in a high profile project to overwhelm the country.

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Midweek Review

A ‘partnership’ like no other!

Published

6 days ago

2026/09/16

Sahan Weerasooriya

Indian Defence Minister Rajnath Singh at the Indian Army memorial

Against the backdrop of the economic crisis that erupted in 2021/2022 Sri Lanka’s dependence on Indian economic and military support is growing. INS Udayagiri, Indian Navy’s indigenously built multi-role stealth frigate, that arrived at Colombo Port hours before Indian Defence Minister Rajnath Singh arrived here, brought essential machinery/equipment spares for Sri Lanka Navy and Sri Lanka Air Force. INS Udayagiri departed on 11 September, less than 24 hours after Singh concluded his three-day visit. The list of Indian support is long. In June this year, India swiftly transferred military stores worth USD 5.5 million to Sri Lanka Army on gratis basis from its operational stocks. India stepped in when Sri Lanka appealed for assistance to deploy over 1,000-member military contingent in Haiti under the UN command to help maintain order in that violence ridden country.

By Shamindra Ferdinando

Parliament on 9 Sept. passed the Chief of Defence Staff (Repeal) Bill, over one and half years after the last Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) General Shavendra Silva retired.

The wartime General Officer Commanding (GoC) of the celebrated 58 Division (former Task Force 1) bid farewell to the Sri Lanka Army (SLA) on 1 January, 2025, following some record breaking achievements, leading his troops from the front in the final phase of the war to eradicate the Tiger terrorists.

Following the debate on the second reading of the Bill, on 9 Sept., the Bill was passed without a division. It clearly indicated that the Samagi Jana Balawegaya (SJB)-led Opposition wasn’t at least interested in making an obvious issue out of it. The Bill has been introduced to repeal the Chief of Defence Staff Act, No. 35 of 2009, enacted in 2009, to carry out functions, including the coordination of activities among the Armed Forces and the Ministry of Defence.

Pointing out that the relevant Bill had been enacted after the conclusion of the war, the National People’s Power (NPP) government declared in Parliament that the abolition of the Office of the CDS wouldn’t harm national security. The NPP emphasised that the Mahinda Rajapaksa administration created that post to accommodate war-winning Army Commander Lt. Gen. Sarath Fonseka after he firmly turned down the offer to accept a non-military post as Secretary to the Sports Ministry.

Amidst rapidly deepening turmoil within the government, Fonseka received the appointment as the first CDS on 15 July, 2009, in terms of the newly enacted Act. It would be pertinent to mention that the government had no option but to placate Fonseka by establishing the Office of CDS through a parliamentary Act to ensure the change of command take place, as planned.

The writer was among those assigned to cover Fonseka receiving the appointment as CDS and Maj. Gen. Jagath Jayasuriya taking over the command of the war-winning Army from Fonseka. This was against a background of Fonseka wanting Chief of Staff Maj. Gen. G.A. Chandrasiri succeeded him. Instead, the Rajapaksas brought in Maj. Gen. Jagath Jayasuriya as Fonseka’s successor. Chandrasiri was made to retire and those who had been senior to Jayasuriya sidelined as the government tightened its grip on the Army. Therefore, the creation of the Office of the CDS to accommodate Fonseka should be considered in the appropriate context.

But, Fonseka quit the CDS post in November 2009 after reaching a consensus with the UNP-JVP combine to contest the presidential election. Air Chief Marshal Roshan Goonetileke succeeded Fonseka as CDS, on 16 November, 2009, while continuing his duties as the Commander of the Air Force.

The NPP, at the inception of its administration, quite clearly wanted to abolish the post of CDS. Silva, who received the appointment as Acting CDS, on 1 January, 2020, while serving as the Commander of the Army, relinquished the substantive post on 1 June, 2022. That happened in the wake of the 9 May countrywide systematic violence unleashed by those spearheading the high profile project to oust President Gotabaya Rajapaksa after the increasingly humiliated SLPP by the siege laid by Aragalaya activists on important government institution with a foreign dictated agenda, ordered a goon attack on those Galle Face protesters.

Retired Maj. Gen. K.B. Egodawele, former Minister Wimal Weerawansa, foreign affairs commentator Asanga Abeyagoonasekera and Prof. Sunanda Maddumabandara, who authored books on the 2022 regime change project, all pointed to external hands in the mayhem. Abeyagoonasekera went to the extent of alleging direct Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) role in the operation, while Prof. Maddumabandara named then Indian High Commissioner Gopal Baglay as the one who asked Speaker Mahinda Yapa Abeywardena to take over the presidency, along with the backing of the likes of Omalpe Sobitha thera. That brought an end to the repeated attacks on US Ambassador Julie Chung over an alleged meeting with Abeywadena on the eve of President Rajapaksa being forced to flee the country.

India never challenged Prof. Maddumabandara’s declaration, widely believed to be based on revelation made by Abeywardena.

A significant visit

Indian Defence Minister Rajnath Singh’s historic three-day official visit to Colombo coincided with the House passing the Chief of Defence Staff (Repeal) Bill. What a coincidence it was!

A rapidly deepening partnership spanning defence, economic aid, and regional connectivity under India’s Neighbourhood First policy dominates bilateral relations.

Singh, a senior member of the ruling Bharatiya Janatha Party (BJP), laid a wreath at the Indian Army memorial, in Pelawatte, Sri Jayewardenepura, on 9 September, on the second day of his visit, as the Parliament announced the repealing of the Bill. The memorial is a stark reminder of a despicable Indian destabilisation project directed at smaller, economically weak Sri Lanka in the 80s.

Singh, who is on his second term as Defence Minister, would go down in history as the first Indian Defence Minister to pay respect at the memorial built in memory of Indian Army officers and men killed in Sri Lanka. Having established a large scale terrorist project in Sri Lanka, the Congress government destabilised Sri Lanka to facilitate signing of the so-called Indo-Lanka Peace Accord after the arm twisting by its infamous ‘parippu’ drop over Jaffna, humiliating and bringing to its knees the then ‘all-powerful’ JRJ government when its powerful friends in the West turned their backs on their perennial vasal here, dubbed the ‘20th Century Fox’. The deployment of the Indian Army followed, beginning 29 July, 1987, on a mission to ostensibly disarm terrorist groups, including the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).

The then Indian Defence Minister K.C. Pant visited Colombo on May 30-June 1, 1988, in the run-up to the presidential election at the time the Indian Army was engaged in operations against the LTTE. India never sent another defence minister here even after Sri Lanka built a memorial near Battaramulla, in August 2008. It had been put up on a recommendation by the late Gen. Lionel Balagalle, Commander of the Army and CDS following an official visit to New Delhi in Dec., 2003.

Indian High Commissioner Ashok Kantha was the first top Indian government representative to pay floral tribute at the memorial on 15 August, 2010, over a year after Sri Lanka brought the once Indian sponsored war to a successful conclusion.

There is another Indian Army memorial in Palaly, Jaffna, built by the Indian Army in memory of 33 officers and men killed in a disastrous heli-borne assault on the LTTE, based in the Jaffna University. That assault took place on 12 Oct., 1987, at the onset of Indian operations. However, among the Indian dead inscribed on the memorial was Lieutenant Colonel Arun Kumar Chhabra who served the 10 Para (SF), elite battalion of the Parachute Regiment involved in the Jaffna University assault. Chhabra died on 14 Oct., 1989, during a gun battle with the LTTE.

The point is whatever various interested parties say today about the Indian intervention here, the truth is Premier Indira Gandhi destabilised this country in line with her strategy meant to address separatist sentiments in Tamil Nadu. India cannot absolve itself of the responsibility for the massive death and destruction caused not only in Sri Lanka but also the assassination of former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi who advanced his slain mother’s strategy by deploying the Indian Army here.

Indian trained terrorists, the People’s Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE), almost succeeded in overthrowing Maldivian President Maumoon Abdul Gayoom in Nov., 1988. Two boat loads of PLOTE terrorists passed under the nose of the Indian Navy, at that time responsible for controlling all movements within Sri Lanka territorial waters, to reach the Maldives. The Indian intervention in the Maldives to save the Gayoom’s administration was hailed as a spectacular Indian military operation. No one found fault with India for sponsoring PLOTE. In fact, the PLOTE, widely believed to have been disarmed by the Indian Army in line with the Indo-Lanka peace accord signed under duress, retained weapons to mount the operation. That proved the much publicised project to disarm terrorist groups, including the LTTE and PLOTE, was more a farce than anything else.

The top BJPer’s, who recently concluded his visit to Colombo, emphasised the nearly four decades long absence of an Indian Defence Minister paying respects at the Jayewardenepura monument. Interested parties have sought to depict the monument as a testament to India sacrificing life to protect Sri Lanka. But, the truth is the monument reminds the world of a politically motivated terror project that ruined Sri Lanka, caused deaths of at least 1,200 Indian military personnel, and paved the way for a coup attempt in the Maldives. Names of 1169 Indians, including 55 officers, are inscribed therein. The catastrophic Indian project also led to the invention of suicide attacks (human bombs), a tactic now practiced in different parts of the world. India experienced the horrors of suicide bombing when a Sri Lanka woman blew up Rajiv Gandhi at Sriperumbudur, Tamil Nadu, on 21 May, 1991, over a year after India pulled out its Army from Sri Lanka.

Two Battaramulla memorials

Sri Lanka and Indian media reported Defence Minister Singh’s visit to the Indian Army memorial at Battaramulla. Unfortunately, print, electronic and social media failed to mention that the National War Memorial, with names of nearly 29,000 officers and men, who paid the supreme sacrifice, inscribed, is situated a walking distance from the Indian Army memorial. Perhaps the Indian Defence Minister should have laid a wreath at the National War Memorial, a gesture that may have somewhat atoned for an utterly irresponsible and reckless political decision.

The two memorials situated just 1.1 kms apart underscore the horrors of conflict engineered and sustained by regional power that almost destroyed Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka was trapped in separatist terrorism and a simultaneous insurgency in the South that ripped the country apart.

Sri Lanka transformed its ceremonial armed forces to a worthy fighting formation over the years. The Office of the CDS had been in place throughout the war though it was not constituted by a specific law (Chief of Defence Staff Act, No. 35 of 2009).

As the armed forces expanded, the country needed a headquarters for better coordination among the armed forces and police. The Joint Operations Command (JOC) was established in 1985. In 1999, during the tenure of President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga, the JOC was replaced by Joint Operations Bureau (JOB), a civilian led set up that failed miserably to meet the challenging task. In the same year, Kumaratunga, in her capacity as the Defence Minister, did away with the JOB and established Joint Operations Headquarters.

Kumaratunga created the Office of CDS in 2000 ahead of major northern battles. That functioned till the end of the war in May, 2009, and no one ever thought of enacting a specific Bill to constitute the Office of CDS. The NPP told Parliament, on 9 September, that a staggering Rs 8.7 bn had been spent on the Office of CDS, since 2009.

Multi-role stealth frigate INS Udayagiri at the Colombo port. The ship
visit coincided with Singh’s 3-day tour

The Indian political establishment largely ignored the humiliating loss of lives suffered during the mission in Sri Lanka. They conveniently forgot the disastrous intervention though the High Commissioner here visited the Battaramulla memorial in 2010. However, Modi, having captured power at the 2014 general election, initiated his own strategy. He first visited the Battaramulla memorial, in March, 2015, less than a year after becoming the Premier. He again visited the memorial in April, 2025, when he visited Colombo to sign seven Memorandum of Understanding (MoUs), including one on defence.

Having backed Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s ouster in 2022, Modi (Rajnath Singh served as the Defence Minister during the US-Indian operation in Colombo) endorsed the candidature of Anura Kumara Dissanayake, in February, 2024, by extending an official invitation to the leader of the NPP, as well as the JVP. Dissanayake was given the opportunity to meet External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar and National Security Advisor Ajit Doval. The message from New Delhi was loud and clear. Although Al Jazeera described the Indian move as an unlikely invitation, those who have carefully analyzed New Delhi’s actions here may realise the importance of the unexpected rescue of Somawansa Amarasinghe, in the early 90s, as the UNP government was about to capture him. Had Amarasinghe ended up in the custody of the military, the same fate that befell other party seniors, including Rohana Wijeweera, too, would have been his.

The UNP showed no mercy at all to the JVPers. Amarasinghe escaped with Indian help in February, 1990, three months after the Army executed Wijeweera. Although some speculated about a possible Indian role in saving Amarasinghe, no one could prove it. Then, unexpectedly, Amarasinghe himself, at a rally held in Kalutara, in late 2001, disclosed how India saved his life. The revelation was made at the first rally he addressed after returning home, following a 12-year exile.

Dissanayake received a second invitation from New Delhi after his historic unlikely victory achieved, thanks to outside machinations, mainly by the West ,in the run up to the Sept. 2024 presidential election. Modi announced their consensus on entering into MoU on defence at the conclusion of Dissanayake’s Dec. 2024 visit, though the joint statement didn’t say so. India swiftly moved to finalise the Defence MoU along with six other MoUs in the first week of April 2025 when Modi visited Colombo.

By then even the JVP/NPP had forgotten that the JVP waged insurgency against the UNP over the signing of the Indo-Lanka Accord. The emergence of the NPP as the undisputed political power in Colombo has facilitated the Indian strategy here. It also facilitated US strategy, as well as joint US-Indian scheme, the future of it now very much in doubt, especially with erratic actions of President Trump.

Immediately after Modi concluded his April 2025 visit, the Colombo West International Terminal (CWIT), Sri Lanka’s first fully automated container terminal with an $800 million investment, officially commenced operations. The project that offered a significant boost to the maritime economy marked a major milestone in India–Sri Lanka infrastructure collaboration.

By then, India has secured the controlling interests of the Colombo Dockyard Limited (CDL), a move facilitated by Japan. Although the announcement regarding Japan’s Onomichi Dockyard parting with its 51% of shares to India’s state-owned Mazagon Dock Shipbuilders Limited, supplier of warships to India et al. It was India’s first-ever acquisition of a foreign shipyard.

India never had such a hold on Sri Lanka during the war of post-conflict period. In fact, the current Indo-Lanka partnership or whatever you choose to call it seemed to be fait accompli.

The way forward

‘Yankie Dicky’s’ (JRJ was known as Yankie Dicky because of his ardent pro-American stands) nephew Ranil Wickremesinghe, in his capacity as President and Defence Minister, declared a moratorium on foreign scientific research vessels during 2024. Wickremesinghe, struggling to cope up with economic difficulties amidst being at the mercy of US and India, announced the moratorium on such ship visits. It was meant to deprive Sri Lanka of the opportunity to receive Chinese vessels. Wickremesinghe’s announcement came in the wake of US backed Indian protests over Chinese vessels Yuan Wang 5 and Shi Yan 6 vessels visiting Sri Lanka. But, Wickremesinghe’s moratorium still remains in force as the incumbent government shied away from making its position known to the public. China, having acquired the strategically situated Hambantota Port and Colombo International Container Terminals (CICT), South Asia’s premier deep water terminal, Beijing consolidated its position here. Perhaps many people do not remember that the Colombo Terminal project was awarded to a consortium involving China, in Sept, 2010, then a joint venture established under a 35-year Build–Operate and Transfer (BOT) project in 2011 and the facility inaugurated in August 2013 though construction continued till April 2014.

The Hambantota Port was acquired in 2017 during the Yahapalana government, in the wake of the Colombo Port City controversy. In spite of issues, China has established control over Colombo Port City, CICTT, as well as the Hambantota Port.

Sri Lanka may overtly take a stand that may see us as bei pro-India but at the end of the day whoever wielded political power as well as those in the Opposition wouldn’t be able to disregard Chinese interests. President Gotabaya Rajapaksa realised his folly when he declared intention to renegotiate the Hambantota Port deal. China simply dismissed the President’s proposal. The President was compelled to issue a clarification at his own expense.

The recent statement attributed by the Defence Ministry to Defence Secretary AVM (retd) Sampah Thyuyakontha regarding Sri Lanka’s readiness to seek NATO assistance drew a sharp response from General Secretary of the Communist Party of Sri Lanka Dr. G. Weerasinghe. Thuyakontha made the statement during a recent visit to Canada where he represented the government at the 28th Annual Indo-Pacific Chiefs of Defence (CHOD) Conference, held in Victoria, Canada, from 31 August to 2 September 2026.

There hadn’t been a previous instance of Sri Lanka seeking NATO assistance. The CP Chief questioned Sri Lanka’s unexpected declaration while examining post-2024 presidential polls developments. It would be pertinent to mention that it was Mahinda Rajapaksa who first entered into ACSA (Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement) in March, 2007. The CP, without hesitation, criticised President Rajapaksa’s action. President Sirisena extended that agreement in 2017 though he pretended he didn’t approve it. Since the change of government in 2024, the NPP has enhanced defence relations with the US and the next year’s extension of ACSA is a foregone conclusion. Sri Lanka is set to go ahead with US-India strategies though China remains a factor that cannot be ignored, under any circumstances.

Midweek Review

Feeling political sadness as signs of hope and resistance

Published

6 days ago

2026/09/16

Sahan Weerasooriya

by Sasanka Perera
(The writer is on X as @sasmester)

A few weeks ago, a friend in India wrote to me about Ghazala Jamil’s book, What to Do with Political Sadness and Other Essays on Death, Destruction and Hauntology (2026). It had just been published by New Delhi’s Simon & Schuster India and Yoda Press. And thanks to the kindness of yet another friend, I managed to get a copy of the book. I think we are all surrounded by different forms of ‘political sadness’ both in our own country and beyond. And some of us might actually ask ourselves the same question Jamil has posed in the title of her book: What to do with political sadness? In this situation, since the book spoke to me directly, I ended up writing notes on it and reflecting on what she had to say as I read.

Globally, we live in an era governed by systemic attrition, state-sanctioned violence, and the steady dismantling of democratic institutions. In this situation, despair is frequently framed as a personal pathology or a personal tragedy that is difficult for one to reconcile with. This is particularly the case if one lives in conditions of political instability burdened with a conscience — knowing full well what is right and what is wrong but not having the power to make a difference. Contemporary neoliberal politics routinely urge the disenfranchised to practice ‘resilience’ or ‘mindfulness’ without offering serious means to deal with unbearable situations. That process helps strong-man and dictatorial politics to not only survive but also justify their destructive politics.

Ghazala Jamil thoughtfully and reflectively deals with what happens when one must deal with politics of violence up front in her collection of essays. Jamil argues that the political sadness felt by marginalized people experiencing juridical, economic, and physical destruction is neither an aberration nor a personal failure. It is, instead, a rational and ethically sound response to state power built on dispossession and intimidation. For Jamil, political sadness is a method of both perseverance in difficult conditions and a means of generating hope as well as a way of imagining a future despite being surrounded by orchestrated death, destruction and dispossession.

Rather than attempting to ‘cure’ this sadness or dismiss it as weakness, Jamil interrogates its anatomy in an attempt to locate something far more durable than passive optimism or taken-for-granted fatalism so familiar in South Asia. That is a radical, unyielding form of idealism rooted in memory and a refusal to be silenced. Idealism in this sense is increasingly becoming a scarce resource in the circumstances where most of us live and work. While reading Jamil’s essays and writing these thoughts, I was also contemplating on the unfolding politics in Sri Lanka. A recent tweet by me in response to a news item pertaining to the UN Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers, Margaret Satterthwaite requesting information from the Sri Lankan government’s proposed judicial reforms in Sri Lanka drew much criticism.

While I was concerned overall on the reforms meant to increase the retirement age of judges across the judicial hierarchy on matters of principle and potential impact on democratic governance in the country, my immediate concern was the UN’s established bias in responding to these kinds of issues. That is, the blatant lack of equality where people at the receiving end usually happen to be nations without a veto or the ability to control one in the UN. Many people, both known and unknown, were upset with the tweet claiming I did not know how the UN system worked or had not done my homework. My sense was, I was considered naïve or even stupid as I harboured a sense of idealism, which sadly they had lost. Jamil, on the other hand, might agree with me.

Across nineteen essays, spanning political philosophy, urban sociology, and cultural critique, the collection is based on a close reading of three primary and closely related theoretical positions buttressed by immediate life experiences in both India and beyond.

The first position deals with what might be called, mechanics of state violence. Here, Jamil explores the politics of physical and institutional mechanisms, that range from spatial segregation and legal disenfranchisement — such as the weaponisation of citizenship laws — to the degradation of public resources such as education and transport. In this situation, she considers death and destruction as essential byproducts of governance that may not however be always intended. But ultimately, such mechanisms define the nature and reach of state authority.

The second overall position she deals with has to do with bodily dissent and martyrdom. It is in this discussion that Jamil analyzes extreme forms of political protest, such as hunger strikes and suicide drawing from experiences ranging from India to Ireland. When the state strips vulnerable communities of institutional recourse to justice and fair play, the body becomes the final site of sovereignty and agency. But bodily self-sacrifice forces a public ethical showdown, demonstrating that even the dispossessed retain the agency to expose the moral bankruptcy of majoritarian power. Even so, such extreme protests do not always work, nevertheless keeping alive political sadness, and with it, reservoirs of hope.

The final position Jamil explores is focused on the idea of hauntology and futures. Drawing on Jacques Derrida’s concept of hauntology, Jamil examines the spectral presence of unfulfilled post-colonial promises. In the Indian context, the constitutional ideals of secularism, egalitarianism, and social justice have been systematically compromised or dismantled, even though their ‘ghosts’ refuse to disappear. They haunt the present, reminding us of what was promised, what was destroyed, and what remains to be reclaimed and achieved. Therefore, this also becomes a repository for hope from where futures may be imagined.

As far as my reading is concerned, the core strength of Jamil’s work lies in how she retrieves hope from the debris of political grief. Her kind of idealism rejects toxic positivity, insisting that genuine hope can only emerge after we fully confront actual histories and experiences of destruction. This, I think, is essential, and speaks to me personally and directly in a situation where such idealism has been compromised by an unfortunate combination of naivety and political foolishness.

For Jamil, hauntology acts as an engine of political memory. Ideally, the ghosts of past struggles should prevent us from normalising present atrocities. Idealism, therefore, is not an abstract dream of a utopian future. Instead, it is the stubborn refusal to allow state violence to dictate the limits of human imagination. To feel political sadness is to remember that things were supposed to be different, and that they still could be.

Though Jamil writes from her location in India augmented by theoretical arguments that are in global circulation, what she has to say speaks to the world in the present time. This makes her critique both locally grounded and regionally and globally applicable.

In so far as India is concerned, Jamil’s critique speaks to a situation marked by the relentless rise of ethno-nationalism, religious intolerance, bulldozer politics of dispossession, and the systematic marginalisation of minority identities and their sense of being. Hope in this context is found in grassroots resistance, such as the constitutional consciousness kept alive by student movements, civil rights activists, and community-led dissenters who insist on asserting full citizenship despite systemic hostility. I would locate the recent Cockroach Janta Party agitations in this context.

As far as my own location, Sri Lanka is concerned, Jamil’s exploration of hauntology provides immediate resonance and painful familiarity. Sri Lankan society is haunted by unresolved ghosts of wartime as well as post-war absence of state accountability, forced disappearances, alienation of minorities, and the catastrophic economic collapse that dismantled public security. This is without even venturing into the violence and dispossession orchestrated by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam and Janata Vimukti Peramuna when these entities wielded power in their agitations against the state. The mass uprising of 2022 or the ‘aragalaya’ placed in context both the transformative power of collective hope and the tragic reality of state appropriation. Reading Jamil from Colombo underscores how South Asian states export and replicate tools of division, militarization, and erasure.

Beyond the subcontinent, Jamil’s writing indicates the necessity that localised grief must be connected to globally intertwined histories. From hyper-capitalist labor exploitation to climate displacement, the Global South faces a collective and ongoing crisis of hegemony. Reclaiming hope requires cross-border solidarity, recognising that struggles against authoritarianism or majoritarianism in South Asia and elsewhere constitutes part of a worldwide fight for human dignity.

For me, Ghazala Jamil’s What to Do with Political Sadness is an essential and thoughtful manual for ethical survival and the generation of hope in difficult times. It does not offer easy comfort or simple solutions. Instead, it offers something far more valuable: a framework for ethical survival and persevering with idealism and hope. Let me conclude with my 2022 poem, ‘Island Story’ (Let Us be Silent: Poems, Sarasavi, Nugegoda, 2025).

“To live in the blessed isle
close your ears
guard your tongue
freeze your heart

Then,
hell of despair

would seem
like
heaven of hope”

I attempted to deal with my unhappiness not merely by writing a poem, but by trying not to see what was obvious, as a means of dealing with pain and overshadowing the conscience. Jamil, will have none of this as she has convincingly argued throughout her book. By transforming political grief into an active analytical tool and method for hope, Jamil reminds us that our sadness is proof of our lingering moral clarity. In many ways, her effort is a conversation among theory, life experience and hope. For most of us, living under the shadow of disrupted pasts and lost futures, this book serves as a powerful reminder that as long as we remember what has been destroyed, the blueprint for a just world remains alive.

(A shorter version of this essay was published in The Wire [new Delhi] on 22 August 2026)