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Sri Lanka in Lee Kuan Yew’s words

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Prime Minister and Mrs Lee Kuan Yew presenting gifts to President of Sri Lanka Junius Richard (J R) Jayewardene (back to camera), who is on a one-day stopover in Singapore after attending the Commonwealth Heads of Government Regional Meeting in Sydney, during dinner in honour of the visiting Sri Lankan leader at Mandarin Hotel in Orchard Road. Image courtesy of Ministry of Information and the Arts Collection, courtesy of National Archives of Singapore

By Hasala Perera

It is often said that Lee Kuan Yew (LKY) once considered Sri Lanka as a development model, but no one has questioned the veracity of this claim, and it will be interesting to see what he has said about Sri Lanka.

LKY’s views about Sri Lanka have been published in three books, one is his memoirs, ‘From Third World to First’, second in a compilation of his speeches titled ‘LKY -The man and his ideas’ and ‘Giants of Asia – Conversations with LKY’, which contains interviews American journalist Tom Plate had with LKY.

In his book, ‘From Third World to First’, LKY has dedicated an entire chapter to his views of India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, and it titled ‘South Asia’s Legends and Leaders’ and seven out of these 22 pages are devoted to Sri Lanka.

For easy reference, ‘From Third World To First’ as [1], ‘LKY – Man and his ideas’ is mentioned as [2], and ‘Giants of Asia – Conversations with LKY’ as [3] with the corresponding page number where appropriate. It is important to note here that LKY refers to the country both as Ceylon and Sri Lanka.

LKY’s first Impression

LKY visited Sri Lanka on four occasions. His first visit was in 1956 and during each visit he had happened to meet a new leader in the country.

He states that ‘Ceylon was Britain’s model commonwealth country’ [1, p 461] and that ‘Ceylon had more resources and better infrastructure than Singapore’ [1, p 460], he attributes this to Lord Mountbatten’s presence in Kandy [ibid], which could be some proof that he had a positive outlook of Sri Lanka and wished if Singapore had the same infrastructure as Sri Lanka.

He was full of praise of the capital city Colombo when he states that ‘Colombo was a better city than Singapore’ [2, pg.14/22], and he was ‘impressed by the public buildings’ in the city [1, p 460].

His View of Sri Lankan Leaders

LKY gave his opinion on six Premiers of Sri Lanka namely S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike, Dudley Senanayake, Sirimavo Bandaranaike, J.R Jayewardene, Ranasinghe Premadasa and on Mahinda Rajapaksa just a. few years before his death

His first visit to Sri Lanka coincided with the victory of Bandaranaike’s newly created Sri Lanka Freedom Party, he calls him a dapper little man, well dressed, articulate and a ‘Pukka Sahib’ [1, p 460] a term invented by the British to call the inhabitants of their colonies who followed their ways.

LKY says that Bandaranaike was elated to have won the election mandate from a Sinhala majority and he had promised to make Sinhalese the official language and Buddhism the state religion and did not seem troubled by the disadvantage caused by the minorities as a result of it [1, p 460], during his conversations with him he felt that Bandaranaike spoke to him as if he had still been a member of the Oxford Union debating society [1, p461], despite all his effort to be a champion of the Sinhalese Language, he states that three years later he was not surprised to hear about his assassination by a Buddhist monk [ibid].

LKY’s second visit to Sri Lanka was in 1966, when Dudley Senanayake was the prime minister of the Country, who he refers as a gentle, resigned and a fatalistic elderly man [1, p 462], while playing golf together in Colombo he describes an incident where Dudley Senanayake apologised to him about the huts, goats and cows encroached by squatters at the fairway, as he was unable to justify people for keeping open spaces in the city, unlike our present leaders Senanayake quite casually sent LKY by train from Colombo to Nuwara Eliya, where he played a game of golf and witnessed the same problem with the squatters as in Colombo [ibid]. He felt that Senanayake was a weak leader and did not have control over the citizens of the country.

When he visited Sri Lanka for the third time in 1970, the prime minister of Sri Lanka was Sirimavo Bandaranaike, whom he believed had won due to a sympathy vote [1, p 461] but he describes her as a tougher, determined and less voluble leader than her husband S.W.R.D Bandaranaike [ibid]. He praises her policy on the non-aligned ideology, but he is not in favour of her policy-based decision on supporting the removal of US troops from several South East Asian Countries as he felt that Singapore could be at a disadvantage if they were removed as there was a possibility of communism taking over those countries which could have a negative impact on Singapore [ibid].

It was through one of her Cabinet Ministers Felix Dias Bandaranaike that he learnt Sri Lanka spent only 2.5% of its budget on defence [1, p 461], and the reason he gives is that Sri Lanka is “blessed” with peace and security as a result of its good fortune in geography and history. LKY calls him a bright but an ‘unprofound’ person, but despite its ‘blessings’ he ironically mentions that 10 years later Sri Lanka spends more than half of its budget on defence and arms to crush a rebellion that took place inside the Country [ibid], he is the only Sri Lankan minister ever mentioned by him.

LKY further states the futility of Mrs Bandaranaike’s decision to change the name of the country from ‘Ceylon’ to ‘Sri Lanka’ and making the country a republic as it did not improve the fortunes of the country, the best example he takes here is that Sri Lankan Tea was still been sold as Ceylon Tea [1, pg.463] as a matter of fact even to this day Sri Lankan Tea is known as Ceylon Tea. He further states that by changing names sometimes you could deceive gods, but you can’t deceive the people who live in it [2, pg.15/22]

His meeting with President J R Jayewardene took place outside Sri Lanka, which was at the CHOGRM Conference held in Sydney. He says that during this meeting Jayewardene wanted Sri Lanka to move away from socialist policies which had bankrupted the country and wanted Singapore to get involved in the development of Sri Lanka; he says that he was impressed by his practical approach which made him visit Sri Lanka for the fourth time in 1978 [1, pp 463,464].

Despite the positive outlook LKY had on President Jayewardene, as time went by he started seeing his drawbacks, the former thought that the latter’s decision to start a national airline as a symbol of progress and employ a pilot as a chairman of the newly built airline as a weakness [1, p 464]. He finally states Jayewardene retired as a tired man who had run out of solutions [1, p 465], which indicates that his opinion of Jayewardene had changed.

He calls Ranasingha Premadasa, who succeeded him a ‘Sinhala Chauvinist’ [1, p 465] and considers the latter’s decision to remove Indian Soldiers brought down during the Jayawardena government to fight the civil war as insensible [ibid]. He did not have a positive attitude towards Ranasinghe Premadasa.

A few years before his death in an interview he had given to the American journalist Tom Plate he gives his views on the former President and the incumbent Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapaksa as follows: “He thinks he has finished the war, I have read his speeches, I knew he was a Sinhalese extremist and I cannot change his mind” [3], he felt that Rajapaksa was an obstinate leader and extremist.

His View on Sri Lanka’s Economy and Management

LKY was aware that Sri Lanka was a country with wealth. ‘Sri Lanka had large Sterling Reserves’ [2, p 14/22], yet he knew that the country lacked management principles and sound policies that could one day challenge the ability to retain that wealth.

One of his first experiences was when the Prime Minister Dudley Senanayake sent LKY from Colombo to Nuwara Elya by train in a special carriage, the food given on that train was ‘poisonous’, and the crab meal that was served to him was stinking and badly contaminated [1, pg.462], which showed carelessness and irresponsible management by the railway department. He went into the toilet and spewed it all [ibid].

LKY realised that Sri Lankan leaders were not intelligent in identifying priorities. When Jayewardene wanted to start an airline as he thought that it was a symbol of progress, LKY advised him that it should not be his priority because to start an airline one needed many talented and good administrators, in addition to that an airline is a glamour project and is not of great value for developing Sri Lanka [1, p 464] instead he advised the Sri Lankan President that priority should be given to other projects in the country such as irrigation, agriculture, industrial development and housing [ibid].

LKY observed the lack of meritocracy in Sri Lankan administration when Jayewardene decided to employ a pilot as a Chairman of the newly formed Airline, his simple question to him was this: ‘How can an airline pilot run an airline?’ [1, pg.464], he firmly believed that it should be done by a capable administrator. However Jayewardene insisted on it so LKY helped him to launch it in six months with the help of the staff of Singapore Airlines. This was the beginning of Air Lanka (now Sri Lankan Airlines), but it lacked a proper top management and when the newly elected chairman decided to buy certain aircraft against their advice, the Singaporean government decided to withdraw its support.

LKY foresaw that Air Lanka was doomed to fail, and he gave five reasons for it, and they were excessive capacity expansion, negative cash flow, lack of trained staff, unreliable services and insufficient passengers. [1, p 464].

LKY noticed the absence of meritocracy when he saw the condition of the tea estates here; he was very disappointed of the way tea estates were managed and criticised the locals who managed it when he states that ‘the locals who had been promoted were not good supervisors as their British predecessors’ [1, p 463], and as a result there was no strict discipline, plucking was not done appropriately and the tea plantations were in a deplorable condition’[ibid]; if responsibilities are not given based on meritocracy the industries wouldcollapse and as a result the economy of the country is doomed to fail.

LKY’s on the Education System of Sri Lanka and his visit to the Peradeniya University

LKY had a very positive view of the education system introduced by the British in Sri Lanka. He says, ‘It (Sri Lanka) had a relatively good standard of education’ [1, p 462]. He says Sri Lanka had some universities of high quality in Colombo and Kandy (Peradeniya) that was teaching in English [ibid] and before the war they had thick layer of educated talent [2, pg. 14/22], but he was disappointed at its change of medium to local languages and the standards of the education after his visit to the Peradeniya University.

LKY mentions his visit to the Peradeniya University, which he calls the University of Kandy, when he learnt from the Vice Chancellor that the medium of instruction in the university Sinhala for Sinhalese students, Tamil for students from Jaffna and English for Burgher students. [1, pg.463]

LKY asks the Vice Chancellor, ‘How can three engineers educated in three different languages build one bridge?’ And the VC replied: ‘That, Sir is a political question for the ministers to answer’ [1, p 463]. This statement showed how qualified educationists in Sri Lanka became helpless because of the decisions made by politicians.

The Vice Chancellor further mentions that all the basic textbooks which were printed in English had to be translated to Sinhala and Tamil and by the time they were translated and printed, they were three to four editions old; LKY calls this translation a slow and unwieldy process [1, p 463].

Although LKY does not mention the name of the Vice Chancellor, he describes him as a Burgher gentleman who wore a Cambridge University tie, and this description matches Professor E. O. E Periera, who held the position of the Vice Chancellor of Peradeniya University from 1969 to 1971.

Even though LKY was full of praise of the Sri Lankan education system, which was initially conducted in English, after his visit to the Peradeniya University his views changed as he witnessed the switch over from English to local languages and the helplessness of the academics.

What Sri Lanka did was the opposite of what LKY did to Universities in Singapore; he changed the medium of instruction at the Nanyang University in Singapore from Chinese to English, when he realised that it could not be done as the lecturers lacked the proper skills he merged it with the University of Singapore and thus was the beginning of the National University of Singapore [2, p 3/4], several years later reflecting about his decision he says Nanyang University no longer taught in Chinese and its graduates could easily find employment. [1, pg702].

LKY’s view on ethnic problem of Sri Lanka

LKY was very sympathetic towards the Tamils of Sri Lanka. He states that ‘they were active and intelligent fellows who worked hard and got themselves penalised as a result of the domination of the Sinhala majority’ [2, p 14/22]: ‘Sinhalese who are less capable are putting down Tamils who are more capable [3].

He was critical of Sri Lanka’s election. He mentions that ‘one-man-one-vote system did not solve a basic problem’ [1, p 462]. He believed that that the voting system did not give a fair representation. He states, ‘The majority Sinhalese could outvote the Tamils’ [Ibid] and ‘Sri Lanka is a democracy based on one citizen one vote’ [3] and he is not against democracies when they work, but he was against defending countries because of democracy [ibid].

J R Jayewardene told LKY that he was willing to give autonomy control to the Tamil people in Jaffna but later realised that he could not giveaway to the supremacy of Sinhalese to the Tamil, which led to the civil war [1, pg.464].

LKY firmly believed that a political solution was the only way to sort out the ethnic problem of Sri Lanka. During his meetings with President Premadasa he tried to convince him that the conflict could not be solved by force of arms and the political solution was the only way [1, p 465].

LKY believed that the civil war that took place in Sri Lanka destroyed the hope of a prosperous Sri Lanka for many years if not many generations [1, p 464], which is true as every successive government in Sri Lanka from the 1980s had to deal with it and despite ending the war, we are yet overcome the scars and horrors of it.

His view on reasons for Sri Lanka’s failure

LKY thought that S.W.R. D Bandaranaike’s decision to make Sinhala the national language and Buddhism the national religion as the start of the ‘unravelling’ of Ceylon [1, p 460]; he further states that the minority Tamils felt disadvantaged and disposed as a result of it [1, p 462].

He wanted English to be made the primary language of use in Singapore. ‘We inherited the English Language from the British and adopted it as our common working language’ [1, p 78] and when Singapore got independence from the British, the Chinese Chamber of Commerce wanted him to make Chinese the official language of Singapore. Although the Chinese were the majority community in Singapore and LKY was himself a Chinese, his answer to them was ‘You must be mad’. [2, pg.2/4].

LKY was against the concept of welfare. ‘Welfare undermines Self Reliance’ [1, p 126] as he believed everyone had to work. ‘The world does not owe us a living; we cannot live by the begging bowl’ [1, p 70] but successive Sri Lankan governments depended on loans and aid while the people of Sri Lanka depended on welfare and concessions.

In 1994, during a debate in the Singapore Parliament LKY asked, ‘Can you have a good government without having good men in charge?’ [2, pg13/22], his simple view was that you can’t have a good Country without good administrators and referring to Sri Lanka he states, ‘During my visits over the years I watched the promising country go to waste [1, pg.462] and it failed because they had wrong or weak leaders like the Philippines [2, p 15/22].

Conclusion

Was LKY aware that Sri Lanka was looking at Singapore as a model? He did, and what was his opinion about it? He says, ‘It was ‘flattering’ for Sri Lanka to model its Country from Singapore’ [1, pg464]. He knew that Sri Lanka can never be a Singapore.

LKY never wanted any prestige and honour. ‘I had no desire to rewrite the past and perpetuate ourselves by renaming streets or buildings or putting our faces on postage stamps or currency notes’. However, in Sri Lanka majority of the road names in Colombo were changed and many Prime Ministers and Presidents had their faces in postage stamps, coins and banks notes.

LKY ends the chapter on Sri Lanka in his memoir thus: “It’s sad that the country whose ancient name Serendip [sic] has given the English Language the word ‘serendipity’ is now the epitome of conflict, pain, sorrow and hopelessness’ [1, pg.466]. According to the Oxford Dictionary the word serendipity means ‘Something interesting or pleasant happening by chance’.

In another speech, LKY states that Sri Lanka can never be put together again and somebody should have told Sri Lankans to change the system, loosen up or break off [2, pg.14/22]. Today, Sri Lankans have come on to the streets protesting the rulers to leave and change the system, something LKY expected Sri Lanka to do, or the Country would break.

A few years before his death, LKY mentioned that despite the end of the civil war ‘It (Sri Lanka) is not a happy, united country’ [3], so will Sri Lanka groom itself to be a united and a happy Country, this will be possible only if its citizens are confident in achieving it, as Lee Kwan states ‘If I have to choose one word to explain why Singapore succeeded, it is CONFIDENCE’ [1, p 87]. Hopefully, if Sri Lankans move forward with confidence, the country will be able to achieve its goal.



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Opinion

War with Iran and unravelling of the global order – II

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A US airstrike on Iran

Broader Strategic Consequences

One of the most significant strategic consequences of the war is the accelerated erosion of U.S. political and moral hegemony. This is not a sudden phenomenon precipitated solely by the present conflict; rather, the war has served to illuminate an already evolving global reality—that the era of uncontested U.S. dominance is in decline. The resurgence of Donald Trump and the reassertion of his “America First” doctrine reflect deep-seated domestic economic and political challenges within the United States. These internal pressures have, in turn, shaped a more unilateral and inward-looking foreign policy posture, further constraining Washington’s capacity to exercise global leadership.

Moreover, the conduct of the war has significantly undermined the political and moral authority of the United States. Perceived violations of international humanitarian law, coupled with the selective application of international norms, have weakened the credibility of U.S. advocacy for a “rules-based international order.” Such inconsistencies have reinforced perceptions of double standards, particularly among states in the Global South. Skepticism toward Western normative leadership is expected to deepen, contributing to the gradual fragmentation of the international system. In this broader context, the ongoing crisis can be seen as symptomatic of a more fundamental transformation: the progressive waning of a global order historically anchored in U.S. hegemony and the emergence of a more contested and pluralistic international landscape.

The regional implications of the crisis are likely to be profound, particularly given the centrality of the Persian Gulf to the global political economy. As a critical hub of energy production and maritime trade, instability in this region carries systemic consequences that extend far beyond its immediate geography. Whatever may be the outcome, whether through the decisive weakening of Iran or the inability of external powers to dismantle its leadership and strategic capabilities, the post-conflict regional order will differ markedly from its pre-war configuration. In this evolving context, traditional power hierarchies, alliance structures, and deterrence dynamics are likely to undergo significant recalibration.

A key lesson underscored by the war is the deep interconnectivity of the contemporary global economic order. In an era of highly integrated production networks and supply chains, disruptions in a single strategic node can generate cascading effects across the global system. As such, regional conflicts increasingly assume global significance. The structural realities of globalisation make it difficult to contain economic and strategic shocks within regional boundaries, as impacts rapidly transmit through trade, energy, and financial networks. In this context, peace and stability are no longer purely regional concerns but global public goods, essential to the functioning and resilience of the international system

The conflict highlights the emergence of a new paradigm of warfare shaped by the integration of artificial intelligence, cyber capabilities, and unmanned systems. The extensive use of unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs)—a trend previously demonstrated in the Russia–Ukraine War—has been further validated in this theatre. However, unlike the Ukraine conflict, where Western powers have provided sustained military, technological, and financial backing, the present confrontation reflects a more direct asymmetry between a dominant global hegemon and a Global South state. Iran’s deployment of drone swarms and AI-enabled targeting systems illustrates that key elements of Fourth Industrial Revolution (4IR) warfare are no longer confined to technologically advanced Western states. These capabilities are increasingly accessible to Global South actors, lowering barriers to entry and significantly enhancing their capacity to wage effective asymmetric warfare. In this evolving context, technological diffusion is reshaping the strategic landscape, challenging traditional military hierarchies and altering the balance between conventional superiority and innovative, cost-effective combat strategies.

The war further exposed and deepened the weakening of global governance institutions, particularly the United Nations. Many of these institutions were established in 1945, reflecting the balance of power and geopolitical realities of the immediate post-Second World War era. However, the profound transformations in the international system since then have rendered aspects of this institutional architecture increasingly outdated and less effective.

The war has underscored the urgent need for comprehensive international governance reforms to ensure that international institutions remain credible, representative, and capable of addressing contemporary security challenges. The perceived ineffectiveness of UN human rights mechanisms in responding to violations of international humanitarian law—particularly in contexts such as the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and more recently in Iran—has amplified calls for institutional renewal or the development of alternative frameworks for maintaining international peace and security. Moreover, the selective enforcement of international law and the persistent paralysis in conflict resolution mechanisms risk accelerating the fragmentation of global norms. If sustained, this trajectory would signal not merely the weakening but the possible demise of the so-called liberal international order, accelerating the erosion of both the legitimacy and the effective authority of existing multilateral institutions, and deepening the crisis of global governance.

Historically, major wars have often served as harbingers of new eras in international politics, marking painful yet decisive transitions from one order to another. Periods of systemic decline are typically accompanied by instability, uncertainty, and profound disruption; yet, it is through such crises that the contours of an emerging order begin to take shape. The present conflict appears to reflect such a moment of transition, where the strains within the existing global system are becoming increasingly visible.

Notably, key European powers are exhibiting a gradual shift away from exclusive reliance on the U.S. security umbrella, seeking instead a more autonomous and assertive role in global affairs. At the same time, the war is likely to create strategic space for China to expand its influence. As the United States becomes more deeply entangled militarily and politically, China may consolidate its position as a stabilising economic actor and an alternative strategic partner. This could be reflected in intensified energy diplomacy, expanded infrastructure investments, and a more proactive role in regional conflict management, advancing Beijing’s long-term objective of reshaping global governance structures.

However, this transition does not imply a simple replacement of Pax Americana with Pax Sinica. Rather, the emerging global order is likely to be more diffuse, pluralistic, and multilateral in character. In this sense, the ongoing transformation aligns with broader narratives of an “Asian Century,” in which power is redistributed across multiple centers rather than concentrated in a single hegemon. The war, therefore, may ultimately be understood not merely as a geopolitical crisis, but as a defining inflection point in the reconfiguration of the global order.

Conclusion: A New Era on the Horizon

History shows that major wars often signal the birth of new eras—painful, disruptive, yet transformative. The present conflict is no exception. It has exposed the vulnerabilities of the existing world order, challenged U.S. dominance, and revealed the limits of established global governance.

European powers are beginning to chart a more independent course, reducing reliance on the U.S. security umbrella, while China is poised to expand its influence as an economic stabiliser and strategic partner. Through energy diplomacy, infrastructure investments, and active engagement in regional conflicts, Beijing is quietly shaping the contours of a more multipolar world. Yet this is not the rise of Pax Sinica replacing Pax Americana. The emerging order is likely to be multilateral, fluid, and competitive—a world in which multiple powers, old and new, share the stage. The war, in all its turbulence, may therefore mark the dawn of a genuinely new global era, one where uncertainty coexists with opportunity, and where the next chapter of international politics is being written before our eyes.

by Gamini Keerawella
(First part of this article appeared yesterday (08 April)

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Opinion

University admission crisis: Academics must lead the way

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130,000 students are left out each year—academics hold the key

Each year, Sri Lanka’s G.C.E. Advanced Level examination produces a wave of hope—this year, nearly 175,000 students qualified for university entrance. Yet only 45,000 will be admitted to state universities. That leaves more than 130,000 young people stranded—qualified, ambitious, but excluded. This is not just a statistic; it is a national crisis. And while policymakers debate infrastructure and funding, the country’s academics must step forward as catalysts of change.

Beyond the Numbers: A National Responsibility

Education is the backbone of Sri Lanka’s development. Denying access to tens of thousands of qualified students risks wasting talent, fueling inequality, and undermining national progress. The gap is not simply about seats in lecture halls—it is about the future of a generation. Academics, as custodians of knowledge, cannot remain passive observers. They must reimagine the delivery of higher education to ensure opportunity is not a privilege for the few.

Expanding Pathways, Not Just Campuses

The traditional model of four-year degrees in brick-and-mortar universities cannot absorb the demand. Academics can design short-term diplomas and certificate programmes that provide immediate access to learning. These programmes, focused on employable skills, would allow thousands to continue their education while easing pressure on degree programmes. Equally important is the digital transformation of education. Online and blended learning modules can extend access to rural students, breaking the monopoly of physical campuses. With academic leadership, Sri Lanka can build a reliable system of credit transfers, enabling students to begin their studies at affiliated institutions and later transfer to state universities.

Partnerships That Protect Quality

Private universities and vocational institutes already absorb many students who miss out on state admissions. But concerns about quality and recognition persist. Academics can bridge this divide by providing quality assurance and standardised curricula, supervising joint degree programmes, and expanding the Open University system. These partnerships would ensure that students outside the state system receive affordable, credible, and internationally recognised education.

Research and Advocacy: Shaping Policy

Academics are not only teachers—they are researchers and thought leaders. By conducting labour market studies, they can align higher education expansion with employability. Evidence-based recommendations to the University Grants Commission (UGC) can guide strategic intake increases, regional university expansion, and government investment in digital infrastructure. In this way, academics can ensure reforms are not reactive, but visionary.

Industry Engagement: Learning Beyond the Classroom

Sri Lanka’s universities must become entrepreneurship hubs and innovation labs. Academics can design programmes that connect students directly with industries, offering internship-based learning and applied research opportunities. This approach reduces reliance on classroom capacity while equipping students with practical skills. It also reframes education as a partnership between universities and the economy, rather than a closed system.

Making the Most of What We Have

Even within existing constraints, academics can expand capacity. Training junior lecturers and adjunct faculty, sharing facilities across universities, and building international collaborations for joint programmes and scholarships are practical steps. These measures maximise resources while opening new avenues for students.

A Call to Action

Sri Lanka’s university admission crisis is not just about numbers—it is about fairness, opportunity, and national development. Academics must lead the way in transforming exclusion into empowerment. By expanding pathways, strengthening partnerships, advocating for policy reform, engaging with industry, and optimizing resources, they can ensure that qualified students are not left behind.

“Education for all, not just the fortunate few.”

Dr. Arosh Bandula (Ph.D. Nottingham), Senior Lecturer, Department of Agricultural Economics & Agribusiness, Faculty of Agriculture, University of Ruhuna

by Dr. Arosh Bandula

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Opinion

Post-Easter Sri Lanka: Between memory, narrative, and National security

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As Sri Lanka approaches the seventh commemoration of the Easter Sunday attacks, the national mood is once again marked by grief, reflection, and an enduring sense of incompleteness. Nearly seven years later, the tragedy continues to cast a long shadow not only over the victims and their families, but over the institutions and narratives that have since emerged.

Commemoration, however, must go beyond ritual. It must be anchored in clarity, accountability, and restraint. What is increasingly evident in the post-Easter landscape is not merely a search for truth, but a contest over how that truth is framed, interpreted, and presented to the public.

In recent times, public discourse has been shaped by book launches, panel discussions, and media interventions that claim to offer new insights into the attacks. While such contributions are not inherently problematic, the manner in which certain narratives are advanced raises legitimate concerns. The selective disclosure of information particularly when it touches on intelligence operations demands careful scrutiny.

Sri Lanka’s legal and institutional framework is clear on the sensitivity of such matters. The Official Secrets Act (No. 32 of 1955) places strict obligations on the handling of information related to national security. Similarly, the Police Ordinance and internal administrative regulations governing intelligence units emphasize confidentiality, chain of command, and the responsible use of information. These are not mere formalities; they exist to safeguard both operational integrity and national interest.

When individual particularly those with prior access to intelligence structures enter the public domain with claims that are not subject to verification, it raises critical questions. Are these disclosures contributing to justice and accountability, or are they inadvertently compromising institutional credibility and future operational capacity?

The challenge lies in distinguishing between constructive transparency and selective exposure.

The Presidential Commission of Inquiry into the Easter Sunday Attacks provided one of the most comprehensive official examinations of the attacks. Its findings highlighted a complex web of failures: lapses in intelligence sharing, breakdowns in inter-agency coordination, and serious deficiencies in political oversight. Importantly, it underscored that the attacks were not the result of a single point of failure, but a systemic collapse across multiple levels of governance.

Yet, despite the existence of such detailed institutional findings, public discourse often gravitates toward simplified narratives. There is a tendency to identify singular “masterminds” or to attribute responsibility in ways that align with prevailing political or ideological positions. While such narratives may be compelling, they risk obscuring the deeper structural issues that enabled the attacks to occur.

Equally significant is the broader socio-political context in which these narratives are unfolding. Sri Lanka today remains a society marked by fragile intercommunal relations. The aftermath of the Easter attacks saw heightened suspicion, polarisation, and, in some instances, collective blame directed at entire communities. Although there have been efforts toward reconciliation, these fault lines have not entirely disappeared.

In this environment, the language and tone of public discourse carry immense weight. The framing of terrorism whether as a localized phenomenon or as part of a broader ideological construct must be handled with precision and responsibility. Overgeneralization or the uncritical use of labels can have far-reaching consequences, including the marginalization of communities and the erosion of social cohesion.

At the same time, it is essential to acknowledge that the global discourse on terrorism is itself contested. Competing narratives, geopolitical interests, and selective historiography often shape how events are interpreted. For Sri Lanka, the challenge is to avoid becoming a passive recipient of external frameworks that may not fully reflect its own realities.

A professional and unbiased approach requires a commitment to evidence-based analysis. This includes:

· Engaging with primary sources, including official reports and judicial findings
·

· Cross-referencing claims with verifiable data
·

· Recognizing the limits of publicly available information, particularly in intelligence matters

It also requires intellectual discipline the willingness to question assumptions, to resist convenient conclusions, and to remain open to complexity.

The role of former officials and subject-matter experts in this discourse is particularly important. Their experience can provide valuable insights, but it also carries a responsibility. Public interventions must be guided by professional ethics, respect for institutional boundaries, and an awareness of the potential impact on national security.

There is a fine balance to be maintained. On one hand, democratic societies require transparency and accountability. On the other, the premature or uncontextualized release of sensitive information can undermine the very systems that are meant to protect the public.

As Sri Lanka reflects on the events of April 2019, it must resist the temptation to reduce a national tragedy into competing narratives or political instruments. The pursuit of truth must be methodical, inclusive, and grounded in law.

Easter is not only a moment of remembrance. It is a test of institutional maturity and societal resilience.

The real question is not whether new narratives will emerge they inevitably will. The question is whether Sri Lanka has the capacity to engage with them critically, responsibly, and in a manner that strengthens, rather than weakens, the foundations of its national security and social harmony.

In the end, justice is not served by noise or conjecture. It is served by patience, rigor, and an unwavering commitment to truth.

Mahil Dole is a former senior law enforcement officer and national security analyst, with over four decades of experience in policing and intelligence, including serving as Head of Counter-Intelligence at the State Intelligence Service of Sri Lanka and a graduate of the Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies in Hawai, USA.

by Mahil Dole
Former Senior Law Enforcement Officer National Security Analyst; Former Head of Counter-Intelligence, State Intelligence Service)

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