Opinion

Sri Lanka in Lee Kuan Yew’s words

Published

4 years ago

2022/04/22

Prime Minister and Mrs Lee Kuan Yew presenting gifts to President of Sri Lanka Junius Richard (J R) Jayewardene (back to camera), who is on a one-day stopover in Singapore after attending the Commonwealth Heads of Government Regional Meeting in Sydney, during dinner in honour of the visiting Sri Lankan leader at Mandarin Hotel in Orchard Road. Image courtesy of Ministry of Information and the Arts Collection, courtesy of National Archives of Singapore

By Hasala Perera

It is often said that Lee Kuan Yew (LKY) once considered Sri Lanka as a development model, but no one has questioned the veracity of this claim, and it will be interesting to see what he has said about Sri Lanka.

LKY’s views about Sri Lanka have been published in three books, one is his memoirs, ‘From Third World to First’, second in a compilation of his speeches titled ‘LKY -The man and his ideas’ and ‘Giants of Asia – Conversations with LKY’, which contains interviews American journalist Tom Plate had with LKY.

In his book, ‘From Third World to First’, LKY has dedicated an entire chapter to his views of India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, and it titled ‘South Asia’s Legends and Leaders’ and seven out of these 22 pages are devoted to Sri Lanka.

For easy reference, ‘From Third World To First’ as [1], ‘LKY – Man and his ideas’ is mentioned as [2], and ‘Giants of Asia – Conversations with LKY’ as [3] with the corresponding page number where appropriate. It is important to note here that LKY refers to the country both as Ceylon and Sri Lanka.

LKY’s first Impression

LKY visited Sri Lanka on four occasions. His first visit was in 1956 and during each visit he had happened to meet a new leader in the country.

He states that ‘Ceylon was Britain’s model commonwealth country’ [1, p 461] and that ‘Ceylon had more resources and better infrastructure than Singapore’ [1, p 460], he attributes this to Lord Mountbatten’s presence in Kandy [ibid], which could be some proof that he had a positive outlook of Sri Lanka and wished if Singapore had the same infrastructure as Sri Lanka.

He was full of praise of the capital city Colombo when he states that ‘Colombo was a better city than Singapore’ [2, pg.14/22], and he was ‘impressed by the public buildings’ in the city [1, p 460].

His View of Sri Lankan Leaders

LKY gave his opinion on six Premiers of Sri Lanka namely S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike, Dudley Senanayake, Sirimavo Bandaranaike, J.R Jayewardene, Ranasinghe Premadasa and on Mahinda Rajapaksa just a. few years before his death

His first visit to Sri Lanka coincided with the victory of Bandaranaike’s newly created Sri Lanka Freedom Party, he calls him a dapper little man, well dressed, articulate and a ‘Pukka Sahib’ [1, p 460] a term invented by the British to call the inhabitants of their colonies who followed their ways.

LKY says that Bandaranaike was elated to have won the election mandate from a Sinhala majority and he had promised to make Sinhalese the official language and Buddhism the state religion and did not seem troubled by the disadvantage caused by the minorities as a result of it [1, p 460], during his conversations with him he felt that Bandaranaike spoke to him as if he had still been a member of the Oxford Union debating society [1, p461], despite all his effort to be a champion of the Sinhalese Language, he states that three years later he was not surprised to hear about his assassination by a Buddhist monk [ibid].

LKY’s second visit to Sri Lanka was in 1966, when Dudley Senanayake was the prime minister of the Country, who he refers as a gentle, resigned and a fatalistic elderly man [1, p 462], while playing golf together in Colombo he describes an incident where Dudley Senanayake apologised to him about the huts, goats and cows encroached by squatters at the fairway, as he was unable to justify people for keeping open spaces in the city, unlike our present leaders Senanayake quite casually sent LKY by train from Colombo to Nuwara Eliya, where he played a game of golf and witnessed the same problem with the squatters as in Colombo [ibid]. He felt that Senanayake was a weak leader and did not have control over the citizens of the country.

When he visited Sri Lanka for the third time in 1970, the prime minister of Sri Lanka was Sirimavo Bandaranaike, whom he believed had won due to a sympathy vote [1, p 461] but he describes her as a tougher, determined and less voluble leader than her husband S.W.R.D Bandaranaike [ibid]. He praises her policy on the non-aligned ideology, but he is not in favour of her policy-based decision on supporting the removal of US troops from several South East Asian Countries as he felt that Singapore could be at a disadvantage if they were removed as there was a possibility of communism taking over those countries which could have a negative impact on Singapore [ibid].

It was through one of her Cabinet Ministers Felix Dias Bandaranaike that he learnt Sri Lanka spent only 2.5% of its budget on defence [1, p 461], and the reason he gives is that Sri Lanka is “blessed” with peace and security as a result of its good fortune in geography and history. LKY calls him a bright but an ‘unprofound’ person, but despite its ‘blessings’ he ironically mentions that 10 years later Sri Lanka spends more than half of its budget on defence and arms to crush a rebellion that took place inside the Country [ibid], he is the only Sri Lankan minister ever mentioned by him.

LKY further states the futility of Mrs Bandaranaike’s decision to change the name of the country from ‘Ceylon’ to ‘Sri Lanka’ and making the country a republic as it did not improve the fortunes of the country, the best example he takes here is that Sri Lankan Tea was still been sold as Ceylon Tea [1, pg.463] as a matter of fact even to this day Sri Lankan Tea is known as Ceylon Tea. He further states that by changing names sometimes you could deceive gods, but you can’t deceive the people who live in it [2, pg.15/22]

His meeting with President J R Jayewardene took place outside Sri Lanka, which was at the CHOGRM Conference held in Sydney. He says that during this meeting Jayewardene wanted Sri Lanka to move away from socialist policies which had bankrupted the country and wanted Singapore to get involved in the development of Sri Lanka; he says that he was impressed by his practical approach which made him visit Sri Lanka for the fourth time in 1978 [1, pp 463,464].

Despite the positive outlook LKY had on President Jayewardene, as time went by he started seeing his drawbacks, the former thought that the latter’s decision to start a national airline as a symbol of progress and employ a pilot as a chairman of the newly built airline as a weakness [1, p 464]. He finally states Jayewardene retired as a tired man who had run out of solutions [1, p 465], which indicates that his opinion of Jayewardene had changed.

He calls Ranasingha Premadasa, who succeeded him a ‘Sinhala Chauvinist’ [1, p 465] and considers the latter’s decision to remove Indian Soldiers brought down during the Jayawardena government to fight the civil war as insensible [ibid]. He did not have a positive attitude towards Ranasinghe Premadasa.

A few years before his death in an interview he had given to the American journalist Tom Plate he gives his views on the former President and the incumbent Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapaksa as follows: “He thinks he has finished the war, I have read his speeches, I knew he was a Sinhalese extremist and I cannot change his mind” [3], he felt that Rajapaksa was an obstinate leader and extremist.

His View on Sri Lanka’s Economy and Management

LKY was aware that Sri Lanka was a country with wealth. ‘Sri Lanka had large Sterling Reserves’ [2, p 14/22], yet he knew that the country lacked management principles and sound policies that could one day challenge the ability to retain that wealth.

One of his first experiences was when the Prime Minister Dudley Senanayake sent LKY from Colombo to Nuwara Elya by train in a special carriage, the food given on that train was ‘poisonous’, and the crab meal that was served to him was stinking and badly contaminated [1, pg.462], which showed carelessness and irresponsible management by the railway department. He went into the toilet and spewed it all [ibid].

LKY realised that Sri Lankan leaders were not intelligent in identifying priorities. When Jayewardene wanted to start an airline as he thought that it was a symbol of progress, LKY advised him that it should not be his priority because to start an airline one needed many talented and good administrators, in addition to that an airline is a glamour project and is not of great value for developing Sri Lanka [1, p 464] instead he advised the Sri Lankan President that priority should be given to other projects in the country such as irrigation, agriculture, industrial development and housing [ibid].

LKY observed the lack of meritocracy in Sri Lankan administration when Jayewardene decided to employ a pilot as a Chairman of the newly formed Airline, his simple question to him was this: ‘How can an airline pilot run an airline?’ [1, pg.464], he firmly believed that it should be done by a capable administrator. However Jayewardene insisted on it so LKY helped him to launch it in six months with the help of the staff of Singapore Airlines. This was the beginning of Air Lanka (now Sri Lankan Airlines), but it lacked a proper top management and when the newly elected chairman decided to buy certain aircraft against their advice, the Singaporean government decided to withdraw its support.

LKY foresaw that Air Lanka was doomed to fail, and he gave five reasons for it, and they were excessive capacity expansion, negative cash flow, lack of trained staff, unreliable services and insufficient passengers. [1, p 464].

LKY noticed the absence of meritocracy when he saw the condition of the tea estates here; he was very disappointed of the way tea estates were managed and criticised the locals who managed it when he states that ‘the locals who had been promoted were not good supervisors as their British predecessors’ [1, p 463], and as a result there was no strict discipline, plucking was not done appropriately and the tea plantations were in a deplorable condition’[ibid]; if responsibilities are not given based on meritocracy the industries wouldcollapse and as a result the economy of the country is doomed to fail.

LKY’s on the Education System of Sri Lanka and his visit to the Peradeniya University

LKY had a very positive view of the education system introduced by the British in Sri Lanka. He says, ‘It (Sri Lanka) had a relatively good standard of education’ [1, p 462]. He says Sri Lanka had some universities of high quality in Colombo and Kandy (Peradeniya) that was teaching in English [ibid] and before the war they had thick layer of educated talent [2, pg. 14/22], but he was disappointed at its change of medium to local languages and the standards of the education after his visit to the Peradeniya University.

LKY mentions his visit to the Peradeniya University, which he calls the University of Kandy, when he learnt from the Vice Chancellor that the medium of instruction in the university Sinhala for Sinhalese students, Tamil for students from Jaffna and English for Burgher students. [1, pg.463]

LKY asks the Vice Chancellor, ‘How can three engineers educated in three different languages build one bridge?’ And the VC replied: ‘That, Sir is a political question for the ministers to answer’ [1, p 463]. This statement showed how qualified educationists in Sri Lanka became helpless because of the decisions made by politicians.

The Vice Chancellor further mentions that all the basic textbooks which were printed in English had to be translated to Sinhala and Tamil and by the time they were translated and printed, they were three to four editions old; LKY calls this translation a slow and unwieldy process [1, p 463].

Although LKY does not mention the name of the Vice Chancellor, he describes him as a Burgher gentleman who wore a Cambridge University tie, and this description matches Professor E. O. E Periera, who held the position of the Vice Chancellor of Peradeniya University from 1969 to 1971.

Even though LKY was full of praise of the Sri Lankan education system, which was initially conducted in English, after his visit to the Peradeniya University his views changed as he witnessed the switch over from English to local languages and the helplessness of the academics.

What Sri Lanka did was the opposite of what LKY did to Universities in Singapore; he changed the medium of instruction at the Nanyang University in Singapore from Chinese to English, when he realised that it could not be done as the lecturers lacked the proper skills he merged it with the University of Singapore and thus was the beginning of the National University of Singapore [2, p 3/4], several years later reflecting about his decision he says Nanyang University no longer taught in Chinese and its graduates could easily find employment. [1, pg702].

LKY’s view on ethnic problem of Sri Lanka

LKY was very sympathetic towards the Tamils of Sri Lanka. He states that ‘they were active and intelligent fellows who worked hard and got themselves penalised as a result of the domination of the Sinhala majority’ [2, p 14/22]: ‘Sinhalese who are less capable are putting down Tamils who are more capable [3].

He was critical of Sri Lanka’s election. He mentions that ‘one-man-one-vote system did not solve a basic problem’ [1, p 462]. He believed that that the voting system did not give a fair representation. He states, ‘The majority Sinhalese could outvote the Tamils’ [Ibid] and ‘Sri Lanka is a democracy based on one citizen one vote’ [3] and he is not against democracies when they work, but he was against defending countries because of democracy [ibid].

J R Jayewardene told LKY that he was willing to give autonomy control to the Tamil people in Jaffna but later realised that he could not giveaway to the supremacy of Sinhalese to the Tamil, which led to the civil war [1, pg.464].

LKY firmly believed that a political solution was the only way to sort out the ethnic problem of Sri Lanka. During his meetings with President Premadasa he tried to convince him that the conflict could not be solved by force of arms and the political solution was the only way [1, p 465].

LKY believed that the civil war that took place in Sri Lanka destroyed the hope of a prosperous Sri Lanka for many years if not many generations [1, p 464], which is true as every successive government in Sri Lanka from the 1980s had to deal with it and despite ending the war, we are yet overcome the scars and horrors of it.

His view on reasons for Sri Lanka’s failure

LKY thought that S.W.R. D Bandaranaike’s decision to make Sinhala the national language and Buddhism the national religion as the start of the ‘unravelling’ of Ceylon [1, p 460]; he further states that the minority Tamils felt disadvantaged and disposed as a result of it [1, p 462].

He wanted English to be made the primary language of use in Singapore. ‘We inherited the English Language from the British and adopted it as our common working language’ [1, p 78] and when Singapore got independence from the British, the Chinese Chamber of Commerce wanted him to make Chinese the official language of Singapore. Although the Chinese were the majority community in Singapore and LKY was himself a Chinese, his answer to them was ‘You must be mad’. [2, pg.2/4].

LKY was against the concept of welfare. ‘Welfare undermines Self Reliance’ [1, p 126] as he believed everyone had to work. ‘The world does not owe us a living; we cannot live by the begging bowl’ [1, p 70] but successive Sri Lankan governments depended on loans and aid while the people of Sri Lanka depended on welfare and concessions.

In 1994, during a debate in the Singapore Parliament LKY asked, ‘Can you have a good government without having good men in charge?’ [2, pg13/22], his simple view was that you can’t have a good Country without good administrators and referring to Sri Lanka he states, ‘During my visits over the years I watched the promising country go to waste [1, pg.462] and it failed because they had wrong or weak leaders like the Philippines [2, p 15/22].

Conclusion

Was LKY aware that Sri Lanka was looking at Singapore as a model? He did, and what was his opinion about it? He says, ‘It was ‘flattering’ for Sri Lanka to model its Country from Singapore’ [1, pg464]. He knew that Sri Lanka can never be a Singapore.

LKY never wanted any prestige and honour. ‘I had no desire to rewrite the past and perpetuate ourselves by renaming streets or buildings or putting our faces on postage stamps or currency notes’. However, in Sri Lanka majority of the road names in Colombo were changed and many Prime Ministers and Presidents had their faces in postage stamps, coins and banks notes.

LKY ends the chapter on Sri Lanka in his memoir thus: “It’s sad that the country whose ancient name Serendip [sic] has given the English Language the word ‘serendipity’ is now the epitome of conflict, pain, sorrow and hopelessness’ [1, pg.466]. According to the Oxford Dictionary the word serendipity means ‘Something interesting or pleasant happening by chance’.

In another speech, LKY states that Sri Lanka can never be put together again and somebody should have told Sri Lankans to change the system, loosen up or break off [2, pg.14/22]. Today, Sri Lankans have come on to the streets protesting the rulers to leave and change the system, something LKY expected Sri Lanka to do, or the Country would break.

A few years before his death, LKY mentioned that despite the end of the civil war ‘It (Sri Lanka) is not a happy, united country’ [3], so will Sri Lanka groom itself to be a united and a happy Country, this will be possible only if its citizens are confident in achieving it, as Lee Kwan states ‘If I have to choose one word to explain why Singapore succeeded, it is CONFIDENCE’ [1, p 87]. Hopefully, if Sri Lankans move forward with confidence, the country will be able to achieve its goal.

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Opinion

Sri Lanka’s geopolitical positioning for future prosperity

Published

14 hours ago

2026/09/25

Thilina Walpola

Kariyawasam

By Chula Goonasekera
For the LEADS Forum (admin@srilankaleads.com)

Sri Lanka’s future prosperity will depend on how effectively it positions itself within an increasingly complex global environment. At a recent LEADS Forum discussion (https://youtu.be/Bbr3e_qU1Fw), veteran diplomat Prasad Kariyawasam, former Secretary to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, High Commissioner to India, Ambassador to the United States, Ambassador /Permanent Representative to the UN in New York and Geneva —outlined the strategic choices Sri Lanka must make to secure long term stability and economic advancement. Kariyawasam offered a rare blend of historical perspective, diplomatic experience and practical guidance.

His central message was clear: Sri Lanka must exercise strategic agency—engaging all major partners while safeguarding its national interests.

Foreign Policy as an Extension of National Aspirations

Foreign policy, Kariyawasam emphasised, is inseparable from domestic priorities. As your text notes, “foreign relations often reflect the medium- and long-term aspirations of a country’s people and its leadership.” Governments must therefore craft external relations that reflect the public’s economic and social expectations, avoiding short-term political impulses that undermine long-term national interests.

For a small nation, foreign policy cannot be symbolic or personality driven. It must be purposeful, pragmatic and directed towards the security and prosperity of the people.

A History of Global Connectivity

Sri Lanka’s history demonstrates that the island has never been isolated. From ancient ties with India and Southeast Asia to Arab, Persian and Chinese maritime networks, the island prospered when connected to the wider world. We must realise that “geography creates opportunity, but geography alone does not create prosperity.” Institutions, infrastructure and policy determine whether geographic advantage becomes economic success.

Colombo’s emergence as a cosmopolitan trading hub and Galle’s role as a resupply station for Indian Ocean shipping in colonial times , illustrate how deeply Sri Lanka has been embedded in global commerce for centuries.

Lessons from Asia’s High Performers

Kariyawasam highlighted the experiences of Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Vietnam. Their paths differ, but their success rests on common foundations:

• investment in human capital and infrastructure

• merit based institutions

• integration into global markets

• attraction of investment and technology

• export oriented industries

• strategic engagements with both China and Western economies

The lesson for Sri Lanka is not imitation but continuous adaptation and constructive integration with the global economy.

India: Sri Lanka’s Closest Major Partner

India’s transformation into a global economic power presents Sri Lanka with both opportunity and responsibility. India is already Sri Lanka’s largest source of tourists and a major investor. Kariyawasam states, “The larger question is how effectively Sri Lanka can participate in and benefit from India’s growth.”

A partnership should encompass modern, more open pathways for trade, investment, logistics, energy, technology, digital services, education and professional mobility—And asymmetry between the two economies must be handled with maturity and foresight, seeking special and differential treatment .

China and Other Global Partners

China remains a significant economic partner. Sri Lanka must avoid viewing this relationship through a zero sum lens. The goal should be productive and transparent engagement, ensuring better terms of trade and meaningful technology transfer.

Equally Important relations must be nurtured with the United States, European Union, United Kingdom, Japan, Australia, ASEAN and the Gulf.

All these relationships can be vibrant partnerships that does not lead towards , dependency but mutually beneficial pragmatic arrangements .

A Fragmenting International System

Global geopolitics is becoming more volatile. Trade tensions, wars, sanctions, supply chain disruptions, climate change and technological competition increasingly shape national security. We must realise, “foreign policy cannot be separated from economic policy.”

Sri Lanka’s recent economic crisis demonstrated the importance of international confidence, access to finance and resilient supply chains. Energy security, food security, cybersecurity and digital infrastructure are now core elements of national strategy.

Strategic Agency: The Guiding Principle

Sri Lanka must avoid becoming an arena for great power competition. Strategic agency means making decisions based on national interest, expanding Sri Lanka’s choices, not restricting them.

India is essential. China is important. The United States, Europe, Japan, Australia, ASEAN and the Gulf are important. The objective is a web of partnerships that strengthens resilience and autonomy.

Sri Lanka’s Strategic Assets

1. Location: Sri Lanka’s geography is a long standing advantage. Ports such as Colombo, Hambantota, Trincomalee and Galle can become specialised hubs—if connected to logistics, manufacturing, services and exports.

2. Digital Connectivity: Submarine cables, data centres, cloud services and cybersecurity are now as important as physical geography. Sri Lanka can turn its location into both a maritime and digital advantage.

3. Tourism and Natural Heritage: The focus should shift from tourist numbers to value creation—wellness, heritage, ecotourism, cruise tourism, education and MICE tourism.

4. Human Resources and Demographics: High literacy is no longer enough. Skills in technology, engineering, AI, logistics and advanced manufacturing are essential, especially with an ageing population.

5. Migrant Workforce: Migrant workers are a strategic asset, not merely a source of remittances. Bilateral labour agreements, skills recognition and diaspora engagement should be central to foreign policy.

Requirements for Sustained Prosperity

Sri Lanka’s future depends on:

• peace and security

• access to international markets

• productive investment

• a skilled, productive workforce

• modernised agriculture

• higher value tourism

• demographic preparedness

• climate resilience

• strong, predictable institutions

Please note that “foreign policy can open doors. Domestic institutions determine whether we can walk through them.”

The Role of the State

Sri Lanka does not need a larger state—only a more capable one. Policy continuity, professional institutions, predictable regulation and reduced corruption are essential. Geography does not change; long-term national interests do not change. Intentional relationships built over decades should not be reinvented with each election cycle.

Building Trust Internationally

Trust is a strategic asset. Sri Lanka must be known as a country that honours commitments and maintains predictable policies. This is vital not only for diplomacy but also for investment and long term partnerships.

Avoiding Zero Sum Geopolitics

Sri Lanka does not need to choose between India and China, or between Asia and the West. The task is to identify what each relationship can contribute to national development while protecting sovereignty and freedom of decision making.

Sri Lanka’s geography is an inheritance, but prosperity is not guaranteed. The world is changing rapidly—great-power competition, technological disruption, and climate vulnerability demand a foreign policy that is pragmatic, adaptive, and anchored in national interest.

Sri Lanka must build partnerships without dependencies, maintain strategic agency without isolation, and integrate with the global economy while strengthening domestic capacity.

“We cannot change where Sri Lanka is. We can, however, determine what Sri Lanka becomes because of where it is”

Opinion

A tariff deal with the US? Make haste slowly

Published

2 days ago

2026/09/24

Sahan Weerasooriya

by Gomi Senadhira

Sri Lanka’s former ambassador to the United States Mahinda Samarasinghe is back in Sri Lanka lobbying for speedier finalisation of a new tariff deal with the United States. According to news reports, delivering the keynote address at the Sri Lanka Institute of Directors’ Annual Meeting last week, he stated, “I have recommended very strongly to the government that we need to conclude the agreement so that we can lock in the very favourable tariff rate that Sri Lanka has got up to now“.

I do not understand why the former ambassador is urging the government to expedite the finalisation of a new tariff deal or what is “the very favourable tariff rate” he refers to in his speech. However, given the ongoing terrible tariff turbulence in the United States and the fragile economic situation in Sri Lanka, I believe, this is not the right time to rush into finalising any trade agreement with the United States. I am also of the opinion that at this juncture Sri Lanka should maintain strategic patience and explore all available options.

Lessons from the countries that rushed for trade deals

To better comprehend this, let’s look at experiences of the countries that rushed to conclude tariff deals with the United States after President Donald Trump declared his “reciprocal tariffs” under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) in April 2025. As Samarasinghe stated in his keynote, “The bottom line on all these negotiations was that every country that finally agreed to sign the agreement had to give either complete duty-free access for American exports into those markets, or near complete duty-free access.” In exchange for these tariff concessions and other market access commitments these countries managed to get the newly introduced country specific “reciprocal tariffs” reduced.

However, in February 2026, the Supreme Court of the United States (SCOTUS) struck down these “reciprocal tariffs” under the IEEPA. With that, the market access gains these countries received in exchange for complete duty-free access for American exports into their markets evaporated under U.S. domestic law. By moving too fast to conclude bilateral tariff agreements with the United States these countries are now bound to strict obligations whereas the benefits they bargained from the U.S. administration are not worth the paper those were written on.

Sri Lanka’s experience

In April 2025, President Trump declared his “reciprocal tariffs” and labelled Sri Lanka as the worst offender, imposing one of the highest additional duties at 44%. Since then, Ambassador Samarasinghe and other negotiators have managed to negotiate this down to 20%. I do not know what the deal was through which Sri Lanka managed to reduce the 44% tariff to 20% or what we gave in return for this “concession.” However, what we received in return has absolutely no value after the decision by the SCOTUS.

Current state of US tariffs

After the decision by SCOTUS, the U.S. administration introduced a temporary 10% additional tariff on all countries for 150 days. At the end of that period, this 10% tariff was replaced by a new “forced labor tariff ” of 10% to 12.5% on all trading partners under Section 301 of U.S. trade law. Twenty-five U.S. states and several small businesses have already filed lawsuits against these tariffs in U.S. courts. This new “forced labour tariff ” on Sri Lanka was first fixed at 12.5%. Later, after President Anura Kumara Dissanayake issued a gazette notice prohibiting the importation of goods produced using forced labour, it was reduced to 10%. That means Sri Lanka has already made a substantial commitment to receive this “tariff concession,” and I presume our negotiators understand the implications of this commitment.

Make haste slowly

After President Trump imposed 44% “reciprocal tariffs” on Sri Lanka, through an article published in The Island on 25th April 2026 (), I urged the government to engage immediately with the US administration on these tariffs. However, I also emphasised that the best way to move forward was to make haste slowly.

Two millennia ago, Augustus Caesar, the first emperor of Rome, frequently used the phrase, “make haste slowly”, because he detested rashness and haste in his military commanders. It was the recurring guiding maxim that he emphasised throughout his 40-year imperial rule. After 2000 years, this classical oxymoron remains a definitive golden rule for professional trade negotiators. More importantly it is the exact blueprint required when navigating turbulence in trade negotiations with the Trump administration.

The endgame – The most dangerous moment in trade negotiation

Samarasinghe has also stated the agreement is 90% complete. Any experienced trade negotiator should know that the final 10% contains high-stakes provisions and is the most dangerous moment in a trade negotiation. A single misplaced comma or ambiguous product description in a tariff schedule can cost millions through unintended loopholes. Rushing this last stretch to secure a deal can permanently expose Sri Lanka to sudden shifts in American trade policy, heavy compliance costs, or strict enforcement under Section 301 regarding supply-chain labour standards. Hence, this is the time for strategic patience.

(The writer can be reached at senadhiragomi@gmail.com)

Opinion

Buddhist law and constitutional amendments

Published

2 days ago

2026/09/24

Sahan Weerasooriya

Upon reading the article titled “Prof. Pieris says Buddha Dhamma recognized as source of law under Constitution” (Island, September 12, 2026), the classical Sinhala idiom “Yanne Koheda? Malle Pol” immediately comes to mind. The expression, translating literally to answering “I have coconuts in my bag” when asked “Where are you going?”, underscores a complete disconnect in logic. Because it is uncertain whether the article accurately represents the professor’s precise words, the following critique addresses the contents of the report rather than the speaker himself.

The central premise of the report concerns a statement delivered by the Chief Justice regarding a petition filed against the 22nd Amendment to the Constitution. According to the report, the Chief Justice’s observation that the determination would be made strictly on the basis of established law rather than Buddhist teachings was characterised as a “cavalier dismissal” of the Buddha Dhamma. This assertion carries a host of unexamined assumptions. Had the writer specified precisely which tenets of the Buddha Dhamma were violated, a direct legal or philosophical evaluation could take place. However, no specific Buddhist tenet or law was identified as having been transgressed, and for good reason: no such statutory legal framework exists within the Buddha’s teachings.

To understand the flaw in this argument, one must examine the constitutional context alongside the canonical meaning of the terms involved. Article 9 of the 1978 Constitution of Sri Lanka mandates that the Republic shall give Buddhism the foremost place and that it shall be the duty of the State to protect and foster the Buddha Sasana, while guaranteeing the fundamental rights of all religions under Articles 10 and 14(1)(e).

While “Buddhism” and “Buddha Dhamma” are frequently used as interchangeable terms in casual dialogue, they represent distinct concepts. “Buddhism” is an umbrella term coined by 19th-century Western scholars to classify the global institutionalised religion, incorporating its diverse sects, cultural traditions, rituals, and socio-political histories. Conversely, Sasana is the ancient term designating the structural framework established by the Buddha to preserve and transmit his teachings, comprising the monastic order (Sangha) and its supporting institutions.

In classical Theravada commentarial literature, the Sasana operates as a functional three-tiered structure. It encompasses Pariyatti Sasana, the preservation and study of sacred texts; Paṭipatti Sasana, the practical execution of the doctrine through ethical conduct and meditation; and Paṭivedha Sasana, the direct experiential realization of ultimate truth, or enlightenment. This structural breakdown raises fundamental questions about state capacity. While a state can readily support Pariyatti Sasana through academic institutions, textual preservation, and educational funding, it cannot legislate or enforce Paṭipatti or Paṭivedha. Practical engagement and spiritual realisation are inherently internal, first-person experiences. Expecting the state to codify or guarantee enlightenment is a conceptual impossibility.

Furthermore, the Buddha Dhamma refers specifically to the unconditioned truths of existence and the teachings imparted to realize them, including the Four Noble Truths, the Eightfold Path, and Dependent Origination. As the late Venerable Professor Kotagama Wachissara Thera observed, there is no rigid ideologue or “ism” in the core Dhamma. The teachings do not constitute a system of divine commandments or a legal statute enforced through reward and punishment. Rather, Buddhist ethics function as self-directed guidelines for psychological clarity and moral inquiry. Even the Vinaya Pitaka, which contains explicit rules of conduct, functions as an internal monastic code rather than a civil or criminal law intended for the laity.

Throughout the Pali Canon, guidance regarding governance focuses on the moral character of leadership and the social duties of statecraft rather than rigid legal codification. In discourses such as the Cakkavatti Sihanada Sutta (DN 26), the Buddha observes that social instability and crime cannot be eliminated solely through punitive measures, emphasising instead that states must provide economic opportunities, fair wages, and resource distribution to maintain societal balance. Crucially, in the Maha Parinibbana Sutta (DN 16), the Buddha explicitly highlights the importance of respecting established laws and traditions rather than enacting arbitrary regulations.

The natural laws articulated in the Dhamma, such as the law of cause and effect or the three characteristics of existence, govern all phenomena universally, regardless of legal statutes or personal belief. They are not human laws to be applied or suspended by a court of law. Therefore, characterizing the Chief Justice’s adherence to constitutional jurisprudence over religious doctrine as a “cavalier dismissal” lacks logical and textual foundation. Framing the judiciary’s adherence to legal precedent as an attack on the Dhamma distracts from fundamental constitutional principles and risks misguiding the public for political ends.

Geewananda
Gunawardana,
Ph.D.