Features
Significance of Ceylon-China Trade Agreement of 1952
by Dr. J. B. Kelegama
Excerpts from the keynote address at the 50 th anniversary celebrations of the historic “Rubber-Rice Pact” between Sri Lanka and China at the BMICH on December 20, 2002
I am honoured by the invitation of the Sri Lanka-China Business Cooperation Council and the Sri Lanka-China Society to deliver today the keynote address on the occasion of the golden jubilee celebrations of the historic Rubber-Rice Pact between Sri Lanka and China signed in December 1952.
I accepted this invitation with alacrity and pleasure, firstly because I have conducted negotiations with China and actually implemented the Agreement over a period of about 12 years in my capacity as a senior government official, secondly, because I have visited China seven or eight times both as a government official and a UN consultant and thirdly, because I have been a student of China’s economic development for many years and written and published several articles on China’s economic and trade issues, under my own name as well as under pen-names.
Further, I had the privilege of speaking on this subject at the death anniversary of Mr. R. G. Senanayake some years back, on the invitation of no less a person than Mrs. R. G. Senanayake herself.
The Ceylon-China Trade Agreement of 1952 was undoubtedly the most useful trade agreement negotiated by Sri Lanka and one of the most successful and durable trade agreements in the world, having been in operation for 30 years. It is therefore useful to assess the significance of the agreement and to refresh our memory regarding the circumstances that led to it and the person who played the key role in bringing it about – R. G. Senanayake.
Rice shortage
1952 was a very bad year for Sri Lanka. Premier D. S. Senanayake had died and Dudley Senanayake had just formed a new government when the country had to face a world shortage of rice.
The Government was committed at that time to provide every adult person with two measures of rice per week at a subsidised price, but rice was not available from the traditional suppliers – Burma, Thailand and Indo-China – and the world market price of rice had risen by 38 per cent between 1951 and 1952.
Sri Lanka was therefore compelled to buy 60,000 tons of rice from the USA and 10,000 tons from Ecuador at high prices, although this variety of rice was not suitable to the Sri Lankan palate. She was however not in a position to buy all the rice she needed at this high price as her foreign exchange resources were limited; besides, distribution of this rice would have pushed the food subsidy bill to intolerable levels.
The country was also facing a foreign exchange crisis in 1952 caused by a dramatic fall in her export prices brought about by the quick end of the Korean War boom. The end of the Korean War and the drastic reduction of commodity purchases by the West – in particular, of natural rubber by the United States – led to a collapse of Sri Lanka’s export prices by 23 per cent between 1951 and 1952.
The price of natural rubber declined by 36 per cent, of tea by 10 per cent, and of coconut oil by 40 per cent. Import prices increased by 8 per cent and terms-of-trade fell by 28 per cent. The trade surplus of Rs. 345 million in 1951 turned into a trade deficit of Rs. 200 million in 1952 and external assets fell by 30 per cent. In this critical situation Sri Lanka attempted to negotiate with the USA for a loan of US$50 million and for favourable prices for rubber exports and rice imports, but failed. The country was facing an unprecedented crisis: she could not find enough rice to feed her people and she had no prospect of a favourable market for her rubber exports.
It was in this grim setting that R. G. Senanayake, the then Minister of Commerce, played his master stroke. He found out that China was prepared to sell rice to Sri Lanka in exchange for rubber. At that time China was unable to obtain rubber as a result of prohibition of rubber exports from Malaya following a UN resolution preventing the sale of rubber to China. Thus China wanted rubber as badly as Sri Lanka wanted rice. R. G. Senanayake was quick to realise the mutual benefits of trade with China, and negotiated the Ceylon-China Trade Agreement or the Rubber-Rice Pact in Beijing towards the end of 1952. He stated in Parliament.
“We waited for foreign aid, foreign assistance. As you know Sir, over and over again, we made appeals for Point Four aid, we waited four long years. We have got in the form of assistance only a cook for the Kundasale Girls’ School. Therefore in these circumstances, it was necessary that we should go where it was possible to get our requirements.”
Opposition
The Agreement was negotiated in the teeth of opposition from some of his own colleagues in the Cabinet. Indeed, the opposition of J. R. Jayewardene, the Minister of Finance, was well known. The Cabinet was advised by the newly created Central Bank under an American Governor. Opposition also came from R. G. Senanayake’s predecessor in the ministerial post, from the American Government, and from some of the local newspapers which carried on a virulent press campaign against any dealings with Communist China. S. P. Amarasingham’s informative book “Rice and Rubber: The Story of China-Ceylon Trade” provides a detailed account of the strong opposition R. G. Senanayake had to face in negotiating the Agreement.
The American Government invoked the Battle Act which prevented it from giving aid to countries selling strategic materials to Communist countries and cut off aid to Sri Lanka. In addition, she stopped selling sulphur needed by Sri Lanka’s rubber plantations. This was the price that had to be paid for trading with China.
Prime Minister, Dudley Senanayake, however, fully backed his Minister of Commerce and was prepared to pay this price; he realised that the benefits to Sri Lanka from the agreement far outweighed losses consequent to the cutting-off of American aid. He argued:
“Ceylon’s old trade pattern has been knocked out by changes in the world market and we have to seek new markets for our needs of essential foodstuffs and for our exports.”
Rebutting the charges that the Trade Agreement was opening the door to communist influences in Sri Lanka, he pointed out:
“Communism thrives in many places not through an understanding of that particular ideology but through poverty and want. I am confident that our Trade Agreement with China will instead of opening doors to communism help us to stand firmer against it.”
It is a tribute to the two Senanayakes that they displayed remarkable pragmatism and courage in negotiating the Trade Agreement. They did not allow their prejudices or ideological considerations to stand in the way of deciding what was in the best interests of the Country; nor were they intimidated by threats of big powers.
R. G. Senanayake stated:
“I have always held the view that political ideologies should not stand in the ways of countries trading with each other if that trade is to their mutual advantage.”
He foresaw as far back as 1952, the emergence of China as a world power. He stated in a speech: “Talking of China in particular, it would be unrealistic to ignore a nation of 500 million in our continent with a united and cohesive government for the first time in many centuries. She is bound to be a major factor in world trade.”
As he foresaw, China has now become the seventh largest exporter in the world and the largest trader among developing countries whose purchases and sales influence the world markets. In 2000 for instance, her exports were US$249 billion and imports US$225 billion. If we include Hong Kong’s trade with China (as the greater part of Hong Kong’s trade is entrepot trade with China) then China becomes the fourth largest exporter in the world after the USA, Germany and Japan, its exports amounting to $452 billion.
The Agreement
The Trade Agreement signed in 1952 was for five years and renewable; there was, however, an annual Trade Protocol specifying the quantities of commodities to be exchanged in the ensuing year, which had to be negotiated every year. The trade was based on barter – exports and imports to balance every year; only the outstanding balance at the end-of-the-year was to be settled in foreign exchange.
Trade however was rarely balanced in the following years but the outstanding balance was generally carried forward to the next year without settlement in foreign exchange.
In the first part of the agreement there were specific commitments by Sri Lanka to purchase rice, and for China to buy rubber; the values were to balance. Thus in 1953, Sri Lanka agreed to buy 270,000 tons of rice from China which in turn agreed to purchase 50,000 tons of rubber; these quantities were exchanged on the basis of world market prices and were equal in value. In addition, China agreed to pay a premium price for rubber over the world market (Singapore) price and further, handling charges for rubber exports in Colombo.
Thus in 1953, China paid for Sri Lanka rubber Rs. 1.74 per lb. whereas the average world market price was Rs. 1.05 per lb. This premium varied with every five-year agreement. The handling charge which was fixed at five cents per lb. too varied in subsequent years. China also agreed to supply rice to Sri Lanka below market prices – at 54 pounds or Rs. 720 per ton in 1953.
Thus Sri Lanka benefited both ways from the agreement. The second part of the agreement covered trade in other commodities – those Sri Lanka and China wanted to buy and sell – but without specific commitments; the total value of exports and imports however were expected to balance every year. In view of the substantial mutual benefits, the Trade Agreement was renewed every five years by R. G. Senanayake’s successors in his ministerial post – in 1958, 1962, 1967, 1972 and 1977 – and was wound up, in the sense that the barter element was given up, in 1982 when it was found that the barter of rice and rubber was no longer in mutual interest. Sri Lanka had almost reached self-sufficiency in rice and needed only very small quantities from abroad while China was able to purchase rubber from several rubber producing countries without restriction and without paying a premium.
R. G. Senanayake paid an important tribute to China after negotiating the Trade Agreement, when he concluded his Cabinet paper on the subject in the following words:
“We noted on the Chinese side the absence of the spirit of bargaining and haggling on comparatively small points. On the other hand, they gave us the impression of being large-minded and forthright in their dealings.”
I can confirm this as I conducted trade negotiations with China over a dozen times. Benefits
The significance of the Ceylon-China Trade Agreement lies in the positive benefits Ceylon received during the thirty years of its duration. Those benefits exceeded expectation as China expressed her gratitude to Sri Lanka for supplying her rubber when other rubber producers were not prepared to do so and in spite of the opposition and denial of aid by the US Government. These benefits are discussed in detail below.
(1) The premium over world market price for rubber was estimated between Rs. 68 and Rs. 95 million in 1953 alone. It was about 56 per cent more than the world market price in that year. No estimates are available for successive years, but the premium was substantial, for even a ten cents premium meant Rs. 200 per metric ton and Rs. 10 million for 50,000 tons.
(2) The handling charge of 5 cents per lb., in 1953 was equal to Rs. 100 per metric ton or Rs. 5 million for 50,000 metric tons of rubber. As the charge and quantity varied from year-to-year the total sum too changed, but it was significant.
(3) The sale of rice by China to Sri Lanka at prices below the world market resulted in a net benefit of about Rs. 92 million in 1953 alone. Although there was a net benefit in the following years, no estimates have been made. China agreed to sell rice at the same price Burma sold rice to Sri Lanka with certain adjustments for differences in quality and transport costs. China never tried to exploit the rice market to her advantage.
Even when she did not have an exportable surplus, she supplied Sri Lanka with rice direct from Burma under a triangular trade arrangement, but charged us only the price she paid Burma – not a cent more – even when she had reason to charge something more.
(4) As a result of the agreement a grant of about Rs. 125 million was extended by China during the ten-year period 1958-68 to meet part of the costs of rubber replanting. Thousands of acres of uneconomic rubber land were replanted thereby revitalizing our rubber industry.
(5) China continued to purchase Sri Lanka’s rubber at a premium even when other markets were prepared to sell her rubber at lower prices.
(6) Sri Lanka found an assured market for her rubber and an assured source of supply for her rice and insured herself to a great extent against vagaries in the world market. She also diversified her export and import markets.
(7) The Trade Agreement benefitted the Ceylonese traders as against non-national traders by creating a new market for them. In spite of the opposition from non-national trading establishments – particularly British managing agency houses – R.G. Senanayake reserved the export of rubber to China for the Ceylonese traders. He also reserved China for the Ceylonese importer under his policy of Ceylonizing the external trade of the country.
(8) The Trade Agreement laid the foundation for expanding trade between Sri Lanka and China even after the barter agreement ceased to operate. In 2001 for instance China and Hong Kong (which mainly re-exports China’s products) constituted the largest supplier of imports valued at Rs. 64 billion to Sri Lanka.
(9) Economic co-operation between Sri Lanka and China began with the Trade Agreement. It was expanded by leaps and bounds with establishment of diplomatic relations with China by S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike and closer relations under Sirimavo Bandaranaike as symbolised by the Bandaranaike Memorial International Conference Hall (BMICH), textile mills at Veyangoda and Pugoda, other grants and interest-free loans. Economic co-operation thereafter is demonstrated by the superior courts complex, Gin ganga scheme and assistance to restore Abayagiri dagaba.
(10) The Ceylon-China Trade Agreement with its price concessions for both Sri Lanka’s exports and imports and assistance to rubber replanting by China was perhaps the first instance of a developing country giving economic assistance to another developing country. In other words, it was the first time where economic co-operation among developing countries or South-South co-operation took place.
(11) Finally, Ceylon-China Trade Agreement and closer commercial and economic relations laid the foundations for a firm friendship between Sri Lanka and China, which was strengthened, expanded, and cemented by the Bandaranaike governments. China’s friendship for Sri Lanka has been demonstrated not only in trade and economic co-operation but also in times of national crisis. There was only China to warn other countries to ‘keep their hands off Sri Lanka’ at the height of the Indo-Lanka crisis in June-July 1987. This friendship was demonstrated again thereafter by the visit of Prime Minister of China and his offer of Rs. 375 million in economic assistance.
Features
Trump-Xi meet more about economics rather than politics
The fact that some of the US’ topmost figures in business, such as Tesla chief Elon Musk and major US chipmaker Jensen Huang of NVIDIA fame, occupied as nearly a prominent a position as President Donald Trump at the recent ‘historic and landmark’ visit by the latter to China underscores the continuing vital importance of business in US-China ties. Business seemed to outweigh politics to a considerable degree in importance during the visit although the political dimension in US-China ties appeared to be more ‘headline grabbing’.
To be sure, the political dimension cannot be downplayed. For very good reason China could be seen as holding the power balance somewhat evenly between East and West. The international politics commentator couldn’t be seen as overstating the case if he takes the position that China could exercise substantial influence over the East currently; that is Russia and Iran, in the main. The latter powers hold the key in the Eastern hemisphere to shaping international politics in the direction of further war or of influencing it towards a measure of peace.
For example, time and again China has prevented the West from ‘having its own way’, so to speak, in the UN Security Council, for instance, in respect of the ongoing conflicts involving Russia and Iran, by way of abstaining from voting or by vetoing declarations that it sees as deleterious. That is, China has been what could be seen as a ‘moderating influence’ in international politics thus far. It has helped to keep the power balance somewhat intact between East and West.
At present a meet is ongoing between Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin in Beijing. This happened almost immediately after the Trump visit. Apparently, Beijing is in an effort to project itself as treating the US and Russia even-handedly while underscoring that it is no ‘special friend’ of the US or the West.
This effort at adopting a non-partisan stance on contentious questions in international politics is also seen in Beijing’s policy position on the Hormuz tangle and issues growing out of it. The Chinese authorities are quoted as saying in this regard, for instance, that China is for ‘a comprehensive and lasting ceasefire in the Middle East’.
Such a position has the effect of enhancing the perception that China is even-handed in its handling of divisive foreign policy posers. It is not openly anti-West nor is it weighing in with Iran and other Eastern actors that are opposed to the West in the West Asian theatre. A ‘comprehensive and lasting ceasefire’ implies that a solution needs to be arrived at that would be seen as fair by all quarters concerned.
On the highly sensitive Taiwan issue, President Xi was comparatively forthright during the Trump visit, but here too it was plain to see that Beijing was not intent on introducing a jarring, discordant note into the ongoing, largely cordial discussions with Washington. On the Taiwan question President Xi was quoted saying: ‘If mishandled, the two nations could collide even come into conflict.’ In other words, the US was cautioned that China’s interests need to be always borne in mind in its handling of the Taiwan issue.
The cautioning had the desired result because Trump in turn had reportedly conveyed to Taiwan that the latter’s concerns on the matter of independence had to be handled discreetly. He had told Taiwan plainly not to declare ‘independence.’
Accordingly, neither the US nor China had said or done anything that would have made either party lose face during their interaction. Apparently, both sides were sensitive to each others’ larger or national interests. And the economic interests of both powers were foremost among the latter considerations.
There is no glossing over or ignoring economic interests in the furtherance of ties between states. They are primal shaping forces of foreign policies and the fact that ‘economics drives politics’ is most apparent in US-China ties. That is, economic survival is fundamental.
Among the more memorable quotes from President Xi during the interaction, which also included US business leaders, was the following: ‘China’s doors will be open wider’ and US firms would have ‘broader prospects in the Chinese market.’
Xi went on to say that the sides had agreed to a ‘new positioning for ties’ based on ‘constructive strategic stability’. The implication here is that both sides would do well not to undermine existing, mutually beneficial economic relations in view of the wider national interests of both powers that are served by a continuation of these economic ties. That is, the way forward, in the words of the Chinese authorities, is ‘win-win cooperation.’
It is the above pronouncements by the Chinese authorities that probably led President Trump to gush that the talks were ‘very successful’ and of ‘historic and landmark’ importance. Such sentiments should only be expected of a billionaire US President, bent on economic empire-building.
One of the most important deals that were put through reportedly during the interaction was a Chinese agreement to buy some 200 Boeing jets and a ‘potential commitment to buy an additional 750 planes.’ However, details were not forthcoming on other business deals that may have been hatched.
Accordingly, from the viewpoint of the protagonists the talks went off well and the chances are that the sides would stand to gain substantially from unruffled future economic ties. However, there was no mention of whether the health of the world economy or the ongoing conflicts in West Asia were taken up for discussion.
Such neglect is regretful. Although the veritable economic power houses of the world, the US and China, are likely to thrive in the short and medium terms and their ruling strata could be expected to benefit enormously from these ongoing economic interactions the same could not be said of most of the rest of the world and its populations.
Needless to say, the ongoing oil and gas crisis, for instance, resulting from the conflict situation in West Asia, is taking a heavy toll on the majority of the world’s economies and the relevant publics. While no urgent intervention to ease the lot of the latter could be expected from the Trump administration there is much that China could do on this score.
China could use its good offices with the US to address the negative fallout on the poorer sections of the world from the present global economic crunch and urge the West to help in introducing systemic changes that could facilitate these positive outcomes. After all, China remains a socialist power.
Features
The Quiet Shift: China as America’s “+1” in a Changing World Order
“Everything ever said to me by any Chinese of any station during any visit was part of an intricate design”
— Henry Kissinger
That design may already be complete before this week’s , a meeting that could shape the future balance of global power.
The wind arrives quietly. By the time it is heard, history has already begun to turn. Across Asia, that wind is no longer distant. It carries with it the exhaustion of an old order and the uncertain birth of another. The question now is not whether the world will change. It is whether those who hold power possess the wisdom to guide that change toward something less violent than the century behind us.
Since 1945, the United States has carried the burden of a global order built with its Western allies. To its credit, the world avoided another direct world war between great powers. The conflicts remained contained in distant lands—proxy wars fought in the shadows of ideology, oil, and influence. From Latin America to Asia, the American century expanded not only through prosperity, but through intervention. Yet empires, even democratic ones, grow tired. Fatigue settles slowly into institutions, alliances, and public memory. The role of global policeman no longer inspires certainty in Washington as it once did.
The “rules-based order” now confronts its own contradiction: it was built to be universal, yet it often appeared selective. During my recent visit to , a young researcher asked me quietly, “Does the West itself still believe in the rules-based order?” The question lingered long after the conversation ended. The rising century demands a more inclusive architecture—one that recognises the reality of Asian power, especially China.
My three years of field research across South and Southeast Asia, documented in , revealed a transformation too significant to dismiss as temporary. China has moved beyond being merely a competitor to the United States. In trade, infrastructure, technology, cultural diplomacy, and economic influence, Beijing has established itself as what may be called the world’s “US +1.”
Great powers often search for such a partner. History shows this tendency clearly. When an empire becomes overextended—burdened by wars, alliances, sanctions, tariffs, and crises—it seeks another center of gravity to stabilize the system it can no longer manage alone. The United States today faces disorder stretching from Venezuela to Iran, from Ukraine to the unsettled Middle East. In this landscape, China emerges not simply as a rival, but as a state powerful enough to broker peace where Washington alone no longer can.
Drawing from the lessons of the Nixon–Mao era, warned that “” The United States and China are now engaged in a long-term economic, technological, political, and strategic competition. Managing that competition wisely may become the defining challenge of this century. In such a deeply polarized and unstable world, recognising China as a “US +1” partner is not surrender, but strategic realism.
Donald Trump understood this reality before boarding his flight to meet Xi Jinping. Their meeting inside Zhongnanhai—the guarded compound where China’s leadership governs—was never merely ceremonial. It symbolized a deeper recognition already acknowledged quietly within the itself: China is the nearest peer competitor the United States has ever confronted. Before departing Washington, Trump seemed to reassess not only China’s strength, but its unavoidable position as a “” shaping the future global balance.
Yet the significance of a Trump–Xi meeting extends beyond trade wars, tariffs, or diplomatic spectacle. It presents an opportunity to confront two crises shaping the century ahead: global energy insecurity and regional instability. Washington increasingly understands the limits of direct engagement with Tehran. Decades of pressure, sanctions, and confrontation have produced exhaustion rather than resolution. In that vacuum, Beijing now possesses leverage that Washington does not.
For China, this is an opportunity to evolve from a development partner into a security actor. Xi Jinping’s (GSI) was never designed merely as rhetoric. It was intended as the next phase of Chinese influence—transforming economic dependence into strategic trust. The geopolitical spillover from the Iranian conflict now offers Beijing a historic opening to project itself as a stabilising force in the region, not against the United States, but alongside it as a “US +1” partner.
If China succeeds in helping stabilise the Gulf and secure energy corridors vital to Asia, it will reshape perceptions of Chinese power globally. Beijing would no longer be seen only as the builder of ports, railways, and industrial zones, but as a guarantor of regional balance. This transition—from infrastructure diplomacy to security diplomacy—may become one of the defining geopolitical shifts of the coming decade.
Xi Jinping does not seek open confrontation. His strategy is older, more patient, and perhaps more formidable because of its restraint. Beijing speaks not of domination, but of a “,” advanced through three instruments of influence: the Global Development Initiative (GDI), the Global Security Initiative (GSI), and the Global Civilization Initiative (GCI). These are not slogans alone. Across Asia, many governments increasingly trust China as a development partner more than any other power.
India, despite its ambitions, has not matched this scale of regional penetration. In both ASEAN and South Asia, China’s economic gravity is felt more deeply. Ports, railways, technology networks, and financial dependency have altered the geopolitical map quietly, without the spectacle of war.
In , I compared three inward-looking national strategies shaping Asia today: Trump’s MAGA, Modi’s emerging economic nationalism , and Xi’s strategy. Among them, China has demonstrated the greatest structural resilience. Faced with American tariffs and decoupling pressures, Beijing diversified its supply chains across Central Asia, Europe, and Southeast Asia. Rail corridors now connect Chinese industry to European markets through Eurasia. ASEAN has surpassed the United States as China’s largest trading partner, while the European Union follows closely behind. Exports to America have declined sharply, yet China continues to expand. Trump, once defined by confrontation, now arrives seeking a new “” with China—an acknowledgment that economic rivalry alone can no longer define the relationship between the world’s two largest powers.
Unlike Washington, which increasingly retreats from multilateral institutions, Beijing presents itself as the defender of multilateralism. Whether genuine or strategic matters less than perception. In geopolitics, perception often becomes reality.
What emerges, then, is not surrender between rivals, but interdependence between powers too large to isolate one another. The future may not belong to a bipolar Cold War, but to a reluctant coexistence. The United States now recognises that China possesses diversified markets and partnerships capable of reducing dependence on America. China, in turn, understands that its long march toward global primacy still requires strategic engagement with the United States.
This is where the true geopolitical shift begins.
Many analysts continue to frame China solely as a threat. Yet history rarely moves through absolutes. The next world order may not be built through confrontation alone, but through uneasy partnership. Artificial intelligence, technological supremacy, economic stability, and global governance now demand cooperation between Washington and Beijing, whether either side admits it publicly or not.
Trump will likely celebrate his personal relationship with Xi, presenting himself as the American leader capable of negotiating a “better deal” with China than his predecessors. But beneath the rhetoric lies something larger: the gradual acceptance of China’s indispensable role in shaping the future international order.
Even the question of war increasingly returns to Beijing. If Washington seeks an understanding with Tehran, China’s influence becomes unavoidable. Iran listens to Beijing in ways it no longer listens to the West. This alone signals how profoundly the balance of power has shifted. And Xi, careful as always, refuses to openly inherit the mantle of global leadership. He delays, softens, and obscures intention. It is part of a longer strategy: to rise without provoking the final resistance of a declining hegemon too early.
History rarely announces its turning point. Empires fade slowly, while new powers rise quietly beneath the noise of the old order. Washington still holds immense power, but Beijing increasingly holds the patience, reach, and strategic depth to shape what comes after.
The century ahead may not belong to one power alone, but to the uneasy balance between Washington and Beijing. And in that silence, a new world order is already taking shape.
By Asanga Abeyagoonasekera
Features
Egypt … here I come
Chit-Chat Nethali Withanage
Three months ago, 19-year-old Nethali Withanage, with Brian Kerkoven as her mentor, walked the ramp at Colombo Fashion Week. On 06 June, she’ll walk for Sri Lanka in Hurghada, Egypt, as the country’s delegate to Top Model of the World 2026._
I caught up with Nethali as she prepares to fly out, this weekend, and here’s how our chit-chat went:
1. Tell me something about yourself?
I’m someone who blends creativity with ambition. I’ve always loved expressing myself, whether it’s through fashion, styling, or the way I present myself to the world. At the same time, I’m very driven and disciplined, especially when I was working, as a student counsellor, at Campus One, at a young age, where I’ve learned how to connect with people, understand them, and communicate with confidence. I believe I’m still evolving, and that’s what excites me the most … becoming better every single day.
2. What made you decide to be a model?
Modelling felt natural to me because it combines everything I love – fashion, confidence, and storytelling without words. I realised that modelling isn’t just about appearance, it’s about presence and how you carry your energy. I wanted to be part of an industry where I could express different sides of myself, while inspiring others to feel confident in their own skin.
3. What sets you apart from other models?
I would say my ability to connect. Whether it’s with the camera, a brand, or an audience, I bring authenticity. I also have a strong background in communication and sales, which gives me an edge in understanding how to represent a brand, not just wear it. I don’t want to just model clothes, I want to bring them to life.
4. What clothing do you prefer to model?
I enjoy modelling versatile styles, but I’m especially drawn to elegant and expressive fashion pieces that tells a story. I love looks that allow me to embody confidence and femininity, whether it’s a structured outfit or something soft and flowing.
5. What is the most important aspect of modelling?
Confidence combined with professionalism. Confidence allows you to own the moment, but professionalism ensures that you respect the work, the team, and the brand you represent. Both are equally important.
6. If you could change one thing about yourself, what would it be?
I would say I’m learning to trust myself more and not overthink. I’ve realised that growth comes from embracing who you are, not constantly trying to change it. So instead of changing something, I’m focused on becoming more confident in my own voice.
7. School?
I did my O/Ls at Seventh Day Adventist High School Kandana, and, while at school, I was actively involved in creative activities. I enjoyed participating in English Day events that allowed me to express myself and interact with others. Those experiences helped me build confidence, teamwork, and communication skills, which continue to shape who I am today.
8. Happiest moment?
One of my happiest moments is realising how far I’ve come from being unsure of myself to stepping into opportunities, like modelling, and representing myself with confidence. That feeling of growth is something I truly value, and also a dream come true!
9. Your idea of perfect happiness?
Perfect happiness for me is peace of mind, being surrounded by people I love, doing what I’m passionate about, and feeling proud of who I am becoming.
10. Your ideal guy?
My ideal partner is someone who is respectful, supportive, and confident in himself. Someone who values growth, understands my ambitions, and encourages me to be the best version of myself.
11. Which living person do you most admire?
I admire strong, self-made individuals who have built their identity through hard work and resilience. People who stay true to themselves, despite challenges, inspire me, because they show that success is not just about talent, but also about strength and consistency.
12. Your most treasured possession?
My most treasured possession is my confidence. It’s something I’ve built over time, and it allows me to face challenges, take opportunities, and believe in myself, even when things are uncertain.
13. If you were marooned on a desert island, who would you like as your companion?
I would choose someone who is calm, positive, and resourceful, someone who can turn a difficult situation into an adventure. The right mindset matters more than anything.
14. Your most embarrassing moment?
I’m 19 and still haven’t faced any most embarrassing moment. But I would say I’ve had small moments where things didn’t go as planned, but I’ve learned to laugh at myself. Those moments remind me that perfection isn’t necessary; confidence is about how you recover, not how you avoid mistakes.
15. Done anything daring?
Pursuing modelling and stepping into competitions is something I consider daring. It pushed me out of my comfort zone and challenged me to grow, both personally and professionally.
16. Your ideal vacation?
My ideal vacation would be somewhere peaceful, yet beautiful, like a beach destination where I can relax, reflect, and reconnect with myself, while enjoying nature.
17. What kind of music are you into?
I choose music that matches my mood at that time, whether it’s calm and relaxing or energetic and uplifting. Music is something that helps me express emotions and stay inspired.
18. Favourite radio station?
Usually I don’t listen to radio stations but whenever I get into a car I would search for Yes FM because it has a refined balance of contemporary hits and timeless music. I appreciate how it maintains a vibrant yet sophisticated energy, keeping listeners engaged while creating a consistently uplifting atmosphere. It’s something I enjoy because it adds a sense of positivity and elegance to my day.
19. Favourite TV station?
At the moment, I don’t have a television at home, but growing up, my favourite TV station was ‘Nickelodeon’. I genuinely loved the shows and series it aired; they were fun, creative, and full of personality. It was something I always looked forward to, and those memories still bring a sense of joy and nostalgia, whenever I think about it.
20. Any major plans for the future?
My future plans are to grow in the modelling industry, work with international brands, build a strong personal brand and finish completing a Bachelor’s Degree in Business Studies. At the same time, I want to explore my creative side further, especially in fashion and business, so I can create something of my own one day.
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News5 days agoCourt orders further arrests in alleged USD 42 Mn NDB fraud case
