Midweek Review

Rightwing economics or centre-left Opposition?

Published

4 years ago

2021/09/22

By Dr. DAYAN JAYATILLEKA

The situation is ripe for a progressive, social democratic, centre-left Opposition with necessarily populist appeal, but can there be one if an archaic, conservative, rightist economic theory is propounded as an alternative to the government’s oligarchic crony-capitalism?

How can the main Opposition party become a truly progressive-centrist formation which can be a magnet for voters from the vast bloc that voted for the Rajapaksas/Pohottuwa? What must it do?

The answer to that is clear and simple, and it isn’t mine. Thirty years ago, the UNP held power at the Presidential, Parliamentary and Pradesheeya Sabha levels, i.e., executive, legislative and local authority levels. That was the last time it did so. The leader responsible for that achievement made a typically unorthodox and fascinating remark while addressing his last May Day rally in 1992, at Galle Face, a year before he was assassinated by a Tiger suicide-bomber. Ranasinghe Premadasa made a surprising and pointed reference to SWRD Bandaranaike:

“…The late Prime Minister SWRD Bandaranaike…left the UNP and formed the Sri Lanka Freedom Party because he thought that his views cannot be implemented through the UNP. If one were to take into account the changes that have taken place in the UNP between then and now, I am sure that if he were still alive, he would have rejoined the UNP…When you look at it from that point of view, you will be able to guess which May Day rally he would have attended if he were alive—the rally at Galle Face or the one at Campbell Park.” (President Premadasa: His Vision and Mission, Selected Speeches, p 192)

What Premadasa says here is that SWRD Bandaranaike with the progressive, moderate nationalist, centre-left views (the SLFP’s founding document used the definition ‘social democratic’) he held at the time he ruptured with the UNP because he thought they could not be accommodated, would have felt compelled and comfortable enough to rejoin the UNP because it had been transformed so radically as to be able to accommodate and represent such personalities and perspectives.

Translated into today’s politics, it can be understood as an injunction to the post-UNP successor party (led by Premadasa’s son) to be a party so configured that it can win over the voters and personalities of the progressive centre, the moderate nationalists, by representing their ideology, sentiments and grievances. In short, an Opposition party capable of winning over the centre-left SLFP and SLPP voters; the Rajapaksa voters.

JR-Ranil or Premadasa?

The ongoing and deepening economic crisis is tailor-made for a ‘Premadasist’ intervention, for three reasons:

(a) Globally, the Covid-19 pandemic has been acknowledged as proving the need for more investment in public goods and social infrastructure, rather than rely on the ‘magic of the marketplace’ with its profit motive.

(b) President Premadasa demonstrated that even in a context of extreme crisis, is it practically possible to revive economic growth, increase industrial exports and foreign investment while simultaneously, not sequentially, transferring real income to the poorest, increasing the real wages of the people and reducing inequality.

(c) The Opposition is led by his only son. It would be as absurdly incongruous for an Opposition party, led by President Ranasinghe Premadasa’s son not to adopt the Premadasa development paradigm and policy as it would be someday for an Opposition party led by Namal Rajapaksa, not to have his father Mahinda Rajapaksa’s as symbol, his achievements as template, and Mahinda Chinthanaya as the basis of its guiding ideology.

The problem is that there is an ideological inclination on the part of some in society and Opposition politics, to ignore the Premadasa development model and philosophy, pat him on the back for ‘reforms’, and elevate instead, rightwing economic doctrines. In international terms these are the economic ideas that President George HW Bush (Bush Sr.), a moderate Republican, derided as “voodoo economics”.

The UNP never won a Presidential election, won only two parliamentary elections, 15 years apart, with never a second consecutive term in governmental office, after it dumped the Premadasa development paradigm and shifted to neoliberal economics, or shifted back to the pre-Premadasa economic model which helped cause the Southern uprising.

With its leadership and Presidential candidate who did far better in November 2019 than the party did before (Feb 2018) or since, the post-UNP Opposition is more organically suited for a frankly neo-Premadasist strategy for economic revival and social upliftment, which the current crisis demands.

JR+BR?

A slightly surreal slogan was tweeted recently, claiming that “we need JR+Shenoy reform once again”. This relates to the ideas of rightwing economist BR Shenoy who produced a pamphlet in 1966 which was adopted as a policy platform by JR Jayewardene, then a Minister in the Dudley Senanayake Cabinet of 1965-’70.

This policy perspective is wrong headed several times over, starting with the contextual fact that the JR+Shenoy platform was not conceived as alternative to the parental precursor of the current Rajapaksa government’s policies, namely the Sirimavo Bandaranaike-NM Perera policies of the coalition government of 1970-’77.

The JRJ-Shenoy policy doctrine was one corner of an intra-governmental UNP policy debate in the mid-1960s. Today it is being revived at the second corner of a bipolar patterning of policy discourse, i.e., in an unhealthy polarisation.

Shenoy Syndrome

As a precocious lad who spent time in the editorial offices of Lake House and hung out with my father and his journalist colleagues and buddies, I was quite aware of the Shenoy episode real-time, because BR Shenoy was tapped, and his product promoted, by Esmond Wickremesinghe, the Managing Director of Lake House (and Ranil’s father). That episode was part of a policy debate that rocked the UNP government of Prime Minister Dudley Senanayake in 1965-1970.

Far from being the antipode of the statist closed economy of the Sirimavo regime, the JR+Shenoy (actually JR+Esmond+Shenoy) platform squarely targeted the genuinely liberal-welfarist economics of the PM Dudley Senanayake and his Planning Ministry tzar, Dr Gamini Corea.

It is absurd and dangerous to exalt the JR+BR Shenoy line today, when the logic of the Dudley Senanayake-Gamani Corea response at that time has been tragically validated by our political history: “It is wiser to spend on welfare, than to cut welfare and have to spend much more on military expenditure later.”

As the John Attygalle Report (he was the IGP, but the report was co-authored by D.I.G Ana Seneviratne) on the pre-1971 JVP revealed, and the statements of the accused in the main trial of the Criminal Justice Commission (CJC) confirmed, the movement was founded for armed revolution partly as a response to the ideological struggle within the UNP government. Rohana Wijeweera’s view was that the JR Jayewardene-BR Shenoy project would require the ouster of the Senanayake faction, the installation of an Indonesian style dictatorship, and the scrapping of national elections scheduled for 1970.

This was not as wildly outlandish as it seemed. The Indonesian coup and massacre had taken place in September 1965. Esmond Wickremesinghe and those who backed the JR+Shenoy programme against Senanayake liberal-welfarism, were applauding the post-coup Indonesian economic model. My father Mervyn de Silva had been in Indonesia (with his wife and son) at the invitation of President Sukarno’s Foreign Minister Dr. Subandrio for the celebration by Afro-Asian journalists of the 10th anniversary of the Bandung conference virtually on the eve of the coup. Mervyn was the last foreign journalist to interview DN Aidit, leader of the PKI (the non-violent Indonesian Communist Party) who was murdered by the Army a few months later while in hiding, unarmed. My father was among the few (I’m being generous here) in the Lake House press writing against the Indonesian coup and the massacre of 1965, while “the Indonesian model” was being promoted.

Coiled for armed resistance to a dictatorship which never came at the hands of the UNP Right identified as JRJ and Esmond Wickremesinghe equipped with the BR Shenoy agenda, the JVP uncoiled uncontrollably on the watch of the elected successor government, the SLFP-led UF coalition in 1971.

It is not that today’s JVP or FSP is dabbling in any way with violent resistance or ever likely to, but a worker-peasant-student social movement radicalised by the policies and political culture of the Gotabaya presidency, has grown to almost the same capacity as in the 1960s, and if ‘JR+Shenoy’ economic policies are followed after the Rajapaksa regime is inevitably turfed-out, the social explosion will occur no less inevitably on the watch of the incoming ex-UNP administration.

Development Debate

Today’s Lankan economic neoliberals (who call themselves ‘economic liberals’) target a giant of Third World economic thinking, Raul Prebisch. The bridge to the tradition of Prebisch, and indeed the great Ceylonese contribution to the global economic debate, was not the Sirimavo Bandaranaike-NM Perera regime, but rather, those who had been the targets of JRJ and Shenoy in the policy debate within the UNP of 1965-1970: the liberal-welfarist progressives of the Planning Ministry under Prime Minister Dudley Senanayake, namely Dr. Gamani Corea and his deputy, Godfrey Gunatilleke.

In the 1970s, the Lankan node of ‘Third Worldist’ progressive development thinking was the MARGA Institute, which was targeted by the UF coalition government, especially the rightwing Minister Felix Dias Bandaranaike and the Communist Party.

The Gamani Corea-Godfrey Gunatilleke perspective that JRJ+BR Shenoy (plus Esmond Wickremesinghe) had targeted within the UNP government of 1965-1970 and eventually supplanted, found itself revived, revised and reaccommodated within the economic paradigm of Ranasinghe Premadasa.

Prime Minister Premadasa’s extempore remarks at the panel discussion on the sidelines of the UNGA 1980; his invocation of justice for the global South at the UNGA 1980 and the Nonaligned Conference in Harare 1986, are evidence of his commitment to the international tradition of development thinking which Dr. Gamani Corea was a giant of, but is reviled by today’s para-UNP economic neoliberals. (https://www.unmultimedia.org/avlibrary/asset/2114/2114561/)

It is hardly accidental that the founder-Chairperson of the Institute of Policy Studies (IPS), at its initiation by Finance Minister Ronnie de Mel and through the Premadasa Presidency, was Dr. Gamani Corea rather than an ‘economic libertarian’ or ‘classic economic liberal’.

Premadasa Project

The formula that ‘we need JR+Shenoy reform once again’ also overlooks the history of the evolution of policy within the UNP in the Opposition in 1970-1973. The Dudley Senanayake line was being eclipsed, the JRJ line was becoming dominant, but a third line was coming into view, which was to be validated by real history when the ‘JR+Shenoy’ paradigm was a causative factor of the civil war in the south.

This ‘third paradigm’ was Ranasinghe Premadasa’s, an early articulation of which was his 4th April 1973 address to the Colombo West Rotary Club. He was so committed to that speech (delivered several years before Susil Sirivardhana joined him) that he republished it in the ‘SAARC Summit special supplement’ of the Daily News during his Presidency, accompanied by an introduction in bold type which read: “The seeds of today’s concepts were sown years ago…President Ranasinghe Premadasa, then First Member of Parliament for Colombo Central was invited by the Colombo West Rotary Club to deliver an address on the topic ‘A Plan for Sri Lanka’ at a luncheon meeting of the Club. The speech was delivered when President Ranasinghe Premadasa was only an Opposition member of Parliament and portrays the vision of a young politician of what he thought was the best for Sri Lanka”.

That he chose to reproduce it in the SAARC special supplement (1991) indicates that this perspective is one he wanted the outside world to know about, and which he hoped to radiate in the region.

In April 1973, he wrestled with the same problem that the economy faces today– the crisis of foreign exchange and dependency—and gave an answer that is distinctively redolent of the Rooseveltian New Deal (his 1988 Presidential election manifesto was to be entitled ‘a New Vision, a New Deal’):

“…If the problems of foreign exchange, development and unemployment are to be satisfactorily tackled, a massive development venture has to be launched to provide the necessary infra-structure such as a network of roads, a network of electricity, a network of irrigation and a network of domestic water supply. With the launching of such a scheme large number of people could be gainfully employed. Together with development of the infrastructure the country’s agricultural and industrial ventures will automatically improve. As a result, foreign exchange could be conserved. People will get more money into their hands thus enabling them to purchase their requirements. The question of subsidies will eventually be eliminated. We can solve our problems. Scarcity of foreign exchange is no obstacle. To earn foreign exchange, we must increase production; to increase production we must develop our national resources, and if we are to develop our national resources, we must harness the human potential that we have in abundance. It is futile to go on bended knees to foreign countries begging for assistance…” (Republished as ‘People’s Participation in Government’, CDN Nov. 21, 1991.)

After the UNP victory of 1977 and the installation of ‘JR+Shenoy reforms’ the evidence of its downside piled up in the 1980s from the reports of various UN agencies which had replaced ‘classical liberal economics’ with indices of inequality, the physical quality of life index (PQLI) and later the Human Development report (HDR), under the intellectual impact of a global struggle for ‘Another Development’ (as it was conceptualized) in which Gamini Corea and Godfrey Gunatilleke were the foremost Sri Lankan figures.

Prime Minister Premadasa appointed the Warnasena Rasaputram Commission. Janasaviya was Premadasa’s response to the revelations of the Rasaputram Report. The hubris of the Open economy and the ‘JR +Shenoy reform’ model had evaporated with the bloody near-extermination of the UNP in the latter half of the 1980s by Sinhala youth from the South (just as Premadasa had predicted).

Open Economy, ‘Economic Democracy’

“If anything, I am for economic democracy” Premadasa told civil service legend Neville Jayaweera in a substantive interview given to the latter published as ‘Charter for Democracy’ (1990). For him, ‘economic democracy’ meant “turning the nation into one where ‘have-nots’ become ‘haves’”.

This was Premadasa’s perspective on the open economy:

“In a world of economic interdependence, those who are self-dependent grow in strength. We live in a world society. We cannot close ourselves off from the world. Yet, we must be free to live and develop as we wish to. We will provide all the conditions for economic growth in an open economy. But an open economy does not mean an economy dictated to by others. An open economy does not mean an economy run for the benefit of others. An open economy must first benefit Sri Lankans before it benefits outsiders.” (‘Address at the Inauguration of the Koggala Export Processing Zone’-June 14th 1991, in ‘President Premadasa: His Vision & Mission-Selected Speeches’, pp 89-92.)

The Premadasa economic philosophy, though partly based on the Open Economy, is not that of ‘JR+BR Shenoy reforms’ of 1977 still less of 1966. It is a different, far more progressive policy paradigm or economic episteme. It is Sri Lankan Social Democracy.

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Midweek Review

Dr. Jaishankar drags H’tota port to reverberating IRIS Dena affair

Published

7 days ago

2026/03/11

Sahan Weerasooriya

Sri Lanka reached an agreement with China to build the Hambantota port after India declined the then President Mahinda Rajapaksa’s request to take charge of the high profile project. The Indian decision may have been influenced by the war raging in the northern region at that time.

Indian Foreign Minister Dr. S. Jaishankar recognised Hambantota harbour as a Chinese military facility that underlined intimidating foreign military presence in the Indian Ocean. Jaishankar was responding to queries regarding India’s widely mentioned status as the region’s net security provider against the backdrop of a US submarine blowing up an Iranian frigate IRIS Dena, off Galle, within Sri Lanka’s Exclusive Economic Zone.

This happened at the Raisina Dialogue 2026 (March 5 to 7) in New Delhi. Raisina Dialogue was launched in 2016, three years after Narendra Modi became the Prime Minister.

The query obviously rattled the Indian Foreign Minister. Urging the moderator, Ms. Pakli Sharma Ipadhyay, to understand, what he called, the reality of the Indian Ocean, Dr. Jaishankar pointed out the joint US-British presence at Diego Garcia over the past five decades. Then he referred to the Chinese presence at Djibouti in East Africa, the first overseas Chinese military base, established in 2017, and Chinese takeover of Hambantota port, also during the same time. China secured the strategically located port on a 99-year lease for USD 1.2 bn, under controversial circumstances. China succeeded in spite of Indian efforts to halt Chinese projects here, including Colombo port city.

The submarine involved is widely believed to be Virginia-class USS Minnesota. The crew, included three Australian Navy personnel, according to international news agencies. However, others named the US Navy fast-attack submarine, involved in the incident, as USS Charlotte.

Diego Garcia is responsible for military operations in the Middle East, Africa and the Indo-Pacific. Dr. Jaishankar didn’t acknowledge that India, a key US ally and member of the Quad alliance, operated P8A maritime patrol and reconnaissance flights out of Diego Garcia last October. The US-India-Israel relationship is growing along with the US-Sri Lanka partnership.

The Indian Foreign Minister emphasised the deployment of the US Fifth Fleet in Bahrain, one of the countries that had been attacked by Iran, following the US-Israeli assassination of Iranian Supreme Leader, and key government functionaries, in a massive surprise attack, aiming at a regime change there. The Indian Minister briefly explained how they and Sri Lanka addressed the threat on three Indian navy vessels following the unprovoked US-Israeli attacks on Iran. Whatever the excuses, the undeniable truth is, as Sharma pointed out, that the US attack on the Iranian frigate took place in India’s backyard.

Sri Lankan Foreign Minister Vijitha Herath who faced Sharma before Dr. Jaishankar, struggled to explain the country’s position. Dr. Jaishankar made the audience laugh at Minister Herath’s expense who repeatedly said that Sri Lanka would deal with the situation in terms of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and international laws. Herath should have pointed out that Hambantota was not a military base and couldn’t be compared, under any circumstances, with the Chinese base in Djibouti.

Typical of the arrogant Western power dynamics, the US never cared for international laws and President Donald Trump quite clearly stated their position.

Israel is on record as having declared that the decision to launch attacks on Iran had been made months ago. Therefore, the sinking of the fully domestically built vessel that was launched in 2021 should be examined in the context of overall US-Israeli strategy meant to break the back of the incumbent Islamic revolutionary government and replace it with a pro-Western regime there as had been the case after the toppling of the democratically elected government there, led by Prime Minister Mossadegh, in August, 1953.

US Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth declared that IRIS Dena “thought it was safe in international waters’ but died a quiet death.” A US submarine torpedoed the vessel on the morning of March 4, off Galle, within Sri Lanka’s exclusive economic zone and that decision must have been made before the IRIS Dena joined International Fleet Review (IFR) and Exercise Milan 2026, at Visakhapatnam, from February 15 to 25.

The sinking of the Iranian vessel, a Moudge –class frigate attached to Iran’s southern fleet deployed in the Gulf of Oman and Strait of Hormuz, had been calculated to cause mayhem in the Indian Ocean. Obviously, and pathetically, Iran failed to comprehend the US-Israeli mindset after having already been fooled with devastating attacks, jointly launched by Washington and Tel Aviv against the country’s nuclear research facilities, while holding talks with it on the issue last June. Had they comprehended the situation they probably would have pulled out of the IFR and Milan 2026. Perhaps, Iran was lulled into a false sense of security because they felt the US wouldn’t hit ships invited by India. The US Navy did not participate though the US Air Force did.

The US action dramatically boosted Raisina Dialogue 2026, but at India’s expense. Prime Minister Modi’s two-day visit to Tel Aviv, just before the US-Israel launched the war to effect a regime change in Teheran, made the situation far worse. BJP seems to have decided on whose side India is on. But, the US action has, invariably, humiliated India. That cannot be denied. The Indian Navy posted a cheery message on X on February 17, the day before President Droupadi Murmu presided over IFR off the Visakhapatnam coast. “Welcome!” the Indian Navy wrote, greeting the Iranian warship IRIS Dena as it steamed into the port of Visakhapatnam to join an international naval gathering. Photographs showed Iranian sailors and a grey frigate gliding into the Indian harbour on a clear day. The hashtags spoke of “Bridges of Friendship” and “United Through Oceans.”

US alert

Dr. Jaishankar

Altogether, three Iranian vessels participated in IFR. In addition to the ill-fated IRIS Dena, the second frigate IRIS Lavan and auxiliary ships IRIS Bushehr comprised the group. Dr. Jaishankar disclosed at the Raisina Dialogue 2026 that Iran requested India to allow IRIS Lavan to enter Indian waters. India accommodated the vessel at Cochin Port (Kochi Port) on the Arabian Sea in Kerala.

At the time US torpedoed IRIS Dena, within Sri Lanka’s EEZ, IRIS Lavan was at Cochin port. Sri Lanka’s territorial waters extend 12 nautical miles (approximately 22 km) from the country’s coastline. The US hit the vessel 19 nautical miles off southern coastline.

Sri Lanka, too, participated in IFR and Milan 2026. SLN Sagara (formerly Varaha), a Vikram-class offshore patrol vessel of the Indian Coast Guard and SLN Nandimithra, A Fast Missile Vessel, acquired from Israel, participated and returned to Colombo on February 27, the day before IRIS Lavan sought protection in Indian waters.

Although many believed that Sri Lanka responded to the attack on IRIS Dena, following a distressed call from that ship, the truth is it was the Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) that alerted the Maritime Rescue Coordination centre (MRCC) after blowing it up with a single torpedo. The SLN’s Southern Command dispatched three Fast Attack Craft (FACs) while a tug from Sri Lanka Ports Authority (SLPA) joined later.

The INDOPACOM, while denying the Iranian claim that IRIS Dena had been unarmed at the time of the attack, emphasised: “US forces planned for and Sri Lanka provided life-saving support to survivors in accordance with the Law of Armed Conflict.” In the post shared on X (formerly Twitter) the US has, in no uncertain terms, said that they planned for the rescuing of survivors and the action was carried out by the Sri Lanka Navy.

IRIS Lavan and IRIS Bushehr are most likely to be held in Cochin and in Trincomalee ports, respectively, for some time with the crews accommodated on land. With the US-Israel combine vowing to go the whole hog there is no likelihood of either India or Sri Lanka allowing the ships to leave.

Much to the embarrassment of the Modi administration, former Indian Foreign Secretary Kanwal Sibal has said that IRIS Dena would not have been targeted if Iran was not invited to take part in IFR and Milan naval exercise.

“We were the hosts. As per protocol for this exercise, ships cannot carry any ammunition. It was defenseless. The Iranian naval personnel had paraded before our president,” he said in a post on X.

Sibal argued that the attack was premeditated, pointing out that the US Navy had been invited to the exercise but withdrew at the last minute, “presumably with this operation in mind.”

Sibal added that the US ignored India’s sensitivities, as the Iranian ship was present in the waters due to India’s invitation.

He stressed that India was neither politically nor militarily responsible for the US attack, but carried a moral and humanitarian responsibility.

“A word of condolence by the Indian Navy (after political clearance) at the loss of lives of those who were our invitees and saluted our president would be in order,” Sibal said.

Iran and even India appeared to have ignored the significance of USN pullout from IFR and Milan exercise at the eleventh hour. India and Sri Lanka caught up in US-Israeli strategy are facing embarrassing questions from the political opposition. Both Congress and Samagi Jana Balwegaya (SJB), as well as Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna (SLPP), exploited the situation to undermine respective governments over an unexpected situation created by the US. Both India and Sri Lanka ended up playing an unprecedented role in the post-Milan 2026 developments that may have a lasting impact on their relations with Iran.

The regional power India and Sri Lanka also conveniently failed to condemn the February 28 assassination of Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, while that country was holding talks with the US, with Oman serving as the mediator.

Condemning the unilateral attack on Iran, as well as the retaliatory strikes by Iran, Leader of the Opposition in the Lok Sabha and Congress leader Rahul Gandhi on Tuesday (March 3, 2026) questioned India’s silence on the Middle East developments.

In a post on social media platform X, Gandhi said Prime Minister Narendra Modi must speak up. “Does he support the assassination of a Head of State as a way to define the world order? Silence now diminishes India’s standing in the world,” he said.

Under heavy Opposition fire, India condoled the Iranian leader’s assassination on March 5, almost a week after the killing. Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri met the Iran Ambassador in Delhi and signed the condolence book, though much belatedly.

SL-US relations

The Opposition questioned the NPP government’s handling of the IRIS Dena affair. They quite conveniently forgot that any other government wouldn’t have been able to do anything differently than bow to the will of the US. Under President Trump, Washington has been behaving recklessly, even towards its longtime friends, demanding that Canada become its 51st state and that Denmark handover Greenland pronto.

SJB and Opposition leader Sajith Premadasa cut a sorry figure demanding in Parliament whether Sri Lanka had the capacity to detect submarines or other underwater systems. Sri Lanka should be happy that the Southern Command could swiftly deploy three FACs and call in SLPA tug, thereby saving the lives of 32 Iranians and recovering 84 bodies of their unfortunate colleagues. Therefore, of the 180-member crew of IRIS Dena, 116 had been accounted for. The number of personnel categorised as missing but presumably dead is 64.

There is no doubt that Sri Lanka couldn’t have intervened if not for the US signal to go ahead with the humanitarian operation to pick up survivors. India, too, must have informed the US about the Iranian request for IRIS Lavan to re-enter Indian waters. Sri Lanka, too, couldn’t have brought the Iranian auxiliary vessel without US consent. President Trump is not interested in diplomatic niceties and the way he had dealt with European countries repeatedly proved his reckless approach. The irrefutable truth is that the US could have torpedoed the entire Iranian group even if they were in Sri Lankan or Indian Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) that extends to 200 nautical miles from its coastline.

In spite of constantly repeating Sri Lanka’s neutrality, successive governments succumbed to US pressure. In March 2007, Mahinda Rajapaksa’s government entered into Acquisition and Cross- Servicing Agreement (ACSA) with the US, a high profile bilateral legal mechanism to ensure uninterrupted support/supplies. The Rajapaksas went ahead with ACSA, in spite of strong opposition from some of its partners. In fact, they did not even bother to ask or take up the issue at Cabinet level before the then Defence Secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa, a US citizen at the time, and US Ambassador here Robert O. Blake signed it. Close on the heels of the ACSA signing, the US provided specific intelligence that allowed the Sri Lanka Navy to hunt down four floating LTTE arsenals. Whatever critics say, that US intervention ensured the total disruption of the LTTE supply line and the collapse of their conventional fighting capacity by March 2009. The US favourably responded to the then Vice Admiral Wasantha Karannagoda’s request for help and the passing of intelligence was not in any way in line with ACSA.

That agreement covered the 2007 to 2017 period. The Yahapalana government extended it. Yahapalana partners, the SLFP and UNP, never formally discussed the decision to extend the agreement though President Maithripala Sirisena made a desperate attempt to distance himself from ACSA.

It would be pertinent to mention that the US had been pushing for ACSA during Rail Wickremesinghe’s tenure as the Premier, in the 2001-2003 period. But, he lacked the strength to finalise that agreement due to strong opposition from the then Opposition. During the time the Yahapalana government extended ACSA, the US also wanted the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) signed. SOFA, unlike ACSA, is a legally binding agreement that dealt with the deployment of US forces here. However, SOFA did not materialise but the possibility of the superpower taking it up cannot be ruled out.

Gotabaya Rajapaksa, who won the 2019 presidential election, earned the wrath of the US for declining to finalise MCC (Millennium Challenge Corporation) Compact on the basis of Prof. Gunaruwan Committee report that warned that the agreement contained provisions detrimental to national security, sovereignty, and the legal system. In the run up to the presidential election, UNP leader Ranil Wickremesinghe declared that he would enter into the agreement in case Sajith Premadasa won the contest.

Post-Aragalaya setup

Since the last presidential election held in September 2024, Admiral Steve Koehler, a four-star US Navy Admiral and Commander of the US Pacific Fleet visited Colombo twice in early October 2024 and February this year. Koehler’s visits marked the highest-level U.S. military engagement with Sri Lanka since 2021.

Between Koehler’s visits, the United States and Sri Lanka signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) formalising the defence partnership between the Montana National Guard, the US Coast Guard District 13, and the Sri Lanka Armed Forces under the Department of War’s State Partnership Programme (SPP). The JVP-led NPP government seems sure of its policy as it delayed taking a decision on one-year moratorium on all foreign research vessels entering Sri Lankan waters though it was designed to block Chinese vessels. The government is yet to announce its decision though the ban lapsed on December 31, 2024.

The then President Ranil Wickremesinghe was compelled to announce the ban due to intense US-Indian pressure.

The incumbent dispensation’s relationship with US and India should be examined against allegations that they facilitated ‘Aragalaya’ that forced President Gotabaya Rajapaksa out of office. The Trump administration underscored the importance of its relationship with Sri Lanka by handing over ex-US Coast Guard Cutter ‘Decisive ‘to the Sri Lanka Navy. The vessel, commanded by Captain Gayan Wickramasooriya, left Baltimore US Coast Guard Yard East Wall Jetty on February 23 and is expected to reach Trincomalee in the second week of May.

Last year Sri Lanka signed seven MoUs, including one on defence and then sold controlling shares of the Colombo Dockyard Limited (CDL) to a company affiliated to the Defence Ministry as New Delhi tightened its grip.

Sri Lanka-US relations seemed on track and the IRIS Dena incident is unlikely to distract the two countries. The US continues to take extraordinary measures to facilitate war on Iran. In a bid to overcome the Iranian blockade on crude carriers the US temporarily eased sanctions to allow India to buy Russian oil.

Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent declared a 30-day waiver was a “deliberate short-term measure” to allow oil to keep flowing in the global market. The US sanctioned Russian oil following Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine, forcing buyers to seek alternatives.

The US doesn’t care about the Ukraine government that must be really upset about the unexpected development. India was forced to halt buying Russian oil and now finds itself in a position to turn towards Russia again. But that would be definitely at the expense of Iran facing unprecedented military onslaught.

By Shamindra Ferdinando

Midweek Review

A Living Legend of the Peradeniya Tradition:

Published

7 days ago

2026/03/11

Sahan Weerasooriya

Prof. H. L. Seneviratne

A Tribute to Professor H. L. Seneviratne – Part I

My earliest memories of the eminent anthropologist, Professor H. L. Seneviratne date back to my childhood, when I first encountered his name through the vivid accounts of campus life shared by my late brother, Sugathapala de Silva, then a lecturer in the Department of Sinhala at the University of Peradeniya. By the time I became a first-year sociology student in 1968/69, I had the privilege of being taught by the Professor, whose guidance truly paved the way for my own progression in sociology and anthropology. Even then, it was clear that he was a towering presence—not just as an academician, but as a central figure in the lively cultural and literary renaissance that defined that era of the university’s intellectual history.

H.L. Seneviratne stood alongside a galaxy of intellectuals who shaped and developed the literary consciousness of the Peradeniya University. His professorial research made regular appearances in journals such as Sanskriti and Mimamsa, published Sinhala and English articles, and served as channels for the dissemination of the literary consciousness of Peradeniya to the population at large. These texts were living texts of a dynamic intellectual ferment where the synthesis of classical aesthetic sensibilities with current critical intellectual thought in contemporary Sri Lanka was under way.

The concept of a ‘Peradeniya tradition or culture’, a term which would later become legendary in Sri Lankan literary and intellectual circles, was already being formed at this time. Peradeniya culture came to represent a distinctive synthesis: cosmopolitanism entwined with well-rooted local customs, aesthetic innovation based on classical Sinhala styles, and critical interaction with modernity. Among its pre-eminent practitioners were intellectual giants such as Ediriweera Sarachchandra, Gunadasa Amarasekara, and Siri Gunasinghe. These figures and H.L. Seneviratne himself, were central to the shaping of a space of cultural and literary critique that ranged from newspapers to book-length works, public speeches to theatrical performance.

Unlimited influence

H.L. Seneviratne’s influence was not limited to the printed page, which I discuss in this article. He operated in and responded to the performative, interactive space of drama and music, situating lived artistic practice in his cultural thought. I recall with vividness the late 1950s, a period seared into my memory as one of revelation, when I as a child was fortunate enough to witness one of the first performances of Maname, the trailblazing Sinhala drama that revolutionised Sri Lankan theatre. Drawn from the Nadagam tradition and staged in the open-air theatre in Peradeniya—now known as Sarachchandra Elimahan Ranga Pitaya—or Wala as used by the campus students. Maname was not so much a play as a culturally transformative experience.

H.L. Seneviratne was not just an observer of this change. He joined the orchestra of Maname staged on November 3, 1956, lending his voice and presence to the collective heartbeat of the performance. He even contributed to the musical group by playing the esraj, a quiet but vital addition to the performance’s beauty and richness. Apart from these roles, he played an important part in the activities of Professor Sarathchandra’s Sinhala Drama Society, a talent nursery and centre for collaboration between artists and intellectuals. H.L. Seneviratne was a friend of Arthur Silva, a fellow resident of Arunachalam Hall then, and the President of the Drama Circle. H.L. Seneviratne had the good fortune to play a role, both as a member of the original cast, and an active member of the Drama Circle that prevailed on lecturer E.R. Sarathchandra to produce a play and gave him indispensable organizational support. It was through this society that Sarachchandra attracted some of the actors who brought into being Maname and later Sinhabhahu, plays which have become the cornerstone of Sri Lanka’s theatrical heritage.

The best chronicler of Maname

H.L. Seneviratne is the best chronicler of Maname. (Towards a National Art, From Home and the World, Essays in honour of Sarath Amunugama. Ramanika Unamboowe and Varuni Fernando (eds)). He chronicles the genesis of Ediriweera Sarachchandra’s seminal play Maname, framing it as a pivotal attempt to forge a sophisticated national identity by synthesizing indigenous folk traditions with Eastern theatrical aesthetics. Seneviratne details how Sarachchandra, disillusioned with the ‘artificiality’ of Western-influenced urban theatre and the limitations of both elite satires and rural folk plays, looked toward the Japanese Noh and Kabuki traditions to find a model for a ‘national’ art that could appeal across class divides. The author emphasises that the success of Maname was not merely a solo intellectual feat but a gruelling, collective effort involving a ‘gang of five’ academics and a dedicated cohort of rural, bilingual students from the University of Ceylon at Peradeniya. Through anecdotes regarding the discovery of lead actors like Edmund Wijesinghe and the assembly of a unique orchestra, Seneviratne highlights the logistical struggles—from finding authentic instruments to managing cumbersome stage sets—that ultimately birthed a transformative ‘oriental’ theatre rooted in the nadagama style yet refined for a modern, sophisticated audience.

Born in Sri Lanka in 1934, in a village in Horana, he was educated at the Horana Taxila College following which he was admitted to the Department of Sociology at the University of Peradeniya. H.L. Seneviratne’s academic journey subsequently led him to the University of Rochester for his doctoral studies. But, despite his long tenure in the United States, his research has remained firmly rooted in the soil of his homeland.

His early seminal work, Rituals of the Kandyan State, his PhD thesis turned into a book, offered a groundbreaking analysis of the Temple of the Tooth (Dalada Maligawa). By examining the ceremonies surrounding the sacred relic, H.L. Seneviratne demonstrated how religious performance served as the bedrock of political legitimacy in the Kandyan Kingdom. He argued that these rituals at the time of his fieldwork in the early 1970s were not static relics of the past, but active tools used to construct and maintain the authority of the state, the ideas that would resonate throughout his later career.

The Work of Kings

Perhaps, his most provocative contribution arrived with the publication of The Work of Kings published in 1999. In this sweeping study, H.L. Seneviratne traced the transformation of the Buddhist clergy, or Sangha, from the early 20th-century ‘social service’ monks, who focused on education and community upliftment, to the more politically charged nationalist figures of the modern era. He analysed the shift away from a universalist, humanistic Buddhism toward a more exclusionary identity, sparking intense debate within both academic and religious circles in Sri Lanka.

In The Work of Kings, H.L. Seneviratne has presented a sophisticated critique and argued that in the early 20th century, influenced by figures like Anagarika Dharmapala, there was a brief ‘monastic ideal’ centred on social service and education. This period saw monks acting as catalysts for community development and moral reform embodying a humanistic version of Buddhism that sought to modernize the country while maintaining its spiritual integrity.

However, H.L. Seneviratne contends that this situation was eventually derailed by the rise of post-independence nationalism. He describes a process where the clergy moved away from universalist goals to become the vanguard of a narrow ethno-religious identity. By aligning themselves so closely with the state and partisan politics, H.L. Seneviratne suggests that the Sangha inadvertently traded their moral authority for political influence. This shift, in his view, led to the ‘betrayal’ of the original social service movement, replacing a vision of broad social progress with one centred on political dominance.

The core of his critique lies in the disappearance of what he calls the ‘intellectual monk.’ He laments the decline of the scholarly, reflective tradition in favour of a more populist and often inflammatory rhetoric. By analysing the rhetoric of key monastic figures, H.L. Senevirathne illustrates how the language of Buddhism was repurposed to justify political ends, often at the expense of the pluralistic values that he believes are inherent to the faith’s core teachings.

H.L. Seneviratne’s work remains highly relevant today as it provides a framework for understanding contemporary religious tensions. His analysis serves as a warning about the consequences of merging religious institutional power with state politics. By documenting this historical shift, he challenges modern Sri Lankans—and global observers—to reconsider the role of religious institutions in a secular, democratic state, urging a return to the compassionate and socially inclusive roots of the Buddhist tradition.

Within the broader context of Sri Lankan anthropology, H.L. Seneviratne is frequently grouped with other towering figures of his generation, most notably Stanley Jeyaraja Tambiah and Gananath Obeyesekere. Together, this remarkable cohort revolutionized the study of Sri Lanka by applying structural and psychological analyses to religious and ethnic identity. While Tambiah famously interrogated the betrayal of non-violent Buddhist principles in the face of political violence, H.L. Seneviratne’s work is often seen as the essential sociological counterpart, providing the detailed historical and institutional narrative of how the monastic order itself was reshaped by these very forces.

Reation to Seneviratne’s critque

The reaction to H.L. Seneviratne’s critique has been as multifaceted as the work itself. In academic circles, particularly those influenced by post-colonial theory, he is celebrated for speaking truth in a public place. Scholars have noted that because he writes as an insider—both a Sinhalese and a Buddhist, that makes them both credible and, to some, highly objectionable. His work has paved the way for a younger generation of Sri Lankan sociologists and anthropologists to move beyond traditional functionalism towards more radical articulations of competing interests and political power.

However, his analysis has also made him a target for nationalist critics. Those aligned with ethno-religious movements often view his deconstruction of the Sangha’s political role as an attack on Sinhalese-Buddhist identity itself. These detractors argue that H.L. Seneviratne’s intellectualist or universalist view of Buddhism fails to account for the necessity of the clergy’s role in protecting the nation against neo colonial and modern pressures. This tension highlights the very descent into ideology that H.L. Seneviratne has spent his career documenting.

H.L. Seneviratne’s legacy is defined by this ongoing dialogue between scholarship and social reality. His transition from the detached scholar seen in his early work on Kandyan rituals to the socially concerned intellectual of The Work of Kings mirrors the very transformation of the Sangha and Buddha Sasana he studied. By refusing to look away from the complexities of the present, he has ensured that his work remains a cornerstone for any serious discussion on the future of religion and governance in Sri Lanka.

Focus on good governance

In his later years, H.L. Seneviratne has pivoted his focus toward the practical application of his theories, specifically examining how the concept of ‘Good Governance’ interacts with traditional religious structures. He argues that for Sri Lanka to achieve true stability, there must be a fundamental reimagining of the Sangha’s role in the public sphere—one that moves away from the ‘work of Kings’ and returns to a more ethical, advisory capacity. This shift in his recent lectures reflects a deep concern about the erosion of democratic institutions and the way religious sentiment can be harnessed to bypass the rule of law.

Building on this, contemporary scholars like Benjamin Schonthal have expanded H.L. Seneviratne’s inquiry into the legal and constitutional dimensions of Buddhism in Sri Lanka. While H.L. Seneviratne provided the anthropological groundwork for how monks gained political power, this newer generation of academics examines how that power has been codified into the very laws of the state. They explore the ‘path dependency’ created by the historical shifts H.L. Seneviratne documented, looking at how the legal privileging of Buddhism creates unique challenges for a pluralistic society.

New Sangha

Furthermore, his influence is visible in the work of local scholars who focus on ‘engaged Buddhism.’ These researchers look back at H.L. Seneviratne’s description of the early 20th-century social service monks as a blueprint for modern reform. By identifying the moment where the clergy’s mission shifted from social welfare to political nationalism, these scholars use H.L. Seneviratne’s historical milestones to advocate a ‘New Sangha’ that prioritizes reconciliation and inter-ethnic harmony over state-aligned power.

The enduring power of H.L. Seneviratne’s work lies in its refusal to offer easy answers. By mapping the transition within Buddhist practice from ritual to politics, and from social service to nationalism, he has provided an analytical framework in which the nation can see its own transformation. His legacy is not just a collection of books, but a persistent, rigorous habit of questioning that continues to inspire those who seek to understand the delicate balance between faith and the modern state.

H.L. Seneviratne continues to challenge his audience to think beyond the immediate political moment. By documenting the arc of Sri Lankan history from the sacred rituals of the Kandyan kings to the modern halls of parliament, he provides a vital sense of perspective. Whether he is being celebrated by the academic community or critiqued by nationalist voices, his work ensures that the conversation regarding the soul of the nation remains rigorous, historically grounded, and unafraid of its own complexities.

Anthropology and cinema

H.L. Seneviratne identifies the mid-1950s as the critical turning point for this cinematic shift, specifically anchoring the move to 1956 with the release of Lester James Peries’s “Rekava.” This period was a watershed moment in Sri Lankan history, coinciding with a broader nationalist resurgence that sought to reclaim a localized identity from the influence of colonial and foreign powers. H.L. Seneviratne suggests that before this era, the ‘South Indian formula’ dominated the screen, characterized by studio-bound sets, theatrical acting, and musical interludes that felt alien to the island’s actual social fabric. The pioneers of this movement, led by Lester James Peries and later followed by figures like Siri Gunasinghe in the early 1960s, deliberately moved the camera into the open air of the rural village to capture what H.L. Seneviratne describes as the ‘authentic rhythms’ of life. This transition was not merely aesthetic but deeply ideological; it replaced the mythical, exaggerated heroism of commercial cinema with a nuanced exploration of the post-colonial middle class and the crumbling feudal hierarchies. By the 1960s, through landmark works like ‘Gamperaliya,’ these filmmakers were successfully crafting a modern mythology that reflected the internal psychological tensions and the social evolution of a nation navigating its way between traditional Buddhist values and a rapidly modernizing world.

His critique of the relationship between art and the state is particularly evident in his analysis of historical epics, where he has argued that certain cinematic portrayals of ancient kings and battles serve as a form of ‘visual nationalism,’ translating the ideological shifts he documented in The Work of Kings onto the silver screen. By analysing these films, he shows how popular culture can become a powerful tool for constructing a simplified, heroic past that often ignores the multi-ethnic and pluralistic realities of the island’s history.

(To be concluded)

by Professor M. W. Amarasiri de Silva