Midweek Review

Prez takes Trinco Oil Tank Farm to next level

Published

3 years ago

2023/03/8

Admiral Ravi Wijegunaratne stands next to President Ranil Wickremesinghe, at the Trincomalee Oil Tank Farm, on 03 March. National Security Advisor, Sagala Ratnayake, is behind Wickremesinghe, while Minister Kanchana Wijesekera is at extreme right (Pic courtesy PMD)

By Shamindra Ferdinando

A pair of Chinese built F-7 multi-role jet fighters flew over SLAF China Bay parade grounds, within minutes after President Ranil Wickremesinghe arrived there, on March 03, to take the salute, as the Chief Guest, at a Commissioning and Wings parade of the No 65 Officer Cadets’ Intake, comprising a total of 40 officers, belonging to No. 17 Lady Officer Cadets’ Intake, and the No. 35 and No. 37 Kotelawala Defence University (KDU) Intakes.

F7s flew from Katunayake air base, the home to the famed No. 05 Squadron that played a significant role, during the Eelam War IV (August 2006-May 2009).

The Commissioning and Wings parade coincided with the 72nd anniversary of the Sri Lanka Air Force (SLAF). The F-7 GS’ flew immediately after President Wickremesinghe, who is also the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, arrived at the saluting dais.

It would be pertinent to mention that SLAF Chief, Air Marshal Sudarshana Pathirana, veteran jet pilot, on whose invitation President Wickremesinghe attended the China Bay event, was among the three-member group that recommended the acquisition of Chinese interceptors, in 2007, as the war had entered its final phase, which was undoubtedly a fight to the finish against ‘the world’s most ruthless terrorist outfit’, with a formidable fighting force, comprising naval, air, and land capabilities, all of whose signature modus operandi was the suicide attack.

The group consisted of the then Group Captain Priyantha Gunasinghe (retired in the rank of Group Captain), Group Captain Sudarshana Pathirana and Wing Commander Sajeewa Hendawitharane (retired in the rank of Group Captain) asserted that the Chinese interceptors should be acquired to counter immediate LTTE air threat, and the other available aircraft, at that time, MiG 29s, acquired from Ukraine, should be considered as a long-term solution. This decision was made soon after the LTTE carried out its first air attack on the Katunayake air base, in March 2007. F-7 GS were first flown here, in January 2008. The No. 05 Squadron achieved a 5-6 minute reaction time during a scramble and was the Squadron to be on 24-hour stand by, in an interceptor role, since its deployment in early 2008.

By the time the LTTE was brought to its knees, on the Vanni east front, in May 2009, the four Chinese jets had registered altogether 506 missions. During the last phase of the ground offensive, the then Air Force Commander, Air Marshal Roshan Goonetilleke, moved a pair of those jets to China Bay, in case the top LTTE leadership made an attempt to escape, by sea. At that height of the war, the SLAF jet Squadrons consisted of Kfirs, MiG 27s and F-7s.

On the day of the China Bay parade, the writer was invited to deliver a lecture at the Naval and Maritime Academy, Trincomalee (32nd JNSC course) on ‘media management’ in armed forces or ‘military and media management.’

Well over a decade after Sri Lanka’s triumph over the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), the country is in a bind with the government seeking USD 2.9 bn IMF bailout package. No less a person than theGovernor of the Central Bank, Dr. Nandalal Weerasinghe, recently alleged that the government had been hiding Sri Lanka’s bankruptcy status before he admitted the reality, a couple of moons ago. In an utterly destabilized environment, every sector seems to be in turmoil, no doubt exacerbated by a combination of events, including the 2019 Easter Sunday suicide attacks, crippling the vibrant tourist trade, the Covid-19 pandemic, something not scene in our living memory, hitting the whole world, the following year, thereby robbing the country’s financial sector of vital worker remittances, running to billions of dollars, by underground money transfer systems.

The armed forces are certainly not exempted. The ongoing controversy, over a three-member committee, comprising Admiral of the Fleet Wasantha Karannagoda (Governor, North Western Province), Air Chief Marshall Roshan Goonatilleke (Governor, Western Province) and ex-Army Commander Daya Ratnayake, finding fault with the then Army Commander, Gen. Shavendra Silva, for his alleged failure to bring the 09 May, 2022, violence swiftly under control. The reportage of the unexpected development is a serious challenge to those responsible for media management in armed forces. This contentious issue cannot be discussed without taking into consideration (i) Gen. Silva, the first General Officer Commanding (GOC) of the famed 58 Division (formerly Task Force 1) is the incumbent Chief of Defence Staff (ii) The role played by those at Temple Trees in instigating a hooligan attack on Galle Face protesters and (iii) the ferocity of counter meticulous attacks, mounted by well-organized groups across the country, against those in power.

The continuing economic-political-social crisis has destabilized the country to such an extent with political parties, represented in Parliament, hell-bent on advancing their own agendas, regardless of the consequences.

Like Gen. Shavendra Silva’s controversial conduct, during the events that led to the forced ouster of President Gotabaya Rajapaksa, after having been one of the significant frontline ground commanders, who took the fight to the LTTE, resulting in its eventual defeat, similarly while everyone talks about a IMF bailout to no end, day in day out, critics are legitimately asking whether all this financial turmoil was deliberately created by interested parties and even those in the highest echelons of the government have not done anything tangible to get back USD billions from export proceeds that had been parked overseas, by unscrupulous exporters, as that amount alone is enough for us to climb out of the present rut.

New move on Trinco oil tank farm

Having participated at the China Bay parade, President Wickremesinghe, accompanied by National Security Advisor and Chief of Presidential Staff, Sagala Ratnayake, and several others, including Power and Energy Minister Kanchana Wijesekera, toured the Trincomalee Oil Tank Farm, consisting originally of 100 tanks, situated in 827 acres of land. The tank No. 91, however, was destroyed in Japanese air attacks, launched by ship-borne bombers, and attack aircraft, during World War 11. President Wickremesinghe is the first head of state to visit the Oil Tank Farm since Sri Lanka handed it over to Lanka Indian Oil Company (LIOC) during his previous tenure as the Prime Minister. The Oil Tank Farm is situated in China Bay. Managing Director of LIOC, Manoj Gupta, was there to welcome President Wickremesinghe.

In terms of the agreement, finalized on 07 February, 2003, during Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga’s tenure as the President, the LIOC took over the 99 oil tanks, each capable of holding 12,300 tonnes (1 tonne =1,000 litres) of fuel. The upper and lower tank farms consist of 85 tanks and 14 tanks, respectively.

On behalf of Sri Lanka, the then Secretary to the Treasury, Jayampathy Charitha Ratwatte ,signed the agreement, operative for a period of 35 years. In fact, the Trincomalee facility is so far covered by three agreements, namely (i) the Indo-Lanka Accord of 29 July, 1987, signed by President JRJ and PM Rajiv Gandhi (ii) the agreement on taking over of possession and related matters of the China Bay installation of the Ceylon Petroleum Corporation (CPC), signed on 07 February, 2003, and (iii) comprehensive agreement on cooperation in economic projects, finalized on 26 April, 2017, by Indian External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj and Development Strategies and International Trade Minister Malik Samarawickrema.

President Wickemesinghe declared, at China Bay, in no uncertain terms, the urgent need to go ahead with the Oil Tank Farm development project.

In line with the government’s overall strategy, President Wickremesinghe recently brought in one-time Navy Commander, Admiral Ravi Wijegunaratne, as the Managing Director of the Ceylon Petroleum Corporation (CPC), and to its Director Board as President’s nominee, and also as Chairman, CPC Trincomalee Oil Tank Farm Development Company. The Director Board consists of eight-four each from Sri Lanka and India. The CPC /LIOC venture is meant to speed up the entire process. National Security Advisor Sagala Ratnayake is working on this project.

Of the 99 tanks, 61 tanks are empty. President Wickremesinghe is keen to restore the unused 61 tanks to working condition. Would it be possible to store here what can be safely called the strategic Indian oil reserves?

Indian response to the 80s threat

On 29 July, 1987, President JRJ and Premier Rajiv Gandhi exchanged letters which dealt with the Trincomalee Oil Tank Farm as part of the controversial Indo-Lanka Accord. They essentially addressed security issues, against the backdrop of the then growing Indian concerns that foreign military, and intelligence personnel, posed a serious threat to India. India never acknowledged that Sri Lanka wouldn’t have had to seek foreign military assistance if not for its then Premier Indira Gandhi launching a destabilisation project here by covertly training Sri Lankan Tamil armed groups, as a direct counter to then Sri Lankan President JRJ’s overt pro-Western stand, by even offering Trincomalee as a base to Washington.

India included the Trincomalee Oil Tank Farm in the agreement that was meant to bring the situation under control. But, at the end of its direct intervention, India had lost 1,300 officers and men, over double that number wounded, and Rajiv Gandhi himself was blown up, in Tamil Nadu, by a female Tiger suicide bomber. It was the price India paid for interfering in Sri Lanka’s internal affairs.

At the time New Delhi’s hand was also forced by covert Western actions to destabilize and, possibly, break up India, by backing various separatist groups there. So, in a way, the Tamil separatist movement here was hijacked by the West to sow discord in India, where there are more than 60 million Tamils. The West, led by the USA and the UK, was all out to finish off India, even using Pakistan as a proxy because it was seen as being too close to the then Soviet Union. But they were halted, in their tracks, because of the solid backing that New Delhi received from Moscow, the then countervailing military power. Later, with the collapse of the Soviet Union, in the late 80s, the West found a new convenient mortal enemy in Islamic terrorists, who were in the first place incubated, in Pakistan and Afghanistan, by Washington, to chase out Russians from the latter, with the backing of wealthy Arab countries, like Saudi Arabia.

So those in Delhi should be aware that if there was no China, India would have been the West’s current number two target, after Russia. These pale faces are essentially and, undoubtedly, evil, especially if one looks at what they have done around the world by plundering and enslaving the weakest, while outwardly professing ‘all men are created equal’. At least the Russians, after their October revolution, helped to free many of the enslaved colonies. All those colonies were given independence, for fear of the spread of Communism, and certainly not because the colonial powers suddenly became enlightened.

Let me reproduce the letter, dated 29 July, 1987, signed by Rajiv Gandhi.

” (1) Conscious of the friendship between our two countries, stretching over two millennia, and more, and recognizing the importance of nurturing this traditional friendship, it is imperative that both Sri Lanka and India reaffirm the decision not to allow our respective territories to be used for activities, prejudicial to each other’s unity, territorial integrity and security.

(2) In this spirit, you had during the course of our discussions, agreed to meet some of India’s concerns as follows: (i) Your Excellency and myself will reach an early understanding about the relevance and employment of foreign military and intelligence personnel with a view to ensuring that such presence will not prejudice Indo-Sri Lankan relations; (ii) Trincomalee, or any other ports in Sri Lanka, will not be made available for military use by any country in a manner prejudicial to India’s interests; (iii) The work of restoring and operating the Trincomalee Oil Tank Farm will be undertaken as a joint venture between India and Sri Lanka; (iv) Sri Lanka’s agreement with broadcasting organizations will be reviewed to ensure that any facilities set up by them in Sri Lanka are solely used as public broadcasting facilities and not for any military or intelligence purposes.

(3) In the same spirit India will: (i) Deport all Sri Lankan citizens who are found to be engaging in terrorist activities or advocating separatism or secessionism (ii) provide training facilities and military supplies for Sri Lankan security forces

(4) India and Sri Lanka have agreed to set up a joint consultative mechanism to continuously review matters of common concern in the light of the objectives stated in para 1 and specifically to monitor the implementation of other matters contained in this letter.

(5) Kindly confirm Excellency that the above correctly sets out the agreement reached between us. Please accept, Excellency, the assurances of my highest consideration.”

India raised concerns particularly over US and Israeli presence in the 80s. But, today, India is part of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QSD), widely known as the Quad, formed to meet what the US, Japan, Australia and India perceived as the growing Chinese challenge. Sri Lanka is caught up in the Quad politics due to heavy Chinese investments here, particularly the leasing of the Hambantota Port, for a period of 99-years, to China, in 2017, by the Yahapalana government. But what is really interesting is that the same government finalized a wide ranging memorandum of understanding for cooperation in economic projects, on 26 April, 2017, with India, that covered the Trincomalee Oil Tank Farm, eight months before China secured 85 percent of shares in the Hambantota Port for USD 1.12 bn.

Media management in armed forces

While the writer was working on the presentation for JNSC, the US embassy, in Colombo, in a joint press release with Sir John Kotelawela Defence University (KDU), dealt with the launch of a publication, titled ‘A Shared Vision for the Indo-Pacific: Implications for South Asia,” edited by Dr. Harendra Vidanage, at the Cinnamon Grand, one of the hotels targeted by the Easter Sunday bombers.

Vice Chancellor of the General Sir John Kotelawala Defence University, Major General Milinda Peiris, was among those present, along with US Ambassador here Julie J. Chung.

The joint statement quoted Rear Admiral (ret.) Peter A. Gumataotao, of the USN, as having told the gathering: “What is at stake is our ability to respond to activities that undermine the values and principles of a free and open Indo-Pacific. Competition is good, but when rules are changed, the process should be transparent and agreed on. The US embassy is busy promoting a shared vision for the Indo-Pacific. It would be pertinent to mention that the US embassy issued statements in Sinhala, Tamil and English. Obviously, the media management is part of their operation. A few days before the Cinnamon Grand event, Ambassador Chung visited Parliament. She was there to welcome the appointment of new office-bearers of the Sri Lanka-US Parliamentary Friendship Association. Rebel SLPP MP Chandima Weerakkody was elected the President of the Association.

Sri Lanka seems to be in a catch 22 situation. Contrary to repeated assurances that Sri Lanka wouldn’t take sides in China vs Quad, Sri Lanka appears to be already tilted towards the US-led grouping. The proposed operationalization of the Trincomalee Oil Tank Farm should be examined against the Quad operations. Economic ruination has paved the way for external interventions as Sri Lanka struggled to cope up with growing challenges.

The armed forces and police find the situation tough as media manipulations continue. India is now part of the overall US political-security-economic policy. India actually encourages Sri Lanka to be part of the US-led club but there can be certain concerns. Unfortunately, the Opposition has conveniently missed key factors in the strategic Indo-Pacific project. The status of India-US relations is at its zenith, therefore our giant neighbour wouldn’t mind even if Sri Lanka signed the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) with the US. The Americans prefer to call the SOFA Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA).

Sri Lanka entered into the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) in August 2017 during Maithripala Sirisena’s tenure as the President. Perhaps those responsible for national security should study the circumstances President Sirisena gave into pressure that was brought to bear on him by Sri Lankan Ambassador in Washington at that time, Prasad Kariyawasam, to renew ACSA, in early August 2017. Sri Lanka first signed the ACSA in March 2007. It expired in 2017. The Yahapalana partner obviously had no objection. SOFA was first signed in 1995 during CBK’s presidency. Apparently, the United States asked Sri Lanka for a new pact and sent a draft to the Sri Lankan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in August 2018. SOFA, however, is on hold.

The Millennium Challenge Corporation Compact (MCC) – a project worth USD 480 mn (Rs 89 bn) – was torpedoed by a committee, headed by Prof. Lalithsiri Gunaruwan, in February 2020. The economist didn’t mince his words when he declared ACSA, SOFA and MCC could be part of the US-Indo Lanka strategy.

Political leadership, regardless of the party in power, appears to have continuously failed to examine developments/situations/events properly. For the first time such a report was prepared in Sinhala.

The government media needs to closely study developing situations. With the emergence of social media, in the past decade, as an extremely powerful tool, media management has become a tough task. Situations cannot be tackled by simply issuing statements, or trying to suppress information.

A cohesive system is required to address issues at hand. Perhaps, those handling media will have to work outside official channels to overcome challenges.

Sri Lanka’s growing dependence on foreign powers to meet its needs, ranging from essential items, including medicines, school uniforms and defence requirements, in a way portends long term problems. Sri Lanka should be certainly grateful for international support but also mindful of other factors.

A recent statement, attributed to Deputy Indian High Commissioner, Vinod K. Jacob, underscored the status of Indian assistance. Jacob declared that India offered as many as 1,500 training slots, annually, to Sri Lanka, at an annual cost of USD 7mn. Jacob was addressing a group of Indian Navy trained Sri Lanka Defence Forces personnel, on board INS Sukanya, on February 28.

Referring to India’s much-touted ‘Neighbourhood First’ policy, Jacob mentioned a five-point plan to take Indo-Lanka relations to the next level. The Indian HC quoted Jacob as having said: “First is the potential for economic and financial cooperation by building on the Indian support to the people of Sri Lanka, in 2022, to the tune of USD 4 billion. The focus could be laid on areas, such as trade in national currencies, ease of investments and strengthening financial cooperation. Second, the two sides are working towards increasing air, ferry, digital and energy connectivity. Third, a new type of development cooperation partnership building on the existing multi-billion portfolio, with special emphasis on vulnerable communities, is required. Fourth, both sides need to enhance people to people exchanges, particularly in tourist movements. Fifth, it is essential to strengthen the cultural, religious, music, movie and sporting links for mutual benefit.”

Sri Lanka needs to develop a strategy of its own, drawing support from the international community. The current economic-political-social crisis should be addressed, without further delay. The failure to reach a consensus, on Local Government polls, can cause a protracted political conflict that may undermine the overall efforts to restore economic stability.

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Midweek Review

2019 Easter Sunday carnage in retrospect

Published

2 weeks ago

2026/04/8

Sahan Weerasooriya

November 21, 2019: President Gotabaya Rajapaksa meets Archbishop of Colombo, His Eminence Malcolm Cardinal Ranjith at the Bishop House where he requested the Church to nominate a representative for the Presidential Commission of Inquiry (PCoI) probing the Easter Sunday carnage.

Coordinated suicide attacks targeted three churches—St. Anthony’s in Colombo, St. Sebastian’s at Katuwapitiya and Zion Church in Batticaloa—along with popular tourist hotels Shangri-La, Kingsbury, and Cinnamon Grand. No less a person than His Eminence Archbishop of Colombo Rt. Rev. Malcolm Cardinal Ranjith is on record as having said that the carnage could have been averted if the Yahapalana government shared the available Indian intelligence warning with him. Yahapalana Minister Harin Fernando publicly admitted that his family was aware of the impending attack and the warning issued to senior police officers in charge of VVIP/VIP security is evidence that all those who represented Parliament at the time knew of the mass murder plot. Against the backdrop of Indian intelligence warning and our collective failure to act on it, it would be pertinent to ask the Indians whether they knew the Easter Sunday operation was to facilitate Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s victory at the 2019 presidential poll. Perhaps, a key to the Easter Sunday conspiracy is enigma Sara Jasmin (Tamil girl from Batticaloa converted to Islam) whose husband Atchchi Muhammadu Hasthun carried out the attack on St. Sebastian’s Church, Katuwapitiya

By Shamindra Ferdinando

Pivithuru Hela Urumaya (PHU) leader Udaya Gammanpila’s Pasku Praharaye Mahamolakaru Soya Yema (Searching for the mastermind behind the Easter Sunday attacks) inquired into the 2019 April 21 Easter Sunday carnage. The former Minister and Attorney-at-Law quite confidently argued that the mastermind of the only major post-war attack was Zahran Hashim, one of the two suicide bombers who targeted Shangri-la, Colombo.

Gammanpila launched his painstaking work recently at the Sambuddhathva Jayanthi Mandiraya at Thummulla, with the participation of former Presidents Gotabaya Rajapaksa, who had been accused of being the beneficiary of the Easter Sunday carnage at the November 2019 presidential election, and Maithripala Sirisena faulted by the Presidential Commission of Inquiry (PCoI) that probed the heinous crime. Rajapaksa and Sirisena sat next to each other, in the first row, and were among those who received copies of the controversial book.

PCoI, appointed by Sirisena in September, 2019, in the run-up to the presidential election, in its report submitted to President Gotabaya Rajapaksa, in February, 2020, declared that Sirisena’s failure as the President to act on ‘actionable intelligence’ exceeded mere civil negligence. Having declared criminal liability on the part of Sirisena, the PCoI recommended that the Attorney General consider criminal proceedings against former President Sirisena under any suitable provision in the Penal Code.

PCoI’s Chairman Supreme Court Judge Janak de Silva handed over the final report to President Rajapaksa on February 1, 2021 at the Presidential Secretariat. Gotabaya Rajapaksa received the first and second interim reports on 20 December and on 2 March, 2020, respectively.

The Commission consists of the following commissioners: Justice Janak De Silva (Judge of the Supreme Court and Chairman of the Commission), Justice Nissanka Bandula Karunarathna (Judge of the Court of Appeal), Justice Nihal Sunil Rajapakse (Retired Judge of the Court of Appeal), Bandula Kumara Atapattu (Retired Judge of the High Court) and Ms W.M.M.R. Adikari (Retired Ministry Secretary).

H.M.P. Buwaneka Herath functioned as the Secretary to the PCoI.

It would be pertinent to mention that the Archbishop of Colombo Malcolm Cardinal Ranjith, declined an opportunity offered by President Rajapaksa to nominate a person for the PCoI. The Church leader asserted such a move would be misconstrued by various interested parties. Both the former President and Archbishop of Colombo confirmed that development soon after the presidential election.

Having declared its faith in the PCoI and received assurance of the new government’s intention to implement its recommendations, the Church was taken aback when the government announced the appointment of a six-member committee, chaired by Minister Chamal Rajapaksa, to examine the PCoI and recommend how to proceed. That Committee included Ministers Johnston Fernando, Udaya Gammanpila, Ramesh Pathirana, Prasanna Ranatunga and Rohitha Abeygunawardena.

The Church cannot deny that their position in respect of the Yahapalana government’s pathetic failure to thwart the Easter Sunday carnage greatly influenced the electorate, and the SLPP presidential candidate Gotabaya Rajapaksa directly benefited. Alleging that the Archbishop of Colombo played politics with the Easter Sunday carnage, SJB parliamentarian Harin Fernando, in June 2020, didn’t mince his words when he accused the Church of influencing a decisive 5% of voters to back Gotabaya Rajapaksa. At the time that accusation was made about nine months before the PCoI handed over its report, President Rajapaksa and the Archbishop of Colombo enjoyed a close relationship.

The Church raised the failure on the part of the government to implement the PCoI’s recommendations six months after President Rajapaksa received the final report.

The National Catholic Committee for Justice to Eastern Sunday Attack Victims, in a lengthy letter dated 12 July 2021, demanded the government deal with the following persons for their failure to thwart the attacks. The Committee warned that unless the President addressed their concerns alternative measures would be taken. The government ignored the warning. Instead, the SLPP adopted delaying tactics much to their disappointment and the irate Church finally declared unconditional support for the US-India backed regime change project.

Sirisena and others

On the basis of the 19th Chapter, titled ‘Accountability’ of the final report, the Committee drew President Rajapaksa’s attention to the following persons as listed by the PCoI: (1) President Maithripala Sirisena (2) PM Ranil Wickremesinghe (3) Defence Secretary Hemasiri Fernando (4) Chief of National Intelligence Sisira Mendis (5) Director State Intelligence Service Nilantha Jayawardena.

The 20th Chapter, titled ‘Failures on the part of law enforcement authorities’ in the Final report (First Volume), identified the following culprits ,namely IGP Pujith Jayasundera, SDIG Nandana Munasinghe (WP), Deshabandu Tennakoon (DIG, Colombo, North), SP Sanjeewa Bandara (Colombo North), SSP Chandana Atukorale, B.E.I. Prasanna (SP, Director, Western province, Intelligence), ASP Sisira Kumara, Chief Inspector R.M. Sarath Kumarasinghe (Acting OIC, Fort), Chief Inspector Sagara Wilegoda Liyanage (OIC, Fort)., Chaminda Nawaratne (OIC, Katana), State Counsel Malik Azeez and Deputy Solicitor General Azad Navaavi.

The PCoI named former Minister and leader of All Ceylon Makkal Congress Rishad Bathiudeen, his brother Riyaj, Dr Muhamad Zulyan Muhamad Zafras and Ahamad Lukman Thalib as persons who facilitated the Easter Sunday conspiracy, while former Minister M.L.A.M. Hisbullah was faulted for spreading extremism in Kattankudy.

Major General (retd) Suresh Sallay, who is now in remand custody, under the CID, for a period of 90 days, in terms of the prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) ,was not among those named by the PCoI. Sallay, who served as the head of the Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI/from 2012 to 2016) was taken into custody on 25 February and named as the third suspect in the high profile investigation. (Interested parties propagated that Sallay was apprehended on the basis of UK’s Channel 4 claim that the officer got in touch with would-be Easter Sunday bombers, including Zahran Hashim, with the help of Sivanesathurai Chandrakanthan, alias Pilleyan. However, Pilleyan who had been arrested in early April 2025 under PTA was recently remanded by the Mount Lavinia Magistrate’s Court, pending the Attorney General’s recommendations in connection with investigations into the disappearance of a Vice Chancellor in the Eastern Province in 2006. There was absolutely no reference to the Easter Sunday case)

The Church also emphasised the need to investigate the then Attorney General Dappula de Livera’s declaration of a ‘grand conspiracy’ behind the Easter Sunday carnage. The Church sought answers from President Rajapaksa as to the nature of the grand conspiracy claimed by the then AG on the eve of his retirement.

Sallay was taken into custody six years after the PCoI handed over its recommendations to President Rajapaksa and the appointment of a six-member parliamentary committee that examined the recommendations. The author of Pasku Praharaye Mahamolakaru Soya Yema, Gammanpila, the only lawyer in the six-member PCoI, should be able to reveal the circumstances that committee came into being.

Against the backdrop of the PCoI making specific recommendations in respect of the disgraced politicians, civilian officials and law enforcement authorities over accountability and security failures, the SLPP owed an explanation regarding the appointment of a six-member committee of SLPPers. Actually, the SLPP owed an explanation to Sallay whose arrest under the PTA eight years after Easter Sunday carnage has to be discussed taking into consideration the failure to implement the recommendations.

Let me briefly mention PCoI’s recommendations pertaining to two senior police officers. PCoI recommended that the AG consider criminal proceedings against SDIG Nandana Munasinghe under any suitable provision in the Penal Code or Section 82 of the Police Ordinance (Final report, Vol 1, page 312). The PCoI recommended a disciplinary inquiry in respect of DIG Deshabandu Tennakoon. The SLPP simply sat on the PCoI recommendations.

Following the overthrow of President Rajapaksa by a well-organised Aragalaya mob in July 2022, the SLPP and President Ranil Wickremesinghe paved the way for Deshabandu Tennakoon to become the Acting IGP in November 2023. Wickremesinghe went out of his way to secure the Constitutional Council’s approval to confirm the controversial police officer Tennakoon’s status as the IGP.

Some have misconstrued the Supreme Court ruling, given in January 2023, as action taken by the State against those named in the PCoI report. It was not the case. The SC bench, comprising seven judges, ordered Sirisena to pay Rs 100 mn into a compensation fund in response to 12 fundamental rights cases filed by families of the Easter Sunday victims, Catholic clergy and the Bar Association of Sri Lanka. The SC also ordered ex-IGP Pujith Jayasundara and former SIS head Nilantha Jayawardene to pay Rs. 75m rupees each, former Defence Secretary Hemasiri Fernando Rs. 50 million and former CNI Sisira Mendis Rs. 10 million from their personal money. All of them have been named in the PCoI report. As previously mentioned, Maj. Gen. Sallay, who headed the SIS at the time of the SC ruling that created the largest ever single compensation fund, was not among those faulted by the sitting and former justices.

Initial assertion

The Archbishop of Colombo, in mid-May 2019, declared the Easter Sunday carnage was caused by local youth at the behest of a foreign group. The leader of the Catholic Church said so in response to a query raised by the writer regarding a controversial statement made by TNA MP M. A. Sumanthiran. The Archbishop was joined by Most Ven Ittapane Dhammalankara Nayaka Thera of Kotte Sri Kalyani Samagri Dharma Maha Sangha Sabha of Siyam Maha Nikaya. They responded to media queries at the Bishop’s House, Borella.

The Archbishop contradicted Sumanthiran’s claim that the failure on the part of successive governments to address the grievances of minorities over the past several decades led to the 2019 Easter Sunday massacre.

Sumanthiran made the unsubstantiated claim at an event organised to celebrate the first anniversary of the Sinhala political weekly ‘Annidda,’ edited by Attorney-at-Law K.W. Janaranjana at the BMICH.

The Archbishop alleged that a foreign group used misguided loyal youth to mount the Easter Sunday attacks (‘Cardinal rejects TNA’s interpretation’, with strap line ‘foreign group used misguided local youth’, The Island, May 15, 2019 edition).

Interested parties interpreted the Easter Sunday carnage in line with their thinking. The writer was present at a special media briefing called by President Sirisena on 30 April, 2019 at the President’s House where the then Northern Province Governor Dr. Suren Raghavan called for direct talks with those responsible for the Easter Sunday massacre. One-time Director of the President’s Media Division (PMD) Dr. Raghavan emphasised that direct dialogue was necessary in the absence of an acceptable mechanism to deal with such a situation. Don’t forget Sisisena had no qualms in leaving the country a few days before the attacks and was away in Singapore when extremists struck. Sirisena arrived in Singapore from India.

The NP Governor made the declaration though none of the journalists present sought his views on the post-Easter Sunday developments.

During that briefing, in response to another query raised by the writer, Army Commander Lt. Gen. Mahesh Senanayake disclosed that the CNI refrained from sharing intelligence alerts received by the CNI with the DMI. Brigadier Chula Kodituwakku, who served as Director, DMI, had been present at Sirisena’s briefing and was the first to brief the media with regard to the extremist build-up leading to the Easter Sunday attacks.

The collapse of the Yahapalana arrangement caused a security nightmare. Frequent feuds between Yahapalana partners, the UNP and the SLFP, facilitated the extremists’ project. The top UNP leadership feared to step in, even after Justice Minister Dr. Wijeyadasa Rajapaksha issued a warning in Parliament, in late 2016, regarding extremist activities and some Muslim families securing refuge in countries dominated by ISIS. Instead of taking tangible measures to address the growing threat, a section of the UNP parliamentary group pounced on the Minister.

The UNP felt that police/military action against extremists may undermine their voter base. The UNP remained passive even after extremists made an abortive bid to kill Thasleem, Coordinating Secretary to Minister Kabir Hashim, on 8 March 2019. Thasleem earned the wrath of the extremists as he accompanied the CID team that raided the extremists’ facility at Wanathawilluwa. The 16 January 2019 raid indicated the deadly intentions of the extremists but PM Wickremesinghe was unmoved, while President Sirisena appeared clueless as to what was going on.

Let me reproduce the PCoI assessment of PM Wickremesinghe in the run-up to the Easter Sunday massacre. “Upon consideration of evidence, it is the view of the PCoI that the lax approach of Mr. Wickremesinghe towards Islamic extremists as the Prime Minister was one of the primary reasons for the failure on the part of the then government to take proactive steps towards tackling growing extremism. This facilitated the build-up of Islam extremists to the point of the Easter Sunday attack.” (Final report, Vol 1, pages 276 and 277).

The National Catholic Committee for Justice to Easter Sunday Attack Victims, in its letter dated 12 July, 2021, addressed to President Rajapaksa, questioned the failure on the part of the PCoI to make any specific recommendations as regards Wickremesinghe. Accusing Wickremesinghe of a serious act of irresponsibility and neglect of duty, the Church emphasised that there should have been further investigations regarding the UNP leader’s conduct.

SLPP’s shocking failure

The SLPP never made a serious bid to examine all available information as part of an overall effort to counter accusations. If widely propagated lie that the Easter Sunday massacre had been engineered by Sallay to help Gotabaya Rajapaksa win the 2019 presidential poll is accepted, then not only Sirisena and Wickremesinghe but all law enforcement officers and others mentioned in the PCoI must have contributed to that despicable strategy. It would be interesting to see how the conspirators convinced a group of Muslims to sacrifice their lives to help Sinhala Buddhist hardliner Gotabaya Rajapaksa to become the President.

Amidst claims, counter claims and unsubstantiated propaganda all forgotten that a senior member of the JVP/NPP government, in February 2021, when he was in the Opposition directly claimed Indian involvement. The accusation seems unfair as all know that India alerted Sri Lanka on 4 April , 2019, regarding the conspiracy. However, Asanga Abeygoonasekera, in his latest work ‘Winds of Change’ questioned the conduct of the top Indian defence delegation that was in Colombo exactly two weeks before the Easter Sunday carnage. Abeygoonasekera, who had been a member of the Sri Lanka delegation, expressed suspicions over the visiting delegation’s failure to make reference to the warning given on 4 April 2019 regarding the plot.

The SLPP never had or developed a strategy to counter stepped up attacks. The party was overwhelmed by a spate of accusations meant to undermine them, both in and outside Parliament. The JVP/NPP, in spite of accommodating Mohamed Yusuf Ibrahim, father of two Easter Sunday suicide bombers Ilham Ahmed Ibrahim (Shangila-la) and Imsath Ahmed Ibrahim (Cinnamon Grand), in its 2015 National List was never really targeted by the SLPP. The SLPP never effectively raised the possibility of the wealthy spice trader funding the JVP to receive a National List slot.

The Catholic Church, too, was strangely silent on this particular issue. The issue is whether Mohamed Yusuf Ibrahim had been aware of the conspiracy that involved his sons. Another fact that cannot be ignored is Attorney-at-Law Hejaaz Hizbullah who had been arrested in April 2020 in connection with the Easter Sunday carnage but granted bail in February 2022 had been the Ibrahim family lawyer.

Hejaaz Hizbullah’s arrest received international attention and various interested parties raised the issue.

The father of the two brothers, who detonated suicide bombs, was granted bail in May 2022.

Eric Solheim, who had been involved in the Norwegian-led disastrous peace process here, commented on the Easter Sunday attacks. In spite of the international media naming the suicide bombers responsible for the worst such atrocity Solheim tweeted: “When we watch the horrific pictures from Sri Lanka, it is important to remember that Muslims and Christians are small minorities. Muslims historically were moderate and peaceful. They have been victims of violence in Sri Lanka, not orchestrating it.”

That ill-conceived tweet exposed the mindset of a man who unashamedly pursued a despicable agenda that threatened the country’s unitary status with the connivance of the UNP. Had they succeeded, the LTTE would have emerged as the dominant political-military power in the Northern and Eastern Provinces and a direct threat to the rest of the country.

Midweek Review

War with Iran and unravelling of the global order – I

Published

2 weeks ago

2026/04/8

Sahan Weerasooriya

At present, the world stands in the midst of a transitional and turbulent phase, characterised by heightened uncertainty and systemic flux, reflecting an ongoing transformation of the modern global order. The existing global order, rooted in the US hegemony, shows unmistakable signs of decay, while a new and uncertain global system struggles to be born. In such moments of profound transformation, as Antonio Gramsci observed, morbid symptoms proliferate across the body politic. From a geopolitical perspective, the intensifying coordinated aggression of the United States and Israel against Iran is not merely a regional crisis, but an acceleration of a deeper structural transformation in the international order. In this context, the conduct of Donald Trump appears less as an aberration and more as a morbid symptom of a declining US-led global order. As Amitav Acharya argues in The Once and Future World Order (2025), the emerging global order may well move beyond Western dominance. However, the pathway to that future is proving anything but orderly, shaped instead by disruption, unilateralism, and the unsettling symptoms of a system in transition.

Origins of the Conflict

To begin with, the origins and objectives of the parties to the present armed confrontation require unpacking. In a sense, the current Persian Gulf crisis reflects a convergence of long-standing geopolitical rivalries and evolving security dynamics in the Middle East. The roots of tension between the West and the Middle East can be traced back to earlier historical encounters, from the Persian Wars of classical antiquity to the Crusades of the medieval period. A new phase in the region’s political trajectory commenced in 1948 with the establishment of Israel—widely perceived as a Western enclave within the Arab world—and the concurrent displacement of approximately 700,000 Palestinians from their homeland. Since then, Israel has steadily consolidated and expanded its territory, a process that has remained a persistent source of regional instability. The Iranian Revolution introduced a further layer of complexity, fundamentally reshaping regional alignments and ideological contestations. In recent years, tensions between Israel and the United States on one side and Iran on the other have steadily intensified. The current phase of the conflict, however, was directly triggered by coordinated U.S.–Israeli airstrikes on both civilian and military targets on 28 February 2026, which, as noted in a 2 April 2026 statement by 100 international law experts from leading U.S. universities, constituted a clear violation of the UN Charter and International Humanitarian Law (IHL).

Objectives and Strategic Aims

Israel’s strategic objective appears to be directed toward the systematic and total destruction of Iran’s military, nuclear, and economic capabilities, driven by the perception that Iran remains the principal obstacle to its security and its pursuit of regional primacy. Israel was aware that Iran did not possess a nuclear weapon at the time; however, its nuclear programme remained a subject of international contention, with competing assessments regarding its ultimate intent and potential for weaponisation.

The United States, for its part, appears to be pursuing more targeted political and strategic objectives, including eventual transformation of Iran’s current political regime. Washington has long regarded the Iranian leadership as fundamentally antagonistic to U.S. interests in the Middle East. In this context, the United States may seek to enhance its strategic leverage over Iran, including in relation to its substantial oil and gas resources, a point underscored in recent statements by Donald Trump. It must be noted, however, successive U.S. administrations since 1979 have avoided direct large-scale military confrontation with Iran, preferring instead a combination of sanctions, diplomatic pressure, and indirect military engagement.

The positions of other Arab states in the Persian Gulf are shaped by a combination of security calculations, sectarian considerations, and broader geopolitical alignments. While several Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members, notably Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates, have expressed tacit support for measures that counter Iranian regional influence, their involvement remains calibrated to avoid direct military confrontation. Their position is informed by the belief that Iran provides backing to militant non-state actors, including Hezbollahs in the West Bank and the Houthis in Southern Yemen, which they view as destabilising forces in the region. These states are balancing competing priorities: the desire to curb Iran’s power projection, maintain strong security and economic ties with the United States, and preserve domestic stability. At the same time, countries such as Oman and Qatar have adopted more neutral or mediating stances, emphasizing diplomatic engagement and conflict de-escalation.

Militarily, Iran is not positioned to match the combined military capabilities of U.S.–Israeli forces. Nevertheless, it retains significant asymmetric leverage, particularly through its capacity to influence global energy flows. Control over critical maritime chokepoints, most notably the Strait of Hormuz, provides Tehran with a potent strategic instrument to disrupt global oil supply. Iranian leadership appears to view this leverage as a key pressure point, designed to compel global economic actors to push Washington and Tel Aviv toward a cessation of hostilities and a negotiated settlement. In this context, attacks on oil and gas infrastructure, shipping routes, and supply lines constitute central components of Iran’s survival strategy. As long as the conflict persists and energy flows through the Strait of Hormuz remain disrupted, the resulting instability is likely to generate severe repercussions across the global economy, increasing pressure on the United States to halt military operations against Iran.

Now entering its fifth week, the conflict continues to flare intensely, characterised by sustained and intensive aerial operations. Joint U.S.–Israeli strikes have reportedly destroyed substantial elements of Iran’s air and naval capabilities, as well as critical military and economic infrastructure. Nevertheless, Iran has retained the capacity to conduct guided missile strikes within Israel and against selected U.S. economic, diplomatic, and military assets across the Middle East, including reported long-range attacks on the U.S. facility at Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean, approximately 4,000 kilometers from Iranian territory. Initial U.S. and Israeli strategic calculations—anticipating that a decisive initial strike and the targeted killing of Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei would precipitate regime collapse and popular uprising—have not materialized. On the contrary, the destruction of civilian facilities has strengthened anti-American sentiment and reinforced domestic support for the Iranian leadership. While Iran faced initial setbacks on the battlefield, it has achieved notable success in the international media front, effectively shaping global perceptions and advancing its propaganda objectives. By the fifth week, Tehran’s asymmetric strategy has yielded tangible results, including the downing of two U.S. military aircraft, F15E Strike Eagle fighter jet and A10 Thunderbolt II (“Warthog”) ground-attack aircraft , signaling the resilience and operational efficacy of Iran’s military power.

The Military Industrial Complexes and ProIsrael Lobby

Why did the United States initiate military action against Iran at this particular juncture? Joe Kent, who resigned in protest over the war, stated that available intelligence did not indicate an imminent Iranian capability to produce a nuclear weapon or pose an immediate threat to the United States. This assessment raises important questions about the stated objective of dismantling Iran’s nuclear programme, suggesting that it may have served to obscure broader strategic and economic considerations underpinning the intervention. To understand the timing and rationale of the U.S. intervention in the Persian Gulf, it is therefore necessary to examine the influence of two powerful domestic pressure groups: the military–industrial complex and the pro-Israel lobby.

The influence of the U.S. military–industrial complex on American foreign policy is most clearly manifested through the institutionalized “revolving door” between defense corporations and senior positions within the U.S. administration. Over the past two decades, key figures such as Lloyd Austin (Secretary of Defence, 2021–2025), a former board member of Raytheon Technologies, Mark Esper (Secretary of Defence 2019–2020), who previously served as a senior executive at the same firm, and Patrick Shanahan (2019) from Boeing exemplify the direct movement of personnel from industry into the highest levels of strategic decision-making. This circulation is complemented by influential policy actors such as Michèle Flournoy (Under Secretary of Defence Under President Obama) and Antony Blinken (Secretary of State 2021 to 2025, Deputy Secretary of State 2015 to 2017), whose engagement with consultancies like WestExec Advisors further blurs the boundary between public policy and private defense interests. This pattern appears to persist under the present Trump administration, where the interplay between defense industry interests and strategic policymaking continues to shape procurement priorities and threat perceptions. Consequently, the military–industrial complex operates not merely as an external pressure group but as an internalized component of the policy process, shaping U.S. foreign policy in ways that align strategic objectives with the structural and commercial interests of the defense sector. Armed conflicts may also generate substantial commercial opportunities, as increased military spending often translates into expanded profits for defense contractors.

The influence of the pro-Israel lobby on U.S. foreign policy is best understood as a dense network of advocacy organisations, donors, policy institutes, and political actors that shape both elite consensus and decision-making within successive administrations. At the center of this network is the American Israel Public Affairs Committee, widely regarded as one of the most effective lobbying organisations in Washington, which works alongside a broader constellation of groups and donors to sustain bipartisan support for Israel. This influence is reinforced through the presence of senior policymakers and advisors with strong ideological or institutional affinities toward Israel, including Donald Trump and Benjamin Netanyahu, whose close political alignment has translated into consistent diplomatic and strategic backing. Policy decisions—ranging from the recognition of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital to continued military assistance—reflect not only geopolitical calculations but also the domestic political salience of pro-Israel advocacy within the United States. Consequently, the pro-Israel lobby operates not merely as an external pressure group but as an embedded force within the policy ecosystem, shaping U.S. foreign policy in ways that sustain a strong and often unconditional commitment to Israeli security and strategic interests. A fuller explanation of U.S. policy toward Iran emerges when the influence of both the military–industrial complex and the pro-Israel lobby is considered together. These two forces, while distinct in composition and motivation, converge in reinforcing a strategic outlook that prioritises the identification of Iran as a central threat and legitimizes the use of coercive military instruments.

Global Economic Fallout

After five weeks of sustained conflict, the trajectory of the war suggests that Iran’s strategy of resilience and asymmetric resistance is yielding tangible effects. While the United States, alongside Israel, has inflicted significant damage on Iran’s economic and military infrastructure, it has not succeeded in eroding Tehran’s capacity—or resolve—to continue the conflict through unconventional means. At the same time, Washington appears to be encountering increasing difficulty in bringing the war to a decisive conclusion, even as signs of strain emerge in its relations with key European allies. Most importantly, the repercussions of the conflict are no longer confined to the battlefield: the unfolding crisis has generated a widening economic shock that is reverberating across global markets and supply chains. It is this broader international economic impact of the war that now warrants closer examination.

The Persian Gulf conflict is rapidly sending shockwaves through the global economy. At the forefront is the energy sector: even partial disruptions to oil and gas exports from the region are driving prices sharply higher, placing severe pressure on energy-importing economies in Europe and Asia and fueling inflation worldwide. Maritime trade is also under strain, as heightened risk prompts longer shipping routes, increased freight rates, and rising war-risk premiums. These disruptions ripple through global supply chains, pushing up the cost of goods far beyond the energy sector.

Insurance costs for shipping and aviation are soaring as large zones are designated high-risk or even excluded from coverage, further elevating transport costs and pricing out smaller operators. Together, these pressures constitute a systemic economic shock: industrial production costs rise, supply chains fragment, and trade volumes contract, stressing manufacturing, logistics, and consumption simultaneously.

The cumulative effect is already slowing global growth. Major economies such as the EU, China, and India face slower expansion, while import-dependent states risk recession. Trade-driven sectors are contracting, reinforcing a scenario of high inflation and stagnating growth. Air travel is also impacted, with restricted airspace, higher fuel prices, and elevated insurance premiums driving up ticket costs and lengthening travel routes. Rising energy prices, logistics bottlenecks, and increased production costs are pushing up food prices and cost-of-living pressures, potentially forcing central banks into tighter monetary policy and slowing growth further.

Finally, global manufacturing—from chemicals and plastics to agriculture—is experiencing ripple effects as supply chain disruptions intensify shortages and price increases. The conflict in the Persian Gulf is thus not only a regional security crisis but also a catalyst for broad, interconnected economic disruptions that are reverberating across markets, trade networks, and everyday life worldwide.

(To be continued)