Midweek Review
Prez recalls debilitating Elephant Pass setback at Reid Avenue talk
Close on the heels of humiliating battlefield defeats in the Jaffna peninsula, President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga declared her intention to establish full diplomatic ties with Israel. Sri Lanka opened a diplomatic mission in Tel Aviv in Oct 2000 after having established full diplomatic ties with the Jewish State in May 2000, just a few weeks after losing Elephant Pass. Kumaratunga made her move after India refused to throw its military weight behind Sri Lanka’s bid to bring the war to a successful end in the Jaffna peninsula. Sri Lanka closed down the Israeli Interest Section in 1989.The Kumaratunga administration even subjected the print media reportage of Indo-Lanka relations pertaining to defence matters to censorship. In the wake of the Elephant Pass debacle and repeated assaults on the retreating SLA, the Kumaratunga government at one point feared the possibility of having to abandon the Jaffna peninsula. But, the SLA courageously fought back to halt the enemy advance and then made modest territorial gains. But, the politically motivated change of Northern and Jaffna Commands appeared to have led to Operation Agni Kheela, nothing but a catastrophe that caused quite significant damage to the SLA offensive capacity.
By Shamindra Ferdinando
President Ranil Wickremesinghe recently referred to the worst ever battlefield defeat suffered by the Sri Lanka Army (SLA) during the war against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).
Addressing a distinguished gathering at his alma mater Royal College, Colombo 07, on Oct 27, the UNP leader, who is also the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, recalled the supreme sacrifice made by two Royalists, namely Brigadier Percy Fernando and Colonel Bhathiya Jayatilleke during the chaotic withdrawal from the Elephant Pass (EP) base or Aanai Iravu, as it is known in Tamil, in late April 2000.
The strategically located EP base had never been overrun and was widely believed to be impregnable until the LTTE executed a meticulously planned operation, having disrupted the overland supply route. The EP calamity took place during Eelam War III when Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga served as the President (April 1995- Nov 2005).
At the time of the EP debacle, Wickremesinghe served as the Opposition Leader, having received the UNP leadership in 1994 after his party was voted out following a17-year long reign. During the UNP reign, the SLA experienced its worst setback at Pooneryn on the Vanni mainland in early Nov. 1993 that led to the hasty retirement of then Army Commander Cecil Waidyaratne.
Percy Fernando, Deputy General Officer Commanding (GoC) of the fully fledged 54 Division, and Bhathiya Jayatilleke, Commander of 54.1 Brigade, were promoted to the rank of Major General and Brigadier, posthumously. The SLA couldn’t have held the EP after the LTTE captured their sole source of drinking water, the wells at Iyakachchi, and immediate withdrawal became inevitable. Both top officers and many of their men suffered from severe dehydration and not so much from enemy fire. Jayatillake was also the son-in-law of then JOC Head Lt. Gen Hamilton Wanasinghe.
Paying a glowing tribute to the former Royalists, the UNP leader declared that in spite of the grave risk to their lives they didn’t flee theElephant Pass base but stayed with the withdrawing troops. The old Royalist said that they (Royalists) never fled under any circumstances. Wickremesinghe pointed out how he and Premier Dinesh Gunawardena faced daunting political challenges as Royalists.
Perhaps, the Elephant Pass debacle should be examined also taking into consideration the recent death of General Lionel Balagalle, one-time Army Commander who also served in Jaffna before the EP calamity. Widely regarded as the father of the Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI) Balagalle had been the Chief of Staff at the time of the debilitating EP setback and was involved in failed attempts to thwart LTTE offensive action therein.
The SLA first deployed a platoon at EP in the early ’80s. In 1990, EP became the home for a battalion of troops and support units. A decade later, the SLA had over a Division plus troops in the EP sector but couldn’t repulse the LTTE offensive.
The EP strip was of strategic importance to both the SLA and the LTTE as it linked the Vanni mainland with the Jaffna peninsula. Both the Jaffna-Kandy A9 road and the railway line to Jaffna run through EP, and the narrow strip of land was in a sense the gateway to Jaffna. The EP debacle should be also examined keeping in mind, that at the time, the SLA held the Jaffna peninsula, comprising Waligamam, Thennamaratchchy and Vadamaratchchy areas.
Brig. Fernando had been walking with a group of soldiers moving northwards, away from Elephant Pass, when he was shot dead by a sniper, whereas Jayatilleke died from dehydration despite being admitted to the Palaly military hospital. Then Maj. Janaka Ritigahapola, the Commanding Officer of the Second Battalion of the Commando Regiment, who had been walking ahead of the Deputy Division Commander, later organized a night mission to recover the senior officer’s body.
Now retired, Lt. Col. Ritigahapola told the writer, last weekend, how the Deputy Division Commander’s battle buddy accompanied a group of commandos who volunteered to walk back to the spot where the Brigadier was shot through the back of his head. “We really do now know he was sniped,” Ritigahapola said, adding that the senior officer’s sidearm was brought back by his battle buddy. According to Ritigahapola, like him, Brig. Fernando had returned to EP within 48 hours before having attended the funeral of a serviceman who succumbed to injuries suffered at EP.
Otherwise the SLA would have had to depend on the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to secure the senior officer’s body. The LTTE returned many bodies of officers and men attached to the 54 Division through the ICRC as the situation deteriorated. The writer used to contact the then ICRC spokesperson Harasha Gunawardene regularly to receive updates as the LTTE pressed ahead with its offensive in the Jaffna peninsula. According to Gunawardene, as many as 200 bodies, or more, may have been transferred across the frontline at that time.
The LTTE directed phase four of large scale multi-pronged operation Ceaseless Waves (Oyatha Alaikal) at EP. That was meant to overrun the 54 Division plus troops deployed in the Elephant Pass sector. Phase I and II of Ceaseless Waves defeated the SLA in the Vanni and phase III, carried out beginning the second week of Dec. 1999, severely weakened the SLA position in the north, thereby facilitating the fourth phase. The first Unceasing Waves destroyed the isolated the Mullaithivu base, home to two infantry battalions and support units in July 1996. In terms of officers and men killed, Mullaithivu was the worst single battlefield loss.
The failure on the part of the SLA to thwart the LTTE offensive on the EP base is still a mystery. At that time, the fully equipped 54 Division, headquartered at Elephant Pass, had Division plus troops. Brigadier K.B. Egodawela, who had served as the GoC of the ill-fated Division, was among those who managed to escape the marauding LTTE units. The Division Commander had been among the sections of 54 Division which succeeded in evading the LTTE units deployed to block escape routes.
Undoubtedly, the loss of EP was the worst debacle the LTTE inflicted on the SLA. Close on the heels of their success at EP, the LTTE brought in all available units to press ahead with its assault on Jaffna. Fortunately, the SLA managed to repulse a series of determined LTTE attempts to advance on Jaffna town. Had the LTTE succeeded in its bloody efforts, Jaffna, regained in Dec. 1995 by Operation Riviresa, too, would have been lost. Had that happened, both the Palaly airbase and Kankesanthurai harbour would have been vulnerable to the LTTE offensive and the war could have taken a dangerous turn.
Unprecedented crisis
At the time the EP base fell, the then President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga had been in the UK. Therefore, the decision to order the 54 Division to withdraw from EP was taken at a meeting of the National Security Council (NSC), chaired by the then Deputy Defence Minister, the late Anuruddha Ratwatte on the night of April 19, 2000. Amidst Opposition criticism of the President’s absence, the Presidential Secretariat declared that Mrs. Kumaratunga was abroad to receive medical treatment.
As pressure mounted on the SLA to take a swift decision on the EP base, the then Army Chief Lt. Gen. Srilal Weerasooriya, risked his life to visit the base, under siege, for consultations with Division Commander Brig. Egodawela and other senior officers. Lt. Gen. Weerasooriya had flown to Palaly airbase on the morning of April 19 and from there moved overland to the EP in two light vehicles and returned, following consultations, to Palaly before taking a flight to Ratmalana.
Gen. Weerasooriya had briefed the NSC regarding the developing situation and the need to act swiftly to save the lives of officers and men as the combined security forces weren’t in a position to defend the EP base. The Army Chief has pushed for immediate withdrawal as the combined forces couldn’t intervene successfully. Responding to The Island query over the last weekend, the former Army Chief emphasized that he never asked for a ceasefire but underscored the urgent need to evacuate the defence complex if the enemy onslaught couldn’t be defeated.
The PA leadership opposed a ceasefire as such a move would undermine the government. Therefore, Deputy Defence Minister Ratwatte had given the go ahead for Lt. Gen. Weerasooriya to take necessary actions.
Over the Army communications setup, instructions had been given to Brig. Egodawela to carry out the withdrawal on April 22, 2000. By the time instructions were issued, some sections of the 54 Division had already shifted positions, the former Army Chief said, recalling Brig. Fernando opted to walk with his men though he had an opportunity to get on board an Armoured Personnel Carrier (APC) or some other vehicle.
The writer was among a selected group of journalists invited to cover a hastily arranged media briefing at SLA headquarters on the night of April 24, 2000.
Lt. Gen. Weerasooriya and Maj. Gen. Balagalle explained the measures that were being taken at that time to consolidate the government position in Jaffna, following their pullout from EP. They were flanked by Air Force Commander Air Vice Marshal Jayalath Weerakkody, Navy Commander Vice Admiral Cecil Tissera and Brigadier Palitha Fernando, the then military spokesman.
A grim-faced Army Chief declared that a re-thinking of strategy was required as the SLA consolidated its positions in the general area Soranpattu, northwest of Iyakachchi.
Against the backdrop of the developing crisis in Jaffna, the Army Chief dispatched Maj. Gen. Janaka Perera and Maj. Gen. Sarath Fonseka to the Jaffna peninsula. Maj. Gen. Perera received the appointment as Overall Operations Commander (OOC) for the entire northern theater while Maj. Gen. Fonseka assumed duties as Security Forces Commander, Jaffna.
Lt. Gen. Weerasooriya stressed the need to rapidly enhance the firepower to meet the emerging threat. The Army Chief also underscored the urgent need to bolster the fighting units in line with overall defence policy. He declined to comment on the enactment of laws to introduce hitherto unprecedented step of conscription to meet the serious manpower shortage experienced by the SLA.
Lt. Gen. Weerasooriya said: “When a war is on, like ammunition we need men.” Commenting on the need to strengthen the SLA, the Army Chief said: “We would like to further increase our firepower and re-equip.”
It would be pertinent to mention that the PA government subjected the reportage on the conflict to military censorship. The government felt uncomfortable that battlefield losses could erode its popularity among the public, therefore there was no alternative to censorship. The media raised the issue with the Army. Lt. Gen. Weerasooriya, who emphatically denied ever requesting the government to impose censorship. Brigadier Palitha Fernando strongly opposed the media taking up the contentious issue of censorship at this particular media briefing.
The LTTE carried out ‘Unceasing Waves’ during the late Lt. Gen. Rohan Daluwatte’s tenure as the Army Commander (May 1, 1996-Dec. 15, 1998) and his successor Lt. Gen. Weerasooriya (Dec. 16, 1998-Aug. 24, 2000). Lionel Balagalle succeeded Weerasooriya on Aug. 25, 2000 and served as the Commander till June 30, 2004, during a politically turbulent period as the country headed for Eelam War IV.
Playing politics at the SLA’s expense
Regardless of the consequences, the PA and the UNP clashed over the EP debacle. Having returned home from abroad, Mrs Kumaratunga immediately went on the offensive. Kumaratunga accused the UNP of seeking political advantage over what she called a temporary setback suffered by the SLA in the Jaffna peninsula. She flayed the UNP for asserting the withdrawal from EP as a major military debacle.
What the PA really feared was the emerging threat on the Palaly-Kankesanthurai joint military complex in case the SLA had to abandon Jaffna following the EP debacle. The PA sought some sort of consensus with the UNP regarding the developments in the Jaffna peninsula whereas the UNP parliamentary group felt the government had suffered an irreversible setback and the situation could further deteriorate in case the SLA position in Jaffna town and its suburbs became untenable.
The LTTE launched the offensive against the EP base on Dec. 11, 1999, as the country was heading for presidential election on Dec. 21, 1999. On Dec. 18, 1999, the LTTE made an abortive bid to assassinate Kumaratunga at the final presidential election rally. In the run-up to the previous presidential election held on Nov. 09, 1994, the LTTE assassinated UNP candidate Gamini Dissanayake in late Oct. 1994.
In the Jaffna theatre post-EP debacle, the LTTE pressed ahead with offensive operations and the SLA struggled to defend its positions. The UNP demanded a special debate on the situation as the SLA vacated Ittavil, Pulopullai and Pallai. The PA sustained censorship to deprive the public of their right to know what was going on in the north. The ICRC continued to transfer bodies of SLA personnel found in areas under LTTE control. The PA and UNP shamelessly played politics with the Jaffna situation regardless of the fact that the then the entire Vanni theatre had already fallen into the hands of the LTTE.
However, the SLA with a range of new arms, ammunition and equipment acquired in the wake of the EP crisis, thwarted the LTTE offensive and stabilized the situation. As the SLA gradually brought the situation under control, the PA removed both Majors General Janaka Perera and Sarath Fonseka. President Kumaratunga scrapped the post of OOC while Fonseka was replaced by Brig. Anton Wijendra. The PA appeared to have felt confident that the LTTE no longer posed a threat on Jaffna therefore the services of the two officers, who led the defence and also the counter attack, was no longer required. Maj.Gen. Perera received the appointment as Chief of Staff whereas Fonseka moved to Vanni. What really made the PA remove both Perera and Fonseka?
Maj. Gen. Wijendra consolidated the SLA positions in the Jaffna peninsula before the launch of Operation Agni Kheela (Rod of Fire) in early 2001 that was meant to regain the area lost to the LTTE in the previous year. The offensive went awry. The LTTE inflicted heavy losses on the SLA. That was the last large-scale SLA offensive before the signing of a Ceasefire Agreement in Feb. 2002 following the return of the UNP to power at the Dec 5, 2001, general election.
Midweek Review
Fonseka clears Rajapaksas of committing war crimes he himself once accused them of
With Sri Lanka’s 17th annual war victory over separatist Tamil terrorism just months away, warwinning Army Chief, Field Marshal Sarath Fonseka (Dec. 06, 2005, to July 15, 2009) has significantly changed his war narrative pertaining to the final phase of the offensive that was brought to an end on May 18, 2009.
The armed forces declared the conclusion of ground operations on that day after the entire northern region was brought back under their control. LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran, hiding within the secured area, was killed on the following day. His body was recovered from the banks of the Nanthikadal lagoon.
With the war a foregone conclusion, with nothing to save the increasingly hedged in Tigers taking refuge among hapless Tamil civilians, Fonseka left for Beijing on May 11, and returned to Colombo, around midnight, on May 17, 2009. The LTTE, in its last desperate bid to facilitate Prabhakatan’s escape, breached one flank of the 53 Division, around 2.30 am, on May 18. But they failed to bring the assault to a successful conclusion and by noon the following day those fanatical followers of Tiger Supremo, who had been trapped within the territory, under military control, died in confrontations.
During Fonseka’s absence, the celebrated 58 Division (formerly Task Force 1), commanded by the then Maj. Gen. Shavendra Silva, advanced 31/2 to 4 kms and was appropriately positioned with Maj. Gen. Kamal Gunaratne’s 53 Division. The LTTE never had an opportunity to save its leader by breaching several lines held by frontline troops on the Vanni east front. There couldn’t have been any other option than surrendering to the Army.
The Sinha Regiment veteran, who had repeatedly accused the Rajapaksas of war crimes, and betraying the war effort by providing USD 2 mn, ahead of the 2005 presidential election, to the LTTE, in return for ordering the polls boycott that enabled Mahinda Rajapaksa’s victory, last week made noteworthy changes to his much disputed narrative.
GR’s call to Shavendra What did the former Army Commander say?
* The Rajapaksas wanted to sabotage the war effort, beginning January 2008.
* In January 2008, Mahinda Rajapaksa, Defence Secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa and Navy Commander VA Wasantha Karannagoda, proposed to the National Security Council that the Army should advance from Vavuniya to Mullithivu, on a straight line, to rapidly bring the war to a successful conclusion. They asserted that Fonseka’s strategy (fighting the enemy on multiple fronts) caused a lot of casualties.
* They tried to discourage the then Lt. Gen. Fonseka
* Fonseka produced purported video evidence to prove decisive intervention made by Defence Secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa on the afternoon of May 17. The ex-Army Chief’s assertion was based on a telephone call received by Maj. Gen. Shavendra Silva from Gotabaya Rajapaksa. That conversation had been captured on video by Swarnavahini’s Shanaka de Silva who now resides in the US. He had been one of the few persons, from the media, authorised by the Army Headquarters and the Defence Ministry to be with the Army leadership on the battlefield. Fonseka claimed that the videographer fled the country to escape death in the hands of the Rajapaksas. It was somewhat reminiscent of Maithripala Sirisena’s claim that if Rajapaksas win the 2015 Presidential election against him he would be killed by them.
* Shanaka captured Shavendra Silva disclosing three conditions laid down by the LTTE to surrender namely (a) Their casualties should be evacuated to Colombo by road (b) They were ready to exchange six captured Army personnel with those in military custody and (c) and the rest were ready to surrender.
* Then Fonseka received a call from Gotabaya Rajapaksa, on a CDMA phone. The Defence Secretary issued specific instructions to the effect that if the LTTE was to surrender that should be to the military and definitely not to the ICRC or any other third party. Gotabaya Rajapaksa, one-time Commanding Officer of the 1st battalion of the Gajaba Regiment, ordered that irrespective of any new developments and talks with the international community, offensive action shouldn’t be halted. That declaration directly contradicted Fonseka’s claim that the Rajapaksas conspired to throw a lifeline to the LTTE.
Fonseka declared that the Rajapaksa brothers, in consultation with the ICRC, and Amnesty International, offered an opportunity for the LTTE leadership to surrender, whereas his order was to annihilate the LTTE. The overall plan was to eliminate all, Fonseka declared, alleging that the Rajapaksa initiated talks with the LTTE and other parties to save those who had been trapped by ground forces in a 400 m x 400 m area by the night of May 16, among a Tamil civilian human shield held by force.
If the LTTE had agreed to surrender to the Army, Mahinda Rajapaksa would have saved their lives. If that happened Velupillai Prabhakaran would have ended up as the Chief Minister of the Northern Province, he said. Fonseka shocked everyone when he declared that he never accused the 58 Division of executing prisoners of war (white flag killings) but the issue was created by those media people embedded with the military leadership. Fonseka declared that accusations regarding white flag killings never happened. That story, according to Fonseka, had been developed on the basis of the Rajapaksas’ failed bid to save the lives of the LTTE leaders.
Before we discuss the issues at hand, and various assertions, claims and allegations made by Fonseka, it would be pertinent to remind readers of wartime US Defence Advisor in Colombo Lt. Col. Lawrence Smith’s June 2011 denial of white flag killings. The US State Department promptly declared that the officer hadn’t spoken at the inaugural Colombo seminar on behalf of the US. Smith’s declaration, made two years after the end of the war, and within months after the release of the Darusman report, dealt a massive blow to false war crimes allegations.
UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, in 2010, appointed a three-member Panel of Experts, more like a kangaroo court, consisting of Marzuki Darusman, Yasmin Sooka, and Steven Ratner, to investigate war crimes accusations.
Now Fonseka has confirmed what Smith revealed at the defence seminar in response to a query posed by Maj. General (retd.) Ashok Metha of the IPKF to Shavendra Silva, who had been No 02 in our UN mission, in New York, at that time.
White flag allegations
‘White flag’ allegations cannot be discussed in isolation. Fonseka made that claim as the common presidential candidate backed by the UNP-JVP-TNA combine. The shocking declaration was made in an interview with The Sunday Leader Editor Frederica Jansz published on Dec. 13, 2009 under ‘Gota ordered them to be shot – General Sarath Fonseka.’
The ‘white flag’ story had been sensationally figured in a leaked confidential US Embassy cable, during Patricia Butenis tenure as the US Ambassador here. Butenis had authored that cable at 1.50 pm on Dec. 13, 2009, the day after the now defunct The Sunday Leader exclusive. Butenis had lunch with Fonseka in the company of the then UNP Deputy Leader Karu Jayasuriya, according to the cable. But for the writer the most interesting part had been Butenis declaration that Fonseka’s advisors, namely the late Mangala Samaraweera, Anura Kumara Dissanayake (incumbent President) and Vijitha Herath (current Foreign Minister) wanted him to retract part of the story attributed to him.
Frederica Jansz fiercely stood by her explosive story. She reiterated the accuracy of the story, published on Dec. 13, 2009, during the ‘white flag’ hearing when the writer spoke to her. There is absolutely no reason to suspect Frederica Jansz misinterpreted Fonseka’s response to her queries.
Subsequently, Fonseka repeated the ‘white flag’ allegation at a public rally held in support of his candidature. Many an eyebrow was raised at The Sunday Leader’s almost blind support for Fonseka, against the backdrop of persistent allegations directed at the Army over Lasantha Wickrematunga’s killing. Wickrematunga, an Attorney-at-Law by profession and one-time Private Secretary to Opposition Leader Sirimavo Bandaranaike, was killed on the Attidiya Road, Ratmalana in early January 2009.
The Darusman report, too, dealt withthe ‘white flag’ killings and were central to unsubstantiated Western accusations directed at the Sri Lankan military. Regardless of the political environment in which the ‘white flag’ accusations were made, the issue received global attention for obvious reasons. The accuser had been the war-winning Army Commander who defeated the LTTE at its own game. But, Fonseka insisted, during his meeting with Butenis, as well as the recent public statement that the Rajapaksas had worked behind his back with some members of the international community.
Fresh inquiry needed
Fonseka’s latest declaration that the Rajapaksas wanted to save the LTTE leadership came close on the heels of Deputy British Prime Minister David Lammy’s whistle-stop visit here. The UK, as the leader of the Core Group on Sri Lanka at the Geneva-based United Nations Human Rights Council, spearheads the campaign targeting Sri Lanka.
Lammy was on his way to New Delhi for the AI Impact Summit. The Labour campaigner pushed for action against Sri Lanka during the last UK general election. In fact, taking punitive action against the Sri Lankan military had been a key campaign slogan meant to attract Tamil voters of Sri Lankan origin. His campaign contributed to the declaration of sanctions in March 2025 against Admiral of the Fleet Wasantha Karannagoda, General (retd) Shavendra Silva, General (retd) Jagath Jayasuriya and ex-LTTE commander Karuna, who rebelled against Prabhakaran. Defending Shavendra Silva, Fonseka, about a week after the imposition of the UK sanctions, declared that the British action was unfair.
But Fonseka’s declaration last week had cleared the Rajapaksas of war crimes. Instead, they had been portrayed as traitors. That declaration may undermine the continuous post-war propaganda campaign meant to demonise the Rajapaksas and top ground commanders.
Canada, then a part of the Western clique that blindly towed the US line, declared Sri Lanka perpetrated genocide and also sanctioned ex-Presidents Mahinda Rajapaksa and Gotabaya Rajapaksa. Other countries resorted to action, though such measures weren’t formally announced. General (retd) Jagath Dias and Maj. Gen (retd) Chagie Gallage were two of those targeted.
Against the backdrop of Fonseka’s latest claims, in respect of accountability issues, the urgent need to review action taken against Sri Lanka cannot be delayed. Although the US denied visa when Fonseka was to accompany President Maithripala Sirisena to the UN, in Sept. 2016, he hadn’t been formally accused of war crimes by the western powers, obviously because he served their interests.
On the basis of unsubstantiated allegations that hadn’t been subjected to judicial proceedings, Geneva initiated actions. The US, Canada and UK acted on those accusations. The US sanctioned General Shavendra Silva in Feb. 2020 and Admiral Karannagoda in April 2023.
What compelled Fonseka to change his narrative, 18 years after his Army ended the war? Did Fonseka base his latest version solely on Shanaka de Silva video? Fonseka is on record as claiming that he got that video, via a third party, thereby Shanaka de Silva had nothing to do with his actions.
DNA and formation of DP
Having realised that he couldn’t, under any circumstances, reach a consensus with the UNP to pursue a political career with that party, Fonseka teamed up with the JVP, one of the parties in the coalition that backed his presidential bid in 2010. Fonseka’s current efforts to reach an understanding with the JVP/NPP (President Anura Kumara Dissanayake is the leader of both registered political parties) should be examined against the backdrop of their 2010 alliance.
Under Fonseka’s leadership, the JVP, and a couple of other parties/groups, contested, under the symbol of the Democratic National Alliance (DNA) that had been formed on 22 Nov. 2009. but the grouping pathetically failed to live up to their own expectations. The results of the parliamentary polls, conducted in April 2010, had been devastating and utterly demoralising. Fonseka, who polled about 40% of the national vote at the January 2010 presidential election, ended up with just over 5% of the vote, and the DNA only managed to secure seven seats, including two on the National List. The DNA group consisted of Fonseka, ex-national cricket captain Arjuna Ranatunga, businessman Tiran Alles and four JVPers. Anura Kumara Dissanayake was among the four.
Having been arrested on February 8, 2010, soon after the presidential election, Fonseka was in prison. He was court-martialed for committing “military offences”. He was convicted of corrupt military supply deals and sentenced to three years in prison. Fonseka vacated his seat on 7 Oct .2010. Following a failed legal battle to protect his MP status, Fonseka was replaced by DNA member Jayantha Ketagoda on 8 March 2011. But President Mahinda Rajapaksa released Fonseka in May 2012 following heavy US pressure. The US went to the extent of issuing a warning to the then SLFP General Secretary Maithripala Sirisena that unless President Rajapaksa freed Fonseka he would have to face the consequences (The then Health Minister Sirisena disclosed the US intervention when the writer met him at the Jealth Ministry, as advised by President Rajapaksa)
By then, Fonseka and the JVP had drifted apart and both parties were irrelevant. Somawansa Amarasinghe had been the leader at the time the party decided to join the UNP-led alliance that included the TNA, and the SLMC. The controversial 2010 project had the backing of the US as disclosed by leaked secret diplomatic cables during Patricia Butenis tenure as the US Ambassador here.
In spite of arranging the JVP-led coalition to bring an end to the Rajapaksa rule, Butenis, in a cable dated 15 January 2010, explained the crisis situation here. Butenis said: “There are no examples we know of a regime undertaking wholesale investigations of its own troops or senior officials for war crimes while that regime or government remained in power. In Sri Lanka this is further complicated by the fact that responsibility for many of the alleged crimes rests with the country’s senior civilian and military leadership, including President Rajapaksa and his brothers and opposition candidate General Fonseka.”
Then Fonseka scored a major victory when Election Commissioner Mahinda Deshapriya on 1 April, 2013, recognised his Democratic Party (DNA was registered as DP) with ‘burning flame’ as its symbol. There hadn’t been a previous instance of any service commander registering a political party. While Fonseka received the leadership, ex-Army officer Senaka de Silva, husband of Diana Gamage ((later SJB MP who lost her National List seat over citizenship issue) functioned as the Deputy Leader.
Having covered Fonseka’s political journey, beginning with the day he handed over command to Lt. Gen. Jagath Jayasuriya, in July, 2009, at the old Army Headquarters that was later demolished to pave the way for the Shangri-La hotel complex, the writer covered the hastily arranged media briefing at the Solis reception hall, Pitakotte, on 2 April, 2023. Claiming that his DP was the only alternative to what he called corrupt Mahinda Rajapaksa’s government and bankrupt Ranil Wickremesinghe-led Opposition, a jubilant Fonseka declared himself as the only alternative (‘I am the only alternative,’ with strapline ‘SF alleges Opposition is as bad as govt’. The Island, April 3, 2013).
Fonseka had been overconfident to such an extent, he appealed to members of the government parliamentary group, as well as the Opposition (UNP), to switch allegiance to him. As usual Fonseka was cocky and never realised that 40% of the national vote he received, at the presidential election, belonged to the UNP, TNA and the JVP. Fonseka also disregarded the fact that he no longer had the JVP’s support. He was on his own. The DP never bothered to examine the devastating impact his 2010 relationship with the TNA had on the party. The 2015 general election results devastated Fonseka and underscored that there was absolutely no opportunity for a new party. The result also proved that his role in Sri Lanka’s triumph over the LTTE hadn’t been a decisive factor.
RW comes to SF’s rescue
Fonseka’s DP suffered a humiliating defeat at the August 2015 parliamentary polls. The outcome had been so bad that the DP was left without at least a National List slot. Fonseka was back to square one. If not for UNP leader and Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe, Fonseka could have been left in the cold. Wickremesinghe accommodated Fonseka on their National List, in place of SLFPer M.K.D.S. Gunawardene, who played a critical role in an influential section of the party and the electorate shifting support to Maithripala Sirisena. Gunawardena passed away on 19 January, 2016. Wickremesinghe and Fonseka signed an agreement at Temple Trees on 3 February, 2016. Fonseka received appointment as National List MP on 9 February, 2016, and served as Minister of Regional Development and, thereafter, as Minister of Wildlife and Sustainable Development, till Oct. 2018. Fonseka lost his Ministry when President Sirisena treacherously sacked Wickremesinghe’s government to pave the way for a new partnership with the Rajapaksas. The Supreme Court discarded that arrangement and brought back the Yahapalana administration but Sirisena, who appointed Fonseka to the lifetime rank of Field Marshal, in recognition of his contribution to the defeat of terrorism, refused to accommodate him in Wickremesinghe’s Cabinet. The President also left out Wasantha Karannagoda and Roshan Goonetilleke. Sirisena appointed them Admiral of the Fleet and Marshal of Air Force, respectively, on 19, Sept. 2019, in the wake of him failing to secure the required backing to contest the Nov. 2019 presidential election.
Wickremesinghe’s UNP repeatedly appealed on behalf of Fonseka in vain to Sirisena. At the 2020 general election, Fonseka switched his allegiance to Sajith Premadasa and contested under the SJB’s ‘telephone’ symbol and was elected from the Gampaha district. Later, following a damaging row with Sajith Premadasa, he quit the SJB as its Chairman and, at the last presidential election, joined the fray as an independent candidate. Having secured just 22,407 votes, Fonseka was placed in distant 9th position. Obviously, Fonseka never received any benefits from support extended to the 2022 Aragalaya and his defeat at the last presidential election seems to have placed him in an extremely difficult position, politically.
Let’s end this piece by reminding that Fonseka gave up the party leadership in early 2024 ahead of the presidential election. Senaka de Silva succeeded Fonseka as DP leader, whereas Dr. Asosha Fernando received appointment as its Chairman. The DP has aligned itself with the NPP. The rest is history.
By Shamindra Ferdinando
Midweek Review
Strengths and weaknesses of BRICS+: Implications for Global South
The 16th BRICS Summit, from 22 to 24 October 2024 in Kazan, was attended by 24 heads of state, including the five countries that officially became part of the group on 1 January: Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Iran, Egypt and Ethiopia. Argentina finally withdrew from the forum after Javier Milei’s government took office in 2023.
In the end, it changed its strategy and instead of granting full membership made them associated countries adding a large group of 13 countries: two from Latin America (Bolivia and Cuba), three from Africa (Algeria, Nigeria, Uganda) and eight from Asia (Belarus, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Thailand, Turkey, Uzbekistan and Vietnam). This confirms the expansionary intent of the BRICS, initiated last year and driven above all by China, which seeks to turn the group into a relevant multilateral forum, with focus on political than economic interaction, designed to serve its interests in the geopolitical dispute with the United States. This dispute however is not the making of China but has arisen mainly due to the callous bungling of Donald Trump in his second term in office.
China has emerged as the power that could influence the membership within the larger group more than its rival in the region, India. Obviously, the latter is concerned about these developments but seems powerless to stop the trend as more countries realize the need for the development of capacity to resist Western dominance. India in this regard seems to be reluctant possibly due to its defence obligations to the US with Trump declaring war against countries that try to forge partnerships aiming to de-dollarize the global economic system.
The real weakness in BRICS therefore, is the seemingly intractable rivalry between China and India and the impact of this relationship on the other members who are keen to see the organisation grow its capacity to meet its stated goals. China is committed to developing an alternative to the Western dominated world order, particularly the weaponization of the dollar by the US. India does not want to be seen as anti-west and as a result India is often viewed as a reluctant or cautious member of BRICS. This problem seems to be perpetuated due to the ongoing border tensions with China. India therefore has a desire to maintain a level playing field within the group, rather than allowing it to be dominated by Beijing.
Though India seems to be committed to a multipolar world, it prefers focusing on economic cooperation over geopolitical alignment. India thinks the expansion of BRICS initiated by China may dilute its influence within the bloc to the advantage of China. India fears the bloc is shifting toward an anti-Western tilt driven by China and Russia, complicating its own strong ties with the West. India is wary of the new members who are also beneficiaries of China’s Belt and Road Initiative. While China aims to use BRICS for anti-Western geopolitical agendas, India favors focusing on South-South financial cooperation and reforming international institutions. Yet India seems to be not in favour of creating a new currency to replace the dollar which could obviously strengthen the South-South financial transactions bypassing the dollar.
Moreover, India has explicitly opposed the expansion of the bloc to include certain nations, such as Pakistan, indicating a desire to control the group’s agenda, especially during its presidency.
In this equation an important factor is the role that Russia could play. The opinion expressed by the Russian foreign minister in this regard may be significant. Referring to the new admissions the Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has said: “The weight, prominence and importance of the candidates and their international standing were the primary factors for us [BRICS members]. It is our shared view that we must recruit like-minded countries into our ranks that believe in a multipolar world order and the need for more democracy and justice in international relations. We need those who champion a bigger role for the Global South in global governance. The six countries whose accession was announced today fully meet these criteria.”
The admission of three major oil producing countries, Saudi Arabia, Iran and UAE is bound to have a significant impact on the future global economic system and consequently may have positive implications for the Global South. These countries would have the ability to decisively help in creating a new international trading system to replace the 5 centuries old system that the West created to transfer wealth from the South to the North. This is so because the petro-dollar is the pillar of the western banking system and is at the very core of the de-dollarizing process that the BRICS is aiming at. This cannot be done without taking on board Saudi Arabia, a staunch ally of the west. BRICS’ expansion, therefore, is its transformation into the most representative community in the world, whose members interact with each other bypassing Western pressure. Saudi Arabia and Iran are actively mending fences, driven by a 2023 China-brokered deal to restore diplomatic ties, reopen embassies, and de-escalate regional tensions. While this detente has brought high-level meetings and a decrease in direct hostility rapprochement is not complete yet and there is hope which also has implications, positive for the South and may not be so for the North.
Though the US may not like what is going on, Europe, which may not endorse all that the former does if one is to go by the speech delivered by the Canadian PM in Brazil recently, may not be displeased about the rapid growth of BRICS. The Guardian UK highlighted expert opinion that BRICS expansion is rather “a symbol of broad support from the global South for the recalibration of the world order.” A top official at the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, Caroline Kanter has told the daily, “It is obvious that we [Western countries] are no longer able to set our own conditions and standards. Proposals will be expected from us so that in the future we will be perceived as an attractive partner.” At the same time, the bottom line is that BRICS expansion is perceived in the West as a political victory for Russia and China which augurs well for the future of BRICS and the Global South.
Poor countries, relentlessly battered by the neo-liberal global economy, will greatly benefit if BRICS succeeds in forging a new world order and usher in an era of self-sufficiency and economic independence. There is no hope for them in the present system designed to exploit their natural resources and keep them in a perpetual state of dependency and increasing poverty. BRICS is bound to be further strengthened if more countries from the South join it. Poor countries must come together and with the help of BRICS work towards this goal.
by N. A. de S. Amaratunga
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