Diligent observer or clueless bystander

* What will be the implications on Sri Lanka, of this FTA between the UK, our second-largest export market and India, our third-largest export market?

* The UK’s imports from Sri Lanka have declined significantly during the last ten years (from US$1,108 million in 2013 to US$800 million by 2024), mainly due to the drop in apparel exports.

* The FTA will be a game-changer for the Indian apparel exporters as it would provide a nearly ten percent tariff advantage to them. As a result, apparel exports from India to the UK are projected to double by 2030. As the size of the UK’s apparel market is not going to expand proportionately, this growth need to come from the market shares of other main exporters like Sri Lanka.

* Will this, along with new additional Ad Valorem duty in the United States, sound the death knell for Sri Lanka’s apparel exports?

Biggest and most economically significant FTA

On 6th May 2025, India and the United Kingdom agreed on a Free Trade Agreement (the FTA) after nearly three years of negotiations. The FTA is expected to take effect in January 2026. Announcing the agreement, the British government labelled it as the “biggest and most economically significant” trade agreement the UK has signed since leaving the European Union in 2020. If so, this is an extremely important development because the UK has already signed 39 trade agreements with about 73 countries, including very significant trade deals with Australia and Japan and one with the EU. The UK Prime Minister, Keir Starmer hailed this agreement as a major achievement and a “landmark deal with far-reaching economic implications.”

Unfortunately, the “far-reaching economic implications” from a landmark deal like this would not be limited to the parties to the agreement. It would certainly result in equally far-reaching implications for their trading partners. The United Kingdom and India are Sri Lanka’s second and third-largest trading partners for exports. So, what would be the implications of this FTA for Sri Lanka?

Implications on “Bystanders”

Regrettably, so far, I have not seen any public discussion on this agreement within the country. Normally, such a discussion should have been initiated by the relevant government agencies and our High Commissions in New Delhi and London, because they have access to more information on this subject, including access to the negotiators. These government agencies should have prompted a public discussion on the FTA with trade chambers, think tanks, exporters and the media, long before the agreement was concluded. Now, as the agreement is finalised, the options available to Sri Lanka to counter the possible adverse implications are more limited. However, even at this late stage, it is necessary to begin a public discussion on the issue, particularly because, a cursory look at the available data shows that the FTA would have a serious adverse impact on Sri Lanka’s exports of goods and services to the UK in general and on apparel exports in particular.

Sri Lanka’s Declining Competitiveness in the UK

To begin with, it is necessary to point out, the UK’s total imports from Sri Lanka had declined substantially during the last ten years; from US$ 1,108 million in 2013 to US$800 million in 2024. Yet, as illustrated in the table below, UK’s imports from India, Vietnam, Pakistan and Bangladesh had improved significantly during the same period. (See Table 1, Table 2 and Table 3)

The drop in imports from Sri Lanka, as illustrated in Tables 2 and 3, has mainly resulted from the decline of apparel imports from US$ 916 million in 2013 to US$ 510 million by 2024. Unfortunately, our apparel exports are continuing to be stagnant or decline and the market share is getting eroded fast due to strong competition from Bangladesh, Cambodia, Pakistan, Pakistan and Viet Nam. The export performance of China and India has also been somewhat lacklustre.

Some analysts may try to argue that the decline of Sri Lanka’s exports to UK has resulted from the reduction of UK’s overall imports of apparel products after Brexit (2020). It is true that the UK’s overall imports of apparel have also declined significantly since Brexit. But Sri Lanka’s apparel exports to UK had already reached a very low mark even by 2020 and have failed to recover since.

Impact of Tariff

Currently, all these countries, other than India and China, have duty-free market access to UK market. Bangladesh, Cambodia, Sri Lanka and Pakistan enjoy zero-duty access to the UK under its Developing Countries Trading Scheme (DCTS). Vietnam has an FTA (the UK-Vietnam FTA) under which tariffs will be phased out, but for many Vietnamese apparel exports already enjoy reduced or zero tariffs to the UK. India is currently subjected to a DCTS tariff which is at 9.5 percent. China faces higher MFN tariff of 12 percent.

Though Sri Lanka has duty-free entry under DCTS, Sri Lanka’s preference utilisation has remained significantly low for apparel. I don’t have an official number, but I believe this is less than 50 percent. Most probably, more than half of our exports are charged a 12 percent MFN tariff.

UK India FTA – A Game-Changer for Indian Apparel Industry

Due to the competitive disadvantageous position in this important market, India has very cleverly negotiated this FTA, focussing on the elimination of tariffs on approximately 99 percent of Indian exports to the UK. More importantly, these tariff concessions cover key labour-intensive sectors like apparel, which had struggled under high tariffs. The FTA will eliminate this duty disadvantage instantly and level the playing field for India against her competitors who already have duty-free access to the UK. In the highly price-sensitive apparel market, many companies often operate on very thin margins. For them, this 9.5 percent tariff advantage will be a great advantage to consolidate and expand the market share in the UK.

It is also noteworthy that Indian apparel exporters, even with a major tariff disadvantage, have managed to perform reasonably well in the UK market. Now with the FTA, they can build on this momentum, significantly improve their cost competitiveness and expand its UK market share. An Indian investment information and credit rating agency, ICRA, has predicted that due to the tariff concessions under the FTA, India’s apparel and home textiles exports to the United Kingdom would double by 2030. A reputed apparel industry trade journal has predicted that Indian apparel exports may achieve this landmark by 2027.

Impact on Other Exporters

As the size of the UK’s apparel market is not going to expand proportionately to accommodate this growth, it needs to come from the market shares of other main exporters. According to available information, for a long period, India has focused on relatively higher-priced garments in the UK apparel market, while Bangladesh and Cambodia have operated in the low and ultra-low-cost segments of the market. China and Vietnam, on the other hand, have focused on the middle and premium market segments and have priced their products closer to Indian prices. Sri Lanka, due to the higher cost of production and the focus on ethical and sustainable manufacturing, has always operated around the higher end of the market. So, the enhanced competition from India will have a more immediate impact on Chinese, Vietnamese and Sri Lankan exports than on Bangladeshi or Cambodian exports. And the impact on Sri Lanka may be harsher because we have lost our competitive advantage in the market due low utilization of preferential access.

Will this sound the death knell for Sri Lanka’s apparel exports?

I don’t want to sound pessimistic, but in these uncertain times it is necessary to “prepare for the worst and hope for the best.”

The prevailing conditions in the UK market, 12% duty as against 0% duty for Viet Nam, Bangladesh and Cambodia, don’t bode well for the bulk of our apparel exports. Duty-free access to India would further aggravate the situation. This will reduce our apparel exports significantly, very significantly, unless action is taken early, to improve the conditions on market access through DCTS or other arrangements. This requires early proactive intervention by the government with the UK authorities. If not, this, along with new additional Ad Valorem duty in the United States, may sound the death knell for Sri Lanka’s apparel exports.

(The writer, a former public servant, can be reached at senadhiragomi@gmail.com)

The United States isn’t the first country to wrestle with the idea of enforcing a single national language. In fact, two Asian democracies—India and Sri Lanka—offer cautionary tales about how language policies, when driven by nationalist ideals, can deepen social divides instead of healing them.

In a sweeping move that has sparked fierce debate across the country, President Donald Trump signed an executive order officially declaring English as the national language of the United States. The announcement came on March 1, 2025, along with the removal of the Spanish-language version of the White House website, signaling a renewed push toward what many are calling “linguistic nationalism.”

While supporters hail the decision as a unifying force, critics warn it could divide the nation further by alienating millions of Americans who speak languages other than English.

Why This Order Matters

The new executive order marks a sharp departure from previous language-access policies, notably reversing a Clinton-era rule that required federally funded programmes to offer assistance in multiple languages. Now, while government agencies are allowed to continue offering services in other languages, there’s no longer a mandate to do so. Instead, they’re “encouraged” to promote English proficiency as a gateway to opportunity.

According to the White House, the change is about “strengthening national unity,” claiming that a common language empowers Americans—new and old—to engage more fully in society.

“English is the language of our founding documents, of our shared culture, and of our national success,” President Trump stated in a press release.

The Reality on the Ground

However, the U.S. isn’t exactly a monolingual country. Far from it. According to the latest Census data, over 350 languages are spoken in American homes. Spanish, Chinese, Tagalog, Vietnamese, and Arabic are just a few of the most common.

For many immigrants and ethnic communities, language is more than a tool for communication—it’s a part of their identity. Critics argue that making English the sole official language could marginalise these groups, reduce access to public services like healthcare and education, and ultimately create a more divided society.

“This policy sends a message that some Americans are more ‘American’ than others,” says Dr. Elena Cárdenas, a linguistics and civil rights researcher. “It doesn’t promote unity—it punishes diversity.”

What Other Countries Have Done

The U.S. is one of the few developed nations that has never had an official language—until now. Countries like France and China have long enforced language laws to preserve a national identity. But those policies have come with their own challenges, including the suppression of regional dialects and minority languages.

Meanwhile, nations like Canada and Switzerland have embraced multilingualism. Canada’s bilingual system (English and French) is often credited with strengthening its global trade relationships and social inclusiveness. Switzerland, with four national languages, shows that diversity in language doesn’t have to be a weakness—it can be a strength.

What’s at Stake: Brain functions and human rights

Supporters of the executive order argue that using a single language will make government operations more efficient and encourage immigrants to assimilate. They also point to the fact that more than 30 U.S. states already recognise English as their official language.

But many economists and education experts see it differently. Studies show that being multilingual boosts brain function, increases job opportunities, and improves a country’s ability to compete in global markets. In fact, the European Union operates with 24 official languages and considers linguistic diversity a key part of its economic and diplomatic strategy.

There’s also the legal angle. Critics say removing language-access requirements could violate international human rights agreements, including United Nations guidelines that promote linguistic and cultural inclusion.

A Political Flashpoint

This isn’t the first time language has become a political hot-button. Similar debates have played out in places like Sri Lanka and India, where promoting one language over others led to long-standing social unrest and even violence.

While the U.S. situation is different, the tension is real. Civil rights groups are already exploring legal challenges. Many Spanish-speaking Americans and other minority communities fear losing access to vital information—from disaster alerts to voting instructions—if those services are no longer offered in their native languages.

“This policy doesn’t build bridges—it builds walls,” said Congressman Luis Gutierrez. “It’s less about language and more about whose voices get heard.”

Sri Lanka: A Language That Sparked a Civil War

In 1956, Sri Lanka passed the Sinhala Only Act, which made Sinhala the sole official language of the country. This law was pushed by nationalist Sinhalese politicians to assert cultural dominance in a newly independent nation. But in doing so, it marginalised Tamil-speaking minorities—many of whom had lived in the country for generations.

The consequences were far-reaching and tragic. Tamil communities were excluded from government jobs, education, and public services. Over time, this linguistic injustice fueled ethnic tensions that escalated into a brutal civil war lasting nearly 30 years. Many experts and historians point to the Sinhala Only Act as a key trigger for the conflict. In short, language policy turned into a weapon of division rather than a tool of unity.

India: A Nation United in Diversity—But Not Without Tensions

India, too, has had its struggles with language politics. After independence in 1947, leaders attempted to make Hindi the sole official language. But this move met strong resistance, especially from southern states where people speak Dravidian languages like Tamil, Telugu, and Kannada.

To prevent further unrest, the Indian government compromised by keeping English as an additional associate official language, alongside Hindi. Today, India recognises 22 official languages and supports many regional tongues. While tensions over language still flare up occasionally, the country has largely managed to celebrate its linguistic diversity rather than suppress it.

These international examples show us what can happen when language policies ignore the lived realities of multilingual societies. Instead of creating a shared sense of belonging, such policies can end up deepening divides—whether ethnic, regional, or cultural.

To understand the risks, look no further than Sri Lanka—a country whose well-intentioned language policy in 1956 led not to unity, but to decades of violence.

Sri Lanka: When Language Laws Divide Instead of Unite

In the aftermath of independence, Sri Lanka’s government passed the Sinhala Only Act, making Sinhala the exclusive official language of administration, law, and education. While meant to assert sovereignty and majority identity, it alienated Tamil-speaking minorities who had been integral to the nation’s social fabric.

The Tamil population faced systemic exclusion: they lost access to public sector jobs, university admissions, and government services. Peaceful protests were met with repression, and what began as a linguistic grievance eventually transformed into an armed ethnic conflict. By the early 1980s, Sri Lanka was in the grip of a full-blown civil war, one of the longest and bloodiest in Asia. Historians widely agree: the Sinhala Only policy didn’t just fail to unite Sri Lanka—it fractured it. The country is still healing from the scars today.

India: Diversity Managed Through Inclusion, Not Imposition

In contrast, neighbouring India avoided such a fate by adopting a more pluralistic approach. Though Hindi was promoted as a national language, protests—particularly from Tamil Nadu—led the central government to compromise. Today, India recognizes 22 official languages, with both Hindi and English used at the national level, and regional languages thriving within states.

While not without tensions, India’s inclusive linguistic framework has helped preserve national unity in a country of over 1.4 billion people and extraordinary linguistic diversity.

Conclusion

The ongoing debate in the United States over making English the sole official language may appear as a patriotic initiative aimed at fostering unity. However, history offers a cautionary tale. In 1956, Sri Lanka introduced the “Sinhala Only Act,” effectively excluding the Tamil-speaking minority from state affairs, education, and employment. Rather than uniting the nation, this policy sowed deep resentment, ultimately contributing to a devastating civil war that lasted nearly three decades and claimed over 100,000 lives. The lesson is clear: language is not merely a means of communication—it is a symbol of identity, dignity, and inclusion.

Today, India recognises 22 official languages and uses English as a neutral bridge, managing to maintain unity within diversity despite significant challenges. The Indian experience demonstrates that pluralism, though messy, can be a powerful safeguard against social fragmentation.

As the U.S. contemplates linguistic policy, it must recognise the complex emotional and political weight language carries. In a nation where communities speak hundreds of languages and dialects, enforcing a single linguistic identity risk marginalising entire populations and undermining social cohesion. Rather than repeating historical mistakes, the U.S. has the opportunity to lead by example—building unity not through exclusion, but through recognition and respect for its linguistic and cultural mosaic.

The lesson for the U.S.? Imposing a one-language-fits-all policy may seem like a path to national unity, but it risks alienating communities and undermining the very cohesion it aims to promote. As history shows, true unity often lies in embracing diversity—not erasing it.

(The writer, a senior Chartered Accountant and professional banker, is Professor at SLIIT , Malabe. He is also the author of the “Doing Social Research and Publishing Results”, a Springer publication (Singapore), and “Samaja Gaveshakaya (in Sinhala). The views and opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the institution he works for. He can be contacted at saliya.a@slit.lk and www.researcher.com)

The dates May 18-19 highlight a continuing divide in the country with few willing to look at the losses on the other side though they were all Sri Lankans. These two days in particular surface the uncomfortable truth that the country’s people have different memories, including the manner in which the three-decade long war ended. The Tamil people have commemorated May 18 as the day on which many of them, including LTTE members, were killed and the war was lost. This year there were commemorations in different parts of the country, including in Colombo. It was not only Tamils who commemorated their loved ones on May 18. Sinhalese did so too at ceremonies they organised. They were all sorrowful occasions. The government commemorated May 19 at the War Heroes Memorial near Parliament, remembering both the victory that was won and the members of the security forces who were killed with President Anura Kumara Dissanayake in attendance.

More often than not, there has been tension on these days, with large numbers of security forces deployed especially in the former war zones of the north and east. Both the Tamil people within the country and in the diaspora, along with the Western international community believe that large scale human rights violations and war crimes took place on those days. The government would be concerned at the decline in support it received from the voters in the north and east and not wish to add to that decline. Initially, it was reported that the President would not attend the Victory Day ceremony on May 19. But election results indicate that translating electoral support into governance requires more than symbolic gestures such as attending or not attending a commemoration event. The fact that Tamil people felt they could attend the memorial events in large numbers is evidence that the country is changing in the direction of reconciliation.

State institutions have cooperated in this process in creating a conducive climate for memorialisation. The Human Rights Commission of Sri Lanka wrote to the Inspector General of Police requesting him to instruct all policemen to permit the May 18 commemorations to take place undisturbed. They pointed out that on past occasions, even when the government gave permission for the May 18 commemorations the security forces arrested people citing violations of the law. In its missive to the police, the Human Rights Commission stated that it “is of the view that peaceful acts of commemoration and the distribution of food items cannot be considered forms of incitement to discrimination, hostility, or violence, and are protected under the right to the freedom of speech and expression guaranteed under article 14(1)(a) of the Sri Lankan Constitution”. This time around the police appeared to have followed this instruction in the spirit it was meant.

Early Warning

There are indications that the government is rethinking its approach towards the dissatisfied ethnic and religious minorities. The results of the recent local government elections in Sri Lanka’s north and east are an early warning of minority discontent with the government that it cannot afford to dismiss. In a country that has experienced deep ethnic fault lines, the success of Tamil and Muslim parties in these areas is a signal that minority communities are not convinced the government is prioritising their concerns. These electoral outcomes have revealed what lies beneath the surface: a persistence of unaddressed grievances and distinct aspirations that have not been adequately engaged by the NPP government. If the government is to maintain the legitimacy of its reform agenda and translate electoral gains into lasting stability, it must find answers to these problems of the minorities sooner rather than later.

The minorities of the north and east share common ground with communities in the rest of the country including the ethnic Sinhalese majority. These include poverty, lack of development, inadequate access to economic resources, and frustration with entrenched corruption. However, the ethnic and religious minorities also carry burdens specific to their historical and political context, problems the ethnic majority does not face. These include the military occupation of civilian lands, unresolved cases of missing persons, prolonged detentions without charge or trial under the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA), and a long-standing demand for regional self-rule.

In the face of these long continuing problems, taking the position that all people are equal and will be treated equally, as frequently stated by government leaders would be inadequate in itself. The persistence of these issues has deepened distrust, and the government’s cautious, often opaque, approach has done little to reassure affected communities. The NPP’s emphasis on equity in development and equal rights resonates in theory, but its real test lies in addressing the unique challenges that minority communities face. Repealing the PTA must be at the top of the list. Its repeal would be a powerful gesture of goodwill and an important policy shift that minorities (and international community) would take seriously.

The repeal of the PTA would also lead to release of many prisoners who have been incarcerated under this draconian law, first brought into the statute books in 1979 as a temporary measure for only six months but which has legitimised prolonged detention for over four decades under different governments. It also allows confessions obtained by security forces to be admissible in court though courts have also rejected these confessions or been careful in admitting them as evidence. Its continued existence is incompatible with the government’s commitment to human rights and democracy. It is another cause of grievance to the Tamil people. An NPP-led repeal of the PTA would mark a major shift toward democratic reform and human rights, aligning Sri Lanka with global norms and advancing lasting peace and reconciliation.

Potent Appeals

The release of land under military occupation would be another priority. The Jaffna District Secretary has confirmed that notwithstanding repeated assurances from successive governments, more than 2,500 acres of Tamil-owned land in Jaffna remain occupied by Sri Lanka’s military, navy, air force, and police, nearly 16 years after the end of the armed conflict. The return of these lands is not only a matter of justice but also of practical importance to displaced families seeking to rebuild their lives. The government has both the authority and the opportunity to address this without delay. It is unfortunate that on the contrary the government has published a notice that lands unclaimed in the north will be taken over by the government unless claimed in three months. The three-month time frame is very short, giving rise to surmise as to why this is and whether it is another land grab by the state, as those lands have been inaccessible to the people for decades, and some have left the country and others are no longer amongst the living.

Provincial council elections are similarly a priority and need to be held without further delay. One of the shortcomings of the present government has been the lack of minority voices in national policy-making and key appointments. Elected provincial councils can make up for this void especially if the central government enters into engagements with them as partners rather than as rivals. The repeated deferral of these elections, now overdue for more than six years, has undermined the promise of devolution, and thereby the sharing of power, and stoked resentment.

The 13th Amendment, which remains the constitutional basis for power-sharing, cannot be meaningfully implemented without functioning provincial councils. The government must ensure that these elections are held without delay, and that steps are taken to revitalise and empower provincial governance structures. It needs to fully implement the 13th Amendment, which means devolving police and land powers, instead of undermining adherence to the constitution by not implementing a part of it at its discretion as successive governments have done.

So far, it appears that the government’s strategy is one which envisions a national policy on reconciliation being drafted afresh before being debated in Parliament with the aim of consensual endorsement. It reflects a desire to move forward under the guidance of expert committees which will take a considerable amount of time. But the minority communities have waited many years for answers. They have no faith in lengthy deliberations such as All Party Conferences and Commissions of Inquiry that drag on for years and end up in file cupboards. Linking their implementation to the uncertainties of parliamentary consensus in a highly polarised environment amounts to deferral by design. The government needs to make use of the 2/3 parliamentary majority that the people, including in the north and east, gave it six months ago and act today.

by Jehan Perera