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Part I: Constitutional Principles, Legislature and the Executive

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Collective for Democracy and Rule of Law

Principles and Proposals for Political and Constitutional Reform for Democracy

The year 2024 is a election year to choose a new President and possibly a new Parliament. In that context, the theme of political and constitutional reforms has once again begun to draw the attention of the citizens, civil society movements and political parties. It is necessary to recognise that any constitutional reform effort should have two main goals. They are (a) restoring the country’s parliamentary democracy and (b) replacing, not just reforming, the existing 1978 Constitution with a new and democratic constitution. A new constitution should also give effect to the democratising hopes of the people of Sri Lanka.

Therefore, an agenda for restoring democratic government calls for major changes in the Constitution as well as the system of government.

The proposals for constitutional change and democratisation offered in this document embody the following principles and goals:

Restoring parliamentary democracy and freeing it from the control of the President and the executive.

Restoring the public trust and faith in the Constitution, Parliament, institutions of government and democracy.

Ensuring people’s right to hold the government and the elected representatives accountable through new mechanisms. The aim is to make the principle of popular sovereignty meaningful to the people who are the bearers of sovereignty in a democracy.

Preventing the government from using the political power to misuse the Constitution and the law for arbitrary and tyrannical objectives.

Deepening democracy through citizens’ participation in the process of government.

Constitutional Principles and Sovereignty

The proposed official name of the country is ‘Sri Lanka’ instead of the long name, ‘Democratic, Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka.’

The republican character of the state of Sri Lanka is to be retained with the new description: ‘Sri Lanka is one, free, sovereign, democratic, and independent Republic.’

The Sri Lankan people are sovereign and free citizens of a modern republic. They are equal members of an independent and democratic political community, valuing their ethnic, cultural, and social diversity.

A set of ‘Constitutional Principles’ will be included in the Constitution. They will be described as ‘immutable and inviolable values of democratic republicanism.’ These principles will embody the fundamental constitutional values that guide the new Constitution as well as future judicial interpretation of any of its clauses.

The following are proposed as Founding Constitutional Principles and Values in accordance with which the Constitution is founded and interpreted:

Sri Lanka is one, free, sovereign, democratic and independent Republic founded on the following immutable and inviolable values of democratic republicanism and consociationalism:

= human dignity, social justice, economic justice, equality and the advancement of human rights and freedoms;

(b) ethnic, gender and social equality;

(c) the supremacy of the Constitution and the Rule of Law;

(d) regular, uninterrupted, free and fair elections and a multi-party system of democratic government;

(e) non-concentration of state power in one individual or institution;

(f) the assurance of accountability, responsiveness and transparency at all levels of governance;

(g) public authorities hold and exercise powers in accordance with the doctrine of public trust.

The new Constitution will embody a framework that will facilitate the shift of political power from the Executive President to Parliament. This will ensure that the abolition of the executive presidential system should lead to restoring parliamentary democracy.

We agree in principle with the proposal that was made during the Aragalaya that citizens should have the right to initiate legislation. The proposal merits a deeper study as there is also the possibility of abuse, as was the case in the initiative to ban the construction of minarets in mosques in Switzerland.

The new Constitution will create a Second Chamber, a Senate. It will augment the Parliament’s representative function. The Second Chamber will also strengthen the principle of power-sharing by giving representation to the provinces in Parliament. This will lead to establishing closer linkages between the Centre and the periphery.

The House of Representatives consists of 200 members elected on the following basis:

One hundred and thirty members will be elected from territorial constituencies. They will include multi-member and smaller constituencies carved out to facilitate the representation of social groups of shared interest.

Sixty members will be elected based on proportional representation at a national or provincial level.

Ten seats would be filled through national-level proportional representation from among parties that have not secured a seat through territorial constituencies or the sixty seats mentioned above. This will enable small parties with significant national presence without local concentration to secure parliamentary representation.

Appropriate provisions will be made to ensure adequate representation of women, youth and underrepresented’ interest groups.’

In order to prevent undemocratic manipulation of the process of government formation after an election, it is proposed that if the Prime Minister appointed after the conclusion of a general election does not win a vote of confidence at the first sitting of the new House of Representatives, s/he will be deemed to have resigned.

The Prime Minister will also be considered to have resigned if, at any time during the duration of Parliament, a vote of no-confidence is passed against her/him, the Budget is defeated, or the Statement of Government Policy is defeated. Both cases will result in a new Prime Minister being appointed. If the new Prime Minister does not win a vote of confidence within fourteen days, the House of Representatives shall be dissolved by the President as the House is no longer viable.

The House of Representatives will also stand dissolved if a motion in the name of the Prime Minister to that effect is passed. Such a motion will need the agreement of the Leader of the Opposition and the leader of the third-largest party in the House of Representatives, the latter’s agreement being required to prevent a ‘deal’ between the other two.

The PM should not have the power to advise the President to dissolve the legislature as s/he would do so when it best suits them.

Right of recall, cross-overs, expulsions, by-elections

Restoration of public trust in Parliament, as well as Members of Parliament, is another key task in rebuilding parliamentary democracy in Sri Lanka. The existing practices concerning crossovers of MPs are seen by the people as being enmeshed with the pervasive culture of political corruption. Generally, it is a practice resorted to by leading parties to secure parliamentary majorities by unethical and unlawful means.

Rectifying this distortion of Sri Lanka’s parliamentary democracy is a significant reform expectation of the citizens. It requires a mechanism for the MP’s accountability and moral obligation to the party and the voters.

An issue that was raised during the Aragalaya is the right of voters to recall an MP who has violated the mandate given to him/her. We agree in principle and suggest that a deeper study be done on how this could be incorporated into the Constitution while preventing its abuse.

We propose the following:

A Member of the House of Representatives will lose her/his seat when:

The MP votes in violation of a decision of the Party, or without permission of the Party, or,

Declares his/her support for or joins another party, the seat of such Member shall become vacant.

However, there would be safeguards for those MPs who have contested as coalition partners or under a memorandum of understanding.

Where a Member elected from a constituency ceases to be a member of the party that nominated her/him, the seat will become vacant. If this happens due to expulsion, the MP may challenge her/his expulsion in the Supreme Court within one month. The Supreme Court must rule on the application within two months.

When the seat of a Member elected from a constituency becomes vacant, a by-election will be held to fill the vacancy.

When the seat of a Member elected based on proportional representation becomes vacant, it can be filled by the Party only from among those nominated on the original PR list.

The Senate

In many countries, a Second Chamber serves as an institution of power-sharing, ensuring representation of the provinces. It also promotes closer linkages between the Centre and the periphery.

The Senate can also function as a mechanism to rectify possible imbalances of representation in the House of Representatives. Acting as an in-built mechanism against arbitrary or hasty legislation and legislation that may adversely affect the provinces will enhance the role of the Senate as an institution of democratic checks and balances.

The Senate will consist of fifty members. Each Provincial Council will elect five members who have distinguished themselves in public life, based on proportional representation. This would facilitate the representation of different communities and political parties. At least two such members shall be women.

Five members shall be appointed to the Senate by the President to represent unrepresented or underrepresented group interests or identities. Their appointment will be on the joint nomination of the Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition in the House of Representatives.

All Bills would be referred to the Senate to obtain its views before the Second Reading. When the Senate does not agree to a Bill other than a Money Bill, the Bill would be referred to a Joint Parliamentary Legislative Committee for consideration. The Committee will submit its report to both Houses within one month.

A Bill seeking to lay down national policy or standards on a subject or matter in the Provincial Council List that would be binding on Provincial Councils must be passed by the Senate as well, with at least two Senate members representing each province voting in favour. This will function as a safeguard to protect the powers of the Provincial Councils from the unilateral intervention of the Centre.

A Constitutional Amendment must be passed by both the House of Representatives and the Senate with a two-thirds majority. This will give the provinces a say in constitution-making and constitutional reforms.

The public and citizens’ organisations must be afforded more opportunities to be involved in the activities of the legislature. The Constitution should mandate public participation in law-making through mechanisms such as opportunities to comment on draft legislation, consultation meetings, and public hearings. Proceedings of Sectoral Oversight Committees should be broadcast online. This should be extended to Provincial Councils as well.

The Executive

Abolishing the ‘Executive Presidential’ system of government and its associated constitutional order is a longstanding and unfulfilled demand of the people of Sri Lanka. It has also generated widespread agreement among the people and political parties. As clearly articulated during the Aragalaya in 2022, the ‘executive presidency’ is the main obstacle to democracy and democratisation in Sri Lanka. Thus, an agenda for returning to parliamentary democracy in Sri Lanka calls for re-constituting the balance of power between the President and the legislature.

Making the President the nominal head of the executive while retaining the position of Head of State is a critical democratising measure proposed in this reform package.

It is proposed that the President be elected by an electoral college comprising members of the House of Representatives and the Senate.

Sri Lanka’s democratic consolidation as a multi-ethnic and pluralist democracy calls for sharing higher-level political office between ethnic communities. Therefore, a position of Vice President from a community other than the community to which the President belongs, elected by the same electoral college, is proposed.

The President and Vice-President shall be responsible and accountable to the national legislature.

While the President will be the nominal head of the executive, the Cabinet of Ministers will exercise such executive power and be answerable to the People via Parliament. The President would exercise powers on the advice of the Cabinet of Ministers conveyed to him/her by the Prime Minister, who will be the Head of the Cabinet of Ministers. The Constitution will expressly provide any exception to this rule.

The President would appoint as Prime Minister the Member of Parliament who, in the President’s opinion, is most likely to command the confidence of the House of Representatives. However, the President would not have the power to remove the Prime Minister.

Reducing the size of the Cabinet of Ministers and the number of other ministers is also a long-unfulfilled popular demand to reduce political corruption and inefficient governance. Therefore, the maximum number of Ministers proposed is twenty. Of them, at least five are to be women. Also, not less than five ministers need to belong to communities other than the majority community. There will be a Deputy Prime Minister chosen from among the ministers. However, she/he must belong to a community other than the community to which the Prime Minister belongs.

The total number of State Ministers and Deputy Ministers will be limited to twenty. Among them, not less than five will be women. Similarly, not less than five should belong to communities other than the majority community.

Secretaries of Ministries will be appointed by the National Public Service Commission in consultation with the Prime Minister.

Geoffrey Alagaratnam, President’s Counsel

Dr. A.M. Navaratne Bandara, Former Professor in Political Science, University of Peradeniya

Bhavani Fonseka, Attorney-at-law, Senior Researcher, Centre for Policy Alternatives

Dr. Mario Gomez, Executive Director, International Centre for Ethnic Studies

Dr. Sakuntala Kadirgamar, Executive Director, Law & Society Trust

Saliya Pieris, President’s Counsel

Dr. Pakiasothy Saravanamuttu, Executive Director, Centre for Policy Alternatives

Dr. Kalana Senaratne, Department of Law, University of Peradeniya

M.A. Sumanthiran, President’s Counsel

Professor Deepika Udagama, Chair Professor of Law, University of Peradeniya

Professor Jayadeva Uyangoda, Emeritus Professor of Political Science, University of Colombo

Dr. Jayampathy Wickramaratne, President’s Counsel

Lal Wijenayake, Attorney-at-law



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Opinion

What BNP should keep in mind as it assumes power

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PM Tarique Rahman

BNP rightly deserves our congratulations for winning a decisive victory in the 13th parliamentary election. This outcome reflects an unequivocal mandate that is both politically and historically significant. Coming as it does at a critical point in Bangladesh’s democratic journey, this moment marks more than a change of government; it signals a renewed public resolve to restore democratic norms, accountability, and institutional integrity.

The election came after years of severe distrust in the electoral process, questions over legitimacy, and institutional strain, so the poll’s successful conduct has reinforced trust in the process as well as the principle that governments derive authority from the consent of the governed. For quite some time now, Bangladesh has faced deep polarisation, intolerance, and threats to its democratic foundations. Regressive and anti-democratic tendencies—whether institutional, ideological, or political—risked steering the country away from its foundational goals. BNP’s decisive victory can therefore be interpreted as a call to reverse this trajectory, and a public desire for accountable, forward-looking governance rooted in liberal democratic principles.

However, the road ahead is going to be bumpy, to put it mildly. A broad mandate alone cannot resolve deep-rooted structural problems. The BNP government will likely continue to face economic challenges and institutional constraints for the foreseeable future. This will test its capacity and sincerity not only to govern but also to transform the culture of governance in the country.

Economic reform imperatives

A key challenge will be stabilising the economy, which continues to face mounting pressures: growth has decelerated, inflation has eroded people’s purchasing power, foreign exchange reserves remain low, and public finances are tight. External debt has increased significantly in recent years, while the tax-to-GDP ratio has fallen to historically low levels. State-owned enterprises and the banking sector face persistent structural weaknesses, and confidence among both domestic and international investors remains fragile.

The new government should begin by restoring macroeconomic discipline. Containing inflation will need close coordination across ministries and agencies. Monetary policy must remain cautious and credible, free from political interference, while fiscal policy should prioritise stability rather than expand populist spending.

Tax reform is also unavoidable. The National Board of Revenue requires comprehensive modernisation, digitalisation, and total compliance. Broadening the tax base, especially by bringing all high-income groups and segments of the informal economy into the formal system, is crucial. Over time, reliance on indirect taxes such as value-added tax and import duties should be reduced, paving the way for a more progressive direct tax regime.

Banking sector reform is equally crucial. Proper asset quality reviews and regulatory oversight are necessary to rebuild confidence in the sector. Political patronage within the financial institutions must end. Without a resilient financial system, private investment cannot recover. As regards growth, the government should focus on diversifying exports beyond ready-made garments and deepening integration into regional value chains. Attracting foreign direct investment will depend on regulatory predictability and improvements in logistics and energy reliability. Ambitious growth targets must be matched by realistic implementation capacity.

Political Challenges

Distrust among political actors, partly fuelled by fears of retribution and violence, is a reality that may persist. BNP will face pressure from its supporters to act quickly in addressing perceived injustices, but good governance demands restraint. If the new government resorts to or tolerates exclusion or retaliation, it will risk perpetuating the very cycle it has condemned.

Managing internal party discipline will also be crucial, as a large parliamentary majority can sometimes lead to complacency or factional rivalry. Strong leadership will be required to maintain unity while allowing constructive internal debate. BNP must also rebuild trust with minority communities and vulnerable groups. Elections often heighten anxieties among minorities, so a credible commitment to equal citizenship is crucial. BNP’s political maturity will also be judged by how it treats or engages with its opponents. In this regard, Chairman Tarique Rahman’s visits to the residences of top opposition leaders on Sunday marked a positive gesture, one that many hope will withstand the inevitable pressures or conflicts over governance in the coming days.

Strengthening democratic institutions

A central promise of this election was to restore democracy, which must now translate into concrete institutional reforms. Judicial independence needs constant safeguarding. Which means that appointment, promotion, and case management processes should be insulated from political influence. Parliamentary oversight committees must also function effectively, and the opposition’s voice in parliament must be protected.

Electoral institutions also need reform, particularly along the lines of the July Charter. Continued credibility of the Election Commission will depend on transparency, professional management, and impartiality. Meanwhile, the civil service must be depoliticised. Appointments based on loyalty rather than merit have long undermined governance in the country. So the new administration must work on curtailing the influence of political networks to ensure a professional, impartial civil service. Media reform and digital rights also deserve careful attention. We must remember that democratic consolidation is built through institutional habits, and these habits must be established early.

Beyond winner-takes-all

Bangladesh’s politics has long been characterised by a winner-takes-all mentality. Electoral victories have often resulted in monopolisation of power, marginalising opposition voices and weakening checks and balances. If BNP is serious about democratic renewal, it must consciously break with this tradition. Inclusive policy consultations will be a good starting point. Major economic and constitutional reforms should be based on cross-party dialogue and consensus. Appointments to constitutional bodies should be transparent and consultative, and parliamentary debates should be done with the letter and spirit of the July Charter in mind.

Meeting public expectations

The scale of public expectations now is naturally immense. Citizens want economic relief, employment opportunities, necessary institutional reforms, and improved governance. Managing these expectations will be quite difficult. Many reforms will not yield immediate results, and some may impose short-term costs. So, it is imperative to ensure transparent communication about the associated timelines, trade-offs, and fiscal constraints.

Anti-corruption efforts must be credible and monitored at all times. Measures are needed to strengthen oversight institutions, improve transparency in public procurement, and expand digital service delivery to reduce opportunities for rent-seeking. Governance reform should be systematic, not selective or politically driven. Tangible improvements are urgently needed in public service delivery, particularly in health, education, social protection, and local government.

Finally, a word of caution: BNP’s decisive victory presents both opportunities and risks. It can enable bold reforms but it also carries the danger of overreach. The key deciding factor here is political judgment. The question is, can our leaders deliver based on the mandate voters have given them? (The Daily Star)

Dr Fahmida Khatun is an economist and executive director at the Centre for Policy Dialogue (CPD). Views expressed in the article are the author’s own.

Views expressed in this article are the author’s own.

by Fahmida Khatun

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Opinion

Why religion should remain separate from state power in Sri Lanka: Lessons from political history

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Religion has been an essential part of Sri Lankan society for more than two millennia, shaping culture, moral values, and social traditions. Buddhism in particular has played a foundational role in guiding ethical behaviour, promoting compassion, and encouraging social harmony. Yet Sri Lanka’s modern political history clearly shows that when religion becomes closely entangled with state power, both democracy and religion suffer. The politicisation of religion especially Buddhism has repeatedly contributed to ethnic division, weakened governance, and the erosion of moral authority. For these reasons, the separation of religion and the state is not only desirable but necessary for Sri Lanka’s long-term stability and democratic progress.

Sri Lanka’s post-independence political history provides early evidence of how religion became a political tool. The 1956 election, which brought S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike to power, is often remembered as a turning point where Sinhala-Buddhist nationalism was actively mobilised for political expedience. Buddhist monks played a visible role in political campaigning, framing political change as a religious and cultural revival. While this movement empowered the Sinhala-Buddhist majority, it also laid the foundation for ethnic exclusion, particularly through policies such as the “Sinhala Only Act.” Though framed as protecting national identity, these policies marginalised Tamil-speaking communities and contributed significantly to ethnic tensions that later escalated into civil conflict. This period demonstrates how religious symbolism, when fused with state power, can undermine social cohesion rather than strengthen it.

The increasing political involvement of Buddhist monks in later decades further illustrates the risks of this entanglement. In the early 2000s, the emergence of monk-led political parties such as the Jathika Hela Urumaya (JHU) marked a new phase in Sri Lankan politics. For the first time, monks entered Parliament as elected lawmakers, directly participating in legislation and governance. While their presence was justified as a moral corrective to corrupt politics, in practice it blurred the boundary between spiritual leadership and political power. Once monks became part of parliamentary debates, policy compromises, and political rivalries, they were no longer perceived as neutral moral guides. Instead, they became political actors subject to criticism, controversy, and public mistrust. This shift significantly weakened the traditional reverence associated with the Sangha.

Sri Lankan political history also shows how religion has been repeatedly used by political leaders to legitimise authority during times of crisis. Successive governments have sought the public endorsement of influential monks to strengthen their political image, particularly during elections or moments of instability. During the war, religious rhetoric was often used to frame the conflict in moral or civilisational terms, leaving little room for nuanced political solutions or reconciliation. This approach may have strengthened short-term political support, but it also deepened ethnic polarisation and made post-war reconciliation more difficult. The long-term consequences of this strategy are still visible in unresolved ethnic grievances and fragile national unity.

Another important historical example is the post-war period after 2009. Despite the conclusion of the war, Sri Lanka failed to achieve meaningful reconciliation or strong democratic reform. Instead, religious nationalism gained renewed political influence, often used to silence dissent and justify authoritarian governance. Smaller population groups such as Muslims and Christians in particular experienced growing insecurity as extremist groups operated with perceived political protection. The state’s failure to maintain religious neutrality during this period weakened public trust and damaged Sri Lanka’s international reputation. These developments show that privileging one religion in state power does not lead to stability or moral governance; rather, it creates fear, exclusion, and institutional decay.

The moral authority of religion itself has also suffered as a result of political entanglement. Traditionally, Buddhist monks were respected for their distance from worldly power, allowing them to speak truth to rulers without fear or favour. However, when monks publicly defend controversial political decisions, support corrupt leaders, or engage in aggressive nationalist rhetoric, they risk losing this moral independence. Sri Lankan political history demonstrates that once religious figures are seen as aligned with political power, public criticism of politicians easily extends to religion itself. This has contributed to growing disillusionment among younger generations, many of whom now view religious institutions as extensions of political authority rather than sources of ethical guidance.

The teachings of the Buddha offer a clear contrast to this historical trend. The Buddha advised rulers on ethical governance but never sought political authority or state power. His independence allowed him to critique injustice and moral failure without compromise. Sri Lanka’s political experience shows that abandoning this principle has harmed both religion and governance. When monks act as political agents, they lose the freedom to challenge power, and religion becomes vulnerable to political failure and public resentment.

Sri Lanka’s multi-religious social structure nurtures divisive, if not separatist, sentiments. While Buddhism holds a special historical place, the modern state governs citizens of many faiths. Political history shows that when the state appears aligned with one religion, minority communities feel excluded, regardless of constitutional guarantees. This sense of exclusion has repeatedly weakened national unity and contributed to long-term conflict. A secular state does not reject religion; rather, it protects all religions by maintaining neutrality and ensuring equal citizenship.

Sri Lankan political history clearly demonstrates that the fusion of religion and state power has not produced good governance, social harmony, or moral leadership. Instead, it has intensified ethnic divisions, weakened democratic institutions, and damaged the spiritual credibility of religion itself. Separating religion from the state is not an attack on Buddhism or Sri Lankan tradition. On the contrary, it is a necessary step to preserve the dignity of religion and strengthen democratic governance. By maintaining a clear boundary between spiritual authority and political power, Sri Lanka can move toward a more inclusive, stable, and just society one where religion remains a source of moral wisdom rather than a tool of political control.

In present-day Sri Lanka, the dangers of mixing religion with state power are more visible than ever. Despite decades of experience showing the negative consequences of politicised religion, religious authority continues to be invoked to justify political decisions, silence criticism, and legitimise those in power. During recent economic and political crises, political leaders have frequently appeared alongside prominent religious figures to project moral legitimacy, even when governance failures, corruption, and mismanagement were evident. This pattern reflects a continued reliance on religious symbolism to mask political weakness rather than a genuine commitment to ethical governance.

The 2022 economic collapse offers a powerful contemporary example. As ordinary citizens faced shortages of fuel, food, and medicine, public anger was directed toward political leadership and state institutions. However, instead of allowing religion to act as an independent moral force that could hold power accountable, sections of the religious establishment appeared closely aligned with political elites. This alignment weakened religion’s ability to speak truthfully on behalf of the suffering population. When religion stands too close to power, it loses its capacity to challenge injustice, corruption, and abuse precisely when society needs moral leadership the most.

At the same time, younger generations in Sri Lanka are increasingly questioning both political authority and religious institutions. Many young people perceive religious leaders as participants in political power structures rather than as independent ethical voices. This growing scepticism is not a rejection of spirituality, but a response to the visible politicisation of religion. If this trend continues, Sri Lanka risks long-term damage not only to democratic trust but also to religious life itself.

The present moment therefore demands a critical reassessment. A clear separation between religion and the state would allow religious institutions to reclaim moral independence and restore public confidence. It would also strengthen democracy by ensuring that policy decisions are guided by evidence, accountability, and inclusive dialogue rather than religious pressure or nationalist rhetoric. Sri Lanka’s recent history shows that political legitimacy cannot be built on religious symbolism alone. Only transparent governance, social justice, and equal citizenship can restore stability and public trust.

Ultimately, the future of Sri Lanka depends on learning from both its past and present. Protecting religion from political misuse is not a threat to national identity; it is a necessary condition for ethical leadership, democratic renewal, and social harmony in a deeply diverse society.

by Milinda Mayadunna

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Opinion

NPP’s misguided policy

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Balangoda Kassapa Thera

Judging by some recent events, starting with the injudicious pronouncement in Jaffna by President Anura Kumara Dissanayake and subsequent statements by some senior ministers, the government tends to appease minorities at the expense of the majority. Ill-treatment of some Buddhist monks by the police continues to arouse controversy, and it looks as if the government used the police to handle matters that are best left to the judiciary. Sangadasa Akurugoda concludes his well-reasoned opinion piece “Appeasement of separatists” (The island, 13 February) as follows:

“It is unfortunate that the President of a country considers ‘national pride and patriotism’, a trait that every citizen should have, as ‘racism’. Although the President is repeating it like a mantra that he will not tolerate ‘racism’ or ‘extremism’ we have never heard him saying that he will not tolerate ‘separatism or terrorism’.”

It is hard to disagree with Akurugoda. Perhaps, the President may be excused for his reluctance to refer to terrorism as he leads a movement that unleashed terror twice, but his reluctance to condemn separatism is puzzling. Although most political commentators consider the President’s comment that ‘Buddhist go to Jaffna to spread hate’ to be callous, the head of an NGO heaped praise on the President for saying so!

As I pointed out in a previous article, puppet-masters outside seem to be pulling the strings (A puppet show? The Island, 23 January) and the President’s reluctance to condemn separatism whilst accusing Buddhists of spreading hatred by going to Jaffna makes one wonder who these puppeteers are.

Another incident that raises serious concern was reported from a Buddhist Temple in Trincomalee. The police removed a Buddha statue and allegedly assaulted Buddhist priests. Mysteriously, the police brought back the statue the following day, giving an absurd excuse; they claimed they had removed it to ensure its safety. No inquiry into police action was instituted but several Bhikkhus and dayakayas were remanded for a long period.

Having seen a front-page banner headline “Sivuru gelawenakam pahara dunna” (“We were beaten till the robes fell”) in the January 13th edition of the Sunday Divaina, I watched on YouTube the press briefing at the headquarters of the All-Ceylon Buddhist Association. I can well imagine the agony those who were remanded went through.

Ven. Balangoda Kassapa’s description of the way he and the others, held on remand, were treated raises many issues. Whether they committed a transgression should be decided by the judiciary. Given the well-known judicial dictum, ‘innocent until proven guilty’, the harassment they faced cannot be justified under any circumstances.

Ven. Kassapa exposed the high-handed actions of the police. This has come as no surprise as it is increasingly becoming apparent as they are no longer ‘Sri Lanka Police’; they have become the ‘NPP police’. This is an issue often editorially highlighted by The Island. How can one expect the police to be impartial when two key posts are held by officers brought out of retirement as a reward for canvassing for the NPP. It was surprising to learn that the suspects could not be granted bail due to objections raised by the police.

Ven. Kassapa said the head of the remand prison where he and others were held had threatened him.

However, there was a ray of hope. Those who cry out for reconciliation fail to recognise that reconciliation is a much-misused term, as some separatists masquerading as peacemakers campaign for reconciliation! They overlook the fact that it is already there as demonstrated by the behaviour of Tamil and Muslim inmates in the remand prison, where Ven. Kassapa and others were kept.

Non-Buddhist prisoners looked after the needs of the Bhikkhus though the prison chief refused even to provide meals according to Vinaya rules! In sharp contrast, during a case against a Sri Lankan Bhikkhu accused of child molestation in the UK, the presiding judge made sure the proceedings were paused for lunch at the proper time.

I have written against Bhikkhus taking to politics, but some of the issues raised by Ven. Kassapa must not be ignored. He alleges that the real reason behind the conflict was that the government was planning to allocate the land belonging to the Vihara to an Indian businessman for the construction of a hotel. This can be easily clarified by the government, provided there is no hidden agenda.

It is no secret that this government is controlled by India. Even ‘Tilvin Ayya’, who studied the module on ‘Indian Expansionism’ under Rohana Wijeweera, has mended fences with India. He led a JVP delegation to India recently. Several MoUs or pacts signed with India are kept under wraps.

Unfortunately, the government’s mishandling of this issue is being exploited by other interested parties, and this may turn out to be a far bigger problem.

It is high time the government stopped harassing the majority in the name of reconciliation, a term exploited by separatists to achieve their goals!

By Dr Upul Wijayawardhana

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