Sirancee Gunawardena, the author of ‘Palm leaf manuscripts of Sri Lanka ‘(1977) met J. Pannila of Artigala south, Hanwella when she was researching palm leaf manuscripts. He was then a village elder and was the descendant of a long line of palm leaf manuscript writers.

Pannila had told Sirancee how the palm leaf is prepared as writing material and she has reproduced the information in her book. It is possible to infer from the knowledge shown by Pannila that palm leaf manuscripts writers were also trained in preparing the palm leaf, and in preserving the manuscript as well as writing on it. I think there may have been others who lacked the skill of writing, but who knew to prepare the item and to preserve it.

In Sri Lanka palm leaf manuscripts were made out of the young fronds of the Talipot palm. Talipot was able to resist the tropical climate of Sri Lanka. Pannila said, before the leaf bud opens, rings of bamboo are put 18 inches apart round the main leaf (sic). After 21 days, the branch is cut and brought down carefully, from the crown of the tree which is usually about 60 feet above ground. The mid rib of each leaf is cut off and the leaves become flexible strips.

The leaves are wound up into rolls. These are put into a large clay pot, with layers of pineapple leaves in between. Pot is filled with water and Kappetiya branches are placed on top, the vessels is sealed with a cloth and heated over a fire. The palm leaves were considered sufficiently boiled when the leaves of the Kappetiya fell off. The rolls were then taken out and washed.

The leaves were polished by rubbing them against a rounded pole of Walla wood, till the strips became flat. They were hung on a coir rope, like a clothes line, and kept outdoors for a week or so, get a fine polished texture. They were now ready for writing. The leaf strip was placed on a piece of soft wood and held in the left hand for writing with the right hand.

Writing was done with the Panhinda. This stylus had a steel tipped quill. The end of the quill was like that of an arrow, both sides were sharp and the edge was pointed to obtain sharp outlines. There were different sized quills. Some broader than others. Sharp, small size stylus was used for drawings. Sirancee owned two stylus, one long stylus with an ornate fan shaped top and another with two decorative metal globules.

The ordinary stylus was traditionally hand made by the village blacksmith. But there were elaborate ones with ornate gold, metal, ivory or carved wooden handles. The gold stylus was made of pure gold except for the stylus which was of steel. The gold stylus was a symbol of prestige. The Ananda Coomaraswamy collection has a golden stylus with royal ensign ‘SrI’. It is said to have been originally given by King Narendrasinha to Alagaboda Nilame.

The stylus was treated with respect. Sirancee pointed out that the Maha Lekammitiya and stylus were carried in the Dalada temple procession in the Esala perahera. The Matale Mahadivase Kadainmpota said “Niharepola Alahakoon Mohottala was appointed lekam of Tunkorale and received the ran Panhinda and flag”.

Inscribing a palm leaf was a skilled task. A scribe had to go through a long period of training before he was allowed to write on ola. Only very experienced writers were allowed to inscribe a major work. The handwriting in a manuscript therefore was very beautiful and were works of art, said Sirancee. Letters were uniform and evenly spaced. Palm leaf drawings were fine line drawings, which required great skill. Circles and shapes were drawn free hand.

The manuscript usually starts with the auspicious word ‘Svasti’, with the latter ‘ka’ below it. The text commenced with traditional salute to the Buddha and ended with a colophon which gave the name of the author and promoter and some times the scribe and the date. But most authors were anonymous.

Palm leaf manuscripts were numbered starting from the Sinhala letter Ka according to the Sinhala alphabet. words were written from left to right. There are no punctuation marks and no spaces between words. There were margins and a symbol to demarcate paragraphs. Most manuscripts only had text, but there were many with illustrations.

The words scratched on the ola had to be made visible. Inking was a special art. The process was called Kalumadima. The palm leaf was rubbed with a soft cloth dipped in Dummala oil and powdered charcoal obtained from the Godama tree. The surface of the leaf was then cleaned with rice bran (Dahaiyya).

The dummala used was a resin derived from a fossilised root of a plant called Hal ((vateria acuminata). It was dug out from paddy fields and river beds, on the two auspicious days, Wednesdays and Saturday. The dummala was distilled in an earthen pot with the outside coated in cow dung and clay. The distilling was done between 6 pm and 2 am in the garden. Ten pounds of Dummala produced about 2 bottles of oil.

When palm leaves were gathered together to form a single text, they resembled books. The manuscripts seen by Sirancee averaged 60-65 folios, but there were many which were larger. One manuscript had 311 folios.

Creating this ‘book’ was also a special process. The leaves were cut into the required size, usually two inches wide and between 8 and 18 inches in length. The inscribed leaves were placed one under the other. Holes were punched with a hot rod, and a cord passed through. The punching of holes was done according to rules given as verse. Fold the leaf into three then into four and make the holes in between the creases at the two ends. One manuscript seen by Sirancee was stitched together and opened like an accordion.

Folios were placed between two covers known as Kamba. Most manuscripts had wooden covers, of ebony, jak, milla, calamander and other hard woods. The covers were decorated in lac with flower designs, such as Jasmin, kadupul, lotus, liya wela,creepers,. Some were decorated with geometric designs, or rope design. Some had ivory inlay, others had contrasting wood in marquetry, tortoise shell was also used. One manuscript had ebony cover inlaid with ivory. the button was of tortoise shell. At Katarangala in Halloluwa they found a pirit pota with covers in dainty design.

Highly venerated manuscripts such as those on Buddhism had covers of ivory or silver, and were decorated with gem stones. These are kept safely. Malwatte temple had a palm leaf manuscript on Abhidamma written in Sinhala, with ivory covers, a border of rubies and blue sapphires and a design of flowers set in gold. Malwatte had another manuscript, with cover in silver and gold and a floral design richly encrusted with white sapphires and zircons. Hanguranketa temple had a manuscript with gem studded covers. Pelmadulla Raja maha vihara also had a manuscript with carved ivory cover. Several other manuscripts had gem studded covers. National Museum library had a manuscript on Abhidamma with an ornamented cover in brass. SWRD Bandaranaike collection had a manuscript with silver cover and gems.

The formula for making oil for preserving manuscripts is a heavily guarded secret, said Sirancee. Pannila had a secret formula which was handed down generation to generation and was known only to a few families. Pannila gave Sirancee the formula in appreciation of her interest in the subject. Sirancee has gven the formula and method, with photographs, in her book on pages 38-40.

Pannila had been commissioned by the National Museum library to apply his secret oil to the palm leaf manuscripts which needed preserving. He was also invited to temple libraries and to the Institute of Indigenous medicine at Rajagiriya to clean and restore their manuscripts.

Sirancee stated that palm leaf manuscripts stored on wooden shelves did not deteriorate despite the humid climate. Manuscripts kept in pettagama tended to disintegrate, she said. But Nagolle Raja Maha vihara was a well-known exception. The olas stored in its pettagama remain well preserved.

The National Library of Sri Lanka has a Preservation and Conservation Centre (PAC) which pays special attention to palm leaf manuscripts. The IFLA PAC Centre was inaugurated on 5^th August 2015. The Centre produces “Panhida Herbal Oil”for the conservation of palm leaf manuscripts.

Udaya Cabral, who heads the PAC, with M Ravikumar, and T Ramanan presented a paper titled Developing a strategic program for safeguarding palm-leaf manuscripts in Sri Lanka at IFLA Conference, 2018.In 2021 the National Library issued a report on best practices for the conservation of Palm-Leaf Manuscripts, prepared by Udaya Cabral and R.M Nadeeka Rathnabahu.

Cabraal and Ratnabahu said that a palm leaf manuscript around 200 years old located in National Library of Sri Lanka, regularly treated by Dummala herbal oil was examined under microscope. They found that the traditional oil was not completely effective, some fungus still remained. PAC recommended that after treatment with Dummala oil, the manuscripts be kept in a specially designed ‘fume cupboard ‘made out of neem wood, with a cube of Thymol placed at the bottom.

In my view, it is only in recent times, that ola manuscripts are treated as archival material, to be preserved somehow. My guess is that in ancient times, the original manuscript was kept as long as possible but a copy was made when it was clear that the original was going to perish. This was repeated over and over again. That is how the Mahavamsa came to us. ( continued)

REFERENCES

Sirancee Gunawardana Palm leaf manuscripts of Sri Lanka. 1977 p 14–, 33-. 132, 134, 248-251, 254, 25

https://www.ifla.org/news/pac-sri-lanka-publishes-a-new-report-on-best-practices-for-the-conservation-of-palm-leaf-manuscripts/

http://library.ifla.org/2266/1/124-cabral-en.pdf

https://www.ifla.org/wp-content/uploads/files/assets/pac/Documents/pac_sri_lanka_report_best_practices_for_conservation_of_palm-leaf_manuscripts_.pdf

BY KAMALIKA PIERIS

Now in their seventeenth year,

Separate ceremonies are ongoing,

By the Victors and Vanquished of war,

To remember the dead of both halves,

Proving that ‘Two Nations’ exist after all,

Whereas what’s so badly needed by the Isle,

Is a North-South bridge-building project,

That would meld the two sides into one,

On the basis of a spirit of mutual forgiving,

And a law of equality all-embracing.

By Lynn Ockersz

The country is in deepening turmoil over the theft of USD 2.5 mn from the Treasury. The Treasury affair has placed the arrogant NPP in an embarrassing position. The controversial release of 323 red-flagged containers from the Colombo Port, in addition to two carrying narcotics and the coal scam that forced Energy Minister Kumara Jayakody to resign, has eroded public confidence though the NPP pretends otherwise.

Suspicious deaths of a Finance Ministry official, suspended over the Treasury heist of USD 2.5 million, and ex-SriLankan Airlines CEO Kapila Chandrasena shouldn’t distract the government and the Opposition from marking victory over terrorism.

But, the country, under any circumstances, shouldn’t forget to celebrate Sri Lanka’s greatest post-independence achievement. Dinesh Udugamsooriya, a keen follower of conflict and post-Aragalaya issues, insists that those who cherish the peace achieved should raise the national flag in honour of the armed forces.

The armed forces paid a huge price to preserve the country’s unitary status. Those who represent Parliament and outside waiting for an opportunity to return to Parliament must keep in their minds, unitary status is non-negotiable, under any circumstances, and such efforts would be in vain.

By Shamindra Ferdinando

Sri Lanka celebrates, next week, the eradication of the bloodthirsty separatist Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) as a conventional threat to the survival of this nation, at least in our hearts, even if the authorities dampen any celebrations. The armed forces brought the war to a successful conclusion on 18 May, 2009. The body of undisputed leader of the LTTE, Velupillai Prabhakaran, was found on the banks of the Nanthikadal lagoon, on the morning of 19 May, less than 24 hours after the ground forces declared the end of operations in the Vanni theatre.

The LTTE’s annihilation is Sri Lanka’s greatest post-independence achievement. Whatever various interested parties, pursuing different agendas say, the vast majority of people accept the eradication of the LTTE’s conventional military capacity as the armed forces’ highest achievement.

Sri Lanka’s triumph cannot be discussed without taking into consideration how the Indian-trained LTTE, who also went on to fight the New Delhi’s Army deployed here, in terms of the Indo-Lanka Peace Accord, signed in July, 1987, giving it an unforgettable hiding. The Indian misadventure here cost them the lives of nearly 1,500 officers and men. Just over a year after the Indian pullout, in March, 1990, the LTTE assassinated Rajiv Gandhi who, in his capacity as the Prime Minister, deployed the Indian Army here. But India launched the Sri Lanka destabilisation project during Indira Gandhi’s premiership.

Western powers, the now decimated United National Party (UNP), Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), and an influential section of the media, propagated the lie that the LTTE couldn’t be defeated. But, the United People’s Freedom Party (UPFA), under President Mahinda Rajapaksa’s resolute leadership, sustained a nearly three-year long genuine sustained offensive that brought the entire Northern and Eastern regions back under government control.

The UNP relentlessly hindered the war against the LTTE. UNP leader Ranil Wickremesinghe, hell-bent on undermining the military campaign, had no qualms in questioning the military strategy. The former Prime Minister went to the extent of sarcastically questioning the culmination of the military campaign in the East with the capture of Thoppigala (Baron’s cap) in the second week of July, 2007, calling it just a rock outcrop with no significance. Believing the military lacked the strength to continue with the campaign, Wickremesinghe publicly ridiculed the Thoppigala success. The then Brigadier Chagie Gallage, the pint-sized human dynamo, provided critical leadership to the highly successful Eastern campaign that deprived the LTTE the opportunity to compel the armed forces to commit far larger strength to the region. We clearly recall how he went to announce the prized capture from his forward base, that afternoon, driving his own jeep, dressed as a soldier wearing a cap, with his second in command seated by his side, obviously not to fall victim to any sniper hiding in the surrounding jungles.

The likes of Ravi Karunanayaka, Lakshman Kiriella, Dr. Rajitha Senaratna and the late Mangala Samaraweera demeaned such successes by contributing to a vicious political campaign that dented public confidence in the armed forces. Then Lt. General Sarath Fonseka’s Army needed a massive boost, not only to sustain the relentless advance into the enemy territory, but to hold onto and stabilise areas brought under government control. But the viciousness of these critics were such that Samaraweera had the gall to say that Fonseka was not even fit to lead the Salvation Army.

The Opposition campaign was meant to deter the stepped up recruitment campaign that enabled the Army to increase its strength from 116,000 to over 205,000 at the end of the campaign. In spite of disgraceful Opposition attempts to cause doubts, regarding the military campaign among the public, with backing from Western vultures, who were all for LTTE success, the Rajapaksa government maintained the momentum.

President Rajapaksa had a superb team that ensured the government confidently met the daunting challenge. That team included Defence Secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa, Vice Admiral Wasantha Karannagoda, Lt. General Sarath Fonseka, Air Marshal Roshan Goonetileke and the then Chief of National Intelligence (CNI) Maj. General Kapila Hendawitharana. There were also the likes of Rear Admiral Sarath Weerasekera, who returned from retirement to transform the once ragtag Home Guards into a worthy back-up to the military, as the Civil Defence Force, at critical places/junctures.

The then Governor of the Central Bank, Ajith Nivard Cabraal, played a significant role in overall government response to the challenge. The then presidential advisor MP Basil Rajapaksa’s role, too, should be appreciated and Prof. Rajiva Wijesinghe as well as Minister Mahinda Samarasinghe contributed to counter the false propaganda campaigns directed at the country. Whatever the shortcomings of the Mahinda Rajapaksa-led UPFA may have had, the armed forces couldn’t have succeeded if the resolute political leadership he provided, with his team of brothers, failed both in and outside Parliament. That is the undeniable truth.

During the 2006-2009 campaign, the UNP twice tried to defeat the UPFA Budget, thereby hoping to bring the war to an abrupt end. Th utterly contemptible move to defeat the UPFA Budget ultimately caused a split in the JVP with a section of the party switching its allegiance to President Rajapaksa to save the day.

Amidst political turmoil and both overt and covert Western interventions, the armed forces pressed ahead with the offensive. It would be pertinent to mention that the Vanni campaign began in March, 2007, a couple of months before the armed forces brought the eastern campaign to an end.

Vanni campaign

The Army launched the Vanni campaign in March, 2007. The 57 Division that had been tasked with taking Madhu, and then proceeding to Kilinochchi, faced fierce resistance. The principal fighting Division suffered significant casualties and progress was slow. An irate Fonseka brought in Maj. Gen. Jagath Dias as General Officer Commanding (GoC) of the 57 Division to advance and consolidate areas brought under control.

The Army expanded the Vanni campaign in September, 2007. The Task Force 1 (later 58 Division) launched operations from the Mannar ‘rice bowl’. Fonseka placed Gallage in command of that fighting formation but was replaced by the then Brigadier Shavendra Silva, as a result of a medical emergency.

The Army gradually took the upper hand in the Vanni west while the LTTE faced a new threat in the Vanni east with the newly created 59 Division, under Brigadier Nandana Udawatta, launching offensive action in January, 2008. Having launched its first major action in the Weli Oya region, that Division fought its way towards Mullaitivu, an LTTE stronghold since 1996.

The 53 (Maj. Gen. Kamal Gunaratne) and 55 (Brig. Prasanna Silva) Divisions, deployed in the Jaffna peninsula, joined the Vanni offensive, in late 2008, as the TF 1 fought its way to Pooneryn, turned right towards Paranthan, captured that area and then hit Elephant Pass and rapidly advanced towards Kilinochchi. The TF 1 and 57 Division met in Kilinochchi and the rest is history.

Once the Army brought Kilinochchi under its control, in January, 2009, the LTTE lost the war. The raising of the Lion flag over Kilinochchi meant that the entire area, west of the Kandy-Jaffna A9 road, had been brought under government control. By then the LTTE had lost the sea supply route, between Tamil Nadu and Mannar region. The LTTE was surrounded by several fighting formations in the Vanni east while the Navy made an unprecedented achievement by cordoning off the Mullaitivu coast that effectively cut them off on all sides.

During the final phase of the naval action, they captured Sea Tiger leader Soosai’s wife, Sathyadevi, and her children Sivanesan Mani Arasu and Sivanesan Sindhu. Spearheaded by the elite Fourth Fast Attack Flotilla, the Navy conducted a sustained campaign, with spectacular success in the high seas, and, by late 2008, the Navy dominated the waters around the country.

The sinking of floating LTTE warehouses, with the intelligence provided by the Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI) and the US Pacific Command, after the Americans decided to speed up the inevitable, and a campaign, directed at operations across the Palk Strait, weakened the LTTE. By early January, 2009, the LTTE had lost its capacity to carry out mid-sea transfers, and the use of Tamil Nadu fishing trawlers to bring in supplies, and it was only a matter of time before the group surrendered or faced the consequences.

Although Tamil Diaspora still believed in the LTTE launching a massive counter attack on the Vanni east front and the Tamil National Alliance (TNA), under the leadership of the late R. Sampanthan, worked hard to halt the offensive, President Rajapaksa declared that the offensive wouldn’t be called off. President Rajapaksa had the strength to resist the combined pressure brought on him by the West and the UN until the armed forces delivered the final blow.

The despicable efforts made by US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to block IMF funding for Sri Lanka is in the public domain. Clinton was obviously trying to please the Tamil Diaspora. The US made that attempt as the ground offensive was on the last phase against the backdrop of the international community suspending relief supply ships to Puthumathalan.

The IMF provided the much required funding to Sri Lanka, regardless of Clinton’s intervention.

A targeted assassination

The Air Force conducted a strategic campaign against the LTTE while providing support to both the Army and the Navy. Despite limited resources, the Air Force pulverised the enemy and high profile target assassination of S.P. Thamilselvan, in his Kilinochchi hideout, in early November, 2007, shook the LTTE leadership. The deployment of a pair of jets (Kafir and MiG 27), on the basis of intelligence provided by the DMI and backed by UAV footage, to carry out a meticulous strike on Thamilselvan’s Kilinochchi hideout, caused unprecedented fear among the LTTE.

Current Defence Secretary, Sampath Thuyakontha, in his capacity as the Commanding Officer of No 09 Squadron, played a vital role in action against the LTTE. Thuyakontha earned the respect of all for landing behind enemy lines in support of LRRP (Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol).

As the Army advanced on the Vanni east front, thousands of LTTE cadres gave up their weapons, threw away their trade mark cyanide capsules and surrendered. Their defences crumbled and even hardcore cadres surrendered, regardless of the warning issued by Prabhakaran. By the time the armed forces concluded clearing operations, over 12,000 LTTE cadres were in government custody. Although those who couldn’t stomach Sri Lanka’s victory over the LTTE propagated lies regarding the rehabilitation programme, the ordinary Tamil people appreciated the project.

C.V. Wigneswaran, in his capacity as the Chief Minister of the Northern Province, called for a US investigation into the death of ex-LTTE cadres in government custody. The retired Supreme Court judge sought to consolidate his political power by alleging the Army executed surrendered men by injecting them with poison. The then Yahapalana government failed to take action against Wigneswaran who claimed over 100 deaths among ex-combatants.

Instead of initiating legal action, the war-winning Rajapaksa government rehabilitated them. Even after the change of government, in 2015, the rehabilitation project continued. Almost all of them had been released and, since the end of war, the members of the defeated LTTE never tried to reorganise, though some Diaspora elements made an attempt.

The LTTE’s demise brought an end to the use of child soldiers. Those who demand justice for Tamils, killed during the war, conveniently forget that forcible recruitment of children, by the LTTE, also ended in May, 2009. Struggling to overcome severe manpower shortage, amidst mounting battlefield losses, the LTTE abducted Tamil children, from the early ’90s, to be press-ganged into their cadre.

Although the UN and ICRC sought a consensus with the LTTE, way back during Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga’s tenure as the President, to cease forced recruitment of children, they couldn’t achieve the desired results. The much publicised UN-ICRC projects failed. The LTTE continued with its despicable abduction of children. The LTTE never stopped child recruitment and, depending on the ground situation, it carried out forced recruitment drives. The signing of the Norwegian arranged Ceasefire Agreement (CFA), too, failed to halt forced child recruitment.

The Darusman report that accused the military of killing over 40,000 civilians during the last phase of the war revealed that the LTTE tried to recruit children as it was about to collapse.

The TNA, or any other like-minded group here or abroad, never urged the LTTE to give up civilian shields and stop recruiting children, though they realised Prabhakaran could no longer change the outcome of the war. Norway, and those who still believed in a negotiated ‘settlement’ in a bid to prevent the annihilation of the group, desperately tried to convince Prabhakaran to give up civilian shields.

A note, dated February 16, 2009, sent to Basil Rajapaksa, by Norwegian Ambassador Tore Hattrem, expressed concern over the fate of those who had been trapped in the Vanni east. Hattrem’s note to Basil Rajapaksa revealed Norway’s serious concern over the LTTE’s refusal to release the civilians.

The following is the Norwegian note, headlined ‘Offer/Proposal to the LTTE’, personally signed by Ambassador Hattrem: “I refer to our telephone conversation today. The proposal to the LTTE on how to release the civilian population, now trapped in the LTTE controlled area, has been transmitted to the LTTE through several channels. So far, there has been, regrettably, no response from the LTTE and it doesn’t seem to be likely that the LTTE will agree with this in the near future.”

In the aftermath of the Anandapuram debacle in the first week of April, 2009, the LTTE lost its fighting capacity to a large extent. The loss of over 600 cadres marked the collapse of the organisation’s conventional fighting capacity.

The LTTE sought an arrangement in which it could retain its remaining weapons and start rebuilding the group again. President Rajapaksa emphasised that only an unconditional surrender could save the group’s remaining cadre. The President refused to recognise an area under the LTTE’s control. The CFA, signed by Wickremesinghe and Prabhakaran, in February, 2002, recognised a vast area under the LTTE control. The CFA gave unparalleled recognition to the terrorist group and that was exploited by them to the hilt.

NPP’s dilemma

During his controversial May Day address this year, President Anura Kumara Dissanayake declared that only the armed forces and police could carry arms. Dissanayake warned that no one else could retain weapons.

President Dissanayake’s declaration is of pivotal importance as the armed forces and police twice crushed JVP-led insurgencies, in 1971 and 1987-1990. Dissanayake is the leader of the JVP and the NPP, two political parties recognised by the Election Commission.

Dissanayake, who is also the Minister of Defence and Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, caused controversy last year when the government announced that the President wouldn’t attend the 16th annual war heroes’ commemoration ceremony at War Heroes’ Memorial, in Sri Jayawardenepura Kotte.

That announcement triggered massive backlash. The government rescinded its earlier decision. Having received an unprecedented endorsement from the northern and eastern electorates, both at presidential and parliamentary polls in September and November, 2024, respectively, President Dissanayake seemed to have been somewhat reluctant to join the national celebration.

Yahapalana leaders President Maithripala Sirisena and Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe succumbed to Tamil Diaspora and Western pressures to do away with the 2016 annual armed forces Victory Day parade. That treacherous move followed them betraying the war-winning armed forces at the Geneva-based United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) in October, 2015.

They co-sponsored accountability resolution, introduced by the US in terms of an understanding with the LTTE’s sidekick. Sirisena and Wickremesinghe forgot that the TNA recognised the LTTE as the sole representative of the Tamil speaking people, in 2001, thereby setting the stage for Eelam War IV. Sampanthan’s outfit, the Illankai Thamil Arasu Kadchi (ITAK)-led TNA, showed its true colours when it joined the UNP-JVP led initiative to defeat Mahinda Rajapaksa. Having accused the war-winning Army Commander, Sarath Fonseka, of unpardonable war crimes, the TNA, along with the UNP-JVP combine, backed Fonseka at the 2010 presidential election. The South rejected Fonseka and he lost the race by a staggering 1.8 mn votes which late JVP leader Somawansa Amarasinghe foolishly called a computer ‘jilmart’, a newly coined word of our fake Marxists. Fonseka’s indefensible declaration, in the run-up to the 2010 presidential election that the celebrated 58 Division executed surrendered LTTE cadres, didn’t do him any good. President Rajapaksa never explained why the US’ unofficial contradiction of Fonseka’s claim was never used cleverly to counter unsubstantiated war crimes allegations, along with Lord Naseby disclosures made in October, 2017.

Sri Lanka’s failure to properly defend the armed forces is nothing but an insult to them. They saved the country from the JVP twice, and Indian trained over half a dozen terrorist groups, finally bringing the largest and the deadliest of them, the LTTE, down to its knees, on the banks of the Nanthikadal lagoon.

The armed forces shouldn’t hesitate to remember their glorious victory over terrorism. Since the change of government in September, 2024, the armed forces refrained from at least mentioning their battlefield achievements. At the last Independence Day, the armed forces shockingly mentioned their role in the Ditwah cyclone recovery efforts as their main achievement, to please the political masters, who themselves have been lackeys of the West, while outwardly professing to be Marxists, the latter line they have already conveniently dropped for all purposes. The armed forces shouldn’t play NPP politics but explain the situation to the current dispensation. The failure on the part of armed forces to erase their proud achievements against terrorism, out of their press releases/narratives, look rather stupid.