Features
Origins and growth of Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna
THE APRIL 1971 REVOLT – I
By Jayantha Somasundaram
The 50th anniversary of the first JVP insurrection falls today. The 1971 rebellion was the first armed uprising against the state in modern times.
The JVP was the brainchild of Rohana Wijeweera. Born in 1943, at Hunandeniya, in the Matara District, his father was a supporter of the Communist Party of Ceylon (CPC). However, while studying medicine in Moscow, Wijeweera became critical of the Soviet Union, and, on his return, he joined the Communist Party (CP), which was Maoist. Not long after, in 1966, Wijeweera, along with his supporters, broke ranks with the CP to form their own movement, which would later become the JVP. Wijeweera had concluded that the agricultural labourer -̶ the rural proletariat -̶ was the largest and most important component of Sri Lanka’s working class, not the urban or plantation worker.
The JVP was able to attract university students to its cause. It gained recruits at Vidyalankara (Kelaniya) University by winning over students who were members of the PC-supporting Lanka Jatika Sishya Sangamaya (Lanka National Students Society) led by G. I. D. ‘Castro’ Dharmasekera. In 1970, the JVP wrested control of the Samajawadi Sishiya Sangamaya (the Socialist Students Society) at the Peradeniya University; while on behalf of the JVP, Mahinda Wijesekera led the Sangamaya at Vidyodaya (Sri Jayewardenepura) University.
In 1969, Wijeweera organised two Congresses, bringing together all his supporters. At the two-day conference in Madampella, Negombo, the leadership, which consisted of Wijeweera, Sanath, Karunaratne and Loku Athula, along with the District Secretaries, constituted the JVP Central Committee. Later that year, at Urubokka, in the Matara District, the movement took on its final configuration. Five-member cells formed the core structure, overseeing them would be area leaders who were in turn responsible to District Secretaries.
At the Urubokka Conference, the prospect of manufacturing weapons was taken up and the suggestion made that projectiles such as rockets would be effective against the Army’s Panagoda Cantonment, at Homagama. In early 1970, at the Dondra Conference, in addition to collecting and manufacturing weapons, the details of recruitment, training, uniforms, and collecting information on the Armed Forces, were discussed.
The JVP’s Ideology
The JVP was critical of the mainstream left parties, the Lanka Sama Samaja Party (LSSP) and the Communist Party as they had entered into an alliance with the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP) and would be constituents of the United Front (UF) government, which came to power in May 1970. However, it was in those very areas, that had been worked on by the older left parties for three decades, that the JVP took root.
The JVP leaders, however, were from backgrounds and experiences quite different from that of the old left parties. They did not come from Colombo’s public schools, few of them had been to the British-styled residential university at Peradeniya, and none to Western universities. Many were teachers and students of small-town Central Schools and the Pirivena (Buddhist monastic) Universities. “Unlike the traditional left, the activists of the JVP were the children of the 1956 Sinhala-only struggle, with its attendant limitations and advantages,” writes Michael Cooke in Rebellion, Repression and the Struggle for Justice in Sri Lanka: The Lionel Bopage Story.
The rank and file of the JVP consisted of militant Sinhala-educated young men and women. They were underprivileged rural youth, with meagre job opportunities, constituting a potential army of frustrated school and university leavers. Overwhelmingly Buddhist Sinhalese, they were drawn from marginalised castes. Wahumpura villages in Elpitiya gave the JVP strong support, while, in Kegalle, the Batgam were won over by the JVP. In Sri Lanka: Third World Democracy, James Jupp explains: “The JVP appealed to the Buddhist Karawe, Durawe, Batgam, Wahumpura … both from the Southern Province and the Kegalle District, anti-Govigama feeling was a motive behind the mass recruitment to the JVP in certain villages.”
The JVP endeavoured to recruit sympathisers in the armed forces, with Wijeweera establishing contact, as early as 1965, with Tilekaratne, a rating in the Royal Ceylon Navy. Later Uyangoda held classes for Naval personnel, made contact with Air Force personnel in Wanathamulla and Katunayake, and delivered lectures to them. They also provided classes for soldiers stationed at Diyatalawa.
The Party evolved its own Marxist ideology which was a hybrid. It drew on Trotsky’s criticism of Stalinism and the ‘popular front.’ From Mao it asserted the primacy of the peasantry as the backbone of the revolution. And from Castro it learnt armed insurrection. The JVP training for its cadres emphasised neo-colonialism, attacked parliamentarianism and rejected the mainstream left parties.
In its economic teaching, the JVP differed little from the LSSP or CP. However, they did not only point out the neo-colonial dependence of Sri Lanka’s economy, but identified the UF as part of this neo-colonial system. They called for a halt to the expansion of the tea plantations while advocating the intense cultivation of food crops and the collectivisation of land to overcome landlessness. The JVP in its propaganda organ Vimukthi claimed that “the socialist revolution would succeed in Ceylon only when the oppressed peasantry became politicised … hey are the moving force of the Ceylonese revolution.”
Political Growth
The JVP recruited cadres who would attend political training, delivered through five lectures. These covered the economic crisis, neo-colonialism, Indian expansionism, the left movement and the Sri Lanka revolution. Those who completed all five lectures and volunteered for combat, around 9,000, had military training.
It was in tactics, however, that the JVP differed radically from the rest of the left, which had been concerned with trade unions, strikes, rallies and elections. With the passage of time, the JVP evolved a tactic, where they functioned openly as an agitational group, whilst, at the same time recruiting combatants into a clandestine military organisation. They held that the socialist revolution in Sri Lanka would have to be a sudden armed insurrection, launched simultaneously across the country. This is the most advanced and complex form of revolutionary combat.
Their ‘24-Hour Revolution’ was premised on the assumption that the police and the armed forces had insufficient ammunition to survive a simultaneous uprising throughout the country. However they also wrestled with a critical tactical dilemma: “How to attack the government, moving carefully enough not to outpace the disillusion of the masses, yet fast enough to hit before the government struck at it.” (Fred Halliday The Ceylonese Insurrection in Explosion in a Sub Continent edited by Robin Blackburn)
The JVP came into the open, in 1969, through public meetings, the first of which was held at Vidyodaya University. This public profile brought a large number of new recruits whom the leadership claim reached about 23,000 committed members. But it also resulted in the police responding with widespread arrests amounting to about a thousand JVP activists. Fearing all out repression, they established protected villages in remote rural areas, as logistical bases. “The movement took no root in the towns, nor in the industrial coastal areas around Colombo, nor in the Tamil areas,” wrote the Belgian Catholic priest and sociologist Francois Houtart in Religion and Ideology in Sri Lanka.
Shortly before the May 1970 general election, Dharmasekera allegedly informed the Minister of State J. R. Jayewardene, through an intermediaries, of the JVP threat. This triggered heightened interest in the media which gave them the appellation ‘Che Guevarists,’ and the establishment of a special CID Unit, which began arresting JVP members. Wijeweera himself was arrested at Hambantota on 12th May. When he was released in July, Wijeweera launched a series of public meetings across the country, going as far north as Anuradhapura. There was a pause after October and then came a massive meeting in Colombo at Hyde Park on 27 February 1971.
The Prelude to the Uprising
The JVP’s highest decision-making body was its 12-person Political Bureau (PB) which, at its Ambalangoda meeting, in September 1970 decided to begin collecting arms, with Loku Athula placed in charge of the armed section and directed to collect 100,000 bombs. At the next PB meeting, held at year-end, Loku Athula reported that 3,000 bombs were ready.
The hand bomb was the JVPs main weapon. But guns and ammunition were also being purchased and stolen and stored by the JVP, in one instance at the Talagalle Temple at Homagama, which was raided by the Police. Uniforms for JVP combatants were being produced secretly, mainly at Vidyodaya Campus; a blue shirt and trouser with pockets, a cartridge belt, boots and helmet. In addition, Viraj Fernando, an engineer who was sympathetic to the JVP, had at Wijeweera’s request went overseas in November 1970 to make contact with foreign rebel groups to procure weapons.
Wijeweera also gave instructions to Piyasiri to build under-ground storage facilities to hide their stock of weapons and explosives, but on 9 March an explosion at one of these hideouts, in Nelundeniya, killed five. This drew attention, nationally to the fact that the JVP was arming itself.
Then on the 16 came an explosion at Marrs Hall at the Peradeniya Campus, in a room occupied by Hewavitharne. When the Police arrived and searched the halls of residence, they also found a stock of detonators at Hilda Obeysekera Hall.
A faction, within the JVP, led by Castro Dharmasekera, wanted the movement to remain secret and prepare for guerrilla warfare. But the majority disagreed and Dharmasekera and his supporters were expelled. In response, on 6th March, calling themselves the Maoist Youth Front, they held a demonstration outside the US Embassy in Colombo during which a police officer was killed. Although the JVP denounced Dharmasekera, Wijeweera and hundreds of his supporters were arrested during March, the JVP claimed that 4,000 cadre were now behind bars.
Dharmasekera’s provocation and the bomb explosions led on March 16th to the government declaring a State of Emergency, dusk to dawn curfew and their warning of a JVP plot to take state power. In response, the Army deployed two platoons of the 1st Battalion, Ceylon Light Infantry (1CLI) to the Kegalle District, which would soon become the centre of fierce fighting. This was followed by a further two platoons being sent to Kandy.
(To be continued tomorrow)
Six months into the term of office of the new government, the main positive achievements continue to remain economic and political stability and the reduction of waste and corruption. The absence of these in the past contributed to a significant degree to the lack of development of the country. The fact that the government is making a serious bid to ensure them is the best prognosis for a better future for the country. There is still a distance to go. The promised improvements that would directly benefit those who are at the bottom of the economic pyramid, and the quarter of the population who live below the poverty line, have yet to materialise. Prices of essential goods have not come down and some have seen sharp increases such as rice and coconuts. There are no mega projects in the pipeline that would give people the hope that rapid development is around the corner.
There were times in the past when governments succeeded in giving the people big hopes for the future as soon as they came to power. Perhaps the biggest hope came with the government’s move towards the liberalisation of the economy that took place after the election of 1977. President J R Jayewardene and his team succeeded in raising generous international assistance, most of it coming in the form of grants, that helped to accelerate the envisaged 30 year Mahaweli Development project to just six years. In 1992 President Ranasinghe Premadasa thought on a macro scale when his government established 200 garment factories throughout the country to develop the rural economy and to help alleviate poverty. These large scale projects brought immediate hope to the lives of people.
More recently the Hambantota Port project, Mattala Airport and the Colombo Port City project promised mega development that excited the popular imagination at the time they commenced, though neither of them has lived up to their envisaged potential. These projects were driven by political interests and commission agents rather than economic viability leading to debt burden and underutilisation. The NPP government would need to be cautious about bringing in similar mega projects that could offer the people the hope of rapid economic growth. During his visits to India and China, President Anura Kumara Dissanayake signed a large number of agreements with the governments of those countries but the results remain unclear. The USD 1 billion Adani project to generate wind power with Indian collaboration appears to be stalled. The USD 3.7 billion Chinese proposal to build an oil refinery also appears to be stalled.
RENEWED GROWTH
The absence of high profile investments or projects to generate income and thereby take the country to a higher level of development is a lacuna in the development plans of the government. It has opened the door to invidious comparisons to be drawn between the new government’s ability to effect change and develop the economy in relation to those in the opposition political parties who have traditionally been in the seats of power. However, recently published statistics of the economic growth during the past year indicates that the economy is doing better than anticipated under the NPP government. Sri Lanka’s economy grew by 5 percent in the year 2024, reversing two years of contraction with the growth rate for the year of 2023 being estimated at negative 2.3 percent. What was particularly creditable was the growth rate for the fourth quarter of 2024 (after the new government took over) being 5.4 percent. The growth figures for the present quarter are also likely to see a continuation of the present trend.
Sri Lanka’s failure in the past has been to sustain its economic growth rates. Even though the country started with high growth rates under different governments, it soon ran into problems of waste and corruption that eroded those gains. During the initial period of President J R Jayawardene’s government in the late 1970s, the economy registered near 8 percent growth with the support of its mega projects, but this could not be sustained. Violent conflict, waste and corruption came to the centre stage which led to the economy getting undermined. With more and more money being spent on the security forces to battle those who had become insurgents against the state, and with waste and corruption skyrocketing there was not much left over for economic development.
The government’s commitment to cut down on waste and corruption so that resources can be saved and added to enable economic growth can be seen in the strict discipline it has been following where expenditures on its members are concerned. The government has restricted the cabinet to 25 ministers, when in the past the figure was often double. The government has also made provision to reduce the perks of office, including medical insurance to parliamentarians. The value of this latter measure is that the parliamentarians will now have an incentive to upgrade the health system that serves the general public, instead of running it down as previous governments did. With their reduced levels of insurance coverage they will need to utilise the public health facilities rather than go to the private ones.
COMMITTED GOVERNMENT
The most positive feature of the present time is that the government is making a serious effort to root out corruption. This is to be seen in the invigoration of previously dormant institutions of accountability, such as the Bribery and Corruption Commission, and the willingness of the Attorney General’s Department to pursue those who were previously regarded as being beyond the reach of the law due to their connections to those in the seats of power. The fact that the Inspector General of Police, who heads the police force, is behind bars on a judicial order is an indication that the rule of law is beginning to be taken seriously. By cost cutting, eliminating corruption and abiding by the rule of law the government is removing the obstacles to development. In the past, the mega development projects failed to deliver their full benefits because they got lost in corrupt and wasteful practices including violent conflict.
There is a need, however, for new and innovative development projects that require knowledge and expertise that is not necessarily within the government. So far it appears that the government is restricting its selection of key decision makers to those it knows, has worked with and trusts due to long association. Two of the committees that the government has recently appointed, the Clean Lanka task force and the Tourism advisory committee are composed of nearly all men from the majority community. If Sri Lanka is to leverage its full potential, the government must embrace a more inclusive approach that incorporates women and diverse perspectives from across the country’s multiethnic and multireligious population, including representation from the north and east. For development that includes all, and is accepted by all, it needs to tap into the larger resources that lie outside itself.
By ensuring that women and ethnic minorities have representation in decision making bodies of the government, the government can harness a broader range of skills, experiences, and perspectives, ultimately leading to more effective and sustainable development policies. Sustainable development is not merely about economic growth; it is about inclusivity and partnership. A government that prioritises diversity in its leadership will be better equipped to address the challenges that can arise unexpectedly. By widening its advisory base and integrating a broader array of voices, the government can create policies that are not only effective but also equitable. Through inclusive governance, responsible economic management, and innovative development strategies the government will surely lead the country towards a future that benefits all its people.
by Jehan Perera
Former Minister Ali Sabry’s recent op-ed, “Why Sri Lanka must continue to pursue a non-aligned, yet multi-aligned foreign policy,” published in the Daily FT on 3 March, offers a timely reflection on Sri Lanka’s foreign policy trajectory in an increasingly multipolar world. Sabry’s articulation of a “non-aligned yet multi-aligned” approach is commendable for its attempt to reconcile Sri Lanka’s historical commitment to non-alignment with the realities of contemporary geopolitics. However, his framework raises critical questions about the principles of non-alignment, the nuances of multi-alignment, and Sri Lanka’s role in a world shaped by great power competition. This response seeks to engage with Sabry’s arguments, critique certain assumptions, and propose a more robust vision for Sri Lanka’s foreign policy.
Sabry outlines five key pillars of a non-aligned yet multi-aligned foreign policy:
- No military alignments, no foreign bases: Sri Lanka should avoid entangling itself in military alliances or hosting foreign military bases.
- Economic engagement with all, dependency on none
: Sri Lanka should diversify its economic partnerships to avoid over-reliance on any single country.
* Diplomatic balancing
: Sri Lanka should engage with multiple powers, leveraging relationships with China, India, the US, Europe, Japan, and ASEAN for specific benefits.
- Leveraging multilateralism
: Sri Lanka should participate actively in regional and global organisations, such as UN, NAM, SAARC, and BIMSTEC.
- Resisting coercion and protecting sovereignty
: Sri Lanka must resist external pressures and assert its sovereign right to pursue an independent foreign policy.
While pillars 1, 2, and 5 align with the traditional principles of non-alignment, pillars 3 and 4 warrant closer scrutiny. Sabry’s emphasis on “diplomatic balancing” and “leveraging multilateralism” raises questions about the consistency of his approach with the spirit of non-alignment and whether it adequately addresses the challenges of a multipolar world.
Dangers of over-compartmentalisation
Sabry’s suggestion that Sri Lanka should engage with China for infrastructure, India for regional security and trade, the US and Europe for technology and education, and Japan and ASEAN for economic opportunities reflects a pragmatic approach to foreign policy. However, this compartmentalisation of partnerships risks reducing Sri Lanka’s foreign policy to a transactional exercise, undermining the principles of non-alignment.
Sabry’s framework, curiously, excludes China from areas like technology, education, and regional security, despite China’s growing capabilities in these domains. For instance, China is a global leader in renewable energy, artificial intelligence, and 5G technology, making it a natural partner for Sri Lanka’s technological advancement. Similarly, China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) offers significant opportunities for economic development and regional connectivity. By limiting China’s role to infrastructure, Sabry’s approach risks underutilising a key strategic partner.
Moreover, Sabry’s emphasis on India for regional security overlooks the broader geopolitical context. While India is undoubtedly a critical partner for Sri Lanka, regional security cannot be addressed in isolation from China’s role in South Asia. The Chinese autonomous region of Xizang (Tibet) is indeed part of South Asia, and China’s presence in the region is a reality that Sri Lanka must navigate. A truly non-aligned foreign policy would seek to balance relationships with both India and China, rather than assigning fixed roles to each.
Sabry’s compartmentalisation of partnerships risks creating silos in Sri Lanka’s foreign policy, limiting its flexibility and strategic depth. For instance, by relying solely on the US and Europe for technology and education, Sri Lanka may miss out on opportunities for South-South cooperation with members of BRICS.
Similarly, by excluding China from regional security discussions, Sri Lanka may inadvertently align itself with India’s strategic interests, undermining its commitment to non-alignment.
Limited multilateralism?
Sabry’s call for Sri Lanka to remain active in organisations like the UN, NAM, SAARC, and BIMSTEC is laudable. However, his omission of the BRI, BRICS, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) is striking. These platforms represent emerging alternatives to the Western-dominated global order and offer Sri Lanka opportunities to diversify its partnerships and enhance its strategic autonomy.
The BRI is one of the most ambitious infrastructure and economic development projects in history, involving over 140 countries. For Sri Lanka, the BRI offers opportunities for infrastructure development, trade connectivity, and economic growth. By participating in the BRI, Sri Lanka can induce Chinese investment to address its infrastructure deficit and integrate into global supply chains. Excluding the BRI from Sri Lanka’s foreign policy framework would be a missed opportunity.
BRICS and the SCO represent platforms for South-South cooperation and multipolarity. BRICS, in particular, has emerged as a counterweight to such Western-dominated institutions as the IMF and World Bank, advocating for a more equitable global economic order. The SCO, on the other hand, focuses on regional security and counterterrorism, offering Sri Lanka a platform to address its security concerns in collaboration with major powers like China, Russia, and India. By engaging with these organisations, Sri Lanka can strengthen its commitment to multipolarity and enhance its strategic autonomy.
Non-alignment is not neutrality
Sabry’s assertion that Sri Lanka must avoid taking sides in major power conflicts reflects a misunderstanding of non-alignment. Non-alignment is not about neutrality; it is about taking a principled stand on issues of global importance. During the Cold War, non-aligned countries, like Sri Lanka, opposed colonialism, apartheid, and imperialism, even as they avoided alignment with either the US or the Soviet Union.
Sri Lanka’s foreign policy, under leaders like S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike and Sirimavo Bandaranaike, was characterised by a commitment to anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism, opposing racial segregation and discrimination in both its Apartheid and Zionist forms. Sri Lanka, the first Asian country to recognise revolutionary Cuba, recognised the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) and the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam, supported liberation struggles in Africa, and opposed the US military base in Diego Garcia. These actions were not neutral; they were rooted in a principled commitment to justice and equality.
Today, Sri Lanka faces new challenges, including great power competition, economic coercion, and climate change. A truly non-aligned foreign policy would require Sri Lanka to take a stand on issues like the genocide in Gaza, the colonisation of the West Bank, the continued denial of the right to return of ethnically-cleansed Palestinians and Chagossians, the militarisation of the Indo-Pacific, the use of economic sanctions as a tool of coercion, and the need for climate justice. By avoiding these issues, Sri Lanka risks becoming the imperialist powers’ cringing, whingeing client state.
The path forward
Sabry’s use of the term “multi-alignment” reflects a growing trend in Indian foreign policy, particularly under the BJP Government. However, multi-alignment is not the same as multipolarity. Multi-alignment implies a transactional approach to foreign policy, where a country seeks to extract maximum benefits from multiple partners without a coherent strategic vision. Multipolarity, on the other hand, envisions a world order where power is distributed among multiple centres, reducing the dominance of any single power.
Sri Lanka should advocate for a multipolar world order that reflects the diversity of the global South. This would involve strengthening platforms like BRICS, the SCO, and the NAM, while also engaging with Western institutions like the UN and the WTO. By promoting multipolarity, Sri Lanka can contribute to a more equitable and just global order, in line with the principles of non-alignment.
Ali Sabry’s call for a non-aligned, yet multi-aligned foreign policy falls short of articulating a coherent vision for Sri Lanka’s role in a multipolar world. To truly uphold the principles of non-alignment, Sri Lanka must:
* Reject compartmentalisation
: Engage with all partners across all domains, including technology, education, and regional security.
* Embrace emerging platforms
: Participate in the BRI, BRICS, and SCO to diversify partnerships and enhance strategic autonomy.
* Take principled stands
: Advocate for justice, equality, and multipolarity in global affairs.
* Promote South-South cooperation
: Strengthen ties with other Global South countries to address shared challenges, like climate change and economic inequality.
By adopting this approach, Sri Lanka can reclaim its historical legacy as a leader of the non-aligned movement and chart a course toward a sovereign, secure, and successful future.
(Vinod Moonesinghe read mechanical engineering at the University of Westminster, and worked in Sri Lanka in the tea machinery and motor spares industries, as well as the railways. He later turned to journalism and writing history. He served as chair of the Board of Governors of the Ceylon German Technical Training Institute. He is a convenor of the Asia Progress Forum, which can be contacted at asiaprogressforum@gmail.com.)
by Vinod Moonesinghe
Cancellation of shows has turned out to be a regular happening where former Backstreet Boys Nick Carter is concerned. In the past, it has happened several times.
If Nick Carter is not 100 percent fit, he should not undertake these strenuous world tours, ultimately disappointing his fans.
It’s not a healthy scene to be cancelling shows on a regular basis.
In May 2024, a few days before his scheduled visit to the Philippines, Carter cancelled his two shows due to “unforeseen circumstances.”
The promoter concerned announced the development and apologised to fans who bought tickets to Carter’s shows in Cebu, on May 23, and in Manila, on May 24.
The dates were supposed to be part of the Asian leg of his ‘Who I Am’ 2024 tour.
Carter previously cancelled a series of solo concerts in Asia, including Jakarta, Mumbai, Singapore, and Taipei. And this is what the organisers had to say:
“Due to unexpected matters related to Nick Carter’s schedule, we regret to announce that Nick’s show in Asia, including Jakarta on May 26 (2024), has been cancelled.
His ‘Who I Am’ Japan tour 2024 was also cancelled, with the following announcement:
Explaining, on video, about the
cancelled ‘Who I Am’ shows
“We regret to announce that the NICK CARTER Japan Tour, planned for June 4th at Toyosu PIT (Tokyo) and June 6th at Namba Hatch (Osaka), will no longer be proceeding due to ‘unforeseen circumstances.’ We apologise for any disappointment.
Believe me, I had a strange feeling that his Colombo show would not materialise and I did mention, in a subtle way, in my article about Nick Carter’s Colombo concert, in ‘StarTrack’ of 14th January, 2025 … my only worry (at that point in time) is the HMPV virus which is reported to be spreading in China and has cropped up in Malaysia, and India, as well.
Although no HMPV virus has cropped up, Carter has cancelled his scheduled performance in Sri Lanka, and in a number of other countries, as well, to return home, quoting, once again, “unforeseen circumstances.”
“Unforeseen circumstances” seems to be his tagline!
There is talk that low ticket sales is the reason for some of his concerts to be cancelled.
Yes, elaborate arrangements were put in place for Nick Carter’s trip to Sri Lanka – Meet & Greet, Q&A, selfies, etc., but all at a price!
Wonder if there will be the same excitement and enthusiasm if Nick Carter decides to come up with new dates for what has been cancelled?
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