Midweek Review

Opportunity for deployment under UN command as STF celebrates 40th anniversary

Published

3 years ago

2023/03/1

Sahan Weerasooriya

A contingent of STF personnel deployed in Colombo during Aragalaya last year

By Shamindra Ferdinando

Having received its baptism of fire, within months of formation, in early 1983, the police para-military arm, the elite Special Task Force (STF), is now ready to serve under the UN command, in the near future.

The UN deployment is a much desired achievement in the wake of it celebrating 40 years of dedicated service to the nation having sacrificed much by its heroic members.

Well over a decade after the successful conclusion of the war, the STF is now engaged in peacetime duties. Incumbent STF Commandant, Deputy Inspector General (DIG) Waruna Jayasundara, says they are ready for deployment in any part of the world.

Jayasundara, who had served the STF for many years, received the top post, in June 2020, several months after the last presidential election.

Established on March 01, 1983, with a group of 60 personnel, the STF received the leadership of late Senior DIG Bodhi Liyanage, the first Commandant, and was followed by DIG Dharmasiri Weerakoon, Senior DIG Zerney Wijesuriya, late DIG Lionel Karunasena, late DIG Nimal Gunathilleke, SDIG Nimal Lewke, DIG K.M.L. Sarathchandra, DIG R.W.M.C. Ranawana, DIG J.K.R.A. Perera, Senior DIG M.R. Latiff and DIG Lionel Gunathilleke.

Having played a low-key role, during the unprecedented political-economic-social crisis that forced Gotabaya Rajapaksa out of the office of executive president, the STF now faces the unenviable challenging task of countering organized political groups pushing for political reforms.

With trade unions affiliated to various political parties, as well as professional bodies, such as the Government Medical Officers’ Association (GMOA), threatening to cripple the government over the new tax regime, law enforcement authorities are certain to come under pressure. The STF will have to throw its weight behind the police, pressed into tackling the Opposition challenge.

Tackling political dissent is a challenging task, especially at a time restrictions cannot be imposed on the media. Privately owned print and electronic, as well as uncontrollable social media, pose quite a challenge as the slightest excesses,on the part of law enforcers, are certain to reach the public.

The formation of the STF, originally called Special Striking Force, during the JRJ administration, was meant to meet the growing threat, posed by Indian trained terrorists. JRJ gave the go ahead, following recommendations made by a committee, headed by one-time Minister J.W. Subasinghe, and the late President’s son, Ravi Jayewardene, an ex-military man, too, played a major, but an unassuming role, mostly behind the scene, in its infancy, as the then National Security Advisor. It would be pertinent to mention that in spite of the JVP-led 1971 insurgency, those responsible for national security didn’t form a specialized unit, within the police, to meet any eventuality.

The formation of the STF took place four months before the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) triggered the first Eelam War, with the killing of 13 soldiers at Thinnaveli, Jaffna. In Sept. 1984, the STF suffered a demoralizing setback when the LTTE planted landmine claimed the lives of four police commandos. The blast on the Point Pedro –Valvettiturai road also wounded nine other STF men.

Those who volunteered to join the SSF/STF were, initially, trained at Katukurunda and at the Army Combat Training School, Ampara, by instructors, led by the then Maj. Ananda Weerasekera, elder brother of parliamentarian Sarath Weerasekera, who served the Navy during a turbulent period, before retirement in the rank of Rear Admiral, and Maj. S. Manawadu. Ananda Weerasekera retired from the Army after rising to the rank of Major General and later ordained as Ven. Buddhangala Ananda Thera. The Ven. Thera passed away in late Dec 2021.

Tikkam blast

Their initial deployment covered Point Pedro, Velvettiturai and Kankesanturai and the gradual expansion cannot be discussed without deliberating the role played by the then National Security Advisor, Ravi Jayewardene.

Sri Lanka obtained ex-Special Air Services (SAS) personnel via Keenie Meenie Services (KMS), one of the first British mercenary companies to prepare the STF for the battles ahead. In the wake of the Tikkam blast, the STF was re-deployed in the Eastern Province.

SSF personnel initially used SLR rifles, though they gradually acquired a range of new weapons to meet the ever increasing threat. Among the weapons were US manufactured M 16 and German Heckler and Koch. They also acquired a range of mortars, including 120 mm used by the SLA.

The British personnel imparted their knowledge and expertise on a range of subjects, including tactics adopted by anti-riot squads, weapons training, firing practices, counter terrorism search, handling explosives, mapping, use of compass and first aid.

During the Eelam War I (the period before the deployment of the Indian Army in the Northern and Eastern regions), the STF dominated theEastern Batticaloa and Ampara districts. In terms of the Indo-Lanka Peace Accord, that had been forced on Sri Lanka, the Sri Lankan military, the police and its para-military arm were confined to barracks. By the time, India quit Sri Lanka mission, in March 1990, the LTTE was prepared to launch Eelam War II. Fighting re-erupted in the second week of June 1990. During the IPKF deployment, the STF joined the other services, and the police, in fighting the second JVP-led insurrection.

The STF went flat out against the JVP and the reports of excesses during that period hadn’t been denied.

The Bolgoda Lake killings during the Kumaratunga presidency were nothing but a black mark on the STF.

‘Bolgoda killings’ caused irreparable damage to the STF’s reputation in the mid-1990s, when some officers and men were found guilty of extra-judicial killings in the city and its suburbs. During Eelam War IV, an ‘STF operation’ in Trincomalee, too, brought disrepute to the force, though overall it has been a well-disciplined unit.

In response to the LTTE threat, at the onset of Eelam War II, the then President Ranasinghe Premadasa’s government launched military operations. In line with the overall counter-terrorist strategy, the STF was tasked with regaining the Ampara and Batticaloa districts. The STF achieved the challenging task, within months. In the post-IPKF era, the military and the STF faced the battle hardened LTTE that received tremendous boost, by way of experience gained by confronting the mighty Indian Army and the free flow of weapons from abroad. By then, all other Indian trained groups, including the People’s Liberation Organization of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE), responsible for Nov. 1988 abortive bid to oust the then Maldivian President, Maumoon Abdul Gayoom, had given up terrorism. Only the LTTE remained committed to the macabre Eelam project. By 1993, the military and the STF cleared the East to enable the conduct of the Local Government polls.

The LTTE, on May Day 1993, delivered a stunning blow to the STF by mounting suicide attack on President Ranasinghe Premadasa. The LTTE cleverly infiltrated Premadasa’s security contingent and the STF cannot absolve itself of the responsibility for the unprecedented security lapse, whatever the political environment security chiefs had to work in. During Premadasa’s honeymoon (May 1989-June 1990) with the LTTE, the STF provided security to members of the LTTE delegation. The writer, during this period, met the late Anton Balasingham at the Hilton. There were STF personnel outside Balasingham’s room.

When Eelam War II erupted in the second week of June, 1990, the STF had to escort a small group of LTTE personnel, from the Colombo Hilton to the Ratmalana air base. They were then airlifted to Palaly and allowed to leave the base safely as Premadasa and his chief negotiator, the late A.C.S. Hameed, made a desperate bid to bring the LTTE back to the negotiating table.

With emergence of Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga, as the Prime Minister, and then President, in late 1994, the government entered into fresh round of negotiations. Following a 100-day truce, fighting erupted in late April 1995 with the sinking of two Navy gunboats, at the Trincomalee harbour, and shooting down of Avro aircraft, with heat-seeking missiles, as they were approaching the Palaly airbase. The LTTE made some rapid progress in the Eelam War II, though it couldn’t sustain the tempo. In the East, the LTTE stepped up pressure on STF detachments at Tikkodai, Porativu, and Ambalanturai. In Dec. 1996, the LTTE forced the STF out of its Pulukunawa detachment. In one of the fiercest attacks, faced by the STF, the combined STF-Army contingent, deployed at Pulukunawa, failed to thwart the multi-pronged attack. The LTTE captured some arms and ammunition, including artillery pieces. However, those who vacated the base, with the arrival of reinforcements, fought back to regain the Pulukunawa detachment, within 24 hours.

In 1997, the STF expanded its deployment to the Vanni region. That year, the Army, engaged in Operation ‘Jayasikurui’, suffered devastating losses in the Vanni theatre after making vast advances. After a series of heavy defeats, in the Northern Province, and an abortive bid to assassinate Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga, the President and Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, by the terrorists, the UNP regained power, at the parliamentary polls, conducted in Dec. 2001. The stage was set for another round of talks with the LTTE, with the signing of the virtually one-sided Ceasefire Agreement, drawn up by the Norwegians.

When Eelam War IV erupted, in June 2006, the STF was asked to launch operations in support of the overall combined security forces campaign in the East. The STF played a critically important role, during Eelam War IV.

During the 40 years of service to the nation, the STF lost 464 officers and men in the line of duty, while 774 were wounded. Six of its civilian employees also died during this period.

The number of dead and wounded, suffered by the STF, when compared with the SLA, may seem insignificant, though the contribution made by the unit to defeating terrorism was DEFINITELY NOT. The SLA lost 6,000 officers and men during Eelam War IV alone, while some 27,000 received injuries.

Post-war responsibilities

Following the successful conclusion of the conflict, the elite unit received greater responsibility in fighting illicit narcotic trade and organized crime, regular law enforcement, high profile/high risk arrests, protection of radioactive materials deployed across the country, responses to crisis, VVIP Security, search and bomb disposal, fire and rescue in expressways and enforcement of the law with regard to the offenses related to the environment.

The STF faces daunting challenge in preserving the experience gained in counter-insurgency operations in the South (1987-1990) and combat operations in the Eastern Province. With the government recently declaring its intention to gradually cut the strength of the Army to 100,000 by 2030, after reducing the numbers to 135,000 by next year, an assessment is also likely as regards the STF. Currently, the STF consists of nearly 8,000 officers, and men, deployed across the country, including Jaffna.

It would be the responsibility of both political and military leadership to maintain the overall capabilities of the armed forces and the police. There cannot be any dispute over the need to reduce the number of men, under arms, as Sri Lanka struggles to cope up in an extremely rough economic crisis. The peacetime political-economic-social crisis has placed the Wickremesinghe-Rajapaksa government, with pressure being exerted on all sectors, to cut down on expenditure. However, it would be a grave mistake, on the part of the incumbent administration, to deprive the armed forces and law enforcement the wherewithal to maintain peace and, particularly, the strength to face future challenges.

The continuing debate over the granting of police and land powers to the provinces, in terms of 13th Amendment to the Constitution, enacted in late 1987, has not so far touched the fate of the STF, in case full implementation of the controversial piece of legislation, which Sri Lanka was forced to adopt, becomes a reality. As the STF, too, comes under the Inspector General of Police what would be the destiny of the para-military armm, in the event the police deployment, in the provinces, come under respective Chief Ministers.

STF Commandant DIG Waruna Jayasundara

Subsequent to the signing of the Ceasefire Agreement (CFA), in late Feb. 2002, the LTTE launched a series of protests, targeting security forces bases, and police stations, in the then temporarily merged Northern and Eastern Province.

Close on the heels of the attack on the Valaichenai police station, the LTTE targeted an isolated base, held by the elite Special Task Force (STF), at Kanjirankudah, south of Batticaloa. Several hundred civilians launched a protest campaign, on Oct. 9, 2002, shortly after an incident involving STF personne, and two LTTE cadres, M. Visuvanathan, in charge of Pottuvil, and Christy Rajah. The LTTE exploited the situation to launch the protest. The LTTE used civilians as a human shield to move into the detachment, though the STF fired warning shots into the air. But, once the STF realized the LTTE’s strategy, the commandos opened fire, killing several persons. Protesters fled carrying the dead and the wounded. The STF recovered seven bodies. Of them, two were identified as Vijayaprakash and Nagarasa. To the surprise of many, Vijayaprakash was identified as one of those held under the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA), but released consequent to the CFA.

At the behest of the LTTE, students and their parents stormed the Point Pedro Brigade headquarters, on Sept. 2, 2002, and the Valaichenai police station, on Oct. 1, 2002, inflicting considerable damage on those facilities. The LTTE obviously felt that a sustained protest campaign, directed at the troops and the police, deployed therein, in the wake of Pongu Thamil rallies, would undermine the government’s authority. Instead of taking effective counter measures to control the situation, the then government brought pressure to bear on the media not to highlight the deteriorating situation.

The government restricted the issuing of daily situation reports, and went to the extent of censoring situation reports, issued by the military. The government’s response should be examined, taking into consideration the circumstances under which the police raided the Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI) safe house, at Aturugiriya, on the ridiculous allegation the Army, with the involvement of ex-LTTE cadres, planned to assassinate Prime Minister Ranil Wckremesinghe, during the 2001 general election campaign.

Although the STF’s response to the LTTE threat to its camp, at Kanjirankudah, it helped the government to stabilize the situation. Tamil civilians resisted LTTE attempts to use children in protests. The government gave an interesting twist to the Kanjirankudah incident. It alleged that the Presidential Security Division (PSD) had been involved in the attack, prompting both the President’s Office and the PSD to issue statements.

The then PSD head, DIG N. K. Illangakoon, a former Deputy Commandant of the STF (he later served as IGP) said that his officers hadn’t even visited the base, ahead of the incident. Shortly after the incident, the government appointed the then SSP Nimal Lewke, the Deputy Commandant of the STF as the senior officer in charge of its personnel deployed in the Ampara-Batticaloa.

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Midweek Review

A victory that can never be forgotten

Published

14 hours ago

2026/05/13

Sahan Weerasooriya

President Mahinda Rajapaksa at the Matara victory parade, in 2014, held to mark the eradication of the LTTE.

The country is in deepening turmoil over the theft of USD 2.5 mn from the Treasury. The Treasury affair has placed the arrogant NPP in an embarrassing position. The controversial release of 323 red-flagged containers from the Colombo Port, in addition to two carrying narcotics and the coal scam that forced Energy Minister Kumara Jayakody to resign, has eroded public confidence though the NPP pretends otherwise.

Suspicious deaths of a Finance Ministry official, suspended over the Treasury heist of USD 2.5 million, and ex-SriLankan Airlines CEO Kapila Chandrasena shouldn’t distract the government and the Opposition from marking victory over terrorism.

But, the country, under any circumstances, shouldn’t forget to celebrate Sri Lanka’s greatest post-independence achievement. Dinesh Udugamsooriya, a keen follower of conflict and post-Aragalaya issues, insists that those who cherish the peace achieved should raise the national flag in honour of the armed forces.

The armed forces paid a huge price to preserve the country’s unitary status. Those who represent Parliament and outside waiting for an opportunity to return to Parliament must keep in their minds, unitary status is non-negotiable, under any circumstances, and such efforts would be in vain.

By Shamindra Ferdinando

Sri Lanka celebrates, next week, the eradication of the bloodthirsty separatist Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) as a conventional threat to the survival of this nation, at least in our hearts, even if the authorities dampen any celebrations. The armed forces brought the war to a successful conclusion on 18 May, 2009. The body of undisputed leader of the LTTE, Velupillai Prabhakaran, was found on the banks of the Nanthikadal lagoon, on the morning of 19 May, less than 24 hours after the ground forces declared the end of operations in the Vanni theatre.

The LTTE’s annihilation is Sri Lanka’s greatest post-independence achievement. Whatever various interested parties, pursuing different agendas say, the vast majority of people accept the eradication of the LTTE’s conventional military capacity as the armed forces’ highest achievement.

Sri Lanka’s triumph cannot be discussed without taking into consideration how the Indian-trained LTTE, who also went on to fight the New Delhi’s Army deployed here, in terms of the Indo-Lanka Peace Accord, signed in July, 1987, giving it an unforgettable hiding. The Indian misadventure here cost them the lives of nearly 1,500 officers and men. Just over a year after the Indian pullout, in March, 1990, the LTTE assassinated Rajiv Gandhi who, in his capacity as the Prime Minister, deployed the Indian Army here. But India launched the Sri Lanka destabilisation project during Indira Gandhi’s premiership.

Western powers, the now decimated United National Party (UNP), Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), and an influential section of the media, propagated the lie that the LTTE couldn’t be defeated. But, the United People’s Freedom Party (UPFA), under President Mahinda Rajapaksa’s resolute leadership, sustained a nearly three-year long genuine sustained offensive that brought the entire Northern and Eastern regions back under government control.

The UNP relentlessly hindered the war against the LTTE. UNP leader Ranil Wickremesinghe, hell-bent on undermining the military campaign, had no qualms in questioning the military strategy. The former Prime Minister went to the extent of sarcastically questioning the culmination of the military campaign in the East with the capture of Thoppigala (Baron’s cap) in the second week of July, 2007, calling it just a rock outcrop with no significance. Believing the military lacked the strength to continue with the campaign, Wickremesinghe publicly ridiculed the Thoppigala success. The then Brigadier Chagie Gallage, the pint-sized human dynamo, provided critical leadership to the highly successful Eastern campaign that deprived the LTTE the opportunity to compel the armed forces to commit far larger strength to the region. We clearly recall how he went to announce the prized capture from his forward base, that afternoon, driving his own jeep, dressed as a soldier wearing a cap, with his second in command seated by his side, obviously not to fall victim to any sniper hiding in the surrounding jungles.

The likes of Ravi Karunanayaka, Lakshman Kiriella, Dr. Rajitha Senaratna and the late Mangala Samaraweera demeaned such successes by contributing to a vicious political campaign that dented public confidence in the armed forces. Then Lt. General Sarath Fonseka’s Army needed a massive boost, not only to sustain the relentless advance into the enemy territory, but to hold onto and stabilise areas brought under government control. But the viciousness of these critics were such that Samaraweera had the gall to say that Fonseka was not even fit to lead the Salvation Army.

The Opposition campaign was meant to deter the stepped up recruitment campaign that enabled the Army to increase its strength from 116,000 to over 205,000 at the end of the campaign. In spite of disgraceful Opposition attempts to cause doubts, regarding the military campaign among the public, with backing from Western vultures, who were all for LTTE success, the Rajapaksa government maintained the momentum.

President Rajapaksa had a superb team that ensured the government confidently met the daunting challenge. That team included Defence Secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa, Vice Admiral Wasantha Karannagoda, Lt. General Sarath Fonseka, Air Marshal Roshan Goonetileke and the then Chief of National Intelligence (CNI) Maj. General Kapila Hendawitharana. There were also the likes of Rear Admiral Sarath Weerasekera, who returned from retirement to transform the once ragtag Home Guards into a worthy back-up to the military, as the Civil Defence Force, at critical places/junctures.

The then Governor of the Central Bank, Ajith Nivard Cabraal, played a significant role in overall government response to the challenge. The then presidential advisor MP Basil Rajapaksa’s role, too, should be appreciated and Prof. Rajiva Wijesinghe as well as Minister Mahinda Samarasinghe contributed to counter the false propaganda campaigns directed at the country. Whatever the shortcomings of the Mahinda Rajapaksa-led UPFA may have had, the armed forces couldn’t have succeeded if the resolute political leadership he provided, with his team of brothers, failed both in and outside Parliament. That is the undeniable truth.

During the 2006-2009 campaign, the UNP twice tried to defeat the UPFA Budget, thereby hoping to bring the war to an abrupt end. Th utterly contemptible move to defeat the UPFA Budget ultimately caused a split in the JVP with a section of the party switching its allegiance to President Rajapaksa to save the day.

Amidst political turmoil and both overt and covert Western interventions, the armed forces pressed ahead with the offensive. It would be pertinent to mention that the Vanni campaign began in March, 2007, a couple of months before the armed forces brought the eastern campaign to an end.

Vanni campaign

The Army launched the Vanni campaign in March, 2007. The 57 Division that had been tasked with taking Madhu, and then proceeding to Kilinochchi, faced fierce resistance. The principal fighting Division suffered significant casualties and progress was slow. An irate Fonseka brought in Maj. Gen. Jagath Dias as General Officer Commanding (GoC) of the 57 Division to advance and consolidate areas brought under control.

The Army expanded the Vanni campaign in September, 2007. The Task Force 1 (later 58 Division) launched operations from the Mannar ‘rice bowl’. Fonseka placed Gallage in command of that fighting formation but was replaced by the then Brigadier Shavendra Silva, as a result of a medical emergency.

The Army gradually took the upper hand in the Vanni west while the LTTE faced a new threat in the Vanni east with the newly created 59 Division, under Brigadier Nandana Udawatta, launching offensive action in January, 2008. Having launched its first major action in the Weli Oya region, that Division fought its way towards Mullaitivu, an LTTE stronghold since 1996.

The 53 (Maj. Gen. Kamal Gunaratne) and 55 (Brig. Prasanna Silva) Divisions, deployed in the Jaffna peninsula, joined the Vanni offensive, in late 2008, as the TF 1 fought its way to Pooneryn, turned right towards Paranthan, captured that area and then hit Elephant Pass and rapidly advanced towards Kilinochchi. The TF 1 and 57 Division met in Kilinochchi and the rest is history.

Once the Army brought Kilinochchi under its control, in January, 2009, the LTTE lost the war. The raising of the Lion flag over Kilinochchi meant that the entire area, west of the Kandy-Jaffna A9 road, had been brought under government control. By then the LTTE had lost the sea supply route, between Tamil Nadu and Mannar region. The LTTE was surrounded by several fighting formations in the Vanni east while the Navy made an unprecedented achievement by cordoning off the Mullaitivu coast that effectively cut them off on all sides.

During the final phase of the naval action, they captured Sea Tiger leader Soosai’s wife, Sathyadevi, and her children Sivanesan Mani Arasu and Sivanesan Sindhu. Spearheaded by the elite Fourth Fast Attack Flotilla, the Navy conducted a sustained campaign, with spectacular success in the high seas, and, by late 2008, the Navy dominated the waters around the country.

The sinking of floating LTTE warehouses, with the intelligence provided by the Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI) and the US Pacific Command, after the Americans decided to speed up the inevitable, and a campaign, directed at operations across the Palk Strait, weakened the LTTE. By early January, 2009, the LTTE had lost its capacity to carry out mid-sea transfers, and the use of Tamil Nadu fishing trawlers to bring in supplies, and it was only a matter of time before the group surrendered or faced the consequences.

Although Tamil Diaspora still believed in the LTTE launching a massive counter attack on the Vanni east front and the Tamil National Alliance (TNA), under the leadership of the late R. Sampanthan, worked hard to halt the offensive, President Rajapaksa declared that the offensive wouldn’t be called off. President Rajapaksa had the strength to resist the combined pressure brought on him by the West and the UN until the armed forces delivered the final blow.

The despicable efforts made by US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton to block IMF funding for Sri Lanka is in the public domain. Clinton was obviously trying to please the Tamil Diaspora. The US made that attempt as the ground offensive was on the last phase against the backdrop of the international community suspending relief supply ships to Puthumathalan.

The IMF provided the much required funding to Sri Lanka, regardless of Clinton’s intervention.

A targeted assassination

The Air Force conducted a strategic campaign against the LTTE while providing support to both the Army and the Navy. Despite limited resources, the Air Force pulverised the enemy and high profile target assassination of S.P. Thamilselvan, in his Kilinochchi hideout, in early November, 2007, shook the LTTE leadership. The deployment of a pair of jets (Kafir and MiG 27), on the basis of intelligence provided by the DMI and backed by UAV footage, to carry out a meticulous strike on Thamilselvan’s Kilinochchi hideout, caused unprecedented fear among the LTTE.

Current Defence Secretary, Sampath Thuyakontha, in his capacity as the Commanding Officer of No 09 Squadron, played a vital role in action against the LTTE. Thuyakontha earned the respect of all for landing behind enemy lines in support of LRRP (Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol).

As the Army advanced on the Vanni east front, thousands of LTTE cadres gave up their weapons, threw away their trade mark cyanide capsules and surrendered. Their defences crumbled and even hardcore cadres surrendered, regardless of the warning issued by Prabhakaran. By the time the armed forces concluded clearing operations, over 12,000 LTTE cadres were in government custody. Although those who couldn’t stomach Sri Lanka’s victory over the LTTE propagated lies regarding the rehabilitation programme, the ordinary Tamil people appreciated the project.

C.V. Wigneswaran, in his capacity as the Chief Minister of the Northern Province, called for a US investigation into the death of ex-LTTE cadres in government custody. The retired Supreme Court judge sought to consolidate his political power by alleging the Army executed surrendered men by injecting them with poison. The then Yahapalana government failed to take action against Wigneswaran who claimed over 100 deaths among ex-combatants.

Instead of initiating legal action, the war-winning Rajapaksa government rehabilitated them. Even after the change of government, in 2015, the rehabilitation project continued. Almost all of them had been released and, since the end of war, the members of the defeated LTTE never tried to reorganise, though some Diaspora elements made an attempt.

The LTTE’s demise brought an end to the use of child soldiers. Those who demand justice for Tamils, killed during the war, conveniently forget that forcible recruitment of children, by the LTTE, also ended in May, 2009. Struggling to overcome severe manpower shortage, amidst mounting battlefield losses, the LTTE abducted Tamil children, from the early ’90s, to be press-ganged into their cadre.

Although the UN and ICRC sought a consensus with the LTTE, way back during Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga’s tenure as the President, to cease forced recruitment of children, they couldn’t achieve the desired results. The much publicised UN-ICRC projects failed. The LTTE continued with its despicable abduction of children. The LTTE never stopped child recruitment and, depending on the ground situation, it carried out forced recruitment drives. The signing of the Norwegian arranged Ceasefire Agreement (CFA), too, failed to halt forced child recruitment.

The Darusman report that accused the military of killing over 40,000 civilians during the last phase of the war revealed that the LTTE tried to recruit children as it was about to collapse.

The TNA, or any other like-minded group here or abroad, never urged the LTTE to give up civilian shields and stop recruiting children, though they realised Prabhakaran could no longer change the outcome of the war. Norway, and those who still believed in a negotiated ‘settlement’ in a bid to prevent the annihilation of the group, desperately tried to convince Prabhakaran to give up civilian shields.

A note, dated February 16, 2009, sent to Basil Rajapaksa, by Norwegian Ambassador Tore Hattrem, expressed concern over the fate of those who had been trapped in the Vanni east. Hattrem’s note to Basil Rajapaksa revealed Norway’s serious concern over the LTTE’s refusal to release the civilians.

The following is the Norwegian note, headlined ‘Offer/Proposal to the LTTE’, personally signed by Ambassador Hattrem: “I refer to our telephone conversation today. The proposal to the LTTE on how to release the civilian population, now trapped in the LTTE controlled area, has been transmitted to the LTTE through several channels. So far, there has been, regrettably, no response from the LTTE and it doesn’t seem to be likely that the LTTE will agree with this in the near future.”

In the aftermath of the Anandapuram debacle in the first week of April, 2009, the LTTE lost its fighting capacity to a large extent. The loss of over 600 cadres marked the collapse of the organisation’s conventional fighting capacity.

The LTTE sought an arrangement in which it could retain its remaining weapons and start rebuilding the group again. President Rajapaksa emphasised that only an unconditional surrender could save the group’s remaining cadre. The President refused to recognise an area under the LTTE’s control. The CFA, signed by Wickremesinghe and Prabhakaran, in February, 2002, recognised a vast area under the LTTE control. The CFA gave unparalleled recognition to the terrorist group and that was exploited by them to the hilt.

NPP’s dilemma

During his controversial May Day address this year, President Anura Kumara Dissanayake declared that only the armed forces and police could carry arms. Dissanayake warned that no one else could retain weapons.

President Dissanayake’s declaration is of pivotal importance as the armed forces and police twice crushed JVP-led insurgencies, in 1971 and 1987-1990. Dissanayake is the leader of the JVP and the NPP, two political parties recognised by the Election Commission.

Dissanayake, who is also the Minister of Defence and Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, caused controversy last year when the government announced that the President wouldn’t attend the 16th annual war heroes’ commemoration ceremony at War Heroes’ Memorial, in Sri Jayawardenepura Kotte.

That announcement triggered massive backlash. The government rescinded its earlier decision. Having received an unprecedented endorsement from the northern and eastern electorates, both at presidential and parliamentary polls in September and November, 2024, respectively, President Dissanayake seemed to have been somewhat reluctant to join the national celebration.

Yahapalana leaders President Maithripala Sirisena and Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe succumbed to Tamil Diaspora and Western pressures to do away with the 2016 annual armed forces Victory Day parade. That treacherous move followed them betraying the war-winning armed forces at the Geneva-based United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) in October, 2015.

They co-sponsored accountability resolution, introduced by the US in terms of an understanding with the LTTE’s sidekick. Sirisena and Wickremesinghe forgot that the TNA recognised the LTTE as the sole representative of the Tamil speaking people, in 2001, thereby setting the stage for Eelam War IV. Sampanthan’s outfit, the Illankai Thamil Arasu Kadchi (ITAK)-led TNA, showed its true colours when it joined the UNP-JVP led initiative to defeat Mahinda Rajapaksa. Having accused the war-winning Army Commander, Sarath Fonseka, of unpardonable war crimes, the TNA, along with the UNP-JVP combine, backed Fonseka at the 2010 presidential election. The South rejected Fonseka and he lost the race by a staggering 1.8 mn votes which late JVP leader Somawansa Amarasinghe foolishly called a computer ‘jilmart’, a newly coined word of our fake Marxists. Fonseka’s indefensible declaration, in the run-up to the 2010 presidential election that the celebrated 58 Division executed surrendered LTTE cadres, didn’t do him any good. President Rajapaksa never explained why the US’ unofficial contradiction of Fonseka’s claim was never used cleverly to counter unsubstantiated war crimes allegations, along with Lord Naseby disclosures made in October, 2017.

Sri Lanka’s failure to properly defend the armed forces is nothing but an insult to them. They saved the country from the JVP twice, and Indian trained over half a dozen terrorist groups, finally bringing the largest and the deadliest of them, the LTTE, down to its knees, on the banks of the Nanthikadal lagoon.

The armed forces shouldn’t hesitate to remember their glorious victory over terrorism. Since the change of government in September, 2024, the armed forces refrained from at least mentioning their battlefield achievements. At the last Independence Day, the armed forces shockingly mentioned their role in the Ditwah cyclone recovery efforts as their main achievement, to please the political masters, who themselves have been lackeys of the West, while outwardly professing to be Marxists, the latter line they have already conveniently dropped for all purposes. The armed forces shouldn’t play NPP politics but explain the situation to the current dispensation. The failure on the part of armed forces to erase their proud achievements against terrorism, out of their press releases/narratives, look rather stupid.

Midweek Review

A Novel, a Movie and a Play

Published

15 hours ago

2026/05/13

Sahan Weerasooriya

Drawing a Thread through Loss and Creativity in Shakespeare’s Life

William Shakespeare [1556-1616] is generally regarded as the greatest playwright and poet in the English language. Notwithstanding the universal appeal and the timelessness of his work, very little is known about his inner-self. Despite his profound understanding of the human condition, evident in his remarkable works of drama and poetry, the origin of his psychological insights – formed long before formal theories of the mind emerged – remain unknown, often loosely ascribed to an innate gift. The thematic and philosophical dimensions of his work are often said to be influenced by the classics of the ‘ancient world’ such as Ovid’s Metamorphosis.

The bestselling novel, Hamnet, by Maggie O’Farrell is a confluence of fact and fiction. The award-winning movie, by the same name, is an adaptation of the novel, its screenplay co-written by Maggie O’Farrell and Chloe Zhao, the director. The central theme of the novel and the movie is the devastating impact of the death of Shakespeare’s son, Hamnet, in 1596, at an early age of eleven, and the sensitive portrayal of the grieving process of the family, inviting the audience to reflect on the proposition that Shakespeare channelled his personal grief into writing Hamlet, the play, four years later.

Mourning and melancholy take centre stage in Hamlet prompting a probable link between William Shakespeare’s own emotional world and his artistic imagination. Interestingly, the names Hamnet and Hamlet were used interchangeably during the Elizabethan era, adding weight to the speculation.

The movie matches the imaginative and descriptive brilliance of the novel. The narrative unfolds against the backdrop of Stratford-upon-Avon and its environs and its inhabitants of Elizabethan England, finally shifting to London and the Globe Theatre. The film won eight nominations at the 98^th Academy Awards, including best picture, best director for Zhao, and best actress for Jessie Buckley, who immortalises Anne Hathaway, [‘Agnes’] Shakespeare’s wife, through whom the real face of family grief is portrayed. Shakespeare [nameless] remains ‘silent’ and virtually ‘back-stage’ in London preoccupied with the playhouse, the players and the plays.

Many Shakespeare scholars have speculated about a probable link between the death of Hamnet Shakespeare and the writing of Hamlet, his Magnum Opus:

“No one can say for certain how the death of Shakespeare’s son affected him, but it is hard not to notice that in the years following Hamnet’s death Shakespeare wrote a play obsessed with fathers and sons, grief, and the persistence of the dead.” [James Shapiro]

“Hamnet’s death must have been a devastating blow…..and the shadow of that loss may well lie behind the profound meditations on mortality in Hamlet.” [Park Honan]

“The death of Hamnet is the most plausible personal event to have touched Shakespeare deeply in these years, and it is tempting to hear an echo of that loss in the grief that permeates Hamlet.” [Germaine Greer]

That echo is clearly heard in Act 4, scene 5 in Hamlet:

He is dead and gone, lady,

He is dead and gone;

At his head a grass-green turf,

At his heels a stone.

Yet, in the play, a son loses his father, and the circumstance of the loss is different. Hamlet mourns the sudden death of his father, king Hamlet, he idolised. The young prince is faced with a complex emotional challenge as the late king’s brother, Claudius, usurper to the throne, marries the widowed queen, denying the young prince of his lawful right to sovereignty. The process of mourning is weighed down by the profound significance of the personal loss to the prince and being bereft of any trusting relationships to share his grief – mourning turning to melancholy.

Shakespeare’s greatest tragedy, Hamlet, has gained unremitting interest of audiences, universally over four hundred years, and has been open to divergent appraisal. Any commentary on the play without an exploration of the psyche of its protagonist, prince Hamlet, would be as the popular cliché goes, ‘like Hamlet without the prince of Denmark!’ Hamlet is the longest of all Shakespearean plays, with the least amount of action, but with the most amount of spoken word, mainly by prince Hamlet, which includes his soliloquies [solo locution: self-discourse] that opens the door to his inner self, inviting in by Hamlet himself: “pluck out the heart of my mystery”.

In the first of his soliloquies, Hamlet reveals his affliction with melancholy. He describes the world as worthless, wishes he is dead, contemplates suicide but regrets that God does not sanction such self-destruction. “O, that this too too solid flesh would melt/ Thaw and resolve itself into dew/ O, that the Everlasting had not fixed/ His cannon ‘gainst self-slaughter. O, God, God/ Seem to me all the uses of this world!’

Hamlet’s anguish is expressed as: ‘This goodly frame, the earth’ is no more than a ‘Sterile promontory’; ‘this majestical roof fretted with golden fire’; the heavens, ‘a foul and pestilent congregation of vapours’; and man, ‘the paragon of animals’, a quintessence of dust’, his mind ‘an unweeded garden/ That grows to seed.’ – Hamlet’s melancholic thought with depressive and nihilistic content expressed in philosophical terms.

But his anguish is best depicted in his fourth soliloquy [Act 3, Scene1] arguably, the most quoted piece of verse in all Shakespeare: ‘To be, or not to be’ – about life and death. He questions, ‘whether ‘tis nobler in the mind to suffer/ The slings and arrows of outrageous fortune/ Or take arms against a sea of troubles/ and by opposing, end them’. What happens after death? Is it a peaceful sleep or nightmare? Do we end our miseries by putting ourselves to the ‘quietus’ with a dagger, and enter that ‘undiscovered country’ from which ‘no traveller returns’, or put up with our problems? ‘Conscience makes cowards of us all’ and make us procrastinate.

In his soliloquies Hamlet reveals his affliction with melancholy. He wishes that his body would melt away, describes the world as worthless and contemplates suicide – negative cognitions about the self, the environment and the future, characteristic of severe mood disturbance – but regrets that God does not sanction such self-destruction.

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Grief is a universal human experience following loss, characterised by sadness, at times mixed with anger and guilt, and frequently transient in nature. Depending on the perceived significance [‘meaningfulness’] of the loss and the absence of a sharing or confiding relationship, grief may become prolonged, with a potential to become pathological.

In a seminal paper published in 1917, Sigmund Freud [1856 – 1939], argued that there are two different responses to loss – ‘Mourning and Melancholia’. His contribution remains the basis for understanding unconscious grief in psychoanalytic thought.

Freud describes mourning as a natural way to respond to losing something or someone significant. It is a transitory process, potentially transforming, albeit painful. In mourning the loss of a loved one, the bereaved gradually withdraws the emotional energy – ‘libido’ – from ‘the lost object’, and the emotional investment is redirected to an ‘alternate object’ or pursuit. Throughout this process the ‘self’ remains intact, allowing the person to heal by integrating the loss into life. In psychology, this process in which a person unconsciously redirects unacceptable or distressing impulses into socially acceptable or constructive activities is called sublimation – a concept introduced by Sigmund Freud and later developed further by his daughter Anna Freud. Instead of expressing the impulse directly, the energy behind it is transformed into something positive or productive – an ‘ego defence’.

On the other hand, Freud described melancholia as a persistent state that stays within the ‘unconscious’ – the repressed aspect of the mind, while the person feels trapped in unresolved emotions which jeopardises their mental and physical well-being.

Shakespeare lost a child, the only son, Hamnet, still in his formative years. The playwright had no option but to leave his family in his birthplace of Stratford-upon-Avon, and return to London after burying his son to continue his work at the playhouse. The significance of the loss to the father would, no doubt, have been profound, as the Greek historian Herodotus fittingly proclaimed, “No one that has lost a child knows what it is to lose a child”.

In the novel, and as depicted in the movie, Agnes [Anne Hathaway] travels to London to meet her husband. Unknown to him she stands with the audience at the Globe Theatre to watch Hamlet, the play, while Shakespeare remains backstage. As O’Farrell poignantly writes in her novel, “Hamlet, here on this stage, is two people, the young man alive, and the father dead. He is both alive and dead. Her husband [Shakespeare] has brought him back to life, in the only way he can”. “She stretches out a hand as if to acknowledge them, as if to feel the air between the three of them, as if to pierce the boundary between audience and players, between real life and play”.

Many literary scholars speculate that Shakespeare in mourning gave voice to his grief through Hamlet, the play’s introspective protagonist, who takes to the stage with melancholic expression. There are others who dispute this view, arguing that Hamlet is a product of his creative genius that transcends any autobiographical explanation. While Hamnet, the novel, and its film adaptation do not assert a direct historical link, they suggest an association between the playwright’s personal loss and his artistic creation. The notion that Shakespeare sublimated his grief into creating the iconic stage work remains suggestive, yet unprovable, but reveals an important ‘therapeutic strategy’ [sublimation] in dealing with loss. Nevertheless, through Hamlet, he gives enduring expression to a universal human condition – grief – that resonates across time.

Moreover, from an aesthetic point of view, a work of art can truly be called Art – whether encountered on the page, the screen, or the stage – when it invites reflection or evokes emotion. The thread that runs through the novel, the movie and the play tend to reinforce that notion.

By Dr. Siri Galhenage, Psychiatrist [Retd]
sirigalhenage@gmail.com