Features
Of lives and livelihoods
by Usvatte-aratchi
We seem to face a complicated set of problems in handling the epidemic Covid-19 in our country. The infection rate is well above 1. The number identified to have been infected during the last few days has been counting up to 2,000. That is alarmingly high. Consequent upon the rapid rise in infections, there are four tightening bottlenecks: there is an emerging scarcity of hospital beds; the number of acute-care-beds is well short of probable requirements; healthcare personnel are exhausted and short in supply; and the supply and distribution of clinical oxygen may dangerously fall well short of the number of patients distributed over the island that need such care. That is when the capacity of the system will be tested and the current death rate of those being infected will rise rapidly from the present 0.65 per hundred of the infected. The conversion of existing hospitals to accommodate corona patients and the construction of field hospitals may solve the first problem. It is well to remember that the conversion of existing hospitals to accommodate corona patients will be at the expense of beds for non-corona-virus patients.
The scarcity of acute care beds can be very dangerous and there is no alternative to emergency purchase of equipment, when other countries themselves may find it difficult to release such equipment. As with hospital beds, the diversion of health care personnel to treat corona patients will be at cost to other patients. Eventually, when other morbidities are counted, departures from the normal will tell its own tale. Health care personnel from physicians to those that disinfect premises have worked with tremendous dedication and high efficiency. The availability of such persons may be the most strictly binding constraint to saving lives. We have been re-assured that the two factories that produce clinical oxygen have capacity to increase production fast enough to avoid shortages. Distribution to hospitals, as their locations spread wide, may pose problems. All these exigencies arose because we failed to stem the tide of invading infections. We have had ample time to prevent the emergence of these exigencies. Incompetence and complacency among policy makers seem to have conspired to put the population at severe risks and to their unfortunate consequences. Our government did well in early 2020 to lockdown the country, close boundaries and keep the invasion at bay. That may have engendered a sense of undue complacency.
The corona-19 infection is far more widespread than the Spanish flu that ravaged most parts of the world 1919-1920. Although the numbers are not beyond dispute, the best judgement is that some 3.5 percent of those infected died in that epidemic. That wider spread of the epidemic in 2020-21 is explained by the increased mobility of people and goods now compared to that which prevailed 100 years ago. With advances in medical care, the fast discovery of effective vaccines and more effective organization, we should do much better this time round. With nearly 18 months from the beginning of the epidemic in China, there was a wealth of experience that we, in this country, could have learned from. The first experience in fighting the epidemic was in Wuhan, a city of about 11 million people in Hubei Province with some 60 million people.
The Chinese authorities locked down the city completely for more than six weeks. The lockdown was strict with no political ignoramuses countermanding the restrictions imposed by the officials, supported, of course, by CCP. Gates to some apartment buildings were barred from outside with strips of steel. When the epidemic appeared further east, the same prescription was administered. China was the first to be infected and the first to see its back, the latter a truly remarkable achievement with the crowded eastern seaboard. These methods may not be replicable in other societies but variants were applied in other parts of the world. Vietnam closed its long border with China very early. It closed its airs pace for flights from southern China. It locked down the country effectively. The government spoke to the people frequently. Vietnam has had for some decades a commendable public health system (see its infant mortality and maternal mortality figures for the 1980s). New Zealand and Australia stand out as success stories. New Zealand closed its air space to those outside and imposed a lockdown inside the country. Australia down communities, even large cities like Melbourne, as the threat of widespread infection appeared. Australia had gone so far as to keep out their own citizens, when they wished to return from a dangerously infected land.
There is both thought about the policy and determination in its execution. Now neither New Zealand nor Australia runs the risk of runaway infection. Among other countries, some expected the epidemic to run out if steam when it had infected a large enough number in the population (herd immunity). Among those were Sweden, US with Donald Trump as president, and Brazil with seemingly idiosyncratic Jair Bolsonaro as president. Sweden soon realized the implausibility of its expectation and they still suffer very high infection rates. US had to await the arrival of Joseph Biden as president, who took the advice of scientists and physicians, to galvanise a program of vigorous vaccination and has now 200 million persons fully or partially vaccinated. Britain, after a period of strict lockdown has used its excellent NHS to vaccinate about 67% of its population. The outstanding success is that small country Israel, which is so free of the virus now, that they shake hands casually.
The information below from Johns Hopkins (copied from The Economist) shows you success in vaccination in several countries up to May 6, 2021 . The small population of Bhutan (Bho tan, land’s end), up in the tail end of Himalayas, as well as atolls Maldives have wisely vaccinated their populations. Maldives is especially instructive to us because of the importance of tourism in its economy. In contrast, the massive population of India has been reeling under the weight of the irresistible spread of the infection. The attitude of the government with a population not alive to the true nature of the infection has left that population helpless against the onslaught. Even the rich states of Gujerat and Maharashtra have been hotbeds of infection.
The unregulated celebration of Kumbh mela where millions of devotees assemble in the small town Hardwar for several days provided the ideal fertile ground where SARS–Cov-2 thrived. The enthusiasm of both Trinamool and BJP to win the election in Bengal caused the gathering of large crowds in various parts of that densely populated state. The spread of the infection in Bengal is yet to be seen. These lackadaisical attitudes of the BJP government have made India one of the most severely infected countries in the world.
We have to take account of inadequate public health in the country, despite the first rate AIIMS hospitals in cities. India has some of the largest vaccine producing facilities in Maharashtra. Yet, there has been no plan for vigorous vaccination of the population, formidable as that task will be. In Sri Lanka no more than 5% of the population has been vaccinated to date.
(see the image)
Sri Lanka has had excellent public health services for decades. The elimination of childhood diseases and infectious disease bear witness to their excellence. Derivative evidence is the low infant mortality rate, the low maternal mortality rate and the consequent high average expectation of life at birth.
The public health services have been constructed with the commitment of wise and farseeing government leaders who provided the physical facilities and the dedication and commitment of physicians and support staff, on wages unattractive in most countries. In this compact land, communications are very good by most standards, now vastly improved with highspeed motorways. To an impartial observer there are long standing reasons why the covid epidemic should not take hold here. But alas, it has.
It has because the government opened airports and new mutations of SARS-CoV-2 marched in the company of visa holders. The new mutations evidently transfer themselves from one person to another, faster than the ones that prevailed locally. The government decided that in the race between lives and livelihoods that livelihoods are what mattered more than lives. The argument, which runs as follows, is not without merit. Covid-2019 kills. But so does the scarcity of livelihoods. It is more important to maintain livelihoods than prevent infections. Therefore, do not lockdown the country but lockdown localities selectively; the selection depending on the incidence of infections in the locality. By the time a locality is locked down, it has high infection; the community has been wounded and then it is locked down to lick its wounds, so to say. In the meanwhile, people from other parts of the country had been infected by people who now ae sequestrated. The three districts in the western province, for several days now, have contributed more than half the high number of infections in the country. Selective lock down of localities have not abated the rate of infection either in those districts or elsewhere. More intensive interaction among people in these districts contributes to the growth of infections. Consequently, it is more sensible to strictly lock down the country, as Wuhan and Hubei were locked down for nearly two months. More intense infection and high number of deaths compel people to lock themselves down. The evidence is in the cancellation of passenger trains by CGR and buses idling in depots for lack of passengers. In Colombo itself, roads are almost empty. There is no evidence anywhere that the denial of livelihoods consequent upon such lock down killed any large numbers. Nor is there evidence yet, that they contributed to stunting and wasting in children. Government must spend to maintain minimum standards of living during the lockdown. Yes, doing so will reduce the value of the rupee both internally and externally but that is the way that the population at large rather than those in low income groups alone bear the burden of the policies. That is also the way that the rampant ravage of the infection can be brought under control.
The respite gained by the lockdown must be used to vaccinate some 65%-70% of the population. The development of vaccines to prevent the spread of SARS-CoV-2 is a triumph of modern science, medical technology and the strength of pharmaceutical companies and other organisations. Governments which foresaw the use of vaccinations in controlling the infection contracted with providers to supply them with vaccinations. Some either did not foresee that need, could not find the resources to contract with suppliers or were pre-occupied with other concerns. We fall into the second category and pay a price, in both in lives and in livelihoods for our failure to procure vaccines. We have seen the effectiveness of vaccination in checking the spread of the infection in US, Britain and Israel and other countries. We have also seen the failure of US with Donald Trump, Brazil with Bolsonaro and India with Modi to vaccinate their people resulting large scale infection and the loss of lives. When the number of deaths rises to 7 million from the present 3.5 million, the world will have lost 1 per 1,000 of its population; a tremendous cost. Our government needs to sit back and re-consider its own policies. Silly heroic stands of ‘ I do not change my mind’ will do us all in.
From that point of view, the debate on the epidemic in Parliament on April 6, was a grave disappointment. Neither the Opposition nor the government gained any stature in the course of the debate. The Opposition did not present an analysis of the problems facing the country and propose alternative policies to solve them and their own preferred choice. The government did not articulate its policies and seek justification for them. A minister of government, who is also a professor of medicine, and who wound up the debate for the government, at the end of a combative response, issued a report card with a load of F’s to the Opposition. That debate in Parliament, as is usual, generated ‘a foul and pestilent congregation of vapours’. The public of this country deserve better.
A new Era of Dance in Sri Lanka
Kapila Palihawadana, an internationally renowned dancer and choreographer staged his new dance production, Riddhi-Ma, on 28 March 2025 at the Elphinstone theatre, which was filled with Sri Lankan theatregoers, foreign diplomats and students of dance. Kapila appeared on stage with his charismatic persona signifying the performance to be unravelled on stage. I was anxiously waiting to see nATANDA dancers. He briefly introduced the narrative and the thematic background to the production to be witnessed. According to him, Kapila has been inspired by the Sri Lankan southern traditional dance (Low Country) and the mythologies related to Riddhi Yâgaya (Riddi Ritual) and the black magic to produce a ‘contemporary ballet’.
Riddhi Yâgaya also known as Rata Yakuma is one of the elaborative exorcism rituals performed in the southern dance tradition in Sri Lanka. It is particularly performed in Matara and Bentara areas where this ritual is performed in order to curb the barrenness and the expectation of fertility for young women (Fargnoli & Seneviratne 2021). Kapila’s contemporary ballet production had intermingled both character, Riddi Bisaw (Princes Riddhi) and the story of Kalu Kumaraya (Black Prince), who possesses young women and caught in the evil gaze (yaksa disti) while cursing upon them to be ill (De Munck, 1990).
Kapila weaves a tapestry of ritual dance elements with the ballet movements to create visually stunning images on stage. Over one and a half hours of duration, Kapila’s dancers mesmerized the audience through their virtuosic bodily competencies in Western ballet, Sri Lankan dance, especially the symbolic elements of low country dance and the spontaneity of movements. It is human bodily virtuosity and the rhythmic structures, which galvanised our senses throughout the performance. From very low phases of bodily movements to high speed acceleration, Kapila managed to visualise the human body as an elevated sublimity.
Contemporary Ballet
Figure 2 – (L) Umesha Kapilarathna performs en pointe, and (R) Narmada Nekethani performs with Jeewaka Randeepa, Riddhi-Ma, at Elphinstone Theatre, Maradana, 28th March 2025. Source:
Malshan Witharana
The dance production Riddhi-Ma was choreographed in several segments accompanied by a flow of various music arrangements and sound elements within which the dance narrative was laid through. In other words, Kapila as a choreographer, overcomes the modernist deadlock in his contemporary dance work that the majority of Sri Lankan dance choreographers have very often succumbed to. These images of bodies of female dancers commensurate the narrative of women’s fate and her vulnerability in being possessed by the Black Demon and how she overcomes and emancipates from the oppression. In this sense, Kapila’s dancers have showcased their ability to use the bodies not much as an object which is trained to perform a particular tradition but to present bodily fluidity which can be transformed into any form. Kapila’s performers possess formlessness, fluid fragility through which they break and overcome their bodily regimentations.
It was such a highly sophisticated ‘contemporary ballet’ performed at a Sri Lankan theatre with utmost rigour and precision. Bodies of all male and female dancers were highly trained and refined through classical ballet and contemporary dance. In addition, they demonstrated their abilities in performing other forms of dance. Their bodies were trained to achieve skilful execution of complex ballet movements, especially key elements of traditional ballet namely, improvisation, partnering, interpretation and off-balance and the local dance repertoires. Yet, these key ballet elements are not necessarily a part of contemporary ballet training (Marttinen, 2016). However, it is important for the dance students to learn these key elements of traditional ballet and use them in the contemporary dance settings. In this sense, Kapila’s dancers have achieved such vigour and somatic precision through assiduous practice of the body to create the magic on stage.
Pas de deux
Among others, a particular dance sequence attracted my attention the most. In the traditional ballet lexicon, it is a ‘pas de deux’ which is performed by the ‘same race male and female dancers,’ which can be called ‘a duet’. As Lutts argues, ‘Many contemporary choreographers are challenging social structures and norms within ballet by messing with the structure of the pas de deux (Lutts, 2019). Pas de Deux is a dance typically done by male and female dancers. In this case, Kapila has selected a male and a female dancer whose gender hierarchies appeared to be diminished through the choreographic work. In the traditional pas de deux, the male appears as the backdrop of the female dancer or the main anchorage of the female body, where the female body is presented with the support of the male body. Kapila has consciously been able to change this hierarchical division between the traditional ballet and the contemporary dance by presenting the female dominance in the act of dance.
The sequence was choreographed around a powerful depiction of the possession of the Gara Yakâ over a young woman, whose vulnerability and the powerful resurrection from the possession was performed by two young dancers. The female dancer, a ballerina, was in a leotard and a tight while wearing a pair of pointe shoes (toe shoes). Pointe shoes help the dancers to swirl on one spot (fouettés), on the pointed toes of one leg, which is the indication of the ballet dancer’s ability to perform en pointe (The Kennedy Centre 2020).
The stunning imagery was created throughout this sequence by the female and the male dancers intertwining their flexible bodies upon each other, throwing their bodies vertically and horizontally while maintaining balance and imbalance together. The ballerina’s right leg is bent and her toes are directed towards the floor while performing the en pointe with her ankle. Throughout the sequence she holds the Gara Yakâ mask while performing with the partner.
The male dancer behind the ballerina maintains a posture while depicting low country hand gestures combining and blurring the boundaries between Sri Lankan dance and the Western ballet (see figure 3). In this sequence, the male dancer maintains the balance of the body while lifting the female dancer’s body in the air signifying some classical elements of ballet.
Haptic sense
Figure 3: Narmada Nekathani performs with the Gara Yaka mask while indicating her right leg as en pointe. Male dancer, Jeewaka Randeepa’s hand gestures signify the low country pose. Riddhi-Ma, Dance Theatre at Elphinstone Theatre, 28th March 2025. Source: Malshan Witharana.
One significant element of this contemporary ballet production is the costume design. The selection of colour palette, containing black, red and while combining with other corresponding colours and also the costumes which break the traditional rules and norms are compelling. I have discussed in a recent publication how clothes connect with the performer’s body and operate as an embodied haptic perception to connect with the spectators (Liyanage, 2025). In this production, the costumes operate in two different ways: First it signifies sculpted bodies creating an embodied, empathic experience.
Secondly, designs of costumes work as a mode of three dimensional haptic sense. Kapila gives his dancers fully covered clothing, while they generate classical ballet and Sinhalese ritual dance movements. The covered bodies create another dimension to clothing over bodies. In doing so, Kapila attempts to create sculpted bodies on stage by blurring the boundaries of gender oriented clothing and its usage in Sri Lankan dance.
Sri Lankan female body on stage, particularly in dance has been presented as an object of male desire. I have elsewhere cited that the lâsya or the feminine gestures of the dance repertoire has been the marker of the quality of dance against the tândava tradition (Liyanage, 2025). The theatregoers visit the theatre to appreciate the lâsya bodies of female dancers and if the dancer meets this threshold, then she becomes the versatile dancer. Kandyan dancers such as Vajira and Chithrasena’s dance works are explored and analysed with this lâsya and tândava criteria. Vajira for instance becomes the icon of the lâsya in the Kandyan tradition. It is not my intention here to further discuss the discourse of lâsya and tândava here.
But Kapila’s contemporary ballet overcomes this duality of male-female aesthetic categorization of lâsya and tândava which has been a historical categorization of dance bodies in Sri Lanka (Sanjeewa 2021).
Figure 4: Riddhi-Ma’s costumes creates sculpted bodies combining the performer and the audience through empathic projection. Dancers, Sithija Sithimina and Senuri Nimsara appear in Riddhi-Ma, at Elphinstone Theatre, 28th March 2025, Source, Malshan Witharana.
Conclusion
Dance imagination in the Sri Lankan creative industry exploits the female body as an object. The colonial mind set of the dance body as a histrionic, gendered, exotic and aesthetic object is still embedded in the majority of dance productions produced in the current cultural industry. Moreover, dance is still understood as a ‘language’ similar to music where the narratives are shared in symbolic movements. Yet, Kapila has shown us that dance exists beyond language or lingual structures where it creates humans to experience alternative existence and expression. In this sense, dance is intrinsically a mode of ‘being’, a kinaesthetic connection where its phenomenality operates beyond the rationality of our daily life.
At this juncture, Kapila and his dance ensemble have marked a significant milestone by eradicating the archetypical and stereotypes in Sri Lankan dance. Kapila’s intervention with Riddi Ma is way ahead of our contemporary reality of Sri Lankan dance which will undoubtedly lead to a new era of dance theatre in Sri Lanka.
References
De Munck, V. C. (1990). Choosing metaphor. A case study of Sri Lankan exorcism. Anthropos, 317-328. Fargnoli, A., & Seneviratne, D. (2021). Exploring Rata Yakuma: Weaving dance/movement therapy and a
Sri Lankan healing ritual. Creative Arts in Education and Therapy (CAET), 230-244.
Liyanage, S. 2025. “Arts and Culture in the Post-War Sri Lanka: Body as Protest in Post-Political Aragalaya (Porattam).” In Reflections on the Continuing Crises of Post-War Sri Lanka, edited by Gamini Keerawella and Amal Jayawardane, 245–78. Colombo: Institute for International Studies (IIS) Sri Lanka.
Lutts, A. (2019). Storytelling in Contemporary Ballet.
Samarasinghe, S. G. (1977). A Methodology for the Collection of the Sinhala Ritual. Asian Folklore Studies, 105-130.
Sanjeewa, W. (2021). Historical Perspective of Gender Typed Participation in the Performing Arts in Sri Lanka During the Pre-Colonial, The Colonial Era, and the Post-Colonial Eras. International Journal of Social Science And Human Research, 4(5), 989-997.
The Kennedy Centre. 2020. “Pointe Shoes Dancing on the Tips of the Toes.” Kennedy-Center.org. 2020 https://www.kennedy-center.org/education/resources-for-educators/classroom-resources/media- and-interactives/media/dance/pointe-shoes/..
Acknowledgements
The author wishes to thank Himansi Dehigama for proofreading this article.
About the author:
Saumya Liyanage (PhD) is a film and theatre actor and professor in drama and theatre, currently working at the Department of Theatre Ballet and Modern Dance, Faculty of Dance and Drama, University of the Visual and Performing Arts (UVPA), Colombo. He is the former Dean of the Faculty of Graduate Studies and is currently holding the director position of the Social Reconciliation Centre, UVPA Colombo.
Chinese Naval Entry and End of Post-War Unipolarity
The ascendancy of China as an emerging superpower is one of the most striking shifts in the global distribution of economic and political power in the 21st century. With its strategic rise, China has assumed a more proactive diplomatic and economic role in the Indian Ocean, signalling its emergence as a global superpower. This new leadership role is exemplified by initiatives such as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). The Economist noted that “China’s decision to fund a new multilateral bank rather than give more to existing ones reflects its exasperation with the glacial pace of global economic governance reform” (The Economist, 11 November 2014). Thus far, China’s ascent to global superpower status has been largely peaceful.
In 2025, in terms of Navy fleet strength, China became the world’s largest Navy, with a fleet of 754 ships, thanks to its ambitious naval modernisation programme. In May 2024, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) further strengthened its capabilities by commissioning the Fujian, its latest aircraft carrier. Equipped with an advanced electromagnetic catapult system, the Fujian can launch larger and heavier aircraft, marking a significant upgrade over its predecessors.
Driven by export-led growth, China sought to reinvest its trade surplus, redefining the Indian Ocean region not just as a market but as a key hub for infrastructure investment. Notably, over 80 percent of China’s oil imports from the Persian Gulf transit to the Straits of Malacca before reaching its industrial centres. These factors underscore the Indian Ocean’s critical role in China’s economic and naval strategic trajectories.
China’s port construction projects along the Indian Ocean littoral, often associated with the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), exemplify its deepening geopolitical and economic engagement in the region. These initiatives encompass multipurpose berth development, deep-sea port construction, and supporting infrastructure projects aimed at enhancing maritime connectivity and trade. Key projects include the development of Gwadar Port in Pakistan, a strategic asset for China’s access to the Arabian Sea; Hambantota Port in Sri Lanka, which became a focal point of debt diplomacy concerns; the Payra deep-sea port in Bangladesh; as well as port and road infrastructure development in Myanmar’s Yunnan and Kyaukphyu regions and Cambodia’s Koh Kong.
While these projects were promoted as avenues for economic growth and regional connectivity, they also triggered geopolitical tensions and domestic opposition in several host countries. Concerns over excessive debt burdens, lack of transparency, and potential dual-use (civilian and military) implications of port facilities led to scrutiny from both local and external stakeholders, including India and Western powers. As a result, some projects faced significant pushback, delays, and, in certain cases, suspension or cancellation. This opposition underscores the complex interplay between economic cooperation, strategic interests, and sovereignty concerns in China’s Indian Ocean engagements.
China’s expanding economic, diplomatic, and naval footprint in the Indian Ocean has fundamentally altered the region’s strategic landscape, signalling the end of early post-Cold War unipolarity. Through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) initiatives, China has entrenched itself economically, financing. Diplomatically, Beijing has deepened its engagement with littoral states through bilateral agreements, security partnerships, and regional forums, challenging traditional Western and Indian influence.
China’s expanding naval deployments in the Indian Ocean, including its military base in Djibouti, and growing security cooperation with regional states, mark the end of unchallenged US dominance in the region. The Indian Ocean is now a contested space, where China’s presence compels strategic recalibrations by India, the United States, and other regional actors. The evolving security landscape in the Indian Ocean—marked by intensifying competition, shifting alliances, and the rise of a multipolar order—has significant implications for Sri Lanka’s geopolitical future.
India views China’s growing economic, political, and strategic presence in the Indian Ocean region as a key strategic challenge. In response, India has pursued a range of strategic, political, and economic measures to counterbalance Chinese influence, particularly in countries like Sri Lanka through infrastructure investment, defense partnerships, and diplomatic engagements.
Other Extra-Regional powers
Japan and Australia have emerged as significant players in the post-Cold War strategic landscape of the Indian Ocean. During the early phases of the Cold War, Australia played a crucial role in Western ‘Collective Security Alliances’ (ANZUS and (SEATO). However, its direct engagement in Indian Ocean security remained limited, primarily supporting the British Royal Navy under Commonwealth obligations. Japan, meanwhile, refrained from deploying naval forces in the region after World War II, adhering to its pacifist constitution and post-war security policies. In recent decades, shifting strategic conditions have prompted both Japan and Australia to reassess their roles in the Indian Ocean, leading to greater defence cooperation and a more proactive regional presence.
In the post-Cold War era, Australia has progressively expanded its naval engagements in the Indian Ocean, driven by concerns over maritime security, protection of trade routes, and China’s growing influence. Through initiatives, such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) and deeper defence partnerships with India and the United States, Australia has bolstered its strategic presence in the Indian Ocean region.
Recalibration of Japan’s approach
Japan, too, has recalibrated its approach to Indian Ocean security in response to geopolitical shifts. Recognising the Indian Ocean’s critical importance for its energy security and trade, Japan has strengthened its naval presence through port visits, joint exercises, and maritime security cooperation. The Japan Maritime Self-Defence Force (JMSDF) has taken on a more active role in anti-piracy operations, freedom of navigation operations (FONOPS), and strategic partnerships with Indian Ocean littoral states. This shift aligns with Japan’s broader strategy of contributing to regional stability while balancing its constitutional constraints on military force projection.
Japan’s proactive role in the Indian Ocean region is evident in its diplomatic and defence engagements. In January 2019, Japan sent its Foreign Minister, Taro Kono, and Chief of Staff, Joint Staff, Katsutoshi Kawano, to the Raisina Dialogue, a high-profile geopolitical conference in India. Japan’s National Security Strategy, released in December 2022, identifies China’s growing assertiveness as its greatest strategic challenge and underscores the need to deepen bilateral ties and multilateral defence cooperation in the Indian Ocean. It also emphasises the importance of securing stable access to sea-lanes, through which more than 80 percent of Japan’s oil imports pass. In recent years, Japan has expanded its port investment portfolio across the Indian Ocean, with major projects in Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and Myanmar. In 2021, Japan participated for the first time in CARAT-Sri Lanka (Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training), a bilateral naval exercise. Japan’s Maritime Self-Defence Force returned for the exercise in January 2023, held at Trincomalee Port and Mullikulam Base.
Japan’s strategic interests in the Indian Ocean have been most evident in its involvement in port infrastructure development projects. Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and Myanmar are key countries where early Chinese-led port construction faced setbacks. Unlike India, which carries historical and political complexities in its relations with these countries, Japan is better positioned to compete with China. In December 2021, a Japanese company established a ship repair and rebuilding facility in Trincomalee, complementing the already well-established Tokyo Cement factory. When the Sri Lanka Ports Authority announced plans in mid-2022 to develop Trincomalee as an industrial port—inviting expressions of interest from investors to utilise port facilities and up to 2,400 hectares of surrounding land—Trincomalee regained strategic attention.
The Colombo Dockyard, in collaboration with Japan’s Onomichi Dockyard, has established a rapid response afloat service in Trincomalee, marking a significant development in Japan’s engagement with Sri Lanka’s maritime infrastructure. This initiative aligns with Japan’s broader strategic interests in the Bay of Bengal, a region of critical economic and security importance. A key Japanese concern appears to be limiting China’s ability to establish a permanent presence in Trincomalee. This initiative underscores the broader strategic competition in the Indian Ocean. Trincomalee, with its deep-water harbour, has long been regarded as a critical maritime asset. Japan’s involvement reflects its efforts to deepen economic and strategic engagement with Sri Lanka amid growing regional competition. The challenge before Sri Lanka is how to navigate this strategic contest while maximising its national interests.
Other Regional Powers
In analyzing the evolving naval security architecture of the post-Cold War Indian Ocean, particular attention should be given to the naval developments of regional powers such as Pakistan, Indonesia, and Malaysia. In 2012, Pakistan established the Naval Strategic Force Command (NSFC) to strengthen Pakistan’s policy of Credible Minimum Deterrence (CMD). The creation of the NSFC suggests a shift toward sea-based deterrence, complementing Pakistan’s broader military strategy. In December 2012, Pakistan conducted a series of cruise missile tests from naval platforms in the Arabian Sea. Given India’s expanding maritime capabilities, which Pakistan views as a significant threat, the Pakistan Navy may consider deploying tactical nuclear weapons on surface ships as part of its evolving deterrence strategy. Sri Lanka’s foreign policy cannot overlook this development.
Indonesia also emerged as a significant player in the evolving naval security landscape of the Indian Ocean. In 2010, it launched a military modernisation programme aimed at achieving a ‘Minimum Essential Force’ (MEF) by 2024. As part of this initiative, Indonesia sought to build a modern Navy with 247 surface vessels and 12 submarines. One of the primary challenges faced by the Indonesian Navy (TNI-AL) is piracy. To enhance maritime security, Indonesia and Singapore signed the SURPIC Cooperation Arrangement in Bantam in May 2005, enabling real-time sea surveillance in the Singapore Strait for more effective naval patrols. In 2017, Indonesia introduced the Indonesian Ocean Policy (IOP) and subsequently incorporated blue economy strategies into its national development agenda, reinforcing its maritime vision. According to projections from the Global Firepower Index, published in 2025, the Indonesian Navy is ranked fourth in global ranking and second in Asia in terms of Navy fleet strength (Global Firepower, 2025).
In October 2012, the Royal Malaysian Navy (RMN) announced plans to build a second Scorpène simulator training facility at its base in Kota Kinabalu, in addition to submarine base in Sepanggar, Sabah, constructed in 2002. To enhance its naval capabilities, the RMN planned to procure 18 Littoral Mission Ships (LMS) for maritime surveillance and six Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) between 2019 and 2023. Malaysia and China finalised their first major defence deal during Prime Minister Najib Razak’s visit to Beijing in November 2016. During this visit, Malaysia’s Defence Ministry signed a contract to procure LMS from China, as reported by The Guardian. Despite this agreement, Malaysia continues to maintain amicable relations with both China and India, as does Indonesia.
The increasing presence of major naval powers, the rise of regional stakeholders, and the growing significance of trade routes and maritime security have transformed the Indian Ocean into a central pivot of both regional and global politics, with Sri Lanka positioned at its heart. (To be Continued)
by Gamini Keerawella
Sri Lankan Andrea Marr, now based in Australia, is in the spotlight again. She says she has teamed up with a fantastic bunch of Sri Lankan musicians, in Melbourne, and the band is called IntoGroove.
“The band has been going strong for many years and I have been a fan of this outfit for quite a few years; just love these guys, authentic R&B and funk.”
Although Andrea has her original blues band, The McNaMarr Project, and they do have a busy schedule, she went on to say that “when the opportunity came up to join these guys, I simply couldn’t refuse … they are too good.”
IntoGroove is Jude Nicholas (lead vocals), Peter Menezes (bass), Keith Pereira (drums), Blaise De Silva (keyboards) and and Steve Wright (guitar).
Andrea Marr: Powerhouse of the blues
“These guys are a fantastic band and I really want everyone to hear them.”
Andrea is a very talented artiste with many achievements to her credit, and a vocal coach, as well.
In fact, she did her second vocal coaching session at Australian Songwriters Conference early this year.
Her first student showcase for this year took place last Sunday, in Melbourne, and it brought into the spotlight the wonderful acts she has moulded, as teacher and mentor.
What makes Andrea extra special is that she has years of teaching experience and is able to do group vocal coaching for all styles, levels and genres.
In January, this year, she performed at the exclusive ‘Women In Blues’ showcase at Alfred’s On Beale Street (rock venue with live entertainment), in Memphis, in the USA, during the International Blues Challenge when bands from all over the world converge on Memphis for the ‘Olympics of the Blues.’
The McNaMarr Project with Andrea and Lindsay Marr in the
vocal spotlight
This was her fourth performance in the home of the blues; she has represented Australian Blues three times and, on this occasion, she went as ambassador for Blues Music Victoria, and The Melbourne Blues Appreciation Society’s ‘Women In Blues’ Coordinator.
Andrea was inducted into the Blues Music Victoria Hall of Fame in 2022 and released her 10th album which hit #1 on the Australian Blues Charts.
Known as ‘the pint-sized powerhouse of the blues’ for her high energy, soulful, original music, Andrea is also a huge fan of the late Elvis Presley and has checked out Graceland, in Memphis, Tennessee, USA, many times.
In Melbourne, the singer also plays a major role in helping Animal Rescue organisations find homes for abandoned cats.
Andrea Marr’s wish, at the moment, is that the Lankan audience, in Melbourne, would get behind this band, IntoGroove. They are world class, she added.
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