Features

NPP govt., a patchwork of ideological differences, bound to suffer splits – FSP

Published

11 months ago

2025/01/9

Sahan Weerasooriya

Pubudu Jagoda

by Saman Indrajith

Education Secretary of the Frontline Socialist Party, Pubudu Jagoda, has expressed skepticism about the government’s ability to overcome the country’s pressing economic challenges.

In an interview with The Island, Jagoda highlights the inherent divisions within the JVP/NPP coalition, which, he believes, are bound to hinder its ability to provide meaningful relief to the public.

“The government is a patchwork of ideological contradictions,” Jagoda says. “It includes remnants of the old JVP cadre who advocate socialist solutions for economic problems. Alongside them are newer social democrats whose views often clash with the socialist stance. Adding to this complexity are neoliberals who align with Ranil Wickremesinghe’s policies but reject him personally, and a faction of nationalists—many of whom were part of Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s Viyath Maga initiative before joining the NPP.”

Jagoda says that this diversity of perspectives has resulted in an inability to present a cohesive strategy for addressing the country’s economic woes. “This collection of divergent views struggles to formulate practical solutions for the people’s problems.”

Jagoda is of the view that the government’s current approach relies heavily on rhetoric around anti-corruption initiatives and promises of reforming the political culture. While these efforts may garner short-term support, they lack the capacity to address the more immediate issues faced by the population. “There are limits to how far you can go with slogans about changing the political culture. These initiatives cannot put food on people’s tables,” he said.

Excerpts of the interview:

Q: What is your assessment of the current situation in Sri Lanka?

A: The global economy has faced numerous crises over the years, from time to time. In the late 19th century, the 1920s, and 1973, significant economic downturns came into being. Historically, these crises have been characterised by fluctuating trends, often described using the shapes of English letters—V-shaped, U-shaped, and W-shaped—to denote the pattern of economic recovery and recession. For example, the 1973 crisis was V-shaped, while the 1927 crisis exhibited a W-shaped recovery. However, the global economic crisis of 2008 defied such conventional classifications. Initially described as L-shaped due to a sharp decline followed by prolonged stagnation, it later evolved into a pattern resembling a staircase cross-section. Economists now predict a further decline in 2025 and 2026, signifying a fast-collapsing global economy.

Economists argue that addressing the economic crisis requires a comprehensive strategy to manage external interventions by superpowers and to protect national interests. However, opposition parties, including the NPP and SJB, have failed to articulate clear economic policies. Their manifestos are technocratic and lack detailed strategies for addressing issues such as the debt crisis, state revenue challenges, foreign currency shortages, and a coherent development plan.

The government’s mandate, though significant in the parliamentary election, lacks a unified vision.

Sri Lanka faces three key economic policy challenges: the first one is continuation of IMF-driven policies. Will the NPP Government continue with the IMF’s structural adjustment programmes? The second is about managing superpower interventions: Can this government leverage its mandate to negotiate more favourable terms with global powers? The third is about addressing public welfare: Will the government prioritise economic relief for citizens or continue to favour corporate elites under the guise of political reform?

Sri Lanka’s economic crisis manifests starkly in rising poverty and malnutrition. Statistics reveal that 25% of families rely on financial support from neighbors and relatives, while 61% have reduced their food consumption. Child malnutrition rates have soared to 26%, levels previously associated with countries like Ethiopia and Somalia in the 1990s.

The government’s inability to articulate a clear economic vision and its reliance on neoliberal reforms risk deepening the crisis.

Q: What is the FSP going to do about it?

A: We advocate for an economic plan that provides an alternative to the IMF programme. We emphasise the importance of a foreign policy that protects Sri Lanka’s sovereignty and shields its people from the geostrategic invasions of powers like the US and India. Furthermore, we want the inequities created by a top corporate elite that benefited disproportionately from the previous regime’s economic policies addressed. Our position has consistently been that this elite should bear a fair share of the tax burden to provide relief to the people. These three pillars formed the foundation of our political campaign.

Looking ahead, we believe the most critical aspects will continue to revolve around these priorities, the first of them is opposition to the IMF programme. We challenge its long-term implications on Sri Lanka’s sovereignty and economy. Then the issue of geostrategic independence. We advocate for a foreign policy that avoids subjugation to major powers. Third aspect is about equitable Taxation. We demand ensuring that economic policies benefit the majority rather than a privileged few.

As public frustration with the government grows, there is a real danger that people may revert to supporting extreme-right factions responsible for Sri Lanka’s economic turmoil. This could include figures like Ranil Wickremesinghe, members of the SJB, the Mahinda Rajapaksa camp, or even more regressive alternatives. History teaches us that severe economic crises often lead to two potential outcomes: revolutions/military coups or the rise of far-right fascist governments. Sri Lanka is no exception to this historical pattern.

If the current trajectory continues, new leaders could emerge from outside the existing political framework, replacing figures such as Ranil Wickremesinghe, Sajith Premadasa, or Namal Rajapaksa. Alternatively, the country could face a revolution or even a military coup. Superpowers are unlikely to oppose such outcomes, as these scenarios could align with their strategic interests and facilitate their agendas.

Recognising these risks, we are focused on preventing a sudden collapse of the government. While criticising the IMF programme and the restructuring of International Sovereign Bonds (ISBs), we have taken proactive steps to offer alternatives. For instance, we submitted a detailed 13-page document outlining the dangers of the IMF programme and proposing alternative solutions. Recently, we provided 22 proposals for the national budget, reaffirming our commitment to constructive engagement rather than mere criticism.

Despite our efforts, the government has ignored these suggestions, offering no response or acknowledgment. Nevertheless, we see it as our responsibility to propose solutions and advocate for change. If the government continues on its current path, failure seems inevitable, leading to heightened public frustration.

In such a context, our primary focus is to create a political space that prevents the public from being pushed toward far-right factions or fascist military-style governance. To achieve this, we are engaging with leftist and progressive elements within the democratic framework. In the meantime, we are utilising platforms like the People’s Struggle to unite individuals and organisations against the potential rise of far-right authoritarianism.

This initiative seeks to build a broad coalition capable of resisting such a shift while advocating for a just and equitable alternative. We understand that this cannot be achieved by our party alone, so we are collaborating with other progressive forces to strengthen this movement.

Our efforts are directed toward preventing a political and economic regression in Sri Lanka. By uniting progressive forces and presenting clear alternatives, we aim to address the root causes of the crisis while protecting the nation from the threats of authoritarianism and economic subjugation.

Q: How would you interpret the Joint Statement issued by India and Sri Lanka following President Anura Kumara Dissanayake’s visit?

A: We must acknowledge the geopolitical reality that India is both Sri Lanka’s closest neighbour and the regional superpower. It is inevitable that Sri Lanka must work with India while being mindful of her strategic and economic interests. However, this does not mean that we must relinquish our sovereignty, independence, or national dignity. A balance is both possible and necessary.

For instance, President Anura Kumara Dissanayake’s assurance that Sri Lanka would not allow its territory to be used against India’s security interests was, while prudent in principle, perhaps an over-commitment in execution. Safeguarding India’s security concerns is one thing but providing explicit commitments risks undermining our flexibility and sovereignty. It is a self-imposed limitation that could have been avoided.

Similarly, the joint statement’s commitments to land connectivity, an integrated oil pipeline, and a shared electricity grid raise serious concerns. These projects are not without precedent in the region, and the experiences of other nations connected to India offer cautionary lessons. Nepal, Pakistan, and Bangladesh all face significant challenges arising from their direct land links with India. Sri Lanka’s geographical separation by sea has so far shielded it from similar vulnerabilities, and it would be unwise to jeopardise this advantage without thorough deliberation.

The proposed electricity grid integration is another contentious issue. Nations like Bangladesh, which are already connected to India’s electricity grid, are formulating exit strategies due to reliability and sovereignty concerns. For instance, Bangladesh faced prolonged power cuts when it failed to settle bills with India. Similarly, Nepal has been unable to fully exploit its hydropower potential because of obligations under agreements with India. Sri Lanka, with over a century of independent electricity production and potential for future self-sufficiency, has no engineering necessity to integrate its grid with India. Such a move appears driven more by political than practical considerations.

The oil pipeline and refinery agreements also warrant scrutiny. Historically, Sri Lanka has imported crude oil for domestic refining, with plans to upgrade facilities like the Sapugaskanda refinery to produce and export diesel and petrol, emulating Singapore. However, recent agreements have seen the handover of strategic assets, including Trincomalee’s oil tanks and the operation of local petrol stations, to Indian entities. Furthermore, the proposed monopoly on LNG supply by an Indian company undermines Sri Lanka’s ability to procure competitively priced LNG from global markets.

These agreements are reportedly still at the “in-principle” stage, but the government’s failure to consult parliament or public forums before committing to such significant undertakings raises serious concerns. Instead of deferring to agreements made by former President Ranil Wickremesinghe, whose policies were widely rejected in elections, the current administration should assert its mandate and demand reconsideration of these commitments.

The issue of awarding the digital national ID project to an Indian company further highlights the erosion of sovereignty. In an era where data is as critical as military assets, granting access to the biometric and personal data of 22 million Sri Lankans to a foreign entity is a grave risk. The tender process itself has been controversial, with conditions favoring only Indian companies and the tender notice published exclusively in Indian newspapers. This lack of transparency and favoritism raises alarms about national security and accountability.

Examples from other nations further underline the dangers of such agreements. In Kenya, the same Indian company involved in Sri Lanka’s digital ID project was banned after allegations of data fraud. Despite this, the Sri Lankan government has persisted with plans that effectively outsource national security data to a foreign entity, undermining the country’s sovereignty.

While Sri Lanka’s size and economic vulnerability necessitate diplomatic tact, these factors do not justify subservience to any foreign power. The President’s visit to India and the commitments made during the visit failed to uphold the dignity and independence of Sri Lanka. It is imperative that our leaders adopt a more balanced approach that safeguards national sovereignty while engaging constructively with India.

Q: How would you comment on the President’s scheduled visit to China?

A: The geopolitical scene has evolved significantly since the Cold War era, transforming international relations into a complex interplay of economic, political, and military interests. Unlike the binary divisions of the past, where nations were clearly aligned with one of two superpowers, today’s global politics involves multifaceted alliances that often overlap and conflict.

For instance, India, which historically aligned with the USSR, now pursues multiple roles. Economically, India collaborates with China and Russia within BRICS, promoting de-dollarization. However, militarily, India partners with the U.S. and other QUAD nations, positioning itself against Chinese regional dominance. Similarly, China has shifted its foreign policy from rigid ideological stances to pragmatic engagement, often accommodating regional superpowers’ roles in their respective spheres of influence.

In this context, President Anura Kumara Dissanayake’s upcoming visit to China is unlikely to yield significant pushback against the commitments made to India. China is more likely to seek reciprocal agreements, such as securing concessions in Hambantota or other strategic locations, rather than urging Sri Lanka to reject Indian interests outright. This reflects a broader Chinese strategy of coexistence with other regional powers while pursuing its own strategic and economic goals.

A case in point is China’s stance on Sri Lanka’s IMF programme. Unlike during the Cold War, when China might have opposed Western-led financial restructuring, it now focuses on securing a foothold within those frameworks. For example, if Sri Lanka privatizes state-owned entities like the CEB, China’s concern would not be with the principle of privatization but with acquiring a significant stake in those assets.

The lifting of the moratorium on research vessels in Sri Lankan waters exemplifies the government’s precarious balancing act. Allowing both Indian and Chinese vessels to conduct ocean floor mapping may appear to appease both powers, but it risks antagonizing one or the other, depending on the strategic implications of the research findings. The government might view this as a strategy to placate China following the President’s visit to India, but such concessions only deepen the geopolitical entanglement.

Instead of succumbing to these pressures, Sri Lanka should revisit and reaffirm its historical commitment to neutrality in the Indian Ocean, as embodied in the 1972 UN resolution declaring the region a Zone of Peace. This resolution, co-sponsored by Sri Lanka and India, explicitly seeks to prevent military and economically motivated agreements with indirect military implications among Indian Ocean littoral states. By invoking this resolution, Sri Lanka could resist external pressures without directly antagonizing powerful nations.

The government’s current approach, of attempting to “give a little to everyone,” is fraught with risk. It creates the perception of a nation willing to compromise its sovereignty for short-term diplomatic gains. Such policies can lead to long-term strategic vulnerabilities, as seen with the lifting of the research vessel moratorium and the transactional diplomacy of balancing Chinese and Indian interests.

The broader concern is that Sri Lanka’s vulnerability, compounded by economic challenges, could make it a flashpoint in escalating global tensions. Any future conflict, potentially involving advanced ballistic missile systems, AI-driven warfare, and nuclear capabilities, would have catastrophic consequences for small nations like Sri Lanka.

While the government justifies its actions as necessary for an economically bankrupt nation, we believe that there remains space to assert Sri Lanka’s sovereignty and protect its long-term interests. Diplomacy should not equate to submission, and economic hardship must not justify policies that undermine national security and dignity. Instead, the leadership must tread carefully, adopting a principled approach that balances strategic interests while preserving the country’s independence.

Q: How do you view the Aragalaya protests now after years of their end?

A: The Aragalaya emerged as a powerful expression of public frustration, driven predominantly by economic pressures. For many Sri Lankans, the tipping point was the failure of Gotabaya Rajapaksa to provide relief during a devastating economic crisis. The sense of betrayal was especially acute among those who had voted for him in 2019, such as in Kaduwela, where Gotabaya secured 76% of the vote. This sense of disillusionment was evident when thousands from areas like Malabe, Athurugiriya, and Pelawatte—a stronghold of Rajapaksa supporters—joined daily protests for months and ultimately marched 26 kilometers to Colombo on May 9, 2022, to demand his resignation.

This mass movement was not confined to one demographic; it brought together people from all sectors of society, each with their own grievances and aspirations. For the general public, it was primarily about economic hardship and a betrayal of trust. For others, like leftist and progressive groups, it was an opportunity to promote the idea of a revolutionary mass movement aimed at empowering people.

However, the Aragalaya was also marked by significant political and diplomatic interference. Representatives from various political factions—including UNPers sponsored by Ashu Marasinghe, Mahinda Rajapaksa’s allies, Basil Rajapaksa’s agents, Sarath Fonseka’s supporters, and Champika Ranawaka’s supporters were present, each attempting to advance their own agendas. Diplomats from major powers, such as the U.S., India, and China, as well as government intelligence agents, were also actively monitoring and engaging with the movement.

Despite its grassroots energy, the real political shifts occurred in Parliament, not in the streets. The appointment of an interim president was a key moment that divided the movement and eroded its momentum. Opposition parties like the NPP and SJB had the option to reject Ranil Wickremesinghe’s election by refusing to participate in the parliamentary process, aligning with the Aragalaya’s demand for a complete overhaul of the system. Instead, they chose to field their own candidates—Anura Kumara Dissanayake and Dullas Alahapperuma—only to concede and congratulate Wickremesinghe after his victory. These actions were televised, demoralizing many activists who viewed them as a betrayal by the opposition.

An alternative approach, proposed by representatives of the Aragalaya, called for the establishment of an interim government with a six-month mandate, followed by elections. This proposal included forming a cabinet representing all political parties but excluded the concept of an interim president. It was well-received at a meeting at the Public Library Auditorium in Colombo on May 5, 2022, just days before Gotabaya was ousted. However, it failed to gain traction in Parliament, where the ultimate decisions were made.

The Aragalaya, while unprecedented in its scope and inclusivity, was ultimately undermined by political fragmentation, external influences, and the lack of a unified strategy among its leaders and participants. It highlighted the deep disconnection between parliamentary politics and the will of the people, leaving many to question whether meaningful change is possible within the current system.

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Features

Why Sri Lanka Still Has No Doppler Radar – and Who Should Be Held Accountable

Published

20 hours ago

2025/12/14

Thilina Walpola

Eighteen Years of Delay:

Cyclone Ditwah has come and gone, leaving a trail of extensive damage to the country’s infrastructure, including buildings, roads, bridges, and 70% of the railway network. Thousands of hectares of farming land have been destroyed. Last but not least, nearly 1,000 people have lost their lives, and more than two million people have been displaced. The visuals uploaded to social media platforms graphically convey the widespread destruction Cyclone Ditwah has caused in our country.

The purpose of my article is to highlight, for the benefit of readers and the general public, how a project to establish a Doppler Weather Radar system, conceived in 2007, remains incomplete after 18 years. Despite multiple governments, shifting national priorities, and repeated natural disasters, the project remains incomplete.

Over the years, the National Audit Office, the Committee on Public Accounts (COPA), and several print and electronic media outlets have highlighted this failure. The last was an excellent five-minute broadcast by Maharaja Television Network on their News First broadcast in October 2024 under a series “What Happened to Sri Lanka”

The Agreement Between the Government of Sri Lanka and the World Meteorological Organisation in 2007.

The first formal attempt to establish a Doppler Radar system dates back to a Trust Fund agreement signed on 24 May 2007 between the Government of Sri Lanka (GoSL) and the World Meteorological Organisation (WMO). This agreement intended to modernize Sri Lanka’s meteorological infrastructure and bring the country on par with global early-warning standards.

The World Meteorological Organisation (WMO) is a specialized agency of the United Nations established on March 23, 1950. There are 193 member countries of the WMO, including Sri Lanka. Its primary role is to promote the establishment of a worldwide meteorological observation system and to serve as the authoritative voice on the state and behaviour of the Earth’s atmosphere, its interaction with the oceans, and the resulting climate and water resources.

According to the 2018 Performance Audit Report compiled by the National Audit Office, the GoSL entered into a trust fund agreement with the WMO to install a Doppler Radar System. The report states that USD 2,884,274 was deposited into the WMO bank account in Geneva, from which the Department of Metrology received USD 95,108 and an additional USD 113,046 in deposit interest. There is no mention as to who actually provided the funds. Based on available information, WMO does not fund projects of this magnitude.

The WMO was responsible for procuring the radar equipment, which it awarded on 18^th June 2009 to an American company for USD 1,681,017. According to the audit report, a copy of the purchase contract was not available.

Monitoring the agreement’s implementation was assigned to the Ministry of Disaster Management, a signatory to the trust fund agreement. The audit report details the members of the steering committee appointed by designation to oversee the project. It consisted of personnel from the Ministry of Disaster Management, the Departments of Metrology, National Budget, External Resources and the Disaster Management Centre.

The Audit Report highlights failures in the core responsibilities that can be summarized as follows:

· Procurement irregularities—including flawed tender processes and inadequate technical evaluations.

· Poor site selection

—proposed radar sites did not meet elevation or clearance requirements.

· Civil works delays

—towers were incomplete or structurally unsuitable.

· Equipment left unused

—in some cases for years, exposing sensitive components to deterioration.

· Lack of inter-agency coordination

—between the Meteorology Department, Disaster Management Centre, and line ministries.

Some of the mistakes highlighted are incomprehensible. There is a mention that no soil test was carried out before the commencement of the construction of the tower. This led to construction halting after poor soil conditions were identified, requiring a shift of 10 to 15 meters from the original site. This resulted in further delays and cost overruns.

The equipment supplier had identified that construction work undertaken by a local contractor was not of acceptable quality for housing sensitive electronic equipment. No action had been taken to rectify these deficiencies. The audit report states, “It was observed that the delay in constructing the tower and the lack of proper quality were one of the main reasons for the failure of the project”.

In October 2012, when the supplier commenced installation, the work was soon abandoned after the vehicle carrying the heavy crane required to lift the radar equipment crashed down the mountain. The next attempt was made in October 2013, one year later. Although the equipment was installed, the system could not be operationalised because electronic connectivity was not provided (as stated in the audit report).

In 2015, following a UNOPS (United Nations Office for Project Services) inspection, it was determined that the equipment needed to be returned to the supplier because some sensitive electronic devices had been damaged due to long-term disuse, and a further 1.5 years had elapsed by 2017, when the equipment was finally returned to the supplier. In March 2018, the estimated repair cost was USD 1,095,935, which was deemed excessive, and the project was abandoned.

COPA proceedings

The Committee on Public Accounts (COPA) discussed the radar project on August 10, 2023, and several press reports state that the GOSL incurred a loss of Rs. 78 million due to the project’s failure. This, I believe, is the cost of constructing the Tower. It is mentioned that Rs. 402 million had been spent on the radar system, of which Rs. 323 million was drawn from the trust fund established with WMO. It was also highlighted that approximately Rs. 8 million worth of equipment had been stolen and that the Police and the Bribery and Corruption Commission were investigating the matter.

JICA support and project stagnation

Despite the project’s failure with WMO, the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) entered into an agreement with GOSL on June 30, 2017 to install two Doppler Radar Systems in Puttalam and Pottuvil. JICA has pledged 2.5 billion Japanese yen (LKR 3.4 billion at the time) as a grant. It was envisaged that the project would be completed in 2021.

Once again, the perennial delays that afflict the GOSL and bureaucracy have resulted in the groundbreaking ceremony being held only in December 2024. The delay is attributed to the COVID-19 pandemic and Sri Lanka’s economic crisis.

The seven-year delay between the signing of the agreement and project commencement has led to significant cost increases, forcing JICA to limit the project to installing only one Doppler Radar system in Puttalam.

Impact of the missing radar during Ditwah

As I am not a meteorologist and do not wish to make a judgment on this, I have decided to include the statement issued by JICA after the groundbreaking ceremony on December 24, 2024.

“In partnership with the Department of Meteorology (DoM), JICA is spearheading the establishment of the Doppler Weather Radar Network in the Puttalam district, which can realize accurate weather observation and weather prediction based on the collected data by the radar. This initiative is a significant step in strengthening Sri Lanka’s improving its climate resilience including not only reducing risks of floods, landslides, and drought but also agriculture and fishery“.

Based on online research, a Doppler Weather Radar system is designed to observe weather systems in real time. While the technical details are complex, the system essentially provides localized, uptotheminute information on rainfall patterns, storm movements, and approaching severe weather. Countries worldwide rely on such systems to issue timely alerts for monsoons, tropical depressions, and cyclones. It is reported that India has invested in 30 Doppler radar systems, which have helped minimize the loss of life.

Without radar, Sri Lanka must rely primarily on satellite imagery and foreign meteorological centres, which cannot capture the finescale, rapidly changing weather patterns that often cause localized disasters here.

The general consensus is that, while no single system can prevent natural disasters, an operational Doppler Radar almost certainly would have strengthened Sri Lanka’s preparedness and reduced the extent of damage and loss.

Conclusion

Sri Lanka’s inability to commission a Doppler Radar system, despite nearly two decades of attempts, represents one of the most significant governance failures in the country’s disastermanagement history.

Audit findings, parliamentary oversight proceedings, and donor records all confirm the same troubling truth: Sri Lanka has spent public money, signed international agreements, received foreign assistance, and still has no operational radar. This raises a critical question: should those responsible for this prolonged failure be held legally accountable?

Now may not be the time to determine the extent to which the current government and bureaucrats failed the people. I believe an independent commission comprising foreign experts in disaster management from India and Japan should be appointed, maybe in six months, to identify failures in managing Cyclone Ditwah.

However, those who governed the country from 2007 to 2024 should be held accountable for their failures, and legal action should be pursued against the politicians and bureaucrats responsible for disaster management for their failure to implement the 2007 project with the WMO successfully.

Sri Lanka cannot afford another 18 years of delay. The time for action, transparency, and responsibility has arrived.

(The views and opinions expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the policy or position of any organization or institution with which the author is affiliated).

By Sanjeewa Jayaweera

Features

Ramifications of Trump Corollary

Published

20 hours ago

2025/12/14

Thilina Walpola

President Donald Trump speaks during a Cabinet meeting as Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth look on, at the White House, in Washington, Dec. 2, 2025

President Trump is expected to close the deal on the Ukraine crisis, as he may wish to concentrate his full strength on two issues: ongoing operations in Venezuela and the bolstering of Japan’s military capabilities as tensions between China and Japan over Taiwan rise. Trump can easily concede Ukraine to Putin and refocus on the Asia–Pacific and Latin America. This week, he once again spilled the beans in an interview with Politico, one of the most significant conversations ever conducted with him. When asked which country currently holds the stronger negotiating position, Trump bluntly asserted that there could be no question: it is Russia. “It’s a much bigger country. It’s a war that should’ve never happened,” he said, followed by his usual rhetoric.

Meanwhile, US allies that fail to adequately fund defence and shirk contributions to collective security will face repercussions, Secretary of War Pete Hegseth declared at the 2025 Reagan National Defense Forum in Simi Valley, California. Hegseth singled out nations such as South Korea, Israel, Poland, and Germany as “model allies” for increasing their commitments, contrasting them with those perceived as “free riders”. The message was unmistakably Trumpian: partnerships are conditional, favourable only to countries that “help themselves” before asking anything of Washington.

It is in this context that it becomes essential to examine the Trump administration’s National Security Strategy, issued last week, in order to consider how it differs from previous strategies and where it may intersect with current US military practice.

Trump’s 2025 National Security Strategy is not merely another iteration of the familiar doctrine of American primacy; it is a radical reorientation of how the United States understands itself, its sphere of influence, and its role in the world. The document begins uncompromisingly: “The purpose of foreign policy is the protection of core national interests; that is the sole focus of this strategy.” It is the bluntest opening in any American NSS since the document became a formal requirement in 1987. Whereas previous strategies—from Obama to Biden—wrapped security in the language of democracy promotion and multilateralism, Trump’s dispenses entirely with the pretence of universality. What matters are American interests, defined narrowly, almost corporately, as though the United States were a shareholder entity rather than a global hegemon.

It is here that the ghost of Senator William Fulbright quietly enters, warning in 1966 that “The arrogance of power… the belief that we are uniquely qualified to bring order to the world, is a dangerous illusion.” Fulbright’s admonition was directed at the hubris of Vietnam-era expansionism, yet it resonates with uncanny force in relation to Trump’s revived hemispheric ambitions. For despite Trump’s anti-globalist posture, his strategy asserts a unique American role in determining events across two oceans and within an entire hemisphere. The arrogance may simply be wearing a new mask.

Nowhere is this revisionist spirit more vivid than in the so-called “Trump Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine”, perhaps the most controversial American hemispheric declaration since Theodore Roosevelt’s time. The 2025 NSS states without hesitation that “The United States will reassert and enforce the Monroe Doctrine to restore American preeminence in the Western Hemisphere.” Yet unlike Roosevelt, who justified intervention as a form of pre-emptive stabilisation, Trump wraps his corollary in the language of sovereignty and anti-globalism. The hemispheric message is not simply that outside powers must stay out; it is that the United States will decide what constitutes legitimate governance in the region and deny “non-Hemispheric competitors the ability to position forces or other threatening capabilities… in our Hemisphere”.

This wording alone has far-reaching implications for Venezuela, where US forces recently seized a sanctioned supertanker as part of an escalating confrontation with the Maduro government. Maduro, emboldened by support from Russia, Iran, and China’s so-called shadow fleet, frames Trump’s enforcement actions as piracy. But for Trump, this is precisely the point: a demonstration of restored hemispheric authority. In that sense, the 2025 NSS may be the first strategic document in decades to explicitly set the stage for sustained coercive operations in Latin America. The NSS promises “a readjustment of our global military presence to address urgent threats in our Hemisphere.” “Urgent threats” is vague, but in practical military planning, vagueness functions as a permission slip. It is not difficult to see how a state accused of “narco-terrorism” or “crimes against humanity” could be fitted into the category.

The return to hemispheric dominance is paired with a targeted shift in alliance politics. Trump makes it clear that the United States is finished subsidising alliances that do not directly strengthen American security. The NSS lays out the philosophy succinctly: “The days of the United States propping up the entire world order like Atlas are over.” This is a direct repudiation of the language found in Obama’s 2015 NSS, which emphasised that American leadership was indispensable to global stability. Trump rejects that premise outright. Leadership, in his framing, is merely leverage. Allies who fail to meet burden expectations will lose access, influence, and potentially even protection. Nowhere is this more evident than in the push for extraordinary defence spending among NATO allies: “President Trump has set a new global standard with the Hague Commitment… pledging NATO countries to spend 5 percent of GDP on defence.”

In turn, US disengagement from Europe becomes easier to justify. While Trump speaks of “negotiating an expeditious cessation of hostilities in Ukraine”, it requires little sophistication to decode this as a form of managed abandonment—an informal concession that Russia’s negotiating position is stronger, as Trump told Politico. Ukraine may well become a bargaining chip in the trade-off between strategic theatres: Europe shrinks, Asia and Latin America expand. The NSS’s emphasis on Japan, Taiwan, and China is markedly sharper than in 2017.

China looms over the 2025 NSS like an obsession, mentioned over twenty times, not merely as a competitor but as a driving force shaping American policy. Every discussion of technology, alliances, or regional security is filtered through Beijing’s shadow, as if US strategy exists solely to counter China. The strategy’s relentless focus risks turning global priorities into a theatre of paranoia, where the United States reacts constantly, defined less by its own interests than by fear of what China might do next.

It is equally striking that, just nine days after Cyclone Ditwah, the US Indo-Pacific Command deployed two C130 aircraft—capable of landing at only three locations in Sri Lanka, well away from the hardest-hit areas—and orchestrated a highly choreographed media performance, enlisting local outlets and social media influencers seemingly more concerned with flaunting American boots on the ground than delivering “urgent” humanitarian aid. History shows this is not unprecedented: US forces have repeatedly arrived under the banner of humanitarian assistance—Operation Restore Hope in Somalia (1992) later escalated into full security and combat operations; interventions in Haiti during the 1990s extended into long-term peacekeeping and training missions; and Operation United Assistance in Liberia (2014) built a lasting US operational presence beyond the Ebola response.

Trump’s NSS, meanwhile, states that deterring conflict in East Asia is a “priority”, and that the United States seeks to ensure that “US technology and US standards—particularly in AI, biotech, and quantum computing—drive the world forward.” Combined with heightened expectations of Japan, which is rapidly rearming, Trump’s strategic map shows a clear preference: if Europe cannot or will not defend itself, Asia might.

What makes the 2025 NSS uniquely combustible, however, is the combination of ideological framing and operational signalling. Trump explicitly links non-interventionism, long a theme of his political base, to the Founders’ moral worldview. He writes that “Rigid adherence to non-interventionism is not possible… yet this predisposition should set a high bar for what constitutes a justified intervention.”

The Trump NSS is both a blueprint and a warning. It signals a United States abandoning the liberal internationalist project and embracing a transactional, hemispherically focussed, sovereignty-first model. It rewrites the Monroe Doctrine for an age of great-power contest, but in doing so resurrects the very logics of intervention that past presidents have regretted. And in the background, as Trump weighs the cost of Ukraine against the allure of a decisive posture in Asia and the Western Hemisphere, the world is left to wonder whether this new corollary is merely rhetorical theatre or the prelude to a new era of American coercive power. The ambiguity is deliberate, but the direction of travel is unmistakable.

[Correction: In my column last week, I incorrectly stated that India–Russia trade in FY 2024 25 was USD 18 billion; the correct figure is USD 68.7 billion, with a trade deficit of about USD 59 billion. Similarly, India recorded a goods trade surplus of around USD 41.18 billion with the US, not a deficit of USD 42 billion, with exports of USD 86.51 billion and imports of USD 45.33 billion. Total remittances to India in FY 2024 25 were roughly USD 135.46 billion, including USD 25–30 billion from the US. Apologies for the error.]

by Nilantha Ilangamuwa

Features

MEEZAN HADJIAR

Published

20 hours ago

2025/12/14

Thilina Walpola

selfmade businessman who became one of the richest men in the Central Province

I am happy that a book about the life and contribution of Sathkorale Muhamdiramlagedara Segu Abdul Cader Hajiar Mohamed Mohideen better known as Meezan Hadjiar or Meezan Mudalali of Matale [1911—1964] written by Mohammed Fuaji -a former Principal of Zahira College Matale, has now been published by a group of his admirers and relatives. It is a timely addition to the history of Matale district and the Kandyan region which is yet to be described fully as forming a part of the modern history of our country. Coincidentally this book also marks the centenary of Meezan Hadjiars beginning of employment in Matale town which began in 1925.

Matale which was an outlier in the Kandyan Kingdom came into prominence with the growth of plantations for coffee and, after the collapse of the coffee plantations due to the ‘coffee blight’ , for other tree crops . Coffee was followed by the introduction of tea by the early British investors who faced bankruptcy and ruin if they could not quickly find a substitute beverage for coffee.They turned to tea.

The rapid opening of tea plantations in the hill country demanded a large and hardworking labour force which could not be found domestically. This led to the indenturing of Tamil labour from South India on a large scale. These helpless workers were virtually kidnapped from their native villages in India through the Kangani system and they were compelled to migrate to our hill country by the British administration .

Meezan Hadjiar

The route of these indentured workers to the higher elevations of the hill country lay through Matale and the new plantation industry developed in that region thereby dragging it into a new commercial culture and a cash economy. New opportunities were opened up for internal migration particularly for the more adventurous members of the Muslim community who had played a significant role in the Kandyan kingdom particularly as traders,transporters,medical specialists and military advisors.

Diaries of British officials like John D’oyly also show that the Kandyan Muslims were interlocutors between the Kandyan King and British officials of the Low Country as they had to move about across boundaries as traders of scarce commodities like salt, medicines and consumer articles for the Kandyans and arecanuts, gems and spices for the British. Even today there are physical traces of the ‘’Battal’’or caravans of oxen which were used by the Muslims to transport the above mentioned commodities to and from the Kandyan villages to the Low country. Another important facet was that Kandyan Muslims were located in villages close to the entrances to the hill country attesting to their mobility unlike the Kandyan villagers.

Thus Akurana, Galagedera, Kadugannawa, Hataraliyadde and Mawanella which lay in the pathways to enter the inner territory of the Kings domain were populated by ‘Kandyan Muslims’ who had the ear of the King and his high officials. The’’ Ge’’ names and the honorifics given by the King were a testament to their integration with the Sinhala polity. Meezan Hadjiars’’ Ge ‘‘name of Sathkorale Mohandiramlage denotes the mobility of the family from Sathkorale, an outlier division in the Kandyan Kingdom, and Mohandiramlage attests to the higher status in the social hierarchy which probably indicated that his forebears were honoured servants of the king.

Meezan Hadjiar [SM Mohideen] was born and bred in Kurugoda which is a small village in Akurana in Kandy district. He belonged to the family of Abdul Cader who was a patriarch and a well known religious scholar. Cader’s children began their education in the village school but at the age of 12 young Mohideen left his native village to apprentice under a relative who had a business establishment in the heart of Matale town which was growing fast due to the economic boom. It must be stated here that this form of ‘learning the ropes’ as an apprentice’was a common path to business undertaken by many of the later Sri Lankan tycoons of the pre-independence era.

But he did not remain in that position for long .When his mentor failed in his business of trading in cocoa, cardamoms, cloves and arecanuts and wanted to close up his shop young Mohideen took over and eventually made a great success of it. His enterprise succeeded because he was able to earn the trust of both his buyers and sellers. He befriended Sinhalese and Tamil producers and the business he improved beyond measure took on the name of Meezan Estates Ltd [The scales] and Mohideen soon became famous as Meezan Mudalali – perhaps the most successful businessman of his time in Matale. He expanded his business interests to urban real estate as well as tea and rubber estates. Soon he owned over 3,000 acres of tea estates making him one of the richest men in the Central Province.

With his growing influence Meezan spent generously on charitable activities including funding a water scheme for his native village of Kurugoda also serving adjoining villages like Pangollamada located in Akurana. He also gave generously to Buddhist causes in Matale together with other emerging low country businessmen like Gunasena and John Mudalali.

Matale was well known as a town in which all communities lived in harmony and tended to help each other. As a generous public figure he became strong supporter of the UNP and a personal friend of its leaders like Dudley Senanayake and Sir John Kotelawela. UNP candidates for public office-both in the Municipality and Parliament were selected in consultation with Meezan who also bankrolled them during election time. He himself became a Municipal councillor. The Aluvihares of several generations had close links with him. it was Meezan who mentored ACS Hameed – a fellow villager from Kurugoda – and took him to the highest echelons of Sri Lankan politics as Minister of Foreign Affairs. He was a supporter and financier of the UNP through thick and thin.

Though his premature death at the age 53 in 1965 saved him from the worst political witch hunts under SWRD Bandaranaike who was his personal friend it was after 1970 and the Coalition regime that Meezan’s large family were deprived of their livelihood by the taking over of all their estates. Fortunately many of his children were well educated and could hold on till relief was given by President Premadasa despite the objections of their father’s erstwhile protégé ACS Hameed who surprisingly let them down badly.

It is only fitting that we, even a hundred years later, now commemorate a great self made Sri Lankan business magnate and generous contributor to all religious and social causes of his time. His name became synonymous with enterprise in Matale – a district in which I was privileged to serve as Government Agent in the late sixties.He was a model entrepreneur and his large family have also made outstanding contributions to this country which also attest to the late Meezan Hadjiars foresight and vision of a united and prosperous Srilanka.

by SARATH AMUNUGAMA.