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MWL should separate the wheat from the chaff

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By Rohana R. Wasala

Government MP Dr. Wijedasa Rajapaksa, a former Justice Minister and an ex-president of the Bar Association of Sri Lanka, stated over a month ago that the Muslim World League “(owes) families of those who had perished or suffered injuries in the Easter Sunday terror attacks USD 5 mn.” (‘Wijedasa takes it up with Saudi-based outfit’ by Shamindra Ferdinando, The Island, March 25, 2021). This is money that the MWL General Secretary Dr. Sheikh Muhammad Abdul Kareem Al-Issa was said to have promised on behalf of his organization towards the relief of the surviving victims of those attacks at a so-called National Peace Conference held at Nelum Pokuna under the patronage of the then President Maithripala Sirisena on June 30, 2019, a little over two months after the Easter Sunday attacks carried out by eight Islamist suicide bombers in the name of their religion. As claimed by MP Rajapaksa, the Sheikh made the promise in the presence of the then incumbent Sirisena, and former presidents Chandrika Bandaranaike and Mahinda Rajapaksa, among other dignitaries. The same three past presidents dutifully attended the second National Peace Conference on March 5, this year. MP Rajapaksa told The Island that he brought up the issue with the MWL head. This was through a letter of his dated March 22, 2021, where he urged the latter to fulfill what he had promised without further delay. MP Rajapaksa stressed: “Let us hope those who organised the Nelum Pokuna event, too, will take up this matter with the Muslim World League and finalise the transfer of funds before the second anniversary of 2019 Easter Sunday carnage.”

The failure of the MWL was mentioned even at the PCoI, according to the MP, who further said that he had raised the matter with the offices of the previous and present presidents. Dr P.B. Jayasundara (Secretary to the current incumbent) had confirmed that the funds in question had not been received. A letter that the then Western Province Governor A. J. M. Muzammil had received from Muhammad Al-Issa, to which MP Rajapaksa refers, seems to have a hint about the possible reason for the unexplained delay in the payment of the promised financial assistance: it is probably being withheld “pending Sri Lanka providing information relating to the spate of suicide attacks”. Whether the MP’s importunity in the given context is shared by the government is in doubt. What should be of greater concern for the government is the fact that, by contriving to get themselves identified as constituting the  whole Muslim community of the country, the handful of Islamist extremists who are widely believed to have provided tacit or explicit support for the suicide bombers are also foisting themselves on its (the MWL’s) powerful patronage. While being grateful to this organization for offering welcome help at a moment of national distress, Sri Lankan leaders must take care not to allow these Islamist extremists tainted with suspected association with the terrorists who caused that suffering to jeopardise its relations with the traditionally friendly Muslim nations through subterfuge. At the same time, it behoves our leaders to establish the genuineness of the MWL’s intentions and to have a correct understanding of the rationale of its involvement in the post-attack context, before accepting its charity.(Aside: Islamic Jihadists and fanatical Christian proselytizers are minorities that should not for a moment be identified with the traditional Sri Lankan Muslim and Christian communities who have always lived in harmony with the Sinhala Buddhists and Tamil Hindus for centuries. Sri Lanka must take special care to prevent the problematic Islamist and Christian extremist sects from pretending to the outside world that they respectively represent the country’s Muslim and Christian mainstreams in order to subvert its foreign relations as certain powerful Muslim politicos who have somehow contrived to ingratiate themselves with the powers that be seem to be doing at the moment.)

According to the Wikipedia, the Muslim World League is a (Saudi) government-funded NGO, which  was founded in Mecca, Saudi Arabia in 1962. The name suggests that it is about the pan-Islamic Muslim world, not the world in general, which Muslims share with people of other non-Muslim faiths. It came into existence for the purpose of serving Islam and Muslims. Its founding charter, according to the information currently given in the Wikipedia, is as follows:

“We the members of the Muslim World League, representing it religiously, hereby undertake before God, Almighty to: Discharge our obligation towards God, by conveying and proclaiming His Message all over the world. We also reaffirm our belief that there shall be no peace in the world without the application of the principles of Islam. Invite all communities to vie with one another for the common good and happiness of mankind, establish social justice and a better human society. Call upon God to bear witness that we do not intend to undermine, dominate or practice hegemony over anyone else. Hence, in order to further these goals, we intend to: Unite the ranks of the Muslims, and remove all divisive forces from the midst of the Muslim communities around the world. Remove obstacles in the way of establishing the Muslim world union. Support all advocates of charitable deeds. Utilize our spiritual as well as material and moral potentialities in furthering the aims of this charter. Unify efforts in order to achieve these purposes in a positive and practical way. Reject all the pretenses of ancient as well as contemporary Jahiliyah (attitudes of the pre-Islamic era). Always reaffirm the fact that Islam has no place for either regionalism or racism.”

The organization has thus an extensive global agenda with inevitable, wide ranging, religious, educational, cultural, legal, and political implications, particularly for non-Muslim countries Sri Lanka, given that the organization is committed to foster the fiercely conservative brand of Islam, Wahhabism (or Salafism), which is Saudi Arabia’s state religion. It will, among other things, include laying down plans designed to revive the role of the Mosque in the fields of guidance, education, preaching and provision of social services, conducting a comprehensive survey of the world’s Mosques and publishing the information gathered in book form and in the shape of periodical bulletins, selecting and posting groups of well qualified preachers on guidance missions throughout the Mosques of the world, formation of board of directors to supervise the affairs of each and every Mosque at the national as well as the regional levels, studying the ideas and patterns of behavior that contravene the teachings of Islam, and helping in rehabilitating and training Imams and khateebs for posting to the various Muslim areas to lead Muslims in prayers, deliver sermons and guidance lessons (a khateeb is a person who delivers a sermon during Friday prayers).

As the Wikipedia further informs us, all Saudi Arabian citizens are legally required to be Muslims. They don’t have the right to freedom of religion (as the term is understood in democratic countries); nor do the expatriate workers employed in the Saudi kingdom. The official and dominant form of Islam practiced in Saudi Arabia is Wahhabism (also called Salafism) which emerged in the 18th century. Its adherents believe that its teachings “purify the practice of Islam of innovations or practices that deviate from the seventh century teachings of Muhammad and his companions”. Saudi Arabia has long been accused of being the principal exporter of Islamist extremism (WikiLeaks cables).  “… Saudi Arabia arguably remains the most prolific sponsor of international Islamist terrorism, allegedly supporting groups as disparate as the Afghanistan Taliban, Al Qaeda, Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and the Al-Nusra Front… Saudi Arabia is said to be the world’s largest source of funds and promoter of Salafist jihadism …. which forms the ideological basis of terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda, Taliban, Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant and others” (‘State-sponsored terrorism’/Wikipedia/Page last edited 14 April 2021). Saudi Arabia denies these allegations, but the Wikipedia entry mentions the prevalent argument that by its very nature Wahhabism/Salafism “encourages intolerance and promotes terrorism”.  

The MWL, while propagating the religion of Islam, encourages Dawah (lit. issuing summons to/euphemistically, inviting or calling non-Muslims to join, i.e., preaching to them) and conversion of non-Muslims; funds construction of mosques and provides financial relief for Muslims affected by natural disasters; finances distribution of copies of the Quran and political tracts on Muslim minority groups. Though the organization claims that “they reject all acts of violence and promote dialogue with the people of other cultures, within their understanding of Sharia”, they are not free from controversy on that point, having been the subject of several ongoing counter terrorism investigations in the US related to Hamas, al Qaeda and other terrorist groups”

However, since 2016, the Muslim World League has been claiming to be dedicated to combating extremist ideology, and to confronting hatred, disunity and violence closely associated with extremism. The US State Department, in its 2019 Country Reports on Terrorism, stated that the Muslim World League’s Secretary General, Muhammad Abdul Kareem Al-Issa “pressed a message of interfaith dialogue, religious tolerance, and peaceful coexistence with global religious authorities, including Muslim imams outside the Arab world.” The same document said that he “conducted extensive outreach to prominent U.S. Jewish and Christian leaders”. No doubt, the MWL is on the same pious mission in Sri Lanka. We may be hopeful that the MWL leader will similarly reach out to the non-Muslim 90% of the Sri Lankan population comprising Christians, Hindus, and Buddhists.

But whether the assurances given to the powerful US will hold for a small non-Muslim country like ours is still a moot point. The  MWL’s sponsor Saudi Arabia is an absolute monarchy without a legislature (Wikipedia), let alone an elected legislature; its state religion Sunni Islam or Wahhabism,  is growing to be the majority Buddhist Sri Lanka’s scourge, unless checked in time with the help of the predominantly Sufi mainstream Muslim minority, who have peacefully coexisted with the majority Buddhist and other non-Muslim minorities for centuries. The MWL’s post-April 21, 2019 interest or involvement in Sri Lanka should be judged according to its uncompromising commitment to “serving Islam and Muslims” everywhere as explained in the foregoing account. The rich and powerful Saudi-funded, Saudi-basedl Wahhabism-inspired NGO outfit’s patronage of Sri Lanka’s approximately 10% Muslim minority is bound to have understandably important repercussions. 

One could argue that the so-called National Conference on Peace, Harmony and Coexistence that introduced the MWL to the country just two months after the April 21 Islamist terror bombings, in effect, both ‘nationalised’ and ‘internationalised’ Sri lanka’s still nascent Islamic fundamentalist problem. Unless sorted out early, this is not going to do any good to the peaceful and harmonious coexistence which all Sri Lankans of different ethnicities and cultures have been enjoying to date mainly thanks to the influence of the country’s extremely accommodating, tolerant Buddhist cultural foundation, something that is today universally accepted and appreciated by all peaceful non-Buddhist minorities. Through its friendly outreach to the non-Muslim majority, the MWL can hope to further strengthen the already existing interfaith harmony and peaceful coexistence in our island nation. It is heartening that the Saudis now reject extremist ideology and terrorism. However, unfortunately, this cannot be asserted without reservations.

According to  The Island news report mentioned above, Secretary to former president Sirisena, Samira de Silva, told the paper that the MWL was delaying the payment because the National Peace Conference event organizers had still not responded to the following questions: “(1) the number of dead and wounded (2) their faith (religion) (3) list of the dead and the wounded (4) collateral damage to public property (5) number of widows and orphans (6) other relevant information and (7) account number of the President’s or  Prime Minister’s charitable fund”. 

To my mind, these are not charitable questions that we would expect a genuinely humanitarian organization to ask. Why should they demand specific information about the victims’ religion and their particular identities? The term ‘collateral damage’ refers to unintended, but unavoidable, accidentally caused, damage to civilians’ lives and their property during a military conflict. The NGO also calls for the account number of the President’s or Prime Minister’s charitable fund.  

Why all this cheeseparing for the insultingly derisory sum of 5 mn US Dollars by a rich Saudi government funded NGO? For Saudi Arabia with its relatively small population of 34.2 million (2019 estimate) and its GDP at 1.9 trillion US Dollars and per capita income at 56,817 US Dollars (Wikipedia), it is peanuts. Of course, the 5 mn dollar sum (roughly the equivalent of 1 billion currently debased SL rupees) is not intended to sound like a big amount to Sri Lankans, for that would be an affront to their general knowledge.

The Island report said: “According to a missive received from Dr. Jayasundera, the Muslim World League was to directly get in touch with the Prime Minister’s Office to finalise the matter”. Dr Jayasundera is Secretary to President Gotabaya Rajapaksa, who seems to have transferred the ‘matter’ to the PM. 



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Opinion

Remembering Dr. Samuel Mathew: A Heart that Healed Countless Lives

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It is with a deeply heavy heart that I express my sincere condolences on the passing of Dr. Samuel Mathew Kalarickal on the 20th of April 2024. Born in 1948, Dr. Samuel was not only a pioneer of interventional cardiology in India but a giant in South Asian healthcare whose influence extended far beyond national borders.

A Beacon of Excellence and Compassion

Known as the “Father of Angioplasty” in India, Dr. Samuel introduced life-saving coronary interventions when they were still rare. His leadership at Apollo Hospitals and Kokilaben Dhirubhai Ambani Hospital brought cardiac care to global standards. But beyond the accolades, it was his humility, compassion, and unwavering dedication to patients that truly set him apart.

A Lasting Impact on Sri Lanka

Dr. Samuel played a pivotal role in shaping modern cardiac care in Sri Lanka. In the 1990s and early 2000s, many Sri Lankan patients sought his expertise in India, trusting him with their lives. He treated them with care and dignity, leaving lasting impressions on families across the island.

He also trained and mentored numerous Sri Lankan cardiologists, generously sharing knowledge of advanced procedures and technologies. His efforts helped uplift cardiac care back home and empowered many of us to bring those skills to our own communities.

A Mentor Who Lit the Path

To me, Dr. Samuel was more than a mentor—he was a fatherly figure. I fondly recall our time at the 2011 Coimbatore meeting, where he urged me to form the Sri Lanka STEMI Forum. His guidance helped us create national strategies and treatment models for heart attack care—an initiative that continues to save lives today.

A Legacy That Lives On

Dr. Samuel leaves behind more than medical breakthroughs. He leaves behind a legacy of service, inspiration, and heart. His memory will live on in every life he touched, every doctor he guided, and every patient he healed.

You will be remembered always, Sir—not just for what you did, but for who you were.
May your soul find eternal peace.

Dr Gotabhaya Ranasinghe

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Trump tariffs and their effect on world trade and economy with particular reference to Sri Lanka – Part V

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Image courtesy Al Jazeera

(Continued from yesterday)

Domestic Market Development

While Sri Lanka’s relatively small domestic market (22 million people) limits the potential for inward-focused development, there may be opportunities to reduce import dependence in certain sectors and develop stronger linkages between export industries and domestic suppliers. This could create more balanced growth and reduce vulnerability to external shocks.

Policies to support domestic market development might include,

  •  Import Substitution in Strategic Sectors: Targeted support for domestic production of essential goods and inputs to export industries, reducing dependency on imports.

  •  Strengthening Domestic Supply Chains: Developing stronger linkages between export-oriented firms and local suppliers to increase domestic value addition.

  •  Addressing Income Inequality: Policies that increase purchasing power among lower and middle-income Sri Lankans could expand the domestic market for locally produced goods and services.

Such approaches would need to avoid the pitfalls of earlier import substitution models that created inefficient, protected industries. The focus should be on developing competitive domestic capabilities rather than simply erecting barriers to imports.

Policy Recommendations

Based on the analysis of both short-term and longer-term strategies, several specific policy recommendations emerge for Sri Lanka,

Industrial Policy Reforms

Sri Lanka should develop a comprehensive industrial policy that goes beyond the current focus on export promotion to address structural vulnerabilities revealed by the tariff shock. This policy should,

  •  Identify priority sectors for diversification based on a realistic assessment of Sri Lanka’s competitive advantages and global market opportunities.

  •  Provide targeted support for research and development, skills training, and quality infrastructure in these priority sectors.

  •  Reform regulatory frameworks to reduce barriers to business formation, innovation, and growth.

  •  Develop specific strategies for upgrading within existing export sectors like textiles, helping firms move into higher-value activities.

Investment in Innovation and Skills

Human capital development represents a critical foundation for economic resilience and diversification. Sri Lanka should,

  •  Align education and training systems more closely with emerging economic opportunities, emphasizing technical skills, digital literacy, and innovation capabilities.

  •  Support university-industry collaboration to develop applied research relevant to Sri Lanka’s economic challenges.

  •  Facilitate knowledge transfer through diaspora engagement, international partnerships, and strategic foreign direct investment.

  •  Develop innovation hubs and incubators focused on priority sectors for diversification.

Sustainable Debt Management

The tariff shock highlights the importance of building greater resilience into Sri Lanka’s approach to external debt. Recommendations include,

  •  Advocating for reforms to international debt restructuring frameworks that would explicitly link repayment obligations to export performance, similar to the London Debt Agreement model.

  •  Developing contingency clauses in future debt agreements that would automatically adjust payment terms in response to external shocks beyond the country’s control.

  •  Prioritizing concessional financing over commercial borrowing where possible to reduce vulnerability to market sentiment.

  •  Building stronger foreign exchange reserves during periods of stability to provide buffers against future shocks.

Social Protection for Affected Workers

Finally, Sri Lanka must develop more robust systems to protect vulnerable workers during economic transitions. Recommendations include,

  •  Establishing a dedicated adjustment assistance program for workers displaced by trade shocks, providing income support, retraining, and job placement services.

  •  Developing community-based support initiatives in regions highly dependent on export industries.

  •  Engaging international partners to support these efforts through technical and financial assistance.

  •  Ensuring that economic diversification strategies explicitly address employment creation for workers with different skill profiles.

Implementing these recommendations would require significant political will, institutional capacity, and international support. However, the current crisis created by President Trump’s tariffs also presents an opportunity to address long-standing structural vulnerabilities and build a more resilient economic model for Sri Lanka’s future development, just like what Sri Lanka did post economic crisis, such as tax reforms, SOE reforms and cost reflective pricing.

CONCLUSION

The imposition of sweeping tariffs by the Trump administration represents a profound disruption to the global trading system with far-reaching consequences for economies around the world. As we have seen throughout this analysis, these tariffs are not merely technical adjustments to trade policy but potentially transformative shifts that challenge fundamental assumptions about economic development, international cooperation, and the distribution of benefits and costs in our interconnected global economy.

For Sri Lanka, the 44% tariff rate imposed on its exports to the United States threatens to undermine a fragile economic recovery and reverse hard-won progress following the devastating crisis of 2022. With the United States accounting for 23% of Sri Lanka’s exports and the textile industry, which employs 350,000 workers, particularly vulnerable to this trade shock, the human consequences could be severe. Projected losses of $300 million in annual export earnings not only threaten jobs and livelihoods but also raise serious concerns about Sri Lanka’s ability to service its external debt obligations, despite recent restructuring efforts.

Sri Lanka’s experience illuminates broader structural vulnerabilities in the global economic system. The export-led development model promoted by international financial institutions for decades has created deep dependencies on continued access to wealthy consumer markets, particularly the United States. When this access is suddenly restricted through unilateral policy decisions, developing countries bear disproportionate adjustment costs with limited capacity to cushion the impact. The international trade and financial architecture offer inadequate mechanisms to address such shocks, with debt sustainability frameworks failing to properly account for trade performance and multilateral institutions lacking effective tools to prevent or mitigate the damage.

This situation calls for both immediate crisis response and longer-term structural reforms. In the short term, Sri Lanka must pursue diplomatic engagement with the United States, provide targeted support to affected industries within its fiscal constraints, and implement emergency measures to protect vulnerable workers. Over the longer term, strategies for market and product diversification, value chain upgrading, regional integration, and domestic market development offer pathways to greater resilience, though none provides a quick or easy solution to the current challenge.

Beyond Sri Lanka’s specific circumstances, President Trump’s tariffs may accelerate broader shifts in global trade patterns. We may see increased regionalization of trade, a greater role for China as both market and investor for developing economies, production relocation to avoid tariffs, and renewed interest in South-South cooperation and domestic market development. These shifts could fundamentally reshape the global economic landscape in ways that create both risks and opportunities for developing countries.

The tariff shock also highlights the need for more fundamental reforms to the international economic system. A more equitable approach to trade and development would recognize the structural challenges facing developing economies and provide meaningful policy space for them to pursue diversification and resilience-building strategies. Debt sustainability frameworks should explicitly link repayment obligations to export performance, acknowledging the fundamental importance of trade capacity to debt service ability. And multilateral institutions should develop more effective mechanisms to prevent unilateral actions that disproportionately harm vulnerable economies.

For Sri Lanka specifically, this moment of crisis also presents an opportunity for reflection and reform. The country’s heavy dependence on a narrow range of exports to a small number of markets has created vulnerabilities that predate President Trump’s tariffs. A comprehensive strategy for economic diversification, encompassing both products and markets, could create greater resilience against future shocks while potentially opening new pathways for more inclusive and sustainable development.

Ultimately, the story of Trump’s tariffs and their impact on Sri Lanka reminds us that behind abstract economic policies and trade statistics lie real human lives and communities. The textile worker in a factory outside Colombo, the small business owner supplying packaging materials to exporters, the rural family dependent on remittances from a daughter employed in the garment industry, these are the people who will bear the true cost of these tariff policies. Their futures hang in the balance as global economic forces shaped by decisions in Washington ripple outward to distant shores.

As the international community responds to this disruption in global trade, we would do well to centre these human impacts in our analysis and policy responses. A truly equitable international economic system must not only facilitate the efficient exchange of goods and services but also ensure that the benefits of global integration and the costs of economic adjustment are distributed fairly between wealthy and developing nations. President Trump’s tariffs have exposed how far we remain from this ideal, and how urgently we need to work toward a more balanced and inclusive model of global economic cooperation.

Rethinking Trade Metrics: It’s the Current Account, Not Just the Trade Balance

While the Trump administration frames its tariff decisions around bilateral trade deficits in goods, that gives a very skewed picture. The true measure of how our economies are actually connected between nations is the current account, which includes not just the balance of goods, but also services, investment income, and transfer payments.

Take Sri Lanka, while it may appear to run a surplus in goods trade with the U.S., that surplus is more than offset by,

  •  Payments for U.S.-based tech and streaming services (Google, Netflix, Apple)

  •  Outbound tourism and overseas education costs

  •  Interest payments on sovereign debt owed to institutions like the IMF and World Bank, whose returns flow back to major shareholders, including the U.S.

This broader deficit in the current account illustrates that Sri Lanka is not exploiting the U.S., but rather taking part in a back-and-forth economic relationship that is already tilted toward the American economy.

Basing tariff policy solely on trade deficits in goods completely misses this bigger economic picture, and risks harming the very development partners whose growth would ultimately benefit the global economy, including the United States.

(Concluded)

(The writer served as the Minister of Justice, Finance and Foreign Affairs of Sri Lanka)

Disclaimer:

This article contains projections and scenario-based analysis based on current economic trends, policy statements, and historical behaviour patterns. While every effort has been made to ensure factual accuracy using publicly available data and established economic models, certain details, particularly regarding future policy decisions and their impacts, remain hypothetical. These projections are intended to inform discussion and analysis, not to predict outcomes with certainty.

by M. U. M. Ali Sabry
President’s Counsel

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Opinion

Trump tariffs and their effect on world trade and economy with particular reference to Sri Lanka – Part IV

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(Continued from yesterday)

Critique of the International Trade System

President Trump’s tariffs have also highlighted fundamental inequities in the international trade and financial architecture that governs economic relations between wealthy and developing nations.

The World Trade Organization, theoretically designed to provide a rules-based trading system that benefits all members, has proven largely powerless to prevent unilateral actions by powerful economies like the United States. While China has urged the WTO to investigate President Trump’s tariffs as violations of the “most favoured nation” principle that forms the bedrock of the multilateral trading system, the organization lacks effective enforcement mechanisms against major powers.

Similarly, international financial institutions like the IMF have failed to adequately account for trade shocks in their lending programmes and debt sustainability analyses. As discussed earlier, the IMF’s approach to Sri Lanka’s debt restructuring focused primarily on fiscal consolidation while paying insufficient attention to the country’s

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structural trade deficit and vulnerability to external shocks. When Trump’s tariffs suddenly reduce Sri Lanka’s export earnings, the IMF program offers no automatic adjustment mechanisms to accommodate this changed reality.

This situation stands in stark contrast to historical examples of more equitable treatment of indebted nations. The London Debt Agreement of 1953, which restructured West Germany’s external debts, explicitly linked repayment obligations to the country’s trade performance and capped debt service at a sustainable percentage of export earnings. Such an approach recognised the fundamental importance of trade capacity to debt sustainability, a recognition largely absent from contemporary debt restructuring frameworks.

The tariff shock thus reveals not merely technical flaws in trade policy but deeper structural inequities in how the global economic system distributes risks, rewards, and adjustment costs between wealthy and developing nations. While powerful economies can unilaterally reshape trading relationships to serve their domestic political objectives, developing countries must largely accept these changes as given constraints and bear disproportionate costs of adjustment.

Potential Reshaping of Global Trade Patterns

Looking beyond the immediate disruption, President Trump’s tariffs may accelerate several longer-term shifts in global trade patterns with significant implications for developing economies.

First, we may see accelerated regionalisation of trade as countries seek to reduce vulnerability to U.S. policy shifts. Asian economies may deepen integration through mechanisms like the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), while African countries might accelerate the implementation of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA). These regional arrangements could provide alternative markets for exports previously destined for the United States, though the transition would be neither quick nor painless.

Second, China’s role as both a market and investor for developing economies may expand further. As U.S. tariffs effectively close off portions of its market, developing countries may look more intensively toward China as an export destination and source of development finance. This shift would have significant geopolitical implications, potentially accelerating the fragmentation of the global economy into competing blocs centred around major powers.

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Third, some production may relocate to avoid tariffs, creating winners and losers among developing countries. Nations with lower tariff rates or special exemptions could see increased investment as firms restructure supply chains to minimise trade costs. This dynamic could intensify competition among developing countries for foreign investment, potentially triggering a “race to the bottom” on labour and environmental standards.

Fourth, there may be renewed interest in domestic market development and South-South trade as alternatives to excessive dependence on wealthy consumer markets. While the limited purchasing power in many developing countries constrains this option in the short term, over time it could lead to more balanced and resilient development models.

These potential shifts suggest that President Trump’s tariffs may represent not merely a temporary disruption but a catalyst for more fundamental reconfiguration of global trade patterns. For developing economies like Sri Lanka, navigating this changing landscape will require strategic foresight, policy innovation, and international cooperation to ensure that the emerging trade architecture better serves their development needs than the system currently being disrupted.

POTENTIAL MITIGATION STRATEGIES FOR SRI LANKA

Faced with the severe economic challenge posed by Trump’s 44% tariff, Sri Lanka must develop a comprehensive response strategy that addresses both immediate threats and longer-term structural vulnerabilities. This section explores potential approaches at different time horizons, from emergency measures to fundamental economic reorientation.

Short-term Responses

In the immediate term, Sri Lanka’s government and private sector must focus on crisis management to minimise damage to export industries and protect vulnerable workers. Several approaches warrant consideration.

Government Support for Affected Industries

The Sri Lankan government could implement targeted support measures for export sectors most affected by the tariffs, particularly the textile and apparel industry. These might include temporary tax relief, subsidised credit facilities, or reduced

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utility rates for export-oriented manufacturers. Such measures could help companies weather the initial shock while they develop adaptation strategies.

However, Sri Lanka’s fiscal constraints present a significant challenge to implementing such support. The country’s IMF programme imposes strict limits on government spending and deficit targets, while tax increases have been a central component of the economic stabilisation strategy. Any support measures would therefore need to be carefully designed to remain within these constraints or negotiated as exceptions with the IMF based on the external nature of the shock.

One potential approach would be to reallocate existing resources rather than expanding overall spending. For instance, funds previously earmarked for export promotion in the U.S. market, if any, could be redirected toward supporting market diversification efforts or providing temporary relief to affected companies.

Diplomatic Engagement with the United States

Sri Lanka should pursue active diplomatic engagement with the United States to seek modifications to the tariff regime. While the country’s limited economic leverage makes a complete exemption unlikely, there may be opportunities to negotiate targeted relief for specific product categories or to secure technical assistance for adjustment.

The Sri Lankan government could emphasise several arguments in these discussions, the disproportionate impact of the tariffs on a country still recovering from economic crisis, the potential humanitarian consequences of mass unemployment in the textile sector, and the strategic importance of economic stability in Sri Lanka for regional security in the Indian Ocean.

One of the most compelling arguments Sri Lanka can make is the need to move beyond narrow fixation on the trade balance and instead consider a broader current account. While Sri Lanka may show a surplus in goods trade with the U.S., that figure is only a part of the story. Our economy is deeply integrated with U.S. linked services. We pay for American banking and credit card services, subscribe to streaming platforms like Netflix and Amazon, purchase of software and apps from Apple and Google, remit interest payment on loans from international banks, bond holders and multilateral institutions, and spend on tourism and education. When all of these outflows are taken into account, the so called “imbalance” is far more nuanced if not fully offset. This is why a fair and modern economic analysist must consider the full current account, not just goods trade in isolation.

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Engagement should occur through multiple channels, including direct bilateral discussions, multilateral forums like the WTO, and coordination with other affected developing countries to amplify collective concerns. Sri Lanka might also leverage its relationships with international financial institutions like the World Bank and IMF, which could highlight the risks the tariffs pose to the country’s economic recovery program.

Emergency Economic Measures

If the full impact of the tariffs materializes, Sri Lanka may need to implement emergency economic measures to maintain macroeconomic stability. These could include temporary foreign exchange controls to prioritize essential imports, accelerated disbursement of already-committed international financial support, or emergency borrowing from friendly countries or international institutions.

The Central Bank of Sri Lanka might need to adjust monetary policy to respond to potential currency pressures resulting from reduced export earnings. However, any such adjustments would need to be balanced against inflation concerns, which remain sensitive following the recent crisis.

Social Protection for Affected Workers

Protecting workers who lose jobs or face reduced hours due to the tariff impact should be a priority. The government could expand existing social safety net programs to specifically target affected textile workers, potentially with support from international donors or development agencies.

Measures might include temporary unemployment benefits, retraining programmess for displaced workers, or community-based support initiatives in areas with high concentrations of textile employment. Given fiscal constraints, international support would likely be necessary to fund such programmes adequately.

Medium to Long-term Strategies

Beyond immediate crisis response, Sri Lanka must develop strategies to reduce vulnerability to future trade shocks and create a more resilient economic model. Several approaches deserve consideration.

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Market Diversification Beyond the United States

Reducing dependence on the U.S. market represents an obvious but challenging strategy. Potential alternative markets include,

* European Union: Already Sri Lanka’s second-largest export destination, the EU offers preferential access through its GSP+ scheme. Expanding exports to Europe would require meeting stringent standards and potentially adjusting product offerings to suit European consumer preferences.

* Regional Markets: Increasing exports to India, China, and other Asian economies could leverage geographical proximity and growing middle-class consumer bases. This would require navigating complex regional trade agreements and potentially developing new product categories better suited to these markets.

* Emerging Markets: Countries in the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America represent potential growth opportunities, though penetrating these markets would require significant market research and relationship building.

The Joint Apparel Association Forum’s statement that “We have no alternate market that we can possibly target instead of the US” reflects the difficulty of this transition. Established buyer relationships, specialized production capabilities, and compliance certifications all create path dependencies that make market diversification a multi-year project rather than an immediate solution.

Product Diversification Beyond Textiles

Sri Lanka’s heavy reliance on textile and apparel exports creates vulnerability to sector-specific shocks. Diversifying the export basket could create greater resilience, though this too represents a long-term structural challenge rather than a quick fix.

Promising sectors for export diversification include:

* Information Technology and Business Process Outsourcing: Sri Lanka has developed a growing IT/BPO sector that could be expanded with appropriate investment in education, infrastructure, and international marketing.

* High-Value Agricultural Products: Speciality tea, spices, and organic produce could command premium prices in international markets while building on Sri Lanka’s agricultural traditions.

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Sustainable Manufacturing: Leveraging Sri Lanka’s relatively strong environmental credentials to develop green manufacturing capabilities in emerging sectors like electric vehicle components or renewable energy equipment.

Tourism Services: While not directly affected by goods tariffs, expanding tourism could help diversify foreign exchange earnings. However, this sector’s vulnerability to external shocks (as demonstrated during the pandemic) suggests it should be one component of a diversification strategy rather than its centrepiece.

Successful product diversification would require coordinated public-private investment in research and development, skills training, quality infrastructure, and international marketing. It would also necessitate a supportive policy environment that reduces barriers to innovation and entrepreneurship.

Value Chain Upgrading

Even within existing export sectors like textiles, Sri Lanka could pursue strategies to capture more value and reduce vulnerability to tariffs. Moving up the value chain from basic contract manufacturing to design, product development, branding, and direct-to-consumer sales could increase margins and provide greater control over market access.

Some Sri Lankan companies have already begun this transition, developing their own brands or establishing direct relationships with consumers through e-commerce platforms. Government support for such initiatives through design education, intellectual property protection, and export promotion could accelerate this evolution.

Regional Trade Integration

Deepening integration with regional trade blocs could provide both alternative markets and opportunities for participation in regional value chains. Sri Lanka is a member of the South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA) and has bilateral trade agreements with India, Pakistan, and Singapore, and more recently with Thailand, though implementation challenges have limited their effectiveness.

More ambitious regional integration through mechanisms like the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) or the proposed Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) Free

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Trade Area could create new opportunities. However, managing domestic concerns about increased competition from larger economies like India and China would require careful policy design and implementation. (To be continued)

(The writer served as the Minister of Justice, Finance and Foreign Affairs of Sri Lanka)

Disclaimer:

This article contains projections and scenario-based analysis based on current economic trends, policy statements, and historical behaviour patterns. While every effort has been made to ensure factual accuracy using publicly available data and established economic models, certain details, particularly regarding future policy decisions and their impacts, remain hypothetical. These projections are intended to inform discussion and analysis, not to predict outcomes with certainty.

(To be concluded)

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