Features
Mangala’s Economics
I found Karma inexplicable that such an effective Politician was not only taken away prematurely, but we were also denied the right to pay our respects as well.
In recent times, as Foreign Minister he ensured that our International relations were at their best ever.
His period as Finance Minister saw us register with long overdue financial discipline, two consecutive years of primary revenue surpluses in 2017 and 18, for the first time after over fifty years .
In a brief stint as Sports Minister he inspired Vijay Malalasekera’s Interim Committee to such an extent that we recorded our most successful years in International Cricket, with Integrity unquestioned !
Above all he was a very decent, humble, honest and civilised human being and was blessed in consequence with a Midas touch as his tenures will confirm.
We can all stand proudly and say “Here indeed was a true Statesman”
So Let us console ourselves that fate took him prematurely, to enable an early rebirth through his good Karma, and a path thereafter in Politics that will see him as the Head of State of a New Sri Lanka within forty years !
A prosperous era when educated Parliamentarians will adorn that revered Institution, with Country,, ALL its people and self in that order as their priorities and a Parliament that will conduct its affairs with dignity making its people truly proud
“Mangala” deserves that posthumous reward.
In the Interim Dear Sir, Rest in Peace.
A Grateful Citizen
by Deshal de Mel
When Mangala Samaraweera took over the Finance Ministry portfolio in May 2017 Sri Lanka was preparing to face some of its most challenging years in macroeconomic management. 2018 was the year that the government had to make its highest ever domestic debt repayments (LKR 922 billion in capital repayments of domestic debt. For context, in 2020 the domestic debt capital repayment was LKR 456 billion). In 2019 Sri Lanka had to make its highest ever foreign debt repayments (LKR 575 billion foreign capital repayments in 2019. In 2018 the foreign capital repayment was LKR 315 billion and in 2020 it was LKR 505 billion).
In addition to managing an economy where annual debt service payments (LKR 2,022 billion in 2019) were higher than government revenue (LKR 1,891 billion in 2019), in mid-2017 the country was in the midst of its worst drought in 40 years. Agricultural incomes had been decimated and the economy was also hurting from devastating floods in other parts of the country. The fragile coalition between President Maithripala Sirisena’s SLFP and Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe’s UNF was also beginning to show the first signs of cracks as a two year honeymoon period was over. Amidst these challenges Mangala’s time was largely focused on firefighting these critical issues. That did not stop him from taking on some of the most important macroeconomic reforms during his two year stint as Minister of Finance.
Addressing Sri Lanka’s Fiscal Weakness
1996 was the year that Sri Lanka won the cricket world cup but it was also the last year that Sri Lanka had a government revenue to GDP ratio of over 20% (it was 20.1%that year and was consistently above 20% over many years prior to that). Since then revenue had declined dramatically, reaching a nadir of 11.6% in 2014. This was amongst the lowest government revenue performances in the world. Sri Lanka’s recent public expenditure ranging between 17% and 20% of GDP was not high by global standards. As of 2020 Sri Lanka’s government expenditure comprised largely non-discretionary spending including salaries and wages (6% of GDP), interest (6% of GDP), welfare and transfers (4% of GDP). Therefore there is very little room to meaningfully reduce expenditure in a practical manner.
The main causative factor behind Sri Lanka’s consistently high budget deficits was its weak revenue base. Sri Lanka also has an extremely regressive tax structure. As at 2017 approximately 82% of tax revenue was collected as taxes on goods and services and 18% as taxes on income and other direct taxes. Typically taxes on goods and services (indirect taxes) fall disproportionately on the poor. A family would pay the same tax on milk powder regardless of whether their household income is Rs. 50,000 or Rs. 500,000. This was how over 80% of Sri Lanka’s taxes have been collected. This reliance on taxes on goods and services has also contributed to driving up the cost of living as the tax component of prices continues to increase.
Mangala’s simple principle for taxation policy was that the government should wherever possible reduce upfront taxes and costs that disincentivize the commencement or establishment of business. However, once a business is established and profitable, it should pay its fair share in income taxes. This was the opposite to the reality at the time — Sri Lanka’s taxes had hitherto been front loaded into indirect taxes such as cess, PAL, NBT, and VAT — whereas income taxes are low and corporates enjoy a range of income tax holidays. As a result there is typically a high cost of entry into industry and limited competition among established players.
Taxes on incomes have been low for several reasons including open-ended tax holidays, weak collections reliant on self-declaration, and other leakages. The Inland Revenue Act of 2017 was drafted in order to address as many of these issues as possible.
In general the new legislation intended to shift to a rule based tax structure, moving away from discretionary policy which leaves room for leakages and graft. The IRA had important positive impacts on tax collection. Even though the legislation came into effect in April 2018, the full impact of the legislation would only be seen in November 2019 when the 2019/20 filing is completed. The results were impressive. There was a 44% growth in income tax collection in 2019 in spite of major shocks to the economy, tax payers registered with the Inland Revenue Department in 2018 was 986,684 and by 2019 it had increased to 1,505,552. Most importantly, in 2019 the ratio of direct taxes to indirect taxes shifted to 75% to 25% from 83% to 17% in the previous year. Even though marginal, this was an improvement in Sri Lanka’s highly regressive tax structure.
Primary Surpluses
One of Mangala’s key fiscal objectives at MoF was to achieve a primary surplus in the budget. Since independence, Sri Lanka had achieved a primary surplus only in 1954, 1955, and (marginally) in 1992. A primary surplus in the budget occurs when revenue exceeds expenditure minus interest cost. It is the measure of fiscal management that is truly within the control of the Minister of Finance since the past interest cost is payment for past sins. When a primary surplus is achieved it means the government’s revenue exceeds its non-interest expenditure. A primary deficit means the government has to borrow even to finance interest which is undesirable from a debt sustainability perspective. In 2017 Sri Lanka had a primary surplus of Rs.2 billion and in 2018 Rs. 91 billion (0.6% of GDP).
2017 (5.5% of GDP) and 2018 (5.3% of GDP) also saw two of the lowest budget deficits in Sri Lanka’s recent past. In 2016 as well Sri Lanka limited its budget deficit to 5.3% and in 2013 the deficit was 5.4%. However prior to that the only time the budget deficit dipped below 5.3% was in 1977 (4.5% of GDP).
A critique of this achievement is that even though the government had primary surpluses in 2017 and 2018, and the overall debt to GDP decreased in 2017 (from 79% to 78% of GDP), debt to GDP increased to 84.2% in 2018. The reason behind the increase in debt to GDP in 2018 was because of the depreciation of the currency that year due to the global taper tantrum early in the year as the Federal Reserve raised interest rates and the constitutional crisis later that year. When currency weakens, the rupee value of external debt increases, causing the debt to GDP ratio to increase, in spite of the gains made in real fiscal management, which is what can be controlled by the Minister of Finance.
There is also a perception that the decline in GDP growth rates was due to enhanced government revenue measures. However, quarterly GDP growth from Q1 2015 to Q3 2018 averaged 4.3%. This was keeping in line with the average growth levels of 2013 (3.5%) and 2014 (5%). Just as the economy was recovering from the droughts of 2017, this momentum was lost due to the constitutional coup in October 2018 which dragged down Q4 2018 growth to 2.1%. The resulting capital flight and forex reserve sales to defend the rupee resulted in negative market liquidity and higher interest rates that carried on well into 2019, compounded by the Easter Sunday attacks, dragging down 2019 growth as well.

Fuel Price Reform
In early 2018 the hopes of shifting to a market based fuel price formula were fading. This was potentially a major reform given the significant fiscal burden created over the years due to mis-pricing of petrol and diesel and weak balance sheet management by CPC. These factors combined to result in CPC running up debts over LKR 300 billion, mostly placed with the state banks, creating a high-risk fiscal combination. Anchoring retail fuel prices to the global market price (with adjustments for taxes, distribution costs, storage costs, finance costs, and profit margin) would help eliminate additions to the existing fiscal burden of CPC. When global prices rise, the domestic fuel price would rise, when global prices fall, the domestic price would fall. Even if the government chose not to increase retail prices in line with global price shifts, a transparent and publicly available formula would create more visibility on the fiscal costs of such a policy.
Like all challenging reforms, ideally the fuel price formula should have been introduced early in the political cycle, market prices were also trending upwards by 2018. In May 2018 the formula commenced implementation. On the 10th of every month the retail price of fuel will be adjusted to reflect the latest global fuel price (Singapore Platts was the anchor used). The timing could not have been worse, and communication could have been a lot better. Global fuel prices had started sky-rocketing from mid-June and peaked at over US$ 80 per barrel in October from the US$ 50 range leading up to May. Naturally the public associated the fuel price formula with rising prices at the pump. Had the formula been implemented a year prior, the public would have seen prices decline and stabilize prior to increasing. But alas, this was not to be, and the formula was scrapped by the new administration.
Trade Liberalisation
As at end 2019 Sri Lanka’s rank in Trade Openness was 140th out of 141 in the Global Competitiveness Index. In spite of being the first country in South Asia to liberalise in 1977, Sri Lanka’s trade protection levels have increased over the last couple of decades. In the 5 years from 2014 to 2018, the average percentage of government revenue collected at the border was around 49%.
The increased layers of taxes on imports results in three key impediments;
i) These import taxes are a significant burden on consumers. The effective import tax rate of several basic consumption products from milk powder to biscuits goes up to 100%.
ii) Import taxes erode competitiveness as domestic firms receive significant protection from global competition leading to less incentive for innovation and dynamism and thus hinders long term productivity improvements — the true driver of economic growth.
iii) Several intermediate imports have high import taxes — including numerous construction materials. This drives up costs for all industries, eroding competitiveness of almost all Sri Lankan enterprise. It also makes Sri Lanka less attractive a destination for FDI.
In Sri Lanka a lot of border taxes take the form of paratariffs. The standard import duty is customs import duty (CID), however since CID is eliminated in Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) with India and Pakistan, successive Sri Lankan governments have added in layers of paratariffs such as cess and the Ports and Aviation Levy (PAL).
In the 2017 November budget it was decided to commence the elimination of most of these paratariffs. Mangala championed this initiative since he recognized the potential positive implications it would have for the economy in the long term. Some of the treasury officials were less enthusiastic, because there would naturally be a short term revenue loss as a result of removing these tariffs and also because it would result in severe lobbying by protected industries, seeking to retain their walls of protection.
Whilst some in the ministry wanted to see tariffs eliminated almost entirely in a big bang reform move, it was necessary to allow time for domestic industry to adjust to this significant change. It was eventually decided that the best approach would be a five year phase out of most paratariffs. This would make the revenue impact easier to absorb — revenue from PAL and cess amounted to around 1% of GDP. To start with though the 2017 November budget would eliminate paratariffs on 1,200 or so of the least sensitive tariff lines. The impact would not be material, but Mangala felt it would be a robust signal — and also give additional time for industry to make adjustments to the envisaged operating environment. In the March 2019 budget the next phase of para-tariffs was eliminated, and a Trade Adjustment Programme was introduced to provide budgetary support for domestic sector entities that face adverse adjustment costs due to exposure to greater global competition.
Welfare Reform
Another important initiative of the Ministry of Finance under Mangala Samaraweera was the effort to streamline welfare payments. One of the first things Mangala asked me was how we can move away from a system of price controls on essential items to provide relief to the public. He understood that price controls are not sustainable since they are poorly targeted, they tend to result in shortages and erosion of quality when market prices exceed the administered price. And of course they are subject to constant abuse. He was very keen that we look at introducing a system where relief is provided to the needy through cash transfers — his favourite example was Bolsa Familia, Brazil’s cash transfer programme.
Of course this required a robust system of identification and targeting of those who are deserving of such support. This would apply not just to those who were of lower income levels, but also those with disabilities, the elderly and infirm, and those vulnerable to and victims of natural disasters. Sri Lanka’s existing system of welfare distribution, Samurdhi, was woefully inadequate in terms of targeting. Samurdhi had vast numbers of undeserving recipients who benefitted from the scheme and more worryingly, large numbers of deserving citizens who were excluded from the scheme. The World Bank provided technical support in designing such a targeting mechanism and after a lot of work the new targeting criteria was finally gazetted in June 2019. The mechanism consisted of objective, verifiable criteria including education levels, housing conditions, income, electricity consumption, assets, and illnesses. If fully implemented this mechanism of targeting, combined with the use of digital payment systems, would have enabled a transparent and efficient scheme of providing welfare to those who most deserved it, without resorting to the economic inefficiencies of indiscriminate price controls. Unfortunately this initiative too did not make it beyond the election cycle.
Monetary Policy Legislation
Another potentially game changing reform was the new Monetary Law Act. This legislation was championed by the Central Bank under Indrajit Coomaraswamy, and Mangala supported it to the hilt, even at the tail end of the political cycle. The MLA was designed to provide greater independence to the Central Bank, coupled with accountability measures for the Monetary Board. It would create disciplines around deficit financing (money printing) and establish the legal framework for inflation targeting. These measures would have imposed limitations on some of the most problematic interactions between the monetary and fiscal authorities, that have over the years led to Sri Lanka’s fiscal profligacy, deficit financing, all resulting in ballooning debt and monetary instability. Mangala was not a subject expert, but perhaps his best quality was to listen to the experts and formulate his judgment based on the technical advice that he received. The new Monetary Law Act also did not see the light of day.
2018 Constitutional Coup
It had been a very heavy few weeks in the lead up to the 2019 budget to be presented in early November 2018. The 26th of October was a Friday. The Active Liability Management Bill, a landmark piece of legislation that would allow Sri Lanka to buy back or otherwise manage its lumpy liabilities to smoothen out its repayment obligations, was passed in parliament in the afternoon. This piece of legislation had faced stiff opposition by President Sirisena. We had finished the final draft of the budget speech and had sent it for the final technical annotations. The end of a long week and several long months. As I drove out of the treasury building at around six pm I noticed barricades being hurriedly stacked up near the Presidential Secretariat. I didn’t pay much attention and carried on to catch up with some friends.
About forty five minutes in everyone was getting messages, stating that Mr. Mahinda Rajapaksa is being sworn in as Prime Minister at the Presidential Secretariat. The initial reaction was disbelief since that act would in itself be unconstitutional. I made a couple of phone calls and it was clear something extraordinary was going on so I rushed back to the treasury. Most of the staff was gone by this time but the Minister and a couple of the private staff were still around. Nobody could quite believe what was going on. Having thought things through Mangala wanted to send out a tweet at 8.30pm saying “The appointment of @PresRajapaksa as the Prime Minister is unconstitutional and illegal. This is an anti-democratic coup #LKA.” I asked him if he’s sure he wants to use the word coup. It was a strong word and would have important ramifications. He thought for a few seconds and replied in the affirmative, saying that a coup is exactly what is going on.
The economy took a beating over the subsequent two months. Foreign investors took flight and exited their positions in GoSL rupee denominated treasury securities. Rs. 75 billion worth of foreign investments in government securities was sold in just 2 months, creating massive pressure on the currency, causing the rupee to crash from 172/US$ to Rs. 182/US$ between October and December 2018. The currency was already weak due to the taper tantrum in the early part of the year which hammered all emerging economies. When capital flows started reversing in Q4 and other emerging economies saw a recovery, Sri Lanka was in the midst of the coup and associated capital flight.
During this time the government sold US$ 1 billion worth of reserves in just 1 month as reserves declined from US$ 7.9 billion to US$ 6.9 billion. These were valuable reserves the government had been building up in preparation for the substantial external debt repayments in 2019. More importantly Sri Lanka’s credit rating was downgraded by all three rating agencies in November 2018. On the 30th of November 2018 the yield on the January 2019 ISB had reached 10.7% from 5.6% on 26th October. This meant that Sri Lanka was effectively locked out of global capital markets on the cusp of having to settle over US$ 5.3 billion in debt repayments in 2019, including a US$ 500 million ISB in early January 2019. It was heart breaking for Mangala watching this unfold from the sidelines given all the efforts that he had and the team had taken to keep the economy stable to meet the 2019 debt repayments amidst the global bond market volatility in 2018.
As the economy deteriorated into December it became clear that the adverse impacts of the coup would be long lasting. Due to the sales of US$ 1 billion worth of reserves by the Central Bank, liquidity in the domestic rupee market also reduced dramatically. The market was short LKR 100 billion in the overnight money markets and this pushed up domestic interest rates dramatically as well. Prior to the coup, the 1 year treasury bill was in single digits at 9.5% as at end September 2018, having been at 10.5% when Mangala became Finance Minister. During the coup interest rates shot up to 11.25% by mid-December. The market was LKR 100 billion liquid short till at least April 2019, keeping interest rates elevated and hurting economic growth significantly in 2019. The high interest cost added to Sri Lanka’s debt concerns as well by driving up the cost of domestic debt.
Managing External Debt in 2019
When the Supreme Court verdict came through in 13th December and Mangala returned as Finance Minister, there was a lot of work to be done. Firstly there was no year end budget to authorize payments for 2019, and Sri Lanka had lost access to global capital markets to finance the country’s highest foreign debt repayments in 2019. A quick vote on account was passed by end December, and the next step was to somehow regain access to global capital markets to make sure we can refinance debt repayments. It was unfortunately too late for the January 2019 bond which we had to settle out of the already diminished reserves. Soon afterwards Mangala led a team to Washington to meet with the IMF and re-instate and re-negotiate Sri Lanka’s programme. In spite of Mangala losing his suitcase and D.C. being having a snow day as soon as we arrived, the team met with Christine Lagarde and the technical team led by Manuela Goretti, and after some tough negotiations we were able to set the programme back on track with some important concessions. The external goodwill towards Sri Lanka was palpable, and there was nobody better than Mangala to leverage this to the country’s best advantage.
Over the next two months Mangala had to put together a delayed budget for 2019. This was a particularly tough budget since it was an election year and there were expectations of additional concessions, but at the same time it was critical that the fiscal position would inspire the confidence of global capital markets in order to regain access to external financing. Mangala’s last budget was able to meet both criteria. The March 2019 budget included Programmes such as Gampereliya, a rural infrastructure programme which was seen as a means of providing targeted fiscal impetus to improve cash circulation at the rural level, whilst investing in productive infrastructure leveraging on rural value chains. The enhanced Enterprise Sri Lanka programme was a means of reducing cost of capital, one of the key impediments to SMEs in the country. This was a strategy to provide a targeted reduction in interest rates to productive investments without a general reduction in interest rates. A general reduction in interest rates at the time would have led to an acceleration of capital flight post-coup, and would have further de-stabilized an already volatile external sector. Mangala had some other wonderful ideas in that budget, including providing scholarships for the best performing Advanced Level students to study at any top global university that they qualify for admission.
The budget was also able to satisfy global markets and Sri Lanka regained access to global capital markets. Immediately as the budget was passed, the Central Bank led the process of raising the required International Sovereign Bonds (ISBs) to settle the upcoming debt payments in 2019. However, whilst settling the immediate debt, Mangala and Indrajit Coomaraswamy were also cognizant of the fact that leading into two election years (2019 presidential and 2020 parliamentary), Sri Lanka may face risks in retaining global capital market access to finance debt repayments in 2020 and 2021. Accordingly, Mangala and Indrajit made a conscious decision to raise an additional US$ 2.4 billion dollars worth of ISBs in mid-2019 to build up reserves to US$ 7.6 billion by end 2019 to tide over a volatile couple of years ahead. Whilst today many politicians criticize the previous government’s international sovereign bond strategy, it is the reserves built through the US$ 4.4 billion ISBs raised in 2019 that have been used to settle Sri Lanka’s external debts in 2020 and 2021. Sri Lanka would have already defaulted if not for Mangala and Indrajit’s decision in mid-2019.
True Patriot
There are of course many things that I’m sure Mangala wishes went differently. He wanted to update and upgrade legislation for Customs and Excise — to reduce subjectivity, discretion, and shift to a more rules based framework for both pieces of legislation. He wanted to do move faster on trade reform but the political economy of late stage reform made such intentions difficult to fulfil. He was also keen to invest more in education, health, and reconciliation. He wanted to bring in legislation to address microfinance and informal finance related household indebtedness. There was a lot more than could be done within an interrupted 2 year tenure.
I and many others will miss Mangala not so much for his achievements and efforts as Finance Minister. Nor for his work towards reconciliation from the Sudu Nelum movement to date, for his work in liberalization of the telecom sector in the late 1990s, for his work with the UDA in Colombo’s initial beautification. I will miss a human being of immense courage, who stood for what is right regardless of societal or political compulsions. A man of integrity, conviction, and humility. A patriot in the true sense of the word.
Deshal de Mel Economist based in Sri Lanka
Features
Pay attention or pay the price: Sri Lanka’s maritime imperative in a fractured ocean
Sri Lanka stands at a geopolitical crossroads where geography is both its greatest asset and its most vulnerable liability. Sitting astride the Indian Ocean’s critical east-west highway, the waters, south of Dondra Head, channel nearly 30% of the world’s maritime trade. This route is the arterial vein connecting Asia, Europe, and the Middle East. Yet, as tensions flare in the Middle East and great power competition intensifies, Sri Lanka finds itself guarding a highway it does not own, with an economy too fragile to absorb the shocks of collateral damage.
Recent analyses, including insights from the Financial Times on the fragility of global ocean governance, offer a stark warning: international treaties alone cannot guarantee security. The newly enacted UN Biodiversity Beyond National Jurisdiction (BBNJ) treaty may be a diplomatic triumph, but as major powers, like the US, sidestep commitments, while China seeks strategic influence, the high seas are becoming increasingly lawless. For Sri Lanka, relying on international law to protect its 600,000 km² Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), is a strategy destined to fail. The moment demands a shift from passive reliance to active resilience.
The Naval Imperative: Sovereignty requires strength
The first pillar of survival is a robust Navy. The FT report highlights that without enforcement mechanisms, marine protected areas become “paper parks.” Similarly, an EEZ without patrol capacity is merely a line on a map. With Sri Lanka’s Navy having just rescued 32 Iranian sailors from the sunken frigate IRIS Dena, following a US submarine strike in nearby international waters, and additional Iranian vessels now seeking assistance, or operating in the region, amid major powers vying for influence, the risk of direct incidents at sea remains very real.
Sri Lanka must accelerate investment in blue-water naval capacity and EEZ surveillance. Strengthening patrols, south of Dondra Head, is not just about conservation, it is about sovereignty. The ability to manage rescue operations, grant diplomatic clearances, and monitor traffic, without external coercion, is the definition of independence. “Might is right” remains the operating principle for some superpowers. Sri Lanka cannot afford to be a bystander in its own waters. A strong Navy acts as a deterrent, ensuring that the 30% of global shipping passing nearby does not become a theatre for proxy conflicts.
Statecraft: Balancing economics and sovereignty
The second pillar is nuanced statecraft. Sri Lanka imports nearly 100% of its fuel, making it hypersensitive to disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz. Prolonged conflict in the Middle East will spike oil prices, reigniting inflation and threatening the hard-won economic stability following recent crises. However, economic desperation must not drive diplomatic misalignment.
The smartest priority is strict neutrality. Sri Lanka cannot afford to alienate any major partner – the US, India, China, Iran, or the Gulf states. Coordinating quietly with India for maritime domain awareness is prudent given proximity, but joining any military bloc is perilous. Recent discussions highlight how the US aggressively prioritises resource extraction in international waters, often at the expense of broader environmental protections. Sri Lanka must navigate these competing agendas without becoming a pawn. Publicly urging de-escalation, through forums like the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), allows Colombo to advocate for safe passage without picking sides.
Securing the economy and energy future
The third pillar is economic shielding. The immediate threat is fuel security. The government must build emergency fuel stocks and negotiate alternative suppliers to buffer against Hormuz disruptions. The Central Bank must be prepared to manage rupee pressure as import bills swell. Furthermore, monitoring secondary effects is crucial; higher shipping costs will hit exports like tea and garments, while tourism warnings could dampen arrival numbers.
Long-term resilience demands energy diversification, prioritising solar power. Sri Lanka’s abundant sunshine offers huge potential to cut reliance on Middle Eastern oil and shield the economy from geopolitical shocks. Accelerate rooftop/utility-scale solar with incentives: duty exemptions on equipment, enhanced net-metering, subsidies/loans for households and businesses, and fast-tracked approvals plus battery storage support. This attracts investment, creates jobs, and boosts energy security. Secure financier confidence for sustainable blue economy initiatives without compromising sovereignty.
The bottom line
The message for Sri Lanka is clear: This is a “pay attention or pay the price” moment. The country is geographically positioned on the critical Indian Ocean highway but remains economically fragile. The smartest priorities are to protect people first, secure the seas second, and shield the economy third, all while staying strictly neutral.
Any misstep, whether getting drawn into naval incidents or visibly picking sides in a great power struggle, would be far costlier than the fuel price hike itself. The global oceans treaty may offer a framework for cooperation, but as experts warn, we need “systems of co-operation that go beyond the mere words on the page.” For Sri Lanka, those systems must be built on national capacity, diplomatic agility, and an unwavering commitment to neutrality. The ocean is rising with tension; Sri Lanka must ensure it does not drown in the wake.
Reference:
“The geopolitics of the global oceans treaty”https://www.ft.com/content/563bef02-f4a7-42c3-9cfa-7c3fe51be1eb
By Professor Chanaka Jayawardhena
Professor of Marketing
University of Surrey
Chanaka.j@gmail.com
Features
Winds of Change:Geopolitics at the crossroads of South and Southeast Asia
Asanga Abeyagoonasekera’s latest book is a comprehensive account of international relations in the regions it covers, with particular reference to current rivalries between India and China and the United States. It deals with shifting alliances, or rather alliances that grow stronger or weaker through particular developments: there are no actual breaks in a context in which the three contestants for power in the region are wooing or threatening smaller countries, moving seamlessly from one mode to the other though generally in diplomatic terms.
The area is now widely referred to as the Indo-Pacific. Though that term was coined over a hundred years ago by a German keen to challenge the Anglo-American hegemony that triumphed after the First World War, it gained currency more recently, following a speech by the hawkish Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, who was instrumental in developing the Quad Alliance between Japan, India, the United States and Australia.
This marked a radical change in Indian Foreign Policy, for India had prided itself previously on being Non-Aligned, while the West saw it as close to the Soviet Union and then to Russa. But as Abeyagoonasekera constantly reiterates, India’s approach is governed now by nervousness about China, which in the last couple of decades has made deep inroads into the Indian Ocean. Now many states around this Ocean, relatively far from China, are being closely connected, economically but also otherwise, with China.
Instrumental in this development is the Belt and Road Initiative, which China has used to develop infrastructure in the region, designed to facilitate its own trade, but also the trade of the countries that it has assisted. Abeyagoonasekera is clear throughout the book that the initiative has been of great assistance to the recipient countries, and contests vigorously the Western claim that it was designed as a debt trap to control those countries.
I fully endorse this view. To supplement his perspective with a couple of anecdotes, I recall a British friend in Cambodia telling me how the country had benefited from Chinese support, which developed infrastructure – whereas the West in those days concentrated on what it called capacity building, which meant supporting those who shared its views through endless seminars in expensive hotels, a practice with which we are familiar in this country too.
Soon afterwards I met a very articulate taxi driver in Ethiopia, who had come home from England, where he had worked for many years, who described the expansion of its road network. This had been neglected for years, until the Chinese turned up. I remembered then a Dutchman at a conference talking about the sinister nature of a plane full of Chinese businessmen, to which an African responded in irritation that the West had applauded the plunder of the continent by their own businessmen, and that the Africans now knew better and could ensure some benefit to themselves as the owners of the commodities the West had long thought their own birthright.
Abeyagoonasekera contrasts with the Chinese approach the frugality of the Indians, a frugality born of relative poverty, and appends the general suspicions with which Indian interventions are treated, given previous efforts at domination. And while he is himself markedly diplomatic in his accounts of the different approaches of the three players in this game, time and time again he notes the effortless ease with which the Chinese have begun to dominate the field.
His research has been thorough, and the statistics he cites about trade make clear that the Chinese are streets ahead of the other two, both in terms of balances as well as in absolute terms. And he notes too that, whereas the Western discourse is of Chinese restrictions on freedom, in Sri Lanka at any rate it is the others who are wary of transparency.
Though he notes that there is no clarity about the agreements the current government has entered into with the Indians, and that contrary to what might have been expected from former Marxists it has not resumed the tilt towards China of earlier left wing regimes, he shows that there has been no break with China. He seems to believe that the groundwork China laid still gives hope of more economic development than what the other two countries have to offer.
We cannot after all forget that the Rajapaksa government first asked India to develop the Hambantota port, and I still recall the Indian High Commissioner at the time, Ashok Kantha, wondering whether India had erred in not taking up the offer. In a marked example of how individuals affect bilateral relations, I have no doubt his predecessor, the effusive Alok Prasad, would have taken up the offer.
It was Rajapaksa hubris that made the cost of the port escalate, for when the rock inside the breakwaters was discovered, before the harbour was filled, and Mahinda Rajapaksa was told it would not cost much to get rid of it, he preferred to have the opening on his birthday as scheduled, which meant the waters then had to be drained away for the rock to be dynamited. And unfortunately, planning being left to the younger brother, we had grandiose buildings in the town, instead of the infrastructure that would have ensured greater economic activity.
This error was repeated in spades with regard to Mattala. Though not in the right place, which was not the case with the Hambantota development, nothing was done to take advantage of the location such as it was and institute swift connections with the hill country, the East Coast, and the wildlife so abundant in the area.
The last section of the book, after its thorough examination of the activities of the three major players in the region as a whole, deals with Sri Lanka’s Domestic Political Challenges, and records, politely but incisively, the endless blunders that have brought us lower and lower. But while highlighting the callousness of politicians, he also notes how efforts to appease the West weakened what he describes as core protections.
Though there has been much speculation about what exactly brought down Gotabaya Rajapaksa – not his government, for that in essence continued, with a different leader – perhaps the most far-reaching revelation in Abeyagoonasekera’s book is of Gotabaya’s conviction that it was the CIA that destroyed him. As so often when the hidden hand of the West is identified, the local contributions are ignored, as Gotabaya’s absurd energy policy, and the ridiculous tax concessions with which his rule began. But that does not mean there were no other players in the game.
Ironically, Gotabaya’s accusations against the United States occur after a startling passage in which Abeyagoonasekera declares of that country that ‘The fatigue gripping the nation is deeper than weariness; it is a spiritual exhaustion, a slow erosion of belief. Rising prices, policy paralysis, and a fractured foreign policy have left America adrift. Inflation haunts them like a spectre, while the immigrant crisis stirs frustrations in communities already stretched to their limits’.
This he claims explains the re-emergence of Donald Trump. Now, in the midst of the horrors Trump has perpetrated, this passage suggests that he is desperate to assert himself in denial of the fatigue that has overcome a nation initially built on idealism, now in the throes of ruthless cynicism. What will follow I do not know. But the manner in which India’s slavishness to the bullying of Netanyahu and Trump has destroyed the moral stature it once had suggests that Abeyagoonasekera’s nuanced but definite adulation of Chinese policy will be a hallmark of the new world order.
By Rajiva Wijesinha
Features
Human–Elephant conflict in Sri Lanka
Human–elephant conflict (HEC) in Sri Lanka results in significant loss of human life, elephant deaths, and extensive damage to crops and property. Despite numerous interventions over the decades, the situation continues to deteriorate. The reasons for the breakdown of what was once a relatively tolerant coexistence—albeit one dominated by humans—into an increasingly confrontational relationship must be clearly understood by both the public and policymakers. Immediate measures are required to minimise losses, alongside long-term solutions grounded in sound ecological and governance principles. It must also be recognised that this is a complex problem; effective mitigation and sustainable solutions require a multidisciplinary approach integrated into the country’s overall development planning. This article examines several cost-effective methods that have been successfully implemented in other countries and may apply to the Sri Lankan context.
Key Challenge: Lack of Reliable Data
The primary reason for the escalation of human–elephant conflict (HEC) is the shrinking of wildlife habitats in the country due to poorly planned development and uncontrolled, unwise land encroachment. A major barrier to effective intervention is the lack of accurate and comprehensive data in two key areas: (a) land and land utilisation, and (b) the elephant population and their range.
It became evident after the Ditwah cyclone disaster that the lack of readily accessible, reliable data on land and its use, is a major obstacle to a wide range of project planning and implementation efforts. Regardless of how HEC is mitigated, the government must take immediate action to establish a digital land-use database, as this is a key component of long-term planning for any development initiative. Using modern aerial mapping technologies, it should be possible to catalogue the geography and utilisation of every square metre of the island’s landmass.
Similarly, accurate data on the number of elephants, their age and gender distribution, and the extent of their habitat range, are essential for data-driven decision-making. Here, too, modern technology offers practical solutions. Land-based digital cameras have been successfully used to count elephants, identify individual animals, and monitor their range. Research has shown that the pigmentation patterns of Asian elephants—particularly those on their ears—can serve as a “fingerprint” for identifying individuals. The same technique can also be used to study elephant movement patterns and habitat range. Computer programmes already exist for such cataloguing purposes; however, developing a similar programme, locally, could be both economical and educational, for example, as part of a university IT programme. Since data-driven decision-making is key to the success of any long-term strategy, data collection must begin immediately while short-term mitigation measures are implemented.
Root cause
There must be a general understanding of how this problem has worsened. Sri Lanka is considered an anomaly in island biogeography for supporting a high density of megafauna—including Asian elephants, leopards, and sloth bears—on a relatively small landmass of about 65,000 square kilometres. This is further complicated by the country’s high human population density, estimated at about 356–372 people per square kilometre, ranking among the highest in the world. The human population has increased more than fivefold between 1900 and 2024, from about 4.5 million to nearly 22 million.
The corresponding expansion of land use for human settlement, agriculture, and infrastructure development has placed enormous pressure on wildlife habitats. Habitat loss, together with imbalances in predator populations, has resulted not only in escalating human–elephant conflict (HEC) but also in increasing crop damage caused by peacocks, monkeys, giant squirrels, and feral pigs. The Sri Lankan elephant has no natural predators; its only significant threat arises from human activities. Restoring balance within this complex ecological system is no easy task, yet it must remain the long-term objective if the country is to safeguard its unique biodiversity.
Short-term Measures
Since the current situation has developed over an extended period, practical and humane solutions will also take time to implement. In the short term, several interventions can reduce direct interactions between humans and elephants while ensuring the safety of both:
* Strict prohibition of roadside feeding and improved waste management.
* Public education on safe deterrence methods and the promotion of ethical and sustainable practices in forests, national parks, and sanctuaries.
* The use of proven, non-lethal deterrent methods implemented in a coordinated and systematic manner.
* Anti-depredation squads (ADS): well-trained response teams tasked with implementing and monitoring these measures.
* The use of AI-based technologies to prevent train–elephant collisions.
Several countries have successfully used chilli as a deterrent to keep elephants away from farms and settlements. While cultivating chilli as a crop may contribute to this effort, it alone is not an effective deterrent; the pungent compounds in chilli, which act as an irritant to elephants, must be delivered effectively. One widely used and economical method is chilli-grease fencing, an alternative to electric fencing. In this method, rags soaked in a mixture of ground chilli and used motor oil are hung from ropes in strategic locations to create a deterrent barrier.
More advanced deterrence techniques have also been tested. For example, compressed-air launchers that fire chilli-filled projectiles have demonstrated effectiveness in safely redirecting elephants from a distance without causing harm. In some countries, locally made projectiles containing chilli powder, sand, and firecrackers enclosed in flexible sheaths, such as rubber balloons, are ignited and launched ahead of approaching animals. When combined with strobe lights, air horns, or other noise-making devices, these methods have been found to be even more effective. Over time, elephants may learn to associate irritation with light and sound, allowing these signals alone to act as deterrents. The main limitation of this approach is the need for well-trained personnel available throughout the day. Therefore, the involvement of existing national services—such as the armed forces—in developing and implementing such systems should be considered.
Technology can also play an important role in reducing train–elephant collisions. Night-vision cameras mounted on trains, combined with artificial intelligence, could be used not only to detect elephants but also to identify patterns in elephant movements near railway tracks. Once such high-risk locations are mapped, additional cameras could be installed along the tracks to transmit warning signals to approaching trains when elephants are detected nearby. As a further step, this system could be integrated with the Driver’s Safety Device (DSD)—the “dead man’s” handle or pedal—so that trains can be automatically stopped when elephants are detected on or near the tracks, thereby reducing reliance solely on driver response.
Sustainable Long-Term Solutions
A lasting resolution depends on strategic land-use planning and coexistence-based management. This must form part of a broader national discussion on the sustainable use of the country’s limited land resources.
* Protection and restoration of elephant migration corridors.
* Data-driven placement and maintenance of fencing, rather than attempting to confine elephants within fixed areas.
* Strengthened management of wildlife reserves, including the prevention of human encroachment and uncontrolled cattle grazing.
* Habitat improvement within forests to reduce the attraction of elephants to agricultural lands.
* Introduction of drought-resistant grass varieties such as Cenchrus purpureus (commonly known as elephant grass or Napier grass) and Pennisetum purpureum in wildlife refuges and national parks to alleviate food shortages during the dry season.
* Population control measures, including vaccine-based methods, supported by reliable population data.
Public education on the importance of maintaining ecological balance—especially amid environmental change and expanding economic development—must also be a key priority. Basic principles of environmental management should be incorporated into higher education across all disciplines. At the same time, difficult but necessary questions must be asked about the long-term sustainability and economic return of certain land-use patterns, particularly those shaped during the colonial period for plantation crops. Inefficient agricultural practices, such as chena cultivation, should be phased out, and the clearing of wilderness—especially in ecologically sensitive highland areas for tourism development—must be strictly regulated.
Elephants typically travel between 15 and 50 kilometres a day. Therefore, restoring uninterrupted elephant corridors, linking existing wildlife reserves, must be a central component of long-term planning. In some cases, this may require carefully considering the relocation of human settlements that have developed within former elephant corridors.
Unfortunately, rural communities often bear a disproportionate share of the burden created by these conservation measures. It is, therefore, essential that policies ensure they receive a fair share of the economic benefits generated by wildlife-based industries, particularly tourism. Such policies should aim to help these communities transition from subsistence livelihoods toward improved standards of living. In this context, a critical evaluation of existing agricultural systems must form part of a broader national land-management strategy. Put plainly, the long-term viability of plantation industries, such as tea and rubber, should be assessed in terms of their return on investment—particularly the investment of scarce land resources.
Finally, all ecosystems have a carrying capacity, meaning there is a limit to the number of people and animals that a given area of land can sustain. This issue extends beyond Sri Lanka; many scientists argue that, given current levels of malnutrition and resource depletion, the planet may already have exceeded its sustainable carrying capacity. Others suggest that technological advances and lifestyle changes may increase that capacity. In either case, significant changes in human consumption patterns and lifestyles are likely to become inevitable.
For elephants, however, the absence of natural predators means that humane human intervention may be required to manage population growth sustainably. If elephant populations were allowed to increase unchecked, food scarcity could lead to malnutrition and starvation among the animals themselves. At the same time, a nation, already struggling with child malnutrition, must carefully balance its limited resources between human welfare and wildlife conservation.
One promising approach is immunological sterilisation using the Porcine Zona Pellucida (PZP) vaccine, a reversible and humane form of immunocontraception used in wildlife population management. By stimulating antibodies that prevent sperm from fertilising eggs, this dart-delivered vaccine controls reproduction without significantly altering the animals’ natural behaviour. Once accurate data are obtained on the age and gender distribution of the Sri Lankan elephant population, the systematic application of such methods could become feasible.
Moreover, the development of local capacity to produce such vaccines should be encouraged. Similar technologies could also be applied to manage populations of other animals—such as monkeys and stray dogs—whose numbers can become problematic if left unchecked. Local vaccine production would not only address domestic needs but could potentially create opportunities for export and scientific collaboration.
Conclusion
Human–elephant conflict (HEC) in Sri Lanka is intensifying due to habitat fragmentation, unplanned development, and weak governance. Elephants require large, connected landscapes to survive, and when traditional migration corridors are blocked, conflict becomes inevitable.
Current ineffective practices—such as the mass translocation of elephants, fragmented fencing that obstructs migration routes, and policies that overlook the livelihoods of rural communities—must be reconsidered and replaced with more effective strategies. Mechanisms must also be established to ensure that the economic benefits of environmental protection, particularly those generated by wildlife tourism, are fairly shared with rural populations who bear the greatest burden of living alongside wildlife.
A shift toward data-driven planning, protection of ecological corridors, community partnerships, and stronger institutional accountability is essential. The human–elephant conflict is not solely a wildlife issue; it is fundamentally a land-use and governance challenge. Sri Lanka would benefit from establishing a dedicated Human–Elephant Coexistence Organisation, or from strengthening an existing Wildlife Commission with the authority and capacity to implement long-term, science-based management strategies.
With informed policies and genuine support for affected communities, peaceful coexistence between humans and elephants is both achievable and sustainable. Ultimately, educating future generations and equipping them to face emerging environmental challenges with knowledge and responsibility is the most effective long-term strategy.
BY Geewananda Gunawardana and Chula Goonasekera
on behalf of LEADS forum
Email admin@srilankaleads.com
-
News4 days agoUniversity of Wolverhampton confirms Ranil was officially invited
-
News5 days agoLegal experts decry move to demolish STC dining hall
-
News4 days agoFemale lawyer given 12 years RI for preparing forged deeds for Borella land
-
News3 days agoPeradeniya Uni issues alert over leopards in its premises
-
Business5 days agoCabinet nod for the removal of Cess tax imposed on imported good
-
News4 days agoLibrary crisis hits Pera university
-
News3 days agoWife raises alarm over Sallay’s detention under PTA
-
Business6 days agoWar in Middle East sends shockwaves through Sri Lanka’s export sector



