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Midweek Review

Killing of Premakeerthi amidst govt., JVP onslaught on media

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Assassinated Premakeerthi de Alwis' second wife Nirmala handing over "Premakeerthini", a book written by her to the then President Mahinda Rajapaksa in 2014. She caused controversy by alleging that a person who held a top post in SLBC was responsible for her husband's killing. The unsubstantiated claim was made in spite of the Colombo HC sentencing a JVPer to life imprisonment for his confessed junior role in the 1989 dastardly and cowardly killing.

‘Premakeerthi Ghathanaye Sulamula briefly discussed the JVP’s association with PLOTE (People’s Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam), one of the Indian sponsored terrorist groups. The PLOTE that received international attention in late 1988 when it, at the behest of a Maldivian businessman Abdulla Luthfee, mounted a sea borne attack on Male. Their bid to assassinate the then President Maumoon Abdul Gayoom went awry. The JVP has received the backing of the PLOTE to set up a radio station of its own. It was called ‘Ranahanda.’ Tamil groups (not the LTTE) also provided support to the JVP to produce landmines. However, the JVP never succeeded in mastering landmine warfare completely, though they carried out several dozens of attacks. Had they mastered landmine warfare, the second JVP terror campaign could have taken an entirely different turn. Whatever the allegations against the military, police and para military units, they defeated the JVP twice and crushed separatist Tamil terrorism for once and for all.

Dharman Wickremaratne’s latest book ‘Premakeerthi Ghathanaye Sulamula’ meticulously examines the killing of radio announcer, producer and lyricist Premakeerthi de Alwis in late July 1989, at the height of the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP)-led terror campaign.

Having examined various claims, accusations and assertions by interested parties, including Premakeerthi’s first wife, Daya, the author on the basis of the proceedings at the Colombo High Court, during the UNP rule, declared that the much admired SLBC staffer was killed by the JVP.

A gang of JVPers gunned down Premakeerthi after having taken him out of his home, situated on the Homagama-Katuwana road.

Premakeerthi had been 10 years younger to SLBC announcer and lyricist Daya at the time of their marriage. Mother of one child, Daya had been the widow of journalist Somapala Ranatunga at the time she met Premakeerthi.

Daya, who legally separated from Premakeerthi in 1975, following a five-year tumultuous marriage, sent shockwaves through political parties when she declared her former husband was assassinated at the behest of Hudson Samarasinghe. The shocking but unsubstantiated declaration was made at an event at the SLBC, chaired by President Rajapaksa, to mark the 25th death anniversary of Premakeerthi. This happened on 31 July, 2014, just six months before the change of government.

Hudson Samarasinghe moved court against Daya but she again cleared the JVP of one of the most dastardly killings at that time when she appeared alongside National People’s Power candidate Anura Kumara Dissanayake at a propaganda event at the Colombo Public Library about six years later. She cleared the JVP of Premakeerthi’s killing. AKD, who simultaneously led both the JVP and NPP, had been unsuccessful at the 2019 Nov. presidential election. The event at the Colombo public library was held in late Oct. 2019. Daya’s declaration didn’t make any impact.

Hudson Samarasinghe withdrew his defamation case seeking compensation to the tune of Rs 500 mn in the wake of Daya’s death in late July this year.

Hudson Samarasinghe / Dharman Wickremaratne

Dharman, the former Divaina staffer, who served as the Editor of Silumina for a period of four years, during the administrations of Gotabaya Rajapaksa and Ranil Wickremesinghe (2020-2024,) has so far authored four books on the ’80s terror and he intends to release five more books on that period.

Wickremaratne’s far reaching work on the JVP should be examined cautiously, keeping in mind that the author himself had been accused of being supportive of the JVP, and Upali Newspapers was compelled to discontinue his services as a Divaina staffer. The writer joined The Island in 1987, four years after Wickremaretne joined Divaina.

Both the UNP and the JVP furiously directed attacks on the media with the state media at the receiving end of unbridled violence as the latter sought to overwhelm the government. Wickremaretne skillfully dealt with the violence against the media at a time the South bled. In the Northern and Eastern provinces, the armed forces had been confined to barracks in terms of the Indo-Lanka Accord of July 1987, while the New Delhi’s Army, deployed here as the Indian Peace Keeping Force, battled the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) till they were asked to leave by President Premadasa while supplying truckloads of weapons and money to the Tigers to fight the IPKF.

‘Premakeerthi Ghathanaye Sulamula’ is a must read for those interested in the JVP rise to power after having launched two abortive bids in 1971 and 1987-1989 to capture power. Wickremaretne’s account of Saman Priyankara, who had been sentenced to life in prison in March 1994 during the tail end of the UNP reign, joining the JVP, is exciting. The teenager had been among a gang of activists assigned to kill Premakeerthi for refusing to heed a JVP directive to quit the SLBC. The Prisons Department released him after serving 18 years out of the life term.

The author, who had been digging into the past, met Saman Priyankara, as well as many other former members of the organisation. Wickremaratne’s work is particularly important against the backdrop of the JVP-led NPP enjoying political power. Having secured the presidency at the 2019 Sept presidential poll, the AKD-led NPP won an overwhelming 159 seats – nine more than an extraordinary 2/3 majority.

Inspired by anti-India feelings

The author explained the circumstances Saman Priyankara had been sentenced to life imprisonment though he was not among those who shot Premakeerthi. Those who allegedly shot Premakeerthi hadn’t been identified/apprehended during counter-insurgency operations. Saman Priyankara had been a member of the JVP hit squad though he didn’t cause any physical harm to Premakeerthi.

During court proceedings, it transpired that a gang of JVPers, numbering about six, confronted them (Saman Priyankara and a person identified as Pathmasiri), in July 1989, on the road, close to Magammana Purana Viharaya, and demanded that they join the JVP as the Indian Army was destroying Sri Lanka.

The JVP blatantly exploited the deployment of the Indian Army, in the Northern and Eastern Provinces, in terms of the Indo-Lanka accord that had been forced on Sri Lanka, to muster public support. That is the undeniable truth. The author also very briefly discussed the operations undertaken by the JVP in the eastern Trincomalee district embroiled in post-accord violence that at one point threatened to undermine the whole ‘peace’ process.

While the author placed the number of Indian military deaths at 29 during this period (1987 July to 1990 March), the JVP claimed its Eastern front group killed 63 Indians. India never acknowledged deaths caused by JVPers cadres. The JVP’s claims, as well as Wickremaratne’s assertions with regard to Indian Army deaths, need further verification.

As Wickremaratne pointed, out it would be pertinent to mention that the JVP launched its terror campaign several months before India forced Sri Lanka to accept the deployment of its Army here. The first victim of JVP terror had been 39-year-old H. Jayawickrema, killed on 05 Dec., 1986. The JVP found fault with Jayawickrema, principal of Gonadeniya Vidyalaya, Middeniya, for suspending a group of students over pasting of JVP notices.

The Middeniya killing was followed with the assassination of Daya Pathirana on 15 Dec., 1986. At the time of his death, Pathirana led the Independent Students Union of University of Colombo during the period 1985–1986. However, the deployment of the Indian Army gave a massive boost to the JVP and the supposed Marxist group shook the entire political establishment by mounting grenade attacks on the UNP parliamentary group in Parliament on 18 August, 1987. Both President JRJ and Premier Ranasinghe Premadasa had been present at the time of the attack. That attack compelled both the government and the JVP to go all out against each other.

But what really made me interested is the fact that the JVP involved Saman Priyankara, an Army deserter’s younger brother, in somewhat of a high profile killing within days, if not weeks, after he joined the organisation. Obviously the JVP disregarded the possibility of a novice ending up in police/security forces custody. Perhaps, in the absence of sufficient experienced armed cadre, the organisation absorbed the young novices into units assigned to eliminate opponents. Like the Tigers, the cunning JVP hierarchy attracted youth to their movement in their impressionable young and gullible years.

Saman Priyankara had been just 17 years at the time he pledged his allegiance to the organisation. Wickremaretne disclosed some interesting information pertaining to the use of children by the LTTE. According to him, 171 children, under 15 years of age, had been apprehended and rehabilitated after the annihilation of the JVP. But as a percentage of 11,658 rehabilitated, those under 15 is just 1%. However, of the 15 to 25 age category, which included Saman Priyankara, 5,508 underwent rehabilitation (46%) of the total rehabilitated.

The JVP’s use of children cannot be compared with that of the LTTE during the war in the Northern and Eastern Provinces. The LTTE threw children into high intensity battles, involving armour and artillery, and, in a despicable manner that caused massive loss of life. But that does not absolve the JVP of culpability in using children in terrorist activity as cannon fodder.

The author revealed how a 13-year-old boy received training off Kantale in mid-1989. The boy is alleged to have killed a female UNP supporter. As the JVP collapsed in early 1990, within months after the arrest and execution of its leader, Rohana Wijeweera, the boy, known as ‘bonikka’ (doll) must have carried out the killing at the age of 13 or 14.

One of the gruesome examples given by the author to highlight the use of children is the killing of an SLTB driver, identified as Dingiri Banda, who defied a JVP directive not to work. Two 15-year-old boys, in Grade 09, according to the author, murdered the driver attached to the Kuliyapitiya bus depot, at Giriulla. The killing of an employee of the Udugama Janatha Estate Development Board was also blamed on a child activist who delivered the severed head of the victim on a plate to his home. The possibility of exaggeration cannot be ruled out. Therefore, the JVP, now ensconced in power, should consider inquiring into such allegations.

The involvement of children in two other incidents was also mentioned by Wickremaretne whose exposure surely embarrassed not only the JVP but the NPP as well. A driver, attached to the Kataragama depot, identified as Weerasekera, had been killed just before he stepped onto the traditional Poruwa with his would-be-bride for their marriage ceremony at Pallemalala, Hambantota.

Inquirer into sudden deaths of the Hali-Ela Dehiwini Palatha korale, Weeraratne had been shot dead at his home. The author confidently asserted that though children lacked political ideology they were a new element ready to act swiftly. But on the other hand, when apprehended they quickly succumbed to police and armed forces pressure and ended up being informants.

During that reign of terror, altogether 137 SLTB employees had been murdered by the JVP for refusing to leave employment.

JVP’s swift collapse

By June/July 1989, the government had been desperately trying to cope up with the situation. Amidst JVP attacks, and counter violence unleashed by the police, the armed forces and paramilitary groups, the UNP won the parliamentary elections conducted in February 1989. The JVP ordered a civil disobedience campaign. The JVP issued specific orders against those who disregarded its campaign meant to destabilise the state-run media. The then State Defence Minister Ranjan Wijeratne on 07 July, 1989, vowed to retaliate. The author pointed out the JVP’s response to Wijeratne’s warning by killing four persons attached to state media, namely Thevis Guruge (23 July, 1989), Premakeerthi de Alwis (31 July, 1989), chief news editor of Rupavahini, Kulasiri Amaratunga (13 August, 1989) and Rupavahini announcer Sagarika Gomes (13 Sept., 1989). The situation was so bad, President Ranasinghe Premadasa had no option but to bring state media under the then Air Commodore Ananda Samarakoon.

In fact, Premakeerthi had been among a group of SLBC staffers who received letters on a Friday morning, in the first week of July, threatening them with death. All of the threatened persons had been attached to the News Section of the SLBC. The threatened were Hemasiri Kularatne, Wasantha Lankathilaka, Palitha Perera and Premakeerthi de Alwis. However, Premakeerthi had been quite confident that the JVP, or the so-called Deshapremi Janatha Viyaparaya (DJV), wouldn’t cause him any harm. Obviously he was totally wrong.

In a way, the country had been in the grip of JVP terror with the government making desperate bids to counter such violence. Amidst many employees refusing to serve as announcers, due to direct death threats on them, the government brought in the Army and Air Force personnel to fill the vacuum.

Wickremaratne appreciated the role played by military personnel as announcers. The author recalled how Airwoman Anoma Satharasingha, on the night of 13 Nov., 1989, announced the arrest and death of JVP leader Wijeweera. The author named those who had served the government at the risk to their lives amidst the killing of their colleagues. However, Wickremaretne failed to explain as to why Premakeerthi, in spite of receiving direct and specific death threats, hadn’t been granted military security. There is no explanation as to why Premakeerthi had been deprived of security. Did he decline to accept military security?

While trying to cripple the state-run media, the JVP tried hard to set up its own radio. It was called Ranahanda. The government quickly identified the JVP strategy and took measures to neutralize that threat.

Wickremaretne’s narrative of the Army putting pressure on Director Programmes, Rupavahini, Piyadasa Rathnasinha, to announce Wijeweera’s killing, around 2 am, made good reading. The author based his description on an interview Irida Lankadeepa writer Priyantha Kodipilli had with Piyadasa Rathnasinha, carried in the 12 January, 2024, edition. Piyadasa Rathnasinha’s claim that he declined to adhere with the instructions issued by the Army and got in touch with President Premadasa, around 2 am in the morning, and received order from the head-of-state not to telecast the video but wait till he viewed the tape and decided what to do, underscored the crisis at the time. President Premadasa had visited Rupavahini on the same day, viewed the video and decided to edit Wijeweera’s speech, recorded by the Army, to just two minutes.

After having won the presidential election, conducted in Dec. 1988, President Ranasinghe Premadasa made a desperate bid to reach a consensus with the JVP. Regardless of serious concerns, expressed by the police, the armed forces and members of the government, President Premadasa ordered the release of a large number of detained JVP suspects from various places. The President’s gamble failed. The JVP intensified violence. The government resorted to an all-out campaign. The country bled. Within a couple of months after Premadasa’s election as President, the government gradually overwhelmed the JVP. The latter couldn’t keep up with the pace of the government counter terror campaign. Within four months after Premakeerthi’s assassination, the JVP was in tatters. Its top leadership was executed, barring Somawanasa Amerasinghe, who managed to escape to India with the help of New Delhi, and thousands of activists and supporters killed.

Those who demand legal action against Ranil Wickremesinghe for his association with the Batalanda conveniently forget how the JVP strategy compelled the then government to resort to counter terror tactics. But the JVP may not have contemplated the scale of the government’s counter attack. The UNP, regardless of consequences, also took measures to suppress the Opposition, including the media. The assassination of much loved journalist Richard de Zoysa was obviously part of that counter-insurgency strategy. It certainly was a case of absolute power corrupting absolutely with R. Premadasa and Ranjan Wijeratne, who wanted to consolidate their power at any cost. Similarly, the JVPers are no angels or they were even worse having sent so many innocent people to premature and gruesome deaths for their macabre wishes to succeed with no permanent principles whatsoever. A good example of this is that after the crushing of their second violent uprising they joined every government that came to power, thereafter, as a coalition partner and every time it helped to topple each of those administrations in its cunning march to power.

By Shamindra Ferdinando



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Midweek Review

How massive Akuregoda defence complex was built with proceeds from sale of Galle Face land to Shangri-La

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Defence Headquarters Complex (DHQC) at Akuregoda

The Navy ceremonially occupied its new Headquarters (Block No. 3) at the Defence Headquarters Complex (DHQC) at Akuregoda, Battaramulla, on 09 December, 2025. On the invitation of the Commander of the Navy, Vice Admiral Kanchana Banagoda, the Deputy Minister of Defence, Major General Aruna Jayasekara (Retd) attended the event as the Chief Guest.

Among those present were Admiral of the Fleet Wasantha Karannagoda, the Defence Secretary, Air Vice Marshal Sampath Thuyacontha (Retd), Commander of the Army, Lieutenant General Lasantha Rodrigo, Commander of the Air Force, Air Marshal Bandu Edirisinghe, Inspector General of Police, Attorney-at-Law Priyantha Weerasooriya and former Navy Commanders.

With the relocation of the Navy at DHQC, the much-valued project to shift the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and Headquarters of the war-winning armed forces has been brought to a successful conclusion. The Army was the first to move in (November 2019), the MoD (May 2021), the Air Force (January 2024) and finally the Navy (in December 2025).

It would be pertinent to mention that the shifting of MoD to DHQC coincided with the 12th anniversary of bringing back the entire Northern and Eastern Provinces under the government, on 18 May, 2009. LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran was killed on the following day.

The project that was launched in March 2011, two years after the eradication of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), suffered a severe setback, following the change of government in 2015. The utterly irresponsible and treacherous Yahapalana government halted the project. That administration transferred funds, allocated for it, to the Treasury, in the wake of massive Treasury bond scams perpetrated in February and March 2015, within weeks after the presidential election.

Maithripala Sirisena, in his capacity as the President, as well as the Minister of Defence, declared open the new Army Headquarters, at DHQC, a week before the 2019 presidential election. Built at a cost of Rs 53.3 bn, DHQC is widely believed to be the largest single construction project in the country. At the time of the relocation of the Army, the then Lt. Gen. Shavendra Silva, the former Commanding Officer of the celebrated Task Force I/58 Division, served as the Commander.

Who made the DHQC a reality? Although most government departments, ministries and armed forces headquarters, were located in Colombo, under the Colombo Master Plan of 1979, all were required to be moved to Sri Jayewardenepura, Kotte. However successive administrations couldn’t go ahead with the massive task primarily due to the conflict. DHQC would never have been a reality if not for wartime Defence Secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa who determinedly pursued the high-profile project.

The absence of any reference to the origins of the project, as well as the significant role played by Gotabaya Rajapaksa at the just relocated Navy headquarters, prompted the writer to examine the developments related to the DHQC. The shifting of MoD, along with the Armed Forces Headquarters, was a monumental decision taken by Mahinda Rajapaksas’s government. But, all along it had been Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s determination to achieve that monumental task that displeased some within the administration, but the then Defence Secretary, a former frontline combat officer of the battle proved Gajaba Regiment, was not the type to back down or alter his strategy.

GR’s maiden official visit to DHQC

Gotabaya Rajapaksa, who made DHQC a reality, visited the sprawling building in his capacity as the President, Defence Minister and the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces on the morning of 03 August, 2021. It was Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s maiden official visit to the Army Headquarters, located within the then partially completed DHQC, eight months before the eruption of the externally backed ‘Aragalaya.’ The US-Indian joint project has been exposed and post-Aragalaya developments cannot be examined without taking into consideration the role played by political parties, the Bar Association of Sri Lanka, media, as well as the weak response of the political leadership and the armed forces. Let me stress that a comprehensive probe should cover the period beginning with the Swiss project to humiliate President Gotabaya Rajapaka in November, 2019, by staging a fake abduction, and the storming of the President’s House in July 2022. How could Sri Lanka forget the despicable Swiss allegation of sexual harassment of a female local employee by government personnel, a claim proved to be a blatant lie meant to cause embarrassment to the newly elected administration..

Let me get back to the DHQC project. The war-winning Mahinda Rajapaksa government laid the foundation for the building project on 11 May, 2011, two years after Sri Lanka’s triumph over the separatist Tamil terrorist movement. The high-profile project, on a 77-acre land, at Akuregoda, Pelawatta, was meant to bring the Army, Navy, and the Air Force headquarters, and the Defence Ministry, to one location.

President Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s visit to Akuregoda would have definitely taken place much earlier, under a very different environment, if not for the eruption of the Covid-19 pandemic, just a few months after his victory at the November 2019 election. The worst post-World War II crisis that had caused devastating losses to national economies, the world over, and delivered a staggering blow to Sri Lanka, heavily dependent on tourism, garment exports and remittances by its expatriate workers.

On his arrival at the new Army headquarters, President Gotabaya Rajapaksa was welcomed by General Shavendra Silva, who also served as the Chief of Defence Staff. Thanks to the President’s predecessor, Maithripala Sirisena, the then Maj. Gen Shavendra Silva was promoted to the rank of Lt. Gen and appointed the Commander of the Army on 18 August, 2019, just three months before the presidential poll. The appointment was made in spite of strong opposition from the UNP leadership and US criticism.

President Gotabaya Rajapaksa hadn’t minced his words when he publicly acknowledged the catastrophe caused by the plunging of the national income and the daunting challenge in debt repayment, amounting to as much as USD 4 bn annually.

The decision to shift the tri-forces headquarters and the Defence Ministry (The Defence Ministry situated within the Army Headquarters premises) caused a media furor with the then Opposition UNP alleging a massive rip-off. Defence Secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa reiterated his commitment to the project. If not for the change of government in 2015, the DHQC would have been completed during Mahinda Rajapaksa’s third term if he was allowed to contest for a third term successfully. Had that happened, Gotabaya Rajapaksa wouldn’t have emerged as the then Opposition presidential candidate at the 2019 poll. The disastrous Yahapalana administration and the overall deterioration of all political parties, represented in Parliament, and the 19th A that barred Mahinda Rajapaksa from contesting the presidential election, beyond his two terms, created an environment conducive for Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s emergence as the newly registered SLPP’s candidate.

Shangri-La move

During the 2019 presidential election campaign, SLPP candidate Gotabaya Rajapaksa strongly defended his decision to vacate the Army Headquarters, during Mahinda Rajapaksa presidency, to pave the way for the Shangri-La Hotel in Colombo. Shangri-La was among the hotels targeted by the Easter Sunday bombers – the only location targeted by two of them, including mastermind Zahran Hashim.

President Gotabaya Rajapaksa is on record as having said that vacation of the site had been in accordance with first executive President J.R. Jayewardene’s decision to move key government buildings away from Colombo to the new Capital of the country at Sri Jaywardenepura. Gotabaya Rajapaksa said so in response to the writer’s queries years ago.

Gotabaya Rajapaksa said that a despicable attempt was being made to blame him for the Army Headquarters land transaction. “I have been accused of selling the Army Headquarters land to the Chinese.”

Rajapaksa explained that Taj Samudra, too, had been built on a section of the former Army Headquarters land, previously used to accommodate officers’ quarters and the Army rugger grounds. Although President Jayewardene had wanted the Army Headquarters shifted, successive governments couldn’t do that due to the war and lack of funds, he said.

President Maithripala Sirisena and Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe declared open Shangri-La Colombo on 16 November, 2017. The Hong Kong-based Shangri-La Asia invited Gotabaya Rajapaksa for dinner, the following day, after the opening of its Colombo hotel. Shangri-La Chairperson, Kuok Hui Kwong, the daughter of Robert Kuok Khoon Ean, was there to welcome Gotabaya Rajapaksa, who had cleared the way for the post-war mega tourism investment project. Among those who had been invited were former President Mahinda Rajapaksa, former External Affairs Minister Prof. G.L. Peiris, former Presidential Secretary Lalith Weeratunga, and President’s Counsel Gamini Marapana, PC.

The Cabinet granted approval for the high-profile Shangri-La project in October 2010 and the ground-breaking ceremony was held in late February 2012.

Rajapaksa said that the Shangri-La proprietor, a Chinese, ran a big operation, based in Hong Kong, Malaysia and Singapore. Another parcel of land was given to the mega ITC hotel project, also during the previous Rajapaksa administration. ITC Ratnadipa, a super-luxury hotel by India’s ITC Hotels, officially opened in Colombo on April 25, 2024

Following the change of government in January 2015, the remaining section of the Army headquarters land, too, was handed over to Shangri-La.

Gotabaya Rajapaksa emphasised that the relocation of the headquarters of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, as well as the Defence Ministry, had been part of JRJ’s overall plan. The change of government, in January 2015, had caused a serious delay in completing the project and it was proceeding at a snail’s pace, Rajapaksa said. Even Parliament was shifted to Kotte in accordance with JRJ’s overall plan, Gotabaya Rajapaksa said, explaining his move to relocate all security forces’ headquarters and Defence Ministry into one complex at Akuregoda.

Acknowledging that the Army Headquarters had been there at Galle Face for six decades, Rajapaksa asserted that the Colombo headquarters wasn’t tactically positioned.

Rajapaksa blamed the inordinate delay in the completion of the Akuregoda complex on the Treasury taking hold of specific funds allocated for the project.

Over 5,000 military workforce

Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s maiden visit to DHQC on 3 August, 2021. General
Shavendra Silva is beside him

Major General Udaya Nanayakkara had been the first Director, Project Management Unit, with overall command of approximately 5,000 tri-forces personnel assigned to carry it out. The Shangri-La transaction provided the wherewithal to implement the DHQC project though the change of government caused a major setback. Nanayakkara, who had served as the Military Spokesman, during Eelam War IV, oversaw the military deployment, whereas private contractors handled specialised work such as piling, AC, fire protection and fire detection et al. The then MLO (Military Liaison Officer) at the Defence Ministry, Maj. Gen Palitha Fernando, had laid the foundation for the project and the work was going on smoothly when the Yahapalana administration withheld funds. Political intervention delayed the project and by September 2015, Nanayakkara was replaced by Maj Gen Mahinda Ambanpola, of the Engineer Service.

In spite of President Sirisena holding the Defence portfolio, he couldn’t prevent the top UNP leadership from interfering in the DHQC project. However, the Shangri-La project had the backing of A.J.M. Muzammil, the then UNP Mayor and one of the close confidants of UNP leader Ranil Wickremesinghe. Muzammil was among those present at the ground breaking ceremony for Shangri-La held on 24th February, 2012 ,with the participation of Minister Basil Rajapaksa.

Having identified the invaluable land, where the Army Headquarters and Defence Ministry were situated, for its project, Shangri-La made its move. Those who had been aware of Shangri-La’s plans were hesitant and certainly not confident of their success. They felt fearful of Defence Secretary Rajapaksa’s reaction.

But, following swift negotiations, they finalised the agreement on 28 December, 2010. Lt. Gen. Jagath Jayasuriya was the then Commander of the Army, with his predecessor General Fonseka in government custody after having been arrested within two weeks after the conclusion of the 2010 26 January Presidential poll.

Addressing the annual Viyathmaga Convention at Golden Rose Hotel, Boralesgamuwa, on 04 March, 2017, Gotabaya Rajapaksa, perhaps for the first time publicly discussed his role in the Shangri-La project. Declaring that Sri Lanka suffered for want of, what he called, a workable formula to achieve post-war development objectives, the war veteran stressed the pivotal importance of swift and bold decision-making.

Gotabaya Rajapaksa explained how the government had acted swiftly, and decisively, to attract foreign investments though some such efforts were not successful. There couldn’t be a better example than the government finalising an agreement with Shangri-La Hotels, he declared.

Declaring that the bureaucratic red tape shouldn’t in any way be allowed to undermine investments, Rajapaksa recalled the Chairman/CEO of Shangri-La Hotels and Resorts, Robert Kuok Khoon Ean, wanting the Army Headquarters land for his Colombo project. In fact, the hotels chain, at the time, had proposed to build hotels in Colombo, Hambantota and Batticaloa, and was one of the key investors wanting to exploit Sri Lanka’s success in defeating terrorism.

“Khoon-Ean’s request for the Army Headquarters land caused a serious problem for me. It was a serious challenge. How could I shift the headquarters of the war-winning Army? The Army had been there for six decades. It had been the nerve centre of the war effort for 30 years,” said Rajapaksa, who once commanded the First Battalion of the Gajaba Regiment (1GR)

Rajapaksa went on to explain how he exploited a decision taken by the first executive president J.R. Jayewardene to shift the Army Headquarters to Battaramulla, many years back. “Within two weeks, in consultation with the Secretary to the Finance Ministry, Dr. P.B. Jayasundera, and the Board of Investment, measures were taken to finalise the transaction. The project was launched to shift the Army, Navy and Air Force headquarters to Akuregoda, Pelawatte, in accordance with JRJ’s plan.”

The Hong Kong-based group announced the purchase of 10 acres of state land, in January 2011. Shangri-La Asia Limited announced plans to invest over USD 400 mn on the 30-storeyed star class hotel with 661 rooms.

The hotel is the second property in Sri Lanka for the leading Asian hospitality group, joining Shangri-La’s Hambantota Resort & Spa, which opened in June 2016.

Rajapaksa said that the top Shangri-La executive had referred to the finalisation of their Colombo agreement to highlight the friendly way the then administration handled the investment. Shangri-La had no qualms about recommending Sri Lanka as a place for investment, Rajapaksa said.

The writer explained the move to shift the Army Headquarters and the Defence Ministry from Colombo in a lead story headlined ‘Shangri-La to push MoD, Army Hq. out of Colombo city: Army Hospital expected to be converted into a museum’ (The Island, 04 January, 2011).

Yahapalana chaos

In the wake of the January 2015 change of government, the new leadership caused chaos with the suspension of the China-funded Port City Project, a little distance away from the Shangri-La venture. Many an eyebrow was raised when the then Finance Minister Ravi Karunanayake declared, in March, 2015, that funds wouldn’t be made available to the DHQC project until the exact cost estimation of the project could be clarified.

Media quoted Karunanayake as having said “Presently, this project seems like a bottomless pit and we need to know the depth of what we are getting into. From the current state of finances, allocated for this project, it seems as if they are building a complex that’s even bigger than the Pentagon!”

The insinuating declaration was made despite them having committed the blatant first Treasury bond scam in February 2015 that shook the Sirisena-Wickremesinghe administration to its core.

In June 2016, Cabinet spokesperson, Dr. Rajitha Senaratne, announced the suspension of the Akuregoda project. Citing financial irregularities and mismanagement of funds, Dr. Senaratne alleged that all Cabinet papers on the project had been prepared according to the whims and fancies of Gotabaya Rajapaksa.

The then Minister Karunanayake spearheaded the campaign against the DHQC project alleging, in the third week of January, 2015, that Rs 13.2 billion, in an account maintained at the Taprobane branch of the Bank of Ceylon had been transferred to the Consolidated Fund of the Treasury. The matter was being investigated as the account belonged to the Ministry of Defence, he added. The Finance Minister stressed that the MoD had no right to maintain such an account in violation of regulations and, therefore, the opening of the account was being investigated. The Minister alleged that several illegal transactions, including one involving Samurdhi, had come to light. He estimated the Samurdhi transaction (now under investigation) at Rs. 4 billion.

Having undermined Shangri-La and the DHQC projects, the UNP facilitated the expansion of the hotel project by releasing additional three and half acres on a 99-year lease. During the Yahapalana administration, Dayasiri Jayasekera disclosed at a post-Cabinet press briefing how the government leased three and a half acres of land at a rate of Rs. 13.1 mn per perch whereas the previous administration agreed to Rs 6.5 mn per perch. According to Jayasekera the previous government had leased 10 acres at a rate of Rs 9.5 mn (with taxes) per perch.

The bottom line is that DHQC was built with Shangri-La funds and the initiative was Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s whose role as rock solid wartime Secretary of Defence to keep security forces supplied with whatever their requirements could never be compared with any other official during the conflict.

By Shamindra Ferdinando

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Midweek Review

The Hour of the Invisible

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Picking-up the pieces in the bashed Isle,

Is going to take quite a long while,

And all hands need to be united as one,

To give it even a semblance of its former self,

But the more calloused and hardy the hands,

The more suitable are they for the task,

And the hour is upon us you could say,

When those vast legions of invisible folk,

Those wasting away in humble silent toil,

Could stand up and be saluted by all,

As being the most needed persons of the land

By Lynn Ockersz

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Features

Handunnetti and Colonial Shackles of English in Sri Lanka

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Handunetti at the World Economic Forum

“My tongue in English chains.
I return, after a generation, to you.
I am at the end
of my Dravidic tether
hunger for you unassuaged
I falter, stumble.”
– Indian poet R. Parthasarathy

When Minister Sunil Handunnetti addressed the World Economic Forum’s ‘Is Asia’s Century at Risk?’ discussion as part of the Annual Meeting of the New Champions 2025 in June 2025, I listened carefully both to him and the questions that were posed to him by the moderator. The subsequent trolling and extremely negative reactions to his use of English were so distasteful that I opted not to comment on it at the time. The noise that followed also meant that a meaningful conversation based on that event on the utility of learning a powerful global language and how our politics on the global stage might be carried out more successfully in that language was lost on our people and pundits, barring a few commentaries.

Now Handunnetti has reopened the conversation, this time in Sri Lanka’s parliament in November 2025, on the utility of mastering English particularly for young entrepreneurs. In his intervention, he also makes a plea not to mock his struggle at learning English given that he comes from a background which lacked the privilege to master the language in his youth. His clear intervention makes much sense.

The same ilk that ridiculed him when he spoke at WEF is laughing at him yet again on his pronunciation, incomplete sentences, claiming that he is bringing shame to the country and so on and so forth. As usual, such loud, politically motivated and retrograde critics miss the larger picture. Many of these people are also among those who cannot hold a conversation in any of the globally accepted versions of English. Moreover, their conceit about the so-called ‘correct’ use of English seems to suggest the existence of an ideal English type when it comes to pronunciation and basic articulation. I thought of writing this commentary now in a situation when the minister himself is asking for help ‘in finding a solution’ in his parliamentary speech even though his government is not known to be amenable to critical reflection from anyone who is not a party member.

The remarks at the WEF and in Sri Lanka’s parliament are very different at a fundamental level, although both are worthy of consideration – within the realm of rationality, not in the depths of vulgar emotion and political mudslinging.

The problem with Handunnetti’s remarks at WEF was not his accent or pronunciation. After all, whatever he said could be clearly understood if listened to carefully. In that sense, his use of English fulfilled one of the most fundamental roles of language – that of communication. Its lack of finesse, as a result of the speaker being someone who does not use the language professionally or personally on a regular basis, is only natural and cannot be held against him. This said, there are many issues that his remarks flagged that were mostly drowned out by the noise of his critics.

Given that Handunnetti’s communication was clear, it also showed much that was not meant to be exposed. He simply did not respond to the questions that were posed to him. More bluntly, a Sinhala speaker can describe the intervention as yanne koheda, malle pol , which literally means, when asked ‘Where are you going?’, the answer is ‘There are coconuts in the bag’.

He spoke from a prepared text which his staff must have put together for him. However, it was far off the mark from the questions that were being directly posed to him. The issue here is that his staff appears to have not had any coordination with the forum organisers to ascertain and decide on the nature of questions that would be posed to the Minister for which answers could have been provided based on both global conditions, local situations and government policy. After all, this is a senior minister of an independent country and he has the right to know and control, when possible, what he is dealing with in an international forum.

This manner of working is fairly routine in such international fora. On the one hand, it is extremely unfortunate that his staff did not do the required homework and obviously the minister himself did not follow up, demonstrating negligence, a want for common sense, preparedness and experience among all concerned. On the other hand, the government needs to have a policy on who it sends to such events. For instance, should a minister attend a certain event, or should the government be represented by an official or consultant who can speak not only fluently, but also with authority on the subject matter. That is, such speakers need to be very familiar with the global issues concerned and not mere political rhetoric aimed at local audiences.

Other than Handunnetti, I have seen, heard and also heard of how poorly our politicians, political appointees and even officials perform at international meetings (some of which are closed door) bringing ridicule and disastrous consequences to the country. None of them are, however, held responsible.

Such reflective considerations are simple yet essential and pragmatic policy matters on how the government should work in these conditions. If this had been undertaken, the WEF event might have been better handled with better global press for the government. Nevertheless, this was not only a matter of English. For one thing, Handunnetti and his staff could have requested for the availability of simultaneous translation from Sinhala to English for which pre-knowledge of questions would have been useful. This is all too common too. At the UN General Assembly in September, President Dissanayake spoke in Sinhala and made a decent presentation.

The pertinent question is this; had Handunetti had the option of talking in Sinhala, would the interaction have been any better? That is extremely doubtful, barring the fluency of language use. This is because Handunnetti, like most other politicians past and present, are good at rhetoric but not convincing where substance is concerned, particularly when it comes to global issues. It is for this reason that such leaders need competent staff and consultants, and not mere party loyalists and yes men, which is an unfortunate situation that has engulfed the whole government.

What about the speech in parliament? Again, as in the WEF event, his presentation was crystal clear and, in this instance, contextually sensible. But he did not have to make that speech in English at all when decent simultaneous translation services were available. In so far as content was concerned, he made a sound argument considering local conditions which he knows well. The minister’s argument is about the need to ensure that young entrepreneurs be taught English so that they can deal with the world and bring investments into the country, among other things. This should actually be the norm, not only for young entrepreneurs, but for all who are interested in widening their employment and investment opportunities beyond this country and in accessing knowledge for which Sinhala and Tamil alone do not suffice.

As far as I am concerned, Handunetti’s argument is important because in parliament, it can be construed as a policy prerogative. Significantly, he asked the Minister of Education to make this possible in the educational reforms that the government is contemplating.

He went further, appealing to his detractors not to mock his struggle in learning English, and instead to become part of the solution. However, in my opinion, there is no need for the Minister to carry this chip on his shoulder. Why should the minister concern himself with being mocked for poor use of English? But there is a gap that his plea should have also addressed. What prevented him from mastering English in his youth goes far deeper than the lack of a privileged upbringing.

The fact of the matter is, the facilities that were available in schools and universities to learn English were not taken seriously and were often looked down upon as kaduwa by the political spectrum he represents and nationalist elements for whom the utilitarian value of English was not self-evident. I say this with responsibility because this was a considerable part of the reality in my time as an undergraduate and also throughout the time I taught in Sri Lanka.

Much earlier in my youth, swayed by the rhetoric of Sinhala language nationalism, my own mastery of English was also delayed even though my background is vastly different from the minister. I too was mocked, when two important schools in Kandy – Trinity College and St. Anthony’s College – refused to accept me to Grade 1 as my English was wanting. This was nearly 20 years after independence. I, however, opted to move on from the blatant discrimination, and mastered the language, although I probably had better opportunities and saw the world through a vastly different lens than the minister. If the minister’s commitment was also based on these social and political realities and the role people like him had played in negating our English language training particularly in universities, his plea would have sounded far more genuine.

If both these remarks and the contexts in which they were made say something about the way we can use English in our country, it is this: On one hand, the government needs to make sure it has a pragmatic policy in place when it sends representatives to international events which takes into account both a person’s language skills and his breadth of knowledge of the subject matter. On the other hand, it needs to find a way to ensure that English is taught to everyone successfully from kindergarten to university as a tool for inclusion, knowledge and communication and not a weapon of exclusion as is often the case.

This can only bear fruit if the failures, lapses and strengths of the country’s English language teaching efforts are taken into cognizance. Lamentably, division and discrimination are still the main emotional considerations on which English is being popularly used as the trolls of the minister’s English usage have shown. It is indeed regrettable that their small-mindedness prevents them from realizing that the Brits have long lost their long undisputed ownership over the English language along with the Empire itself. It is no longer in the hands of the colonial masters. So why allow it to be wielded by a privileged few mired in misplaced notions of elitism?

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