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Midweek Review

A Living Legend of the Peradeniya Tradition:

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Prof. H. L. Seneviratne

A Tribute to Professor H. L. Seneviratne – Part I

My earliest memories of the eminent anthropologist, Professor H. L. Seneviratne date back to my childhood, when I first encountered his name through the vivid accounts of campus life shared by my late brother, Sugathapala de Silva, then a lecturer in the Department of Sinhala at the University of Peradeniya. By the time I became a first-year sociology student in 1968/69, I had the privilege of being taught by the Professor, whose guidance truly paved the way for my own progression in sociology and anthropology. Even then, it was clear that he was a towering presence—not just as an academician, but as a central figure in the lively cultural and literary renaissance that defined that era of the university’s intellectual history.

 H.L. Seneviratne stood alongside a galaxy of intellectuals who shaped and developed the literary consciousness of the Peradeniya University. His professorial research made regular appearances in journals such as Sanskriti and Mimamsa, published Sinhala and English articles, and served as channels for the dissemination of the literary consciousness of Peradeniya to the population at large. These texts were living texts of a dynamic intellectual ferment where the synthesis of classical aesthetic sensibilities with current critical intellectual thought in contemporary Sri Lanka was under way.

The concept of a ‘Peradeniya tradition or culture’, a term which would later become legendary in Sri Lankan literary and intellectual circles, was already being formed at this time. Peradeniya culture came to represent a distinctive synthesis: cosmopolitanism entwined with well-rooted local customs, aesthetic innovation based on classical Sinhala styles, and critical interaction with modernity. Among its pre-eminent practitioners were intellectual giants such as Ediriweera Sarachchandra, Gunadasa Amarasekara, and Siri Gunasinghe. These figures and H.L. Seneviratne himself, were central to the shaping of a space of cultural and literary critique that ranged from newspapers to book-length works, public speeches to theatrical performance.

Unlimited influence

H.L. Seneviratne’s influence was not limited to the printed page, which I discuss in this article. He operated in and responded to the performative, interactive space of drama and music, situating lived artistic practice in his cultural thought. I recall with vividness the late 1950s, a period seared into my memory as one of revelation, when I as a child was fortunate enough to witness one of the first performances of Maname, the trailblazing Sinhala drama that revolutionised Sri Lankan theatre. Drawn from the Nadagam tradition and staged in the open-air theatre in Peradeniya—now known as Sarachchandra Elimahan Ranga Pitaya—or Wala as used by the campus students.  Maname was not so much a play as a culturally transformative experience.

H.L. Seneviratne was not just an observer of this change. He joined the orchestra of Maname staged on November 3, 1956, lending his voice and presence to the collective heartbeat of the performance. He even contributed to the musical group by playing the esraj, a quiet but vital addition to the performance’s beauty and richness. Apart from these roles, he played an important part in the activities of Professor Sarathchandra’s Sinhala Drama Society, a talent nursery and centre for collaboration between artists and intellectuals. H.L. Seneviratne was a friend of Arthur Silva, a fellow resident of Arunachalam Hall then, and the President of the Drama Circle. H.L. Seneviratne had the good fortune to play a role, both as a member of the original cast, and an active member of the Drama Circle that prevailed on lecturer E.R. Sarathchandra to produce a play and gave him indispensable organizational support. It was through this society that Sarachchandra attracted some of the actors who brought into being Maname and later Sinhabhahu, plays which have become the cornerstone of Sri Lanka’s theatrical heritage.

The best chronicler of Maname

H.L. Seneviratne is the best chronicler of Maname. (Towards a National Art, From Home and the World, Essays in honour of Sarath Amunugama. Ramanika Unamboowe and Varuni Fernando (eds)). He chronicles the genesis of Ediriweera Sarachchandra’s seminal play Maname, framing it as a pivotal attempt to forge a sophisticated national identity by synthesizing indigenous folk traditions with Eastern theatrical aesthetics. Seneviratne details how Sarachchandra, disillusioned with the ‘artificiality’ of Western-influenced urban theatre and the limitations of both elite satires and rural folk plays, looked toward the Japanese Noh and Kabuki traditions to find a model for a ‘national’ art that could appeal across class divides. The author emphasises that the success of Maname was not merely a solo intellectual feat but a gruelling, collective effort involving a ‘gang of five’ academics and a dedicated cohort of rural, bilingual students from the University of Ceylon at Peradeniya. Through anecdotes regarding the discovery of lead actors like Edmund Wijesinghe and the assembly of a unique orchestra, Seneviratne highlights the logistical struggles—from finding authentic instruments to managing cumbersome stage sets—that ultimately birthed a transformative ‘oriental’ theatre rooted in the nadagama style yet refined for a modern, sophisticated audience.

Born in Sri Lanka in 1934, in a village in Horana, he was educated at the Horana Taxila College following which he was admitted to the Department of Sociology at the University of Peradeniya. H.L. Seneviratne’s academic journey subsequently led him to the University of Rochester for his doctoral studies. But, despite his long tenure in the United States, his research has remained firmly rooted in the soil of his homeland.

His early seminal work, Rituals of the Kandyan State, his PhD thesis turned into a book, offered a groundbreaking analysis of the Temple of the Tooth (Dalada Maligawa). By examining the ceremonies surrounding the sacred relic, H.L. Seneviratne demonstrated how religious performance served as the bedrock of political legitimacy in the Kandyan Kingdom. He argued that these rituals at the time of his fieldwork in the early 1970s were not static relics of the past, but active tools used to construct and maintain the authority of the state, the ideas that would resonate throughout his later career.

The Work of Kings

Perhaps, his most provocative contribution arrived with the publication of The Work of Kings published in 1999. In this sweeping study, H.L. Seneviratne traced the transformation of the Buddhist clergy, or Sangha, from the early 20th-century ‘social service’ monks, who focused on education and community upliftment, to the more politically charged nationalist figures of the modern era. He analysed the shift away from a universalist, humanistic Buddhism toward a more exclusionary identity, sparking intense debate within both academic and religious circles in Sri Lanka.

In The Work of Kings, H.L. Seneviratne has presented a sophisticated critique and argued that in the early 20th century, influenced by figures like Anagarika Dharmapala, there was a brief ‘monastic ideal’ centred on social service and education. This period saw monks acting as catalysts for community development and moral reform embodying a humanistic version of Buddhism that sought to modernize the country while maintaining its spiritual integrity.

However, H.L. Seneviratne contends that this situation was eventually derailed by the rise of post-independence nationalism. He describes a process where the clergy moved away from universalist goals to become the vanguard of a narrow ethno-religious identity. By aligning themselves so closely with the state and partisan politics, H.L. Seneviratne suggests that the Sangha inadvertently traded their moral authority for political influence. This shift, in his view, led to the ‘betrayal’ of the original social service movement, replacing a vision of broad social progress with one centred on political dominance.

The core of his critique lies in the disappearance of what he calls the ‘intellectual monk.’ He laments the decline of the scholarly, reflective tradition in favour of a more populist and often inflammatory rhetoric. By analysing the rhetoric of key monastic figures, H.L. Senevirathne illustrates how the language of Buddhism was repurposed to justify political ends, often at the expense of the pluralistic values that he believes are inherent to the faith’s core teachings.

H.L. Seneviratne’s work remains highly relevant today as it provides a framework for understanding contemporary religious tensions. His analysis serves as a warning about the consequences of merging religious institutional power with state politics. By documenting this historical shift, he challenges modern Sri Lankans—and global observers—to reconsider the role of religious institutions in a secular, democratic state, urging a return to the compassionate and socially inclusive roots of the Buddhist tradition.

  Within the broader context of Sri Lankan anthropology, H.L. Seneviratne is frequently grouped with other towering figures of his generation, most notably Stanley Jeyaraja Tambiah and Gananath Obeyesekere. Together, this remarkable cohort revolutionized the study of Sri Lanka by applying structural and psychological analyses to religious and ethnic identity. While Tambiah famously interrogated the betrayal of non-violent Buddhist principles in the face of political violence, H.L. Seneviratne’s work is often seen as the essential sociological counterpart, providing the detailed historical and institutional narrative of how the monastic order itself was reshaped by these very forces.

Reation to Seneviratne’s critque

The reaction to H.L. Seneviratne’s critique has been as multifaceted as the work itself. In academic circles, particularly those influenced by post-colonial theory, he is celebrated for speaking truth in a public place. Scholars have noted that because he writes as an insider—both a Sinhalese and a Buddhist, that makes them both credible and, to some, highly objectionable. His work has paved the way for a younger generation of Sri Lankan sociologists and anthropologists to move beyond traditional functionalism towards more radical articulations of competing interests and political power.

However, his analysis has also made him a target for nationalist critics. Those aligned with ethno-religious movements often view his deconstruction of the Sangha’s political role as an attack on Sinhalese-Buddhist identity itself. These detractors argue that H.L. Seneviratne’s intellectualist or universalist view of Buddhism fails to account for the necessity of the clergy’s role in protecting the nation against neo colonial and modern pressures. This tension highlights the very descent into ideology that H.L. Seneviratne has spent his career documenting.

H.L. Seneviratne’s legacy is defined by this ongoing dialogue between scholarship and social reality. His transition from the detached scholar seen in his early work on Kandyan rituals to the socially concerned intellectual of The Work of Kings mirrors the very transformation of the Sangha and Buddha Sasana he studied.  By refusing to look away from the complexities of the present, he has ensured that his work remains a cornerstone for any serious discussion on the future of religion and governance in Sri Lanka.

Focus on good governance

In his later years, H.L. Seneviratne has pivoted his focus toward the practical application of his theories, specifically examining how the concept of ‘Good Governance’ interacts with traditional religious structures. He argues that for Sri Lanka to achieve true stability, there must be a fundamental reimagining of the Sangha’s role in the public sphere—one that moves away from the ‘work of Kings’ and returns to a more ethical, advisory capacity. This shift in his recent lectures reflects a deep concern about the erosion of democratic institutions and the way religious sentiment can be harnessed to bypass the rule of law.

Building on this, contemporary scholars like Benjamin Schonthal have expanded H.L. Seneviratne’s inquiry into the legal and constitutional dimensions of Buddhism in Sri Lanka. While H.L. Seneviratne provided the anthropological groundwork for how monks gained political power, this newer generation of academics examines how that power has been codified into the very laws of the state. They explore the ‘path dependency’ created by the historical shifts H.L. Seneviratne documented, looking at how the legal privileging of Buddhism creates unique challenges for a pluralistic society.

New Sangha

Furthermore, his influence is visible in the work of local scholars who focus on ‘engaged Buddhism.’ These researchers look back at H.L. Seneviratne’s description of the early 20th-century social service monks as a blueprint for modern reform. By identifying the moment where the clergy’s mission shifted from social welfare to political nationalism, these scholars use H.L. Seneviratne’s historical milestones to advocate a ‘New Sangha’ that prioritizes reconciliation and inter-ethnic harmony over state-aligned power.

The enduring power of H.L. Seneviratne’s work lies in its refusal to offer easy answers. By mapping the transition within Buddhist practice from ritual to politics, and from social service to nationalism, he has provided an analytical framework in which the nation can see its own transformation. His legacy is not just a collection of books, but a persistent, rigorous habit of questioning that continues to inspire those who seek to understand the delicate balance between faith and the modern state.

H.L. Seneviratne continues to challenge his audience to think beyond the immediate political moment. By documenting the arc of Sri Lankan history from the sacred rituals of the Kandyan kings to the modern halls of parliament, he provides a vital sense of perspective. Whether he is being celebrated by the academic community or critiqued by nationalist voices, his work ensures that the conversation regarding the soul of the nation remains rigorous, historically grounded, and unafraid of its own complexities.

Anthropology and cinema

H.L. Seneviratne identifies the mid-1950s as the critical turning point for this cinematic shift, specifically anchoring the move to 1956 with the release of Lester James Peries’s “Rekava.” This period was a watershed moment in Sri Lankan history, coinciding with a broader nationalist resurgence that sought to reclaim a localized identity from the influence of colonial and foreign powers. H.L. Seneviratne suggests that before this era, the ‘South Indian formula’ dominated the screen, characterized by studio-bound sets, theatrical acting, and musical interludes that felt alien to the island’s actual social fabric. The pioneers of this movement, led by Lester James Peries and later followed by figures like Siri Gunasinghe in the early 1960s, deliberately moved the camera into the open air of the rural village to capture what H.L. Seneviratne describes as the ‘authentic rhythms’ of life. This transition was not merely aesthetic but deeply ideological; it replaced the mythical, exaggerated heroism of commercial cinema with a nuanced exploration of the post-colonial middle class and the crumbling feudal hierarchies. By the 1960s, through landmark works like ‘Gamperaliya,’ these filmmakers were successfully crafting a modern mythology that reflected the internal psychological tensions and the social evolution of a nation navigating its way between traditional Buddhist values and a rapidly modernizing world.

His critique of the relationship between art and the state is particularly evident in his analysis of historical epics, where he has argued that certain cinematic portrayals of ancient kings and battles serve as a form of ‘visual nationalism,’ translating the ideological shifts he documented in The Work of Kings onto the silver screen. By analysing these films, he shows how popular culture can become a powerful tool for constructing a simplified, heroic past that often ignores the multi-ethnic and pluralistic realities of the island’s history.

(To be concluded)

by Professor M. W. Amarasiri de Silva



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Midweek Review

Staying relevant in a changing media landscape

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Samita Prakash / Ashok Malik / Marya Shakil

The sinking of an Iranian frigate in India’s backyard, closer to Sri Lanka’s southern coast, in early March this year, a few days after the eruption of war after the unprovoked Israeli-US attack on Iran, posed quite a significant challenge for India and Sri Lanka. They grappled with the escalating situation. No one wanted to blame the US for the death of over 100 unarmed Iranian Navy personnel.

By Shamindra Ferdinando

Reference was made at the Media Fest 2026 to the false claim regarding the resignation of Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe at the height of protests in Colombo, in July, 2022, to highlight the failure on the part of the non-traditional media to report the developing situation accurately.

The fictitious claim received the attention during the second session of Media Fest 2026, organised by the Sri Lanka-India Media Friendship Association (SLIMFA) on 11 July, 2026, at the Taj Samudra. The panel consisted of Ashok Malik, Nisthar Cassim (President, SLIMFA), Vimukthi Karunarathne, Jamila Hussain and Robert Anthony. It was moderated by Kalani Kumarasinghe.

The panel paid attention to the challenge the traditional media, particularly the print, faced in covering the well-orchestrated campaign, especially with foreign inputs to oust President Gotabaya Rajapaksa. Essentially, the finger was pointed at the non-traditional media for being inaccurate, hasty and irresponsible. Reference was also made to the recent Negombo Prison riot, that claimed the lives of 31, to stress the importance of the traditional media as the preferred or truthful news provider.

The stimulating discussion took place after Malik, the former policy advisor/additional secretary in the Ministry of External Affairs of India, dealt with holistic media strategy. Malik, who had been a frequent visitor to Colombo over the years, had served the Ministry of External Affairs during the violent crisis in Colombo. Malik had been with the Ministry from October 2019 to August 2022, the month Wickremesinghe received the parliamentary backing to succeed forcefully ousted Gotabaya Rajapaksa through extra parliamentary means.

The SLIMFA was inaugurated in May 2024 under the patronage of the Indian High Commission. The first ever Media Fest was held also at the Taj Samudra over a period of two days, in April, 2025. Indian High Commissioner in Colombo, Santosh Jha, was present throughout the programme held on 11 July. This year’s focus was on the theme ‘Staying Relevant in a Changing World.’

The two other sessions were addressed by Editor Asian News International, Ms. Smita Prakash, and Managing Editor, India Today Ms Marya Shakil. They dealt with trust, truth and the battle for credibility and the shifting of the audience, respectively. Their perspectives facilitated an exciting dialogue with the panelists and members of the audience making useful contributions.

Passing reference was made to the West Asia conflict that disrupted global energy markets in March, following the unprovoked Israeli-US attack on Iran, as well as the conclusion of Sri Lanka’s successful war against separatist terrorist, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), in May, 2009. Prakash found fault with the Western media coverage of India while Indika Sakalasooriya, Communications Manager at SLYCAN Trust, emphasised that in spite of accusations directed at others, there had been occasions traditional media, too, could be faulted for deceiving the world.

Sakalasooriya cited the high profile accusations directed at Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, by the Western media, regarding their purported Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) project to justify the March 2003 invasion of that country. The US-led coalition caused massive destruction. The Western powers hanged Hussein after what amounted to a kangaroo court trial.

It would have been better if Sakalasooriya mentioned how the US propagated lies to build a case against Iraq, particularly against the backdrop of false accusations that have surfaced directed at Iran to justify the Febuary 28, 2026, unprovoked attack on that nation with a proud history.

In a speech in Cincinnati, Ohio, on 7 October, 2002, US President George W. Bush confidently declared that Iraq “possesses and produces chemical and biological weapons. It is seeking nuclear weapons.”

The US President then vowed that Hussein had to be stopped. “The Iraqi dictator must not be permitted to threaten America and the world with horrible poisons and diseases and gases and atomic weapons,” international news agencies quoted President Bush as having said.

The truth is that the mainstream media, whatever the accusations directed at social media platforms now, then played ball with respective governments in support of their narrow political-military-economic objectives as always. The British and US media, however much they publicly proclaim to be independent, then blindly propagated the lie that Iraq posed an immediate threat to them and, therefore, had to be dealt with.

Perhaps none of those in the relevant panel moderated, by Chief Executive Officer of Advocata Institute, Dhananath Fernando, remembered how Ranil Wickremesinghe, in his capacity as Prime Minister, justified the US invasion. Addressing the UN General Assembly in September, 2003, well over a year after the US failure to find evidence of the WMD project, Wickremesinghe described the US as a reluctant ‘world policeman’ forced to intervene in Iraq due to the failure on the part of the US to deal with Iraq.

Reportage of July 2022 events

An intense social media campaign backed the violent protest campaign here against President Gotabaya Rajapaksa. Then US Ambassador Julie Chung issued several statements on Twitter (now X) warning the government and the military against using force to bring protests to an end. Interested parties exploited her interventions to intensify pressure on the government. The situation eventually turned so bad, Chung had to finally warn the public that accounts impersonating her were spreading misinformation and fake tweets. The US Embassy here, on multiple occasions, urged the public to verify information on the official US Embassy and verified X accounts. But during that chaotic period, the public was so drunk on misinformation, weren’t bothered at all regarding the accuracy and the vast majority was not interested in verifying statements.

The reference to false claims about Wickremesinghe’s resignation, during the panel discussion, should have attracted comments and observations for obvious reasons. Both the US and India have been accused of backing the operation that compelled President Gotabaya Rajapaksa to leave office.

President Wickremesinghe, in June, 2024, claimed that pressure was brought on him to resign in the immediate aftermath of protesters setting ablaze his Kollupitiya private residence on 9 July, 2022. The declaration was made at a function in London to mark the 40th anniversary of the International Democrats Union (IDU).

Prof. Sunanda Maddumabandara, who served as the Senior Advisor (Media) to President Ranil Wickremesinghe (July 2022 to September 2024) in late 2025 declared that the then Indian High Commissioner in Colombo, Gopal Baglay, asked Speaker Mahinda Yapa Abeywardena to take over as the interim president. Maddumabandara contradicted previous claims that it was US Ambassador Chung who intervened on behalf of the regime change project. Prof. Maddumabandara’s revelations in “Aragalaye Balaya” (The Power of the Aragalaya) launched in the presence of both Wickremesinghe and Abeywardena didn’t receive the media attention. Interestingly both traditional and non-traditional media conveniently ignored the author’s claim. Abeywardena remained silent though he must have told the author what transpired between him and Baglay, now New Delhi’s High Commissioner in Australia.

Those who constantly targeted Chung over her support to the anti-Gotabaya Rajapaksa campaign turned a blind eye to Prof. Maddumabandara’s shocking disclosure. The author quoted Abeywardena as having revealed that Baglay promised to bring the blockade on the Speaker’s official residence to an immediate end if he agreed to accept the Presidency. But, Wickremesinghe had strenuously refused to step down though, following a meeting chaired by Abeywardena, a section of the media reported that he would resign.

Sri Lanka lacked the political will to inquire into external interventions that led to the fall of President Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s government. Abeywardena, who revealed direct intervention and how intense pressure was brought on him, did absolutely nothing to activate an investigation. Wickremesinghe, who succeeded Gotabaya Rajapaksa in July, 2022, refrained from launching an inquiry. Having fully backed the campaign against Rajapaksa, Wickremesinghe ended up in the President’s Office. Therefore, his decision to keep quiet is understandable.

The Wickremesinghe-Rajapaksa government terminated a case filed by SLPP parliamentarians against the failure on the part of the government to protect their property.

The JVP-led NPP that won both the presidential and unbeatable 2/3 majority at the parliamentary elections, in 2024, simply forgot the case of foreign interventions. Since the change of government in September, 2024, Sri Lanka has entered into new partnerships with India and the US. The public is totally in the dark as to what they are.

The finalisation of seven MoUs between India and Sri Lanka, in April, 2025, and the subsequent sale of controlling stake in the strategic Colombo Dockyard Limited (CDL) to Mazagon Dock Shipbuilders Limited, affiliated with the Indian Defence Ministry, raised the Indo-Lanka relations to a higher level. The inclusion of a MoU on Defence underscored the bilateral relationship, while India stepped-up assistance to the Sri Lankan military. The recent donation of military stores, estimated to be worth USD 5.5 mn in support of the 1,000-plus Lankan contingent for Haiti, deployment under UN command, as authoritative sources confirmed recently, that agreements in their entirety could not be disclosed under any circumstances thereby underscoring India’s status. The reference was clearly aimed at the controversy that the seven MoUs, including the one on defence, hadn’t been revealed to the public, and the Parliament, too, remained in the dark.

India paid USD 52.96 mn for Japan’s Onomichi Dockyard, previously the majority owner of the Colombo Dockyard.

Terrorists/gunmen

Altogether there were three panels moderated by Dilrukshi Handuneththi, Kalani Kumarasinghe and Dhananath Fernando and some of the panelists questioned the way Western media covered major events. One pointed out how the Indian media couldn’t immediately report the assassination of Indian Premier India Gandhi on 31 October, 1984, as they couldn’t do so until the President made an official statement regarding the killing of a sitting PM, whereas the Western media didn’t have such obstacles.

The despicable western media practice of describing terrorists as gunmen and militants were also mentioned. Unfortunately, no one bothered to remind the audience of the India-led terrorist project that destroyed Sri Lanka, caused the deaths of nearly 1,500 Indian soldiers and her son Rajiv Gandhi, former Prime Minister, as well. The writer, at one point, felt the need to remind the gathering of the need to discuss issues in Sri Lanka context.

Ms Smita Prakash, in her thought-provoking address, discussed the challenge the mainstream Indian media faced in reporting ‘Operation Sindoor’ following the terrorist attack on Pahalgam on 22 April, 2025. India directly blamed Pakistan and launched large-scale offensive action on 7 May. The gathering was told that similar challenges were experienced in covering the unprecedented war between Israel-US combine against Iran this year.

When the new West Asia war erupted, India found the situation quite embarrassing, particularly against the backdrop of Prime Minister Narendra Modi visiting Tel Aviv, just days before the attack on Tehran. India remained silent for several days before Foreign Secretary, Vikram Misri, on 5 March, signed the condolence book at the Iranian Embassy, in Delhi, on behalf of the Government of India. Misri offered condolences on the death of the Supreme Leader of Iran, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.

Over a week later India had no option but to get in touch with the Iranian leadership to secure energy supplies amidst turmoil over disruption of services. The Indian media coverage of the West Asia war obviously took into consideration the developing situation at home as the Modi government carefully navigated the crisis situation. Towards the end of the major confrontations before Iran and US agreed on a ceasefire, the US attacked three vessels crewed by Indians in the Hormuz strait.

Both traditional and non-traditional media have to deal with social media platforms where users can post messages, images and videos. US President Donald Trump shared posts on his social media platform Truth Social on a regular basis that made all other media irrelevant. The impact of the US President’s posts made a huge impact during the West Asia war as he continuously bypassed all official channels to go directly to the people. His regular posts caused uncertainty, increased tensions and undermined efforts to deal with the developing situations, sensibly.

Following recent exchanges and Iranian vows to avenge the death of their Supreme leader, President Trump wrote in a post on his Truth Social account:”1,000 missiles are locked and loaded and aimed at the Islamic Republic of Iran, with thousands more to immediately follow, should the Iranian government act on its threat.” He then signed off the post with the phrase “praise be to Allah”, which he also did in a post threatening Iran last April.

Perhaps, SLIMFA-arranged discussions should have paid attention to the impact of social media platforms in the hands of world leaders and governments. All countries (governments), regardless of their size and influence, use social media to advance their agenda. There is no need for breaking news on television channels or news flash in print media as they can directly go to the public.

The unprecedented transformation of the media landscape, in the wake of proliferation of social media with both governments as well as big business at the receiving end, sometimes. Platforms have emerged as central hubs for global news. The reportage of the West Asia war, as well as other developments at global level, proved the advent of social media and the dependence of major news agencies on social media platforms.

The Western media coverage of the Russia-Ukraine war repeatedly exposed their bias. The UK’s BBC declined to visit the site of a Ukrainian drone attack on a student dormitory in Starobelsk in the Lugansk Republic, in May this year. The CNN, too, declared its inability to join the visit arranged by Russia. One need not be an expert to understand their response as the world knows the Ukraine is being used by Western powers for war with Russia, a claim not denied by them.

Drop in voter enthusiasm

Top award-winning journalist Marya Shakil explained the devastating impact of the smartphone on the Indian electorate.

Recalling her coverage of elections in the Uttar Pradesh, in 2017, the two-time recipient of the prestigious Ramnath Goenka Award for Politics and Government asserted that the younger generation, now addicted to smartphones, may not be interested in politics. Shakil based her claim largely on a boy she found aimlessly scrolling near a political rally and covering election in Bihar last year.

Having displaced a range of figures to prove the continuing decline in the traditional media, Shakil engaged the audience in an exciting conversation that underscored the responsibility on the part of the traditional media to address the issues at hand and face challenges. She reiterated that regardless of expansion and massive profits accrued by non-traditional media, including influencers, at the expense of the traditional media, the latter still remained trustworthy.

Shakil’s assertion regarding declining voter interest, as shown by that boy she ran into during Uttar Pradesh polls coverage. must be examined taking into how smartphones can be a destructive tool. During the discussions, references were made to the violent overthrow of governments in Pakistan (April, 2022), Bangladesh (August, 2024) and Nepal (September, 2025) though Sri Lanka (July, 2024) was not mentioned in that particular context. However, Jamila Hussain referred to the challenging task of covering the campaign against President Gotabaya Rajapaksa.

In those externally backed protest operations against democratically elected governments, sections of the media, both traditional (print/electronic) and non-traditional, played significant roles. Sri Lanka is not an exception. President Gotabaya Rajapaksa didn’t realise what was going on until it was too late. If not for the intervention made by the Navy at the 11th hour, the President and the First Lady could have been trapped at the President’s House when protesters took control of it.

It would be pertinent to mention what Indian National Security Advisor (NSA) Ajith Doval said about the overthrow of governments. Speaking at the Sardar Patel Memorial Lecture, in New Delhi, on 31 October, 2025, Doval attributed recent political instability and “non-constitutional regime changes” in neighbouring countries to deficiencies in governance.

Declaring that the quality of governance is the fundamental determinant of political stability, Doval, who held at influential post since 2014, when the BJP formed government, stressed: “The rise and fall of empires, monarchies, oligarchies, aristocracies, or democracies is, in essence, a history of their governance.”

Commenting on political upheavals in the region, Doval declared: “In the recent cases of regime change through non-constitutional methods in Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, and others, these were actually cases of bad governance. And that is how governance matters.” Is it his opinion that it is India’s sole right to decide what is good governance and bad governance in the region?

Doval’s opinion cannot be examined without taking into consideration their partnership with the US as well as joint US-Japan-India-Australia (Quad) response to the Chinese challenge. Years ago, Gotabaya Rajapaksa disclosed how Doval demanded the cancellation of all major Chinese projects here, including the handing over of the Hambantota Port to China on a 99-year-lease and the Colombo Port City project.

Although India failed to disrupt major Chinese projects here, New Delhi has consolidated its position in Sri Lanka. Taking control of the CDL, as well as the inauguration of the Colombo West International Terminal (CWIT), in April, 2025, boosted their position here. The consortium operating the $800 million CWITT includes India’s Adani Ports & SEZ Ltd, John Keels and the Sri Lanka Ports Authority (SLPA).

The irony is that the JVP, once opposed to everything and anything connected to Delhi, has ended up in a cozy relationship with Modi’s India and got close to the US in a manner that no one believed possible a decade ago.

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Midweek Review

Remote health monitoring: A practical digital solution for dengue burden

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Sri Lanka is once again facing a significant dengue challenge. With rising numbers of suspected and confirmed cases reported across the country, especially during the rainy season, dengue has become not only a public health concern but also a major pressure point for the hospital system. In many affected districts, outpatient departments, emergency treatment units and medical wards are crowded with patients who need assessment, blood investigations and close observation.

Dengue is a disease that can change rapidly. A patient who appears stable in the early days of fever may enter a critical stage within a short period. This is why doctors are cautious, and why many patients are advised to return repeatedly for review. However, in a lower-middle-income country such as Sri Lanka, where public hospitals already function with limited beds, staff shortages and high patient loads, depending only on hospital-based care during an outbreak is not sustainable.

As a specialist in Health Informatics, I believe Sri Lanka needs a practical remote health monitoring system to support dengue care. Such a system can help identify patients who truly need admission, while safely monitoring stable patients at home. This will reduce unnecessary hospital overcrowding and allow hospital resources to be used for patients who are seriously ill.

Not every patient diagnosed with dengue needs immediate admission. Some patients are clinically stable but still require close monitoring, especially during the critical phase of the illness. At present, many such patients are sent home with advice to return if they develop warning symptoms. While this is clinically reasonable, it places a heavy responsibility on families, and danger signs may be missed or recognized late.

A remote monitoring system can close this gap. Once a patient is diagnosed with dengue at a hospital, clinic or laboratory, the patient can be registered into a digital platform. Basic details such as age, day of fever, symptoms, risk factors, etc can be entered. Based on this information, patients can be categorized into low-risk, moderate-risk or high-risk groups according to national clinical guidance.

Patients who are suitable for home care can then be followed up through structured phone calls, SMS, WhatsApp-based forms or a simple mobile application. They or their caregivers can report temperature, pulse, blood pressure if available, vomiting, abdominal pain, dizziness, bleeding symptoms, urine output, fluid intake, and general well-being.

These data can be monitored by a dedicated panel of doctors through a centralized digital dashboard, allowing timely clinical review and appropriate decision-making. Such a system is not intended to replace existing clinical care, but to strengthen the health system by supporting early identification of at-risk patients, improving follow-up, and reducing the unnecessary burden on already crowded hospitals.

Depending on the severity, the patient can be advised to visit the nearest hospital, referred to the area Medical Officer of Health, or connected to an ambulance service. This creates a safer pathway from home to hospital before the condition becomes critical.

The same system can also be used for patients discharged from the hospital. A few days of remote follow-up after discharge can provide reassurance, detect late complications, and reduce unnecessary readmissions.

Sri Lanka already has a strong public health network, including hospitals, MOH offices, public health inspectors and dengue control units. What is needed now is better digital coordination. A low-cost, well-designed remote monitoring system can connect patients, doctors, hospitals and emergency services in a timely manner.

Dengue prevention will always depend on mosquito control, clean environments and community participation. But during an outbreak, timely information can save lives. Remote health monitoring offers Sri Lanka a practical way to protect patients, reduce hospital pressure and deliver the right care at the right time.


by Dr. Harsha Jayakody

Board-certified specialist in Health Informatics
MBBS (Sri Lanka), MBA in Health Admin (Malaysia), MSc in Biomedical Informatics (Sri Lanka), MD in Health Informatics (Sri Lanka)

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Midweek Review

The sordid tale of theft and tragedy at Finance Ministry

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The latest deplorable revelations in the Committee on Public Finance (COPF) report ‘The Fraud Linked to Cybercrime in the US Dollar 2.5 Million Debt Repayment to Australia’, presented to parliament on July 10th tells a tale of irresponsibility, incompetence and disregard for the most important of tasks that are bestowed on a Ministry that is of paramount importance to a country striving to come out of a serious economic crisis.

Every new crisis adds a burden on the backs of the innocent citizens paying for the sins of those who caused it. This time, as in other times, the crisis was caused by those who sit high above the citizenry, governing the country or running its affairs; by those who perpetrated the fraud deliberately, and no less by those who enabled it through incompetence, inattention and perhaps ignorance.

The incredible ease with which the shameful theft of 2.5 million US Dollars occurred in the Ministry of Finance reveals that this theft was facilitated by a series of lapses by those in charge of its processes, as COPF discovered, and was most certainly avoidable.

Ten fraudulent transactions had been allowed to pass through the precincts of the Finance Ministry and the Central Bank of Sri Lanka, before it was discovered that they were the unwitting pawns in a straightforward cybercrime. Two institutions that ordinary citizens hold in high trust and esteem had their pockets picked in broad daylight.

Transition Errors

This whole unsavoury affair starts with a transition.

In order to better manage foreign debt, the government, “in keeping with international standards”, decided to institute a new unit to take care of all things to do with foreign debt within the Ministry of Finance. It is called the Public Debt Management Office (PMOD). It took away those duties from the Central Bank (CBSL), which handled the tasks earlier.

COPF says that “the fraud linked to cybercrime under consideration happened within this process.” It certainly did.

The process of transition from CBSL to PMOD had holes the size of 2.5 million US dollars. And the irresponsible handling of this transition has so far led to the death of a young bureaucrat, so let’s not treat this casually or lightly. Those who undertook to oversee this process to a successful finish must surely examine their own part in this tragic story.

Non-Actions Have Consequences

The transition took 18 months. November 2024 to March 2026. Long enough to ensure that the CBSL had passed on its processes, training and experience to a new team at the PMOD to a satisfactory standard.

One wouldn’t think that an old and respected institution with what we assume were its tested systems and processes, passing on its expertise to a brand-new unit specifically set up to deal with an important set of tasks, would get it wrong. But it did.

COPF was not happy:

*  The Committee found no document that provided a detailed guideline or terms of reference for this complex, multifaceted transition process involving multiple institutions.

*  There are no KPIs available to judge whether the transition was completed in an adequate manner.

*  Even the guidelines that govern the operations of the PDMO were only published on 19 September 2025, 10 months after the establishment of the office.

*  The MoU between the CBSL and PDMO on their areas of collaboration was only signed on 9 March 2026, almost at the end of the official transition period.

It looks like there was inadequate planning from the very start. Every mistake, every slipshod move, every skipping of essential steps in the process, is what the citizen ends up paying for, and even dying for.

The COPF report shows a 4-step CBSL process through which debt repayments transit, from receiving and checking invoices to confirming payment details through to the final payment.

Each is carried out by a separate section.

Each stage is part of an internal controls system, where important checks are carried out to prevent errors and/or fraud.

After the transition to PDMO, there seems to have been a serious lack of internal controls with the checks necessary to prevent fraud.

The COPF specifically faults the PDMO for not securing its IT infrastructure:

*  PDMO’s outdated IT system which “left it at complete risk of cyberattacks”.

*  Shortfalls in IT infrastructure and cybersecurity measures at the MoF, including the ERD, were highlighted in a comprehensive audit carried out by KPMG…in December 2024.

*  Fraud linked to cybercrime in question commenced in mid-November 2025, only a month after the server system stopped receiving Microsoft security updates.

Early Warnings

The COPF report highlights the fact that early in January 2026 a cybersecurity threat was discovered during a debt repayment to be made to the Export-Import (EXIM) Bank of India:

“When CBSL attempted to make payment to the account details provided by the PDMO, with JP Morgan as intermediary, the payment was rejected by JPMorgan’s Global Fraud Prevention Operations team. Contact was made by PDMO officials with an EXIM Bank of India team, allowing the MoF to confirm that fraudulent payment instructions had been provided.”

The details of the attempted fraud are an exact copy of the one that succeeded later with the Australian payment, which failed in the case of India:

“Payment was then made to the correct account, verified through communication with the EXIM Bank of India. This suspicious activity was reported to the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) and SL-CERT on 9th January 2026. The ERD IT Officer’s complaint to SL-CERT mentioned that the suspected fraudulent email address used the domain eximbenkindia.in (while the correct domain appears to be eximbankindia.in).”

This was not the end of it. There was more!

When the cybersecurity threat regarding the Indian payment was reported to the Secretary of the Treasury triggering an investigation by the Director General of the ERD, a veritable treasure trove of fraudulent emails was discovered:

“Payment instructions received via email for several other due payments, including for payments to the United Kingdom (USD 1,294,605.99), Germany (EUR 4,059,987.81) and Belgium (EUR 60,974.88) were further identified as fraudulent.”

What would have happened if not for the JP Morgan team in India? Would these also have gone through, to a thieving scammer? In the event, the report says:

“UK was suspended immediately. Communications initiated by the suspicious party were identified and investigative authorities were alerted. The payment related to Belgium was made to the correct account.”

That’s two saved. What happened to the German payment of Euro 4,059,987.81? Did we pay it to a scammer?

So, it is in the process of verifying these fraudulent payment details that the Ministry of Finance was “alerted on 23rd March 2026 to communications from Export Finance Australia of non-receipt of debt repayments due in previous months.”

The report reproduces the email exchanges on the same set of Australian invoices from 3 different email addresses:

*  @exportfinance.gov.au

*  @exportfinance-au.com

*  @exportfinanceau.com

The communications from these different email accounts were on-going from October 2025, but the fraud was discovered only in March 2026. By then the damage was done. Payments had already been made to the fraudulent account.

This is especially worrying because the COPF report says that after the debt restructure in October 2025, “The MoF officials said in Committee that the existing account details for Export Finance Australia repayments had not been changed in the revised agreement.”

The COPF makes the important observation that the system of internal controls at the MoF are grossly inadequate, citing one example:

“The final payment authorisation within MoF has historically been done by a Director with authority over the Debt Servicing function, at ERD and now PDMO, without any verification process by more senior officials, highlighting weak internal controls.”

The report lists some measures that have been taken by the MoF to prevent any recurrence. However, they add:

“These measures pertain to establishing and strengthening internal controls and ensuring basic cybersecurity within the Ministry of Finance. They should have been in place as a baseline…”

Me Sir? No Sir, Not I Sir!

The views expressed by both the MoF and the CBSL as to who was responsible for these blunders make interesting reading because they reveal more about them than they realize.

COPF says that at the 8th June discussions:

“The Ministry of Finance was of the view that the CBSL should have been more vigilant and taken proactive measures…CBSL was of the view that there was no legal responsibility under the FTRA for its role as banker to the government.”

The practiced passing of the buck between these two institutions is unsavoury, if revealing. Shouldn’t they have carried out an immediate review of their own conduct to discover where each might have failed, individually and together?

The AG has concurred with the CBSL in its view regarding CBSL’s legal responsibility. However, since CBSL had been doing the job until now, had undertaken the training of the new team and transition of the processes, they had a professional responsibility to ensure that adequate systems were in place to mitigate the risks that they, rather than a brand-new team, were far more experienced at identifying.

Isn’t it fair and reasonable to expect that the CBSL would regard it as their responsibility to give adequate training which includes the right internal controls and monitoring, and to see the process through to implementation to their total satisfaction?

As for the MoF, COPF says:

“The MoF was of the view that during the period in which the PDMO officials created the SSIs for the repayments on fraudulent invoices in November 2025, PDD-CBSL officials continued to oversee the process.”

Why did the MoF think they were ready to takeover from the CBSL and run the show, when they admitted to COPF that “PDMO staff did not have a proper understanding of international fund transfer processes and AML concerns, which limited their ability to act upon limited information provided by CBSL staff on such matters.” Shouldn’t they have dealt with this before they went ‘live’, as it were?

It gets even more alarming when the CBSL tells COPF that

* “internal controls within the MoF for payment verification are dysfunctional”

* “CBSL cannot ensure verification through its payments process, acknowledging that even the CBSL PDD would have failed to prevent a fraud linked to cybercrime in such a scenario.”

What were the Ministers doing, while their systems got so dysfunctional that according to CBSL, a fraud couldn’t have been prevented?

What happened in this inadequately conceived and planned transition resulted in more than a substantial financial loss. The MoF suspended 4 officials pending investigations into the fraud. One of those officials, Ranga Rajapaksa, an Assistant Director of the External Resources Department (ERD) was found dead on April 30, 2026, at his residence in Kuliyapitiya. A post-mortem ruled the death a suicide.

[Sanja de Silva Jayatilleka was a member of the team that transitioned GlaxoSmithKline UK’s Financial Services from Britain to India, overseeing the training, testing, final transitioning and post-transition support of the Compliance and Control function.]

by Sanja de Silva Jayatilleka

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