Features
Jaishankar means Victory of Lord Shiva! – Part II
By Austin Fernando
(Former High Commissioner of Sri Lanka in India)
(Continuied from yesterday)
Development and relationships
Foreign Minister Dinesh Gunawardena and his Indian counterpart Dr. S. Jaishankar considered developing mutual relationships concerning existing projects, e. g. the East Container Terminal (ECT) and the Trincomalee Petroleum Tanks.
The Indians have observed increasing involvement of the Chinese in the Colombo and Hambantota ports; in Colombo through the Colombo International Container Terminals Ltd – (CICT), a joint venture between China Merchants Port Holdings Company Ltd., and the Sri Lanka Ports Authority (SLPA). The main stakeholders of South Asia Gateway Terminal – (SAGT) are A.P. Moller Group and John Keells Holdings PLC. The CICT Transshipment business has been there since 2013 with the Chinese owning 85% of its shares; the SAGT has been operational with 10 partners since 1999, with 85% ownership. Therefore, it is only natural that the Indians seek the same terms as China and the private sector.
Transshipment and ‘Sale’ of ECT
India accounts for 66% of Colombo’s transshipment; it is projected to become the world’s fifth-biggest economy. Hence, Sri Lanka’s transshipment business may heavily depend on India. The argument being peddled in some quarters that a possible Indian policy decision to avoid Colombo could deal a crippling blow to Sri Lanka’s transshipment business has been rejected by the protesting trade unions, which insist that vital decisions in this regard are taken by shipping companies, and not governments. I believe the unions are right to a considerable extent on this score.
The transshipment business involves a complex integrated network of industrialists, shippers, ports, and a market that demands fast, timely, secured goods transfer at competitive prices, and, most of all, sustainability. For these reasons, reputed foreign shipping companies engaging with the SLPA, is welcome. As it happens elsewhere, it could be a joint venture (JV). The ‘sale’ of any physical assets is out of the question because the term ‘sale’ triggers protests.
Perhaps, the fact that Adani is an Indian venture might have ignited protests. The Indians may be questioning why such protests were absent when the CICT (with 85% shares against the proposed 51% for Adani) and the SAGT similarly partnered with the SLPA. Of course, the term ‘sale’ was not used then. Secondly, the Indians may be wondering why there was no hostile reaction to questionable actions benefitting the Chinese, e.g., the alienation of extremely valuable land for the Chinese, and permission for Chinese submarines to be berthed at the CICT, allegedly at a risk to the country’s sovereignty. Thirdly, due to other geopolitical contradictions, India may be suspecting that anti-Indian competitive business interests find expression through protesters, despite claims to the contrary. Fourthly, the Indians are concerned about not an only port-related business but also politics, defence, security, and self-respect.
Sri Lanka must strive to strengthen economic ties with India, whose economy is expanding fast. Therefore, transshipment networking should be re-evaluated in that context. Transshipment competitors such as Singapore, Malaysia, Dubai, Oman, Abu Dhabi, etc. have gone into overdrive in developing their ports. If Sri Lanka does not do likewise to remain competitive by developing its ports, it will lose.
As for the importance of upgrading ports, one can look at Abu Dhabi’s Khalifa Port. It handled around 2.5 million 20-foot equivalent units (TEUs) of cargo in 2018 and expects to increase the volume to 8 million-plus TEUs by 2023, by the addition of more ship-to-shore cranes and deeper berths. The investment of $ 1.1 billion comes from the Mediterranean Shipping Company (MSC). Another example is the Port of Salalah benefitting from over USD 800 million in investment expecting to handle over 5 million TEUs. Therefore, the Sri Lankan government must look for lessons on suitable partner/s.
Terminal operations are complex even in India. Although most Indian ports are state-owned, individual terminals are operated by large private companies such as DP World, AP Moller Terminals, and PSA International. Sri Lankans are demanding that ports be managed by the state when competitors are opening doors to foreign and local private partners. Given the generally poor performance of our state-owned ventures, the demand for state involvement in operating in a highly competitive environment must be gladdening the hearts of private competitors elsewhere and even here.
To understand the advantages of integrated terminal management I quote Rohan Masakorala. Having explained how shipping partners negotiate and undertake sharing assets, he has said:
“Therefore, it is proven beyond doubt that irrespective of the country’s wealth and the size of the shipping line, they do partner with competing lines for logical reasons as networks, provide better business models and solutions than working in isolation.”
We are not a large goods producer or shipowner. We must depend on ‘partnering with competing lines for logical reasons,’ utilizing favorable logistics networks, providing “better business models and solutions than working in isolation.” Thus, the challenge before Dr. Jaishankar may be to find a mutually agreeable business model. Probably, the managerial structures may be of some help, but They should have been transparently negotiated with all stakeholders.
Protesting India or JV concept?
Are the ongoing protests against India, or the proposed ECT deal? Or are they due to domestic political frustration or an attempt by the mainstream/social media to embarrass the government? Or are they to finally withdraw and show the hierarchy was reasonable? Is it to force withdrawal and antagonize India to make China to be the saviour from other economic problems? So many complications! Whatever, the protests are huge even to change stances.
Some of those who protested then are now ministers who have realized the need to address realities of development, geopolitics, diplomacy, neighbourly relations, other anticipated economic and political favours, etc; they support President Gotabaya Rajapaksa on the ECT issue. Similarly, some of those who were in the Yahapalana administration supporting the ECT deal is now in the Opposition, protesting the Indian involvement. They have forgotten that their government initiated this project with the Indians. The protesters need to take cognizance of the un-explained truth of mutuality as mentioned by Dr. Jaishankar.
Facing issues for solving
For decisions, clarity is needed on issues. There are six major issues”.
The first is the conceptual agreement of developing the terminals with foreign involvement. The Chandrika Kumaratunga and Mahinda Rajapaksa governments by establishing the SAGT and the CICT respectively accepted it. The incumbent President has realized this, but the circumstances have changed.
Chronologically, the Yahapalana government had only a terminal in mind when the MOU-2017 was signed. In 2018, President Sirisena insisted that the ECT be developed by the SLPA as currently demanded by Unions. He was for foreign participation in developing the West Container Terminal (WCT). In 2019, a Memorandum of Cooperation (MOC) was signed after President Sirisena’s discussions with PMs Modi and Abe for ECT development by an Indian and Japanese operational JV. About a fortnight back President Gotabaya Rajapaksa preferred developing WCT by the SLPA and ECT by Indians. The latest is the Unions accepting external investment in WCT, and the government developing the ECT. (The Island February 1st, 2021). Note the sea changes the wavering state policy on this issue has undergone during the last years and even within a fortnight.
The WCT was on offer in 2018 and the Indians refused. Will they change their stance now? It is too early for the Indians to respond to the latter. If they have stronger bargaining chips, they will remain tight-lipped with a view to winning finally. Anyhow, in inter-state business, if such a change happens, parties discuss and agree before making public statements. In a way, Sri Lanka, which withdrawn from the UNHRC resolution as publicised, withdrawal from a MOC will be no issue. It will depend on the chip in Indian hands.
Still do do not be surprised if the Indians strictly demand implementing the MoC.
The second is the operational mechanism. The CICT is operated by a Chinese company. At the SAGT, the mechanism involves international and local private operators. Therefore, according to the precedent, the agreed mechanism is foreign private operators with the SLPA. But now, is it Adani Group or a different company or other like above Abu Dhabi ports? Or is it an SLPA-Private Sector Project? Could it be Adani’s allied domestic private sector? Many equations are possible.
The third is the selection process. Adani Group is the nominee of India. How Gautham Adani’s company was selected is unknown. If the CITC or the SAGT partners were selected by established procurement procedures, the precedent must be followed. One may recall that Minister Arjuna Ranatunga informed the Cabinet before 2017- MSC that the ‘new operator should be selected following the established Procurement Guidelines.’ Recently, Minister Namal Rajapaksa has also spoken of procedures. These must be discussed across the table because there could be exceptions to procedures.
The fourth is the ownership of the ECT project. The Presidential Media Unit (PMU) Statement and PM Rajapaksa’s statement in Parliament said: “No selling, no leasing of ECT’. But the PMU statement signified an “investment project that has 51% ownership by the government” and the remainder by Adani and other stakeholders. The term ‘51% ownership’ unfortunately but logically makes Adani and others the ‘owner of 49%.”
However, in the aforesaid MOC these percentages are for a “Terminal Operations Company,” meant for the “explicit purpose of providing the equipment and systems necessary for the development of the ECT and managing the ECT.” This difference between ‘ownership’ and the operational company’s objectives clear doubts, but this fact has not been highlighted, fertilizing suspicions.
Ownership is the legal relationship between a person and an object. Therefore, the protestors harp against giving ‘part-ownership’ to Adani, because SLPA owns the whole ECT now. The protestors understand “ownership” as an outcome of a ‘selling’ process. As damage controlling, the President repeated about a JV, with SLPA participation with Adani’s, and others as stakeholders. It is the reality matching the MOC. But the explanation came one week after the PMU statement. By then protestors have socially marketed ‘selling ECT.’
The fifth issue is the influencers/motivators. How views against the President’s wishes are being expressed smack of a move to keep the Indians away. Clearing such doubts is difficult when efforts are organized concertedly.
Sixthly, the happenings unrelated to the ECT could muddy the waters. The destruction of the Jaffna University memorial, Indian fishermen’s deaths, and the Cabinet decision to establish Hybrid Renewable Energy Systems in Nainathivu, Delft, and Analathivu islands through a Chinese contractor (upon international competitive bidding) are three such issues. The last is an extremely security-sensitive issue for India although it was presumably not a favor done to the Chinese by Sri Lanka. The Indians have previously vehemently protested the berthing of Chinese submarines in Colombo and the Chinese housing projects in the North. The Indian protests will be diplomatic and subtle. Nevertheless, their repercussions could override the ECT issues and may influence other bilateral and multilateral matters.
Way forward amidst contradictions
The need is to develop the ECT. Sri Lankan governments are known for policy changes and contradictions; Indians are different. Just see the aforesaid policy contradictions. Even the ECT protesters have double standards. When the CICT with ‘85% foreign ownership’ was established, there were no grudges. When the government announced its decision to form a JV with Adani and others, having 49% shares, therein to run the ECT all hell broke loose!
It is necessary to stop bickering if it is development that we seek. The country must prioritize the economy, neighborhood relations, private sector involvement, foreign investment promotion, diplomacy, security, financing, other personal and political issues.
Although decisions on the Sri Lankan ports must be economic, in this complex world, they are invariably influenced by other factors. I hope the government will strike a balance and select the best option. Sri Lankan must not enslave itself to other countries. It must negotiate for the best profitable and sustainable solutions, be it with China, India, or the US or with large shipping companies undertaking port development. The government must maintain transparency in negotiating the terms of port development. A move to sell a state asset or any move that can be construed as such is sure to lead to negative responses. Concurrently, let the protesters engage with the government and work toward developing the Colombo Port.
As it is, DR Jaishankar’s victory has not yet come about completely. There are roadblocks on his path. The Indian silence is deceptive. However, the Indian responses may not be restricted to shipping. When responses deceptively happen, the consequences could be hurting. Dr. Jaishankar knows Kautilyan deception and would have learned from Sun Tzu when he was the Indian Ambassador in China. Hence the need for Sri Lanka to tread cautiously.
Reciprocation of relationships
Nevertheless, the professional diplomat that he is, Minister Jaishankar highlighted the grand mutual relationship with Sri Lanka, the “trust, interest, respect, and sensitivity.” Perhaps, Indian critics could question this mutuality having seen the protests.
During the Yahapalana regime, mutuality on the part of India was diminishing, although India does not publicly admit it. This for example was reflected in the budgetary allocations for the neighborhood in Minister Nirmala Sitharaman’s budget, where only INR 250 crore was provided for Sri Lanka out of INR 8,415 crore total, while countries like Bhutan, Nepal, Mauritius, the Maldives received much more. The reason may be the security considerations of India. India further expanded a package for the Maldives (August 13th, 2020), that included a $100 million grant and a $400 million new line of credit, for the Greater Malé Connectivity Project, expressing extra neighborly attachment.
Concurrently, requests for a $ 1 billion financial lifeline swap and nearly $ 1 billion debt moratorium made by President and PM Rajapaksas from PM Modi are delayed for months, irrespectively of the much-flaunted mutuality. Sri Lanka should read these signs carefully and understand the message.
Minister Gunawardena (understandably) did not mention competition that may arise from the seaport Projects at Vizhinjam in Kerala, and Nicobar, owned by Indians. Both did not bother about PM Modi’s declaration: “There is a proposal to build a transshipment port at Great Nicobar at a cost of about Rs. 10,000 crores. Large ships can dock once this port is ready” (The Times of India -Business- of August 10th, 2020). Mark the words, “transshipment port!” These ports will invariably compete with Colombo’s ETC in the future, and India may through Nicobar aim to become the transshipment hub, being in proximity to the busy east-west shipping routes. This points to the need for developing the ECT fast and making it competitive.
For sustainability and safety in this competitive business, it will be necessary to be cautious if joint ventures are to be formed, especially by reaching an agreement on time frames, exit clauses, investment programming, senior managerial positioning, arbitration in Sri Lanka, etc. For these the active participation of the SLPA, which has expertise is mandatory. Unfortunately, nothing is heard about such moves. One hears only the voice of the protesting Unions.
Security aspects of relationships
Dr. Jaishankar mentioned maritime security and safety but did not make specific mention of Quad or Indo-Pacific interventions or China. What we must understand about the Indian attitude towards security is that India expects us to be India-centric as could be seen from the following statement by Shri Avatar Singh Bhasin on Indian security relationships:
“There could be no running away from the fact that small states in the region fell in India’s security perimeter and therefore must not follow policies that would impinge on her security concerns in the area. They should not seek to invite outside power(s). If any one of them needed any assistance it should look to India. India’s attitude and relationship with her immediate neighbors depended on their appreciation of India’s regional security concerns; they would serve as buffer states in the event of an extra-regional threat and not proxies of the outside powers…”
The proxy need not be only China; even if it is the US, India will be perturbed, if lines are crossed. Therefore, Minister Jaishankar’s security concerns must be viewed concerning the aforesaid criteria. Dr. Jaishankar subscribes to these. About his visit, the Indian Television had this to say: “An important focus of his visit will be the Chinese presence in the Hambantota harbor on a 99-year lease. It is an understanding between China and Sri Lanka that they will not undertake any military venture there. So, India will take the help of Sri Lanka to ensure that Chinese military or Chinese hegemony don’t come to this region.” This is the Indian attitude.
India’s position always remains the same: “Do not be a proxy of the Chinese, be a buffer state! Do not allow the Indian Ocean to be the Chinese Ocean!” However, considering the proximity, long relations, the possibility for political displacements, regional economics, etc. Sri Lanka will think of the advantage of being with the Indians, of course, without being a buffer. To what extent other motivations—financial, economic development, diplomatic, security, etc.—would work is also important especially when Sri Lanka is haunted by international interventions like the one at the UNHRC. It is not easy to gain the required balance.
Conclusion
Indo-Lanka relations were highlighted by both Ministers. The impending global situations after COVID 19 and the complexities arising due to geopolitics and developments will compel Sri Lanka to work with the world powers. In that respect, even if the past is forgotten the present and future will make it imperative that we maintain friendly relations with everyone, especially with India and China, latter expected to be the future number one economy. This is the reason why Sri Lanka should pay attention to the purpose of Dr. Jaishankar’s recent visit and maintain balance.
Overall, the Indian Foreign Minister visited Sri Lankan not to lose, but to prove that he was ‘Jai Shankar.’ Whether he departed on January 7th, 2021 with expected goodies, officially satisfied to celebrate his 66th birthday the following day, are secrets and will be known in days to come.
Finally, it will be mutually beneficial for both Sri Lanka and India to make compromises and strengthen their relations instead of being obdurate.
Features
The Republic is 54: Towards a Third, “System-changing” Republican Constitution
by (Dr) Jayampathy Wickramaratne President’s Counsel
Sri Lanka’s constitutional journey remains marked by unresolved dilemmas: entrenched executive dominance, fragile fundamental rights, unfulfilled reform promises, and the persistent national question. These challenges have deepened inequality, strained ethnic relations, and weakened democratic accountability. The writer argues that constitutional supremacy must be firmly secured above transient political majorities, with judicial review extending to all acts of the State, including those of Parliament. Central to this vision is the abolition of the executive presidency, whose concentration of power has undermined Parliament and diminished popular sovereignty. Equally vital is the adoption of a modern bill of rights that safeguards equality, social justice, and human dignity and is enforced by an independent judiciary. Devolution of power is presented not as a concession but as a constitutional necessity—indispensable for unity in diversity and for laying the foundations of ethnic peace.
Based on the reports of the Steering Committee and the sub-committees of the 2015-2019 constitutional reform process, one could say that if a constitution had materialised, it would have been somewhere between a “reformist” and a “transformative’ constitution. On the other hand, if the 2000 Constitution Bill had been passed, the new constitution would have been a “transformative” one. On the 54th anniversary of Sri Lanka’s declaration as a Republic, the writer calls for a Third Republican Constitution that should be “transformative” rather than merely “reformist”.
The significance of the Aragalaya
Much has happened since 2000. The separatist war is over, but the ethnic conflict persists. The Aragalaya protest of 2022 marked a historic citizen-led uprising against authoritarianism, corruption, dynastic rule, and economic mismanagement, and was a turning point in the country’s democratic struggle. It symbolised the reclaiming of public space, the demand for accountability, and the assertion that ordinary citizens—especially youth—could challenge entrenched political dynasties. How should the new constitution respond to these developments?
The Aragalaya’s core significance lies in its role as a democratic awakening, in which ordinary citizens, transcending ethnic and class divides, reclaimed public space and demanded accountability from entrenched elites. It symbolised the rejection of corruption, nepotism, and unchecked executive power, while affirming the capacity of grassroots, youth-led mobilisation to force systemic change. As a basis for a new constitution, the Aragalaya underscored the urgent need to embed constitutional supremacy, end executive dominance, secure judicial independence, and strengthen institutional accountability—ensuring that sovereignty truly rests with the people and that governance cannot again be monopolised by dynastic or authoritarian rule. The Aragalaya fostered unprecedented solidarity among Sri Lanka’s diverse communities; it created bonds across ethnic and religious lines, making it far more difficult today for divisive forces to rekindle communal or sectarian hatred.
Aragalaya
directly shaped the 2024 elections in Sri Lanka by delegitimising dynastical rule, energising youth and civil society, and embedding demands for accountability and constitutional reform into the electoral agenda. The protests created the political climate in which voters decisively rejected continuity and sought leadership promising systemic change.
NPP Victory in 2024
In 2019, Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) formed a coalition called the National Peoples Power (NPP) with more than twenty organisations, including political groups, youth organisations, women’s groups, trade unions, and civil society organisations. Although it did not fare well in the 2019 Presidential elections and the 2020 Parliamentary elections, it was the primary beneficiary of the unprecedented protests against the political establishment in the wake of the massive economic crisis in 2022, which culminated in President Gotabhaya Rajapaksa fleeing the country and resigning.
In the 2024 Presidential election, Anura Kumara Dissanayake of the NPP secured 42.31% of the vote in the first round. In the second round, preference votes from candidates outside the top two—Dissanayake and Sajith Premadasa of the SJB—were redistributed, and Dissanayake secured 55.89% of the combined tally and was declared the winner. Upon assuming office, President Dissanayake promptly dissolved Parliament. The subsequent election delivered a historic outcome: the NPP captured 61.56% of the vote and 159 of 225 seats, granting the party a decisive two-thirds majority to pursue constitutional reform.
In its election manifesto, the NPP pledged to introduce a new Constitution. Notably, the NPP committed to completing the 2015-19 constitutional reform process early. The main features of the Constitution would be a parliamentary form of government to replace the executive presidency, a new electoral system, fundamental rights to include economic, social, and cultural rights, rights of women, children, and the disabled, as well as “devolution of political and administrative power to provinces, districts, and local government units.”
The NPP’s main rival, the SJB, also committed itself to changing the present Constitution and formulating a new Constitution that would convert the form of government to a parliamentary system, include economic, social, and cultural rights, and provide maximum devolution based on the Thirteenth Amendment within a single country.
A transformative, “system-changing” constitution
How should a new constitution respond to the people’s cry during the “Aragalaya“, reiterated at the 2024 elections?
In essence, the Aragalaya’s cry for “system change“ should translate into a constitutional framework in which sovereignty genuinely rests with the People and institutions are resilient against authoritarian capture. The new constitution must affirm that all power flows from the people and is exercised in trust, with accountability and in accordance with justice. Recognising the dangers of unchecked authority, corruption, and dynastic rule, there must be a clear commitment to a constitutional order that safeguards democracy, ensures transparency, and protects the independence of institutions.
The above can be realised only through a “transformative constitution” committed to “system change”, not a mere “reformist constitution”. The essentials of such a constitution lie in recognising that it is not a static text but a dynamic, evolving framework of governance. It must enable courts to interpret constitutional provisions in ways that respond to contemporary realities and advance justice and equality. A new constitution must therefore embody a strong commitment to social justice, requiring the state to dismantle systemic discrimination and ensure fairness and dignity for marginalised communities. Its legitimacy must also rest on participatory democracy, with citizens playing an active role in shaping institutions and contributing to the ongoing development of the constitutional order. Above all, a new constitution must be understood as a living instrument—capable of adapting to changing social, political, and economic conditions while remaining faithful to democratic values and fundamental rights. In this sense, the purpose of constitutionalism is not merely to preserve constitutional order but also to promote justice, equality, inclusion, and meaningful democratic engagement in a changing society.
Sri Lanka requires a modern, comprehensive bill of rights capable of addressing contemporary challenges, including equality, social justice, and human dignity. Rights must be real and enforceable rather than merely aspirational, and their protection depends on an independent and courageous judiciary. Likewise, devolution of power must be understood not as a political concession but as a constitutional necessity to empower the people at all levels. In a pluralist society, meaningful power-sharing is indispensable for preserving national unity while respecting diversity and for laying the foundations for ethnic peace.
Supremacy of the Constitution
The supremacy of the Constitution should be the cornerstone of any truly transformative constitutional order. In the Sri Lankan context, it should mean that no state institution, nor any individual, family, or political party, can place itself above the law or manipulate institutions for personal gain. A transformative constitution must therefore enshrine the principle that all state power derives from and is limited by the Constitution, and that any act inconsistent with it is void.
To achieve this, the new Constitution must, at a minimum, provide that any law, subordinate legislation, or conduct inconsistent with its provisions is void, thereby affirming constitutional supremacy. It should guarantee unlimited judicial review of legislation, ensuring that no enactment escapes scrutiny. All existing laws must be interpreted subject to the Constitution, including the fundamental rights, unlike under the 1972 and 1978 Constitutions. Furthermore, all actions of Parliament, whether legislative or otherwise, must remain subject to judicial review. Finally, the jurisdiction of fundamental rights should extend to all actions of the state—legislative, executive, judicial, and otherwise—as well as to conduct by non-state actors, thereby securing comprehensive accountability under the constitutional framework.
An unalterable basic structure
Soon after a parliamentary election, the governing party often enjoys strong prospects of winning a referendum. But does this mean that a twothirds majority in Parliament, combined with 50% plus one of the People, can impose any constitution? Could it, for example, deny the freedom from torture to suspected terrorists or entrench oneparty rule? In the absence of entrenched safeguards, the risk of such perilous constitutional changes remains unchecked.
Sri Lanka’s constitutional reform process should pursue a carefully balanced approach to entrenchment. Provisions that safeguard foundational principles are essential to guard against abusive or opportunistic amendments. However, such protections must be drafted with precision and restraint. If entrenchment is framed too broadly, it can immobilise detailed or technical provisions, resulting in excessive rigidity and weakening the Constitution’s capacity to adapt to evolving democratic realities.
The most effective protection lies in a dual framework: confining entrenchment to the Constitution’s core identity while simultaneously empowering the judiciary to scrutinise constitutional amendments against those basic principles. This approach secures permanence where it is most necessary while preserving flexibility in other areas of governance. For Sri Lanka, the central lesson is that constitutional stability should not be achieved at the cost of democratic adaptability. A thoughtfully calibrated combination of narrowly defined entrenchment and principled judicial review provides the most reliable foundation for a constitutional order that is both resilient and responsive.
The writer submits that a future constitution should contain a set of basic principles that form an unalterable basic structure. On the eve of the 2024 Presidential elections, the Collective for Democracy and Rule of Law, a group of academics and professionals, proposed that a set of ‘Constitutional Principles’ be included in a new Constitution. They should be described as ‘immutable and inviolable values of democratic republicanism.’ These principles will embody the fundamental constitutional values that guide the new Constitution and future judicial interpretation of its clauses. The Collective proposed that the Constitution should recognise the following immutable and inviolable values of democratic republicanism and consociationalism: human dignity, social justice, economic justice, equality and the advancement of human rights and freedoms; ethnic, gender and social equality; the supremacy of the Constitution and the Rule of Law; regular, uninterrupted, free and fair elections and a multi-party system of democratic government; non-concentration of state power in one individual or institution; the assurance of accountability, responsiveness and transparency at all levels of governance; public authorities hold and exercise powers in accordance with the doctrine of public trust. The writer submits that the above principles could form the basis for an unalterable basic structure.
The NPP government was entrusted with a clear mandate to dismantle authoritarian structures and deliver constitutional reform, yet its continued inaction betrays that trust. Sri Lanka cannot afford further delay, for every day without reform entrenches executive dominance and erodes public faith in democracy. What is needed now is decisive action to abolish the executive presidency, entrench constitutional supremacy, advance devolution, and pave the way for social justice, so that sovereignty genuinely resides with the people and the promise of a just, democratic republic is finally realised.
(Excerpted from the writer’s forthcoming publication ‘Constitutional Conversations.’)
Features
Mattala Airport, wildlife and possible solution
The Island of 20 May revealed the possible Indian investment in the ‘loneliest Airport In the world’.
Will the proverbial camel put its head inside the tent?
This effort could be compared to flogging a dead horse!
Your report mentions that Mattala Airport is an ideal place for a flying school.
The sad fact is that no wind pattern and turbulence studies have been carried out in the area. The turbulence is so great that even large passenger aircraft find the approach to land extremely turbulent.
In the same issue of The Island, another report by Ifham Nizam, on the Human-Elephant conflict at Hambantota says an’ Elephant Management Reserve’ is essential for Hambantota. The real reason for that is no secret. It is due to the displacement of elephants from their natural surroundings.
Read the whole story of Mattala Rajapaksa International Airport (MRIA) below. It is an extract from a book, titled ‘From Nose to Tale’ By Captain Gihan A. Fernando, published last year.
‘Mattala: A Mistake?’
“Many years ago, when an alternative international airport to Colombo-Bandaranaike International (BIA), Katunayake was mooted, the Air Ceylon Pilots’ Guild began lobbying for China Bay, Trincomalee. Among other considerations, it was pointed out that because Sri Lanka is subject to both the Southwest and Northeast monsoons, at each of those seasons the coast on the opposite ‘quadrant’ of the island would generally be experiencing good weather, and vice versa.
But the guild’s request came too late, as the Sri Lanka Air Force (SLAF), which has a base at China Bay, had already stated that they had no objection for tall silos to be built at the site of the Prima flour mill, along the take-off and landing paths of China Bay’s single runway.
Another site was then suggested, near Nilaveli, 20 miles north of Trincomalee. In the 1970s, Nilaveli was fast developing into a popular tourist location. But that idea of a new airport was also dropped when Eelam separatist rumblings first began as early as 1978 when an Air Ceylon HS 748 on the ground at Ratmalana Airport was destroyed by a terrorist’s bomb, fortunately without injuries to anyone or loss of lives (Chapter 17).
The need for an alternative international airport in Sri Lanka was driven by a requirement by Ceylon’s then Air Navigation Regulations (ANR) for all airliners destined for BIA. In the event of being unable to land there for one reason or another, they must be carrying sufficient fuel to reach Madras (Chennai), the nearest ‘alternative’ to BIA that could accept large jets, plus fuel for another half-hour in the air. Establishment of a second international airport would obviate that burdensome necessity.
However, all aircraft ‘burn fuel to carry fuel’. For example, if an aircraft needed to have 10,000 kg of fuel onboard to comfortably reach BIA, based on flying time for that particular sector, the crew would have had to uplift 12,000 kg at the point of departure. Put simply, if a closer alternative airport was available, carrying less fuel would be a saving.
The ANRs of developed countries have been progressively updated to keep pace with advances in aviation, yet in Sri Lanka supplementary regulations to ANRs promulgated in 1955 remain in force.
When Air Lanka began operating Lockheed L-1011 TriStars, the first few were obtained from Canada. Accordingly, the airline followed operational procedures laid down by Air Canada in the Canadian operations manual. One such statement was that it was not necessary to always have fuel onboard to reach a designated alternate airport as it permitted the captain to arrive at the destination with a lesser amount of fuel, provided the destination airport predicted good weather and had at least two runways [author’s emphasis].
The theory behind the Canadians’ thinking was that even if one runway becomes unusable for whatever reason, a second was available as a fall-back. Interestingly, even today, when a new airline requests permission from the Civil Aviation Authority of Sri Lanka (CAASL) to operate to BIA, they must show that it can remove a disabled aircraft as soon as possible, so as not to obstruct the single runway leaving it unserviceable for an unduly protracted period.
When the runway at BIA was becoming outdated, having been constructed with Canadian aid and expertise in the late 1960s, it was decided that a new one should be constructed, this time with aid from Japan. The plan was for it to be built parallel to and north of the existing runway, with the latter narrowed and converted to a taxiway. That was when the Air Line Pilots’ Guild of Sri Lanka (ALPGSL) made representations to General D. Sepala Attygalle, secretary to the Ministry of Defence under whose purview Air Lanka was administered. They requested Attygalle to retain the old runway as a second runway, so that the requirement to carry extra fuel during times of good weather would no longer apply.
Separately, an expert from the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) declared that the new and taller air traffic control tower was too close to the old runway, making its use illegal. On the other hand, what pilots wanted was a runway that would be used in ‘one-off’ situations, not on a regular basis. However, those plans didn’t proceed, and the status quo prevailed.
Another suggestion was for an international airport at Hingurakgoda, site of the present domestic and military Minneriya airfield. With Australian financial aid promised, there was a strong possibility of that proposition becoming reality. In fact, Singapore Airlines began drawing up Boeing 747 performance charts for use at the proposed new Hingurakgoda International Airport. However, some decision-makers believed that the estimated costs, based on Australian labour rates, were too high. Other critics pointed out that the same weather patterns affecting BIA would prevail at Hingurakgoda too. Eventually, that idea was also scrapped.
Then the SLAF decided to move its jet-fighter base to Sigiriya airport which, after extension, could have also accepted big passenger jets diverting from BIA. However, the Department of Archaeology objected to that move on the grounds of noise and vibration produced by jet engines adversely affecting the structure and amenity of Sigiriya Rock.
In response, Sri Lanka’s then President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga granted the Director of Archaeology, Dr. Roland Silva, and chairman of the Urban Development Authority, Mr. Gemunu Silva, an eminent civil engineer, the use of a SLAF Bell 412 helicopter for two weeks, to travel to all parts of the island looking for a suitable location for an alternative international airport. The pair identified a potential 250-acre site within the triangle formed by Kekirawa, Dambulla and Habarana, consisting mostly of crown land requiring no major acquisition from resident farmers. A report was submitted to the president, but nothing eventuated from that exercise.
Second Runway at BIA
Meanwhile, many experts declared that the best option was indeed to construct a second runway at BIA. Accordingly, an extensive study was conducted by the International Air Transport Association (IATA) in conjunction with Dayantha Athulathmudali, a former deputy director of CAASL. They took into consideration such diverse factors as: the proximity to the Attanagalu Oya; relocating the SLAF base from Katunayake to another site; the effect on the Free Trade Zone (FTZ); and how the many churches and temples in the area may be affected. The primary question was whether the new, second runway, aligned parallel to the existing one (built with Japanese aid), should be situated north or south of it.
Going Down South
But before any decision on the future of expansion at Katunayake was made, it was announced by the then secretary to Ports and Civil Aviation that three potential sites in the Hambantota District were under consideration: Udamaththala, Gonnoruwa and Weerawila. Already, in 2007, an Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) was conducted on behalf of Airport and Aviation Services (Sri Lanka) Ltd (AASL), on behalf of the Central Environmental Authority (CEA), by the Central Engineering Consultancy Bureau (CECB). The report stated that as there was already an airport at Weerawila, it was the most cost-effective location for the second international airport, and therefore the preferred of all three options examined.
When it was eventually announced that the second international airport would be built at Weerawila, many aviation ‘experts’ wrote to the newspapers claiming that the government had its priorities mixed, and that the best option was, still, to build a second runway at BIA. One writer even said that Weerawila is “one of the best examples of an ill-conceived project and chronic waste of tax-payers’ money.”
Similar sentiments were expressed in 1975, when the Canadian government built a new airport at Mirabel in Montreal to cater to the 1976 Olympics in that city. But after the Olympics, and for a variety of other economic reasons, Montreal-Mirabel Airport gradually fell into disuse over the next 27 years. In Sri Lanka, concerned parties believed that Weerawila would suffer an identical fate.
Near-deserted passenger terminal at Mirabel Airport Montreal, Quebec, Canada
When farmers discovered that the officially preferred site was Weerawila, and that their paddy lands would have to be acquired, organisations representing them resorted to legal action, forcing the government to revert to its second preference, Udamaththala, 13 km from Weerawila. Accordingly, 800 hectares (almost 2,000 acres) were cleared, and 44,000 hardwood trees chopped down on land that largely comprised elephant habitat. Although it was widely known that this site was in the middle of an elephant corridor, no-one protested – at least not immediately.
Yet the chairman of the Central Environmental Authority (CEA) subsequently said: “Since there was no objection from stakeholders, we gave permission to the Mattala project. I refute the allegations levelled against this institution by the environmentalists. Those allegations are made to mislead the people.”
The Mattala airport project started in 2009, but airline pilots, the ‘end users’, were not consulted. Nor was there any serious aeronautical or environmental research. For example, no wind studies were carried out, contrary to ICAO recommendations that before construction of a new airport commences a wind study must be conducted for at least five years, with readings taken at least eight times daily at frequent intervals. ICAO also stipulates, in Annex 14 to the ICAO Convention, that the potential for turbulence must be studied too. CAASL officers neither knew nor cared to determine the locations relative to each other of the proposed airport, Bundala Bird Sanctuary, and Yala National Park.
They even lacked a detailed map of the area, despite the author having donated a 1:50000 map to the CAASL.
In March 2007 the Sri Lanka Aeronautical Society (SLAeS) was formed to primarily serve as a think tank on aviation matters, with all aspects coming under its purview. When the first president of the SLAeS, who was an airline captain not working in Sri Lanka, pointed out the embarrassing truth that Mattala was going to be a bad investment, and that it was SLAeS’s duty to make it known, his warning was not well received by CAASL officials. Instead, because the Mattala airport project had to proceed at all costs, a parallel association was formed to take over some of the functions of the SLAeS with a view to deliberately shutting down the latter body – which soon happened. Sadly no-one, including officers of CAASL, was bold enough to speak up for fear of incurring the ire of political forces driving the establishment in that location of what would be named Mattala Rajapaksa International Airport (MRIA).
So much so that in 2017, by which time the viability of MRIA was shown to be far below expectations, the aviation minister declared to members of CAASL: “You people never told us”. In other words, claiming not to have been forewarned of what a farce the new, grossly under-utilised airport would turn out to be.
But there were other acts of omission. In fairness to CAASL, in 2007 its management was in a fluid state. The CAASL chairman’s contract hadn’t been renewed, and the director-general had taken leave of absence from CAASL as he had had a difference of opinion with the then chairman of Mihin Lanka, the newly formed government-backed regional airline. Consequently, CAASL officials were all acting in other capacities.
Nowadays at Mattala the air is often extremely turbulent on final approach, and it is a struggle even for pilots of big jets who occasionally fly in there. On some days lighter aircraft are also unable to land due to turbulence. Ironically, today the same farming organisations which took out an interim injunction on development of the Weerawila airport are affected by elephants displaced from the Mattala precinct.
Creating further environmental disruption and damage, trees at the future site of Mahinda Rajapaksa International Cricket Stadium, another grandiose government project built at Sooriyawewa in the Hambantota District, were felled in the name of progress. That stadium has also been rarely used for its intended purpose, and fallen into neglect and deterioration.
According to Nirmala Kannangara writing in the Sunday Leader, the Director of the Environment Conservation Trust, Sajeewa Chamikara, is reported to have said: “All attempts to educate the Aviation Ministry of the consequences that have to be faced in future when plans were drawn to construct an international airport at Mattala were ignored. Since this area is populated with migrant birds throughout the year, we told the government to shift the location to a place with less vulnerability, but their failure to listen to us has now brought several consequences.” Mr. Chamikara’s warnings were supported by many leading professionals who also wrote about the dire consequences to aircraft, passengers and crew in the event of bird strikes.
But building a new airport, suitably located or otherwise, is not the end of the process. The airport authority must continuously maintain it, at great expense. High safety standards must be met in a multitude of areas, not least aircraft inspection, servicing, overhaul and repair.
All components of its infrastructure require constant attention, for example such items as: maintenance of landing visual aids; provision of spare parts; adhering to a lighting maintenance schedule for general and basic maintenance of approach, runway and taxiway lighting systems; aircraft docking systems including their specific light maintenance procedures; cleaning procedures for lights; light intensity measurements; removal of water (condensation); maintaining signs and painted markings. Painting runway centre lines alone requires more than 1,000 gallons of white paint.
Runway and tarmac surfaces need constant maintenance and repair, with attention paid to joints and cracks in concrete and bituminous pavements. ‘Gardening’ activities must be undertaken regularly to keep grass and other unpaved areas neat and free of excess growth. Building maintenance must encompass such aspects as lighting and other electrical equipment, communication facilities, air conditioning systems, automatic doors, baggage conveyor belts, baggage claim units, passenger boarding bridges, people lifts (elevators), people movers (escalators and travelators), fixed fire protection installations. Not least, conducting regular safety meetings. The list goes on.
In view of the above, the question must be asked: did the authorities get their priorities mixed up? Their rationale for MRIA’s creation and existence to earn revenue as an emergency refuge for overflying traffic between two other destinations is no more than a myth. BIA can satisfy the same requirement. Apart from a second runway at BIA, the focus should have been on improving domestic air services, for locals and tourists, by developing existing airports, or creating new facilities, at Jaffna, Batticaloa and Weerawila.
It has to be said, though, that Jaffna has since attained the status of an international airport, as have Ratmalana and Batticaloa, with planning already underway for Hingurakgoda to join Sri Lanka’s multitude of ‘international gateways’, taking the total to six. Yes, count them – six international airports on an island the size of Tasmania, Australia. Overkill? Political grandstanding? Parochialism? Nest-feathering? You be the judge.
At the time of writing, 11 years have elapsed since the MRIA ‘white elephant’ was commissioned, yet it continues to suck up taxpayers’ money better than any leech could. Today’s crop of so-called ‘aviation experts’ are unable to come up with an acceptable solution to turn MRIA into a profitable enterprise. Meanwhile, people in high places with vested interests in and ‘connections’ with the regime that built that wasteful airport in the first place continue to sing its praises while suggesting possible alternatives for using MRIA as an aviation ‘hub’. But that is nothing more than pie in the sky. Or like the emperor’s new clothes in the folktale by Hans Christian Andersen.
So, while MRIA’s runways see more use by trespassing elephants – across whose traditional migratory path the airport violated – than airliners with fare-paying passengers, the question must be asked: what can be done with MRIA? Will the chairman and director-general of CAASL, in conjunction with AASL and environmentalists be able to resolve this expensive problem and face the situation squarely? Or will the nation have to wait even more years for a satisfactory solution than it took for the stewards of Mirabel International Airport, Montreal, Quebec, Canada? “
***
A reasonable solution for Mattala Rajapaksa International Airport
Flying has been this Seeya’s life for over fifty years and he never thought he would be saying this. In Kenya, there is a hotel in the jungle called ‘The Ark’, built near a waterhole where all kinds of animals come to drink, day and night. There are flood lights trained on to the water hole at night. There are animal spotters who activate buzzers in the hotel rooms, depending on the type of animal. The visitors could come to large viewing areas to watch them. The Airport and Aviation Sri Lanka, the Tourist Industry and the Wild Life Conservation Department could remove the electric fencing and reopen the waterholes that were closed to prevent birds from nesting and in short throw it open to the elephants again. There is also an airport in Ecuador, which has been turned into a park. The terminal building has large glass windows that would be great for viewing and photographing elephants. A large water hole by the parking apron could attract more elephants. The Control Tower could be used for elephant spotting. Converting Mattala into a Tourist Hotel will create a money spinner. Let us ‘Bite the bullet’ and cut our losses in these difficult times. As experts say “Mistakes pave the way for innovation, growth and creativity”
The best radio navigational and landing aids have been installed at Mattala and remain largely unused, while Ratmalana, the cradle of Civil Aviation, remains technically deficient. AASL could therefore reinstall some of the Mattala navigational aids like the Very High Frequency Omnidirectional Range/ Distance Measuring Equipment (VOR/DME) and the Instrument Landing System (ILS) at the Colombo International Airport, Ratmalana, at minimum cost. The other ILS could be installed at KKS, Batticaloa or Weerawila airports which also lack Navigational Radio aids.
The Human-Elephant conflict could be greatly resolved if Mattala and Suriya Wewa are given back to the jungle. The SLAF could initiate intense seed bombing to replace the 44,000 trees that were cut. It may take hundreds of years to recover. Let us forget our egos and think out of the box. After all, to ‘Err is human’ (Cicero).
by Guwan Seeya
Features
Depreciation of the Rupee: A Warning Sign of Sri Lanka’s Deep Economic Crisis
The gradual depreciation of the Sri Lankan rupee is one of the most serious economic signals facing the country today. It is not merely a change in the exchange rate. It is a powerful reflection of a nation’s economic strength, fiscal discipline, investor confidence, political stability, and the future hopes of its people.
When a country’s currency loses value, it indicates deeper weaknesses in production capacity, foreign exchange earnings, economic management, and institutional credibility. In this sense, the depreciation of the rupee is not an isolated financial issue. It is a factor that further deepens Sri Lanka’s already fragile economic, social, and political crisis.
Only a few years ago, around Rs. 130 or Rs. 150 was sufficient to buy one US dollar. However, during the 2022 economic crisis, the exchange rate exceeded Rs. 360 per dollar at certain points. Although some stability has returned since then, it would be misleading to say that the real strength of the rupee has been fully restored. The simple meaning is this: Sri Lanka now needs far more rupees than before to import essential goods such as fuel, medicine, food, machinery, and raw materials.
Inflationary Pressure in an Import-Dependent Economy
The first and most direct consequence of rupee depreciation is the increase in the general price level of goods and services. In other words, it fuels inflation. Sri Lanka remains an economy that depends significantly on imports. According to World Bank data, in 2024, imports of goods and services accounted for around 22.5% of Sri Lanka’s Gross Domestic Product.
Therefore, whenever the rupee weakens, the cost of imports rises. Fuel prices increase. Transport costs go up. Industrial production costs become higher. Eventually, this burden falls directly on the daily lives of ordinary people.
In September 2022, inflation in Sri Lanka, measured by the Colombo Consumer Price Index, reached 69.8%, while food inflation climbed to 94.9%. These were not just numbers. They represented real suffering in family food budgets, children’s education, healthcare expenses, and the living standards of the middle class.
As a result, poverty also increased. According to World Bank estimates, urban poverty rose to 15% in 2022, while rural poverty increased to 26%. The data also showed that more than half of the population in estate communities lived below the poverty line.
The Silent Crisis of Fixed-Income Earners
Those most affected by rupee depreciation are people who depend on fixed salaries. Their income may remain the same in numerical terms, but its real purchasing power continues to decline.
A person earning Rs. 100,000 per month today finds it extremely difficult to maintain the same standard of living that was possible a few years ago. The rising cost of food, housing, education, healthcare, and transport has weakened the middle class at an alarming rate.
This situation can be described as “working poverty.” A person may be employed, yet unable to maintain a dignified standard of living from that income. This is a serious threat to social stability, because in any country, a strong middle class is one of the main foundations of social balance and national resilience.
The Collapse of Youth Hope and the Outflow of Human Capital
This economic pressure also damages the hopes of the younger generation. When young people begin to lose faith in the idea that education, effort, and talent can help them build a future within their own country, they naturally begin to think of leaving the country instead of helping to rebuild it.
According to the Sri Lanka Bureau of Foreign Employment, 310,948 people left for foreign employment in 2022. By December 13, 2024, the number had again risen to 300,162. In the first six months of 2025 alone, 144,379 people had left for foreign employment.
In the short term, this may increase foreign exchange earnings through remittances. However, in the long term, it creates a serious challenge for the country. When skilled doctors, engineers, IT professionals, technicians, professionals, and graduates leave in large numbers, Sri Lanka’s human capital, innovation capacity, and productive strength are weakened.
External Debt and the Fiscal Crisis
The depreciation of the rupee also has a serious impact on public finance. A large share of Sri Lanka’s external debt is denominated in US dollars. Therefore, when the rupee weakens, the amount of rupees required to repay the same dollar debt automatically increases.
For example, when the exchange rate is Rs. 200 per dollar, a debt of USD 1 billion is equal to Rs. 200 billion. But if the dollar rises to Rs. 300, the same debt becomes Rs. 300 billion. This shows how the debt burden can increase even without taking new loans, simply because the rupee has weakened.
According to Treasury debt data at the end of 2024, Sri Lanka’s total external debt was around USD 36.7 billion. IMF data also shows that Sri Lanka’s public debt stood at 125.8% of GDP in 2022. Although it declined to 105.7% in 2024, it still remains at a very high level.
In such a situation, the government is often forced to increase taxes, reduce public expenditure, and limit essential services. This again weakens living standards, increases the cost of doing business, and reduces confidence in the economy.
From Economic Crisis to Political Crisis
People often see the collapse of a currency as a symbol of government failure. When the cost of living cannot be controlled, when the tax burden rises, when job opportunities decline, and when uncertainty about the future grows, public confidence begins to collapse.
The 2022 “Aragalaya” is a powerful example of this. It was not merely a political protest. It was a moment when an economic crisis transformed into a social and political crisis. When economic pressure increases, people are often drawn towards populist politics that promise quick and simple solutions. In such an environment, short-term popular decisions can easily take priority over long-term reforms.
The Root Problem: A Weak Economic Structure
It is not enough to understand the depreciation of the rupee merely as an event in the foreign exchange market. It is a warning sign of deep structural weaknesses in Sri Lanka’s economy.
For decades, the country has depended more on consumption than production, more on imports than exports, and more on borrowing than income generation. Political decisions were often shaped by short-term popularity rather than sound economic reasoning. The result is the structural crisis Sri Lanka faces today.
What Should Policymakers Do?
This problem cannot be solved through temporary monetary controls alone. Spending foreign reserves to artificially defend the rupee is not a sustainable long-term solution. What Sri Lanka needs is to give the rupee a real economic foundation.
For that, policymakers must focus on increasing export earnings, strengthening import-substitution industries, maintaining fiscal discipline, broadening the tax base in a fair manner, and creating a stable policy environment for foreign investment.
Sri Lanka should not continue to depend only on tea, garments, tourism, foreign employment, and traditional service exports. The country must build new sources of foreign exchange through information technology, professional services, value-added agriculture, pharmaceutical production, light manufacturing, higher education services, and innovation-driven enterprises.
At the same time, corruption must be controlled, public institutions must regain credibility, policy consistency must be protected, and the business environment must be simplified. The stability of the rupee cannot be secured through Central Bank interest rate policy alone. It requires rebuilding the productive economy, export capacity, fiscal credibility, and public confidence.
The depreciation of the rupee is not merely a decline in the value of money. It is a mirror that reflects the economic strength, political quality, and social confidence of the nation.
Protecting the rupee does not mean artificially controlling the exchange rate. It means rebuilding the country’s productive strength, institutional credibility, fiscal discipline, export capacity, and the future hopes of its people.
Sri Lanka’s real challenge lies there. The rupee becomes strong when the economy becomes strong. The economy becomes strong when the country produces. The country produces when people, businesses, and investors have confidence in the future. Rebuilding that confidence must become one of Sri Lanka’s most urgent national priorities.
by Prof Ranjith Bandara
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