Midweek Review
IMF medicine too bitter to swallow: NPP faces tough choices
Mizukoshi
The Japanese Ambassador in Sri Lanka, Mizukoshi Hideaki, emphasised the importance and the responsibility on the part of Sri Lanka to implement the IMF formula. Hideaki, in an exclusive interview with the writer last August, in the run-up to the parliamentary election, declared that whoever wins the September 21 contest, the winner should adhere to, what he called, IMF remedies (Post-Aragalaya economic recovery depends on implementation of IMF formula – Japanese ambassador, The Island, August 21, 2024).
Bankrupt Sri Lanka, struggling to cope up with the deepening economic-political-social crisis, agreed, in late July 2024, to implement an IMF-led economic recovery programme, backed by Extended Fund Facility (EFF).
Having self-declared the country insolvent in April 2022, political parties, represented in Parliament, had no alternative but to accept the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) dictates to overcome it.
This was the 17th IMF bailout for Sri Lanka and the third since the country brought the war against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) to a successful conclusion in May 2009.
The much discussed EFF arrangement, approved in March 2023, with a total amount of SDR (Special Drawing Rights) 2.3 billion, was definitely the high point in UNP leader Ranil Wickremesinghe’ presidential tenure (July 22 to Sept 2024).
Sri Lanka received the first $330m tranche of the IMF bailout package in March 2023.
The then President Ranil Wickremesinghe and the UNP repeatedly proclaimed that the finalisation of the EFF arrangement was a huge achievement. The Opposition obviously accepted that position when the entire Opposition skipped an opportunity to vote against two controversial Bills that tied up Sri Lanka with the IMF.
Having lambasted Wickremesinghe for the IMF agreement, the main Opposition Samagi Jana Balawegaya (SJB), Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna (SLPP) and national People’s Power (NPP) quietly backed two Bills that were designed to ensure compliance with the widely criticised ‘deal’ with the IMF. The consensus among political parties was nothing but a personal victory for Wickremesinghe who hadn’t received a public mandate to exercise executive powers as the President. Amidst political turmoil, the SLPP-controlled Parliament elected Wickremesinghe as President to complete Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s five-year term, won at the 2019 November presidential election and fearing mob justice otherwise, as was allowed to happen in Bangladesh. That was done at the expense of their own man Dullas Alahapperuma.
The Parliament issued the following statement in the evening of July 24, 2024: “Public Financial Management and Economic Transformation Bills passed in Parliament today (Jul. 25) with amendments and without a vote. Amendments were incorporated to the bills during the committee stage and subsequently, the third reading was passed without a vote. These two bills were presented to Parliament on 22 May 2024.”
Whatever the differences, the Parliament unanimously endorsed the two Bills that made the outcome of the presidential and parliamentary elections irrelevant. Regardless of promises and declarations made by Ranil Wickremesinghe (Independent), Sajith Premadasa (SJB), Anura Kumara Dissanayake (NPP) and Namal Rajapaksa (SLPP) on election platforms, all of them were bound by the IMF agreement. There was no escape for political parties.
Wickremesinghe and his associates repeatedly declared the IMF agreement as the panacea for Sri Lanka’s economic crisis. Wickremesinghe knew he couldn’t win the presidential election under any circumstances. Premadasa, too, realised that he didn’t have an opportunity at all in beating Dissanayake at the presidential election though he addressed rallies as if he was certain of victory.
The failure on the part of Premadasa and Wickremesinghe to reach consensus on the former’s candidature at the presidential contest ensured Dissanayake’s victory. Had the SJB and the UNP reached an agreement, Dissanayake’s victory could have been thwarted. Together they polled over 6.5 mn votes whereas Dissanayake could secure only 5.6 mn. Obviously Wickremesinghe felt much more comfortable with Dissanayake as President than Premadasa, the one-time deputy leader of the UNP.
The UNP knew Wickremesinghe’s decision to contest the presidential election not only ensured Dissanayake’s victory but caused irreparable damage to the SLPP. However, Dissanayake is now under pressure from the IMF to meet the bailout conditions or face the consequences.
President Dissanayake, who also holds the Finance portfolio, is under pressure to increase electricity tariffs in line with the IMF formula.
Stark warning from IMF
IMF spokesperson Julie Kozack recently warned that the final approval of the fourth review of the ongoing programme depended on the government completing, what she called, prior actions, including restoring electricity cost recovery pricing.
All political parties represented in Parliament, including the NPP, regardless of what they told the electorate during the presidential and parliamentary elections, now acknowledge privately Sri Lanka wasn’t in a position to go back on the agreement with the IMF.
The key prerequisite for the IMF Board Meeting on the fourth review is nothing but a significant increase in the pricing formula, not only for electricity, but in turn may extend to water and other basics.
International news agencies quoted Kozack as having said that the main prior actions related to restoring electricity cost recovery pricing and ensuring proper function of the automatic electricity price adjustment mechanism.
In other words, USD 344 million in financing – the fourth tranche – has been put on hold.
President Dissanayake is under pressure to break a key promise made during the costly promises-filled polls campaigns last year. Dissanayake’s promise to reduce electricity rates by 30 percent is irrelevant against the backdrop of the IMF’s stark warning. The agreement between Sri Lanka and IMF that had been endorsed by Parliament in July 2023, overnight, made the Public Utilities Commission of Sri Lanka (PUCSL) irrelevant.
The government owed the public an explanation whether the agreement with the IMF hindered the PUCSL, established in terms of the Public Utilities Commission of Sri Lanka Act No 35 of 2002. If the pricing formula entirely depends on the proposed automatic electricity price adjustment mechanism the government cannot justify the operation of PUCSL.
The IMF has emphasised, in no uncertain terms, that Sri Lanka shouldn’t expect any opportunity to side-step what the lending agency called prior actions.
So, unless President Dissanayake increased electricity tariffs in line with the IMF’s formula, the EFF programme could be halted. That is the ugly truth. Perhaps President Dissanayake should disclose how political parties, represented in the previous Parliament, reached consensus on Public Financial Management and Economic Transformation Bills. At that time the NPP decided not to ask for division, there were only three NPP lawmakers in Parliament. The NPP group consisted of Anura Kumara Dissanayake, Vijitha Herath and Dr. Harini Amarasuriya. Today, the NPP parliamentary group comprises 159 lawmakers.
Having accepted both controversial Bills, the SJB now attacks the NPP over the proposed hike in electricity tariffs.
During the last phase of the parliamentary election campaign, President Dissanayake assured the country of a staggering 30% power tariff reduction in the near future with no intention to fulfill it. This false assurance was given on Nov 09, 2024, at Dambulla. The electorate was deceived. That was deliberate on the President’s part. Dissanayake couldn’t have been unaware that whoever won the parliamentary election the IMF expected the full implementation of the agreement.
Although the PUCSL initiated a public consultations process in line with the Electricity Act, President Dissanayake, in the first week of May, disclosed the decision to go ahead with the electricity tariff hike. The declaration was during a live discussion on Sirasa. Therefore, there cannot be any ambiguity over Sri Lanka adhering to the IMF agreement. The NPP has no option but to implement the agreement with the IMF.
Hideaki on IMF formula
The Japanese Ambassador in Sri Lanka, Mizukoshi Hideaki, emphasised the importance and the responsibility on the part of Sri Lanka to implement the IMF formula. Hideaki, in an exclusive interview with the writer last August, in the run-up to the parliamentary election, declared that whoever wins the September 21 contest, the winner should adhere to, what he called, IMF remedies (Post-Aragalaya economic recovery depends on implementation of IMF formula – Japanese ambassador, The Island, August 21, 2024).
Declaring that the position taken by creditors wasn’t meant to favour the then President Wickremesinghe, Hideaki said: “For Sri Lanka to achieve economic recovery, it is crucial to restore the international community’s trust. To this end, it is essential to steadily implement the various economic and social reforms laid down as conditions by the IMF, which is also the basis for the agreement on the debt restructuring.
Indian High Commissioner Santosh Jha expressed similar sentiments during an informal meeting with a selected group of journalists also in the run-up to the general election.
The country is in such a desperate situation, though there were no queues as during Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s presidency, the government needs to complete the four-year IMF programme. Increasing electricity tariff is not only inevitable but a necessity, though politically damaging, especially at a time the NPP had suffered a significant drop in votes within seven months.
Electricity tariff hike ahead of the forthcoming Provincial Council polls may further undermine the NPP’s vote base and provide a boost for the Opposition. But Dissanayake is not in a position to delay the process as the IMF intends to wrap up the work on the next tranche of funding.
The NPP cannot go back on its pledge to reduce electricity tariffs without losing further public support. The outcome at the Provincial Council election proved that the ruling party, in spite of having a commanding 2/3 majority in Parliament, is vulnerable. Loss of 2.3 mn votes out of 6.8mn that the NPP received at the parliamentary election, just seven months before, and the setback the government suffered in the predominantly Tamil speaking areas, underscored the developing difficulties.
Against that background, the NPP may find IMF conditions extremely difficult to meet but has no choice. Sri Lanka’s record in implementing IMF remedies is poor. Once the Treasury Secretary Mahinda Siriwardana, appearing on state run Rupavahini at the height of the economic crisis, pointed out how Sri Lanka deceived the IMF even during its previous engagements with the lending body. Siriwardena issued a dire warning to the powers that be against not adhering to IMF remedies. The outspoken official’s message was clear – If Sri Lanka bungled this opportunity that would be the end of the ongoing recovery process. Whatever corrupt politicians say to hoodwink voters the country is not out of the woods yet.
The country is in a critical juncture. President Dissanayake, in his capacity as the Finance Minister, is confronted with difficult choices. His government must prudently decide between economic relief and adherence to the IMF’s fiscal targets. Deviating from these targets can jeopardise the country’s access to multilateral financing from institutions, like the ADB and World Bank, which is essential for maintaining foreign currency inflows, necessary in line with the overall recovery process. The NPP cannot ignore that though IMF financial support is limited, its endorsement is crucial for unlocking broader international aid.
The NPP leadership will have to keep in mind that moratorium on repayment of loans ends in 2027 and the responsibility for accumulation of USD reserves lies with the administration. Sri Lanka has no option but to meet its obligations.
The government is unable to rectify sluggish job growth, declining living standards, and rising poverty. Therefore, finding effective policy tools to facilitate a robust recovery has become increasingly urgent.
Case of Pakistan
Former President Wickremesinghe has repeatedly appreciated India’s role in facilitating IMF bailout within months after he succeeded Gotabaya Rajapaksa whose government foolishly rejected the lending agency’s help. By the time the Rajapaksa administration realised irrationality in its much-touted domestic solution, the national economy was in tatters.
Against the backdrop of India interceding on behalf of Sri Lanka with the IMF, New Delhi’s opposition to Washington-based lending agency granting a fresh bailout of USD 1 bn to Pakistan seems contentious.
Indian Defence Minister Rajnath Singh is on record as having alleged, at Bhuj airbase in Gujarat, that Pakistan would certainly utilise a significant portion of the fresh bailout package to rebuild, what he called, the terrorist infrastructure destroyed in operation Sindoor, mounted in response to the Pahalgam massacre on April 22, 2025.
The IMF disregarded India’s concerns. When compared with the IMF bailout package amounting to USD 3 bn to Colombo, the facility made available to Pakistan is much bigger. The IMF has agreed to support Pakistan with a total of $7 billion under the EFF programme. Pakistan received USD 2.1 billion in two separate instalments before the latest tranche of $1 billion was made after the IMF completed its first review of Pakistan’s progress.
Director of the IMF’s communications department Julie Kozack recently explained that under the circumstances the lending agency released USD 1 bn to Pakistan. Kozack dismissed claims of Pakistan utilising IMF funds for rebuilding terrorist infrastructure as money was subjected to tight controls meant to ensure proper utilisation.
Pakistan has denied having a hand in the Pahalgam attack. India’s all-out campaign against Pakistan over its role in international terrorism reminds us of what India did in Sri Lanka. New Delhi’s politically-motivated (no less a person than their National Security Advisor the late J.N. Dixit, admitted Indian intervention here based on political reasons, in his memoirs released in 2005, a year before Sri Lanka launched offensive action (Aug 2006-May 2009).
As combined Sri Lankan armed forces were engaged in large scale operations on the Vanni east front, various interested parties made a desperate bid to halt IMF funding for Sri Lanka. They sought to delay the USD 1.9 bn loan facility to discourage President Mahinda Rajapaksa from bringing the war to a successful conclusion.
In spite of President Rajapaksa’s rejection of a joint UK-France request to call off the Vanni offensive, the UN Security Council asserted that halting the IMF package was not their responsibility.
The then British Foreign Secretary David Miliband and his French counterpart Bernard Kouchner met President Mahinda Rajapaka during the last week of April 2009 as ground forces were making rapid progress on the Vanni east front.
Interested parties had been pushing hard to deprive Sri Lanka of IMF facility after the LTTE’s failure to halt the ground offensive. As long as they felt confident in the LTTE’s military capacity, those demanding accountability on Sri Lanka’s part today never wanted peace. They explored all possible avenues after the LTTE began retreating on all fronts. The bid to halt IMF funding for Sri Lanka should be examined in that context.
The LTTE lobby had been so influential it was able to reach the then US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton whose shocking involvement with the group surprised many. Even after the end of the conflict, the Human Rights Watch (HRW) demanded that the IMF should insist that the government of Sri Lanka address significant post-conflict human rights abuses as part of the approval for a USD 2.5 billion stand-by loan.
The IMF’s handling of funding during the last phase of the conflict, and after, proved that the lending agency couldn’t be influenced by external interventions.
The NPP will have to abide by the IMF remedies or face the consequences. In the run up to the presidential election, the IMF delegation met the NPP team. The meeting that was held at the Shangri-La on 14 March 2024, discussed Sri Lanka’s debt restructuring and anti-fraud processes were discussed at length.
Senior Mission Chief of the Fund, Peter Breuer, led the IMF. The delegation included Assistant to the Director of the Asia and Pacific Department at the IMF Katsiaryna Svieydzenka, and IMF Staff Manavee Abeywickrama.
Representing the NPP at the meeting were party executive members MP Vijitha Herath and Muditha Nanayakkara, and members of the party’s Economic Council Professors Anil Jayantha, Seetha Bandara, and Harshana Suriyapperuma, and former MP Sunil Handunnetti.
The Shangri-La meeting followed a meeting held on January 18, 2024, at the JVP head office at Pelawatte, Battaramulla.
The IMF had been fully involved with political parties during the presidential election campaign last year hence all knew what the IMF remedies were. All political parties exploited the situation to their advantage with the SJB and NPP once boycotting a meeting called by the then President Wickremesinghe with the IMF.
By Shamindra Ferdinando
Midweek Review
Daya Pathirana killing and transformation of the JVP
JVP leader Somawansa Amarasinghe, who returned to Sri Lanka in late Nov, 2001, ending a 12-year self-imposed exile in Europe, declared that India helped him flee certain death as the government crushed his party’s second insurrection against the state in the ’80s, using even death squads. Amarasinghe, sole surviving member of the original politburo of the JVP, profusely thanked India and former Prime Minister V.P. Singh for helping him survive the crackdown. Neither the JVP nor India never explained the circumstances New Delhi facilitated Amarasinghe’s escape, particularly against the backdrop of the JVP’s frenzied anti-India campaign. The JVP has claimed to have killed Indian soldiers in the East during the 1987-1989 period. Addressing his first public meeting at Kalutara, a day after his arrival, Amarasinghe showed signs that the party had shed its anti-India policy of yesteryears. The JVPer paid tribute to the people of India, PM Singh and Indian officials who helped him escape.
By Shamindra Ferdinando
Forty years after the killing of Daya Pathirana, the third head of the Independent Student Union (ISU) by the Socialist Students’ Union (SSU), affiliated with the JVP, one-time Divaina journalist Dharman Wickremaretne has dealt with the ISU’s connections with some Tamil terrorist groups. The LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam) hadn’t been among them, according to Wickremaretne’s Daya Pathirana Ghathanaye Nodutu Peththa (The Unseen Side of Daya Pathirana Killing), the fifth of a series of books that discussed the two abortive insurgencies launched by the JVP in 1971 and the early ’80s.
Pathirana was killed on 15 December, 1986. His body was found at Hirana, Panadura. Pathirana’s associate, Punchiralalage Somasiri, also of the ISU, who had been abducted, along with Pathirana, was brutally attacked but, almost by a miracle, survived to tell the tale. Daya Pathirana was the second person killed after the formation of the Deshapremi Janatha Vyaparaya (DJV), the macabre wing of the JVP, in early March 1986. The DJV’s first head had been JVP politburo member Saman Piyasiri Fernando.
Its first victim was H. Jayawickrema, Principal of Middeniya Gonahena Vidyalaya, killed on 05 December, 1986. The JVP found fault with him for suspending several students for putting up JVP posters.
Wickremaretne, who had been relentlessly searching for information, regarding the violent student movements for two decades, was lucky to receive obviously unconditional support of those who were involved with the SSU and ISU as well as other outfits. Somasiri was among them.
Deepthi Lamaheva had been ISU’s first leader. Warnakulasooriya succeeded Lamahewa and was replaced by Pathirana. After Pathirana’s killing K.L. Dharmasiri took over. Interestingly, the author justified Daya Pathirana’s killing on the basis that those who believed in violence died by it.
Wickremaretne’s latest book, the fifth of the series on the JVP, discussed hitherto largely untouched subject – the links between undergraduates in the South and northern terrorists, even before the July 1983 violence in the wake of the LTTE killing 12 soldiers, and an officer, while on a routine patrol at Thinnavely, Jaffna.
The LTTE emerged as the main terrorist group, after the Jaffna killings, while other groups plotted to cause mayhem. The emergence of the LTTE compelled the then JRJ government to transfer all available police and military resources to the North, due to the constant attacks that gradually weakened government authority there. In Colombo, ISU and Tamil groups, including the PLOTE (People’s Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam) enhanced cooperation. Wickremaretne shed light on a disturbing ISU-PLOTE connection that hadn’t ever been examined or discussed or received sufficient public attention.
In fact, EROS (Eelam Revolutionary Organisation of Students), too, had been involved with the ISU. According to the author, the ISU had its first meeting on 10 April, 1980. In the following year, ISU established contact with the EPRLF (Eelam People’s Revolutionary Liberation Front). The involvement of ISU with the PLOTE and Wickremaretne revealed how the SSU probed that link and went to the extent of secretly interrogating ISU members in a bid to ascertain the details of that connection. ISU activist Pradeep Udayakumara Thenuwara had been forcibly taken to Sri Jayewardenepura University where he was subjected to strenuous interrogation by SSU in a bid to identify those who were involved in a high profile PLOTE operation.
The author ascertained that the SSU suspected Pathirana’s direct involvement in the PLOTE attack on the Nikaweratiya Police Station, and the Nikaweratiya branch of the People’s Bank, on April 26, 1985. The SSU believed that out of a 16-member gang that carried out the twin attacks, two were ISU members, namely Pathirana, and another identified as Thalathu Oya Seneviratne, aka Captain Senevi.
The SSU received information regarding ISU’s direct involvement in the Nikaweratiya attacks from hardcore PLOTE cadre Nagalingam Manikkadasan, whose mother was a Sinhalese and closely related to JVP’s Upatissa Gamanayake. The LTTE killed Manikkadasan in a bomb attack on a PLOTE office, in Vavuniya, in September, 1999. The writer met Manikkadasan, at Bambapalitiya, in 1997, in the company of Dharmalingham Siddharthan. The PLOTE had been involved in operations in support of President Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga’s administration.
It was President Premadasa who first paved the way for Tamil groups to enter the political mainstream. In spite of some of his own advisors expressing concern over Premadasa’s handling of negotiations with the LTTE, he ordered the then Elections Commissioner Chandrananda de Silva to grant political recognition to the LTTE. The LTTE’s political wing PFLT (People’s Front of Liberation Tigers) received recognition in early December, 1989, seven months before Eelam War II erupted.
Transformation of ISU
The author discussed the formation of the ISU, its key members, links with Tamil groups, and the murderous role in the overall counter insurgency campaign during JRJ and Ranasinghe Premadasa presidencies. Some of those who had been involved with the ISU may have ended up with various other groups, even civil society groups. Somasiri, who was abducted along with Pathirana at Thunmulla and attacked with the same specialised knife, but survived, is such a person.
Somasiri contested the 06 May Local Government elections, on the Jana Aragala Sandhanaya ticket. Jana Aragala Sandhanaya is a front organisation of the Frontline Socialist Party/ Peratugaami pakshaya, a breakaway faction of the JVP that also played a critical role in the violent protest campaign Aragalaya against President Gotabaya Rajapaksa. That break-up happened in April 2012, The wartime Defence Secretary, who secured the presidency at the 2019 presidential election, with 6.9 mn votes, was forced to give up office, in July 2022, and flee the country.
Somasiri and Jana Aragala Sandhanaya were unsuccessful; the group contested 154 Local Government bodies and only managed to secure only 16 seats whereas the ruling party JVP comfortably won the vast majority of Municipal Councils, Urban Councils and Pradeshiya Sabhas.
Let us get back to the period of terror when the ISU was an integral part of the UNP’s bloody response to the JVP challenge. The signing of the Indo-Lanka accord, in late July 1987, resulted in the intensification of violence by both parties. Wickremaretne disclosed secret talks between ISU leader K.L. Dharmasiri and the then Senior SSP (Colombo South) Abdul Cader Abdul Gafoor to plan a major operation to apprehend undergraduates likely to lead protests against the Indo-Lanka accord. Among those arrested were Gevindu Cumaratunga and Anupa Pasqual. Cumaratunga, in his capacity as the leader of civil society group Yuthukama, that contributed to the campaign against Yahapalanaya, was accommodated on the SLPP National List (2020 to 2024) whereas Pasqual, also of Yuthukama, entered Parliament on the SLPP ticket, having contested Kalutara. Pasqual switched his allegiance to Ranil Wickremesinghe after Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s ouster in July 2022.
SSU/JVP killed K.L. Dharmasiri on 19 August, 1989, in Colomba Kochchikade just a few months before the Army apprehended and killed JVP leader Rohana Wijeweera. Towards the end of the counter insurgency campaign, a section of the ISU was integrated with the military (National Guard). The UNP government had no qualms in granting them a monthly payment.
Referring to torture chambers operated at the Law Faculty of the Colombo University and Yataro operations centre, Havelock Town, author Wickremaretne underscored the direct involvement of the ISU in running them.
Maj. Tuan Nizam Muthaliff, who had been in charge of the Yataro ‘facility,’ located near State Defence Minister Ranjan Wijeratne’s residence, is widely believed to have shot Wijeweera in November, 1989. Muthaliff earned the wrath of the LTTE for his ‘work’ and was shot dead on May 3, 2005, at Polhengoda junction, Narahenpita. At the time of Muthaliff’s assassination, he served in the Military Intelligence.
Premadasa-SSU/JVP link
Ex-lawmaker and Jathika Chinthanaya Kandayama stalwart Gevindu Cumaratunga, in his brief address to the gathering, at Wickremaretne’s book launch, in Colombo, compared Daya Pathirana’s killing with the recent death of Nandana Gunatilleke, one-time frontline JVPer.
Questioning the suspicious circumstances surrounding Gunatilleke’s demise, Cumaratunga strongly emphasised that assassinations shouldn’t be used as a political tool or a weapon to achieve objectives. The outspoken political activist discussed the Pathirana killing and Gunatilleke’s demise, recalling the false accusations directed at the then UNPer Gamini Lokuge regarding the high profile 1986 hit.
Cumaratunga alleged that the SSU/JVP having killed Daya Pathirana made a despicable bid to pass the blame to others. Turning towards the author, Cumaratunga heaped praise on Wickremaretne for naming the SSU/JVP hit team and for the print media coverage provided to the student movements, particularly those based at the Colombo University.
Cumaratunga didn’t hold back. He tore into SSU/JVP while questioning their current strategies. At one point a section of the audience interrupted Cumaratunga as he made references to JVP-led Jathika Jana Balawegaya (JJB) and JJB strategist Prof. Nirmal Dewasiri, who had been with the SSU during those dark days. Cumaratunga recalled him attending Daya Pathirana’s funeral in Matara though he felt that they could be targeted.
Perhaps the most controversial and contentious issue raised by Cumaratunga was Ranasinghe Premadasa’s alleged links with the SSU/JVP. The ex-lawmaker reminded the SSU/JVP continuing with anti-JRJ campaign even after the UNP named Ranasinghe Premadasa as their candidature for the December 1988 presidential election. His inference was clear. By the time Premadasa secured the presidential nomination he had already reached a consensus with the SSU/JVP as he feared JRJ would double cross him and give the nomination to one of his other favourites, like Gamini Dissanayake or Lalith Athulathmudali.
There had been intense discussions involving various factions, especially among the most powerful SSU cadre that led to putting up posters targeting Premadasa at the Colombo University. Premadasa had expressed surprise at the appearance of such posters amidst his high profile ‘Me Kawuda’ ‘Monawada Karanne’poster campaign. Having questioned the appearance of posters against him at the Colombo University, Premadasa told Parliament he would inquire into such claims and respond. Cumaratunga alleged that night UNP goons entered the Colombo University to clean up the place.
The speaker suggested that the SSU/JVP backed Premadasa’s presidential bid and the UNP leader may have failed to emerge victorious without their support. He seemed quite confident of his assertion. Did the SSU/JVP contribute to Premadasa’s victory at one of the bloodiest post-independence elections in our history.
Cumaratunga didn’t forget to comment on his erstwhile comrade Anupa Pasqual. Alleging that Pasqual betrayed Yuthukama when he switched allegiance to Wickremesinghe, Cumaratunga, however, paid a glowing tribute to him for being a courageous responder, as a student leader.
SSU accepts Eelam
One of the most interesting chapters was the one that dealt with the Viplawadi Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna/Revolutionary Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (RJVP), widely known as the Vikalpa Kandaya/Alternative Group and the ISU mount joint campaigns with Tamil groups. Both University groups received weapons training, courtesy PLOTE and EPRLF, both here, and in India, in the run-up to the so-called Indo-Lanka Peace Accord. In short, they accepted Tamils’ right to self-determination.
The author also claimed that the late Dharmeratnam Sivaram had been in touch with ISU and was directly involved in arranging weapons training for ISU. No less a person than PLOTE Chief Uma Maheswaran had told the author that PLOTE provided weapons training to ISU, free of charge ,and the JVP for a fee. Sivaram, later contributed to several English newspapers, under the pen name Taraki, beginning with The Island. By then, he propagated the LTTE line that the war couldn’t be brought to a successful conclusion through military means. Taraki was abducted near the Bambalapitiya Police Station on the night of 28 April, 2005, and his body was found the following day.
The LTTE conferred the “Maamanithar” title upon the journalist, the highest civilian honour of the movement.
In the run up to the Indo-Lanka Peace Accord, India freely distributed weapons to Tamil terrorist groups here who in turn trained Sinhala youth.
Had it been part of the overall Indian destabilisation project, directed at Sri Lanka? PLOTE and EPRLF couldn’t have arranged weapons training in India as well as terrorist camps here without India’s knowledge. Unfortunately, Sri Lanka never sought to examine the origins of terrorism here and identified those who propagated and promoted separatist ideals.
Exactly a year before Daya Pathirana’s killing, arrangements had been made by ISU to dispatch a 15-member group to India. But, that move had been cancelled after law enforcement authorities apprehended some of those who received weapons training in India earlier. Wickremaretne’s narrative of the students’ movement, with the primary focus of the University of Colombo, is a must read. The author shed light on the despicable Indian destabilisation project that, if succeeded, could have caused and equally destructive war in the South. In a way, Daya Pathirana’s killing preempted possible wider conflict in the South.
Gevindu Cumaratunga, in his thought-provoking speech, commented on Daya Pathirana. At the time Cumaratunga entered Colombo University, he hadn’t been interested at all in politics. But, the way the ISU strongman promoted separatism, influenced Cumaratunga to counter those arguments. The ex-MP recollected how Daya Pathirana, a heavy smoker (almost always with a cigarette in his hand) warned of dire consequences if he persisted with his counter views.
In fact, Gevindu Cumaratunga ensured that the ’80s terror period was appropriately discussed at the book launch. Unfortunately, Wickremaretne’s book didn’t cause the anticipated response, and a dialogue involving various interested parties. It would be pertinent to mention that at the time the SSU/JVP decided to eliminate Daya Pathirana, it automatically received the tacit support of other student factions, affiliated to other political parties, including the UNP.
Soon after Anura Kumara Dissanayake received the leadership of the JVP from Somawansa Amarasinghe, in December 2014, he, in an interview with Saroj Pathirana of BBC Sandeshaya, regretted their actions during the second insurgency. Responding to Pathirana’s query, Dissanayake not only regretted but asked for forgiveness for nearly 6,000 killings perpetrated by the party during that period. Author Wickremaretne cleverly used FSP leader Kumar Gunaratnam’s interview with Upul Shantha Sannasgala, aired on Rupavahini on 21 November, 2019, to remind the reader that he, too, had been with the JVP at the time the decision was taken to eliminate Daya Pathirana. Gunaratnam moved out of the JVP, in April 2012, after years of turmoil. It would be pertinent to mention that Wimal Weerawansa-Nandana Gunatilleke led a group that sided with President Mahinda Rajapaksa during his first term, too, and had been with the party by that time. Although the party split over the years, those who served the interests of the JVP, during the 1980-1990 period, cannot absolve themselves of the violence perpetrated by the party. This should apply to the JVPers now in the Jathika Jana Balawegaya (JJB), a political party formed in July 2019 to create a platform for Dissanayake to contest the 2019 presidential election. Dissanayake secured a distant third place (418,553 votes [3.16%])
However, the JVP terrorism cannot be examined without taking into JRJ’s overall political strategy meant to suppress political opposition. The utterly disgusting strategy led to the rigged December 1982 referendum that gave JRJ the opportunity to postpone the parliamentary elections, scheduled for August 1983. JRJ feared his party would lose the super majority in Parliament, hence the irresponsible violence marred referendum, the only referendum ever held here to put off the election. On 30 July, 1983, JRJ proscribed the JVP, along with the Nawa Sama Samaja Party and the Communist Party, on the false pretext of carrying out attacks on the Tamil community, following the killing of 13 soldiers in Jaffna.
Under Dissanayake’s leadership, the JVP underwent total a overhaul but it was Somawansa Amarasinghe who paved the way. Under Somawansa’s leadership, the party took the most controversial decision to throw its weight behind warwinning Army Chief General (retd) Sarath Fonseka at the 2010 presidential election. That decision, the writer feels, can be compared only with the decision to launch its second terror campaign in response to JRJ’s political strategy. How could we forget Somawansa Amarasinghe joining hands with the UNP and one-time LTTE ally, the Tamil National Alliance (TNA), to field Fonseka? Although they failed in that US-backed vile scheme, in 2010, success was achieved at the 2015 presidential election when Maithripala Sirisena was elected.
Perhaps, the JVP took advantage of the developing situation (post-Indo-Lanka Peace Accord), particularly the induction of the Indian Army here, in July 1987, to intensify their campaign. In the aftermath of that, the JVP attacked the UNP parliamentary group with hand grenades in Parliament. The August 1987 attack killed Matara District MP Keerthi Abeywickrema and staffer Nobert Senadheera while 16 received injuries. Both President JRJ and Prime Minister Ranasinghe Premadasa had been present at the time the two hand grenades were thrown at the group.
Had the JVP plot to assassinate JRJ and Premadasa succeeded in August 1987, what would have happened? Gevindu Cumaratunga, during his speech also raised a very interesting question. The nationalist asked where ISU Daya Pathirana would have been if he survived the murderous JVP.
Midweek Review
Reaping a late harvest Musings of an Old Man
I am an old man, having reached “four score and five” years, to describe my age in archaic terms. From a biological perspective, I have “grown old.” However, I believe that for those with sufficient inner resources, old age provides fertile ground to cultivate a new outlook and reap a late harvest before the sun sets on life.
Negative Characterisation of Old Age
My early medical education and training familiarised me with the concept of biological ageing: that every living organism inevitably undergoes progressive degeneration of its tissues over time. Old age is often associated with disease, disability, cognitive decline, and dependence. There is an inkling of futility, alienation, and despair as one approaches death. Losses accumulate. As Shakespeare wrote in Hamlet, “When sorrows come, they come not single spies, but in battalions.” Doctors may experience difficulty in treating older people and sometimes adopt an attitude of therapeutic nihilism toward a life perceived to be in decline.
Categorical assignment of symptoms is essential in medical practice when arriving at a diagnosis. However, placing an individual into the box of a “geriatric” is another matter, often resulting in unintended age segregation and stigmatisation rather than liberation of the elderly. Such labelling may amount to ageism. It is interesting to note that etymologically, the English word geriatric and the Sanskrit word jara both stem from the Indo-European root geront, meaning old age and decay, leading to death (jara-marana).
Even Sigmund Freud (1875–1961), the doyen of psychoanalysis, who influenced my understanding of personality structure and development during my psychiatric training, focused primarily on early development and youth, giving comparatively little attention to the psychology of old age. He believed that instinctual drives lost their impetus with ageing and famously remarked that “ageing is the castration of youth,” implying infertility not only in the biological sense. It is perhaps not surprising that Freud began his career as a neurologist and studied cerebral palsy.
Potential for Growth in Old Age
The model of human development proposed by the psychologist Erik Erikson (1902–1994), which he termed the “eight stages of man,” is far more appealing to me. His theory spans the entire life cycle, with each stage presenting a developmental task involving the negotiation of opposing forces; success or failure influences the trajectory of later life. The task of old age is to reconcile the polarity between “ego integrity” and “ego despair,” determining the emotional life of the elderly.
Ego integrity, according to Erikson, is the sense of self developed through working through the crises (challenges) of earlier stages and accruing psychological assets through lived experience. Ego despair, in contrast, results from the cumulative impact of multiple physical and emotional losses, especially during the final stage of life. A major task of old age is to maintain dignity amidst such emotionally debilitating forces. Negotiating between these polarities offers the potential for continued growth in old age, leading to what might be called a “meaningful finish.”
I do not dispute the concept of biological ageing. However, I do not regard old age as a terminal phase in which growth ceases and one is simply destined to wither and die. Though shadowed by physical frailty, diminishing sensory capacities and an apparent waning of vitality, there persists a proactive human spirit that endures well into late life. There is a need in old age to rekindle that spirit. Ageing itself can provide creative opportunities and avenues for productivity. The aim is to bring life to a meaningful close.
To generate such change despite the obstacles of ageing — disability and stigmatisation — the elderly require a sense of agency, a gleam of hope, and a sustaining aspiration. This may sound illusory; yet if such illusions are benign and life-affirming, why not allow them?
Sharon Kaufman, in her book The Ageless Self: Sources of Meaning in Late Life, argues that “old age” is a social construct resisted by many elders. Rather than identifying with decline, they perceive identity as a lifelong process despite physical and social change. They find meaning in remaining authentically themselves, assimilating and reformulating diverse life experiences through family relationships, professional achievements, and personal values.
Creative Living in Old Age
We can think of many artists, writers, and thinkers who produced their most iconic, mature, or ground-breaking work in later years, demonstrating that creativity can deepen and flourish with age. I do not suggest that we should all aspire to become a Monet, Picasso, or Chomsky. Rather, I use the term “creativity” in a broader sense — to illuminate its relevance to ordinary, everyday living.
Endowed with wisdom accumulated through life’s experiences, the elderly have the opportunity for developmental self-transformation — to connect with new identities, perspectives, and aspirations, and to engage in a continuing quest for purpose and meaning. Such a quest serves an essential function in sustaining mental health and well-being.
Old age offers opportunities for psychological adaptation and renewal. Many elders use the additional time afforded by retirement to broaden their knowledge, pursue new goals, and cultivate creativity — an old age characterised by wholeness, purpose, and coherence that keeps the human spirit alive and growing even as one’s days draw to a close.
Creative living in old age requires remaining physically, cognitively, emotionally, and socially engaged, and experiencing life as meaningful. It is important to sustain an optimistic perception of health, while distancing oneself from excessive preoccupation with pain and trauma. Positive perceptions of oneself and of the future help sustain well-being. Engage in lifelong learning, maintain curiosity, challenge assumptions — for learning itself is a meaning-making process. Nurture meaningful relationships to avoid disengagement, and enter into respectful dialogue, not only with those who agree with you. Cultivate a spiritual orientation and come to terms with mortality.
The developmental task of old age is to continue growing even as one approaches death — to reap a late harvest. As Rabindranath Tagore expressed evocatively in Gitanjali [‘Song Offerings’], which won him the Nobel Prize:: “On the day when death will knock at thy door, what wilt thou offer to him?
Oh, I will set before my guest the full vessel of my life — I will never let him go with empty hands.”
by Dr Siri Galhenage
Psychiatrist (Retired)
[sirigalhenage@gmail.com]
Midweek Review
Left’s Voice of Ethnic Peace
Multi-gifted Prof. Tissa Vitarana in passing,
Leaves a glowing gem of a memory comforting,
Of him putting his best foot forward in public,
Alongside fellow peace-makers in the nineties,
In the name of a just peace in bloodied Sri Lanka,
Caring not for personal gain, barbs or brickbats,
And for such humanity he’ll be remembered….
Verily a standard bearer of value-based politics.
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JVP leader Somawansa Amarasinghe, who returned to Sri Lanka in late Nov, 2001, ending a 12-year self-imposed exile in Europe, declared that India helped him flee certain death as the government crushed his party’s second insurrection against the state in the ’80s, using even death squads. Amarasinghe, sole surviving member of the original politburo of the JVP, profusely thanked India and former Prime Minister V.P. Singh for helping him survive the crackdown. Neither the JVP nor India never explained the circumstances New Delhi facilitated Amarasinghe’s escape, particularly against the backdrop of the JVP’s frenzied anti-India campaign. The JVP has claimed to have killed Indian soldiers in the East during the 1987-1989 period. Addressing his first public meeting at Kalutara, a day after his arrival, Amarasinghe showed signs that the party had shed its anti-India policy of yesteryears. The JVPer paid tribute to the people of India, PM Singh and Indian officials who helped him escape.