Midweek Review

Historical context of politicisation of Mahavamsa, and Tamil translation of the last volume

Published

2 months ago

2026/01/7

The sixth volume of the Mahavamsa, covering the period 1978-2010 has been rendered into Tamil by N. Saravanan, a well-known Tamil journalist and activist based in Norway. The first three volumes of the Mahavamsa (including the Culavamsa) are now a part of the UNESCO world heritage. They were the work of individual scholar monks, whereas the modern volumes (V to VI) were produced through state-sponsored collective efforts [1].

Although state-sponsored writing of history has been criticised, even the first Mahavamsa, presumably written by the Thera Mahanama in the 5th CE, probably enjoyed Royal Patronage. Furthermore, while it is not at all a sacred text, it is clearly a “Buddhist chronicle” compiled for the “serene joy of the pious” rather than a History of Ceylon, as compiled by, say the University of Ceylon. The latter project was a cooperative venture modeled after the Cambridge Histories. Unlike the Mahavamsa, which is a religious and poetic chronicle, the University effort was an academic work using critical historical methods and archaeological evidence. Hence the criticism [2] leveled against the Mahavamsa editorial board for lack of “inclusivity” (e.g., lack of Muslim or Hindu scholars in the editorial board) may be beside the point. The objection should only be that the ministry of culture has not so far sponsored histories written by other ethno-religious Lankan groups presenting their perspectives. In the present case the ministry of culture is continuing a unique cultural tradition of a Pali Epic, which is some nine centuries old. There has been no such continuous tradition of cultural historiography by other ethno-religious groups on this island (or elsewhere), for the cultural ministry to support.

Consequently, there is absolutely nothing wrong in stating (as Saravanan seems to say) that the Mahavamsa has been written by Buddhists, in the Pali language, “to promote a Sinhala-Buddhist historical perspective”. There IS no such thing as unbiased history. Other viewpoints are natural and necessary in history writing, and they too should be sponsored and published if there is sufficient interest.

While this is the first translation of any of the volumes of the Mahavamsa into Tamil, there were official translations of the Mahavamsa (by Ven. Siri Sumangala and others) into Sinhalese even during British rule, commissioned by the colonial government to make the text accessible to the local people. Although the Legislative Council of the country at that time was dominated by Tamil legislators (advisors to the Governor), they showed no interest in a Tamil translation.

The disinterest of the Tamil community regarding the Mahavamsa changed dramatically after the constitutional reforms of the Donoughmore commission (1931). These reforms gave universal franchise to every adult, irrespective of ethnicity, caste, creed or gender. The Tamil legislators suddenly found that the dominant position that they enjoyed within the colonial government would change dramatically, with the Sinhalese having a majority of about 75%, while the “Ceylon Tamils” were no more than about 12%. The Tamil community, led by caste conscious orthodox members became a minority stake holder with equality granted to those they would not even come face to face, for fear of “caste pollution”.

There was a sudden need for the Tamils to establish their “ownership” of the nation vis-a-vis the Sinhalese, who had the Pali chronicles establishing their historic place in the Island. While the Mahawamsa does not present the Sinhalese as the original settlers of the Island, colonial writers like Baldeus, de Queroz, Cleghorn, Emerson Tennant, promoted the narrative that the Sinhalese were the “original inhabitants” of the Island, while Tamils were subsequent settlers who arrived mostly as invaders. This has been the dominant narrative among subsequent writers (e.g., S. G. Perera, G. C. Mendis), until it was challenged in the 1940s with the rise of Tamil nationalism. Modern historians such as Kartihesu Indrapala, or K. M. de Silva consider that Tamil-speaking people have been present in Sri Lanka since prehistoric or proto-historic times, likely arriving around the same time as the ancestors of the Sinhalese (approx. 5th century BCE). Given that Mannar was a great seaport in ancient times, all sorts of people from the Indian subcontinent and even the Levant must have settled in the Island since pre-historic times.

Although Dravidian people have lived on the land since the earliest times, they have no Epic chronicle like the Mahavamsa. The Oxford & Peradeniya Historian Dr. Jane Russell states [3] that Tamils “had no written document on the lines of the Mahavamsa to authenticate their singular and separate historical authority in Sri Lanka, a fact which Ceylon Tamil communalists found very irksome”. This lack prompted Tamil writers and politicians, such as G. G. Ponnambalam, to attack the Mahavamsa or to seek to establish their own historical narratives. Using such narratives and considerations based on wealth, social standing, etc., a 50-50 sharing of legislative power instead of universal franchise was proposed by G. G. Ponnambalam (GGP), including only about 5% of the population in the franchise, in anticipation of the Soulbury commission. Meanwhile, some Tamil writers tried to usurp the Mahavamsa story by suggesting that King Vijaya was Vijayan, and King Kashyapa was Kasi-appan, etc., while Parakramabahu was “two-thirds” Dravidian. These Tamil nationalists failed to understand that the Mahavamsa authors did not care that its kings were “Sinhalese” or “Tamil”, as long as they were Buddhists! Saravanan makes the same mistake by claiming that Vijaya’s queen from Madura was a Tamil and suggesting a “race-based” reason for Vijaya’s action. This would have had no significance to the Mahavamsa writer especially as Buddhism had not yet officially arrived in Lanka! However, it may well be that Vijaya was looking for a fair-skinned queen from the nearest source, and Vijaya knew that south Indian kings usually had fair-skinned (non-Dravidian) North Indian princesses as their consorts. In fact, even today Tamil bride grooms advertising in matrimonial columns of newspapers express a preference for fair-complexioned brides.

The 1939 Sinhala-Tamil race riot was triggered by a speech where GGP attacked the Mahavamsa and claimed that the Sinhalese were really a “mongrel race”. It was put down firmly within 24 hours by the British Raj. Meanwhile, E. L. Tambimuttu published in 1945 a book entitled Dravida: A History of the Tamils, from Pre-historic Times to A.D. 1800. It was intended to provide a historical narrative for the Tamils, to implicitly rival the Sinhalese chronicle, the Mahavamsa. SJV Chelvanayakam was deeply impressed by Tambimuttu’s work and saw in it the manifesto of a nationalist political party that would defeat Ponambalam’s Tamil congress. So, the Ilankai Tamil Arasu Kadchi, seeking a high degree of self rule for Tamils in their “exclusive traditional homelands”, saw the light of day in 1949, in the wake of Ceylon’s independence from the British.

G. G. Ponnambalam and SWRD Bandaranaike were the stridently ethno-nationalist leaders of the Tamils and Sinhalese respectively, until about 1956. After the passage of the “Sinhala only” act of SWRD, Chelvanayagam took the leadership of Tamil politics. The ensuing two decades generated immense distrust and communal clashes between Sinhalese and Tamils parties, with the latter passing the Vaddukoddai resolution (1976) that called for even taking up arms to establish an Independent Tamil state – Eelam– in the “exclusive” homelands of the Tamils. It is a historical irony that Vaddukkodai was known as “Batakotta” until almost 1900 and indicated a “garrison fort” used by Sinhalese kings to station soldiers (bhata) to prevent local chiefs from setting up local lordships with the help of south Indian kings.

The last volume of the Mahavamsa that has been translated into Tamil by N. Saravanan, covers the contentious period (1978-2010) following the Vaddukkodai resolution and the Eelam wars. This is the period regarding which a militant Tamil writer would hold strong dissenting views from militant Sinhalese. The tenor of Saravanan’s own writings emphasises what he calls the “genocidal nature” of “Sinhala-Buddhist politics” via vis the Tamils. He asserts that the Sri Lankan state used this “Mahavamsa-based ideology” to justify the Eelam War and subsequent actions he characterises as genocidal, including the alleged “Sinhalisation” of Tamil heritage sites.

We should remember that the Eelam wars spanned three decades, while many attempts to resolve the conflict via “peace talks” failed. A major sticking point was the LTTE’s position that even if it would not lay down arms. Saravanan may have forgotten that the Vaddukkodai resolution, though a political declaration, used the language of a “sacred fight” and its demand for absolute separation provided the political framework for the ensuing civil war. So, if the justification for the Eelam wars is to be found in the Mahavamsa, no mention of it was made at Vaddukkoddai. Instead, the “sacred fight” concept goes back to the sacrificial traditions of Hinduism. The concept of a “sacred” or “righteous” fight in Hinduism is known as Dharma-yuddha. While featured and justified in the Mahabharata and Ramayana, its foundational rules and legal frameworks are codified across several other ancient Indian texts. The Bhagavad Gita provides the spiritual justification for Arjuna’s participation in the Kurukshetra War, framing it as a “righteous war” where fighting is a moral obligation. The Arthashastra is a treatise that categorises warfare, distinguishing Dharmayuddha from Kutayuddha (war using deception) and Gudayuddha (covert warfare). While acknowledging Dharmayuddha as the ideal, it pragmatically advocates deception when facing an “unrighteous” enemy.

Saravanan claims that “the most controversial portion is found in the first volume of the Mahavamsa“. He highlights specific passages, such as the Dutugemunu-Elara episode, where monks allegedly tell the king that “killing thousands of Tamils” was permissible because they were “no better than beasts”. This statement is untrue as the monks did not mention Tamils.

What did the monks say to console the king? The king had said: ‘How can there be peace for me, venerable ones, when countless lives have been destroyed by my hand?’ The Theras replied: ‘By this act, there is no obstacle to your path to heaven, O ruler of men. In truth, you have slain only one and a half human beings. One of them sought refuge in the Three Jewels, and the other took the Five Precepts. The rest were unbelievers, evil men who are not to be valued higher than beasts.

This discourse does not even single out or target “Tamils”, contrary to Saravanan’s claim. It mentions unbelievers. The text is from the 5th Century CE. As a person well versed in the literature of the subcontinent, Saravanan should know how that in traditional Hindu scripture killing a Brahmin or a holy person is classified as one of the most heinous sins, ranked higher than the killing of an ordinary layman or killing a person holding onto miccātiṭṭi – (misbelief). The ranking of the severity of such sins is given in texts like the Manusmriti and Chandogya Upanishad, and align with the concepts in the Hindu Manu Dharma that dictate how “low caste” people have been treated in Jaffna society from time immemorial. Hence it is indeed surprising that Sravanan finds the discourse of the monks as something unusual and likely to be the cause of an alleged genocide of the Tamils some 16 centuries later. It was a very mild discourse for that age and in the context of Hindu religious traditions of the “sacred fight” invoked at Vaddukoddai.

Furthermore, Sarvanan should be familiar with the Mahabharat, and the justification given by Krishna for killing his opponents. In the Mahabharata, Krishna justifies the killing of his opponents by prioritising the restoration of Dharma (righteousness) over rigid adherence to conventional rules of war or personal relationships. This was exactly the sentiment contained in the statement of the monks, that “Oh king, you have greatly advanced the cause of the Buddha’s doctrine. Therefore, cast away your sorrow and be comforted.’

So, are we to conclude that Sarvanan is unaware of the cultural traditions of Hinduism, Jainism and Buddhism and the ranking of sins that exist in them, and is he now using the Human Rights concepts of modern times in trying to damn the Mahavamsa? Does he really believe that the majority of the 15 million Sinhala Buddhists have read the Mahavamsa and are activated to kill “unbelievers”? Does he not know that most of these Buddhists also frequent Hindu shrines and hardly regard Hindus beliefs as Mithyadristi? How is it that the majority of Tamils reside in Sinhalese areas peacefully if the Sinhalese are still frenzied by the words of the monks given to console King Dutugamunu 16 centuries ago?

Instead of looking at the ranking of sins found in Indian religions during the time Mahanama wrote the Mahavamsa, let us look at how unbelievers were treated in the Abrahamic religions during those times, and even into recent times. As unbelievers, infidels and even unbaptised men and women of proper faith were deemed to certainly go to hell, and killing infidels was no sin. Historical massacres were justified as divine mandates for the protection of the faith. The Hebrew Bible contains instances where God commanded the Israelites to “utterly destroy all (unbelievers) that breathed”. Medieval Christian and Islamic authorities viewed non-believers or heretics as a spiritual “infection.” Prelates like Augustine of Hippo argued for the state’s use of force to “correct” heretics or eliminate them. Some theologians argued that God being the creator of life, His command to end a life (specially of an “infidel”) is not “murder”.

In contrast, in the Mahavamsa account the king killed his enemies in battle, and the monks consoled him using the ranking of sins recognised in the Vedic, Jain and Buddhist traditions.

If looked at in proper perspective, Sarvanan’s translation of the last volume of at least the Mahavamsa is a valuable literary achievement. But his use of parts of the 5th century Mahavamsa that is not even available to the Tamil reader is nothing but hate writing. He or others who think like him should first translate the old Mahavamsa and allow Tamil-speaking people to make their own judgments about whether it is a work that would trigger genocide 16 centuries later or recognise that there is nothing in the Mahavamsa that is not taken for granted in religions of the Indian subcontinent.

References:

[1]https://www.culturaldept.gov.lk/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=36&Itemid=178&lang=en#:~:text=The%20Mahavamsa%20(%22Great%20Chronicle%22%20is%20the%20meticulously,epic%20poem%20written%20in%20the%20Pali%20language.

[2] https://www.jaffnamonitor.com/the-roots-of-sri-lankas-genocidal-mindset-and-anti-indian-sentiment-lie-in-the-mahavamsa-writer-n-saravanan-on-his-bold-new-translation/#:~:text=Share%20this%20post,have%20been%20silenced%20or%20overlooked.

[3] Jane Russell, Communal Politics in Ceylon under the Donoughmore Constitution, 1931-1948. Ceylon Historical Journal, vol. 36, and Tisara Publishers, Dehiwala, Sri Lanka (1982).

by Chandre Dharmawardana
chandre.dharma@yahoo.ca

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Midweek Review

Dr. Jaishankar drags H’tota port to reverberating IRIS Dena affair

Published

2 days ago

2026/03/11

Sahan Weerasooriya

Sri Lanka reached an agreement with China to build the Hambantota port after India declined the then President Mahinda Rajapaksa’s request to take charge of the high profile project. The Indian decision may have been influenced by the war raging in the northern region at that time.

Indian Foreign Minister Dr. S. Jaishankar recognised Hambantota harbour as a Chinese military facility that underlined intimidating foreign military presence in the Indian Ocean. Jaishankar was responding to queries regarding India’s widely mentioned status as the region’s net security provider against the backdrop of a US submarine blowing up an Iranian frigate IRIS Dena, off Galle, within Sri Lanka’s Exclusive Economic Zone.

This happened at the Raisina Dialogue 2026 (March 5 to 7) in New Delhi. Raisina Dialogue was launched in 2016, three years after Narendra Modi became the Prime Minister.

The query obviously rattled the Indian Foreign Minister. Urging the moderator, Ms. Pakli Sharma Ipadhyay, to understand, what he called, the reality of the Indian Ocean, Dr. Jaishankar pointed out the joint US-British presence at Diego Garcia over the past five decades. Then he referred to the Chinese presence at Djibouti in East Africa, the first overseas Chinese military base, established in 2017, and Chinese takeover of Hambantota port, also during the same time. China secured the strategically located port on a 99-year lease for USD 1.2 bn, under controversial circumstances. China succeeded in spite of Indian efforts to halt Chinese projects here, including Colombo port city.

The submarine involved is widely believed to be Virginia-class USS Minnesota. The crew, included three Australian Navy personnel, according to international news agencies. However, others named the US Navy fast-attack submarine, involved in the incident, as USS Charlotte.

Diego Garcia is responsible for military operations in the Middle East, Africa and the Indo-Pacific. Dr. Jaishankar didn’t acknowledge that India, a key US ally and member of the Quad alliance, operated P8A maritime patrol and reconnaissance flights out of Diego Garcia last October. The US-India-Israel relationship is growing along with the US-Sri Lanka partnership.

The Indian Foreign Minister emphasised the deployment of the US Fifth Fleet in Bahrain, one of the countries that had been attacked by Iran, following the US-Israeli assassination of Iranian Supreme Leader, and key government functionaries, in a massive surprise attack, aiming at a regime change there. The Indian Minister briefly explained how they and Sri Lanka addressed the threat on three Indian navy vessels following the unprovoked US-Israeli attacks on Iran. Whatever the excuses, the undeniable truth is, as Sharma pointed out, that the US attack on the Iranian frigate took place in India’s backyard.

Sri Lankan Foreign Minister Vijitha Herath who faced Sharma before Dr. Jaishankar, struggled to explain the country’s position. Dr. Jaishankar made the audience laugh at Minister Herath’s expense who repeatedly said that Sri Lanka would deal with the situation in terms of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and international laws. Herath should have pointed out that Hambantota was not a military base and couldn’t be compared, under any circumstances, with the Chinese base in Djibouti.

Typical of the arrogant Western power dynamics, the US never cared for international laws and President Donald Trump quite clearly stated their position.

Israel is on record as having declared that the decision to launch attacks on Iran had been made months ago. Therefore, the sinking of the fully domestically built vessel that was launched in 2021 should be examined in the context of overall US-Israeli strategy meant to break the back of the incumbent Islamic revolutionary government and replace it with a pro-Western regime there as had been the case after the toppling of the democratically elected government there, led by Prime Minister Mossadegh, in August, 1953.

US Defence Secretary Pete Hegseth declared that IRIS Dena “thought it was safe in international waters’ but died a quiet death.” A US submarine torpedoed the vessel on the morning of March 4, off Galle, within Sri Lanka’s exclusive economic zone and that decision must have been made before the IRIS Dena joined International Fleet Review (IFR) and Exercise Milan 2026, at Visakhapatnam, from February 15 to 25.

The sinking of the Iranian vessel, a Moudge –class frigate attached to Iran’s southern fleet deployed in the Gulf of Oman and Strait of Hormuz, had been calculated to cause mayhem in the Indian Ocean. Obviously, and pathetically, Iran failed to comprehend the US-Israeli mindset after having already been fooled with devastating attacks, jointly launched by Washington and Tel Aviv against the country’s nuclear research facilities, while holding talks with it on the issue last June. Had they comprehended the situation they probably would have pulled out of the IFR and Milan 2026. Perhaps, Iran was lulled into a false sense of security because they felt the US wouldn’t hit ships invited by India. The US Navy did not participate though the US Air Force did.

The US action dramatically boosted Raisina Dialogue 2026, but at India’s expense. Prime Minister Modi’s two-day visit to Tel Aviv, just before the US-Israel launched the war to effect a regime change in Teheran, made the situation far worse. BJP seems to have decided on whose side India is on. But, the US action has, invariably, humiliated India. That cannot be denied. The Indian Navy posted a cheery message on X on February 17, the day before President Droupadi Murmu presided over IFR off the Visakhapatnam coast. “Welcome!” the Indian Navy wrote, greeting the Iranian warship IRIS Dena as it steamed into the port of Visakhapatnam to join an international naval gathering. Photographs showed Iranian sailors and a grey frigate gliding into the Indian harbour on a clear day. The hashtags spoke of “Bridges of Friendship” and “United Through Oceans.”

US alert

Dr. Jaishankar

Altogether, three Iranian vessels participated in IFR. In addition to the ill-fated IRIS Dena, the second frigate IRIS Lavan and auxiliary ships IRIS Bushehr comprised the group. Dr. Jaishankar disclosed at the Raisina Dialogue 2026 that Iran requested India to allow IRIS Lavan to enter Indian waters. India accommodated the vessel at Cochin Port (Kochi Port) on the Arabian Sea in Kerala.

At the time US torpedoed IRIS Dena, within Sri Lanka’s EEZ, IRIS Lavan was at Cochin port. Sri Lanka’s territorial waters extend 12 nautical miles (approximately 22 km) from the country’s coastline. The US hit the vessel 19 nautical miles off southern coastline.

Sri Lanka, too, participated in IFR and Milan 2026. SLN Sagara (formerly Varaha), a Vikram-class offshore patrol vessel of the Indian Coast Guard and SLN Nandimithra, A Fast Missile Vessel, acquired from Israel, participated and returned to Colombo on February 27, the day before IRIS Lavan sought protection in Indian waters.

Although many believed that Sri Lanka responded to the attack on IRIS Dena, following a distressed call from that ship, the truth is it was the Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) that alerted the Maritime Rescue Coordination centre (MRCC) after blowing it up with a single torpedo. The SLN’s Southern Command dispatched three Fast Attack Craft (FACs) while a tug from Sri Lanka Ports Authority (SLPA) joined later.

The INDOPACOM, while denying the Iranian claim that IRIS Dena had been unarmed at the time of the attack, emphasised: “US forces planned for and Sri Lanka provided life-saving support to survivors in accordance with the Law of Armed Conflict.” In the post shared on X (formerly Twitter) the US has, in no uncertain terms, said that they planned for the rescuing of survivors and the action was carried out by the Sri Lanka Navy.

IRIS Lavan and IRIS Bushehr are most likely to be held in Cochin and in Trincomalee ports, respectively, for some time with the crews accommodated on land. With the US-Israel combine vowing to go the whole hog there is no likelihood of either India or Sri Lanka allowing the ships to leave.

Much to the embarrassment of the Modi administration, former Indian Foreign Secretary Kanwal Sibal has said that IRIS Dena would not have been targeted if Iran was not invited to take part in IFR and Milan naval exercise.

“We were the hosts. As per protocol for this exercise, ships cannot carry any ammunition. It was defenseless. The Iranian naval personnel had paraded before our president,” he said in a post on X.

Sibal argued that the attack was premeditated, pointing out that the US Navy had been invited to the exercise but withdrew at the last minute, “presumably with this operation in mind.”

Sibal added that the US ignored India’s sensitivities, as the Iranian ship was present in the waters due to India’s invitation.

He stressed that India was neither politically nor militarily responsible for the US attack, but carried a moral and humanitarian responsibility.

“A word of condolence by the Indian Navy (after political clearance) at the loss of lives of those who were our invitees and saluted our president would be in order,” Sibal said.

Iran and even India appeared to have ignored the significance of USN pullout from IFR and Milan exercise at the eleventh hour. India and Sri Lanka caught up in US-Israeli strategy are facing embarrassing questions from the political opposition. Both Congress and Samagi Jana Balwegaya (SJB), as well as Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna (SLPP), exploited the situation to undermine respective governments over an unexpected situation created by the US. Both India and Sri Lanka ended up playing an unprecedented role in the post-Milan 2026 developments that may have a lasting impact on their relations with Iran.

The regional power India and Sri Lanka also conveniently failed to condemn the February 28 assassination of Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, while that country was holding talks with the US, with Oman serving as the mediator.

Condemning the unilateral attack on Iran, as well as the retaliatory strikes by Iran, Leader of the Opposition in the Lok Sabha and Congress leader Rahul Gandhi on Tuesday (March 3, 2026) questioned India’s silence on the Middle East developments.

In a post on social media platform X, Gandhi said Prime Minister Narendra Modi must speak up. “Does he support the assassination of a Head of State as a way to define the world order? Silence now diminishes India’s standing in the world,” he said.

Under heavy Opposition fire, India condoled the Iranian leader’s assassination on March 5, almost a week after the killing. Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri met the Iran Ambassador in Delhi and signed the condolence book, though much belatedly.

SL-US relations

The Opposition questioned the NPP government’s handling of the IRIS Dena affair. They quite conveniently forgot that any other government wouldn’t have been able to do anything differently than bow to the will of the US. Under President Trump, Washington has been behaving recklessly, even towards its longtime friends, demanding that Canada become its 51st state and that Denmark handover Greenland pronto.

SJB and Opposition leader Sajith Premadasa cut a sorry figure demanding in Parliament whether Sri Lanka had the capacity to detect submarines or other underwater systems. Sri Lanka should be happy that the Southern Command could swiftly deploy three FACs and call in SLPA tug, thereby saving the lives of 32 Iranians and recovering 84 bodies of their unfortunate colleagues. Therefore, of the 180-member crew of IRIS Dena, 116 had been accounted for. The number of personnel categorised as missing but presumably dead is 64.

There is no doubt that Sri Lanka couldn’t have intervened if not for the US signal to go ahead with the humanitarian operation to pick up survivors. India, too, must have informed the US about the Iranian request for IRIS Lavan to re-enter Indian waters. Sri Lanka, too, couldn’t have brought the Iranian auxiliary vessel without US consent. President Trump is not interested in diplomatic niceties and the way he had dealt with European countries repeatedly proved his reckless approach. The irrefutable truth is that the US could have torpedoed the entire Iranian group even if they were in Sri Lankan or Indian Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) that extends to 200 nautical miles from its coastline.

In spite of constantly repeating Sri Lanka’s neutrality, successive governments succumbed to US pressure. In March 2007, Mahinda Rajapaksa’s government entered into Acquisition and Cross- Servicing Agreement (ACSA) with the US, a high profile bilateral legal mechanism to ensure uninterrupted support/supplies. The Rajapaksas went ahead with ACSA, in spite of strong opposition from some of its partners. In fact, they did not even bother to ask or take up the issue at Cabinet level before the then Defence Secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa, a US citizen at the time, and US Ambassador here Robert O. Blake signed it. Close on the heels of the ACSA signing, the US provided specific intelligence that allowed the Sri Lanka Navy to hunt down four floating LTTE arsenals. Whatever critics say, that US intervention ensured the total disruption of the LTTE supply line and the collapse of their conventional fighting capacity by March 2009. The US favourably responded to the then Vice Admiral Wasantha Karannagoda’s request for help and the passing of intelligence was not in any way in line with ACSA.

That agreement covered the 2007 to 2017 period. The Yahapalana government extended it. Yahapalana partners, the SLFP and UNP, never formally discussed the decision to extend the agreement though President Maithripala Sirisena made a desperate attempt to distance himself from ACSA.

It would be pertinent to mention that the US had been pushing for ACSA during Rail Wickremesinghe’s tenure as the Premier, in the 2001-2003 period. But, he lacked the strength to finalise that agreement due to strong opposition from the then Opposition. During the time the Yahapalana government extended ACSA, the US also wanted the Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) signed. SOFA, unlike ACSA, is a legally binding agreement that dealt with the deployment of US forces here. However, SOFA did not materialise but the possibility of the superpower taking it up cannot be ruled out.

Gotabaya Rajapaksa, who won the 2019 presidential election, earned the wrath of the US for declining to finalise MCC (Millennium Challenge Corporation) Compact on the basis of Prof. Gunaruwan Committee report that warned that the agreement contained provisions detrimental to national security, sovereignty, and the legal system. In the run up to the presidential election, UNP leader Ranil Wickremesinghe declared that he would enter into the agreement in case Sajith Premadasa won the contest.

Post-Aragalaya setup

Since the last presidential election held in September 2024, Admiral Steve Koehler, a four-star US Navy Admiral and Commander of the US Pacific Fleet visited Colombo twice in early October 2024 and February this year. Koehler’s visits marked the highest-level U.S. military engagement with Sri Lanka since 2021.

Between Koehler’s visits, the United States and Sri Lanka signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) formalising the defence partnership between the Montana National Guard, the US Coast Guard District 13, and the Sri Lanka Armed Forces under the Department of War’s State Partnership Programme (SPP). The JVP-led NPP government seems sure of its policy as it delayed taking a decision on one-year moratorium on all foreign research vessels entering Sri Lankan waters though it was designed to block Chinese vessels. The government is yet to announce its decision though the ban lapsed on December 31, 2024.

The then President Ranil Wickremesinghe was compelled to announce the ban due to intense US-Indian pressure.

The incumbent dispensation’s relationship with US and India should be examined against allegations that they facilitated ‘Aragalaya’ that forced President Gotabaya Rajapaksa out of office. The Trump administration underscored the importance of its relationship with Sri Lanka by handing over ex-US Coast Guard Cutter ‘Decisive ‘to the Sri Lanka Navy. The vessel, commanded by Captain Gayan Wickramasooriya, left Baltimore US Coast Guard Yard East Wall Jetty on February 23 and is expected to reach Trincomalee in the second week of May.

Last year Sri Lanka signed seven MoUs, including one on defence and then sold controlling shares of the Colombo Dockyard Limited (CDL) to a company affiliated to the Defence Ministry as New Delhi tightened its grip.

Sri Lanka-US relations seemed on track and the IRIS Dena incident is unlikely to distract the two countries. The US continues to take extraordinary measures to facilitate war on Iran. In a bid to overcome the Iranian blockade on crude carriers the US temporarily eased sanctions to allow India to buy Russian oil.

Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent declared a 30-day waiver was a “deliberate short-term measure” to allow oil to keep flowing in the global market. The US sanctioned Russian oil following Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine, forcing buyers to seek alternatives.

The US doesn’t care about the Ukraine government that must be really upset about the unexpected development. India was forced to halt buying Russian oil and now finds itself in a position to turn towards Russia again. But that would be definitely at the expense of Iran facing unprecedented military onslaught.

By Shamindra Ferdinando

Midweek Review

A Living Legend of the Peradeniya Tradition:

Published

2 days ago

2026/03/11

Sahan Weerasooriya

Prof. H. L. Seneviratne

A Tribute to Professor H. L. Seneviratne – Part I

My earliest memories of the eminent anthropologist, Professor H. L. Seneviratne date back to my childhood, when I first encountered his name through the vivid accounts of campus life shared by my late brother, Sugathapala de Silva, then a lecturer in the Department of Sinhala at the University of Peradeniya. By the time I became a first-year sociology student in 1968/69, I had the privilege of being taught by the Professor, whose guidance truly paved the way for my own progression in sociology and anthropology. Even then, it was clear that he was a towering presence—not just as an academician, but as a central figure in the lively cultural and literary renaissance that defined that era of the university’s intellectual history.

H.L. Seneviratne stood alongside a galaxy of intellectuals who shaped and developed the literary consciousness of the Peradeniya University. His professorial research made regular appearances in journals such as Sanskriti and Mimamsa, published Sinhala and English articles, and served as channels for the dissemination of the literary consciousness of Peradeniya to the population at large. These texts were living texts of a dynamic intellectual ferment where the synthesis of classical aesthetic sensibilities with current critical intellectual thought in contemporary Sri Lanka was under way.

The concept of a ‘Peradeniya tradition or culture’, a term which would later become legendary in Sri Lankan literary and intellectual circles, was already being formed at this time. Peradeniya culture came to represent a distinctive synthesis: cosmopolitanism entwined with well-rooted local customs, aesthetic innovation based on classical Sinhala styles, and critical interaction with modernity. Among its pre-eminent practitioners were intellectual giants such as Ediriweera Sarachchandra, Gunadasa Amarasekara, and Siri Gunasinghe. These figures and H.L. Seneviratne himself, were central to the shaping of a space of cultural and literary critique that ranged from newspapers to book-length works, public speeches to theatrical performance.

Unlimited influence

H.L. Seneviratne’s influence was not limited to the printed page, which I discuss in this article. He operated in and responded to the performative, interactive space of drama and music, situating lived artistic practice in his cultural thought. I recall with vividness the late 1950s, a period seared into my memory as one of revelation, when I as a child was fortunate enough to witness one of the first performances of Maname, the trailblazing Sinhala drama that revolutionised Sri Lankan theatre. Drawn from the Nadagam tradition and staged in the open-air theatre in Peradeniya—now known as Sarachchandra Elimahan Ranga Pitaya—or Wala as used by the campus students. Maname was not so much a play as a culturally transformative experience.

H.L. Seneviratne was not just an observer of this change. He joined the orchestra of Maname staged on November 3, 1956, lending his voice and presence to the collective heartbeat of the performance. He even contributed to the musical group by playing the esraj, a quiet but vital addition to the performance’s beauty and richness. Apart from these roles, he played an important part in the activities of Professor Sarathchandra’s Sinhala Drama Society, a talent nursery and centre for collaboration between artists and intellectuals. H.L. Seneviratne was a friend of Arthur Silva, a fellow resident of Arunachalam Hall then, and the President of the Drama Circle. H.L. Seneviratne had the good fortune to play a role, both as a member of the original cast, and an active member of the Drama Circle that prevailed on lecturer E.R. Sarathchandra to produce a play and gave him indispensable organizational support. It was through this society that Sarachchandra attracted some of the actors who brought into being Maname and later Sinhabhahu, plays which have become the cornerstone of Sri Lanka’s theatrical heritage.

The best chronicler of Maname

H.L. Seneviratne is the best chronicler of Maname. (Towards a National Art, From Home and the World, Essays in honour of Sarath Amunugama. Ramanika Unamboowe and Varuni Fernando (eds)). He chronicles the genesis of Ediriweera Sarachchandra’s seminal play Maname, framing it as a pivotal attempt to forge a sophisticated national identity by synthesizing indigenous folk traditions with Eastern theatrical aesthetics. Seneviratne details how Sarachchandra, disillusioned with the ‘artificiality’ of Western-influenced urban theatre and the limitations of both elite satires and rural folk plays, looked toward the Japanese Noh and Kabuki traditions to find a model for a ‘national’ art that could appeal across class divides. The author emphasises that the success of Maname was not merely a solo intellectual feat but a gruelling, collective effort involving a ‘gang of five’ academics and a dedicated cohort of rural, bilingual students from the University of Ceylon at Peradeniya. Through anecdotes regarding the discovery of lead actors like Edmund Wijesinghe and the assembly of a unique orchestra, Seneviratne highlights the logistical struggles—from finding authentic instruments to managing cumbersome stage sets—that ultimately birthed a transformative ‘oriental’ theatre rooted in the nadagama style yet refined for a modern, sophisticated audience.

Born in Sri Lanka in 1934, in a village in Horana, he was educated at the Horana Taxila College following which he was admitted to the Department of Sociology at the University of Peradeniya. H.L. Seneviratne’s academic journey subsequently led him to the University of Rochester for his doctoral studies. But, despite his long tenure in the United States, his research has remained firmly rooted in the soil of his homeland.

His early seminal work, Rituals of the Kandyan State, his PhD thesis turned into a book, offered a groundbreaking analysis of the Temple of the Tooth (Dalada Maligawa). By examining the ceremonies surrounding the sacred relic, H.L. Seneviratne demonstrated how religious performance served as the bedrock of political legitimacy in the Kandyan Kingdom. He argued that these rituals at the time of his fieldwork in the early 1970s were not static relics of the past, but active tools used to construct and maintain the authority of the state, the ideas that would resonate throughout his later career.

The Work of Kings

Perhaps, his most provocative contribution arrived with the publication of The Work of Kings published in 1999. In this sweeping study, H.L. Seneviratne traced the transformation of the Buddhist clergy, or Sangha, from the early 20th-century ‘social service’ monks, who focused on education and community upliftment, to the more politically charged nationalist figures of the modern era. He analysed the shift away from a universalist, humanistic Buddhism toward a more exclusionary identity, sparking intense debate within both academic and religious circles in Sri Lanka.

In The Work of Kings, H.L. Seneviratne has presented a sophisticated critique and argued that in the early 20th century, influenced by figures like Anagarika Dharmapala, there was a brief ‘monastic ideal’ centred on social service and education. This period saw monks acting as catalysts for community development and moral reform embodying a humanistic version of Buddhism that sought to modernize the country while maintaining its spiritual integrity.

However, H.L. Seneviratne contends that this situation was eventually derailed by the rise of post-independence nationalism. He describes a process where the clergy moved away from universalist goals to become the vanguard of a narrow ethno-religious identity. By aligning themselves so closely with the state and partisan politics, H.L. Seneviratne suggests that the Sangha inadvertently traded their moral authority for political influence. This shift, in his view, led to the ‘betrayal’ of the original social service movement, replacing a vision of broad social progress with one centred on political dominance.

The core of his critique lies in the disappearance of what he calls the ‘intellectual monk.’ He laments the decline of the scholarly, reflective tradition in favour of a more populist and often inflammatory rhetoric. By analysing the rhetoric of key monastic figures, H.L. Senevirathne illustrates how the language of Buddhism was repurposed to justify political ends, often at the expense of the pluralistic values that he believes are inherent to the faith’s core teachings.

H.L. Seneviratne’s work remains highly relevant today as it provides a framework for understanding contemporary religious tensions. His analysis serves as a warning about the consequences of merging religious institutional power with state politics. By documenting this historical shift, he challenges modern Sri Lankans—and global observers—to reconsider the role of religious institutions in a secular, democratic state, urging a return to the compassionate and socially inclusive roots of the Buddhist tradition.

Within the broader context of Sri Lankan anthropology, H.L. Seneviratne is frequently grouped with other towering figures of his generation, most notably Stanley Jeyaraja Tambiah and Gananath Obeyesekere. Together, this remarkable cohort revolutionized the study of Sri Lanka by applying structural and psychological analyses to religious and ethnic identity. While Tambiah famously interrogated the betrayal of non-violent Buddhist principles in the face of political violence, H.L. Seneviratne’s work is often seen as the essential sociological counterpart, providing the detailed historical and institutional narrative of how the monastic order itself was reshaped by these very forces.

Reation to Seneviratne’s critque

The reaction to H.L. Seneviratne’s critique has been as multifaceted as the work itself. In academic circles, particularly those influenced by post-colonial theory, he is celebrated for speaking truth in a public place. Scholars have noted that because he writes as an insider—both a Sinhalese and a Buddhist, that makes them both credible and, to some, highly objectionable. His work has paved the way for a younger generation of Sri Lankan sociologists and anthropologists to move beyond traditional functionalism towards more radical articulations of competing interests and political power.

However, his analysis has also made him a target for nationalist critics. Those aligned with ethno-religious movements often view his deconstruction of the Sangha’s political role as an attack on Sinhalese-Buddhist identity itself. These detractors argue that H.L. Seneviratne’s intellectualist or universalist view of Buddhism fails to account for the necessity of the clergy’s role in protecting the nation against neo colonial and modern pressures. This tension highlights the very descent into ideology that H.L. Seneviratne has spent his career documenting.

H.L. Seneviratne’s legacy is defined by this ongoing dialogue between scholarship and social reality. His transition from the detached scholar seen in his early work on Kandyan rituals to the socially concerned intellectual of The Work of Kings mirrors the very transformation of the Sangha and Buddha Sasana he studied. By refusing to look away from the complexities of the present, he has ensured that his work remains a cornerstone for any serious discussion on the future of religion and governance in Sri Lanka.

Focus on good governance

In his later years, H.L. Seneviratne has pivoted his focus toward the practical application of his theories, specifically examining how the concept of ‘Good Governance’ interacts with traditional religious structures. He argues that for Sri Lanka to achieve true stability, there must be a fundamental reimagining of the Sangha’s role in the public sphere—one that moves away from the ‘work of Kings’ and returns to a more ethical, advisory capacity. This shift in his recent lectures reflects a deep concern about the erosion of democratic institutions and the way religious sentiment can be harnessed to bypass the rule of law.

Building on this, contemporary scholars like Benjamin Schonthal have expanded H.L. Seneviratne’s inquiry into the legal and constitutional dimensions of Buddhism in Sri Lanka. While H.L. Seneviratne provided the anthropological groundwork for how monks gained political power, this newer generation of academics examines how that power has been codified into the very laws of the state. They explore the ‘path dependency’ created by the historical shifts H.L. Seneviratne documented, looking at how the legal privileging of Buddhism creates unique challenges for a pluralistic society.

New Sangha

Furthermore, his influence is visible in the work of local scholars who focus on ‘engaged Buddhism.’ These researchers look back at H.L. Seneviratne’s description of the early 20th-century social service monks as a blueprint for modern reform. By identifying the moment where the clergy’s mission shifted from social welfare to political nationalism, these scholars use H.L. Seneviratne’s historical milestones to advocate a ‘New Sangha’ that prioritizes reconciliation and inter-ethnic harmony over state-aligned power.

The enduring power of H.L. Seneviratne’s work lies in its refusal to offer easy answers. By mapping the transition within Buddhist practice from ritual to politics, and from social service to nationalism, he has provided an analytical framework in which the nation can see its own transformation. His legacy is not just a collection of books, but a persistent, rigorous habit of questioning that continues to inspire those who seek to understand the delicate balance between faith and the modern state.

H.L. Seneviratne continues to challenge his audience to think beyond the immediate political moment. By documenting the arc of Sri Lankan history from the sacred rituals of the Kandyan kings to the modern halls of parliament, he provides a vital sense of perspective. Whether he is being celebrated by the academic community or critiqued by nationalist voices, his work ensures that the conversation regarding the soul of the nation remains rigorous, historically grounded, and unafraid of its own complexities.

Anthropology and cinema

H.L. Seneviratne identifies the mid-1950s as the critical turning point for this cinematic shift, specifically anchoring the move to 1956 with the release of Lester James Peries’s “Rekava.” This period was a watershed moment in Sri Lankan history, coinciding with a broader nationalist resurgence that sought to reclaim a localized identity from the influence of colonial and foreign powers. H.L. Seneviratne suggests that before this era, the ‘South Indian formula’ dominated the screen, characterized by studio-bound sets, theatrical acting, and musical interludes that felt alien to the island’s actual social fabric. The pioneers of this movement, led by Lester James Peries and later followed by figures like Siri Gunasinghe in the early 1960s, deliberately moved the camera into the open air of the rural village to capture what H.L. Seneviratne describes as the ‘authentic rhythms’ of life. This transition was not merely aesthetic but deeply ideological; it replaced the mythical, exaggerated heroism of commercial cinema with a nuanced exploration of the post-colonial middle class and the crumbling feudal hierarchies. By the 1960s, through landmark works like ‘Gamperaliya,’ these filmmakers were successfully crafting a modern mythology that reflected the internal psychological tensions and the social evolution of a nation navigating its way between traditional Buddhist values and a rapidly modernizing world.

His critique of the relationship between art and the state is particularly evident in his analysis of historical epics, where he has argued that certain cinematic portrayals of ancient kings and battles serve as a form of ‘visual nationalism,’ translating the ideological shifts he documented in The Work of Kings onto the silver screen. By analysing these films, he shows how popular culture can become a powerful tool for constructing a simplified, heroic past that often ignores the multi-ethnic and pluralistic realities of the island’s history.

(To be concluded)

by Professor M. W. Amarasiri de Silva