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Genealogy of Concept and Genesis of 13th Amendment -II

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By Prof. Gamini Keerawella

Prior to the 1977 general election, J. R. Jayewardene promised to summon an All Party Conference to take all possible steps to remedy the grievances of the Tamil- speaking people. However, what followed the election victory of the UNP, in 1977, was a series of anti-Tamil riots. On 12 August 1977, in less than a month of the new government assumed office anti-Tamil riots started. It was reported that over 300 Tamil people were killed during the riots. The political implications of the Anti-Tamil riots in Sri Lanka reverberated on the other side of the Palk Strait. On 24th August 1977, the Tamil Nadu Assembly adopted a resolution urging the Government of India to “depute a representative of the status of a Cabinet Minister to Sri Lanka to find out the true status of the affairs and have direct talks with that government by way of assuring the feelings of the Tamils there”. At this time, however, the Prime Minister Moraji Desai dismissed the Tamil Nadu request and stated that the Government of India did not propose to send a Cabinet Minister to Sri Lanka since the Indian High Commissioner in Colombo had been doing every thing possible and the two governments were also in close touch with each other.

Despite the election pledge to summon an All Party Conference to take all possible steps to remedy the grievances of the Tamil-Speaking people, J.R. Jayewardene first offered the District Development Councils (DDCs). It is important to note that, in spite of strong pressure on the part of the militant youth groups not to contest, the TULF participated in the DDCs. The DDC experiment of the TULF proved to be disastrous. On the one hand it faced the antipathy of the youth who advocated direct-armed struggle. On the other, the Central government was not prepared to tolerate even decentralization of administration. “The institution of District Minister ensured that all decisions of the Council will be subjected to strict control by the representative of the central government”.

There were anti-Tamil riots again in 1981. Tamil Nadu politics was rocked again due to the ethnic riots in Sri Lanka. The leaders of the 20 political parties urged the Prime Minister Indira Ghandi to grant the Tamil youths seeking refuge in Tamil Nadu political asylum. This time the Indian official reaction was clearly different. For the first time, the Indian Government made representation to the Government of Sri Lanka regarding the violence against Tamils during the ethnic riots. In the period 1977-1983, the power and influence of the Tamil militant groups increased very rapidly. This is reflected in the Jaffna Municipal elections held in 19 May 1983. The LTTE was able to implement a boycott of the elections successfully and the turn-out of the Jaffna polls was only 14.5 percent. The 1983 July riots created a very strong protest in Tamil Nadu in the form of bandhs and demonstrations. The delegation from Tamil Nadu made representation to Prime Minister Indira Ghandi on this situation and she assured the delegation that New Delhi “was dealing with the Tamil question in Sri Lanka as a national issue affecting the whole country, not merely as a problem concerning Tamil Nadu alone”. Just two days after the outbreak of riots, Prime Minister Indira Ghandi contacted President Jayewardene by telephone to discuss the Sri Lankan situation. As K.M.de Silva reveals, ‘The upshot of that fateful conversation was that Jayewardene found it necessary to invite Mrs. Ghandi to send an official representative to observe the situation in the island on the spot and report back to her”. When V.P Narasinghe Rao, a senior Cabinet Minister, visited Sri Lanka as a special envoy of the Indian Prime Minister on 29 July, parts of Colombo was still burning.

After July 1983, India entered swiftly as a self-appointed mediator and Indira Ghandi selected G. Parathasarathy as the mediator. The declared mission of G. Parathasarathy was to create an atmosphere for a negotiated settlement and act as intermediary between the Government and the Tamil political parties to formulate new proposals for devolution. As Godfrey Gunatilleke traced, at this point there were four inter-related but separate components to the negotiating process. “(1) the negotiation between the government of India and the government of Sri Lanka, (2) the talks between the Indian government and the Tamil Parties (3) the consultation in the conferences of the Sri Lankan political parties, and (4) the negotiation between the Tamil parties and the Sri Lankan government”. The first layer negotiations continued from August to November and the both parties able to agree on an acceptable plan, based on regional councils. This plan was became known as annexure ‘C’

In January, President Jayewardene convened the all-Party conference (APC) to discuss the proposals that came out from the first layer of negotiations. The polarization was very clear. The TULF and Tamil parties firmly stick to ‘regional councils and no less’ while the Sinhala political parties to ‘district councils no more’. Jayewardene’s vacillation and naivety was demonstrated very clearly at the APC and he did not come forward to defend the Annexure – C that he jointly fathered. Lacking his strong support, Annexure “C’ was made impotent”. The deadlock over the two positions made Jayewardene to suspend the APC on 30 September 1984.

Meantime, the Government prepared the 10th Amendment Proposals and Draft District and Regional Council Billi. On 21 December the Jayewardene Government decided to terminate the APC and stated that he would meet the TULF in early January to discuss the proposals. At first, the TULF agreed to go alone with the 10th Amendment. Later, Amirthalingam stated that the proposals were totally unacceptable to the Tamils and left Sri Lanka. Thereafter, President Jayewardene announced that he was withdrawing the proposals.

In June 1985, President Jayewardene and Minister Athulathmudali met Prime Minister Rajiv Ghandi for direct discussions the on ethnic issue and reached “an agreement on using India’s good office in finding a solution to the ethnic problem”. This paved the way for the direct dialogue between the Tamil armed groups and the Sri Lankan Government in Thimpu in August 1985. At the discussions at Thimpu, the six Tamil groups enunciated ‘four principles’ from which they would not waver. The Sri Lankan delegation also presented an outline of structure for devolution of power and affirmed that beyond which they could not proceed. In this context, what has happened in Thimpu is well known.

In June 1986 President Jayewardene decided to embark on a new political initiative and convened a round table conference of all political parties (PPC). He declared the Provincial Councils as the basis for devolution of power at the PPC. Both the SLFP did not attend the PPC but Mrs. Bandaranaike agreed to consult to President Jayewardene separately. The negotiations between GOSL and the TULF as well as discussions within the PPC continued for over three months. The basic draft of the Provincial Councils emerged out of these deliberations. As K.M.de Silva ,who had access to the official documents, traced “consisting of 50 pages in all, they included draft constitutional amendments, a draft Provincial Council Bill, schedules setting out ‘Reserved, Concurrent and Provincial Lists’, as well as detailed memoranda dealing with law and order, land and land settlement and education”. President Jayewardene and Prime Minister met at the Bangalore Summit of SAARC in November 1986 and further discussed the proposals known as ‘19 December Proposals’. It was really an incorporation of the agreements reached at the Bangalore summit into the Draft Provincial Council Bill of the PPC. The main issue remained unsettled was the merger of the Northern and the Eastern Provinces. There were many proposals in this regard but no agreement was reached.

The situation began to change rapidly from January 1987. Prabakaran who was operating in Tamil Nadu till now, slipped into Jaffna, in January anticipating the Indian pressure. The LTTE leader’s arrival marked a new phase in the armed action. In response to the increased pace of the LTTE armed activities, the Sri Lankan government imposed economic and communication blockade on the Jaffna peninsula. In March 1987, Rajiv Ghandi sent his personal envoy, Dinesh Singh to Colombo to convey India’s grave concern about the situation in Jaffna. In response to the Indian concern, Colombo declared an unilateral ceasefire for 10 days in April. However, after a bomb explosion in Colombo, which claimed over 200 deaths, the government decided to commence military offence in the North once again and Vadamarachchi offensive came in this context.

It is true that the Indian démarche was the immediate factor that cleared the way for the Provincial Councils in 1987. Even a cursory look at the political genealogy of the concept of Provincial Councils would clearly endorse that it was not simply a parasitic organ. It has been in the political discourse since independence in various forms. The vacillation and failure to take correct stand at the correct time on the part of Sri Lankan state had given India an opportunity to intervene in Sri Lanka’s internal affairs. By utilising Sri Lanka’s vacillation, India applied coercive diplomacy and violated Sri Lankan air space, entered into the Sri Lanka’s decision making orbit and attained its geo-strategic objectives, which was manifested in the Annexure to the Indo-Sri Lanka Peace accord.

It must be noted that at the outset the Provincial Councils have to carry a certificate of illegitimate birth due to the Indian intervention. However, the Indian role was just a midwifery role. The politically and ideologically weak ruling class of Sri Lanka failed to give it a natural birth. Further, the Provincial Councils had to toddle at the beginning on an unceremonious note as both the LTTE in the North and the JVP in the South violently denounced the Provincial Councils. The SLFP boycotted the Provincial Council elections at the beginning. In addition, there were many inherent structural weaknesses. As President J.R. Jayewardene was not yet deviated from the old centralized mind-set, the devolution package under the 13th Amendment was a half-baked product. The other hand took what was offered by one hand to the Provincial Councils. With all these shortcomings, the 13th Amendment was an important step in the evolution of the political discourse of the country. It alleviated the earlier fears that devolution promotes separation. In addition to the structural weaknesses of the 13th Amendment, non-implementation of some provisions and failure of the central government institutions to devolve functions to provincial units hampered the Provincial Council System. The dominant of centralized political culture of the country has negated the true potentials of the Provincial Council system as another tier of democratic governance. Some of the political criticisms levelled against the provincial council are equally applicable to the central government too. All these shortcomings are not reasons for the abolition of the Provincial Council system. Such a move would create more complicated political problems and their repercussions would be grave. What is necessary at this point is to go forward and address the shortcoming of Provincial Councils to make them true units of devolution of power to the people in the regions. (Concluded)



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Relief without recovery

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A US airstrike on an Iranian oil storage facility

The escalating conflict in the Middle East is of such magnitude, with loss of life, destruction of cities, and global energy shortages, that it is diverting attention worldwide and in Sri Lanka, from other serious problems. Barely four months ago Sri Lanka experienced a cyclone of epic proportions that caused torrential rains, accompanied by floods and landslides. The immediate displacement exceeded one million people, though the number of deaths was about 640, with around 200 others reported missing. The visual images of entire towns and villages being inundated, with some swept away by floodwaters, evoked an overwhelming humanitarian response from the general population.

When the crisis of displacement was at its height there was a concerted public response. People set up emergency kitchens and volunteer clean up teams fanned out to make flooded homes inhabitable again. Religious institutions, civil society organisations and local communities worked together to assist the displaced. For a brief period the country witnessed a powerful demonstration of social solidarity. The scale of the devastation prompted the government to offer generous aid packages. These included assistance for the rebuilding of damaged houses, support for building new houses, grants for clean up operations and rent payments to displaced families. Welfare centres were also set up for those unable to find temporary housing.

The government also appointed a Presidential Task Force to lead post-cyclone rebuilding efforts. The mandate of the Task Force is to coordinate post-disaster response mechanisms, streamline institutional efforts and ensure the effective implementation of rebuilding programmes in the aftermath of the cyclone. The body comprises a high-level team, led by the Prime Minister, and including cabinet ministers, deputy ministers, provincial-level officials, senior public servants, representing key state institutions, and civil society representatives. It was envisaged that the Task Force would function as the central coordinating authority, working with government agencies and other stakeholders to accelerate recovery initiatives and restore essential services in affected regions.

Demotivated Service

However, four months later a visit to one of the worst of the cyclone affected areas to meet with affected families from five villages revealed that they remained stranded and in a state of limbo. Most of these people had suffered terribly from the cyclone. Some had lost their homes. A few had lost family members. Many had been informed that the land on which they lived had become unsafe and that they would need to relocate. Most of them had received the promised money for clean up and some had received rent payments for two months. However, little had happened beyond this. The longer term process of rebuilding houses, securing land and restoring livelihoods has barely begun. As a result, families who had already endured the trauma of disaster, now face prolonged uncertainty about their future. It seems that once again the promises made by the political leadership has not reached the ground.

A government officer explained that the public service was highly demotivated. According to him, many officials felt that they had too much work piled upon them with too little resources to do much about it. They also believed that they were underpaid for the work they were expected to carry out. In fact, there had even been a call by public officials specially assigned to cyclone relief work to go on strike due to complaints about their conditions of work. This government official appreciated the government leadership’s commitment to non corruption. But he noted the irony that this had also contributed to a demotivation of the public service. This was on the unjustifiable basis that approving and implementing projects more quickly requires an incentive system.

Whether or not this explanation fully captures the situation, it points to an issue that the government needs to address. Disaster recovery requires a proactive public administration. Officials need to reach out to affected communities, provide clear information and help them navigate the complex procedures required to access assistance. At the consultation with cyclone victims this was precisely the concern that people raised. They said that government officers were not proactive in reaching out to them. Many felt they had little engagement with the state and that the government officers did not come to them. This suggests that the government system at the community level could be supported by non-governmental organisations that have the capacity and experience of working with communities at the grassroots.

In situations such as this the government needs to think about ways of motivating public officials to do more rather than less. It needs to identify legitimate incentives that reward initiative and performance. These could include special allowances for those working in disaster affected areas, recognition and promotion for officers who successfully complete relief and reconstruction work, and the provision of additional staff and logistical support so that the workload is manageable. Clear targets and deadlines, with support from the non-governmental sector, can also encourage officials to act more proactively. When government officers feel supported and recognised for the extra effort required, they are more likely to engage actively with affected communities and ensure that assistance reaches those who need it most.

Political Solutions

Under the prevailing circumstances, however, the cyclone victims do not know what to do. The government needs to act on this without further delay. Government policy states that families can receive financial assistance of up to Rs 5 million to build new houses if they have identified the land on which they wish to build. But there is little freehold land available in many of the affected areas. As a result, people cannot show government officials the land they plan to buy and, therefore, cannot access the government’s promised funds. The government needs to address this issue by providing a list of available places for resettlement, both within and outside the area they live in. However, another finding at the meeting was that many cyclone victims whose lands have been declared unsafe do not wish to leave them. Even those who have been told that their land is unstable feel more comfortable remaining where they have lived for many years. Relocating to an unfamiliar area is not an easy decision.

Another problem the victims face is the difficulty of obtaining the documents necessary to receive compensation. Families with missing members cannot prove that their loved ones are no longer alive. Without official confirmation they cannot access property rights or benefits that would normally pass to surviving family members. These are problems that Sri Lanka has faced before in the context of the three decade long internal war. It has set up new legal mechanisms such as the provision of certificates of absence validated by the Office on Missing Persons (OMP) in place of death certificates when individuals remain missing for long periods. The government also needs to be sensitive to the fact that people who are farmers cannot be settled anywhere. Farming is not possible in every location. Access to suitable land and water is essential if farmers are to rebuild their livelihoods. Relocation programmes that fail to take these realities into account risk creating new psychological and economic hardships.

The message from the consultation with cyclone victims is that the government needs to talk more and engage more directly with affected communities. At the same time the political leadership at the highest levels need to resolve the problems that government officers on the ground cannot solve. Issues relating to land availability, legal documentation and livelihood restoration require policy decisions at higher levels. The challenge to the government to address these issues in the context of the Iran war and possible global catastrophe will require a special commitment. Demonstrating that Sri Lanka is a society that considers the wellbeing of all its citizens to be a priority will require not only financial assistance but also a motivated public service and proactive political leadership that reaches out to those still waiting to rebuild their lives.

 

by Jehan Perera

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Supporting Victims: The missing link in combating ragging

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A recent panel discussion at the University of Peradeniya examined the implications of the Supreme Court’s judgement on ragging, in which the Court recognised that preventing ragging requires not only criminal penalties imposed after an incident occurs but also systems and processes within universities that enable victims to speak up and receive support. Bringing together perspectives from law, university administration, psychology and students, the discussion sought to understand why ragging continues to persist in Sri Lankan universities despite the existence of legal prohibitions. While the discussion covered legal and institutional dimensions, one theme emerged clearly: addressing ragging requires more than laws and disciplinary rules. It requires institutions that are capable of supporting victims.

Sri Lanka enacted the Prohibition of Ragging and Other Forms of Violence in Educational Institutions Act No. 20 of 1998 following several tragic incidents in universities, during the 1990s. Among the most widely remembered is the death of engineering student S. Varapragash at the University of Peradeniya in 1997. Incidents such as this shocked the country and revealed the consequences of allowing violent forms of student hierarchy to persist. The 1998 Act marked an important legal intervention by recognising ragging as a criminal offence. The law introduced severe penalties for individuals found guilty of engaging in ragging or other forms of violence in educational institutions, including fines and imprisonment.

Despite the existence of this law for nearly three decades, prosecutions under the Act have been extremely rare. Incidents continue to surface across universities although most are not reported. The incidents that do reach university administrations are dealt with internally through disciplinary procedures rather than through the criminal justice system. This suggests that the problem does not lie solely in the absence of legal provisions but also in the ability of victims to come forward and pursue complaints.

The tragic reminders; the cases of Varapragash and Pasindu Hirushan

Varapragash, a first-year engineering student at the University of Peradeniya, was forced by senior students to perform extreme physical exercises as part of ragging, resulting in severe internal injuries and acute renal failure that ultimately led to his death. In 2022, the courts upheld the conviction of one of the perpetrators for abduction and murder. The case illustrates not only the brutality of ragging but also how long and difficult the path to justice can be for victims and their families. Even when victims speak about their experiences, they may not always disclose the full extent of what they have endured. In the case of Varapragash, the judgement records that the victim told his father that he was asked to do dips and sit-ups. Varapragash’s father had testified that it appeared his son was not revealing the exact details of what he had to endure due to shame.

More than two decades after the death of Varapragash, the tragedy of ragging continues. The 2025 Supreme Court judgement arose from the case of Pasindu Hirushan, a 21-year-old student of the University of Sri Jayewardenepura, who sustained devastating head injuries at a fresher’s party, in March 2020, after a tyre sent down the stairs by senior students struck him. He became immobile, was placed on life support, and returned home only months later. If the Varapragash case exposed the deadly consequences of ragging in the 1990s, the Pasindu Hirushan case demonstrates that universities are still failing to prevent serious violence, decades after the enactment of the 1998 Act. It was against this background of continuing institutional failure that the Supreme Court issued its Orders of Court in 2025. Among the key mechanisms emphasised by the judgement is the establishment of Victim Support Committees within universities.

Why do victims need support?

Ragging in universities can take many forms, including verbal humiliation, physical abuse, emotional intimidation and, in some instances, sexual harassment. While all forms of ragging can have serious consequences, incidents involving sexual harassment often present additional barriers for victims who wish to come forward. Victims may hesitate to complain due to weak institutional mechanisms, fear of retaliation, or uncertainty about whether their experiences will be taken seriously. In many cases, those who speak out are confronted with questions that shift attention away from the alleged misconduct and onto their own behaviour: why did s/he continue the conversation?; why did s/he not simply disengage, if the harassment occurred as claimed?; why did s/he remain in the environment?; or did his/her actions somehow encourage the accused’s behaviour? Such responses illustrate how easily victims can be subjected to a second layer of scrutiny when they attempt to report incidents. When individuals anticipate disbelief, minimisation or blame, silence may appear safer than disclosure. In such circumstances, the presence of a trusted institutional body, capable of providing guidance, protection and support, become critically important, highlighting the need for effective Victim Support Committees within universities.

What Victim Support Committees must do

As expected by the Supreme Court, an effective Victim Support Committee should function as a trusted institutional mechanism that places the safety and dignity of victims at the centre of its work. The committee must provide a safe and confidential point of contact through which victims can report incidents of ragging without fear of intimidation or retaliation. It should assist victims in understanding and pursuing available complaint procedures, while also ensuring their immediate protection where there is a risk of continued harassment. Recognising the psychological harm ragging may cause, the committee should facilitate access to counselling and emotional support services. At a practical level, it should also help victims document incidents, record statements, and preserve evidence that may be necessary for disciplinary or legal proceedings. The committee must coordinate with university authorities to ensure that complaints are addressed promptly and responsibly, while maintaining strict confidentiality to protect the identity and well-being of those who come forward. Beyond responding to individual cases, Victim Support Committees should also contribute to broader awareness and prevention efforts, within universities, helping to create an environment where ragging is actively discouraged and students feel safe to report incidents. Without such support, the process of pursuing justice can become overwhelming for individuals who are already dealing with the emotional impact of abuse.

Making Victim Support Committees work

According to the Orders of Court, these committees should include representatives from the academic and non-academic staff, a qualified counsellor and/or clinical psychologist, an independent person, from outside the institution, with experience in law enforcement, health, or social services, and not more than three final-year students, with unblemished academic and disciplinary records, appointed for fixed terms. Further, universities must ensure that committees consist of individuals who possess both expertise and genuine commitment in areas such as student welfare, psychology, gender studies, human rights and law enforcement, in line with the spirit of the Supreme Court’s directions, rather than consisting largely of ex officio positions. If treated as routine administrative positions, rather than responsibilities requiring specialised knowledge, sensitivity and empathy, these committees risk becoming symbolic rather than functional.

Greater transparency in the appointment process could strengthen the credibility of these committees. Universities could invite expressions of interest from individuals with relevant expertise and demonstrated commitment to supporting victims. Such an approach would help ensure that the committees benefit from the knowledge and dedication of those best equipped to fulfil this role.

The Supreme Court judgement also introduces an important safeguard by giving the University Grants Commission (UGC) the authority to appoint members to university-level Victim Support Committees. If exercised with integrity, this provision could help ensure that these committees operate with greater independence. It may also help address a challenge that sometimes arises within institutions, where individuals, with relevant expertise, or strong commitment to addressing issues, such as violence, harassment or student welfare, may not always be included in institutional mechanisms due to internal administrative preferences. External oversight by the UGC could, therefore, create opportunities for such individuals to contribute meaningfully to Victim Support Committees and strengthen their effectiveness.

Ultimately, the success of the recent judgement will depend not only on the directives it issued, the number of committees universities establish, or the number of meetings they convene, or other box-checking exercises, but on how sincerely those directives are implemented and the trust these committees inspire among students and staff. Laws can prohibit ragging, but they cannot by themselves create environments in which victims feel safe to speak. That responsibility lies with institutions. When universities create systems that listen to victims, support them and treat their experiences with seriousness, universities will become places where dignity and learning can coexist.

(Udari Abeyasinghe is attached to the Department of Oral Pathology at the University of Peradeniya)

Kuppi is a politics and pedagogy happening on the margins of the lecture hall that parodies, subverts, and simultaneously reaffirms social hierarchies.

by Udari Abeyasinghe

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Big scene … in the Seychelles

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Mirage: Off to the Seychelles for fifth time

Several of our artistes do venture out on foreign assignments but, I’m told, most of their performances are mainly for the Sri Lankans based abroad.

However, the group Mirage is doing it differently and they are now in great demand in the Seychelles.

Guests patronising the Lo Brizan pub/restaurant, Niva Labriz Resort, in the Seychelles, is made up of a wide variety of nationalities, including Russians, Chinese, French and Germans, and they all enjoy the music dished out by Mirage, and that is precisely why they are off to the Seychelles … for the fifth time!

The band is scheduled to leave this month and will be back after three weeks, but their journey to the Seychelles will continue, with two more assignments lined up for 2026.

In August it’s a four-week contract, and in December another four-week contract that will take in the festive celebrations … Christmas and the New Year.

Donald’s birthday
celebrations

According to reports coming my way, it is a happening scene at the Lo Brizan pub/restaurant, Niva Labriz Resort, whenever Mirage is featured, and the band has even adjusted its repertoire to include local and African songs.

They work three hours per day and six days per week at the Lo Brizan pub/restaurant.

Donald Pieries:
Leader, vocalist,
drummer

Led by vocalist and drummer Donald Pieries, many say it is his

musical talents and leadership that have contributed to the band’s success.

Donald, who celebrated his birthday on 07 March, at the Irish Pub, has been with the group through various lineup changes and is known for his strong vocals.

He leads a very talented and versatile line up, with Sudham (bass/vocals), Gayan (lead guitar/vocals), Danu (female vocalist) and Toosha (keyboards/vocals).

Mirage performs regularly at venues like the Irish Pub in Colombo and also at Food Harbour, Port City.

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