Midweek Review
Foreign Exchange Crisis
By Dr. C. S. Weeraratna
csweera@sltnet.lk Sri Lanka is facing a deepening financial crisis. According to media reports there is a short supply of essential items such as fuel, medicine and gas for domestic use attributed to the foreign exchange (FE) crisis. Dhammika Perera (DP) has proposed a seven-pronged strategy to overcome Sri Lanka’s foreign exchange crisis (The Island 30 January).
One of the strategies suggested by DP is that the government build a university town consisting of five universities within 30 minutes from the Bandaranaike International Airport at Katunayake, to accommodate 150,000 students (30,000 at each university). This is an excellent idea but it will cost the government at least Rs10 billion at the rate of Rs 2 billion per university. Once the universities are built, it will be necessary to get qualified academic staff and suitable accommodation. Further it will take a couple of years to build the five universities. Some need to have laboratories and equipping these adequately is expensive, time consuming and requires a substantial amount of FE. It is a long-term project. Currently, there are 17 universities located in different parts of the country. Perhaps, it may be more realistic if five selected universities already functioning are developed to meet the required standards. Instead of having all the five selected universities in Katunayaka it would be desirable if there is at least one in the north and another one in the east so that those in these regions are also benefited.
Another strategy proposed by DP is to build two hospitals like Singapore’s Mount Elizabeth with internationally recognised facilities. As in the case of establishing new universities, building two such hospitals will take a long time, perhaps two to three years and will require a great deal of foreign exchange. Developing some existing hospitals to meet the stipulated standards may be a realistic alternative.
The total extent under coconut cultivation in Sri Lanka is around 400,000 ha and about 325,000 ha are small holdings. The annual production of coconut has been fluctuating around 3,000 million nuts, (approximately 6000 nuts per hectare). As suggested by DP, developing the coconut industry by planting 1.5 million nuts annually is very timely. At the same time the state of the existing coconut plantations should be looked into. If the production of the existing coconut lands is increased by 1000 nuts per hectare per year through better management and applying organic and inorganic fertilisers, the total production can be increased substantially within a year which will increase the export income from coconut.
One of the main strategies to solve the current FE crisis would be to increase export earnings and reduce expenditure on imports. Most of the activities involved are short term while the others are medium or long term.
Increase export earnings
The dire need to increase our export earnings to meet the severe financial crisis we are facing today has been emphasised by many. Increasing exports is of paramount importance to improve the present FE situation. A major source of FE is the plantation sector. Around 800,000 ha are cultivated with plantation crops tea, rubber and coconut and this sector, in the last few years, earned nearly Rs. 360 billion annually. However, as indicated in table 1, these major export crops do not show a substantial increase in production during the last five years and the contribution from this sector has remained at nearly 20 percent of the export income. Consequently, strategies need to be implemented to increase production and thereby, FE earnings from this sector. There are many state sector organisations to implement such strategies.
As shown in Table 1 tea production has been fluctuating around 300 million kg per year during the last five years, in spite of several institutions assigned to the tea sector. The average tea yields are considerably lower than the potential yields. It has been reported that some of the cultivars developed by the Tea Research Institute of Sri Lanka had been yielding around 8,000 kg per hectare in South India under commercial conditions but the average tea yield in Sri Lanka is much lower. In the smallholder tea sector the average yield is around 1800 kg per hectare and in the estate sector it is about 1200 kg per hectare. In 2020 tea earned Rs. 230 billion in FE. Better management practices in the short term would increase the quantity and quality of the tea produced making it possible to increase FE earnings substantially from the current Rs. 230 billion.
Rubber is another important export crop. In 2017 it earned nearly Rs. 6 billion in foreign exchange but has decreased during the following three years. Based on Central Bank annual reports, the total Rubber production in 2010 was 152.9 million kg and by 2019 it had plummeted to 74.8 million kg. The corresponding average yields are 1561 kg per hectare and 665 kg per hectare respectively. These figures indicate that the Sri Lankan rubber sector is ailing in spite of several institutions assigned to promote rubber production in the country. With the current higher rubber prices it would be possible to earn more FE by increasing rubber production through better management practices which would produce results in the short term. In the last few years the rubber sector was affected by many factors, one of which is ineffective management.
Coconut production too has declined during the last five years as shown in Table 1. This appalling situation in the plantation sector can be attributed to many factors. If the productivity of this sector is raised, by implementing better management practices it would be possible to increase foreign exchange earnings. Most of these practices would produce results in the short term.
A large number of crops, other than tea, rubber and coconut, cultivated in Sri Lanka have high potential as export crops. There are 24 agro ecological zones, each characterised by a specific climate and soil. This makes possible the cultivation of different types of crops such as spice crops, tuberous crops, horticultural (fruit crops) and floricultural crops and medicinal herbs.
Sri Lanka is famous for spices. The most sought after spice crops are cinnamon, pepper, cloves, cardamoms, nutmeg, mace and vanilla which grow in abundance mainly in the wet and intermediate zone. In 2020 the county earned nearly Rs.60 billion by exporting spice crops.
Cinnamon is the most important spice commodity in the spice sector. In 2019, it earned around Rs. 32 billion in FE. The production of cinnamon has been fluctuating around 20,000 tonnes per year during the last few years. Sri Lanka received its first ever Geographical Indication (GI) certification when the European Union (EU) Commission on 2 February, 2022 granted GI status to Ceylon Cinnamon. This would increase the demand for Sri Lanka cinnamon.
Pepper is the second most important commodity among spices. It is grown in the wet and intermediate zones mostly as a mixed crop. The Sri Lankan Pepper has a higher piperine content which gives it a superior quality and pungency. Annual production of pepper too has remained stagnant at around 20,000 kg.
Other spices such as cloves, cardamom, nutmeg and mace have the potential to earn a substantial amount of FE. With the increase of international demand for natural products, and the government’s focus on enhancing and diversifying its value added range, spices and essential oils extracted from these crops will continue to earn more FE.
Dehydrated food is another agricultural product which has the potential to earn much needed FE. During some months there is a glut of fruits and exporting dehydrated or canned fruits would bring in an appreciable amount of FE.
In any programme or plan to increase foreign exchange earnings from the agriculture sector, agro-industries have to be given much emphasis. A large number of crops cultivated in Sri Lanka have considerable potential in various agro-industries. However only rubber, coconut and a few fruit crops are used in industries. Crops such as cassava, horticultural and floricultural crops, medicinal herbs, cane, bamboo, sunflower, castor and ayurvedic herbs have a considerable industrial or export potential but are not cultivated to any appreciable extent. Development of agro-industries will also increase export income and will have a tremendous impact on the economy of the country and also provide employment opportunities to rural people. The private sector can get involved in such projects for which appropriate technical assistance needs to be provided by the relevant public organisations.
Decrease expenditure on imports
While implementing strategies to increase our FE income by promoting exports, action also needs to be taken to decrease our expenditure on imports. During the period between 2017 and 2020 annual expenditure on importing food has been around Rs. 320 billion. The current expenditure on food imports is likely to be even higher due to the depreciation of the SL rupee, and shortage of rice and other food crops, the result of banning import of agrochemicals.
One of the problems the country is facing is the fuel crisis, which is likely to have extremely undesirable repercussions. A large sum of money is spent on importing petroleum to Sri Lanka. In 2020 we have imported fuel worth Rs 540 billion. If we are going to consume petroleum products at the current rate, at least an additional Rs. 50 billion will have to be spent in 2022. Consequently, it is essential to reduce petrol and diesel consumption. In many other countries such as China, Thailand and Singapore, action has already been taken to reduce fuel or power consumption and cut down wastage. If we reduce our power consumption by 10 percent, it will result in a saving of Rs 60 billion in foreign exchange.
Studies conducted in many countries have found that ethanol is a viable alternative for petrol. Many countries are either producing or using ethanol in large quantities or are providing incentives to expand ethanol production and use. Prompted by the increase in oil prices in the 1970s, Brazil introduced a program to produce ethanol for use in automobiles to reduce oil imports. Brazilian ethanol is made mainly from sugar cane. Among other countries using ethanol as a bio fuel are Australia, France, India, Sweden, USA and South Africa. Use of ethanol tends to reduce environmental pollution caused by compounds such as tetraethyl lead, used in petrol. Ethanol can be made from high starch containing crops such as manioc and maize, or high sugar containing crops such as sugarcane. These crops are cultivated in Sri Lanka. Around 10 million litres of alcohol are produced annually at Pelwatta and Sevanagala sugar factories. These can be mixed with petrol to be used at least in three wheelers so that those who use them need not pay higher fares. A few years ago former Science and Technology Minister Dr. Thissa Witharana appointed a committee to look into the possibility of using substitutes for fuel. The committee recommended the use of ethyl alcohol and Jatropha oil as bio-fuels. No follow-up action was taken by the subsequent governments to promote these alternatives as biofuels. Oil from Jatropha (Weta Erandu), a crop that can be grown widely in the Dry Zone of Sri lanka, can be used as a biofuel.
Dendro power can be generated using fast growing nitrogen fixing trees such as gliricidia and Leucaena. These crops can be used not only to generate electricity but are also a good source of animal feed and fertilisers. It may be more beneficial to grow these crops in eroded tea lands where the yields are relatively low. Soil erosion in such tea lands can also be reduced by growing these crops. The Bio Energy Association of Sri Lanka has been instrumental in promoting cultivation of gliricidia.
Sri Lanka, a country begging for dollar loans to import medicine and fuel, which are critical, need to have flexible export and import policies. As indicated above, there are 24 agro ecological zones, each characterised by a specific climate and soil. This makes possible the cultivation of different types of crops. Most of the food imported can be locally produced, thereby reducing expenditure on food imports. A closer look at the imports indicate that around Rs. 50 billion (nearly 16 percent of food imports) in FE is spent on importing sugar, most of which can be locally produced. The total annual requirement of sugar in the country is around 620,000 tonnes, but only about 50,000 tonnes are produced locally. Sugarcane has a considerable potential to reduce food import expenditure. Sugar production in the country has not increased by any appreciable amount during the present decade. The Kantale sugar factory remains closed while a plan to cultivate sugarcane in Bibile remains shelved. Jaggery made from kitul, and sugarcane are good substitutes for sugar manufactured from sugarcane.
A substantial amount of foreign exchange is spent on importing milk. In 2020 Rs. 60 billion in FE was spent on importing milk and dairy products. We have around 1 million mostly indigenous cattle. Their productivity is low (one to three litres per day) mainly due to the poor nature of the breeds and inadequate low quality feed supply. The dairy industry has the potential to contribute considerably to solve Sri Lanka’s FE crisis. Milk production can be increased by increasing availability of cattle feed and thereby an appreciable amount of foreign exchange spent on milk imports can be reduced. Milk production also plays an important role in alleviating malnutrition and offers many employment opportunities. If milk production can be increased, an appreciable amount of foreign exchange spent on milk imports can be reduced, while also improving the nutritional status of the people.
Expenditure on subsidiary food crops such as chillies, green gram, ground nut and potato is few billions of rupees. The extent under these crops and their average per hectare yields have not increased by any appreciable amount during the last decade. A few years ago, a former Minister of Agricultural Development, Chamal Rajapaksa appointed an Advisory Panel to make proposals to develop the agricultural sector so that there is a quantitative and qualitative increase in crop production at a lower cost with no damage to the environment. The recommendations of the panel were mainly on the development and use of better varieties of seeds and planting material; effective control of weeds, insect pests and diseases; better water management, and water conservation; proper use of inorganic and organic fertilisers; control of soil degradation and appropriate land use; promotion of agro-industries and carrying out relevant agricultural research and use of their findings. During the last few years numerous programmes such as AMA, ‘Waga Sangramaya’ and ‘Govi Sevana’ were implemented. All these activities and programmes, appear to have not made any appreciable positive impact on the agricultural sector of the country, indicated by increasing expenditure on food.
In addition to sugar, milk and rice, we spend a colossal sum on importing food items which can be locally produced. Among these are lentils (Rs. 20 billion), onions (Rs 16 billion), maize (Rs. 10 billion), fruits and vegetables and spices, mainly chillies. Even herbs such as katuwelbatu and Thippili, which can be produced locally and used in ayurvedic drugs, are imported at a cost of nearly six million US dollars every year. Most of these crops can be cultivated in the dry zone, where only about two million acres are in productive use out of the 4.5 million ha. Non-availability of adequate rainfall during the Yala season is one of the limiting factors of crop production in the dry zone. However, better water management practices and rainwater harvesting would resolve this limitation.
Although hundreds of research projects related to plantation and food crops are carried out by the faculties of agriculture and Department of Agriculture there appears to be very little liaison or interaction between the relevant institutions, to utilise the research findings in our efforts to increase productivity in the agriculture sector, which will result in saving an appreciable amount of FE.
Midweek Review
Staying relevant in a changing media landscape
The sinking of an Iranian frigate in India’s backyard, closer to Sri Lanka’s southern coast, in early March this year, a few days after the eruption of war after the unprovoked Israeli-US attack on Iran, posed quite a significant challenge for India and Sri Lanka. They grappled with the escalating situation. No one wanted to blame the US for the death of over 100 unarmed Iranian Navy personnel.
By Shamindra Ferdinando
Reference was made at the Media Fest 2026 to the false claim regarding the resignation of Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe at the height of protests in Colombo, in July, 2022, to highlight the failure on the part of the non-traditional media to report the developing situation accurately.
The fictitious claim received the attention during the second session of Media Fest 2026, organised by the Sri Lanka-India Media Friendship Association (SLIMFA) on 11 July, 2026, at the Taj Samudra. The panel consisted of Ashok Malik, Nisthar Cassim (President, SLIMFA), Vimukthi Karunarathne, Jamila Hussain and Robert Anthony. It was moderated by Kalani Kumarasinghe.
The panel paid attention to the challenge the traditional media, particularly the print, faced in covering the well-orchestrated campaign, especially with foreign inputs to oust President Gotabaya Rajapaksa. Essentially, the finger was pointed at the non-traditional media for being inaccurate, hasty and irresponsible. Reference was also made to the recent Negombo Prison riot, that claimed the lives of 31, to stress the importance of the traditional media as the preferred or truthful news provider.
The stimulating discussion took place after Malik, the former policy advisor/additional secretary in the Ministry of External Affairs of India, dealt with holistic media strategy. Malik, who had been a frequent visitor to Colombo over the years, had served the Ministry of External Affairs during the violent crisis in Colombo. Malik had been with the Ministry from October 2019 to August 2022, the month Wickremesinghe received the parliamentary backing to succeed forcefully ousted Gotabaya Rajapaksa through extra parliamentary means.
The SLIMFA was inaugurated in May 2024 under the patronage of the Indian High Commission. The first ever Media Fest was held also at the Taj Samudra over a period of two days, in April, 2025. Indian High Commissioner in Colombo, Santosh Jha, was present throughout the programme held on 11 July. This year’s focus was on the theme ‘Staying Relevant in a Changing World.’
The two other sessions were addressed by Editor Asian News International, Ms. Smita Prakash, and Managing Editor, India Today Ms Marya Shakil. They dealt with trust, truth and the battle for credibility and the shifting of the audience, respectively. Their perspectives facilitated an exciting dialogue with the panelists and members of the audience making useful contributions.
Passing reference was made to the West Asia conflict that disrupted global energy markets in March, following the unprovoked Israeli-US attack on Iran, as well as the conclusion of Sri Lanka’s successful war against separatist terrorist, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), in May, 2009. Prakash found fault with the Western media coverage of India while Indika Sakalasooriya, Communications Manager at SLYCAN Trust, emphasised that in spite of accusations directed at others, there had been occasions traditional media, too, could be faulted for deceiving the world.
Sakalasooriya cited the high profile accusations directed at Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, by the Western media, regarding their purported Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) project to justify the March 2003 invasion of that country. The US-led coalition caused massive destruction. The Western powers hanged Hussein after what amounted to a kangaroo court trial.
It would have been better if Sakalasooriya mentioned how the US propagated lies to build a case against Iraq, particularly against the backdrop of false accusations that have surfaced directed at Iran to justify the Febuary 28, 2026, unprovoked attack on that nation with a proud history.
In a speech in Cincinnati, Ohio, on 7 October, 2002, US President George W. Bush confidently declared that Iraq “possesses and produces chemical and biological weapons. It is seeking nuclear weapons.”
The US President then vowed that Hussein had to be stopped. “The Iraqi dictator must not be permitted to threaten America and the world with horrible poisons and diseases and gases and atomic weapons,” international news agencies quoted President Bush as having said.
The truth is that the mainstream media, whatever the accusations directed at social media platforms now, then played ball with respective governments in support of their narrow political-military-economic objectives as always. The British and US media, however much they publicly proclaim to be independent, then blindly propagated the lie that Iraq posed an immediate threat to them and, therefore, had to be dealt with.
Perhaps none of those in the relevant panel moderated, by Chief Executive Officer of Advocata Institute, Dhananath Fernando, remembered how Ranil Wickremesinghe, in his capacity as Prime Minister, justified the US invasion. Addressing the UN General Assembly in September, 2003, well over a year after the US failure to find evidence of the WMD project, Wickremesinghe described the US as a reluctant ‘world policeman’ forced to intervene in Iraq due to the failure on the part of the US to deal with Iraq.
Reportage of July 2022 events
An intense social media campaign backed the violent protest campaign here against President Gotabaya Rajapaksa. Then US Ambassador Julie Chung issued several statements on Twitter (now X) warning the government and the military against using force to bring protests to an end. Interested parties exploited her interventions to intensify pressure on the government. The situation eventually turned so bad, Chung had to finally warn the public that accounts impersonating her were spreading misinformation and fake tweets. The US Embassy here, on multiple occasions, urged the public to verify information on the official US Embassy and verified X accounts. But during that chaotic period, the public was so drunk on misinformation, weren’t bothered at all regarding the accuracy and the vast majority was not interested in verifying statements.
The reference to false claims about Wickremesinghe’s resignation, during the panel discussion, should have attracted comments and observations for obvious reasons. Both the US and India have been accused of backing the operation that compelled President Gotabaya Rajapaksa to leave office.
President Wickremesinghe, in June, 2024, claimed that pressure was brought on him to resign in the immediate aftermath of protesters setting ablaze his Kollupitiya private residence on 9 July, 2022. The declaration was made at a function in London to mark the 40th anniversary of the International Democrats Union (IDU).
Prof. Sunanda Maddumabandara, who served as the Senior Advisor (Media) to President Ranil Wickremesinghe (July 2022 to September 2024) in late 2025 declared that the then Indian High Commissioner in Colombo, Gopal Baglay, asked Speaker Mahinda Yapa Abeywardena to take over as the interim president. Maddumabandara contradicted previous claims that it was US Ambassador Chung who intervened on behalf of the regime change project. Prof. Maddumabandara’s revelations in “Aragalaye Balaya” (The Power of the Aragalaya) launched in the presence of both Wickremesinghe and Abeywardena didn’t receive the media attention. Interestingly both traditional and non-traditional media conveniently ignored the author’s claim. Abeywardena remained silent though he must have told the author what transpired between him and Baglay, now New Delhi’s High Commissioner in Australia.
Those who constantly targeted Chung over her support to the anti-Gotabaya Rajapaksa campaign turned a blind eye to Prof. Maddumabandara’s shocking disclosure. The author quoted Abeywardena as having revealed that Baglay promised to bring the blockade on the Speaker’s official residence to an immediate end if he agreed to accept the Presidency. But, Wickremesinghe had strenuously refused to step down though, following a meeting chaired by Abeywardena, a section of the media reported that he would resign.
Sri Lanka lacked the political will to inquire into external interventions that led to the fall of President Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s government. Abeywardena, who revealed direct intervention and how intense pressure was brought on him, did absolutely nothing to activate an investigation. Wickremesinghe, who succeeded Gotabaya Rajapaksa in July, 2022, refrained from launching an inquiry. Having fully backed the campaign against Rajapaksa, Wickremesinghe ended up in the President’s Office. Therefore, his decision to keep quiet is understandable.
The Wickremesinghe-Rajapaksa government terminated a case filed by SLPP parliamentarians against the failure on the part of the government to protect their property.
The JVP-led NPP that won both the presidential and unbeatable 2/3 majority at the parliamentary elections, in 2024, simply forgot the case of foreign interventions. Since the change of government in September, 2024, Sri Lanka has entered into new partnerships with India and the US. The public is totally in the dark as to what they are.
The finalisation of seven MoUs between India and Sri Lanka, in April, 2025, and the subsequent sale of controlling stake in the strategic Colombo Dockyard Limited (CDL) to Mazagon Dock Shipbuilders Limited, affiliated with the Indian Defence Ministry, raised the Indo-Lanka relations to a higher level. The inclusion of a MoU on Defence underscored the bilateral relationship, while India stepped-up assistance to the Sri Lankan military. The recent donation of military stores, estimated to be worth USD 5.5 mn in support of the 1,000-plus Lankan contingent for Haiti, deployment under UN command, as authoritative sources confirmed recently, that agreements in their entirety could not be disclosed under any circumstances thereby underscoring India’s status. The reference was clearly aimed at the controversy that the seven MoUs, including the one on defence, hadn’t been revealed to the public, and the Parliament, too, remained in the dark.
India paid USD 52.96 mn for Japan’s Onomichi Dockyard, previously the majority owner of the Colombo Dockyard.
Terrorists/gunmen
Altogether there were three panels moderated by Dilrukshi Handuneththi, Kalani Kumarasinghe and Dhananath Fernando and some of the panelists questioned the way Western media covered major events. One pointed out how the Indian media couldn’t immediately report the assassination of Indian Premier India Gandhi on 31 October, 1984, as they couldn’t do so until the President made an official statement regarding the killing of a sitting PM, whereas the Western media didn’t have such obstacles.
The despicable western media practice of describing terrorists as gunmen and militants were also mentioned. Unfortunately, no one bothered to remind the audience of the India-led terrorist project that destroyed Sri Lanka, caused the deaths of nearly 1,500 Indian soldiers and her son Rajiv Gandhi, former Prime Minister, as well. The writer, at one point, felt the need to remind the gathering of the need to discuss issues in Sri Lanka context.
Ms Smita Prakash, in her thought-provoking address, discussed the challenge the mainstream Indian media faced in reporting ‘Operation Sindoor’ following the terrorist attack on Pahalgam on 22 April, 2025. India directly blamed Pakistan and launched large-scale offensive action on 7 May. The gathering was told that similar challenges were experienced in covering the unprecedented war between Israel-US combine against Iran this year.
When the new West Asia war erupted, India found the situation quite embarrassing, particularly against the backdrop of Prime Minister Narendra Modi visiting Tel Aviv, just days before the attack on Tehran. India remained silent for several days before Foreign Secretary, Vikram Misri, on 5 March, signed the condolence book at the Iranian Embassy, in Delhi, on behalf of the Government of India. Misri offered condolences on the death of the Supreme Leader of Iran, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.
Over a week later India had no option but to get in touch with the Iranian leadership to secure energy supplies amidst turmoil over disruption of services. The Indian media coverage of the West Asia war obviously took into consideration the developing situation at home as the Modi government carefully navigated the crisis situation. Towards the end of the major confrontations before Iran and US agreed on a ceasefire, the US attacked three vessels crewed by Indians in the Hormuz strait.
Both traditional and non-traditional media have to deal with social media platforms where users can post messages, images and videos. US President Donald Trump shared posts on his social media platform Truth Social on a regular basis that made all other media irrelevant. The impact of the US President’s posts made a huge impact during the West Asia war as he continuously bypassed all official channels to go directly to the people. His regular posts caused uncertainty, increased tensions and undermined efforts to deal with the developing situations, sensibly.
Following recent exchanges and Iranian vows to avenge the death of their Supreme leader, President Trump wrote in a post on his Truth Social account:”1,000 missiles are locked and loaded and aimed at the Islamic Republic of Iran, with thousands more to immediately follow, should the Iranian government act on its threat.” He then signed off the post with the phrase “praise be to Allah”, which he also did in a post threatening Iran last April.
Perhaps, SLIMFA-arranged discussions should have paid attention to the impact of social media platforms in the hands of world leaders and governments. All countries (governments), regardless of their size and influence, use social media to advance their agenda. There is no need for breaking news on television channels or news flash in print media as they can directly go to the public.
The unprecedented transformation of the media landscape, in the wake of proliferation of social media with both governments as well as big business at the receiving end, sometimes. Platforms have emerged as central hubs for global news. The reportage of the West Asia war, as well as other developments at global level, proved the advent of social media and the dependence of major news agencies on social media platforms.
The Western media coverage of the Russia-Ukraine war repeatedly exposed their bias. The UK’s BBC declined to visit the site of a Ukrainian drone attack on a student dormitory in Starobelsk in the Lugansk Republic, in May this year. The CNN, too, declared its inability to join the visit arranged by Russia. One need not be an expert to understand their response as the world knows the Ukraine is being used by Western powers for war with Russia, a claim not denied by them.
Drop in voter enthusiasm
Top award-winning journalist Marya Shakil explained the devastating impact of the smartphone on the Indian electorate.
Recalling her coverage of elections in the Uttar Pradesh, in 2017, the two-time recipient of the prestigious Ramnath Goenka Award for Politics and Government asserted that the younger generation, now addicted to smartphones, may not be interested in politics. Shakil based her claim largely on a boy she found aimlessly scrolling near a political rally and covering election in Bihar last year.
Having displaced a range of figures to prove the continuing decline in the traditional media, Shakil engaged the audience in an exciting conversation that underscored the responsibility on the part of the traditional media to address the issues at hand and face challenges. She reiterated that regardless of expansion and massive profits accrued by non-traditional media, including influencers, at the expense of the traditional media, the latter still remained trustworthy.
Shakil’s assertion regarding declining voter interest, as shown by that boy she ran into during Uttar Pradesh polls coverage. must be examined taking into how smartphones can be a destructive tool. During the discussions, references were made to the violent overthrow of governments in Pakistan (April, 2022), Bangladesh (August, 2024) and Nepal (September, 2025) though Sri Lanka (July, 2024) was not mentioned in that particular context. However, Jamila Hussain referred to the challenging task of covering the campaign against President Gotabaya Rajapaksa.
In those externally backed protest operations against democratically elected governments, sections of the media, both traditional (print/electronic) and non-traditional, played significant roles. Sri Lanka is not an exception. President Gotabaya Rajapaksa didn’t realise what was going on until it was too late. If not for the intervention made by the Navy at the 11th hour, the President and the First Lady could have been trapped at the President’s House when protesters took control of it.
It would be pertinent to mention what Indian National Security Advisor (NSA) Ajith Doval said about the overthrow of governments. Speaking at the Sardar Patel Memorial Lecture, in New Delhi, on 31 October, 2025, Doval attributed recent political instability and “non-constitutional regime changes” in neighbouring countries to deficiencies in governance.
Declaring that the quality of governance is the fundamental determinant of political stability, Doval, who held at influential post since 2014, when the BJP formed government, stressed: “The rise and fall of empires, monarchies, oligarchies, aristocracies, or democracies is, in essence, a history of their governance.”
Commenting on political upheavals in the region, Doval declared: “In the recent cases of regime change through non-constitutional methods in Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, and others, these were actually cases of bad governance. And that is how governance matters.” Is it his opinion that it is India’s sole right to decide what is good governance and bad governance in the region?
Doval’s opinion cannot be examined without taking into consideration their partnership with the US as well as joint US-Japan-India-Australia (Quad) response to the Chinese challenge. Years ago, Gotabaya Rajapaksa disclosed how Doval demanded the cancellation of all major Chinese projects here, including the handing over of the Hambantota Port to China on a 99-year-lease and the Colombo Port City project.
Although India failed to disrupt major Chinese projects here, New Delhi has consolidated its position in Sri Lanka. Taking control of the CDL, as well as the inauguration of the Colombo West International Terminal (CWIT), in April, 2025, boosted their position here. The consortium operating the $800 million CWITT includes India’s Adani Ports & SEZ Ltd, John Keels and the Sri Lanka Ports Authority (SLPA).
The irony is that the JVP, once opposed to everything and anything connected to Delhi, has ended up in a cozy relationship with Modi’s India and got close to the US in a manner that no one believed possible a decade ago.
Midweek Review
Remote health monitoring: A practical digital solution for dengue burden
Sri Lanka is once again facing a significant dengue challenge. With rising numbers of suspected and confirmed cases reported across the country, especially during the rainy season, dengue has become not only a public health concern but also a major pressure point for the hospital system. In many affected districts, outpatient departments, emergency treatment units and medical wards are crowded with patients who need assessment, blood investigations and close observation.
Dengue is a disease that can change rapidly. A patient who appears stable in the early days of fever may enter a critical stage within a short period. This is why doctors are cautious, and why many patients are advised to return repeatedly for review. However, in a lower-middle-income country such as Sri Lanka, where public hospitals already function with limited beds, staff shortages and high patient loads, depending only on hospital-based care during an outbreak is not sustainable.
As a specialist in Health Informatics, I believe Sri Lanka needs a practical remote health monitoring system to support dengue care. Such a system can help identify patients who truly need admission, while safely monitoring stable patients at home. This will reduce unnecessary hospital overcrowding and allow hospital resources to be used for patients who are seriously ill.
Not every patient diagnosed with dengue needs immediate admission. Some patients are clinically stable but still require close monitoring, especially during the critical phase of the illness. At present, many such patients are sent home with advice to return if they develop warning symptoms. While this is clinically reasonable, it places a heavy responsibility on families, and danger signs may be missed or recognized late.
A remote monitoring system can close this gap. Once a patient is diagnosed with dengue at a hospital, clinic or laboratory, the patient can be registered into a digital platform. Basic details such as age, day of fever, symptoms, risk factors, etc can be entered. Based on this information, patients can be categorized into low-risk, moderate-risk or high-risk groups according to national clinical guidance.
Patients who are suitable for home care can then be followed up through structured phone calls, SMS, WhatsApp-based forms or a simple mobile application. They or their caregivers can report temperature, pulse, blood pressure if available, vomiting, abdominal pain, dizziness, bleeding symptoms, urine output, fluid intake, and general well-being.
These data can be monitored by a dedicated panel of doctors through a centralized digital dashboard, allowing timely clinical review and appropriate decision-making. Such a system is not intended to replace existing clinical care, but to strengthen the health system by supporting early identification of at-risk patients, improving follow-up, and reducing the unnecessary burden on already crowded hospitals.
Depending on the severity, the patient can be advised to visit the nearest hospital, referred to the area Medical Officer of Health, or connected to an ambulance service. This creates a safer pathway from home to hospital before the condition becomes critical.
The same system can also be used for patients discharged from the hospital. A few days of remote follow-up after discharge can provide reassurance, detect late complications, and reduce unnecessary readmissions.
Sri Lanka already has a strong public health network, including hospitals, MOH offices, public health inspectors and dengue control units. What is needed now is better digital coordination. A low-cost, well-designed remote monitoring system can connect patients, doctors, hospitals and emergency services in a timely manner.
Dengue prevention will always depend on mosquito control, clean environments and community participation. But during an outbreak, timely information can save lives. Remote health monitoring offers Sri Lanka a practical way to protect patients, reduce hospital pressure and deliver the right care at the right time.
by Dr. Harsha Jayakody
Board-certified specialist in Health Informatics
MBBS (Sri Lanka), MBA in Health Admin (Malaysia), MSc in Biomedical Informatics (Sri Lanka), MD in Health Informatics (Sri Lanka)
Midweek Review
The sordid tale of theft and tragedy at Finance Ministry
The latest deplorable revelations in the Committee on Public Finance (COPF) report ‘The Fraud Linked to Cybercrime in the US Dollar 2.5 Million Debt Repayment to Australia’, presented to parliament on July 10th tells a tale of irresponsibility, incompetence and disregard for the most important of tasks that are bestowed on a Ministry that is of paramount importance to a country striving to come out of a serious economic crisis.
Every new crisis adds a burden on the backs of the innocent citizens paying for the sins of those who caused it. This time, as in other times, the crisis was caused by those who sit high above the citizenry, governing the country or running its affairs; by those who perpetrated the fraud deliberately, and no less by those who enabled it through incompetence, inattention and perhaps ignorance.
The incredible ease with which the shameful theft of 2.5 million US Dollars occurred in the Ministry of Finance reveals that this theft was facilitated by a series of lapses by those in charge of its processes, as COPF discovered, and was most certainly avoidable.
Ten fraudulent transactions had been allowed to pass through the precincts of the Finance Ministry and the Central Bank of Sri Lanka, before it was discovered that they were the unwitting pawns in a straightforward cybercrime. Two institutions that ordinary citizens hold in high trust and esteem had their pockets picked in broad daylight.
Transition Errors
This whole unsavoury affair starts with a transition.
In order to better manage foreign debt, the government, “in keeping with international standards”, decided to institute a new unit to take care of all things to do with foreign debt within the Ministry of Finance. It is called the Public Debt Management Office (PMOD). It took away those duties from the Central Bank (CBSL), which handled the tasks earlier.
COPF says that “the fraud linked to cybercrime under consideration happened within this process.” It certainly did.
The process of transition from CBSL to PMOD had holes the size of 2.5 million US dollars. And the irresponsible handling of this transition has so far led to the death of a young bureaucrat, so let’s not treat this casually or lightly. Those who undertook to oversee this process to a successful finish must surely examine their own part in this tragic story.
Non-Actions Have Consequences
The transition took 18 months. November 2024 to March 2026. Long enough to ensure that the CBSL had passed on its processes, training and experience to a new team at the PMOD to a satisfactory standard.
One wouldn’t think that an old and respected institution with what we assume were its tested systems and processes, passing on its expertise to a brand-new unit specifically set up to deal with an important set of tasks, would get it wrong. But it did.
COPF was not happy:
* The Committee found no document that provided a detailed guideline or terms of reference for this complex, multifaceted transition process involving multiple institutions.
* There are no KPIs available to judge whether the transition was completed in an adequate manner.
* Even the guidelines that govern the operations of the PDMO were only published on 19 September 2025, 10 months after the establishment of the office.
* The MoU between the CBSL and PDMO on their areas of collaboration was only signed on 9 March 2026, almost at the end of the official transition period.
It looks like there was inadequate planning from the very start. Every mistake, every slipshod move, every skipping of essential steps in the process, is what the citizen ends up paying for, and even dying for.
The COPF report shows a 4-step CBSL process through which debt repayments transit, from receiving and checking invoices to confirming payment details through to the final payment.
Each is carried out by a separate section.
Each stage is part of an internal controls system, where important checks are carried out to prevent errors and/or fraud.
After the transition to PDMO, there seems to have been a serious lack of internal controls with the checks necessary to prevent fraud.
The COPF specifically faults the PDMO for not securing its IT infrastructure:
* PDMO’s outdated IT system which “left it at complete risk of cyberattacks”.
* Shortfalls in IT infrastructure and cybersecurity measures at the MoF, including the ERD, were highlighted in a comprehensive audit carried out by KPMG…in December 2024.
* Fraud linked to cybercrime in question commenced in mid-November 2025, only a month after the server system stopped receiving Microsoft security updates.
Early Warnings
The COPF report highlights the fact that early in January 2026 a cybersecurity threat was discovered during a debt repayment to be made to the Export-Import (EXIM) Bank of India:
“When CBSL attempted to make payment to the account details provided by the PDMO, with JP Morgan as intermediary, the payment was rejected by JPMorgan’s Global Fraud Prevention Operations team. Contact was made by PDMO officials with an EXIM Bank of India team, allowing the MoF to confirm that fraudulent payment instructions had been provided.”
The details of the attempted fraud are an exact copy of the one that succeeded later with the Australian payment, which failed in the case of India:
“Payment was then made to the correct account, verified through communication with the EXIM Bank of India. This suspicious activity was reported to the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) and SL-CERT on 9th January 2026. The ERD IT Officer’s complaint to SL-CERT mentioned that the suspected fraudulent email address used the domain eximbenkindia.in (while the correct domain appears to be eximbankindia.in).”
This was not the end of it. There was more!
When the cybersecurity threat regarding the Indian payment was reported to the Secretary of the Treasury triggering an investigation by the Director General of the ERD, a veritable treasure trove of fraudulent emails was discovered:
“Payment instructions received via email for several other due payments, including for payments to the United Kingdom (USD 1,294,605.99), Germany (EUR 4,059,987.81) and Belgium (EUR 60,974.88) were further identified as fraudulent.”
What would have happened if not for the JP Morgan team in India? Would these also have gone through, to a thieving scammer? In the event, the report says:
“UK was suspended immediately. Communications initiated by the suspicious party were identified and investigative authorities were alerted. The payment related to Belgium was made to the correct account.”
That’s two saved. What happened to the German payment of Euro 4,059,987.81? Did we pay it to a scammer?
So, it is in the process of verifying these fraudulent payment details that the Ministry of Finance was “alerted on 23rd March 2026 to communications from Export Finance Australia of non-receipt of debt repayments due in previous months.”
The report reproduces the email exchanges on the same set of Australian invoices from 3 different email addresses:
* @exportfinance.gov.au
* @exportfinance-au.com
* @exportfinanceau.com
The communications from these different email accounts were on-going from October 2025, but the fraud was discovered only in March 2026. By then the damage was done. Payments had already been made to the fraudulent account.
This is especially worrying because the COPF report says that after the debt restructure in October 2025, “The MoF officials said in Committee that the existing account details for Export Finance Australia repayments had not been changed in the revised agreement.”
The COPF makes the important observation that the system of internal controls at the MoF are grossly inadequate, citing one example:
“The final payment authorisation within MoF has historically been done by a Director with authority over the Debt Servicing function, at ERD and now PDMO, without any verification process by more senior officials, highlighting weak internal controls.”
The report lists some measures that have been taken by the MoF to prevent any recurrence. However, they add:
“These measures pertain to establishing and strengthening internal controls and ensuring basic cybersecurity within the Ministry of Finance. They should have been in place as a baseline…”
Me Sir? No Sir, Not I Sir!
The views expressed by both the MoF and the CBSL as to who was responsible for these blunders make interesting reading because they reveal more about them than they realize.
COPF says that at the 8th June discussions:
“The Ministry of Finance was of the view that the CBSL should have been more vigilant and taken proactive measures…CBSL was of the view that there was no legal responsibility under the FTRA for its role as banker to the government.”
The practiced passing of the buck between these two institutions is unsavoury, if revealing. Shouldn’t they have carried out an immediate review of their own conduct to discover where each might have failed, individually and together?
The AG has concurred with the CBSL in its view regarding CBSL’s legal responsibility. However, since CBSL had been doing the job until now, had undertaken the training of the new team and transition of the processes, they had a professional responsibility to ensure that adequate systems were in place to mitigate the risks that they, rather than a brand-new team, were far more experienced at identifying.
Isn’t it fair and reasonable to expect that the CBSL would regard it as their responsibility to give adequate training which includes the right internal controls and monitoring, and to see the process through to implementation to their total satisfaction?
As for the MoF, COPF says:
“The MoF was of the view that during the period in which the PDMO officials created the SSIs for the repayments on fraudulent invoices in November 2025, PDD-CBSL officials continued to oversee the process.”
Why did the MoF think they were ready to takeover from the CBSL and run the show, when they admitted to COPF that “PDMO staff did not have a proper understanding of international fund transfer processes and AML concerns, which limited their ability to act upon limited information provided by CBSL staff on such matters.” Shouldn’t they have dealt with this before they went ‘live’, as it were?
It gets even more alarming when the CBSL tells COPF that
* “internal controls within the MoF for payment verification are dysfunctional”
* “CBSL cannot ensure verification through its payments process, acknowledging that even the CBSL PDD would have failed to prevent a fraud linked to cybercrime in such a scenario.”
What were the Ministers doing, while their systems got so dysfunctional that according to CBSL, a fraud couldn’t have been prevented?
What happened in this inadequately conceived and planned transition resulted in more than a substantial financial loss. The MoF suspended 4 officials pending investigations into the fraud. One of those officials, Ranga Rajapaksa, an Assistant Director of the External Resources Department (ERD) was found dead on April 30, 2026, at his residence in Kuliyapitiya. A post-mortem ruled the death a suicide.
[Sanja de Silva Jayatilleka was a member of the team that transitioned GlaxoSmithKline UK’s Financial Services from Britain to India, overseeing the training, testing, final transitioning and post-transition support of the Compliance and Control function.]
by Sanja de Silva Jayatilleka
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