Connect with us

Features

Failure to Launch: Leninism and the NPP Manifesto

Published

on

By Kusum Wijetilleke

Desperation has been a central theme for much of Sri Lanka’s citizenry long before the pandemic. Although it may seem far removed from the present multitude of issues, the Yahapalana/Mahinda Rajapaksa Constitutional crisis of 2018 set in motion a series of events that have contributed significantly to the current tragicomedy of the Sri Lankan State. At the time the ‘Unity’ Government of President Maithripala Sirisena and Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe was struggling along, the economy was in a state of inertia, having recorded a GDP growth of just 3.1 percent in 2017, the lowest in over 15 years. For the sake of balance, there were notable accomplishments under Yahapalanaya that deserve mention: Independent commissions, increased exports to the EU, successive primary account surpluses and 1990 Suwa Seriya, to name a few entries on the credit side. The debit side entries only continued to grow, beginning with the infamous CBSL bond scam and the close association of the then PM to those involved. The public outcry over this major scandal, from a coalition promising ‘good governance’, was only compounded by the Hambantota lease agreement with China Merchants Port company.

Complexities arising from the 19th Amendment, especially regarding the powers of the Executive Presidency and the devolution of powers to the provinces, sparked claims from the Opposition that PM Wickremesinghe was steering Sri Lanka into a future federal state. The Ranilist faction, with hindsight, lost that battle in the court of public opinion. The co-sponsorship of the UNHRC Resolution of 2015 (30/1) and its explicit mention of “foreign judges… and investigators” was another major contributor to tensions that led to the eventual disunity at the heart of Yahapalanaya. The alleged and as yet unconfirmed assassination plot regarding President Sirisena cleared a path that led through the Easter bombing to the current presidency and policy paradigm of Gotabaya Rajapaksa and the Pohottuwa.

Seasons of missed opportunities

The December-January season is critical to the Sri Lankan economy; the boost to local consumption from the season as well as the influx of tourists and remittances represent a windfall that sustains the operations of many businesses for much of the year. In December 2018, there were major disruptions to tourism and hospitality industries arising from travel advisories issued by major tourist origin countries, based on fears of political violence. Sri Lanka’s forex reserves reduced, the Rupee depreciated further and investors sold off treasury bills, all of which contributed to a ratings downgrade and a 3.7 percent drop in industrial activity during that period. The Governments of Japan and the US temporarily froze some $1 billion worth of development aid.

This season of missed opportunity would replay and extend itself in 2019 and beyond. The Yahapalanaya rupture and resulting security failures led to the Easter attacks and ultimately, to an election defined by national security. The context matters; Yahapalanaya, especially with the benefit of hindsight, was clearly an act of desperation. Some three decades of war against a terrorist organisation failed to spawn a meaningful National or ‘Unity’ Government, yet voters were desperate enough to hope that this coalition might be fruitful. The Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s election was also a sign of desperation. The wave of anti-Rajapaksa sentiment that brought in Yahapalanaya dissipated and the public was sold a grand promise of a Lee Kwan Yew-esque administrative juggernaut with fresh ideas, powered by professionals promoted through a meritocracy. These notions seem almost delirious considering what has transpired.

As the President carries on, seemingly unwilling or incapable of making any of the very obvious policy ‘u-turns’ that might help ease the suffering, voters are beginning to feel that familiar tinge of desperation. Against this backdrop, the main Opposition, SJB has been accused of not meeting the moment with requisite energy and fortitude, leading to question marks over its position. There has been a media tilt towards alternatives with the National People’s Power coalition (Jathika Jana Balawegaya) and its leader Anura Kumara Dissanayake (AKD) showing increased energy and organisation.

The JVP-led NPP recently released a manifesto of sorts entitled “Rapid Response to Overcome Current Challenges”; the voting public eagerly anticipated a set of policy alternatives, desperate for some semblance of a strategy to set Sri Lanka on a sustainable path to recovery. AKD’s strength has always been his clear, precise and colourful articulation of the corruption and excesses of government. It might be forgotten to history that the JVP was once a political ‘king-maker’ of sorts, propping up, for example, the UPFA Government of 2004 and the Mahinda Rajapaksa candidacy of 2005. The opening lines of the NPP manifesto alludes to the “misguided economic and social policies pursued by various governments…” of the past, of course this must necessarily include the JVP and many of its present leadership including AKD, who was cabinet minister in the mid-2000s. This argument is also used against the SJB leader Sajith Premadasa due to his seniority in the UNP during its brief periods in power. The crucial difference is that Premadasa, while senior, was certainly outside the UNP establishment of that time, unlike AKD, who was very much a leading figure in the JVP’s support for the UPFA.

Bullet points firing blanks

Political history aside, the NPP must be judged on the merits of its ideas and what proposals it can bring to the table. In discussing the economy, the manifesto makes an immediate critique of the open economic policy of 1977, specifically its “prioritisation of personal gain over social responsibility”. The heading of this section reads “A Thriving economy instead of a Dependent Economy” which then leads to obvious questions.

Given the interdependent and interconnected nature of global economies, given the limited size, scope and production capabilities of Sri Lankan industry and Sri Lanka’s inherent dependence on exports, how does Sri Lanka become self-reliant? Further, if the open economy has been destructive, what form does the alternative take? There are severe efficiency gaps in Sri Lanka’s manufacturing sectors, compounded by strong labour laws and regulations; just some of the reasons the worlds manufacturing conveyor belts are concentrated in specific countries. Does the NPP intend on enhancing manufacturing efficiencies, do they intend on relaxing labour laws, if not how do they intend on reducing the cost of Sri Lankan manufacturing? In fact, the NPP makes the point that “neo-liberalism” has failed to prioritise production and was instead focused on financialisation. This critique fails to realise that Sri Lanka benefits from “neo-liberal” trade policies, in fact Sri Lanka’s exports and consequently its economy depends on open markets and free-trade throughout the world. It must be said that the NPP is hardly alone in making a confused critique of neoliberalism and free trade, yet it points to the fundamental challenge facing the JVP led coalition; the need to balance its Marxist-Leninist roots with the challenge of positioning Sri Lanka in a global market. Turning away from the global market cannot be an option for Sri Lanka.

The Rapid Response Manifesto continues with a section titled “Our Approach” which advocates a “value-added economic approach”, with a number of Bullet points, that once again lacks any specifics with the only clue being to “gradually discourage the importation of goods that can be produced locally”. Here the NPP takes a popular route to production and industry but misses the key factor of cost. There are undoubtedly products that are imported which can be produced locally, the question is at what price. There are reasons why Sri Lankan businesses prefer to import raw materials for the production process rather than source locally and these include: cost, quality and supply chain efficiency.

Any plan to shift production locally must consider these key attributes of production; unfortunately, the NPP manifesto makes no such considerations.

The Bullet points continue with a call to “generate more foreign exchange by joining the global supply chain”. This supply chain is part of the aforementioned and much maligned global open-market and a direct result of globalisation, something the NPP rejects as a precursor to “financialisation”.

In discussing how to tackle Sri Lanka’s rising Government debt, the manifesto further states that more detailed measures will be released in the future with some basic measures being mooted for the time being. These include some sort of punitive action for members of previous administrations, a ‘formal’ five-year plan, working ‘diplomatically’ with creditors for debt restructuring and a mechanism to enhance contributions from migrant workers.

Presidency or Westminster?

These are wasted bullet points given that the country is facing both liquidity and solvency challenges. There is no critique of IMF programmes, no roadmap to restructuring and few plans to increase Government revenue. The very least one might have expected from a coalition with Socialist origins was a broad proposal for income redistribution through an overhaul of the SLPP regime’s tax cuts. As Sri Lanka now has some of this region’s lowest corporate tax rates, it represents an open goal for any political manifesto, one that the NPP seems to have missed completely. Rapid Response, despite the title, does offer some longer-term benchmarks on vital investments on healthcare and education, calling for annual minimum expenditures of five and six percent of GDP respectively.

AKD and the JVP have long been critical of the Executive Presidency; the NPP manifesto reiterates the need for a cabinet accountable to parliament and not to the President. It goes further in calling for the President to be elected by Parliament instead of by the people. This is perhaps where the political rubber meets the road when it comes to Sri Lanka’s unique electoral dynamics. Colombo’s liberal vote base seemed to support similar notions judging by their votes for Yahapalanaya and its purported Westminster model. The Executive Presidency is viewed by the liberal elites as a poisoned chalice, while rural voters in the Sinhala-Buddhist heartland believe this seat and its occupant to be a guarantor against minority rule through globalist proxy.

The NPP gets credit for articulating its position unambiguously; the question remains as to whether the Westminster gambit will be digestible to an electoral base that firmly rejected this parliamentary model in the 2019 election. This brings us back to the aforementioned inertia of the Yahapalanaya regime with its competing power centres and contradictory rhetoric, compounded by an inability to even issue a simple gazette. Sri Lankans will notice that little has changed with the current Pohottuwa administration, Consequently, Executive President or not, the inertia has come full circle.

The NPP’s stance on the Executive Presidency will perhaps force the hand of the main Opposition party in one direction or another. The SJB has political-brand name recognition; few in Colombo perhaps appreciate the strength of the Premadasa name in rural Sri Lanka. On the other hand the SJB also possesses other personalities that have won the trust of the electorate to varying degrees; MPs Harin Fernando, Dr. Harsha De Silva, Eran Wickramaratne and Champika Ranawaka to name a few. These MPs have all carved out their own niches in the wider electorate, consequently, the SJB ‘Team’ might bring its own set of advantages. Whether the core of the SJB believes steadfastly in the Westminster model or whether they utilise the innate ‘brand-name’ might well depend on which election the administration calls first. However, from an ideological standpoint, the SJB must clearly define its path, now that the pretender to the oppositional throne has made its stance clear.

Opportunistic vanguardism

Rapid Response, overall, represents a missed opportunity for the NPP to provide an actual roadmap to economic sustainability and political stability; to be perceived as a real alternative for the electorate. The manifesto seems confused about where it wants to take Sri Lanka’s economy and its people and this is somewhat emblematic of the Marxist-Leninist Communist JVP.

The ideological confusion may seem pedantic but it is hugely informative of why there always seems to be so little convergence of leftist movements and why they are so prone to circular firing squads. Lenin himself is a much-debated figure in history, especially among scholars of Socialism. Prof. Noam Chomsky has written extensively about Leninism and in particular its allegiances with Stalinism noting that for many ‘mainstream’ Marxists of that era, Lenin was a right wing deviation of the socialist movement.

Two of the more famous Marxist intellectuals, Rosa Luxemburg and Anton Pannekoek have referred to what they view as Lenin’s ‘opportunistic vanguardism’. Chomsky notes that Lenin’s writing changed character around 1917; the notion that the radical intelligentsia were going to exploit popular movements to seize control of the state and then organise the populace into the kind of society that they chose. Considering the very core of socialism: Workers’ control over the means of production, this deviation by Lenin seems completely inconsistent. The original Marxists or what Chomsky refers to as ‘left Marxists’ such as Luxemburg and Pannekoek were notably aghast at the moves made by Lenin following the October 1917 revolution, something Chomsky refers to as a ‘coup’ rather than a revolution. One of Lenin’s first actions after seizing power was to destroy the Factory Councils developed by the Soviets, weakening worker control over production: The very antithesis of socialism. As per Chomsky: “Lenin reconstructed the Tsarist systems of oppression” moving away from the libertarian-socialist origins of Luxemburg and Pannekoek.

The JVP led NPP would do well to better understand what Lenin believed, right up to his death; that a socialist state would not be possible in Russia and was instead a holding action for the “real revolution”, which as per traditional Marxist theory would occur in the most advanced industrial capitalist state, which at the time would have been Germany.

The Rapid Response manifesto does little to suggest that the JVP/NPP represents a vanguard intelligentsia of any creed, offering nothing of substance as an alternative in these most desperate of times.

(Email: kusumw@gmail.com, Twitter: @kusumw)



Continue Reading
Advertisement
Click to comment

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *

Features

BRICS upholds inclusive growth; re-affirms South-South cooperation

Published

on

BRICS political leaders at the 2026 New Delhi summit.(BBC)

A principal highlight of the recently concluded BRICS 2026 summit in New Delhi was the grouping’s unambiguous championing of the empowerment of ordinary people everywhere. This was yet another notable coming together of Southern governments over matters of common concern alright but it was the grouping’s people-oriented thinking that struck the impartial commentator as particularly important this time around.

The latter accent merits underscoring in view of the widespread perception that Southern oriented international organizations, such as the Non-aligned Movement (NAM), have had their day, so to speak. However the BRICS summit not only re-affirmed NAM principles but gave proof of its willingness to complement the main undertakings of NAM. Accordingly, causes such as South-South cooperation, international economic and social equity, multilateralism, international peace and the need to uphold the current UN-centred world order received resounding and fresh emphasis.

Particularly encouraging for those espousing Southern development concerns was the stressing of the historic ‘Bandung Principles’ in the New Delhi Declaration which crowned the summit deliberations. As is known, it was the ‘Bandung Spirit’ of 1955 that paved the way for the establishment of NAM and South-South cooperation in a major way. As such the ‘Spirit’ was primary in helping to reshape international development discourse and in giving it a pro-people bent. That is, development correctly conceived was birthed.

The New Delhi Declaration said in this regard: ‘We recall the 1955 Asian-African Conference in Bandung, Indonesia that proclaimed general principles, including equality, independence, non-intervention and mutual benefit. We stress that the Bandung Sprit serves as a reference in the pursuit of a fairer, more inclusive, and representative multilateral system.’

‘Geopolitics’ was not glossed over or ignored in New Delhi, but it is quite forgotten by some sections of opinion in particularly Sri Lanka that BRICS, while being an important Southern counter-balance in terms of power to the global North is also essentially about international economic growth with equity. The New Delhi summit helped to put right this conceptual imbalance in what groupings such as BRICS ought to be thinking and doing.

Even more precisely, people should be at the heart of development and in the exertions and preoccupations of international organizations claiming to represent the South. Southern governments equipped with economic and military might in particular remain important but it is people’s empowerment that ought to be the overriding consideration.

The latter concerns help stress the cruciality of democratic development since it is the latter that facilitates best the well being of people. Unfortunately, BRICS happens to be top-heavy with authoritarian governments that could deliver economic growth but not equity. It is fully representative, participatory governance that could best deliver to the people their essential needs and not totalitarian governments.

This is a complex dilemma for BRICS. It could be resolved somewhat by admitting more and more pro-people, democratic states into the BRICS fold to counter-balance the power and influence of authoritarian states. At present among the principal BRICS countries its only India that meets most of the criteria for democratic development.

Hopefully, more and more Southern democracies would see it fit to join BRICS in consideration of the latter’s potential to be a prime ‘economic powerhouse’ of the world. Equally hopefully, people’s empowerment in the true sense would come to be valued as a crucial merit for BRICS membership. It is relevant to stress that the fulfillment of the fundamental rights of a people is integral to their complete empowerment.

A grave negative fallout from the Trump administration’s current militarism is that more and more states world wide would come to value military heft over people’s empowerment. Consequently, the preference for military power could lead to countries wanting BRICS membership for the wrong reasons. That is, security through collective armed might would come to matter over all else and the world would be rendered an increasingly ‘dangerous place’.

But thinking people would expect from BRICS a more responsible role in world affairs and prefer to have from it inspirational guidance in democratic development, correctly understood.

A commitment by BRICS at the summit of considerable importance to world peace that should not be underplayed is its commitment to the UN system and the strengthening of International Law. The relevant quote from the Declaration spoke of BRICS’ ‘Commitment to strengthening multilateralism and multi-polarity and upholding International Law, including the Purposes and Principles of the Charter of the United Nations.’

Coming at a time when the UN is seen by some as a spent force, lacking effectiveness, the above endorsement of the UN Charter and International Law is of crucial significance. This amounts to solidly upholding the post World War Two order despite current largely rhetorical assertions that it is fast unraveling.

While UN reform remains a compelling necessity, the endorsement of the UN-centred order holds out the possibility of some of the BRICS heavyweights, who are currently acting in violation of International Law, eventually getting back to conduct that would be more in keeping with the requirements of International Law.

The UN could put these developments to constructive use by redoubling its efforts to work out diplomatic solutions to the current conflicts and wars that are showing no signs of being receptive to fresh peace efforts.

Two of these theatres of conflict are the Middle East and the Ukraine. While the US, Israel, Russia and Iran would need to be engaged by the UN with exceptional persuasive power to sort out the conflicts where they have come to feature directly and indirectly, the relevant BRICS members’ commitments to world peace and multilateralism could be used as instruments of moral pressure perhaps to induce them to get onto the path of peaceful conflict resolution.

The wide consensus among the BRICS powers amounts to their scoring a significant political victory over the US and its allies. Their espousal of international peace and the UN Charter exposes the US as being at cross purposes with peace-oriented and democratic sections world wide. Specifically, the moral and intellectual poverty of the Trump administration is being revealed glaringly.

This does not amount to a condemnation of the people of the US perse. It is just that some of them have voted quite unwisely. As a first step towards correcting this situation they could make good use of the upcoming mid term elections to register their strong disapproval of the Trump administration and the political extremists among the US Right. Course correction is not impossible.

Continue Reading

Features

Not I — We: A new uniform will mean nothing if the person inside it is left behind

Published

on

by Mahil Dole

Senior Superintendent of Police (Retd.)

Sri Lanka Police has just marked 160 years. The parades were in order. The sentence that should have followed them has not been written with enough force. A police service that is pulled by politics, rewarded for individual glory and tried every night on social media cannot protect a country that is now a maritime hinge for international narcotics and financial crime. The political authority must decide, not in a speech, but in conduct, whether this force belongs to the law or to the loudest faction of the week.

That is not a plea. It is a warning.

The political hierarchy and the police hierarchy now agree that the service needs a new outlook, beginning with the uniform. The cut and the kit are not yet settled. That conversation is overdue. Criminals have moved into containers, encrypted apps and international logistics. An officer equipped for a quieter decade is less able to detect, and less able to come home.

Sophistication of kit is essential. Body-worn cameras, communications and protective equipment that match the threat are not luxuries. They keep a policeman alive.

If the first decision of this compact is only what the officer will wear, the wrapping will be modern and the person untouched. The priority is not a new silhouette. It is a different person inside the uniform.

The officer is a human being

He and she is a product of this complicated society. The fractures that run through the village, the school and the social-media feed run through the recruit. Communal suspicion, religious identity and ethnic memory are not checked at the armoury gate. The question treated as delicate is operational: is this officer mentally geared for ordinary crime and for communal, religious and ethnic conflict?

What is his stand if he belongs to one community and is sent into a dispute involving another? How will the parties look at him? How will the media frame the first photograph? That decides whether a crowd sees the law or “the other side.” We are all Sri Lankans. The sentence is easy on a Police Day banner. It is hard at a junction when rumour is already ahead of the patrol.

Every officer, from constable to gazetted rank, must be trained for these issues as deliberately as for a baton. Not one lecture at Katukurunda: recurring, scenario-based work on mixed neighbourhoods, mixed complainants, and keeping personal faith out of the method of work. The media will hunt the communal angle; parties to a conflict will hunt the ethnic one. The only answer that holds is an officer whose first identity on duty is Sri Lankan and whose first loyalty is the law.

That is “We.” Assuming the uniform dissolves identity is how a single incident becomes a national story.

What they have been is not what they can remain

From the 1866 ordinance this service has been the state’s civilian arm, colonial order-keeping, post-independence law and order, then a wartime partner that buried its dead beside the armed forces. Specialised units were built for terrorism, organised crime and financial intelligence. The same institution was used as a residual army, a political instrument and a promotion marketplace. Loyalty too often attached to a person, not to the law. Easter Sunday made the price visible. So did every file that moved, or stalled, according to who was in office.

A history of sacrifice does not excuse a present of capture. It makes the capture more shameful.

What they are today

On paper the force is large, some 79,000 authorised, 609 stations. On the ground it is thin. More than 4,300 officers have left since 2020. Vacancies exceed 30,000. Shifts of twelve to eighteen hours are still treated as normal. Distress is still logged as discipline rather than welfare. That is waste, not toughness.

Crime has two faces, and both strike national security. Gang violence over narcotics still produces shootings. Sri Lanka also sits on feeder routes moving Afghan and Pakistani product toward other markets. Harbour and high-sea detections in the hundreds of kilograms are no longer rare. Ice hidden in towels at Colombo Port; heroin pulled from multi-day trawlers; scam compounds and frozen assets in the billions of rupees, these are not “ordinary crime.” They buy influence and fund the next consignment.

The third battlefield is information. Reels and anonymous accounts impersonate officers, launder rumour as fact, and reward the man who seeks a following. Inside the service the culture still teaches “I”: my file, my photograph, my briefing. Rank is being treated as a prize. It is a trust.

The container that became a campaign

Late August 2026, officers opened containers at the Colombo International Container Terminal and recovered some 463 to 472 kilograms of crystal methamphetamine, concealed in towels, originating from Pakistan and valued in the billions of rupees. Suspects including foreign nationals were arrested. The United States DEA publicly associated itself with the intelligence. The criminal case sits with the Central Crime Investigation Bureau.

That is a success. It should have been protected as a success.

Instead, an internal process review, ordered by the Inspector General into how information moved between bureaux, was translated on social media into another story: that the IGP and Senior DIG Ranmal Kodituwakku were being “chambered” over the detection. An Opposition MP warned, correctly, that putting the officers who delivered the raid under a public microscope will teach the service the wrong lesson.

State the distinction without apology. A criminal file is about the network and the money. A process file is about timelines and chain of custody. A blog is neither. Collapsing a Senior DIG’s recorded statement into “the hierarchy is in the dock” is not accountability. It is a gift to those who packed the towels. After a half-tonne interdiction, a process review is normal; leaking it as a morality play is not. Complete the inquiry on the record. If negligence is found, deal with it. If not, say so. Half-spoken files let rumour colonise the institution.

Training, technology and a mind that can bear the load

The IGP and the hierarchy must stop treating training as a calendar ornament. Immediate programmes are required, not next year’s paper.

First

, the evolving issues: communal and religious tension, narrative operations, child and women protection, financial and cyber crime, harbour interdiction, the law of arrest.

Second

, the technologies: digital evidence, data protection under the Personal Data Protection Act, disciplined open-source work, body-worn cameras that protect the public and officers alike.

Third

, mental health as operational infrastructure, counselling an Inspector can use without becoming a Legal Division case, and early recognition of burnout before it becomes a headline.

Incentives must follow: allowances for certified competencies, promotion credit for courses applied, not for attendance photographs. Asking for sophistication at the port with no path to acquire it is theatre.

A new uniform that can carry a camera, worn by an officer unprepared for the society he polices, is a costume. The station, the cell, the unseen hour Look next at where this officer lives and works. Many stations are old, congested and unhygienic. Living standards on duty are low. You cannot demand a different person in the uniform and house him as if he were expendable.

Cells are a particular failure of command. Too many sit out of sight of the men on duty. They are dilapidated. What happens inside goes unnoticed until a death, an assault or an escape. That is a design of our own buildings, not a secret of the underworld. A cell that cannot be seen cannot be defended in court or in conscience. Refurbish, fix sightlines, monitor what the Constitution requires, and treat an escape as a failure of supervision before it becomes a press note.

These are not welfare extras. They are the conditions under which evidence is kept, suspects are held, and officers decide whether the job is still worth the family cost.

The health of the officer is the health of the public

One of the first duties of the hierarchy is the health of the policeman and his family. A sick officer with a sick child is not “uncommitted.” He is a risk to himself, to the next raid, and to the citizen at the counter. Police hospitals are few. Officers in rural stations cannot reach them in time. The IGP should not wait for a building programme. Speak to the health authorities now. Arrange priority access for officers and their families at government hospitals. Dedicated wards or reserved beds are not a privilege class. They are the minimum owed to people sent into harm, and into other people’s crises, at every hour.

Good health is a good mind. A good mind is good care for the people. No uniform compensates for an officer who has not slept, has not been treated, and cannot reach a Police hospital.

What they must be tomorrow

The country does not need more decoration. It needs a service the public can approach without fear and that no politician can casually redirect: intelligence-led against networks that threaten the state; digitally capable and legally bounded; trained for communal heat as well as narcotics; housed and treated as human beings; collectively minded. We hold the ground, not I cleared the file.

The constable at the junction and the analyst tracing a hawala chain are the same institution. National security is not a specialist’s private property.

To the policymakers and the political authority

You have agreed with the Police hierarchy on a new outlook. Use it for more than cloth.

Independence is not the IGP’s personal autonomy. It is the institution’s ability to apply the law without fear or favour, and still answer to the law. You cannot have that and also have a Police summoned, transferred or publicly undermined according to the needs of the week.

Appointment and removal of the Inspector General must remain a process, not patronage. The National Police Commission must exercise its powers over promotions, transfers and discipline without being hectored from the gallery. Cabinet sets policy and budget. It does not choose Tuesday’s suspect. Comment from the House on the guilt of named officers while a file is open is not oversight. It is interference under another name.

If you want an apolitical Police, stop using internal inquiry as a factional weapon and social media as a substitute bench. Different treatment of files is the old disease. Naming it only when the officer is someone you dislike is the same disease.

Then fund what a new uniform implies: immediate training, habitable stations, cells that can be seen, and a health arrangement with the Ministry of Health that does not leave a rural sergeant’s family outside the gate. Announcing kit and withholding living conditions is not reform. It is dressing the service for a photograph.

The public has a part. Distinguish error from crime. Cooperate with the officer who is fair; demand consequences where he is not. In conflict, look at the uniform as the law, not as a census of name, faith or village. Do not outsource judgement to an anonymous account.

The stand It is not I. It should be We.

A new uniform will not make an officer Sri Lankan. Training, health, housing, an apolitical file, and a command that treats him as a human being might. A service that thinks in individual glory will be outrun by networks that think in systems. A political class that thinks in capture will keep receiving detections and wondering why the pipeline never closes. A country that argues about the cloth while the person inside it is exhausted, untrained for communal fire, and unseen in a dilapidated cell block is not preparing for tomorrow. It is rearranging the wardrobe.

The law cannot serve two masters. Neither can the uniform, old or new.

(This analysis is offered in the interest of national security, institutional reform, and public safety)

Mahil Dole, SSP (Retd.), served as Deputy Director in charge of the Counter-Terrorism Desk of the State Intelligence Service and later as Intelligence Coordinator to the Inspector General of Police. He is a former Member of the Sri Lanka Wakfs Board and author of Security Beyond Enforcement: Practical Approaches for a Safer Nation. Email – mahildole54@gmail.com

Continue Reading

Features

The Miss World 2026 scene …

Published

on

History was made under the lights on 05th September, as Joheirry Mola Dominguez, of the Dominican Republic, was crowned Miss World 2026 by outgoing queen Suchata Chuangsri of Thailand at April 2nd Square in Nha Trang, Vietnam.

It is only the second Miss World title for the Dominican Republic; 44 years after Mariasela Álvarez’s win in 1982. Reports described it as an “emotional and historic moment” for the nation.

Joheirry, 24, beat 110 other delegates to take the crown.

A dedicated educator and community advocate, she holds a degree in Business Management and Administration from Universidad Iberoamericana. She is Founder and President of “Voices of Tomorrow”, an initiative expanding access to English education for children in vulnerable communities. She also teaches Literature and Social Studies in English, and works as a correspondent for Univision New York’s Ventana a Quisqueya.

Her advocacy won hearts

It was her advocacy that won hearts.

“My Beauty With a Purpose is to take English programmes to kids in vulnerable communities,”

she said at the Grand Final. “Because I believe that when they know this language, the opportunities, the doors that can open to their life, it’s huge. English is a tool that will stay with them and benefit them for the rest of their lives.”

Spain’s Elisabeth Reynés finished 1st Runner-Up, while Malaysia’s Taanusiya Chetty, also winner of Beauty With a Purpose, took 2nd Runner-Up.

The Top 6 included Vietnam’s Le Nguyen Bao Ngoc, Eritrea’s Snit Habteab, and South Africa’s Romanda Hombir.

The 75th Anniversary edition, hosted for the first time in Vietnam, was a spectacle before 20,000 spectators. Staged on a 110+ meter outdoor platform by Nha Trang beach, the square was lit up with huge LED screens and high-power sound.

Even heavy rain during the Americas & Caribbean segment couldn’t dampen spirits. Umbrellas and raincoats popped up and the show resumed 15 minutes later. Nobody left. That’s dedication.

With 111 ambassadors, cultural dances, ao dai performances, and the seaside backdrop, officials called it a celebration of beauty, talent, confidence, and social responsibility.

With 20,000 people, rain or shine, screaming, cheering, live-streaming, waving flags… it was, indeed, pure Miss World magic.

For Sri Lanka, Prathibha Liyanaarachchi did not make the Top 40 at the 73rd Miss World Festival, but she reached the finalist stages of four fast-track events — Top Model, Talent, Sports, and Beauty With a Purpose.

Miss World magic: The square was lit up with huge LED screens and high-power sound

Continue Reading

Trending