The 20th Amendment has given rise to a debate over whether dual citizens should be allowed to contest elections in this country. The dual citizenship law has been operational for decades and nobody had any issue with it until the yahapalana camp seized on it as a means of keeping the Rajapaksa brothers Gotabhaya and Basil out of politics. The yahapalana camp includes the majority of the foreign funded NGOs that have no purpose other than to interfere in, and influence the politics of Sri Lanka in order to push the agendas of their foreign paymasters. It would appear that individuals belonging to at least some of these foreign funded NGOs have made representations to the Supreme Court against allowing dual citizens to contest elections in this country. That raises a very cogent question.
If dual citizens are to be banned from contesting elections and indeed as some have suggested even holding other government positions because of their ties to foreign nations, then it follows that similar restrictions should be extended to all individuals and organizations that receive funding from foreign governments and organizations to carry out political work in Sri Lanka. If the oath that a person takes in obtaining citizenship in a foreign country is seen as a danger to Sri Lanka, how much more dangerous is the phenomenon of having persons who are paid to do the bidding of various foreign parties within Sri Lanka? For decades, Sri Lanka has had no protection at all from outside parties that seek to influence events here by hiring people to manipulate public opinion and engage in similar activities. As a result of these NGOs, Sri Lanka has few genuine voluntary organizations. The very phrase ‘civil society’ has been hijacked by foreign funded NGOs.
In contrast to Sri Lanka, India has always had adequate protection from the phenomenon of foreign funded political activism in the form of the Foreign Contributions Regulatory Act which was first promulgated in 1976 during the Indira Gandhi era and then revised and updated during the last Congress government in 2010. Indian political elites have always been more conscious of the need to protect their country from this kind of insidious foreign influence than their Sri Lankan counterparts. The re-drafting of India’s Foreign Contributions Regulatory Act took place during the last Congress government by a Parliamentary committee headed by opposition law-maker Sushma Swaraj. Now that a debate on the advisability of having anyone with a foreign linkage however tenuous from engaging in politics has been initiated, it should be extended to people paid by foreign parties to engage in political activities in Sri Lanka.
India’s emulation-worthy legislation
For well over a decade, this writer has been advocating the adoption of an Indian Foreign Contributions Regulatory Act-style law in Sri Lanka. The preamble to the Indian Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Act, 2010, (FCRA) describes it as a law to regulate the acceptance and utilization of foreign contributions or foreign hospitality by certain individuals or associations or companies and to prohibit such acceptance and utilization for any activities detrimental to the national interest. This is exactly what Sri Lanka is in dire need of. It’s not just foreign money that comes under the purview of the Indian FCRA but even foreign junkets, training programmes and scholarships offered by interested parties to selected individuals with a view to influencing them.
The Indian FCRA extends not only to all inhabitants of India, but also to citizens of India outside India and to branches or subsidiaries, outside India, of companies or bodies corporate, registered or incorporated in India. Money earned by Indian citizens from foreign sources by way of salary, wages or other remuneration in the ordinary course of business transacted in or outside India or by way of proceeds of international trade or commerce does not come under the FCRA. India has a large workforce employed outside her borders and a vibrant external trade and the provisions of the FCRA do not interfere in any way with such matters. Stipends received from legitimate foreign scholarships also do not come under the FCRA. However, everything else including even gifts received by members of Indian delegations on overseas visits do come under the FCRA.
Trying to circumvent the FCRA by transferring funds from one entity to another will also not work under the Indian law, because a donation or transfer of any funds by any person who has received it from a foreign source is also deemed to be a foreign contribution. Even interest accrued on a foreign contribution deposited in any bank is deemed to be a foreign contribution. Foreign hospitality which means any facility provided in cash or kind by a foreign source to provide a person with the cost of travel to any foreign country with free board, lodging, transport or medical treatment, also comes under the FCRA. The source of foreign funding or foreign hospitality can be the government of any foreign country or an agency of such government, a foreign company, citizens of a foreign country, companies, corporations, trusts, societies or associations registered in a foreign country, foreign trade unions, or any international agency. However the United Nations and its specialized agencies, and certain other institutions approved by the Central government of India such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund are exempt from the application of the FCRA.
Persons who should not receive foreign funding
In India, the persons prohibited from receiving foreign contributions are candidates for election, correspondents, columnists, cartoonists, editors, owners, printers or publishers of a registered newspaper, and holders of equivalent positions in any electronic or internet based media engaged in the production or broadcast of audio news or audio visual news or current affairs. Judges, government servants or employees of any corporation or any other body controlled or owned by the government, the members of all legislatures (which means the members of every elected body from the Parliament right down to the Panchayats) any political party or office-bearers thereof and any organization of a political nature as may be specified by the Central Government are also prohibited from receiving foreign funding and hospitality.
When you look at this list of persons barred from receiving foreign funding in the Indian law and think of what has been happening in Sri Lanka for decades, you realize that it’s nothing short of a miracle that this country is still in existence. Even as these words were being written, The Island reported that several Sri Lankan NGOs including the People’s Action for Free & Fair Elections (PAFFREL), the Centre for Monitoring Election Violence (CMEV), the (hitherto unheard of) Center for Investigative Reporting Sri Lanka (CIR) and the Sri Lanka Press Institute (SLPI) had received funding from Canada. In India, that would not have been possible. In 2010 and in the run up to the 2015 presidential election, close relatives of the yahapalana presidential candidates of those years were caught red handed while in possession of large amounts of foreign currency and we still have done nothing about banning candidates at elections and political parties from receiving funds from foreign interested parties.
In contrast, under the Indian FCRA, No person, resident in India, and no citizen of India resident outside India, shall accept any foreign contribution, or acquire or agree to acquire any currency from a foreign source, on behalf of any political party. No person, resident in India, shall deliver any currency, whether Indian or foreign, which has been accepted from any foreign source, to any person if he knows or has reasonable cause to believe that such other person intends, or is likely, to deliver such currency to any political party or any person referred to in the list mentioned above.
The Indian Central Government may, having regard to the activities of the organization or the ideology propagated by it or its program or association with the activities of any political party, name such organization as one of a political nature. Such naming will be done by the Central Government on the basis of guidelines formulated by the Central Government itself.
Restrictions on the acceptance of foreign hospitality in the form of junkets by certain categories of people is also a main part of the Indian FCRA. No member of a legislature (which means any elected body from the Parliament down to the Panchayats) or office-bearer of a political party or Judge or Government servant or employee of any corporation or any other body owned or controlled by the Government shall, while visiting any country or territory outside India, accept, except with the prior permission of the Central Government, any foreign hospitality. Even if such a person falls ill during a visit overseas, and receives emergency medical treatment, that’s categorized as foreign hospitality and it has to be reported to the authorities within one month from the date of receipt of such hospitality giving the source from which, and the manner in which, such hospitality was received.
Those who are registered and granted a certificate to receive any foreign contributions, are prohibited from transferring such foreign contribution to any other person unless that other person is also registered and had been granted the certificate or obtained prior permission to receive foreign contributions. Such transfers can take place only on the basis of the prior approval of the Central Government.
Under the Indian FCRA, every person who has been granted a certificate or given prior permission to receive foreign funds can receive such funds only through a single bank account. There are a number of rules which have to adhered to in spending this money as well. Firstly, it can be used only for the purposes for which the contribution has been received. Not more than 50% of the money received can be spent on administrative expenses. In deciding whether any person or entity should be granted permission to receive foreign funds or foreign hospitality, the Indian central government will have to satisfy itself to the effect that allowing such foreign funding or foreign hospitality would not be prejudicial to the sovereignty and integrity of India; the public interest; the freedom or fairness of election to any legislature, or harmony between religious, racial, social, linguistic or regional groups, castes or communities.
The FRCA states very specifically that no person having a definite cultural, economic, educational, religious or social program shall accept foreign funding unless such person obtains a certificate of registration from the Central Government. Another point to note in the Indian FRCA is that the implementing authority is always the Indian central government with the states having no role in it. If the government has reasonable cause to believe that any provision of the FRCA is being, contravened, the Central Government may appoint an officer to audit any books kept by the persons or entities concerned. Such officer shall have the right to enter any premises for the purpose of carrying out his duties.
Every candidate for election, who had received any foreign contribution, at any time within one hundred and eighty days immediately preceding the date on which he is duly nominated, shall give, within such time and in such manner as may be prescribed, an intimation to the Central Government as to the amount of foreign contribution received by him, the source from which, and the manner in which, such foreign contribution was received and the purposes for which and the manner in which such foreign contribution was utilized by him. Whoever accepts, or assists any person, political party or organization in accepting, any contribution from a foreign source, in contravention of any provision of this Act shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to five years, or a fine, or both.
The Foreign Contributions Regulatory Act has obviously served India well over the past four decades and more which is why the 1976 Act was revised and renewed in 2010. The politics of Sri Lanka would have been very different if such a law had been in operation in Sri Lanka as well. The year 2015 was the year that the foreign funded NGO sector virtually took over Sri Lanka with many such individuals obtaining appointments as members of the numerous commissions that were set up. The lesson that our past experiences teach us is that if India needed an FRCA, we need it even more.
A brave new world
By Uditha Devapriya
Divided from the Indian subcontinent, yet also deeply connected to it, Sri Lanka has never had an opportunity of forging and shaping a foreign policy of its own. The high point of its foreign relations, under the three Bandaranaike administrations over a period of 20 years, did signal an effort, and a sincere one, towards this end. Yet with the election of a staunchly pro-Western government in 1977, the emphasis on non-alignment that had been a hallmark of the island’s foreign policy ruptured, never to be regained or restored.
Of course, commentators would contend that Sri Lanka need not be non-aligned. They would also point out that non-alignment, in itself, doesn’t preclude making choices and siding with friends. The fact that the country lead the Non-Aligned Movement, at its peak years in the 1960s and 1970s, did not prevent it from privileging one set of interests over another: this is why, and how, while forging a close relationship with the Indira Gandhi administration, the United Front regime (1970-1977) was able to balance its ties with Pakistan vis-à-vis the 1971 War in Bangladesh and the West vis-à-vis the Soviet Union.
In actual fact, the former colonies of Asia and Africa did not, in the wake of decolonisation, explicitly ally themselves with either side of the Cold War. Ideologically many if not most of them adhered to a socialist economic system, or something that could pass for one. But this didn’t always mean they bandwagoned with the socialist bloc, or, conversely, alienated the Western front. Gamal Abdel Nasser’s attempts at obtaining American funding for the Aswan Dam, and Sirimavo Bandaranaike’s ability to enlist Western aid against the 1971 insurgency, showed that the indigenous elites in these ex-colonies did not [always] identify their foreign relations with one side of the Cold War to the exclusion of the other.
For its part the socialist Left went along with these trends. Throughout the Third World, particularly in countries like Sri Lanka, where traditional Marxist categories did not make sense, the [significantly non-Communist] Left advocated alignments with parties which were, from a Marxist perspective, hardly radical or revolutionary. The LSSP advocated no contest pacts and later agreements and alliances with the SLFP, while Nasser carried on a troubled, ambivalent relationship with the Communist Party. It was only logical to expect a similarly ambivalent stand on foreign policy from these formations.
It wasn’t just those groups, of course; even the strongholds and heartlands of the ideologies and tendencies they stood for often deviated from the orthodox line. Thus, the Maoists in Ceylon, while holding the line against the Sirimavo Bandaranaike government, could not quite withstand China’s decision to provide that regime with military aid against the 1971 insurrection. Internationally, it could not tide over or come to terms with the shock of Deng Xiaoping’s reforms. In foreign policy as in domestic policies, discretion frequently took the better part of valour; ideological abstractions did play a part, but they were often dispensed with in the interests of better relations with other countries.
The lines that had been drawn during the Cold War sharpened considerably in the 1970s and 1980s across Asia and America, often disrupting the political divisions that had been drawn for decades in these countries. In Sri Lanka the election of a leftwing government failed to prevent an uprising among radical Left university graduates. Four years later, that avowedly leftwing government splintered, leading to the expulsion of the two oldest Left parties in the country. Neoliberal authoritarianism, of the sort which had been installed via covert US support in Chile, became a fact of life in 1977. The rhetoric of non-alignment and neutrality, evoked so frequently once, became passe now.
In Sri Lanka, the first and second waves of neo-liberal authoritarianism – the two UNP administrations of J. R. Jayewardene and Ranasinghe Premadasa – would be followed by the election of a Clintonian Third Way Centrist regime, led by the daughter of the same lady associated with the country’s dalliance with socialism. Under Chandrika Kumaratunga Sri Lanka’s nonaligned credentials were restored, yet never to the same extent as before: it was under Kumaratunga, after all, that Israel established an Embassy in Colombo, more or less breaching Sri Lanka’s commitment to the Palestinian cause, which had been a hallmark and a motif of the Non-aligned Movement at its very inception.
It’s tempting to argue that none of these changes could have come about without the end of the Cold War. To say that is to assume that the end of the Cold War came about because of one set of forces triumphing over all others. For a brief time in history, from 1991 to 2001, the United States enjoyed its peak years: what Charles Krauthammer called, not unfittingly, the “Unipolar Movement.” For some it was the end of history, for others it was the victory of liberal democracy. In this brave new liberal world, we were told, power no longer had a say in international relations: hence the many calls, deplored by diplomats such as the late Gamani Corea, to do away with institutions like UNCTAD and NAM.
This argument has many pitfalls, not all of which deserve mentioning here. I would contend that the unipolar moment came to an end in 2001, when two planes rammed into the World Trade Center in New York, the capital of liberal internationalism. What began in 2001 more or less culminated in January 2022, when Vladimir Putin recognised two breakaway regions in Ukraine and kickstarted a war that continues to redefine the frontiers of geopolitics in the present century. Viewed for long as a dependable friend of the West, Putin has now turned into a symbol of the continuing relevance of power in geopolitics: a point which suggests the Cold War never ended, and the old lines and distinctions still linger.
By all accounts, the new Cold War is different from the old. The clash today is not between two superpowers, but between various powers vying over different interests. The world was simpler then. It is more complicated now. While major powers like India and China vie with each other for dominance over specific regions and interests, developments like the Russia-Ukraine War have brought them to the same table. Xi Jinping’s congratulatory missive to the new Indian President and Wang Yi’s meeting with Delhi’s Ambassador to Beijing should not be taken as mere formalities, nor should Indian Foreign Affairs Minister Jaishankar’s remarks be taken as ramblings of an annoyed government official. These episodes suggest clearly the complexities of geopolitics, where, more than the days when the world was divided into two warring halves, there are no permanent friends or enemies, only interests.
Sri Lanka so far has not been fortunate enough to benefit from these developments. It has been guided by a philosophy which died in 2001, a philosophy adhered to by the most zealous advocates of liberal internationalism: those who believe that Western rhetoric on human rights and democracy is what it purports to be and nothing else. As Rajiva Wijesinha has noted in Representing Sri Lanka, a book that deserves to be read closely, these groups make up a considerable part of our foreign policy establishment: a fact which has precluded the country from making some much needed choices in foreign relations.
In his book Wijesinha lambasts two tendencies within the foreign policy establishment in Sri Lanka: a line that hedges all bets for the country’s future on relations with the West, and a line that shirks and demonises the West and seemingly “Western” abstractions like human rights and democracy. As Dayan Jayatilleka has pointed out only too eloquently, the former line almost lost us the war, while the latter has line lost us a durable peace. The result has been a grand mess, where, in a never-ending cycle, we latch ourselves onto one or another major power, only to switch sides unceremoniously to another power while neglecting the concerns of our ex-partners. The recent fracas over the Chinese “spy” vessel is the latest in a series of faux pas that will, I suspect, continue for quite some time.
Stripped of all abstractions, foreign policy is but a manifestation of a country’s interests. Trapped in the past, Sri Lanka is yet to come to terms with this fact. But in the face of an unprecedented crisis, it cannot afford to think this way any longer. It must take stock of what is happening outside, and realise that what matters is what we need. And what we need now is a foreign policy that coheres with our interests.
The writer is an international relations analyst, researcher, and columnist who can be reached at email@example.com
Crime and Punishment In Sri Lanka – Where is the Equity ?
By Anura Gunasekera
Recently, the Kegalle High Court Trial at Bar, on conclusion of the December 2018 Mawanella Buddha statue damaging case, conducted under the Prevention of Terrorism( Temporary Provisions) Act, has passed sentences of varying severity, on the accused who have admitted culpability. Three of the accused have been discharged and the cases against two fixed for further inquiry
Moving back to the period between June 2014 and March 2018, rioting Sinhala mobs, incited or led by Buddhist priests, destroyed or damaged hundreds of Muslim owned businesses, private homes, vehicles, and a couple of mosques, in Aluthagama, Digana and Panadura. Seven people were killed, six of them Muslims. The cost of the damage to assets, owned mostly by Muslims, would be, conservatively, in billions of rupees. Any forensic investigation of the Aluthgama carnage was pre-empted by forces personnel quickly cleaning up the scene of the crime, before investigations could begin, apparently on the orders of former President, Gotabaya Rajapaksa, then Secretary of Defence.
As far as I am aware, not one person has been convicted for any of the above crimes, though much of the destruction is reported to have been caused, in full view of armed police and the forces. There have also been allegations of active assistance provided by uniformed police to the rioting mobs. Two Buddhist priests, Galagoda Athhe Gnanasara and Ampitiye Sumanarathana, publicly associated with the incidents, have been ignored by the law. In fact, in 2020, the Galagoda monk was appointed by then President Gotabaya Rajapaksa, as the chairman of the “One Country, One Law” task force.
Amit Weerasinghe, leader of the “Mahason Balakaya”, a Sinhala-Buddhist extremist entity associated with the riots, was arrested and released. It is not clear whether any action was filed against him. More than a 100 individuals, all from the majority community, arrested in connection with the incidents of anti-Muslim violence described above, were enlarged on bail at the respective first hearings. However, 45 individuals, all Muslims without prior criminal records, arrested in connection with the Mawanella affair, were held in remand custody for forty two months, though there were no eyewitnesses to the related incidents.
Jude Jayamaha, convicted murderer sentenced to death in 2012, was pardoned in 2019 by then President Maithripala. Army Sergeant Sunil Ratnayake, sentenced to death for the torture/murder of a Tamil civilian family of eight, was given a “full presidential pardon” by former president, Gotabaya Rajapaksa, in 2020. Former member of parliament and close associate of president Gotabaya, Duminda Silva, sentenced to death for complicity in murder, benefited from a “special presidential pardon” , extended by GR in June 2021, which also included over a hundred other prisoners. However, Silva has been rearrested in May 2022, on a Supreme Court order suspending the pardon.
In the meantime, the loose-tongued MP, Ranjan Ramanayake, has so far spent one year of a four-year sentence for contempt of court. I am open to correction by those who know the law better but, as I understand it, his sentence is based on a provision of the Penal Code, which dates back to a 19th century statute. However, it is a fact that most mature democracies have moved on from such archaic legal provisions, and now permit robust and reasonable debate in regard to matters pertaining to the judiciary itself.
Also relevant is the case of Lasantha Wickrematunge, and the many other journalists and anti-government activists, featured in the list of the murdered regime-critics over the last three decades, now simply names in a long and sad litany of unsolved crimes. There are the thousands of civilians who disappeared during our long war, and in the course of the suppression of two consecutive Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna uprisings; over 700 Sri Lankan policemen were murdered by the LTTE, in June 1990, after surrendering to them on the orders of the then President, Ranasinghe Premadasa, conveyed through then Inspector General of Police, Ernest Perera. The absence of an in-depth investigation in to this incident is, perhaps, due to the fact that the alleged mastermind- according to Field Marshal Sarath Fonseka- Vinayagamoorthy Muralidaran of the LTTE, subsequently became a government ally.
In fact, a review of unsolved murders and extra-judicial killings since the beginning of the Eelam war, would require a separate volume. The land that the Buddha is supposed to have consecrated with several personal visits is, truly, very bloody, underfoot.
In more recent events, parliamentarian Prasanna Ranatunge, heavily fined and sentenced to a suspended sentence, for attempting to extort money under threat from a businessman, has been appointed Minister of Urban Development and Housing, by President Wickremesinghe. Nimal Siripala de Silva, who resigned his cabinet portfolio pending investigation in to a major bribery charge (reportedly conveyed to then president Gotabaya by Japan’s ambassador), has been “acquitted”- by a panel led by former High Court judge, Kusala Sarojini Weerawardane, on conclusion of what must be the speediest of such investigations conducted in decades; just one week! Within a day of this miraculous “acquittal”, he is reappointed to the cabinet by President Wickremesinghe, as Minister of Ports, Shipping and Aviation.
The two actions by the new president makes a mockery of a key assurance given by him regarding the elimination of bribery and corruption during his maiden address to parliament. How does one conflate that noble pledge with the elevation of two individuals, one patently corrupt and the other allegedly so? That situation is decidedly worse than the case of former state minister, Lohan Ratwatte, whose forcible entry in to Welikada and Anuradhapura prisons, was investigated- with no conclusive outcome- by the same lady.
All of the above is a preamble to the current situation. Wickremesinghe, immediately upon assuming the acting presidency, declared a state of emergency and enabled the arrest of a number of individuals seen as leaders of the “Aragalaya”, the movement which actually paved the way for his presidential appointment. Apart from Joseph Stalin (General Secretary, Ceylon Teachers’ Union), Fr Jeewantha Pieris, Wasantha Mudalige ( Convener, Inter-University Students’ Federation) Eranga Gunasekera( National Organizer for “Socialist Youth Union”) and Lahiru Weerasekera (National Organizer for “Youth for Change”), four protesters “loitering” around the Bandaranaike statue at Galle Face, and a few who have been identified as having entered the Presidential Secretariat and the President’s House, have also been taken in.
In the greater scheme of things the “crimes” attributed to these individuals are clearly low level misdemeanors. Proven damage to premises and content are crimes which must be punished, but relaxing on the president’s bed and sitting in the president’s chair are not major crimes, though the latter have been classified as ” terrorist acts”.
Compare the above with the events which took place in parliament , on November 15, 2018, when members of Mahinda Rajapaksa’s party physically attacked the then Speaker, Karu Jayasuriya. At the fore-front of the aggression were then ministers, Johnston Fernando and Mahindanda Aluthgamage, who attacked the police who tried to restore order. Arundhika Fernando occupied the Speaker’s chair and was seen being smilingly felicitated by MP Pavithra Wanniarachchi. All these events have been caught on video-film as indisputable evidence. Despite the desecration of the very seat of governance by the lawmakers themselves, no action was taken against those guilty. Let us also not forget the May 9 attack on unarmed activists at Galle Face, in which Mahinda Rajapaksa and Johnston Fernando were clearly complicit.
Since April this year six dead bodies have washed up ashore along the Colombo district coastline. The police have been very quick to attribute these incidents, and other recent murders in and around the Colombo district, to drug-related violence, though results of investigations have not been made public. Surprisingly, these incidents appear to have slid under the radar of routine news reporting, with minimal mention in the media.
One can also add the “Bond Scam” of 2015, involving the current president’s then Central Bank Governor appointee, Arjuna Mahendran, the “Sugar Scam” of 2020, the shambolic “Greek Bonds” affair of 2012, under the stewardship of then Central Bank Governor, Nivard Cabraal and the controversial settlement of International Sovereign Bonds in January 2022, again under the supervision of Cabraal in his second term as CB governor. However, Mahendran, hiding from the law in plain sight, is safely delivering profound statements on the economy of Sri Lanka to, international media, the profiteers from the sugar deal have not been dealt with despite recommendations by the National Audit Office, and Cabraal, still unscathed, is living in seclusion.
And what of the Rs 17.8 in cash, discovered in the President’s House by the Aragalists and handed over to the Fort Police on July 9, but produced in court by the police only on July 29? Where did the Fort OIC store this cash in the interim? Will former president Gotabaya, as head of the presidential household, be asked to explain the source of the cash and the reasons for its retention?
The point of this narration is to highlight the glaring inequity, in the application of the same body of law, in the context of social and economic position, proximity to those in power, personal political significance, and ethnicity. It would seem that the wheels of justice grind slowly, and selectively, subject to the above considerations.
President Wickremesinghe’s pious sentiments about combatting crime and corruption, are simply echoes of similar statements made by previous leaders of the country, in successive regimes, which have condoned colossal crimes and acts of corruption. Collectively, they have contributed to the present economic disaster, and the humiliating position of Sri Lanka in the global Human Rights Violation index. After 75 years of independence and “democratic” governance, Sri Lanka occupies the 112th position (in the 3rd quartrile), in the Global Freedom Index of 2022, behind Sierra Leone, Belarus, Kenya and Lebanon. The ongoing repressive measures being implemented by a supposedly liberal president, is likely to result in a further downgrading before long.
PROPPING-UP THIS PRESIDENT IS A PRESCRIPTION FOR POLITICAL SUICIDE
DR. DAYAN JAYATILLEKA
In one dimension, Sri Lankan politics is a tale of cross-party political collaboration that should have taken place but didn’t, and those that shouldn’t have taken place but did.The two varying yet intermittently intertwining story-lines have widely discrepant endings, though. Collaborations that should have taken place but didn’t are stories of what might have been and wasn’t. What might have been is often better than what actually was.By contrast, stories of collaboration that should not have taken place but did, are stories of disasters that were avoidable but weren’t.
Sometimes the collaborations that should have been preceded those that should not have been but were acted upon. These are particularly poignant because an alliance or political equation that had the potential of leading to something positive, was immediately substituted by an equation which culminated in catastrophe.
There is another, inner connection. It is the causal link between the alliances that should have been made and weren’t, that led to lost potential, which was then sought to be offset by alliances that should not have been entered into but were, with worse consequences than the stagnation sought to be avoided or offset by entering into them.
The Left was never as strong as it was after the General Election of 1947. If the discussion at H. Sri Nissanka’s residence ‘Yamuna’ succeed and a bloc had formed of the three left parties—the LSSP, CP and the BLP—and the independent progressives, Ceylon would have had a left oriented Government which would have taken the country on a Nehruvian or ‘left-Nehruvian’ path.
Having rejected that option, the same leftist parties were later reviled, and correctly so, for having clung to “Sirima’s sari pota” and electorally decimated where they remain to this very day. Just recently, and incredibly, their residues voted for Ranil Wickremesinghe’s Emergency under which the Aragalaya activists are being arrested.
After the magnificent Hartal of August 1953, the political parties that participated and supported it failed to unite in a single bloc. The result was that SWRD’s SLFP fell prey to the temptation of Sinhala Only, lobbied for by a civil society caucus led by Prof GP Malalasekara and the All- Ceylon Buddhist Congress he chaired, riding the surf of the Buddha Jayanthi and the ACBC report.
When SWRD tried to compensate by course-correction through the Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam pact, the Left didn’t come forward to enter a bloc with him in support. Ironically the same left entered a united front with his far less progressive widow and enthroned Sinhala only in the 1972 Constitution.
The Left finally entered a United Front in 1963, accompanied by the unification of the left-led trade union movement. The united left won the Borella by-election that year. In 1964 the LSSP broke the left front and joined Mrs. Bandaranaike’s cabinet. In 1968, in place of a reunified Left, the CPSL joined the LSSP in a coalition with the SLFP, holding a joint rally in Bogambara.The resultant vacuum on the left permitted the birth and rapid growth of the JVP.
Fifteen years after the LSSP’s co-optation and nine years after the CPSL’s, the entire old left had been electorally wiped out, with Philip Gunawardena who had joined a UNP cabinet, having been electorally eliminated earlier in 1970.I could go on. The moral of the story is simple. Left unity is a good thing and left disunity is not. Left and the unity with progressive independents is a good thing and its absence is not. The Left uniting with a center party under left dominance is bad but doing so on an equal footing, isn’t.The Left uniting with a dominant center party, i.e., with the SLFP in 1964 and 1970-1975/’77, is a terrible thing.
A center-left or center party uniting with a rightwing or center-right party is a bad thing. President Sirisena and the SLFP learned that lesson the hard way and the current trend of the SLPP opting for Ranil Wickremesinghe over Dullas Alahapperuma, the SLFP and the 10-parties being drawn into President Ranil Wickremesinghe’s orbit, having voted for his draconian Emergency (the SLFP was absent), will prove electorally fatal.
The Tamil parties have a sad history of supporting the rightwing UNP which inevitably winds up unpopular and the target of a huge backlash. The presence of the Tamil parties in a bloc with the UNP, unfortunately facilitates an utterly reprehensible entry of Sinhala chauvinism into the anti-government backlash.
It is utterly counterproductive for the Tamil parties to be in an elitist UNP bloc. It was the presence of those parties in the UNP-led seven-party national Government of 1965-1970 that facilitated the opportunistic or semi-spontaneous injection of Sinhala ethno-populism into the Opposition campaign of the second half of the 1960s, which even more horridly, culminated in the official Sinhala racism after it assumed office, e.g., media-wise and district-wise Standardization of university entrance, the hegemonistic status of Sinhala and Buddhism in the 1972 Constitution.
The Tamil parties should think twice before being enticed into an alliance, de jure or de facto, with the unelected, illegitimate president Ranil Wickremesinghe who will cause a further spike in unprecedentedly high social disaffection by his economic “shock therapy”. It could cause a toxic cocktail as Sir John’s Delft speech did.
What would have happened to any Opposition political party that joined, propped up or let itself be drawn into the orbit of the hawkish UNP administration of Sir John Kotelawala after the Hartal of August 1953?
What if SWRD Bandaranaike, having left the UNP in 1951, helped it in 1953, after chairing the Hartal rally on Galle Face Green, though the SLFP didn’t participate in the Hartal?
The answers of these counterfactual history questions are obvious. Any such party which became a de jure or de facto prop (“mukkuwa”) of the Hartal-hit Establishment which had a harder-line post-Hartal leader, would have been committing political suicide.Had SWRD Bandaranaike done so, he would not have been the beneficiary of the anti-Establishment tectonic shift caused or denoted by the Hartal and swept into office through the Silent Revolution of 1956.
Why then are the Opposition parties of today doing or contemplating something even more colossally stupid, of joining, supporting or collaborating with the UNP leader of the Aragalaya-hit Establishment? It is suicidal for two reasons:
Firstly, the leader in question is utterly unelected, totally devoid of a popular mandate, and is therefore a completely illegitimate (though not illegal) ruler.Secondly, he will drive through a controversial and polarizing economic program, which will sink any party associated with it.Meanwhile, the failure of the pro-Aragalaya parties, the JVP, FSP, SJB and TNA, to unite is a repetition of the failure of the pro-Hartal parties to do so in 1953-1956.
Domestic debt restructuring will cripple EPF, ETF – JVP
Powerful CEBEU says yes to restructuring but on its terms
SJB opposes blanket privatisations
‘Dates have the highest sugar content to fight Coronavirus’
U.S. Congress to probe assets fleecing by US citizens of Sri Lankan origin
Sunday Island 27 December – Headlines
News6 days ago
Wide ranging rackets benefiting CEB engineers
News4 days ago
Thanks to QR code expenditure on fuel drops from USD 500 million to USD 230 million a month
News5 days ago
Delisting of Tamil Diaspora groups irks some; explanation sought
News3 days ago
SJB alleges Prez under SLPP pressure to give up power to dissolve Parliament
Sports6 days ago
Mathews regrets Mankading of Buttler
News3 days ago
Wimal blames Gota’s naivety, Basil’s arrogance for current situation
News2 days ago
State sector reforms: Herath endorses Ranil’s agenda
News1 day ago
CB Governor: Lanka now in a position to pay for essentials