Features
Combination of circumstances gives CBK the opportunity to dissolve Parliament
Bradman takes final bow after a period on intense political manoeuvering
Ranil’s strength, according to the Constitution, came from his supremacy in Parliament. With great managerial skill he managed to keep at all times a sizable majority in place. The UNF never lost a vote in Parliament during those two years (Ranil was PM). The UNF itself was a coalition bringing together five parties which contested the election together. It must have brought much credit to his political acumen and management skills that in spite of severe stresses and strains, the UNF held together. It was also quite remarkable in a country where party political loyalties are notably fickle, that during the period of his government there was not a single resignation from party or office.
According to the Constitution, Parliament cannot be dissolved by presidential fiat until one year after its election. Thereafter though, the president is vested with the power to dissolve parliament at will and even though the government might have an absolute majority in the House. When Ranil’s second year began there was the opportunity for a sudden dissolution but although fears were raised from time to time, this did not happen. The peace process was well on track, the economy was beginning to pick up and investor confidence was rising. It needed an event of dramatic consequence to trigger any decision by the president to dissolve Parliament.
The opportunity finally came through a combination of circumstances. Firstly, the negotiation process itself had stalled in April 2003. Citing non-performance of undertakings given at the `talks’ as a primary reason, and the Washington donor review meeting to which they had not being invited as another, the LTTE refused to continue the schedule of talks as planned. Worse was to follow when they declined the invitation to participate at the June Tokyo Donor Conference. Initially the donor meeting had been planned for with both the government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE being joint hosts.
There was a final issue which literally broke the camel’s back and impelled the line of action that resulted in the dissolution of Parliament.
The Interim Self-Governing Authority (ISGA)
ISGA was the response of the LTTE to the government’s proposals for an Interim Administration for the northeast. The government, after a great deal of thought by Ranil and G L, had sent in a proposal in June 2003 basically designed to provide for a mechanism which would handle effectively and speedily the donor funding anticipated for development. The decision-making authority was to consist of LTTE and government nominees (including representatives of the Muslims) with the LTTE having the majority.
The concept of an interim administration for the northeast was a cornerstone of the road map for a durable peace and had been one of Ranil’s undertakings in the election manifesto for the 2001 elections. Of course the details had not been determined and the government proposals at this stage were in the nature of a first offer open for discussions.
After a while, on October 31, 2003 the LTTE predictably, in view of their own thinking on the matter which was to obtain control of the administration of the northeast province, and not merely have a mechanism for the funding component, put forward their proposals for an Interim Self-Governing Authority (ISGA). This was clearly very far forward towards autonomy in the management of the northeast.
Ranil and G L responded immediately that the ISGA went further than they would think necessary at this stage of the negotiations but that the proposals could certainly constitute the basis for further discussion.
However considerable fear began to be expressed in the media, fuelled by elements opposed to the peace process and the political opposition to the government, that the ISGA represented the opening towards the creation of Eelam. The public debate and agitation put the UNF, already reeling from a sustained campaign carried out by the media, on the defensive. The media had a ready-made portfolio of apparent concessions made by the government to the LTTE through its ‘so-called’ peace process and supposed imminent danger to national security, especially the sea base at Trincomalee through the surreptitious establishment of 13 camps encircling the town.
Daily dispatches from intrepid news reporters filled the newspapers and the names of the ‘formidable’ LTTE camps, particularly Manirasakulam, were in everyone’s heads. Finally a brave attempt at taking the camp by a force of volunteers led by the leader of the Hela Urumaya was foiled in the nick of time – the army turning the force back before they could get within firing range. The government – defence ministry response – was lacklustre and the media had succeeded in preparing the grounds for a final denouement.
The president timed her move to perfection. On November 4, 2003 catching the ground-swell against the government at full tide and at a time when Ranil was out of the country in Washington, for a meeting with President Bush about the Free Trade Agreement with the US, President Chandrika launched her strike. She took over, under her constitutional powers, the ministry of defence on the grounds of the imminent threat to national security.
To make a clean sweep of things she also added the ministry of interior, which controlled the police, and the ministry of mass communication which ran the media institutions – two TV stations with all island coverage, the radio broadcasting service and Lake House with its complement of daily English, Sinhala and Tamil newspapers. This was a huge and an important capture of state power by the president which completely altered the balance of power in the cohabitation arrangement of December 2001. “A superbly timed and effectively executed constitutional coup,” as some commentators described it.
UNP Regroups after November 4
I had not gone to Washington with the PM because the trip was to be of very short duration. It was a long journey and I decided to stay back. As soon as the news broke, Karu Jayasuriya who was deputising for Ranil and Malik Samarawickrama, the very active chairman of the party, got together and called the rest of the Cabinet and MPs for an urgent meeting at Temple Trees. The mood was ugly. Some were for taking to the streets and creating a public agitation which would engulf the president’s house. Finally someone got through to Ranil – it was 3.00 am in the morning in Washington – but he was soon wide awake and giving instructions on how the crisis was to be met.
There was to be no panic reaction and no thought of violence. We were to be in constant consultation with him as the matter progressed. Tilak Marapana, minister of defence, John Amaratunga, minister of the interior and (media minister) Imtiaz Bakeer Markar should go about their work as if nothing had happened. The UNF parliamentary majority should be preserved at all costs. Ranil displayed great maturity in the way he dealt with this crisis. Nothing should be done to disturb the peace; the government should act with care; law and order should be preserved at all times and we should wait until he returned as scheduled. He would come back not a day earlier not a day later.
Ranil’s return to Colombo by air that morning, the November 7, was unprecedented. I have never seen a display of public support as that which he received from the hundreds of thousands who converged on the Katunayake-Colombo highway that day. The crowd was hysterical and would not let the convoy of cars pass on. One could, and some did, walk the 22 kilometres to Colombo faster than the cavalcade of cars. The triumphal procession (it had now taken on the character of a victory parade with papara music bands in open trucks providing the sound) took over nine hours. He should have been at Temple Trees at 10.00 am. He arrived at 5.30 pm flushed and hoarse with the number of speeches he had made on route but exultant in the outpouring of public support he had seen and felt that day.
The National Government of Reconciliation and Reconstruction
Ranil awaited the next move from the president. It came in the form of an invitation to talk. Ranil asked me to join him and I accepted with alacrity because it was always a pleasure to meet Chandrika. She would immediately remember the old days when I was her father’s and mother’s secretary and I felt very much at home with her. She had Karunaratne, her secretary and Mano Tittawella, who had come in as senior advisor at the presidential secretariat on her side.
The little communique we issued later said it was a cordial meeting which lasted almost two hours. But it was much more exciting than that. It began with the tension we officials feared. Ranil’s opening ball was a bumper. “Why did you have to do this when I was away?” he started off with. President Chandrika went into a very interesting, very long explanation of all that the UNP had done to her in the past two years. She had suffered all this in silence. But she had to act now since the government’s inaction had placed the nation in jeopardy. So she had to take over defence.
However she wanted Ranil to continue with the peace process. She did not want to touch it. Ranil countered that it was impossible to handle the peace process without control of the ministry of defence. If she could not give him back the ministry of defence then he had no objection at all to her handling the peace process. As the ‘ping-pong’ match was looking like ending in a draw the president made it known that she was suggesting this in the context of her overall design of a national government which could be termed one for “reconciliation and reconstruction”.
All parties would be represented in it; they could draw up a common, agreed-upon, program of action covering the national issues peace process, constitutional reform, economic development and governance questions; the Cabinet could be expanded from 50 upwards if necessary and there would be a definite period of time for the national government. At the end of the one or two-year period the need for the national government would not be there and the parties could go their individual ways.
President Chandrika also hinted that if this did not find acceptance she had other options to proceed with on her own. She indicated that there was a strong movement from within the PA for an alliance – a sandhanaya – with the JVP. That particular agreement was almost ready for signature. So the idea of a national government was now beginning to sound politically interesting and doable, albeit with a lot of goodwill on all sides. The small print had however to be worked out.
For that, both the president and Ranil agreed, one needed persons who were not politicians. Finally it was decided that the respective secretaries, that is Karu (Jayasuriya) and myself and Malik Samarawickrem and Mano Tittawella would be the four-man team who would work out the details. The president liked and got on well with Malik and she suggested he come in as Ranil’s representative while she would have Mano Tittawella as her person on the team.
Thus was born the ‘Mano-Malik Talks’ – an adequate sobriquet manufactured by the media for the seven rounds of a fascinating, extended conversation between the four of us in the months of November and December 2003 and January 2004. It was valid too, since it was the two of them who did most of the talking. Karu and I did the writing.
We had two basic terms of reference. The first which was easy was to formulate a consensual plan of action outlining the detailed measures to be taken on which all could agree. This covered steps to be taken to resume the negotiations with the LTTE, areas of governance like the appointment of the anti-bribery commission, electoral reform – the Report of the Select Committee of Parliament was to be expedited, clearing the impasse regarding the setting up of the elections commission, and a listing of urgent infrastructural projects awaiting development – roads, power plants, port facilities, etc.
The second which was extremely complex and on which no agreement could be reached, was the issue of the defence ministry. The critical question being as to whether there was any formula by which Ranil would be able to assume authority over the defence apparatus which would enable him to pursue the peace process, while the defence ministry portfolio would continue to be handled by the president. Try as we could, and we had some suggestions from a friendly neighbour too, there was no way something acceptable to both chief actors could be devised all through November and December.
Time was running out when we resumed our talks after the long X’mas and New Year break. We managed to cobble together a not-so-satisfactory arrangement which would have needed great patience and forbearance by both the president and prime minister to work through at our final meeting at the end of January. Malik and I were promised a final decision by the other side at a scheduled meeting on February 9 after the Independence Day festivities were completed. The presidential message of February 4 too seemed promising. But then inexplicably, on the night of February 7, Parliament was dissolved and elections fixed for April 2, 2004. Mano-Malik disappeared into thin air (if that were possible as far as Mano was concerned) and once again the battle lines were being drawn for the now-almost annual parliamentary elections.
Ranil took the field with his old team – all his allies from the UNF, the CWC and Rauf Hakeems S1MC, especially by his side. President Chandrika’s PA now had the powerful support of the JVP in a new political formation: the UPFA the United Peoples Freedom Alliance – retaining traces of the People in JVP and the Freedom in SLFP -. It proved to be a winning combination roaring in with massive majorities in several electoral districts.
Ranil stuck to his track record of credible achievement in the two and a quarter years he had run the government. He had promised an end to the war and peace so that people could lead a normal life. He had fulfilled that promise. He had promised the restoration of a run-down economy and the laying of a foundation for sustainable growth. He felt he had achieved this with modest growth ‘the fundamental macro-economic indicators of inflation, budgetary deficits, etc, in order, and renewed investor interest in the economy. He had promised no ‘goodies’ and he had none to hand out yet. That would come later, after the sweat and tears but no blood.
The UPFA campaign too addressed the two chief issues; the peace process and the economy. But directly in contravention of the UNF’s perception of how things had gone in two years the UPFA insisted that the peace process was flawed; it had only been a craven knuckling-down by the government to the unreasonable demands of the LTTE, endangering national security. The UPFA would keep the peace and negotiate with the LTTE but without sacrificing national security and dignity. On the economy, the UPFA maintained that the rich had got richer but the poor had got poorer. The government’s policy prescriptions, dictated by the World Bank and IMF, only favoured the rich – the cost of living had risen and unemployment was rampant.
The electorates choice was decisive as the results of the April 2 election showed:
UPFA
105 seats 45.60%
UNF
82 seats 37.83%
ITAK
22 seats 6.84%
JHU
9 seats 5.97%
SLMC
5 seats 2.02%
No party or coalition had secured the necessary 113 seats for an absolute majority in the 225 member Parliament. No more sustainable alliances appeared possible. Two new political formations with profound significance for the future too had arrived on the scene.
ITAK – the old (1956) Ilankai Tamil Arasu Katchi – alias Federal Party had emerged after a clean sweep of the north and east and were now virtually the political representatives of the LTTE.
Jatika Hela Urumaya (JHU), the national Sinhala heritage party with only Buddhist monks as its parliamentary representatives had sprung up virtually from nowhere as a protest constituency. It appeared to be a heady mix of middle class professionals, Buddhist devotees. and intellectuals dissatisfied with both mainline parties – the PA and the UNP – and their inability to protect the Sinhala Buddhist identity against the “insidious forces ofTamil separatism, unethical conversions to Christianity, and the sweeping tide of western neo-colonialism under the garb of globalisation.”‘
The polarization of political, economic and social forces had never been seen in such clarity before. The divisive impulses of class – rich against the poor; race Tamil against the Sinhalese (or the Tiger against the Lion); and religion – Buddhists against the Christians – had come back cloaked and garbed, 50 years on to challenge our leaders for the next 50 years. As Ranil, perhaps a trifle wearily, settled down to take stock and address the future, I decided it was time to make my final bow.
(Excerpted from ‘Rendering Unto Caesar’
by Bradman Weerakoon) ✍️
Features
Role of identity in the making and breaking of West Asian peace
The West Asian peace effort continues waveringly amid uncertainties. The world could be considered as having ‘some breathing space’ currently in this tangled situation on account of a dip in oil prices but whether such relief would be of a long term nature is left to be seen.
Meanwhile, some vital ‘details’ in the peace process are continuing to hobble it. One such factor is the nuclear issue. While US President Donald Trump is on record that Iran’s purported nuclear programme from now on will be monitored by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), this assertion is being denied by the Iranian authorities who indicate that Iran will be coming under no such regime. That is, Iran will be answerable to no one with regard to its legitimate right to defend itself.
Accordingly, an early closure to the nuclear question could not be expected and the furthering of peace in the region hinges on the principal sides being of one mind on the issue. Moreover, toll-free shipping through the Strait of Hormuz is proving to be a bone of contention between the warring sides.
However, perhaps going largely unnoticed in the Middle East region are identity questions of considerable magnitude that have stood in the way of the region making some headway towards a peace settlement and which would continue to undermine such a process going forward. Identity, or a group’s self conception, is by far the most intractable of the factors in the conflict and the main sides would do well to manage it effectively before long.
US Vice President J.D. Vance, as pointed out in this column last week, fired one of the first salvos in this regard in the current peace effort. He reportedly said: ‘Regional peace and stability includes stopping the funding of “terrorist organizations” .’ He probably had in mind the Hezbollah organization which is funded and armed by Iran but, needless to say, the latter would reject this statement out of hand because it does not see the Hezbollah as terroristic in orientation.
Accordingly, the tangled issue of ‘who is a terrorist?’ would recur to hamper the West Asian peace bid. An important corollary to this matter is that Middle Eastern militants would be branding US administrations as terroristic considering the humanly costly military interventions undertaken by the latter over the decades in the world’s war zones.
It is difficult to see the main sides taking up the issue of terror and arriving at a common understanding on the problem over the next couple of months in their peace deliberations but the unresolved question could be expected to be the proverbial ‘elephant in the room’ that could even wear the sides down. Accordingly, ‘quick fixes’ to the Middle East imbroglio would need to be ruled out.
However, paring down terror to its essentials, it needs to be found that in contemporary times it is identity and issues growing out of it that keep the question alive and render it intractable. In fact the problem should be seen as igniting and sustaining a multiplicity of conflicts world wide.
So pervasive are identity questions that they are seen by some as having played a role in leading to the recent resignation of Keir Starmer as UK Prime Minister. Among other things, the latter is seen as having been incapable of managing migration related issues besides falling short in strengthening domestic social cohesion.
Identity issues came to a head in the UK in the form of the recent anti-immigrant riots in Northern Ireland. Clearly, some immigrants continue to be seen as aliens and parasitic in nature in some parts of the UK by jingoistic elements. Thus is ignited anti-foreigner violence.
That said, some of the most laudable measures for the promotion of peaceful race relations are found in the UK today. The latter’s race relations legislation could be seen as constituting a model for the rest of the world and needs to be studied and adopted by particularly the global South where identity conflicts are rampant.
Unfortunately, racial amity is not being considered a priority by the Trump administration. Under the latter immigrants are being seen by supremacist whites as the archetypal ‘Other’ who should be violently shunned. Accordingly, social cohesion in the US too is being steadily undermined and stepped-up race hate in the country shouldn’t come as a surprise.
In the West Asian region, archetypal ‘Othering’ could prove particularly pernicious and destructive. It could lead to the unraveling of the current peace talks between the adversaries and needs to be addressed by them if the negotiations are to prove productive.
For far too long the West and Israel have been viewed as archetypal enemies by Iran and its supporters. On the other hand, Palestinian militants have been habitually seen by the Far Right in the US and by hard line Israelis as sworn enemies who are best eliminated. These seemingly unresolvable divides in the Middle East could bring down the present negotiatory process.
Even if the present round of mediated negotiations between the US and Iran lead to a substantive cessation of hostilities in West Asia, the divisive mindsets of the prime antagonists, that is, the US and its ally Israel on the one side and Iran and its supportive militant groups on the other, would need to be changed for the better if enduring peace is to be given a chance. That is, mindsets would need to be transformed on both sides of the divide from mutual hostility to mutual amicability. No doubt, a long-gestation process.
It cannot be stressed enough that those mediating in this long-running conflict, themselves need to approach peace-making with unbiased minds. It needs to be realized, for example, that Israel too has been ‘hurting’ badly in this conflict over the decades to the degree to which the Palestinian side has been victimized cruelly, dispossessed and divested of dignity.
Any negotiated peaceful settlement should seek to address this persistent mindset malaise as well and turn enmity into amicability. An equitable solution that addresses the lingering grievances of both sides could lay the basis for this process of ‘Turning Spears into Ploughshares.’
‘Land and Bread’ have been at the heart of the Middle East conflict over the decades or even centuries. An equitable solution should provide these assets in equal measure for both sides. There is no getting away from the ‘Two State Solution’.
Features
Central bankers live on Short End Street; Economic planners live on Long End Street
Long End Street is not a summation of Short End Streets. Eighteen short-term crises and no long-term growth in sight!
For quite some time, there has been no agency of government dealing with long-term economic and social policy questions. Nor have universities been of any help. There has been a National Planning Department in the Ministry of Finance but we have not seen any worthwhile reports from them. M. D. H. Jayawardena, in 1956, presented in Parliament the Six-Year Programme of Investment. Soloman Bandaranaike established a National Planning Council and a Planning Department, with Princy Siriwardena as its Director. They wrote the Ten-Year Plan, better known for its readability than its depth of analysis or policy content. Ten years or so later Dudley Senanayake established a Ministry of Planning and Employment with Gamani Corea (later of high international repute) as its Permanent Secretary. The Ministry was responsible for some useful analytical work and the development of a bureaucracy responsible for plan implementation. The latter was the work of a brilliant member of the Ceylon Civil Service, Godfrey Gunatilleke, who also worked in the Ministry. The major pre-occupation of the Ministry turned out to be the annual government budget and the management of direly scarce foreign exchange, all short term considerations. They set up a bureaucratic mechanism to evaluate capital expenditure in the government budget. The Ministry won plaudits for its Foreign Exchange Budget, some analytical wok on the economy, including population projections as well as education, in both schools and universities. As the 1970s wore on, planning earned a bad press and the new government of 1971 disbanded most of that and created a Department of National Planning in the Ministry of Finance, which survives to date.
A part of the purpose of this narrative has been to bring out that, all along, government has had no outfit of economists and sociologists whose job was to study long term changes in our society and the economy and in the rest of the world and propose solutions for consideration by governments. (A brilliant exception was the work on education, that was directed by Jinapala Alles, who had graduated in chemistry and was a fast learner and was at great ease with numbers. He was also an effortless leader of a small team of self-selected competent and enthusiastic public servants.) The government depended on the Central Bank for advice on long term development of the economy. Princy Siriwardena was seconded for service in the Planning Secretariat; similarly, Gamani Corea was from the Bank. Later, he was replaced with H.A.de S. Gunasekera, likely the most brilliant economics teacher in the University of Ceylon. He taught monetary economics, essentially short term. (His favourite economist Keynes famously wrote, “In the long run we are all dead”.)
When the Ministry of Planning and Employment was established in 1965, government plundered the Central Bank to staff it: Gamani Corea, R. M. Seneviratne, N. Ramachandran, Nihal Kappagoda and G. Usvatte-aratchi. Later, W. M. Tillekeratne and A. S. Jayawardena both long term employees of the Central Bank, were appointed as the chief economist of government. Jayawardena still later became the Governor of the Bank. Several other employees of the Bank, including J. B. Kelegama, P. B. Karandawela, P. B. Jayasundera worked at high levels in successive governments and that practice continued when Mahinda Siriwardena became the Secretary to the Ministry of Finance when Anura Dissanayake became the Minister of Finance. It is mysterious that the government saw no need for specialist advisers who would identify long term economic and social problems and solutions therefor, look out for markets and technology and warn of impending pitfalls, in contrast to our mighty neighbour which had a Planning Commission that handled long term problems and a Central Bank which had learnt to handle masterly, monetary problems.
Pitambar Pant, Montek Singh Ahluwalia, Manmohan Singh, I. G. Patel and Raghu Ram Rajan were most distinguished economics policymakers and central bankers. Japan benefited greatly from the work of MITI. So did Korea from its counterpart. This is not to argue that had there been an outfit of that sort, Sri Lanka would now be rich but to warn that the Central Bank is neither equipped nor fit to fight those battles. If you scan the Central Bank Act of 2023, you will find stabilisation the most frequently recurring theme. Clause 6 reads ‘The primary object (objective?) of the Central Bank shall be to achieve and maintain domestic price stability.’ The most generous reading that the Bank may have anything to do with economic development is in Clause 6 (4) ‘In pursuing the primary object (objective?), the Central Bank shall take into account, inter alia, the stabilisation of output towards its potential level.’ Lawyers may have a field day with that and economists may beg for its meaning.
Amarananda Jayawardena was the last Governor of the Central Bank who had understood that the central bank was equipped to handle short term problems and that not always valiantly, and that it had neither the tools nor the resources to plan and engineer long term development. As Governor, he did not speak for the government on long term economic and social problems, although prior to assuming duties as Governor of the Bank, he had been the chief economist of the government. Jayawardena knew all too well the nature of the tools and the resources he had and how far he could confidently aim and shoot. It was simply silly to produce a Five-year Road Map (no matter how colourful the accompanying graphics), when a central bank mainly used transactions in the short-term financial assets market to move interest rates and the demand for money. The Bank of England, for most of the 20th century, used Commercial Paper with two ‘good names’ at its Discount Window. Short-term and long-term rates of interest, normally, behave in a predictable relationship, although occasionally, and in volatile times, that relationship may become inverted. (I am not well read on recent Fed and the Riks Bank market operations.)
The economists at the Central Bank are experts in monetary policy and are rarely knowledgeable about economic growth. An exception was S. B. D. de Silva and he found writing a half page note to the Centra Bank Bulletin (monthly) stultifying. He left the Bank quite young and continued studying economics until the very end of his life. As undergraduates they may have read on economic growth and development but as professionals in the central bank, it is unlikely that they kept working on problems in that area. They may also have learned, some time, that there has been no central bank credited with spearheading economic development in any country. Therefore, to pretend that they can advise the government on economic planning, is a hobby which they would be wise to desist from.
We did a splendid job of saving our new born children and their mothers as indicated in low infant mortality and maternal mortality rates. We scored an even more resounding victory in educating all our children. If we have any claim to any civilizing missions in the 20th century, these two stand out. Beside them, we have been mostly failures. The economy has advanced only laggardly. It has miserably failed to exploit excellent opportunities to sell in burgeoning markets, output employing a healthy and educated labour force. Japan, South Korea, China, Vietnam, south India, Ethiopia, Rwanda and several other countries, all (except Japan) late comers to the game compared to Sri Lanka, succeeded in doing just that. It is wrong to blame governments alone for poor economic growth, as many do. Most economic activity in this country is run by the private sector and leaders there have made poor use of opportunities.
When ministers of government and its employers collect bribes, private sector persons pay bribes. The markedly rapid economic growth in Andhra Pradesh, Telangana, Karnataka, Tamil Nadu and Keralam and poor growth in Madhya Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar and many others in the north east are under the same central government dispensation, sharply pointing to differences in the quality of business leadership in the two groups. ‘Big business’ here run betting shops, supermarkets, hospitals, import and market household equipment, banks and insurance companies and, most ambitiously maintain construction companies. (In the widely watched IPL cricket matches 2026, Sri Lanka advertised regularly a Betting Centre!) Tourism in this country is the business of small-scale enterprises with low productivity. The ubiquitous kade with a stock-in-trade of less than one hundred thousand rupees, borrowed from a relative or a friend, is a sign of rampant unemployment and not of budding entrepreneurship. When you go to consult a doctor in a private hospital in Colombo and wait endless hours, count the number of men and women employees idling, supervised by a proportionately large number of idling supervisors. Where are the large-scale manufacturing and service companies, selling the world over, where economies of scale abound in the 21st century? So far as I recall, there has been no Initial Public Offering (IPO) of shares in the Colombo Stock Market during the last 7 years. Nor have multinational companies established here any large factories or offices.
Is the air we breathe deathly to enterprise?
by Usvatte-aratchi
Features
A Requiem for Keir Starmer rule
By the time Sir Keir Rodney Starmer resigned, polls showed that he had become the least popular Labour Prime Minister in living memory. His fall was all the more striking because his political beginnings had once suggested a very different trajectory. As a teenager in the Labour Party Young Socialists, and later as editor of the Marxist journal Socialist Alternatives, he had stood firmly on the radical left. As a human rights lawyer he opposed the illegal invasion of Iraq, earning a reputation for principle and moral clarity.
It was this early radicalism that his supporters later weaponised, presenting him as a unifying leftwing figure in the aftermath of the coup against the Labour Party leader Jeremy Corbyn. The right-wing of Labour, having spent years undermining Corbyn (including through a coordinated campaign that framed him, falsely, as anti-Semitic) found in Starmer a vessel through which they could reclaim the party while reassuring the membership that continuity with the Corbyn surge remained intact.
In his resignation speech, Starmer claimed to have inherited a politically, morally and financially bankrupt Labour Party. Yet the record shows that Corbyn had revived the party’s grassroots, drawing tens of thousands of new members back to a party embodying the tradition of Keir Hardie. The oligarchy closed ranks against this leftist heavyweight, using Starmer and the Labour right wing as their weapon. Starmer’s “Changed Labour” was not a renewal but a repudiation, embracing the very Thatcherite revisionism that had hollowed Labour out in the first place.
A Britain battered by decades of neoliberal restructuring formed the backdrop to Starmer’s rise. The cumulative effects of Maggie “milk-snatcher” Thatcher’s programme, deepened by Blair, Cameron, May, and Johnson, combined with the convulsions of Brexit to produce a profound economic, social, and political crisis. The Conservative Party imploded under the weight of its own contradictions. Starmer, offering managerial calm, an a Corbyn-lite manifesto, rode the wave of Tory collapse to a landslide victory.
But once in office, he revealed himself as a Blairite in sombre tones: a Thatcherite in Labour clothing. Within weeks he slashed winter fuel payments for pensioners, inaugurating a harsh antiworkingclass agenda. He embraced the Israeli government even as it carried out genocide in Gaza. The former human rights lawyer now used antiterror legislation to suppress dissent, particularly protests against the genocide. His immigration rhetoric, invoking an “island of strangers,” echoed the poisonous cadences of Enoch Powell.
Throughout his premiership he remained pofaced, showing little emotion even when forced into humiliating Uturns by public outrage. He displayed no visible sorrow at the mass killing of children in Gaza. Only at the prospect of losing office did he appear moved. He was, in the words of Saki, a man with “the soul of a meringue,” a mediocrity whose obedience to the oligarchic class and to Zionist backers embodied what Hannah Arendt called the banality of evil. His legacy – and that of the Tories who preceded him – is a nation distrustful of politicians of whatever hue, open to the pseudo-anti-elite, deception of the billionaire-backed racist far-right
His resignation leaves Britain at a crossroads – will it follow the fascistic path of Nigel Farage’s Reform Party, or will it go down the green-red road of Zach Polanski and Corbyn? Even replacing Starmer with the newly-elected Andy Burnham will only provide more-of-the-same Tory policies – Burnham went on record saying his first foreign visit as Prime Minister would be to Israel. These are the same policies that created a visceral hatred of Starmer and opened the gates for Reform’s surge.
When news of his resignation broke, a friend told this writer that the one who had engineered the exit of Jeremy Corbyn had been unable to complete two years in office. He added, ‘Rajakam kalath kalakam palade”-– even if you reign, your deeds will bear consequences.
And, so ends the Starmer era, not with the dignity of a statesman, but with the hollow thud of a project built on betrayal, opportunism, and the abandonment of the very principles he once claimed to uphold.
by Vinod Moonesinghe
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