Features
Combination of circumstances gives CBK the opportunity to dissolve Parliament
Bradman takes final bow after a period on intense political manoeuvering
Ranil’s strength, according to the Constitution, came from his supremacy in Parliament. With great managerial skill he managed to keep at all times a sizable majority in place. The UNF never lost a vote in Parliament during those two years (Ranil was PM). The UNF itself was a coalition bringing together five parties which contested the election together. It must have brought much credit to his political acumen and management skills that in spite of severe stresses and strains, the UNF held together. It was also quite remarkable in a country where party political loyalties are notably fickle, that during the period of his government there was not a single resignation from party or office.
According to the Constitution, Parliament cannot be dissolved by presidential fiat until one year after its election. Thereafter though, the president is vested with the power to dissolve parliament at will and even though the government might have an absolute majority in the House. When Ranil’s second year began there was the opportunity for a sudden dissolution but although fears were raised from time to time, this did not happen. The peace process was well on track, the economy was beginning to pick up and investor confidence was rising. It needed an event of dramatic consequence to trigger any decision by the president to dissolve Parliament.
The opportunity finally came through a combination of circumstances. Firstly, the negotiation process itself had stalled in April 2003. Citing non-performance of undertakings given at the `talks’ as a primary reason, and the Washington donor review meeting to which they had not being invited as another, the LTTE refused to continue the schedule of talks as planned. Worse was to follow when they declined the invitation to participate at the June Tokyo Donor Conference. Initially the donor meeting had been planned for with both the government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE being joint hosts.
There was a final issue which literally broke the camel’s back and impelled the line of action that resulted in the dissolution of Parliament.
The Interim Self-Governing Authority (ISGA)
ISGA was the response of the LTTE to the government’s proposals for an Interim Administration for the northeast. The government, after a great deal of thought by Ranil and G L, had sent in a proposal in June 2003 basically designed to provide for a mechanism which would handle effectively and speedily the donor funding anticipated for development. The decision-making authority was to consist of LTTE and government nominees (including representatives of the Muslims) with the LTTE having the majority.
The concept of an interim administration for the northeast was a cornerstone of the road map for a durable peace and had been one of Ranil’s undertakings in the election manifesto for the 2001 elections. Of course the details had not been determined and the government proposals at this stage were in the nature of a first offer open for discussions.
After a while, on October 31, 2003 the LTTE predictably, in view of their own thinking on the matter which was to obtain control of the administration of the northeast province, and not merely have a mechanism for the funding component, put forward their proposals for an Interim Self-Governing Authority (ISGA). This was clearly very far forward towards autonomy in the management of the northeast.
Ranil and G L responded immediately that the ISGA went further than they would think necessary at this stage of the negotiations but that the proposals could certainly constitute the basis for further discussion.
However considerable fear began to be expressed in the media, fuelled by elements opposed to the peace process and the political opposition to the government, that the ISGA represented the opening towards the creation of Eelam. The public debate and agitation put the UNF, already reeling from a sustained campaign carried out by the media, on the defensive. The media had a ready-made portfolio of apparent concessions made by the government to the LTTE through its ‘so-called’ peace process and supposed imminent danger to national security, especially the sea base at Trincomalee through the surreptitious establishment of 13 camps encircling the town.
Daily dispatches from intrepid news reporters filled the newspapers and the names of the ‘formidable’ LTTE camps, particularly Manirasakulam, were in everyone’s heads. Finally a brave attempt at taking the camp by a force of volunteers led by the leader of the Hela Urumaya was foiled in the nick of time – the army turning the force back before they could get within firing range. The government – defence ministry response – was lacklustre and the media had succeeded in preparing the grounds for a final denouement.
The president timed her move to perfection. On November 4, 2003 catching the ground-swell against the government at full tide and at a time when Ranil was out of the country in Washington, for a meeting with President Bush about the Free Trade Agreement with the US, President Chandrika launched her strike. She took over, under her constitutional powers, the ministry of defence on the grounds of the imminent threat to national security.
To make a clean sweep of things she also added the ministry of interior, which controlled the police, and the ministry of mass communication which ran the media institutions – two TV stations with all island coverage, the radio broadcasting service and Lake House with its complement of daily English, Sinhala and Tamil newspapers. This was a huge and an important capture of state power by the president which completely altered the balance of power in the cohabitation arrangement of December 2001. “A superbly timed and effectively executed constitutional coup,” as some commentators described it.
UNP Regroups after November 4
I had not gone to Washington with the PM because the trip was to be of very short duration. It was a long journey and I decided to stay back. As soon as the news broke, Karu Jayasuriya who was deputising for Ranil and Malik Samarawickrama, the very active chairman of the party, got together and called the rest of the Cabinet and MPs for an urgent meeting at Temple Trees. The mood was ugly. Some were for taking to the streets and creating a public agitation which would engulf the president’s house. Finally someone got through to Ranil – it was 3.00 am in the morning in Washington – but he was soon wide awake and giving instructions on how the crisis was to be met.
There was to be no panic reaction and no thought of violence. We were to be in constant consultation with him as the matter progressed. Tilak Marapana, minister of defence, John Amaratunga, minister of the interior and (media minister) Imtiaz Bakeer Markar should go about their work as if nothing had happened. The UNF parliamentary majority should be preserved at all costs. Ranil displayed great maturity in the way he dealt with this crisis. Nothing should be done to disturb the peace; the government should act with care; law and order should be preserved at all times and we should wait until he returned as scheduled. He would come back not a day earlier not a day later.
Ranil’s return to Colombo by air that morning, the November 7, was unprecedented. I have never seen a display of public support as that which he received from the hundreds of thousands who converged on the Katunayake-Colombo highway that day. The crowd was hysterical and would not let the convoy of cars pass on. One could, and some did, walk the 22 kilometres to Colombo faster than the cavalcade of cars. The triumphal procession (it had now taken on the character of a victory parade with papara music bands in open trucks providing the sound) took over nine hours. He should have been at Temple Trees at 10.00 am. He arrived at 5.30 pm flushed and hoarse with the number of speeches he had made on route but exultant in the outpouring of public support he had seen and felt that day.
The National Government of Reconciliation and Reconstruction
Ranil awaited the next move from the president. It came in the form of an invitation to talk. Ranil asked me to join him and I accepted with alacrity because it was always a pleasure to meet Chandrika. She would immediately remember the old days when I was her father’s and mother’s secretary and I felt very much at home with her. She had Karunaratne, her secretary and Mano Tittawella, who had come in as senior advisor at the presidential secretariat on her side.
The little communique we issued later said it was a cordial meeting which lasted almost two hours. But it was much more exciting than that. It began with the tension we officials feared. Ranil’s opening ball was a bumper. “Why did you have to do this when I was away?” he started off with. President Chandrika went into a very interesting, very long explanation of all that the UNP had done to her in the past two years. She had suffered all this in silence. But she had to act now since the government’s inaction had placed the nation in jeopardy. So she had to take over defence.
However she wanted Ranil to continue with the peace process. She did not want to touch it. Ranil countered that it was impossible to handle the peace process without control of the ministry of defence. If she could not give him back the ministry of defence then he had no objection at all to her handling the peace process. As the ‘ping-pong’ match was looking like ending in a draw the president made it known that she was suggesting this in the context of her overall design of a national government which could be termed one for “reconciliation and reconstruction”.
All parties would be represented in it; they could draw up a common, agreed-upon, program of action covering the national issues peace process, constitutional reform, economic development and governance questions; the Cabinet could be expanded from 50 upwards if necessary and there would be a definite period of time for the national government. At the end of the one or two-year period the need for the national government would not be there and the parties could go their individual ways.
President Chandrika also hinted that if this did not find acceptance she had other options to proceed with on her own. She indicated that there was a strong movement from within the PA for an alliance – a sandhanaya – with the JVP. That particular agreement was almost ready for signature. So the idea of a national government was now beginning to sound politically interesting and doable, albeit with a lot of goodwill on all sides. The small print had however to be worked out.
For that, both the president and Ranil agreed, one needed persons who were not politicians. Finally it was decided that the respective secretaries, that is Karu (Jayasuriya) and myself and Malik Samarawickrem and Mano Tittawella would be the four-man team who would work out the details. The president liked and got on well with Malik and she suggested he come in as Ranil’s representative while she would have Mano Tittawella as her person on the team.
Thus was born the ‘Mano-Malik Talks’ – an adequate sobriquet manufactured by the media for the seven rounds of a fascinating, extended conversation between the four of us in the months of November and December 2003 and January 2004. It was valid too, since it was the two of them who did most of the talking. Karu and I did the writing.
We had two basic terms of reference. The first which was easy was to formulate a consensual plan of action outlining the detailed measures to be taken on which all could agree. This covered steps to be taken to resume the negotiations with the LTTE, areas of governance like the appointment of the anti-bribery commission, electoral reform – the Report of the Select Committee of Parliament was to be expedited, clearing the impasse regarding the setting up of the elections commission, and a listing of urgent infrastructural projects awaiting development – roads, power plants, port facilities, etc.
The second which was extremely complex and on which no agreement could be reached, was the issue of the defence ministry. The critical question being as to whether there was any formula by which Ranil would be able to assume authority over the defence apparatus which would enable him to pursue the peace process, while the defence ministry portfolio would continue to be handled by the president. Try as we could, and we had some suggestions from a friendly neighbour too, there was no way something acceptable to both chief actors could be devised all through November and December.
Time was running out when we resumed our talks after the long X’mas and New Year break. We managed to cobble together a not-so-satisfactory arrangement which would have needed great patience and forbearance by both the president and prime minister to work through at our final meeting at the end of January. Malik and I were promised a final decision by the other side at a scheduled meeting on February 9 after the Independence Day festivities were completed. The presidential message of February 4 too seemed promising. But then inexplicably, on the night of February 7, Parliament was dissolved and elections fixed for April 2, 2004. Mano-Malik disappeared into thin air (if that were possible as far as Mano was concerned) and once again the battle lines were being drawn for the now-almost annual parliamentary elections.
Ranil took the field with his old team – all his allies from the UNF, the CWC and Rauf Hakeems S1MC, especially by his side. President Chandrika’s PA now had the powerful support of the JVP in a new political formation: the UPFA the United Peoples Freedom Alliance – retaining traces of the People in JVP and the Freedom in SLFP -. It proved to be a winning combination roaring in with massive majorities in several electoral districts.
Ranil stuck to his track record of credible achievement in the two and a quarter years he had run the government. He had promised an end to the war and peace so that people could lead a normal life. He had fulfilled that promise. He had promised the restoration of a run-down economy and the laying of a foundation for sustainable growth. He felt he had achieved this with modest growth ‘the fundamental macro-economic indicators of inflation, budgetary deficits, etc, in order, and renewed investor interest in the economy. He had promised no ‘goodies’ and he had none to hand out yet. That would come later, after the sweat and tears but no blood.
The UPFA campaign too addressed the two chief issues; the peace process and the economy. But directly in contravention of the UNF’s perception of how things had gone in two years the UPFA insisted that the peace process was flawed; it had only been a craven knuckling-down by the government to the unreasonable demands of the LTTE, endangering national security. The UPFA would keep the peace and negotiate with the LTTE but without sacrificing national security and dignity. On the economy, the UPFA maintained that the rich had got richer but the poor had got poorer. The government’s policy prescriptions, dictated by the World Bank and IMF, only favoured the rich – the cost of living had risen and unemployment was rampant.
The electorates choice was decisive as the results of the April 2 election showed:
UPFA
105 seats 45.60%
UNF
82 seats 37.83%
ITAK
22 seats 6.84%
JHU
9 seats 5.97%
SLMC
5 seats 2.02%
No party or coalition had secured the necessary 113 seats for an absolute majority in the 225 member Parliament. No more sustainable alliances appeared possible. Two new political formations with profound significance for the future too had arrived on the scene.
ITAK – the old (1956) Ilankai Tamil Arasu Katchi – alias Federal Party had emerged after a clean sweep of the north and east and were now virtually the political representatives of the LTTE.
Jatika Hela Urumaya (JHU), the national Sinhala heritage party with only Buddhist monks as its parliamentary representatives had sprung up virtually from nowhere as a protest constituency. It appeared to be a heady mix of middle class professionals, Buddhist devotees. and intellectuals dissatisfied with both mainline parties – the PA and the UNP – and their inability to protect the Sinhala Buddhist identity against the “insidious forces ofTamil separatism, unethical conversions to Christianity, and the sweeping tide of western neo-colonialism under the garb of globalisation.”‘
The polarization of political, economic and social forces had never been seen in such clarity before. The divisive impulses of class – rich against the poor; race Tamil against the Sinhalese (or the Tiger against the Lion); and religion – Buddhists against the Christians – had come back cloaked and garbed, 50 years on to challenge our leaders for the next 50 years. As Ranil, perhaps a trifle wearily, settled down to take stock and address the future, I decided it was time to make my final bow.
(Excerpted from ‘Rendering Unto Caesar’
by Bradman Weerakoon) ✍️
Features
Rebuilding Sri Lanka Through Inclusive Governance
In the immediate aftermath of Cyclone Ditwah, the government has moved swiftly to establish a Presidential Task Force for Rebuilding Sri Lanka with a core committee to assess requirements, set priorities, allocate resources and raise and disburse funds. Public reaction, however, has focused on the committee’s problematic composition. All eleven committee members are men, and all non-government seats are held by business personalities with no known expertise in complex national development projects, disaster management and addressing the needs of vulnerable populations. They belong to the top echelon of Sri Lanka’s private sector which has been making extraordinary profits. The government has been urged by civil society groups to reconsider the role and purpose of this task force and reconstitute it to be more representative of the country and its multiple needs.
The group of high-powered businessmen initially appointed might greatly help mobilise funds from corporates and international donors, but this group may be ill equipped to determine priorities and oversee disbursement and spending. It would be necessary to separate fundraising, fund oversight and spending prioritisation, given the different capabilities and considerations required for each. International experience in post disaster recovery shows that inclusive and representative structures are more likely to produce outcomes that are equitable, efficient and publicly accepted. Civil society, for instance, brings knowledge rooted in communities, experience in working with vulnerable groups and a capacity to question assumptions that may otherwise go unchallenged.
A positive and important development is that the government has been responsive to these criticisms and has invited at least one civil society representative to join the Rebuilding Sri Lanka committee. This decision deserves to be taken seriously and responded to positively by civil society which needs to call for more representation rather than a single representative. Such a demand would reflect an understanding that rebuilding after a national disaster cannot be undertaken by the state and the business community alone. The inclusion of civil society will strengthen transparency and public confidence, particularly at a moment when trust in institutions remains fragile. While one appointment does not in itself ensure inclusive governance, it opens the door to a more participatory approach that needs to be expanded and institutionalised.
Costly Exclusions
Going down the road of history, the absence of inclusion in government policymaking has cost the country dearly. The exclusion of others, not of one’s own community or political party, started at the very dawn of Independence in 1948. The Father of the Nation, D S Senanayake, led his government to exclude the Malaiyaha Tamil community by depriving them of their citizenship rights. Eight years later, in 1956, the Oxford educated S W R D Bandaranaike effectively excluded the Tamil speaking people from the government by making Sinhala the sole official language. These early decisions normalised exclusion as a tool of governance rather than accommodation and paved the way for seven decades of political conflict and three decades of internal war.
Exclusion has also taken place virulently on a political party basis. Both of Sri Lanka’s post Independence constitutions were decided on by the government alone. The opposition political parties voted against the new constitutions of 1972 and 1977 because they had been excluded from participating in their design. The proposals they had made were not accepted. The basic law of the country was never forged by consensus. This legacy continues to shape adversarial politics and institutional fragility. The exclusion of other communities and political parties from decision making has led to frequent reversals of government policy. Whether in education or economic regulation or foreign policy, what one government has done the successor government has undone.
Sri Lanka’s poor performance in securing the foreign investment necessary for rapid economic growth can be attributed to this factor in the main. Policy instability is not simply an economic problem but a political one rooted in narrow ownership of power. In 2022, when the people went on to the streets to protest against the government and caused it to fall, they demanded system change in which their primary focus was corruption, which had reached very high levels both literally and figuratively. The focus on corruption, as being done by the government at present, has two beneficial impacts for the government. The first is that it ensures that a minimum of resources will be wasted so that the maximum may be used for the people’s welfare.
Second Benefit
The second benefit is that by focusing on the crime of corruption, the government can disable many leaders in the opposition. The more opposition leaders who are behind bars on charges of corruption, the less competition the government faces. Yet these gains do not substitute for the deeper requirement of inclusive governance. The present government seems to have identified corruption as the problem it will emphasise. However, reducing or eliminating corruption by itself is not going to lead to rapid economic development. Corruption is not the sole reason for the absence of economic growth. The most important factor in rapid economic growth is to have government policies that are not reversed every time a new government comes to power.
For Sri Lanka to make the transition to self-sustaining and rapid economic development, it is necessary that the economic policies followed today are not reversed tomorrow. The best way to ensure continuity of policy is to be inclusive in governance. Instead of excluding those in the opposition, the mainstream opposition in particular needs to be included. In terms of system change, the government has scored high with regard to corruption. There is a general feeling that corruption in the country is much reduced compared to the past. However, with regard to inclusion the government needs to demonstrate more commitment. This was evident in the initial choice of cabinet ministers, who were nearly all men from the majority ethnic community. Important committees it formed, including the Presidential Task Force for a Clean Sri Lanka and the Rebuilding Sri Lanka Task Force, also failed at first to reflect the diversity of the country.
In a multi ethnic and multi religious society like Sri Lanka, inclusivity is not merely symbolic. It is essential for addressing diverse perspectives and fostering mutual understanding. It is important to have members of the Tamil, Muslim and other minority communities, and women who are 52 percent of the population, appointed to important decision making bodies, especially those tasked with national recovery. Without such representation, the risk is that the very communities most affected by the crisis will remain unheard, and old grievances will be reproduced in new forms. The invitation extended to civil society to participate in the Rebuilding Sri Lanka Task Force is an important beginning. Whether it becomes a turning point will depend on whether the government chooses to make inclusion a principle of governance rather than treat it as a show of concession made under pressure.
by Jehan Perera
Features
Reservoir operation and flooding
Former Director General of Irrigation, G.T. Dharmasena, in an article, titled “Revival of Innovative systems for reservoir operation and flood forecasting” in The Island of 17 December, 2025, starts out by stating:
“Most reservoirs in Sri Lanka are agriculture and hydropower dominated. Reservoir operators are often unwilling to acknowledge the flood detention capability of major reservoirs during the onset of monsoons. Deviating from the traditional priority for food production and hydropower development, it is time to reorient the operational approach of major reservoirs operators under extreme events, where flood control becomes a vital function. While admitting that total elimination of flood impacts is not technically feasible, the impacts can be reduced by efficient operation of reservoirs and effective early warning systems”.
Addressing the question often raised by the public as to “Why is flooding more prominent downstream of reservoirs compared to the period before they were built,” Mr. Dharmasena cites the following instances: “For instance, why do (sic) Magama in Tissamaharama face floods threats after the construction of the massive Kirindi Oya reservoir? Similarly, why does Ambalantota flood after the construction of Udawalawe Reservoir? Furthermore, why is Molkawa, in the Kalutara District area, getting flooded so often after the construction of Kukule reservoir”?
“These situations exist in several other river basins, too. Engineers must, therefore, be mindful of the need to strictly control the operation of the reservoir gates by their field staff. (Since) “The actual field situation can sometimes deviate significantly from the theoretical technology… it is necessary to examine whether gate operators are strictly adhering to the operational guidelines, as gate operation currently relies too much on the discretion of the operator at the site”.
COMMENT
For Mr. Dharmasena to bring to the attention of the public that “gate operation currently relies too much on the discretion of the operator at the site”, is being disingenuous, after accepting flooding as a way of life for ALL major reservoirs for decades and not doing much about it. As far as the public is concerned, their expectation is that the Institution responsible for Reservoir Management should, not only develop the necessary guidelines to address flooding but also ensure that they are strictly administered by those responsible, without leaving it to the arbitrary discretion of field staff. This exercise should be reviewed annually after each monsoon, if lives are to be saved and livelihoods are to be sustained.
IMPACT of GATE OPERATION on FLOODING
According to Mr. Dhamasena, “Major reservoir spillways are designed for very high return periods… If the spillway gates are opened fully when reservoir is at full capacity, this can produce an artificial flood of a very large magnitude… Therefore, reservoir operators must be mindful in this regard to avoid any artificial flood creation” (Ibid). Continuing, he states: “In reality reservoir spillways are often designed for the sole safety of the reservoir structure, often compromising the safety of the downstream population. This design concept was promoted by foreign agencies in recent times to safeguard their investment for dams. Consequently, the discharge capacities of these spill gates significantly exceed the natural carrying capacity of river(s) downstream” (Ibid).
COMMENT
The design concept where priority is given to the “sole safety of the structure” that causes the discharge capacity of spill gates to “significantly exceed” the carrying capacity of the river is not limited to foreign agencies. Such concepts are also adopted by local designers as well, judging from the fact that flooding is accepted as an inevitable feature of reservoirs. Since design concepts in their current form lack concern for serious destructive consequences downstream and, therefore, unacceptable, it is imperative that the Government mandates that current design criteria are revisited as a critical part of the restoration programme.
CONNECTIVITY BETWEEN GATE OPENINGS and SAFETY MEASURES
It is only after the devastation of historic proportions left behind by Cyclone Ditwah that the Public is aware that major reservoirs are designed with spill gate openings to protect the safety of the structure without factoring in the consequences downstream, such as the safety of the population is an unacceptable proposition. The Institution or Institutions associated with the design have a responsibility not only to inform but also work together with Institutions such as Disaster Management and any others responsible for the consequences downstream, so that they could prepare for what is to follow.
Without working in isolation and without limiting it only to, informing related Institutions, the need is for Institutions that design reservoirs to work as a team with Forecasting and Disaster Management and develop operational frameworks that should be institutionalised and approved by the Cabinet of Ministers. The need is to recognize that without connectivity between spill gate openings and safety measures downstream, catastrophes downstream are bound to recur.
Therefore, the mandate for dam designers and those responsible for disaster management and forecasting should be for them to jointly establish guidelines relating to what safety measures are to be adopted for varying degrees of spill gate openings. For instance, the carrying capacity of the river should relate with a specific openinig of the spill gate. Another specific opening is required when the population should be compelled to move to high ground. The process should continue until the spill gate opening is such that it warrants the population to be evacuated. This relationship could also be established by relating the spill gate openings to the width of the river downstream.
The measures recommended above should be backed up by the judicious use of the land within the flood plain of reservoirs for “DRY DAMS” with sufficient capacity to intercept part of the spill gate discharge from which excess water could be released within the carrying capacity of the river. By relating the capacity of the DRY DAM to the spill gate opening, a degree of safety could be established. However, since the practice of demarcating flood plains is not taken seriously by the Institution concerned, the Government should introduce a Bill that such demarcations are made mandatory as part of State Land in the design and operation of reservoirs. Adopting such a practice would not only contribute significantly to control flooding, but also save lives by not permitting settlement but permitting agricultural activities only within these zones. Furthermore, the creation of an intermediate zone to contain excess flood waters would not tax the safety measures to the extent it would in the absence of such a safety net.
CONCLUSION
Perhaps, the towns of Kotmale and Gampola suffered severe flooding and loss of life because the opening of spill gates to release the unprecedented volumes of water from Cyclone Ditwah, was warranted by the need to ensure the safety of Kotmale and Upper Kotmale Dams.
This and other similar disasters bring into focus the connectivity that exists between forecasting, operation of spill gates, flooding and disaster management. Therefore, it is imperative that the government introduce the much-needed legislative and executive measures to ensure that the agencies associated with these disciplines develop a common operational framework to mitigate flooding and its destructive consequences. A critical feature of such a framework should be the demarcation of the flood plain, and decree that land within the flood plain is a zone set aside for DRY DAMS, planted with trees and free of human settlements, other than for agricultural purposes. In addition, the mandate of such a framework should establish for each river basin the relationship between the degree to which spill gates are opened with levels of flooding and appropriate safety measures.
The government should insist that associated Agencies identify and conduct a pilot project to ascertain the efficacy of the recommendations cited above and if need be, modify it accordingly, so that downstream physical features that are unique to each river basin are taken into account and made an integral feature of reservoir design. Even if such restrictions downstream limit the capacities to store spill gate discharges, it has to be appreciated that providing such facilities within the flood plain to any degree would mitigate the destructive consequences of the flooding.
By Neville Ladduwahetty
Features
Listening to the Language of Shells
The ocean rarely raises its voice. Instead, it leaves behind signs — subtle, intricate and enduring — for those willing to observe closely. Along Sri Lanka’s shores, these signs often appear in the form of seashells: spiralled, ridged, polished by waves, carrying within them the quiet history of marine life. For Marine Naturalist Dr. Malik Fernando, these shells are not souvenirs of the sea but storytellers, bearing witness to ecological change, resilience and loss.
“Seashells are among the most eloquent narrators of the ocean’s condition,” Dr. Fernando told The Island. “They are biological archives. If you know how to read them, they reveal the story of our seas, past and present.”
A long-standing marine conservationist and a member of the Marine Subcommittee of the Wildlife & Nature Protection Society (WNPS), Dr. Fernando has dedicated much of his life to understanding and protecting Sri Lanka’s marine ecosystems. While charismatic megafauna often dominate conservation discourse, he has consistently drawn attention to less celebrated but equally vital marine organisms — particularly molluscs, whose shells are integral to coastal and reef ecosystems.
“Shells are often admired for their beauty, but rarely for their function,” he said. “They are homes, shields and structural components of marine habitats. When shell-bearing organisms decline, it destabilises entire food webs.”
Sri Lanka’s geographical identity as an island nation, Dr. Fernando says, is paradoxically underrepresented in national conservation priorities. “We speak passionately about forests and wildlife on land, but our relationship with the ocean remains largely extractive,” he noted. “We fish, mine sand, build along the coast and pollute, yet fail to pause and ask how much the sea can endure.”
Through his work with the WNPS Marine Subcommittee, Dr. Fernando has been at the forefront of advocating for science-led marine policy and integrated coastal management. He stressed that fragmented governance and weak enforcement continue to undermine marine protection efforts. “The ocean does not recognise administrative boundaries,” he said. “But unfortunately, our policies often do.”
He believes that one of the greatest challenges facing marine conservation in Sri Lanka is invisibility. “What happens underwater is out of sight, and therefore out of mind,” he said. “Coral bleaching, mollusc depletion, habitat destruction — these crises unfold silently. By the time the impacts reach the shore, it is often too late.”
Seashells, in this context, become messengers. Changes in shell thickness, size and abundance, Dr. Fernando explained, can signal shifts in ocean chemistry, rising temperatures and increasing acidity — all linked to climate change. “Ocean acidification weakens shells,” he said. “It is a chemical reality with biological consequences. When shells grow thinner, organisms become more vulnerable, and ecosystems less stable.”
Climate change, he warned, is no longer a distant threat but an active force reshaping Sri Lanka’s marine environment. “We are already witnessing altered breeding cycles, migration patterns and species distribution,” he said. “Marine life is responding rapidly. The question is whether humans will respond wisely.”
Despite the gravity of these challenges, Dr. Fernando remains an advocate of hope rooted in knowledge. He believes public awareness and education are essential to reversing marine degradation. “You cannot expect people to protect what they do not understand,” he said. “Marine literacy must begin early — in schools, communities and through public storytelling.”
It is this belief that has driven his involvement in initiatives that use visual narratives to communicate marine science to broader audiences. According to Dr. Fernando, imagery, art and heritage-based storytelling can evoke emotional connections that data alone cannot. “A well-composed image of a shell can inspire curiosity,” he said. “Curiosity leads to respect, and respect to protection.”
Shells, he added, also hold cultural and historical significance in Sri Lanka, having been used for ornamentation, ritual objects and trade for centuries. “They connect nature and culture,” he said. “By celebrating shells, we are also honouring coastal communities whose lives have long been intertwined with the sea.”
However, Dr. Fernando cautioned against romanticising the ocean without acknowledging responsibility. “Celebration must go hand in hand with conservation,” he said. “Otherwise, we risk turning heritage into exploitation.”
He was particularly critical of unregulated shell collection and commercialisation. “What seems harmless — picking up shells — can have cumulative impacts,” he said. “When multiplied across thousands of visitors, it becomes extraction.”
As Sri Lanka continues to promote coastal tourism, Dr. Fernando emphasised the need for sustainability frameworks that prioritise ecosystem health. “Tourism must not come at the cost of the very environments it depends on,” he said. “Marine conservation is not anti-development; it is pro-future.”

Dr. Malik Fernando
Reflecting on his decades-long engagement with the sea, Dr. Fernando described marine conservation as both a scientific pursuit and a moral obligation. “The ocean has given us food, livelihoods, climate regulation and beauty,” he said. “Protecting it is not an act of charity; it is an act of responsibility.”
He called for stronger collaboration between scientists, policymakers, civil society and the private sector. “No single entity can safeguard the ocean alone,” he said. “Conservation requires collective stewardship.”
Yet, amid concern, Dr. Fernando expressed cautious optimism. “Sri Lanka still has immense marine wealth,” he said. “Our reefs, seagrass beds and coastal waters are resilient, if given a chance.”
Standing at the edge of the sea, shells scattered along the sand, one is reminded that the ocean does not shout its warnings. It leaves behind clues — delicate, enduring, easily overlooked. For Dr. Malik Fernando, those clues demand attention.
“The sea is constantly communicating,” he said. “In shells, in currents, in changing patterns of life. The real question is whether we, as a society, are finally prepared to listen — and to act before silence replaces the story.”
By Ifham Nizam
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News5 days agoLankan aircrew fly daring UN Medevac in hostile conditions in Africa
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Midweek Review7 days agoYear ends with the NPP govt. on the back foot
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Sports7 days agoLife after the armband for Asalanka
