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Circular firing squad of minority politics

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by C.A.Chandraprema

The bane of this country has been ethnicity and religion based politics. It first began among the ‘Ceylon’ Tamils in the north and east with the rise of the Ilankai Tamil Arasu Katchi which put the idea of an exclusive Tamil state into the minds of the people of those areas. The rise of communal politics in the north and east was followed by the transmogrification of trade unions among up-country Tamils into political parties. The final addition to the mix was the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress which came to the fore in 1987 on the charge that the UNP government of the day had sold the eastern province Muslims down the river by agreeing to “temporarily” merge the northern and eastern provinces, thus placing the Muslims living in those areas under Tamil overlordship.

Because the senior-most communal political party in the country was the ITAK, all other minority political parties defer to it. In fact, it’s the ITAK which still sets the benchmark for what constitutes minority rights and aspirations. If a political party makes noises that are sympathetic to the political demands of the ITAK led Tamil National Alliance, that is seen as being minority friendly even by the Muslims and Up-country Tamils. Yet in actual fact, the TNA’s demands are diametrically opposed to the interests of the Muslims as well as the Upcountry Tamils. This became glaringly obvious after 2015 when the UNP, JVP, the TNA, the SLMC, the ACMC and the Upcountry Tamil political parties all got together and elected a President of their choice who through the manipulation of the SLFP, was able to provide that government with a two thirds majority.

One of the things that the yahapalana government formed in this manner did, was to formulate a new constitution to satisfy the political demands of the Tamil National Alliance. As could be expected, the new constitution had provisions that would shift all real power from the central government to the provincial councils. Everything ranging from industries, agriculture, education, health care, law and order, land, and the formation of policies on all those matters were to be transferred from the centre to the provinces.

All powerful provincial

governments

If that constitution had been passed, there would have been no point in contesting for the presidency or parliament as all power would have been transferred to autonomous provincial governments. (You have to read that draft constitution in order to come to an understanding of the extent of devolution envisaged – any attempt to describe it in a few words will always be inadequate.) That constitution also had provisions which would make it impossible to reverse the process of devolution once that constitution had been passed into law. All that had been neatly tied up with a provision that would allow the merger of the northern and eastern provinces – a cornerstone ITAK/TNA demand. The merger of the northern and eastern provinces would have given the Tamils of those areas – the so called Ceylon Tamils – a unitary state whereas all other ethnic groups in the country including the Sinhalese, Muslims and Up-country Tamils would have to make do with  a federal state. The arrangement envisaged in that constitution would have given the ‘Ceylon’ Tamils untrammeled control over the entire north and east and the Sinhalese would have had untrammeled control over the remaining seven autonomous units.

The Muslims and Up-country Tamils would not have control over anything anywhere. Since the centre was powerless there was no use in having influence at the centre. What counted was the clout each community would be able to wield within each autonomous provincial unit. The merger of the east with the north would have deprived the Muslims of the two Muslim majority districts in the country – the Digamadulla and Trincomalee districts. In the rest of the country the Muslims will be scattered among the other eight provinces without having a significant share of power in any of them. Even though the Up-country Tamils are by definition concentrated in the Upcountry areas, their people will be scattered among three or four provinces without being able to make a mark anywhere – except perhaps to a limited extent in the Central province which has the largest concentration of Upcountry Tamils.

As of now, the Muslim and Upcountry Tamil political parties have to deal only with one central government. If the country is broken up into nine or eight autonomous provincial units, each provincial unit will need to have its own Muslim and Upcountry Tamil leaderships. Hakeem is from the Central Province, so the Eastern Muslims will have to be under someone else. One or two leaders sitting in parliament will not be able to give leadership to Muslims all over the country as they do at present. Each province will almost be an independent country in everything except the name. When power is devolved, leadership has to be devolved along with it.

If Digambaram chooses to remain in the Nuwara Eliya district, someone else will have to lead the Upcountry Tamils in the Uva province. Hakeem will have the same problem if he chooses to remain in Kandy. The Muslim leader of the Southern province will have no reason to take orders from Hakeem because within his province, he will be Hakeem’s equal in the provincial legislature. Furthermore, the communal leaders in each province will have to negotiate separately with their provincial governments. The Southern provincial government for example will have no reason to take any notice of a Muslim legislator or minister in the Central Province.

The only communal outfit that will not have this problem of being splintered by devolution will be the TNA which will have its unitary state in the north and east. R.Sampanthan sitting in Trincomalee will be able to lead the Tamils in Jaffna and the Vanni as well as in the Batticaloa and Ampara districts because all those areas will come under one provincial government.

The only minority community leadership that has any interest in the devolution of power is the TNA and its offshoots in the north. The Muslim and Upcountry Tamil leaderships seek a place for themselves in the central government. Their bargaining power will disappear if the TNA inspired constitution is passed. As a result we have never heard any Up-country Tamil or Muslim leader ever expressing support for the TNA inspired constitution. It’s not only due to Sinhala opposition that the TNA inspired constitution was never passed, it’s due to the indifference or passive resistance of the Upcountry Tamil and Muslim leaderships. This is why the government of 2015 which was formed by the vast majority of the minority voters combined with a significant minority of Sinhala voters and had a two thirds majority in parliament never passed that constitution into law.

Some people that this writer spoke to think the TNA constitution was not passed because Ranil Wickremesinghe was not interested in pushing for it. If Ranil Wickremesinghe had pushed for it, he too would have been committing political hara kiri because the Up-country Tamil and Muslim leaderships would never have agreed to a constitution that would have turned them into political nonentities in eight separate autonomous provinces. This glaring reality that the interests and aspirations of the northern Tamil lobby are diametrically opposed to the interests of other minority communities like the Muslims and Up-country Tamils is the elephant in the room that nobody seems to be willing to talk about. Everybody, the Sinhalese, the Up-country Tamils and Muslims fall over one another to pay pooja to the demands of the TNA, because they need the TNA’s votes for their political power projects. But after they get the votes of the Tamils of the north and east, they have no further use for the TNA until the next election comes along and the TNA’s persistent demands for the devolution of power become an inconvenience and an embarrassment as we saw happening in the case of the yahapalana government.

When Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe introduced the TNA inspired draft constitution in Parliament in early 2019, he basically disowned it saying that it was not his draft, nor that of the UNP or the yahapalana government but a draft prepared by a panel of experts. If the TNA had 16 seats in Parliament the Muslims and Up-country Tamil political parties together had the same or even more. Thus the Tamils of the north and east would have become like the minority voters in the USA who are stimulated and titillated at election time to vote for a certain political party; and after the election, they are forgotten till the next election. Sumanthiran will be shuffling around till he is Sampanthan’s age, touting his draft constitution which does not have a snowflake’s chance in hell of being passed into law.

Given the demographics of the country where the largest concentration of Muslims lives in the eastern province and 52% of all Tamils (including all Up-country Tamils) permanently live outside the north and east, means that the TNA’s political project will always remain a pipe dream. The demands of one minority community stymied by the interests of other minority communities – the typical circular firing squad. The only feasible arrangement in this country is the unitary state with political parties sharing power at the centre. For decades, the ITAK made it a policy to label anyone cooperating with the Colombo government as traitors. If they start cooperating with a political party at the centre like the short lived experiment from 1965 to 1968 under Dudley Senanayake, they too may be rejected as traitors by the people of the north.

There will be other Tamil groups like the party led by C.V.Wigneswaran which will be only too happy to replace the ITAK as the main political force in the north and east. The Upcountry Tamil political parties and the Muslim political parties do not talk about devolution or any kind of constitutional reform for that matter. It’s only the northern Tamil lobby that is obsessed with the devolution of power – a condition which goes back more than six decades into the 1950s. There is a need for the TNA and the entire northern Tamil lobby to pause a little and take stock of things. But politics does not always follow a rational path. The release of the TNA’s latest manifesto for this parliamentary election shows that they are still treading the same old path which leads nowhere.

Northern Tamils vs. other minorities

Today there is little point in the TNA continuing to demand further devolution of power because the Upcountry Tamils and Muslims have shown that they are not willing to commit political suicide so that the northern Tamils can get what they want. When it comes to minority politics, it’s every community for itself and may the devil take the hindmost. Prabhakaran was in fact right. There’s only one way for the northern Tamil lobby to get what they want in Sri Lanka and that is to get it by the force of arms. There isn’t a snowflake’s chance in hell of getting it through negotiations and political manoeuvres because of the opposition coming from other minority groups.

The TNA is demanding a unitary Tamil state for themselves while dishing out federalism to everyone else. None of those for whom federalism is being proposed by the TNA is keen to have a federal form of government. Neither are they keen to let the TNA have the Tamil unitary state they desire because the Muslims consider a good part of that Ceylon Tamil homeland to be their areas of habitation. The TNA’s politics needs a reset, but how can there be a reset when they don’t seem to be aware that a problem exists? To be sure, the circular firing squad nature of minority community communal politics became apparent in this country in the form that we now see it, only after 2015. But that experience should be enough to show that change is necessary. You can’t keep doing the same thing over and over again expecting a different result at every repetition.

Leaving aside the Sinhalese who also have a say in all this, there is no way that the TNA’s ambitions are going to be compatible with those of the Muslim political parties and the Up-country Tamil political parties. One of the quirks of northern Tamil politics is that for the past sixty years and more, they have been touting devolution of power for the whole country just so that they can get their unitary ‘Ceylon’ Tamil state in the north and east of the country. The powers that they require for the Tamil state are the same powers that they recommend for other provinces outside the north and east. This is essentially the format in which the northern Tamil demand for an autonomous state has been presented to the people of Sri Lanka ever since the Bandaranaike-Chelvanayagam Pact of the 1950s. The reason for pushing for devolution for the whole country may be to make the northern Tamil demand for a unitary ‘Ceylon’ Tamil state look less like the exclusivism and separatism that it actually is. However, no other community wants the devolution that the TNA lobby is trying to force on them.

We have now reached a period comparable to 1948 when G.G.Ponnambalam realized that he will have to change tack if he was to keep the Ceylon Tamils in the mainstream in independent Ceylon. To his credit, it must be said that he was able to make the transition from making communal demands during the last few years of British rule, to participating in the government of an independent Ceylon. The question now is, does the TNA have the ability to change course in that manner? Despite the visibility of other minority communities in this country, most international players involved in Sri Lanka’s ethnic politics tend to give priority to the northern Tamil lobby and takes the other minority communities for granted. They assume that somehow, what the TNA wants for the Ceylon Tamils is compatible with what the Muslims and Up-country Tamils want for their communities.

This is obviously a carry forward from the war era, when only the LTTE counted in peace negotiations and the Muslims and Up-country Tamils counted for nothing. Now however the war is over and everyone has only the ballot as a weapon and the playing field between the northern Tamils and the other minority communities in this country have been levelled. It’s certainly to be hoped that these realities are taken into account and a reset takes place in minority politics in this country at least after the 2020 parliamentary election.

 



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Politics

PROPPING-UP THIS PRESIDENT IS A PRESCRIPTION FOR POLITICAL SUICIDE

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DR. DAYAN JAYATILLEKA

In one dimension, Sri Lankan politics is a tale of cross-party political collaboration that should have taken place but didn’t, and those that shouldn’t have taken place but did.The two varying yet intermittently intertwining story-lines have widely discrepant endings, though. Collaborations that should have taken place but didn’t are stories of what might have been and wasn’t. What might have been is often better than what actually was.By contrast, stories of collaboration that should not have taken place but did, are stories of disasters that were avoidable but weren’t.

Sometimes the collaborations that should have been preceded those that should not have been but were acted upon. These are particularly poignant because an alliance or political equation that had the potential of leading to something positive, was immediately substituted by an equation which culminated in catastrophe.

There is another, inner connection. It is the causal link between the alliances that should have been made and weren’t, that led to lost potential, which was then sought to be offset by alliances that should not have been entered into but were, with worse consequences than the stagnation sought to be avoided or offset by entering into them.

The Left was never as strong as it was after the General Election of 1947. If the discussion at H. Sri Nissanka’s residence ‘Yamuna’ succeed and a bloc had formed of the three left parties—the LSSP, CP and the BLP—and the independent progressives, Ceylon would have had a left oriented Government which would have taken the country on a Nehruvian or ‘left-Nehruvian’ path.

Having rejected that option, the same leftist parties were later reviled, and correctly so, for having clung to “Sirima’s sari pota” and electorally decimated where they remain to this very day. Just recently, and incredibly, their residues voted for Ranil Wickremesinghe’s Emergency under which the Aragalaya activists are being arrested.

After the magnificent Hartal of August 1953, the political parties that participated and supported it failed to unite in a single bloc. The result was that SWRD’s SLFP fell prey to the temptation of Sinhala Only, lobbied for by a civil society caucus led by Prof GP Malalasekara and the All- Ceylon Buddhist Congress he chaired, riding the surf of the Buddha Jayanthi and the ACBC report.

When SWRD tried to compensate by course-correction through the Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam pact, the Left didn’t come forward to enter a bloc with him in support. Ironically the same left entered a united front with his far less progressive widow and enthroned Sinhala only in the 1972 Constitution.

The Left finally entered a United Front in 1963, accompanied by the unification of the left-led trade union movement. The united left won the Borella by-election that year. In 1964 the LSSP broke the left front and joined Mrs. Bandaranaike’s cabinet. In 1968, in place of a reunified Left, the CPSL joined the LSSP in a coalition with the SLFP, holding a joint rally in Bogambara.The resultant vacuum on the left permitted the birth and rapid growth of the JVP.

Fifteen years after the LSSP’s co-optation and nine years after the CPSL’s, the entire old left had been electorally wiped out, with Philip Gunawardena who had joined a UNP cabinet, having been electorally eliminated earlier in 1970.I could go on. The moral of the story is simple. Left unity is a good thing and left disunity is not. Left and the unity with progressive independents is a good thing and its absence is not. The Left uniting with a center party under left dominance is bad but doing so on an equal footing, isn’t.The Left uniting with a dominant center party, i.e., with the SLFP in 1964 and 1970-1975/’77, is a terrible thing.

A center-left or center party uniting with a rightwing or center-right party is a bad thing. President Sirisena and the SLFP learned that lesson the hard way and the current trend of the SLPP opting for Ranil Wickremesinghe over Dullas Alahapperuma, the SLFP and the 10-parties being drawn into President Ranil Wickremesinghe’s orbit, having voted for his draconian Emergency (the SLFP was absent), will prove electorally fatal.

TAMIL PARTIES

The Tamil parties have a sad history of supporting the rightwing UNP which inevitably winds up unpopular and the target of a huge backlash. The presence of the Tamil parties in a bloc with the UNP, unfortunately facilitates an utterly reprehensible entry of Sinhala chauvinism into the anti-government backlash.

It is utterly counterproductive for the Tamil parties to be in an elitist UNP bloc. It was the presence of those parties in the UNP-led seven-party national Government of 1965-1970 that facilitated the opportunistic or semi-spontaneous injection of Sinhala ethno-populism into the Opposition campaign of the second half of the 1960s, which even more horridly, culminated in the official Sinhala racism after it assumed office, e.g., media-wise and district-wise Standardization of university entrance, the hegemonistic status of Sinhala and Buddhism in the 1972 Constitution.

The Tamil parties should think twice before being enticed into an alliance, de jure or de facto, with the unelected, illegitimate president Ranil Wickremesinghe who will cause a further spike in unprecedentedly high social disaffection by his economic “shock therapy”. It could cause a toxic cocktail as Sir John’s Delft speech did.

TODAY’S OPPOSITION

What would have happened to any Opposition political party that joined, propped up or let itself be drawn into the orbit of the hawkish UNP administration of Sir John Kotelawala after the Hartal of August 1953?

What if SWRD Bandaranaike, having left the UNP in 1951, helped it in 1953, after chairing the Hartal rally on Galle Face Green, though the SLFP didn’t participate in the Hartal?

The answers of these counterfactual history questions are obvious. Any such party which became a de jure or de facto prop (“mukkuwa”) of the Hartal-hit Establishment which had a harder-line post-Hartal leader, would have been committing political suicide.Had SWRD Bandaranaike done so, he would not have been the beneficiary of the anti-Establishment tectonic shift caused or denoted by the Hartal and swept into office through the Silent Revolution of 1956.

Why then are the Opposition parties of today doing or contemplating something even more colossally stupid, of joining, supporting or collaborating with the UNP leader of the Aragalaya-hit Establishment? It is suicidal for two reasons:

Firstly, the leader in question is utterly unelected, totally devoid of a popular mandate, and is therefore a completely illegitimate (though not illegal) ruler.Secondly, he will drive through a controversial and polarizing economic program, which will sink any party associated with it.Meanwhile, the failure of the pro-Aragalaya parties, the JVP, FSP, SJB and TNA, to unite is a repetition of the failure of the pro-Hartal parties to do so in 1953-1956.

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Politics

THE SYSTEM CHANGE THAT CAN ENABLE SRI LANKA TO RECOVER FROM THIS MASSIVE CRISIS

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by Prof.Tissa Vitarana

The massive crisis that has affected the lives of nearly all classes in our society, specially the poor and middle, in Sri Lanka is not new to us or to most other countries. It is an inherent cyclical feature, occurring at about seven year intervals, due to ‘boom and bust’ nature of the global market driven capitalist economic system brought on by over production. Periodically it may get out of control, like the Asian crisis of 1997 when a whole region was badly affected.

The affected countries that overcame the crisis by their own effort have learned to tide over these crises with minimal disruption. At an international conference in Cairo I had the good fortune to have a lengthy chat with Dr.Mahathir Mohamed (facilitated by us both being doctors turned politicians). He advised against succumbing to IMF pressure at any cost. This was because it is committed to the Prof. Friedman neo-liberal doctrine which facilitates the exploitation of our countries through an import dependent open economy that USA-led Imperialism controls.

The loans given lead to a debt trap which is the root cause of our situation. Sri Lanka’s foreign debt has reached US$ 52 billion and debt servicing last year was six billion dollars and this year seven billion. Hence the shortage of dollars and of essential imports like fuel, gas, chemical fertilizer, medicines and food items. To ensure that at least six months of these imports are obtained the Foreign Exchange Reserve (FOREX) has been maintained at US$ seven to eight billion. Now it is down to zero, and thus causing this severe crisis.

The answer is the development of a national economy with maximum self-sufficiency which is Government regulated in the real interest of all the people, not a few super rich. This was done by Dr. N.M. Perera as Minister of Finance in the 1970/75 SLFP-LSSP-CP coalition government. Since the neo-liberal UNP Government led by J.R.Jayewardene took power in 1977 the country has gone into a situation of economic crisis. While the rich have got richer, the poor have got poorer.

Now it is estimated by nutritionists that about 70% of all families are living below the poverty line and have inadequate food and other essentials. The level of malnutrition has gone up above 20%. It is with great difficulty that the adults of many of these families survive on one meal a day, and provide two meals for their children. Many go to bed at night hungry. The productivity of the economy has gone down and, due to the economic crisis the closure of factories and other work places, has led to massive pay cuts and job losses.

The farmers harvest outputs have dropped due to the shortage and high cost of fertilizer and other inputs. Due to the fall in the import of fuel the shortage and high price has disrupted the transport system, the operation of factories, and the use of machinery in agriculture and in the fishing industry. The economy is on the verge of total collapse.

In the midst of such crisis where the system itself is collapsing, clearly the country and the world requires a system change. Unfortunately those in power are content to tinker with the existing system and make both minor and some major changes, but the outcome has not been adequate. It is my opinion that there needs to be total change of the system that benefits the whole of society and not the few who can manage with the limited but expensive tinkering process.

Society itself needs to be driven not by the profit motive which largely benefits the rich but also by being re-organized to provide the needs of everybody. That is a society based on socialist principles. For instance the high cost of food (due to the massive food inflation) is an outcome of the profit motivated production, distribution and marketing system that exists today. Further, in Sri Lanka for instance due to the high cost of inputs the farmer has to take large loans to cover his cost. He gets into debt and at the time of harvest he has to pay the capital cost along with the interest.

The farmer generally takes big loans from the trader or from institutions (like banks) that provide credit. Many poor farmers in this country find it easier to obtain credit from the traders thereby avoiding the red tape they have to face when they go to institutions that provide credit. But this leads to further problems as the trader often demands that the produce is sold only to him at an amount below the prevailing market price. At times this does not even cover the actual cost of production. And the farmer gets caught up in a cycle of debt from which he has no escape. A majority of the farmers in this country are deeply in debt. They are trapped in a situation of perpetual poverty.

The same problem is faced by small and medium scale entrepreneurs. As a result value added industries too do not develop in the rural sector. There must be a new system which gives the farmers and the entrepreneurs the necessary credit, if possible at no or very low interest at the time that he needs it. This will have to be done by the Government which should ensure that bureaucratic pressures such as the taking of bribes is firmly eliminated.

The LSSP favours a truly cooperative system. There should be producer cooperatives and consumer cooperatives, and they should directly deal with each other without any intermediaries. In the prevailing private enterprise system the producer is exploited by a series of middlemen who jack up the price, so that the consumer has to pay a far higher amount than what the producer gets. This middleman system must be eliminated and the transaction should be directly between the producer cooperatives and the consumer cooperatives.

Thus the consumer will only have to pay the cost incurred in taking the produce between the two without any profit. Such a cooperative system is not a dream but it works in many countries abroad, specially those in Scandinavia. But this has already worked in Sri Lanka too, during the time that Dr.N.M.Perera was Finance Minister in the Government of Mrs. Sirimavo Bandaranaike. Unfortunately the cooperatives that are still functioning in this country are cooperatives only in name operated by mudalalis. All the members of the producer and consumer cooperatives must meet and elect reliable office bearers who will function properly at all times. This system change is vital to bring down the cost of living and end hunger and poverty.

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Twisting the aragalaya into what it is not

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By Uditha Devapriya

Most analyses approach the crisis in Sri Lanka through the lens of human rights, democratic governance, and accountability. Many of them pin the blame on personalities and parties. Not surprisingly, the narrative has shifted over the last few months. From demonising the Rajapaksas, commentators and analysts now fault President Ranil Wickremesinghe for the country’s problems. More than anything else, they accuse him of trying to harness or tame protesters, citing the raid on Gotagogama in the early hours of July 22.

Internationally, these allegations have found a ready audience. Colombo’s civil society circuits have been given ample time and space on Indian and Western media outlets. The latter have been only too willing to amplify their concerns. In most cases, their narrative follows a set pattern: the government is oppressing protesters, it is using legal and extra-judicial methods to tame them, and it is resorting to militarisation to harness dissent. Such narratives reinforce Sri Lanka’s image as a militaristic State, more or less in line with what was churned about the country at the peak of the separatist conflict.

There is nothing inherently or fundamentally misleading about these claims. Sri Lankans are clamouring for democratic change and they perceive the State and its organs, which include the military, as an affront to their dignity. Yet Colombo’s civil society narratives tend to miss more than a few important points. For instance, they fail to note that while the army has been deployed against protesters, a significant proportion of the latter criticise the army, not for militarising the country, but for acting as vassals of the State. The “People vs Army” line, in that sense, does not really hold when considering how individual soldiers have also joined the protests, to be gleefully welcomed by anti-regime demonstrators.

As far as these analyses go, the military is just the tip of the iceberg. Other narratives include the view that anti-regime protesters all unified under a slogan – #GoHomeGota – because they all had the same demands. These demands included widening access to political power and representation for Sri Lanka’s deprived minorities, not just its ethnic but also sexual minorities. According to this reading, opposition to Rajapaksa brought together different groups, classes, and interests: a welcoming development that can be used to push forward important liberal-democratic political and constitutional reforms.

There is no doubt that, viewed from a certain perspective, and as far as opposition to the State went, the anti-Rajapaksa movement was progressive and liberal. Yet to contend that this alone made the protests progressive would be taking things too far. The truth of the matter is that Gotagogama, out of necessity, lacked a cohesive leadership. This enabled it to play host to different interest groups, not all of whom shared a liberal progressive stance on certain themes and issues. Probably the most important point to take from the protests at Galle Face was that former supporters of the outgoing president formed a significant section there: not really a crowd you’d count on as supporters of liberal causes.

I realised this myself when I paid a visit on July 12, the day before Gotabaya Rajapaksa vacated his office. Towards the evening, when crowds began swarming into Galle Face and emotions were running high, the rhetoric from the centre of the protest zone escalated rather wildly. The centre stood a few feet from a campsite set up for members of Sri Lanka’s LGBTQ community. It was more than a little ironic, then, when an anti-Rajapaksa heckler began shouting slogans which were rather homophobic, throwing words like “butterfly” on the country’s leadership. It was hardly what you’d expect from a protest that was, in every respect, supposed to be aligned with civil society visions of progressive dissent.

In an intriguing essay on the Gotagogama protests (“Sri Lanka’s Next Test”, Project Syndicate), Priyanka Krishnamoorthy raises an important question: was, and is, the aragalaya “a mere marriage of convenience”? In 2019 more than a third of the country gave a whopping majority to Mr Rajapaksa and his party, essentially “endorsing the Rajapaksas’ brand of majoritarian politics.” It goes without saying that the fuel and gas shortages and power cuts have brought them into the streets. But will that by itself be enough to ensure their unity with groups, such as minority rights activists, who have been traditionally viewed with suspicion and tarred as agents for NGO and Western agendas?

In depicting the aragalaya as a swelling of progressive anti-State sentiment, liberals make the same mistake that their nationalist counterparts do: portray the protests as a monolith movement, which it is not. The simple truth is that the aragalaya has hosted gay rights and pro-democracy activists as much as it has homophobes and ultra-nationalists. Liberal outfits may be shy of admitting this, but it’s important to make such a point because the aragalaya needs to be recognised for what it is: a diverse array of political, social, and cultural views and perspectives which do not necessarily cohere with each other, but which came together to oust an unpopular regime: in its simplest sense, a popular uprising.

The same goes for the July 22 raid. By all accounts, the raid was unexpected and, from several standpoints, reprehensible. Yet as the President made it clear, it was his way of demonstrating the State’s commitment to law and order. One may disagree, as I do, with his use of force, and validly concur that it tilted mass opinion against Ranil Wickremesinghe and his government. But then government supporters can claim, as critics like me do not, that in no country has peaceful protests entailed the occupation of public property. This is a deeply divisive debate, one that is yet to be taken forward and concluded.

Civil society and international, particularly Western, media have given the protests the spotlight they deserve. Yet they have also twisted the aragalaya into something it is not. If opposition to the Rajapaksas can be considered liberal, the aragalaya should certainly be lauded for its unyielding stand against the Rajapaksa. Yet to deny its multifaceted character and the complex nature of the situation in the country would be going too far. One must be nuanced in everything. Even when lauding criticism of the State.

The writer is an international relations analyst, researcher, and columnist who can be reached at udakdev1@gmail.com

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