Opinion

Buddhist theatre in South Asia and beyond

Published

3 years ago

2022/12/24

By Syed Jamil Ahmed, PhD

Considerable research conducted by renowned Orientalists such as Moriz Winternitz, Heinrich Lüders, Arthur Berriedale Keith, Sylvain Lévi and Sten Konow between the 1880s and 1960s have established that between the 1st century CE to the 7th century CE, a tradition of Buddhist theatre flourished in South Asia. This tradition, generated by a host of Buddhist scholars and practitioners, is an important source for the study of the indigenous theatre not only of Bangladesh, but also of Pakistan and Afghanistan. The problem with Bangladesh is that very few scholars and practitioners engaged with theatre demonstrate any interest in the tradition. Consequently, the Indian State, media and academia have exerted their hold on the tradition to such an extent that the world recognises ancient Buddhist theatre in South Asia as an exclusive intellectual terrain of modern India. Although Bangladesh can lay a rightful claim to the tradition, it has failed to do so, mostly because the State, media and academia in Bangladesh are hardly enthusiastic regarding the non-Islamic past of Bangladesh. This piece presents a summary of current research on ancient Buddhist theatre in South Asia, in order to serve as a catalyst that hopefully will trigger enough interest in establishing Bangladesh’s rightful claim to its Buddhist past.

Existing evidence indicates that Aśvaghoşa (c. 80-150 CE) was not only the earliest Buddhist playwright, but also the earliest Sanskrit playwright in South Asia. He was a renowned Buddhist philosopher and poet at the court of Kushan emperor Kanişka, whose capital was situated in Puruşapura (what now is Peshawar in Pakistan). Another important playwright from the 5th century CE was Chandragomin. It is now certain that he was not only a famous Buddhist scholar-monk renowned for his work on Sanskrit grammar but also the composer of a play titled Lokānanda. As the famous Buddhist traveler-monk Yijing (I-Tsing) observed, he was from the eastern part of South Asia. Other scholars are in agreement that the eastern region referred to was ancient Bengal. Besides these two playwrights, scholars also believe that a mysterious Buddhist acharya named Rāhula composed a treatise on theatre (nāţya), which is now completely lost. It is also argued that Buddhist theatre beginning with Aśvaghoşa in the first century CE, down to Emperor Harşavardhana in the 7th century CE, was not only well-developed theoretically but was also quite popular among the people. When an exact accounting is done, the corpus of Buddhist plays is found to include the following eight texts, one extant in original, one in translation, five in fragments, while one has been completely lost. Given below is a brief account of these works.

1. Śāriputra-prakaraņa (a play in 9 acts) by Aśvaghoşa. Only fragments of the last two acts are extant. Recovered by Lüders at Turfan in Tarim Basin, in 1911, the play is based on the legend of Śāriputra and Maudgalyāyana ordaining as monks under the Buddha, as related in the Mahāvagga of the Vinayapiţaka. As shown in the last two acts of the play, Śāriputra has an interview with Aśvajit, the Buddha’s first disciple. Then he engages in a conversation with his friend the Vidūşaka (jester), on the merits of the teachings of Gautama Buddha. The Vidūşaka advises Śāriputra against accepting Buddhist teachings, since Śāriputra is a Brahman and the Buddha hails from the kştriya (warrior) caste. But Śāriputra rejects the Vidūşaka’s argument on the ground that the Vaidya (physician) is capable of healing the sick despite belonging to a low social caste. Next, when he meets his dear friend Maudgalyāyana, the latter enquires as to why Śāriputra appears radiant. Śāriputra informs Maudgalyāyana about the Buddha and his teachings, and they both decide to seek refuge in Buddhism. The Buddha receives them warmly and foretells that the two will be the highest in knowledge and magic power among his disciples. At the end of the play, Gautam Buddha and Śāriputra engage in a philosophical dialogue which rejects the belief in a permanent self (ātmā).

2. Fragment of a play, possibly a nāţaka, with allegorical characters such as Buddhi (Wisdom), Dhŗti (Firmness) and Kīrti (Fame). It was found at Turfan in Tarim Basin, but the playwright’s name is unavailable. Nevertheless, because the fragment has been recovered with Śāriputra-prakaraņa and because it demonstrates remarkable linguistic similarity with the same play, it is believed that the playwright of this fragment is also Aśvaghoşa. The fragment shows the three allegorical characters conversing in Sanskrit. At one stage, the Buddha enters the stage. It is uncertain whether he engages in a dialogue with the allegorical characters, because the play is fragmented at this point.

3. Fragment of another play that appears to be a prakaraņa like the Mŗcchakaţikā by Shudraka. It was also recovered at Turfan. The author remains unknown but this too is believed to have been authored by Aśvaghoşa. The characters of the play are a heterogenous lot: a courtesan named Magadhabati, a Vidūşaka named Komudhagandha, a hero named Somadatta, a rogue named Duşţa, a prince named Dhanananjaya, a maid-servant, Śāriputra and Maudgalyāyana. One scene of the play takes place at Magadhabati’s home and another at a park. The play also mentions a festival held at a hilltop.

4. Rāşţapāla-nāţaka by Aśvaghoşa, which has disappeared completely, but its existence is confirmed by references found in a Chinese translation of Sri Dharma-piţaka-sampradāya Nidāna (472 AD), titled Fu fa tsang yin yüan ch’üan, and two other Buddhist liturgical texts. The plot was possibly based on the Raţţhapālasutta in the Majjhimanikāya, showing how Raţţhapāla, after renouncing worldly life to become a monk, could not be enticed back to worldly life even with heaps of gold and alluring advances of his ex-wives. As recounted in Fu fa tsang yin yüan ch’üan, a performance of the play, in which Aśvaghoşa himself conducted the orchestra, was so successful that five hundred kştriyas renounced worldly life to become Buddhist monks. In order to make sure that such a mass exodus is not repeated, the king of Pataliputra forbade all future performance of the play.

5. Lokānanda-nāţaka by Chandragomin, a play in five acts composed in the 5th century CE. The original text in Sanskrit has disappeared. In the first half of the 14th century, the play was translated from Sanskrit into Tibetan in Kathmandu. Michael Hahn used the Tibetan version to translate it in German in 1974, and in English in 1987 as Joy for the World. The play shows how Prince Maṇicūḍa (later the king) of Sāketa, who is gifted with a benevolence-showering jewel implanted on the crown of his head, sacrifices all his possessions including his kingdom – and even his wife and son – in order to remain steadfast to his commitment to munificence. He dies when he sacrifices even the jewel implanted on his head to a wicked Brahmin, but is revived by the gods because of his commitment to munificence.

6. Nāgānanda-nāţaka, a play in five acts attributed to Emperor Harşavardhana (reigned 606 – 648 CE). It is based on King Jimutavåhana’s self-sacrifice to save the Nagas (a race of semi-divine half-serpent beings who live in the underworld). The play is still extant in original Sanskrit. Nāgānanda-nāţaka may demonstrate signs of Buddhist lineage superficially, but a close reading demonstrates that its religio-philosophical inclination is a curious blend of Hinduism and Buddhism.

7. Maitreyasamiti-nāţaka (lit. “Encounter with Maitreya”), a play in 27 acts bearing a Sanskrit title but written in the language known as Tocharian A. Quite a few fragments of the play were recovered from Turfan and Yanqi (Tarim Basin), all dated to the 8th century CE. Maitreyasamiti-nāţaka is based on Buddha Maitreya, the future saviour of the world. An Old Uyghur translation of the Tocharian text, dated to the 10th century CE, has also been recovered.

8. In 2007, fragment of an unnamed another play was recovered in Afghanistan and has been published by Uwe Hartmann. The recovered fragment shows that it was composed in Sanskrit and Prakrit, in prose as well as verse. It appears to indicate dialogue among three characters: Vidūşaka, King, and Minister.

The significance of the corpus of Buddhist plays is immense. Firstly, it indicates that the genesis of theatre in South Asia is well before the 2nd century CE, because when Aśvaghoşa emerged as a playwright at this juncture, he was already well-adapted to the craftsmanship of playwriting, and appears to have inherited a long tradition that flourished before him. Secondly, and more importantly for Bangladesh, ‘the genesis of theatre in the country can now be firmly pushed back to the 5th century CE, since we have Lokānanda-nāţaka as a piece of ‘hard’ evidence. It may be recalled that hitherto, the earliest evidence of theatre in ancient Bengal was dated to the 8th-10th century, as ascertained by the occurrence of the term ‘Buddha-nāţaka’ in a caryā song by Vīnā-pāda. Thirdly, by the 10th century CE, Buddhist theatre appears to have generated the growth of a lively world of performance not only in what today is Bangladesh, India, Pakistan and Afghanistan, but also in Central Asia. Indeed, the Silk Road was key to this transmission. As I argue elsewhere, Buddhist dramaturgy also ‘travelled’ to Tibet, where it was rejected by Vajrayana Buddhism. However, nurtured by Mahayana Buddhism, it prospered in the Tarim Basin and the adjoining oases kingdoms, where it was transmuted into Buddhist plays in Tokharian and Khotanese Saka. These plays were produced during Buddhist festivals in Khotan and Kocho, at mass public gatherings in the vicinity of temples. The Khotanese Buddhist theatre may have met with a sad demise at the hands of the Muslim Kara-Khanid rulers. Nevertheless, Tokharian Buddhist plays, possibly performed in pavilions in temple precincts, travelled on to the Northern Song empire (China), and were further transformed to give rise to zaji, and the performance pavilions such as those in temple compounds located in Shanxi and Zhejiang provinces in China. Towards the end of the T’ang period and during the political upheavals of the 10th century, when Buddhism lost favour of the state, and subsequently in early 11th century, when the Muslims began to control the Silk Road in central Asia, all traces of Buddhist plays were erased by neo-Confucianism and Taoism. Nevertheless, the performances continued to live in transmuted forms.

Laying aside the ‘scholarly’ importance for the academics to ponder over, it is important to turn to Lokānanda-nāţaka, the miracle-recounting Buddhist play from ancient Bangladesh, to recognise that its significance extends beyond that of a heritage object preserved in museums. Let us begin by acknowledging that miracles have been recounted in all major religions, such as Islam, Christianity, Hinduism, Jainism and Buddhism. It is pointless to argue about the validity of any of these miracles, for their worth are embedded deep in the belief system of the devotees. Instead, I argue that a particular significance of Lokānanda-nāţaka lies in its validity as a root paradigm. As the cultural anthropologist Victor Turner explains in Dramas, Fields, and Metaphors: Symbolic Action in Human Society, root paradigms are not univocal concepts nor stereotyped guidelines, but extend beyond the cognitive and the moral to the existential domain.

Paradigms of this fundamental sort reach down to irreducible life stances of individuals, passing beneath conscious prehension to a fiduciary hold on what they sense to be axiomatic values, matters literally of life or death. Root paradigms emerge in life crises, whether of groups or individuals, whether institutionalized or compelled by unforeseen events. One cannot then escape their presence or their consequences.

The root paradigm that Lokānanda-nāţaka posits is Maṇicūḍa’s commitment to munificence. Similar root paradigms may also be found in Raja Harishchandra’s sacrifices as projected in Hinduism and Prophet Ibrahim’s qurbani as articulated in Islam. Faced with endemic corruption in Bangladesh, to the extent that it is ranked 147th out of 180 countries in Transparency International’s Corruption Perception Index, perhaps we would do better if we draw on all the root-paradigms of munificence and sacrifices that our tradition offers us.

(The Daily Star/ANN)
Syed Jamil Ahmed, PhD is Honorary Professor at University of Dhaka and Theatre Director at Spardha: Independent Theatre Collective

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Opinion

Microfinance and Credit Regulatory Authority Act 2026 fails all affacted communities

Published

13 hours ago

2026/03/10

Sahan Weerasooriya

A protest against exploitation by microfinance companies

The Microfinance and Credit Regulatory Authority Bill was passed into law by the Parliament of Sri Lanka on 4 March. According to Deputy Minister of Finance and Planning Dr. Anil Jayantha, the main object of the Act is to establish an Authority to “license and supervise the under-regulated microfinance and moneylending sector, aiming to protect borrowers from exploitation and ensure financial stability”.

However, the Yukthi Collective is saddened and disappointed that a government which pledged to take “measures to alleviate the burden of predatory microfinance loans with high interest rates on women” (NPP Manifesto, 2024: Page no. 44), will now add to their unbearable weight.

The new Act, as virtually all legislation enacted by Anura Kumara Dissanayake’s government, is a legacy of the anti-working class Ranil Wickremesinghe regime. It evades the root causes of the microfinance trap, and ignores debt justice for women borrowers.

It fails in understanding the connections between household debt and public debt. The vicious cycle of national debt is sustained by lack of growth in economic activity because of poor access to affordable credit.

It fails to make equal representation of women mandatory in the new Authority. If representatives of women borrowers and their self-run organisations are not present in the regulatory body, how will its members know of their lived experiences and make decisions that value women’s unpaid and paid contributions to sustaining life?

System Change

Millions of indebted households voted for the NPP with hope and expectation of ‘system change’. But instead of honouring its manifesto promise to them, the government has let them down in the law-making process; as well as the focus and substance of the new Act.

It is appalling that NPP parliamentarians, including some of its women members, appear not to have read and understood the bill they enacted into law, nor spoke to the rural credit community providers in their electorates for their views.

Predatory lending exists in the formal and informal sectors. Within this ecosystem, the Act fails to understand, identify, and prohibit predatory lending and recovery practices. It is a cover for the Central Bank’s failure to properly regulate ‘Licensed Finance Companies’ in the interests of citizens.

The biggest offenders are the big finance companies, in which some parliamentarians are deposit-holders. Therefore, some lawmakers benefit from excess profitmaking through exploitative practices, at the expense of poor mostly rural women.

Where law reform should discipline the bullies and thugs in credit delivery, it will instead wipe out, through over-regulation, community-based and managed lenders such as death donation societies, farmer associations, and urban and rural women’s collectives, which have been a lifeline for vulnerable working-class women and a defence from harmful recovery practices.

Structural Adjustment Programmes

The motivation for this new law are the market- and capital- friendly structural reforms insisted by International Financial Institutions; not the concerns and needs of those at the mercy of predatory lenders.

From the Microfinance Act 2016, to the 2023 version of the Ranil Wickremesinghe regime, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) through its loans has been a promoter of these regressive reforms.

The 2026 Act, with some changes suggested by the Supreme Court in 2024 and hardly any of the changes demanded by affected communities, has been moved forward by the NPP government in line with ADB loan conditionalities.

The path of de-regulation for banking, finance, trade, and investment; and over-regulation of poor people’s savings and credit institutions, smacks of the bias to big capital, which the NPP in opposition once criticised.

Reforms needed

The financial and banking reforms we want to see are to make credit from state banks and public funds accessible and affordable to women producers in agriculture and micro and small business operators; with decent wages and social protection for workers; that improve household opportunity for a dignified livelihood and decent lives.

Yukthi is a forum supporting working people’s movements and people’s struggles for democracy and justice in Sri Lanka.

by Yukthi Collective

Opinion

Illegal Bus Halt at Gate Number 11 of NHSL

Published

2 days ago

2026/03/9

Thilina Walpola

There is an unofficial bus halt at Gate Number 11 of the National Hospital at the 90-degree bend at the Prof. Nandadasa Kodagoda Mawatha (Old Norris Canal Road) which creates traffic jams at peak hours. Especially at the school opening and closing times at Carey College and hospital visiting hours.

Prospective passengers stand by the bend and then the busses stop suddenly on the middle of the road. The motorcycle in the picture is put into danger. The next bus halt is a few yards further near Carey College and Medical College Junction.

The problem is that illegal practices such as these, end up as approved procedure in our neck of the woods!

It must be nipped in the bud.

G. Fernando

Opinion

Naval hostilities close to a neutral coastal state: Legal assessment of a submarine attack on an Iranian warship near Sri Lanka

Published

2 days ago

2026/03/9

Thilina Walpola

SLN rescue operation to save the IRIS Dena survivors of the US submarine attack. (Handout picture from the government of Sri Lanka)

A submarine attack on an Iranian destroyer proximate to Sri Lanka represents more than a discrete naval engagement; it signals a potential horizontal escalation of conflict into the wider Indian Ocean Region (IOR). Historically, confrontations between Iran and Western powers have been largely confined to the Persian Gulf and adjacent regional waters. A strike near Sri Lanka, however, shifts the operational theatre from a semi-enclosed regional sea into the open Indian Ocean. This globally vital maritime space encompasses critical trade routes, energy supply corridors, and strategically sensitive naval zones.

This geographic expansion carries multiple strategic implications. First, it demonstrates the long-range maritime strike capabilities and blue-water operational reach of the belligerent forces. Second, it functions as a form of deterrence signalling, conveying a willingness to project force beyond traditional conflict zones. Third, it widens the theatre of operations, increasing the probability of third-party entanglement and amplifying regional instability.

Beyond its immediate military and strategic dimensions, the incident raises complex legal questions under both jus ad bellum—the body of law governing the use of force between states—and jus in bello, encompassing international humanitarian law applicable to armed conflict at sea. The central questions addressed in this paper are:

a. Lawfulness of Force:

Whether the use of force against the Iranian warship was lawful under the United Nations Charter, including considerations of self-defence and Security Council authorisation.

b. Compliance with International Humanitarian Law:

Whether the attack adhered to the principles and norms of international humanitarian law governing naval warfare, including the lawfulness of the target, proportionality, distinction, and obligations toward shipwrecked personnel.

c. Neutrality and Coastal State Rights:

Whether Sri Lanka’s rights and obligations as a neutral coastal state were violated, particularly within its territorial sea and Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ).

d. Operational and Geostrategic Implications:

The broader implications of conducting military operations within or near neutral maritime zones, and the interplay between legal permissibility, maritime security, environmental obligations, and regional stability.

These questions form the analytical framework that will guide the discussion throughout this paper, providing a structured lens for examining the legal, humanitarian, and strategic dimensions of the incident.

Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello:

Legality of the Use of Force

The legality of a submarine attack against a commissioned warship during an armed conflict must be assessed within a structured framework of international law comprising the jus ad bellum regime under the United Nations Charter, the corpus of international humanitarian law (IHL), and customary principles of naval warfare as reflected in the San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea.

At the threshold level, the UN Charter governs the lawfulness of the use of force between states. Article 2(4) establishes a general prohibition on the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, subject only to narrow exceptions. These exceptions include the inherent right of self-defence under Article 51 and actions authorised by the United Nations Security Council under Chapter VII.

Accordingly, if an Iranian warship were torpedoed by a submarine, the attacking state would be required to demonstrate that the action was undertaken either pursuant to a valid claim of self-defence, necessitated by an armed attack or imminent threat, or as part of an already existing international armed conflict. Absent such justification, the attack could constitute an unlawful use of force in violation of the Charter’s collective security framework.

Where an international armed conflict is already in existence, the analysis shifts from jus ad bellum to Jus in bello, namely the rules governing the conduct of hostilities.

Jus in bello

: Naval Warfare and Attack Against an Iranian Naval Ship

Where an international armed conflict exists between the United States and Iran, the analysis shifts to jus in Bello. Commissioned warships form part of a state’s armed forces and constitute lawful military objectives. Under customary naval warfare law, as reflected in the San Remo Manual on International Law Applicable to Armed Conflicts at Sea, enemy warships may be attacked, including by submarine-launched torpedoes, without prior warning. An Iranian destroyer operating as part of Iran’s navy would therefore constitute a legitimate military objective in principle.

However, the legality of a torpedo attack by a United States submarine remains subject to the foundational principles of international humanitarian law, including distinction, proportionality, military necessity, and precautions in attack. The principle of distinction requires that the target be military in nature; proportionality prohibits attacks expected to cause incidental harm excessive in relation to the anticipated military advantage; and military necessity demands that the force employed be directed toward achieving a legitimate military objective.

These obligations are particularly significant in maritime theatres characterised by dense commercial traffic, such as the sea lanes south of Sri Lanka. Incidental harm to neutral merchant vessels, offshore installations, or third-state interests must therefore be carefully assessed in relation to the anticipated concrete and direct military advantage.Submarine warfare, though technologically sophisticated and strategically consequential, remains subject to these enduring normative constraints, which seek to balance operational effectiveness with humanitarian considerations in the maritime domain.

Customary humanitarian law further requires that feasible measures be taken to search for and rescue the shipwrecked, wounded, and dead following an engagement. In this respect, any action by the Sri Lanka Navy to rescue surviving sailors and recover bodies from the destroyed vessel represents a prudent and legally consonant exercise of humanitarian responsibility. Such conduct reflects long-standing maritime tradition and aligns with the duties recognised under the law of armed conflict and the broader law of the sea, without compromising Sri Lanka’s neutral status.

Sri Lanka’s Legal Position Concerning the Torpedoed Iranian Vessel

Sri Lanka’s legal position is largely determined by the maritime location in which the submarine attack occurred. Should the hostilities have taken place within Sri Lanka’s territorial sea, defined as extending up to 12 nautical miles from the baseline, such conduct would constitute a breach of Sri Lanka’s sovereignty and a violation of the law of neutrality, which forbids belligerent states from engaging in hostilities within neutral waters and imposes a duty on the coastal state to prevent such actions within its jurisdiction. In that circumstance, Sri Lanka would be entitled to issue a diplomatic protest and potentially pursue reparative claims.

By contrast, as the engagement took place within Sri Lanka’s Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), the analysis is more nuanced under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. The EEZ confers sovereign rights for resource exploitation rather than full sovereignty, and prevailing state practice accepts that military operations, including naval manoeuvres, are not per se unlawful in another state’s EEZ. While such an engagement would not automatically breach international law, it would nonetheless generate significant security concerns, including risks to navigational safety, potential environmental damage, and heightened regional instability. Should the sinking result in oil discharge, hazardous material release, or debris affecting shipping lanes, obligations under UNCLOS to protect and preserve the marine environment would be engaged.

Although the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development does not explicitly regulate armed conflict, its principles highlight an increasing expectation for states to protect the environment during hostilities. Similarly, UNCLOS mandates that states protect and preserve the marine environment. Consequently, should the sinking of the Iranian destroyer cause an oil spill, the release of hazardous materials, or navigational hazards, specific environmental liabilities would be triggered. Strategically, a submarine strike near Sri Lanka signals more than a discrete tactical engagement. It reflects the projection of great-power naval capabilities into a strategically sensitive maritime space through which a substantial proportion of global trade transits.

Sri Lanka occupies a pivotal geostrategic position astride the principal East–West Sea Lines of Communication linking Gulf energy supplies, East Asian manufacturing centres, and European markets via the Suez Canal. A substantial proportion of global container traffic transits south of the island, rendering these waters acutely sensitive to instability. Even a limited naval engagement can elevate war-risk insurance premiums, disrupt commercial routing, and indirectly affect port operations in Colombo and Hambantota.

From a jus ad bellum perspective, geographic expansion does not in itself render hostilities unlawful; yet it complicates assessments of necessity and proportionality and increases the risk of escalation affecting neutral states.

The torpedoing of an Iranian naval vessel in maritime zones proximate to Sri Lanka necessitates a carefully layered legal assessment situated at the confluence of jus ad bellum, jus in bello, and the law of the sea. As this paper has demonstrated, the legality of the incident ultimately turns on four interrelated determinations:

(a) whether a lawful basis for the use of force existed under Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, grounded in self-defence;

(b) whether the attack complied with the principles of distinction, proportionality, and military necessity under international humanitarian law;

(c) whether the engagement occurred within Sri Lanka’s territorial sea, thereby infringing its sovereignty and violating the law of neutrality; and

(d) whether the obligations owed to survivors, shipwrecked personnel, and the marine environment were respected in accordance with the law of armed conflict at sea and relevant maritime conventions.

If the attack did not occur within Sri Lanka’s territorial sea, it would not amount to a violation of sovereignty or a breach of the law of neutrality capable of engaging state responsibility on that ground.

By contrast, where the engagement occurred beyond the territorial sea whether within the Exclusive Economic Zone or on the high seas prevailing interpretations of the law of naval warfare, reinforced by consistent state practice, suggest that the operation may be regarded as legally defensible, provided that the cumulative requirements of necessity, proportionality, distinction, and humanitarian obligation were satisfied.

Nevertheless, legal permissibility does not equate to strategic prudence. The deployment of a United States submarine to conduct kinetic operations in proximity to a neutral coastal state within the Indian Ocean underscores the increasingly complex convergence of naval power projection, humanitarian norms, environmental obligations, and coastal state rights within the contemporary maritime domain.

Even where consistent with international law, the extension of submarine warfare into the wider Indian Ocean carries destabilising implications for regional security, commercial shipping, and the safety of neutral coastal states situated along critical sea lines of communication. The geographic expansion of hostilities into this maritime space heightens the risks of miscalculation, escalation, and unintended third-party involvement.

For Sri Lanka, the incident underscores the delicate equilibrium between maintaining neutrality, safeguarding maritime security, and upholding the international legal order. The actions undertaken by the Sri Lanka Navy in conducting rescue and recovery operations for surviving sailors and deceased personnel reflect the discharge of well-established humanitarian duties under international law and exemplify responsible conduct at sea.

Ultimately, this episode illustrates the increasingly complex convergence of naval power projection, international humanitarian norms, and coastal state rights within the contemporary maritime domain. In an era marked by intensifying great-power competition and expanding operational reach in the Indian Ocean, the preservation of legal clarity, strategic restraint, and respect for neutral maritime spaces remains essential to sustaining regional stability and safeguarding the integrity of the international maritime order.

by REAR ADMIRAL (RTD.) JAGATH RANASINGHE
VSV, USP, psc, MSc (DS) Mgt, MMaritimePol (Aus),
PG Dip in CPS, DIP in CR, FNI (Lond), Former Govt Fellow GCSP