Features
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT?
The killing of a Prime Minister
by Sanjiva Senanayake
(PART I)
Many people ‘know’ the conventional tale about the assassination of the Prime Minister of Ceylon, S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike, 62 years ago. However, they each have a slightly different take and theory about the facts, the reasons, the conspiracy theories and who ‘actually’ did it. Those then unborn or too young to have been aware of it at the time, have heard about it from older people. We have to assume that the intrinsic Lankan sense of rumour would have spiced up the details as time went by.
There is a common belief that the standards of general governance, integrity and legal processes were much higher back then, in Ceylon, than now. Bolstering this justifiable belief, adjudication was done by the Supreme Court (SC), the verdict was confirmed in the Court of Criminal Appeal and accepted by the Privy Council in London. Therefore, the predominant view continues to be that justice was served objectively and impartially.
However, there were many controversial interpretations and theories that circulated before, during and after the Bandaranaike trials. There were several aspects of the conduct of the trial and the actual evidence presented that raised questions about the guilt of the alleged assassin and, as a consequence, the guilt of the others.
Articles about those traumatic events of long ago have been published periodically, but they have progressively reverted to recounting and sometimes sensationalizing the standard version, and have not adequately addressed the many controversial questions.
This article focuses specifically on the alleged murderer and the most critical of the controversies, based on the ‘eye-witness’ evidence led at the SC trial – was Somarama proved to be the assassin beyond reasonable doubt? If there is any doubt, it opens up the possibility of a different, politically motivated conspiracy, especially since Bandaranaike was the Prime Minister during turbulent times.
THE STORY IN SUMMARY
The PM was shot several times with a revolver at his residence ‘Tintagel’ – 65, Rosmead Place – at around 10 am on September 25, 1959. Despite appearing to recover somewhat by evening following surgery, and even dictating a message to the nation from hospital, he died the next morning. The only thing Bandaranaike said about the identity of the gunman was that he was “a foolish man dressed in the robes of a monk”. This was the first major targeted political assassination in post-independence Ceylon, one that changed the future course of the country.
A Buddhist monk, Talduwe Somarama, was immediately arrested in the house, with a gun in hand, on suspicion of being the assailant. He was a hitherto low-profile Buddhist monk who was an eye specialist at the College of Indigenous Medicine in Rajagiriya.
After several days another monk, the politically powerful Mapitigama Buddharakkitha, was arrested in addition to several other individuals alleged to have assisted Buddharakkitha as part of a year-long conspiracy to kill Bandaranaike using Somarama as the assassin. Buddharakkitha, although only 38-years old, was the chief monk of the important Kelaniya Temple and, as the head of the Eksath Bhikkhu Peramuna (EBP), the most politically powerful monk in the country at the time. He was also headstrong, impulsive and confrontational – certainly not a pious monk. Although the EBP helped bring Bandaranaike to power in 1956, by 1959 Buddharakkitha was antagonistic toward the PM for being too ‘soft’ in pushing a more aggressive Sinhala Buddhist agenda. Buddharakkitha was aligned with the right-wing of the government and his antagonism toward the leftists (and vice versa) in the government was public knowledge.

After exhaustive investigations and a long trial in the SC, a special jury found both monks and H.P. Jayawardena, a close associate of Buddharakkitha, guilty of the conspiracy, and Somarama guilty of committing the murder, and all three were sentenced to death. The convictions were upheld in the Court of Criminal Appeal, but due to an inadvertent omission in intervening legislative change, Buddharakkitha and Jayawardena were sentenced to life in prison for conspiring to commit murder. An appeal to the Privy Council in London failed, and Somarama was subsequently executed.
There the matter rested and most people forgot about the details of the case with the passage of time. Other dramatic political events followed thereafter leading to an attempted coup d’etat on January 27, 1962 to overthrow the government of Bandaranaike’s widow. Resort to violence for political purposes became more prevalent from the 1970s, and targeted assassinations of political leaders more frequent.
Only two books have been written in English about the assassination; one by the late Justice A.C. Alles and the other by the late Lucian Weeramantry, who was Somarama’s counsel in the trial. It is surprising that more books and academic studies do not seem to have been published specifically about the assassination, an important event in our post-Independence history.
Justice Alles’ book provides a lot of relevant background material but, judging by assertions made and conclusions drawn, it appears to have been written on the assumption that the conspiracy allegedly planned by Buddharakkitha was true and the verdicts just, although he does refer to some questionable issues.
Weeramantry restricts himself to the procedures followed, the evidence led and the submissions made in the SC, to demonstrate that there was more than ‘reasonable doubt’ about the convictions. He argues that the prosecution of the case was politically influenced and not neutral.
It is a fascinating case with many twists and turns as well as contradictions. A critical reading of the above books is recommended to anyone who is interested in digging further into the unusual events specifically pertinent to the murder and trial. A deeper understanding of contemporary political and social developments also helps.
BACKGROUND IN BRIEF
Bandaranaike left the United National Party (UNP) in 1951 and formed the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP). His party lost badly at the next general election in March 1952 and it appeared that his political career was doomed. In the meantime, political pressures by Sinhalese and Buddhist groups for affirmative action had been intensifying since Independence to redress what was perceived as historical discrimination against them from colonial times. The UNP was rather indifferent to these forces but Bandaranaike decided to channel them and was supported strongly by the ‘pancha maha balavegaya’ consisting of Buddhist monks, Ayurveda practitioners, vernacular teachers, peasants and workers.
The SLFP then formed a coalition called the Mahajana Eksath Peramuna (MEP) with a leftist party headed by Philip Gunawardena and a small party
led by W. Dahanayake, to contest the general election of April 1956. A key election slogan was ‘Sinhala-Only in 24 hours’, a potent rallying cry that meant different things to different people. The UNP too adopted the slogan prior to the election when it realised its electoral potential, but its late volte-face lacked credibility and the MEP won by a landslide.
However, the very next year, Bandaranaike initiated discussions with Tamil political leaders to provide devolution of some powers through the establishment of Regional Councils and the so-called Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam Pact was signed in July 1957. It was a compromise on both sides, which the PM likened to the Buddha’s Middle Way, but most of the politicians of the time were focused on short-term gains and not inclined to compromise for stability and longer-term progress. There were opposition and agitation from both sides and some avoidable incidents occurred in the process. Eventually, the pact was abrogated under severe pressure in April 1958, with the EBP too playing a major role.
The antagonistic posturing did not cease and this led to one week of intense conflict at the end of May, the so-called Sinhala-Tamil riots that left long-lasting social scars. The PM’s rule was seen as weak and indecisive in bringing the riots under control and the Governor General, Sir Oliver Goonetilleke, played a major role in quelling it.
Despite all this, Bandaranaike introduced the Tamil Language (Special Provisions) Act No. 28 of 1958 less than three months later in August 1958 as a compromise measure to accommodate Tamil demands regarding matters such as education, public service entrance examinations and the administration of the north and east. This too was criticized by extremists on both sides.
Ceylon in 1959, a decade after Independence but still looking for direction, was a hotbed of political turmoil. Agitations and strikes were rampant, with the constant interplay of all the emotion-rousing political forces of the time – urban vs. rural; westernized vs. nationalist; capitalist vs. socialist; Buddhist vs. Catholic; Sinhala vs. Tamil; rich vs. poor – trying to quickly carve pieces out of the emerging national pie. The old order was dying and a new one was being born.
In April 1959, Bandaranaike had a difference of opinion with the Inspector General of Police, Osmund de Silva and decided to replace him. The PM had been previously warned by various Buddhist leaders and MEP coalition partners in Parliament about a right-wing conspiracy to topple his administration with the involvement of the police and armed forces. Although Osmund de Silva was a Buddhist, all the senior Police officers next in line were not and, despite protests from within the Police, Bandaranaike decided to appoint M.W.F Abeykoon, an administrative officer from outside the Police service, angering several senior officers.
That was not all. The urban elites, more inclined to western lifestyles, accustomed to calling the shots politically and economically, and linguistically quite alienated from the masses, were becoming increasingly alarmed at the turn of events since the debacle in 1956 of their preferred political party, the UNP. The growing influence of more aggressive Sinhalese and Buddhist groups was causing concern among the established organizations and social groups.
There was an international dimension too. Despite the intense Cold War then raging, the Bandaranaike government had established diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union in December 1956 and signed an economic and technical cooperation agreement in 1958. The previous UNP government had recognized the People’s Republic of China in January 1950, supported China’s entry to the United Nations and entered into the historic Rubber-Rice barter agreement in 1952. The Bandaranaike government established full diplomatic relations with China in 1957.
The government’s plans to nationalize State-assisted private schools and foreign businesses such as the oil companies, and its decision in October 1957 to abrogate the Defence Pact with Britain and take back control of Trincomalee harbour and the RAF airbase at Katunayake, were all loud alarm bells.
By the latter half of 1959 the PM was into the fourth year of his five-year term, and already the coalition was fraying. The leftist faction, led by Philip Gunawardena, resigned from the government in April 1959 due to pressure from the coalition’s right wing regarding socialist measures such as the Paddy Lands Act, which included land reform. Strikes became more frequent and intense.
In this milieu, there were many disparate groups that could have had reasons to eliminate Bandaranaike, and perhaps get a bonus by pinning the blame on Buddharakkitha to neutralize a powerful, antagonistic group such as the EBP and the growing direct involvement of Buddhist monks in politics.
THE SHOOTING
Unlike today, firearms were not easily available and targeted political killings were extremely rare. The level of security considered necessary was quite basic and Bandaranaike himself was not keen on too many guards. Access to his residence was freely available during the morning to all and sundry. The shooting at close quarters happened on the verandah of the PM’s private residence with at least 30 people in the immediate vicinity.
Somarama was seated at one end of the outside verandah. There was another monk (Niwanthidiye Ananda) seated about 10 feet away from Somarama and more to the centre of the verandah, near the entrance to the corridor that led from the front porch into the interior of the house. Several others were standing around including a teacher named Gunaratne who was opposite Ananda.
The PM first spoke with Ananda and gave him some instructions. He then moved along the verandah toward Somarama and, as he bent and worshipped him in greeting, a gunshot was heard. Bandaranaike cried out in pain, turned and tried to run back into the house. Further shots were heard, and the PM was hit in the chest and abdomen. Altogether he was hit by four bullets, the first one glancing his left wrist and three entering his torso as he staggered into the house. Gunaratne, who should have had a clear view of the shooting, was also shot in the neck area by a fifth bullet as Bandaranaike stumbled past him to escape into the house along the central corridor.
In the utter confusion that followed, Somarama followed the PM into the house carrying a revolver and was then assaulted by several people who came from other parts of the house before he could say anything. In the melee the revolver went off once, the last bullet, but no one was hurt. The World War I vintage revolver, in rather poor condition, that had been used was recovered by the police.
Somarama’s version was that someone dressed in robes shot repeatedly at the PM from the garden just below the verandah, threw the revolver on to the verandah and then ran off toward the road. He then involuntarily picked up the gun and followed the PM into the house to hand it over to someone responsible.
In the meantime, PC Samarakoon, who was the sentry at the main gate, rushed to the house and shot at Somarama, injuring him in the thigh and groin area. The PM was sent to hospital by car and, soon after that, DIG Sidney de Zoysa, who had a prior appointment to meet the PM, arrived and took control of the chaotic situation. In fact, de Zoysa passed the PM’s car going toward the hospital on his way to the house, but didn’t realise the injured PM was in it. Some time after de Zoysa’s arrival, a bleeding Somarama in obvious pain was, for some inexplicable reason, despatched to the Harbour Police station on the other side of the city and detained there for around two hours before being taken to hospital where he underwent an operation to remove one of his testicles.
The firing of the first five bullets was rapid and probably took less than 10 seconds, since the PM was also moving away. The despatch of the PM by car and the arrival of Sidney de Zoysa would probably have happened within 10-15 minutes thereafter.
It seems, at first glance, to be a straightforward case. The alleged assailant, the weapon, the victim and witnesses were all readily available, and it happened in the heart of Colombo, in a narrow space, in broad daylight. On the face of it, only the motive and the possible involvement of others had to be discerned. But in political murders things are not always what they seem.
THE LEGAL PROCESS
Buddharakkitha and Jayawardena were arrested on October 14, 1959 and held in remand custody, along with Somarama. Following intensive investigations by the police, the magisterial inquiry started on December 14, 1959, less than three months after the murder, and went on until July 27, 1960. At the end of the almost seven month-long hearings, five people were named to stand trial in the SC.
1. Mapitigama Buddharakkitha thero
2. H.P. Jayawardena
3. Anura de Silva
4. Talduwe Somarama thero
5. Newton Perera
All the accused were to be charged with conspiracy to murder the PM, and the fourth with murder as well. The indictment read as follows:
That between the 25th of August, 1958, and the 26th of September, 1959, at Kelaniya, Wellampitiya, Rajagiriya, Colombo and other places within the jurisdiction of this Court, you did agree to commit or abet or act together with the common purpose of committing or abetting an offence, to wit, the murder of Solomon West Ridgeway Dias Bandaranaike, and that you are thereby guilty of the offence of conspiracy to commit or abet the said offence of murder, in consequence of which conspiracy the said offence of murder was committed, and that you have thereby committed an offence punishable under section 296 read with sections 113B and 102 of the Penal Code.
It specifically mentioned a date 13 months earlier (August 25, 1958) as the origin of the conspiracy. This was the date on which the PM, on the advice of senior technocrats of the Ministry of Finance, decided not to award a shipping contract to a company in which Buddharakkitha’s brother had a significant interest. The direct implication is that Buddharakkitha’s resentment due to this act was the trigger for a year-long conspiracy that led to the assassination.
The defence counsel made a request for a Special Jury at the start of the SC trial due to the highly politically-charged nature of the case. They requested that government employees should be excluded but, in the end, the Foreman of the English-speaking jury was a public servant. As a matter of interest, six members were Christians and the seventh was a Buddhist, and all were from Colombo. However, the integrity of the members of the jury was never questioned.
During the SC trial it became apparent that the third accused was an insignificant character and he was finally acquitted unanimously. It was not clear why he was charged at all, or placed ahead of the alleged murderer Somarama, if there was indisputable evidence against Somarama.
Newton Perera, a police officer, allegedly procured the revolver and ammunition used in the killing. He was also accused of training Somarama to shoot, but this was not established. He was subsequently found not guilty in the SC with the jury divided five to two.
The SC trial commenced seven months later, on February 22, 1961 before Justice T.S. Fernando, and went on till May 12, 1961. The government retained George Chitty QC, a prominent criminal defence lawyer from the private Bar, to lead the prosecution in the SC, by-passing the Attorney General’s Department. The Deputy Solicitor General, A.C.M. Ameer, who was the prosecutor in the Magistrate’s Court, resigned in protest.
There were criticisms that the prosecutor for the State focused more on getting judgements against the accused who were charged, rather than seeking the truth via a broader inquiry to get to the bottom of who actually killed the PM of the country, and why. Some of the defence counsel, including Phineas Quass QC, who came over from the UK to defend Buddharakkitha and Jayawardena, also alluded to this during the trial.
The prosecution did not call Gunaratne who was in a perfect position to see the shooting at close quarters. Neither did the prosecution call key witnesses DIG Sidney de Zoysa or any of the senior (Gazetted) police officers who investigated the case. De Zoysa was called instead by Weeramantry, Somarama’s counsel. There was a lot of evidence led by the prosecution that did not appear to have relevance. The government even paid to bring down a ‘witness’ from the UK (Bruno Perera), who only served to distract attention. He was reprimanded and fined by the Judge at the end of the trial.
The seven members of the Special Jury were the final arbiters of the judgement rather than the Judge. They would have had a tedious task in assessing the oral evidence, unravelling the many counsel’s interventions and addresses, absorbing the Judge’s directions on points of law, and then arriving at a decision in a short while. In those non-computerized days, the jury had to rely only on what they heard in the courts almost every day for 55 days and make a decision on a matter of life and death, without the advantage of printed transcripts of evidence. A total of 97 witnesses testified and the typed record of the proceedings ran into 3,536 pages.
(Note: typed transcripts of the day’s proceedings were, however, made available to the Judge and counsel the following day)
TO BE CONTINUED …..
Features
West Asian conflict undergoing manifold complications
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s message to Israel’s enemies was blunt and stark.‘We’re going to win; we have no choice.’ He said so while the majority of attendees at a recent UN General Assembly session walked out of the conference hall when the Israeli Prime Minister took the podium; many of them booing in derision.
Those commentators who have been studying Israel’s handling of her enemy states over the decades are unlikely to dismiss the entirety of Netanyahu’s address as rhetoric. The general pattern has been for the Israeli state to stand up firmly against its enemies in the battle field. On most occasions, these adversaries have been beaten back.
It is also little realized in particularly the Southern hemisphere that Israel, for the most part, could defend herself without much US assistance. The history of the conflict bears this out.
However, from the viewpoint of working towards a just and equitable peace in the Middle East the Israeli hard line stance has proved and will prove incalculably detrimental. The sworn enemies of Israel are not going to be in any way deterred by Netanyahu’s stark warnings. On the other hand, they would be only further provoked into taking on Israel by conventional or unconventional military means and seek its destruction.
The recent aborted mid-air hijacking of a Flydubai flight, consisting mainly of Israeli passengers, by an Omani extremist drives home the point. Israel’s enemies are bound to redouble their efforts to annihilate Israel rather than be deterred by the latter’s warnings about standing firm against them. This too history has proved.
It would be in the fitness of things at this juncture to pay a tribute to the professionalism, courage and humanity of the relevant airline pilot, Captain Machchhar, whose timely action proved decisive in botching the hijack attempt. His intervention averted what could very well have been another 9/11 type tragedy. History is not going to forget his daring and resourcefulness.
Meanwhile, the ground realities in West Asia are undergoing further complications that portend increasing regional instability. For example at the time of writing Turkiye, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia have agreed under the recently established ‘Mecca Alliance for Defence’ to deploy ‘deterrence measures’ collectively in the event of any member of the alliance coming under military strikes from a non-member state.
The agreement is modeled on the NATO collective defence pact and should help in defusing any threat perceptions experienced by the alliance members in the short term. However, the group would need to be cognizant of the major and potentially divisive role Iran could play in the interstate politics of the Middle East region going forward.
Iran’s reported support, for example, for Yemen’s Houthi rebels, who are engaged in attacking Saudi national assets, could at some point in time compel the alliance, under the terms of the pact, to initiate deterrent military measures against Iran.
The implications for regional peace from such a turn of events hardly require elaboration. A full blown regional war emerges as a distinct possibility if Iran sees itself as being excessively antagonized by the alliance. A further complication is that antagonistic sectarian identities of an Islamic kind could come to play hugely divisive roles in it. Shiite Islamic states would be inclined to back Iran while those countries seen as Sunni Islamic in orientation are bound to support Saudi Arabia.
Accordingly, West Asia is a region rife with manifold aggravated insecurities. If the latter are not defused dexterously they could escalate into a conflict of extra regional dimensions. The latter development would render the world a collective loser.
Unfortunately, no constructive help could be expected from the US at this juncture by way of working towards regional and international peace even of short durance. Its war against Iran has only aggravated the world’s current insecurities.
For example, the world has been compelled to face the possibility of compounded economic woes as a consequence of the Hormuz crisis remaining unresolved. The world is currently experiencing what could be seen as a ‘winter of economic discontent’ of unprecedented proportions.
Unfortunately, the international community is to all intents and purposes helpless in the face of this multifaceted crisis. Substantial intervention is expected of the UN but since it has failed to reform itself over the years it is compelled to stand idly by while the world’s insecurities heighten and multiply.
Yet, it is the seemingly paralyzed UN system that has some potential to contain the current tide of international disorder to even a small measure. Given the persisting divergent and conflicting interests among the world’s principal power blocs, the G7 and BRICS for instance, it is mainly the UN and its principal agencies that could carry some credibility as peace brokers and mediators.
However, as an initial step towards bringing the principal protagonists to the negotiating table the UN would need to convince the principal powers of the UN Security Council of the need for a substantive broad-basing of the membership of the Council so as to reflect more accurately the current global political and economic realities. Such reforms would render the Council more representative and help in strengthening its credibility and effectiveness.
The above reforms call for years of dynamism, hard work and resourcefulness on the part of the international community, read the UN. Yet the aims are not impossible to achieve if strong leadership is brought to bear by the UN.
Meanwhile, the UN agencies and allied organizations need to pay stepped-up attention to the West Asian theatre and its wasting conflicts and wars. Here too there is immense hard work to be put in.
There is, for instance, identity politics and its issues that need to be managed urgently. While internal political matters of countries could not be addressed directly by UN agencies, awareness-raising programs and projects could be energetically carried out by them to blunt the appeal of identity-based slogans, relating to, for instance, religion and race.
Besides, values at the heart of democratic politics need to be freshly and enthusiastically propagated. Vast reserves of energy and resources are needed, to be sure, to consistently champion and implement these crucial projects but they need to be pursued single-mindedly if even a dent is to be made in the current runaway global disorder.
The aborted hijacking of the Flydubai flight pointed to the dehumanizing impact of identity politics on the human consciousness. It was also an indication that those sections endowed with humanity cannot stand idly by while identity politics continues to destroy civilizational values. The time to act is ‘now’.
Features
Future of Sri Lanka’s state university system: Should it be shut down and reopened?
by Professor Ranjith Bandara
Emeritus Professor of Economics, University of Colombo
My life has been closely connected with Sri Lanka’s state university system for more than four decades. Its doors opened to me first as a student and later as an academic. The system gave me knowledge, opportunities and a life. Therefore, when I speak about its future, I do so not as an outsider, but as someone who owes much to it and genuinely wishes to see it become better.
Over the years, our university system has expanded significantly. New institutions, faculties, degree programmes and opportunities for students have been created. For 2024, the government expected to admit 43,204 students to national universities. By the time the relevant report was prepared, 42,282 students had been admitted through the general admission process, which had not yet been completed. This is an achievement that should not be dismissed.
However, expanding the system does not necessarily mean that its quality has improved. The real question is not simply how many students we have allowed through the doors, but what kind of education they receive after entering. (Source: Ministry of Education Annual Performance Report 2024.)
We often proudly declare that “our university is number one.” Yet a university does not become number one through publicity. Its true standing depends on the quality of its teaching, the strength of its research and the contribution it makes to society. A vice-chancellor writing about the institution’s, or his or her own, achievements on Facebook does not improve the quality of a university. What matters is good teaching, an education that encourages students to think, credible research and new knowledge that benefits society. A reputation must be earned through meaningful work, not through self-promotion.
The fundamental purpose of a university is clear: to create knowledge, to teach it and to train students to examine and understand it critically. To fulfil this purpose, academics need freedom, responsibility and time. Students must be free to ask questions, disagree and develop their own views based on evidence. Without such an environment, a university may award degrees, but it cannot fulfil the true purpose of university education.
The most serious danger I see is the growing tendency for political activity to take precedence over the academic mission of universities. Over the past five decades, this problem has gradually become more serious. In some universities today, it has become difficult even to hold or express an opinion that differs from the dominant political view.
Members of a university community have every right to hold political views and express them peacefully. A university should not be a place inhabited by silent people. However, when political loyalties, power blocs and struggles for positions become more important than research, teaching and learning, the university moves away from its true purpose. When the political camp to which an academic belongs matters more than the value of that academic’s ideas, the respect that should belong to knowledge is transferred to power.
These criticisms are not ideas I have borrowed from books. They are based on experiences from my own professional life. One such experience was the manner in which I had to leave the university nearly twenty years ago. In my view, the improper exercise of political power within the administration of the University of Colombo at that time, and the strong desire to retain that power, had a serious effect on my professional life. Although this was a personal experience, I mention it with regret because it reveals a deeper institutional problem.
The lesson I learned from that experience is not merely about one person or one incident. When there are no strong institutional safeguards to ensure that power is exercised fairly and individuals are protected, even an academic may be forced to leave an institution he deeply loves.
To those who criticise my later decision to enter national politics, my answer is this: when the university’s institutional system failed to provide me with fairness and professional protection in the face of the injustice I experienced, I had to choose another path through which I could use my knowledge and experience in the service of the country.
This does not mean that all vice-chancellors, academics or students behave in the same way. I personally know many people who, despite difficult circumstances, have taught with dedication, undertaken meaningful research and transformed the lives of their students. Scholars such as Professor W. D. Lakshman, Professor Arjuna Aluwihare and Professor Lakshman Jayatilake may be recognised among the distinguished vice-chancellors in the history of Sri Lanka’s university system. Their service deserves our respect and appreciation.
Nevertheless, the presence of a few good and committed individuals cannot, by itself, strengthen a weak institutional system. We must also create an institutional environment in which such people can work independently, fairly and effectively.
First, university leaders must be selected through a process based on clearly defined qualifications, transparent evaluation and accountability. Once a vice-chancellor has been appointed, his or her performance should be assessed according to the support provided for research, the quality of teaching, student welfare, the institution’s financial discipline and the fairness of its decisions. Personal loyalties and publicity skills cannot replace these measures of performance.
Second, academics must be given the time and space required to carry out their core responsibilities. It is meaningless to demand “world-class universities” without providing adequate time, facilities and reasonable funding for research. Teaching, too, should not be treated merely as delivering lectures. Students must be trained to reason, write, investigate and apply their knowledge to real-world problems. The quality of a degree programme should be measured not by its title, but by the capabilities of the graduates it produces.
Third, universities must establish an honest connection with the needs of the country. The problems confronting our economy, schools, healthcare system, agriculture, environment and wider society are all legitimate subjects for research. Seeking answers to these problems does not diminish the dignity of a university; it increases its value to society.
At the same time, research must not be controlled by short-term political demands. Knowledge can serve the country only when researchers are free to communicate what they discover. Sri Lanka’s World Bank-supported AHEAD higher education programme similarly connected the expansion of enrolment in priority disciplines with improving the quality of degree programmes and promoting research and innovation. These goals were linked because meaningful expansion cannot be separated from educational quality. (Source: World Bank overview of the AHEAD programme.
Fourth, the responsibilities of students must be clearly emphasised. The duty to protect the academic environment of a university cannot be placed solely on administrators and academics. Every student has a fundamental responsibility to give priority to his or her education, respect the right of other students to learn and allow the free exchange of ideas.
Student activities, social debate and political engagement all have an important place in university life. However, none of them should be allowed to disrupt education or prevent other students from learning.
When students abandon their primary purpose of learning and create an environment that obstructs education, the university system cannot fulfil one of its most important functions: producing knowledgeable and responsible graduates. A university may continue to award degree certificates, but if lectures, research, open discussion and intellectual inquiry do not receive sufficient attention, it risks producing graduates who lack depth of knowledge, critical thinking and professional competence.
The result may be the emergence of a group of “half-educated” graduates, individuals who possess certificates but have not received a complete intellectual education. Therefore, just as we discuss student rights, we must also have an honest and open discussion about student responsibilities within the university system.
My position on the current professional struggle of university academics is also clear. If they are demanding fair conditions of employment, those demands should be discussed seriously. If their struggle is also intended to free universities from political interference and restore research, teaching and learning to the centre of university life, I stand with them.
The rights of academics and the educational rights of students should not be presented as opposing interests. Both can be protected and respected only within a well-functioning university.
When I say that “the state university system should be shut down and reopened,” I do not mean that we should close the door on the future of our students. I mean that we must close the door on systems in which power matters more than knowledge.
Students have the right to hold political views and participate actively in debates on national issues. A university needs a student community that thinks about the country’s problems and speaks out against injustice. However, student politics should not shut down the university, deprive other students of their education or become a means of displaying organisational power. The right to fight for one’s beliefs comes with the responsibility to respect another person’s right to an education.
Simply attempting to establish another 50 universities will not solve these problems. Sri Lanka needs a higher education system that brings together the contributions of state, state-affiliated and private institutions while applying clear standards and responsibilities to all of them.
Strict discipline within such a system should not mean suppressing freedom of thought. It should mean ensuring that everyone fulfils their responsibilities in relation to teaching, research, examinations, institutional governance and student welfare. A degree certificate will then have value not merely because of the name of the institution that issued it, but because the knowledge and capabilities of the person who earned it can be trusted.
We should learn from advanced higher education systems, but we should not simply copy them. We must develop institutional autonomy, reliable quality-assurance mechanisms and publicly accountable governance in ways that suit our own needs. What we owe future generations is not merely a country with a larger number of universities, but a country in which people can trust the education those universities provide.
What we must close down, therefore, is not the universities themselves, but the outdated system that closes the door on knowledge, freedom and responsibility. What we must reopen is a genuine university system devoted to learning, inquiry, research and the creation of new knowledge in the service of the country.
Features
The Sri Lankan who made Scottish history
From beauty pageants and medical science to challenging British immigration policy and making political history in Scotland, yes, that’s Sri Lankan Deena Tissera, born into privilege, in Chilaw, but exposed to poverty and the realities of war.
Now, after 15 years in British politics, she tells Ivan Alvis why she is no longer interested in fitting anyone else’s image of a leader.
She was educated at The British school in Colombo and her father was a doctor-entrepreneur-philanthropist, and mother a former beauty queen and movie star.
She studied Medical Science, moved into Global Health and began a PhD in Public Health, competed in Miss Sri Lanka for Miss World, and, in 2022, made history as the first woman of colour elected to Aberdeen City Council; the first politician of Sri Lankan descent elected in Scotland.
The moment that set it all in motion came during the worst period of her life. Her father had died. She was 24 and missed her university examinations to attend his funeral.
“My father’s greatest wish for me was that I completed my education. However, I was being told that my education would be delayed because I had missed examinations to attend his funeral.”
She refused to accept it. She challenged the university, protested, went before its board and represented herself — and won.
“I went from fighting for myself to realising there were thousands of students who sometimes needed somebody to fight with them.”
She was elected Students’ Union Vice President. Soon her campaigning grew larger. As an international student she had experienced Britain’s immigration system, first-hand, and helped build a UK-wide movement, campaigning for international student rights, and contributing to campaigns that helped achieve changes to immigration rules.
“That taught me one of the most important lessons of my life. Politics isn’t about having a title. Politics is understanding where power sits, organising the people who don’t have it and knowing how to make the people who do have it, listen.”

Deena: Beauty pageant
contestant
The instinct to challenge inequality began earlier. Though born to privilege, her father took her into communities affected by the war through his philanthropic work.
“I grew up with opportunities, but I was surrounded by poverty. That contradiction affected me enormously. My father taught me that privilege isn’t something you should feel guilty about. But you should understand the responsibility that comes with it.”
If her father gave her a sense of service, her mother gave her confidence. Inspired by her, Deena took to modelling … and the Miss Sri Lanka pageant.
“People sometimes expect serious women to edit the glamorous parts out of their history. I can, and have been in a beauty pageant, and still understand economic policy.”
Her academic background continues to shape her politics: “Medical science teaches you evidence. Global health teaches you systems. Public health teaches you that someone’s health can be determined by poverty, housing, education and employment long before they reach a hospital.”
While at the University of Aberdeen she joined Labour Students, later becoming Vice-Chair of her Constituency Labour Party. What followed was more than a decade of door-knocking, organising, strategising, winning and losing.
The overnight success took 15 years. In 2022 she won Hilton, Woodside and Stockethill in Aberdeen.
The historic label came with a complicated reality. She remembers entering rooms with qualifications, campaign experience and leadership credentials — and still sensing she was not the person others imagined as leader.
“There have been tables where I have looked around and known I may be the most accomplished person sitting there, but I wasn’t necessarily the person people saw as the leader. And that’s because I didn’t fit the look.”
Her answer was to work harder — another qualification, another campaign. Then she realised the flaw in that strategy.
“If you wait for everybody else to decide you’re good enough, you can spend your entire life auditioning for a position you’re already qualified to occupy. I owned my identity and started leading with the confidence of my competence.”
At 39, successful and unmarried, she speaks with unusual candour. “Being unmarried is a marital status. It isn’t a performance review.”
Her message to young Sri Lankan and migrant women is direct: “Do not shrink your ambition to make yourself easier for somebody else to digest.”
Her blog series ‘Taboo Tuesdays’ — with titles like “Politics Is a Blood Sport – And We Pretend It Isn’t” — examines ambition, envy, ego and power from inside the room.
Since her election, she has led on anti-poverty and inequality, served as Labour’s Energy Spokesperson for Aberdeen covering net zero, environment and transport, and served as Chief Whip of the Labour group.
She was adviser to former Prime Minister Gordon Brown on his Our Scottish Future commission, took part in the Jo Cox Women in Leadership programme, and served as Scottish executive representative for the northeast, Highlands and Islands at her party’s top table.
Recognition has followed — 35 Under 35 Scotland’s rising political stars, Exceptional Achiever of the Year, Politician of the Year nomination, and Outstanding Woman in Governance and Public Policy by Women in Management UK.
As Energy Spokesperson for Aberdeen, one of Europe’s key energy cities, she sits at the centre of Britain’s energy debate. She supports transition but warns: “A just transition cannot mean asking one community to carry the economic cost of everybody else’s environmental ambition.”
Ask her if she wants more power and her answer is simple: “Yes. I am ambitious. But power without purpose is just status.”
Perhaps her most personal answer is about representation: “The first Sri Lankan elected in Scotland means something to me because it means the next Sri Lankan isn’t the first.
“I didn’t have to become less Sri Lankan to become Scottish. I didn’t have to become less feminine to become politically serious. And I didn’t have to look like somebody else’s idea of leadership before I was allowed to lead.”
In conclusion, Deena Tissera had this to say: “There was a time when I wanted to prove I deserved a seat at the table. Now I walk in knowing I do.”
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