Midweek Review

Batalanda and complexities of paramilitary operations

Published

1 year ago

2025/03/26

Former President Ranil Wickremesinghe’s recent combative ‘Head-to-Head’ interview with British-American Mehdi Hasan on Al Jazeera has opened a can of worms. As to why Hasan raised the Batalanda Presidential Commission report, during a 49-minute interview conducted at the London’s Conway Hall, with a clearly pro LTTE audience, remains a mystery. This must be yet another notorious way to show how even-handed they are as in the case of its coverage of Russia, China, Palestine or Ukraine for their gullible viewers.

Recorded in February and aired in March 2025, the interview is definitely the most controversial the UNP leader, who is also an Attorney-at-Law, ever faced during his political career; always used to getting kid glove treatment, especially after taking over the party in 1994.

The continuing public discourse on Batalanda should provoke a wider discussion on Sri Lanka’s response to separatist Tamil terrorism, since the cold blooded murder of Jaffna SLFP Mayor Alfred Duriappah, which signalled the beginning of the LTTE terror campaign that ended in May 2009 with the crushing military defeat of the Tigers on the banks of the Nathikadal lagoon, as well as two southern insurgencies in 1971 and 1987-1990.

As Nandana Gunatilleke (one time JVP General Secretary and ex-MP), Dr. Wasantha Bandara (ex-JVPer and close associate of the slain JVP leader Rohana Wijeweera), Indrananda de Silva (ex-JVPer, incumbent Central Committee member of Frontline Socialist Party [FSP] and ex-military photographer) and Uvindu Wijeweera (Rohana Wijeweera’s son and leader of Dewana Parapura) agreed during the recent Hiru ‘Balaya’ discussion, conducted by Madushan de Silva, the Batalanda operation was in line with the overall counter-terrorist/insurgency strategy of the then government.

The issues at hand cannot be discussed at all without taking into consideration the JVP terrorism that, at one-time, almost overwhelmed the UNP’s unbroken rule, since 1977, carried out while openly brushing aside most of the universally accepted genuine parliamentary norms. The country’s second Republican constitution, promulgated by the UNP regime with a 5/6 majority in Parliament, in 1978, had been amended no less than 13 times by the time they were finally ousted in 1995. This was mainly to facilitate their continuous rule. Unfortunately, all stakeholders have sought to take advantage of Batalanda, thereby preventing a proper dialogue. Quite surprisingly, none of the guests, nor the interviewer, bothered, at least, to make a reference to the JVP bid on President J.R. Jayewardene’s life in Parliament on the morning of July 18, 1987. At the time, JVPer Ajith Kumara, working in the House as a minor employee, hurled two hand grenades towards JRJ, with the then Prime Minister Ranasinghe Premadasa seated next to JRJ. While one government MP lost his life, several others suffered injuries, including then National Security Minister Lalith Athulathmudali, whose spleen had to be removed.

At one point, Gunatilleke declared that they assassinated UNP MP for Tangalle Jinadasa Weerasinghe on July 3, 1987, in response to the government killing well over 100 people, in Colombo, protesting against the signing of the Indo-Lanka accord on July 29, 1987. The parliamentarian was killed near the Barawakumbuka-Welangahawela bridge on the Colombo-Rathnapura-Embilipitiya Road. The UNPer was killed on his way home after having declined Premier Premadasa’s offer to make an SLAF chopper available for him to reach home safely.

Against the backdrop of MP Weerasinghe’s assassination and the grenade attack on the UNP parliamentary group that claimed the life of Keethi Abeywickrema (MP for Deniyaya), the government had no option but to respond likewise. The operation, established at the Batalanda Housing scheme of the State Fertiliser Corporation, constituted part of the counter-insurgency strategy pursued by the UNP.

Those who called Batalanda complex Batalanda torture camp/ wadakagaraya conveniently forgot during the second JVP inspired insurgency, the military had to utilize many public buildings, including schools, as makeshift accommodation for troops. Of course the UNP established Batalanda under different circumstances with the then Industries Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe providing political authority. Batalanda had been an exclusive police operation though the Army had access to it whenever a requirement arose.

Those who had been suddenly withdrawn from the Northern and Eastern Provinces, to meet the rapidly evolving security threat in the South, required accommodation. FSP CC member Indrananada de Silva had received unhindered access to Batalanda in his capacity as a military photographer and the rest is history.

As to why Indrananda de Silva switched his allegiance to the FSP should be examined, taking into consideration his previous role as a trusted military photographer, formerly a Lance Corporal of the Military Police. An influential section of the JVP, led by Kumar Gunaratnam, formed the FSP in April 2012 though it didn’t receive the much anticipated public support. Both Indrananda de Silva and Nandana Gunatilleke, who aligned himself with the UNP, found fault with the JVP-led National People’s Power (NPP) over its handling of the Batalanada issue.

Paramilitary operations

Paramilitary operations had been an integral part of the overall counter-insurgency campaign, directed at the JVP responsible for approximately 6,600 killings. Among those death squads were PRRA primarily drawn from the SLMP (Sri Lanka Mahajana Party) and SRRA (the socialist Revolutionary Red Army). PRRA had close links with the Independent Student Union (ISU) whose leader Daya Pathirana was slain by the JVP. The vast majority of people do not remember that Daya Pathirana, who led the ISU during the turbulent 1985-1986 period, was killed mid-Dec. 1989. The second insurgency hadn’t started at that time though the JVP propagated the lie that they took up arms against the UNP government following the signing of the Indo-Lanka peace accord on July 29, 1987.

In addition to PRRA and SRRA, the government made use of paramilitary groups, namely Kalu balallu, Ukkusso, Rajaliyo, Kaha balallu, Kola koti, Rathu Makaru, Mapila, Gonussa, Nee, Keshara Sinhayo, Le-mappillu and Kalu koti.

The UNP also involved some elements of Indian trained Tamil groups (not of the LTTE) in paramilitary operations. Such operations, that had been backed by respective Cabinet Ministers, were supervised by local law enforcement authorities. Paramilitary operations had been in line with psychological warfare that was meant to cause fear among the JVP, as well as the general population. Military operations that had been combined with paramilitary actions received the blessings of the political leadership at the highest level. In the case of Batalanda (1988-1990) President J.R. Jayewardene and Ranasinghe Premadasa knew of its existence.

Even after the eradication of the top JVP leadership, by Nov. 1989, police, military and paramilitary operations continued unabated. Former JVPers appearing on ‘Balaya’ agreed that counter-insurgency operations were actually brought to an end only after D.B. Wijetunga succeeded President Ranasinghe Premadasa after the latter’s assassination on May Day 1993.

After the LTTE resumed war in June 1990, just a couple of months after the withdrawal of the Indian Army (July 1987-March1990), the UNP authorized paramilitary operations in the northern and eastern areas. Members of TELO, PLOTE, EPRLF as well as EPDP were made part of the overall government security strategy. They operated in large groups. Some paramilitary units were deployed in the Jaffna islands as well. And these groups were represented in Parliament. They enjoyed privileged status not only in the northern and eastern regions but Colombo as well. The government allowed them to carry weapons in the city and its suburbs.

These groups operated armed units in Colombo. The writer had the opportunity to visit EPDP and PLOTE safe houses in Colombo and its suburbs soon after they reached an understanding with President Ranasinghe Premadasa. Overnight at the behest of President Premadasa, the Election Department granted these Tamil groups political recognition. In other words, armed groups were made political parties. The Premadasa government accepted their right to carry weapons while being represented in Parliament.

It would be pertinent to mention that thousands of Tamil paramilitary personnel served the government during that period. There had been many confrontations between them and the LTTE over the years and the latter sought to eliminate key paramilitary personnel. Let me remind you of the circumstances, the EPRLF’s number 02 Thambirajah Subathiran alias Robert was sniped to death in June 2003. Robert was engaged in routine morning exercises on the top floor of the two-storeyed EPRLF office, on the hospital road, Jaffna, when an LTTE sniper took him out from the nearby Vembadi Girls’ high school. The operation of the Norway managed Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) made no difference as the LTTE removed Robert who led the party here in the absence of leader Varatharaja Perumal, the first and the only Chief Minister of the North-Eastern Province.

In terms of the CFA that had been signed by Premier Ranil Wickremesinghe and LTTE leader Velupillai Prabhakaran, in Feb. 2002, the government agreed to disarm all paramilitary personnel. Many wouldn’t remember now that during Premadasa’s honeymoon with the LTTE, the Army facilitated the LTTE onslaught on paramilitary groups in selected areas.

Muthaliff’s role

During the ‘Balaya’ discussion, the contentious issue of who shot JVP leader Rohana Wijeweera came up. Nandana Gunatilleke, who contested the 1999 Dec. presidential election. as the JVP candidate, pointing to an article carried in the party organ that dealt with Wijeweera’s assassination said that he wrongly named Gaffoor as one of the persons who shot their leader whereas the actual shooter was Muthaliff. The headline named Thoradeniya and Gaffoor as the perpetrators.

Declaring that he personally wrote that article on the basis of information provided by Indrananda de Silva, Gunatilleke named Asoka Thoradeniya and Tuan Nizam Muthaliff of the Army as the perpetrators of the crime. Thoradeniya served as Sri Lanka’s High Commissioner in the Maldives during the Yahapalana administration, while Muthaliff was killed by the LTTE in Colombo in late May 2005. The shooting took place at Polhengoda junction, Narahenpita. Muthaliff was on his way from Manning town, Narahenpita, to the Kotelawala Defence University.

The programme was told that the JVP had over the years developed close relationship with Thoradeniya while Indrananda de Silva accused Dr. Wasantha Bandara of duplicity regarding Muthaliff. How could you recognize Muthaliff, slain by the LTTE, as a war hero as he was actually one of the persons who shot Rohana Wijeweera, the latter asked.

At the time of his assassination, Muthaliff served as the Commanding Officer, 1 st Regiment Sri Lanka Military Intelligence Corps. The then parliamentarian Wimal Weerawansa was among those who paid last respects to Maj. Muthaliff.

At the time of Rohana Wijeweera’s arrest, Muthaliff served as Lieutenant while Thoradeniya was a Major. Indrananda de Silva strongly stressed that atrocities perpetrated by the police and military in the South or in the northern and eastern regions must be dealt with regardless of whom they were conducting operations against. The former JVPer recalled the Army massacre in the east in retaliation for the landmine blast that claimed the lives of Northern Commander Maj. Gen. Denzil Kobbekaduwa and a group of senior officers, including Brigadier Wijaya Wimalaratne, in early Aug. 1990 in Kayts.

Dr. Wasantha Bandara warned of the Western powers taking advantage of what he called false narrative to push for a Truth and Reconciliation Commission.

It would be pertinent to mention that the LTTE also used the underworld as well as some corrupt Army personnel in planning high profile assassinations. Investigations into the assassination of Muthaliff, as well as Maj. Gen. Parami Kulatunga, killed in a suicide attack at Pannipitiya, in June 2006, revealed the direct involvement of military personnel with the LTTE.

Indrananda de Silva disclosed that soon after Anura Kumara Dissanayake won the presidential election last September, the FSP, in writing, requested the JVP leader to inquire into killings during that period, including that of Rohana Wijeweera. The FSPer alleged that President Dissanayake refrained from even acknowledging their letter. Indrananda de Silva emphasized that Al Jazeera never disclosed anything new as regards Batalanda as he exposed the truth years ago. The former JVPer ridiculed the ruling party tabling the Batalanda Commission report in the wake of Wickremesinghe’s Al Jazeera interview whereas the matter was in the public domain for quite some time.

Indrananda de Silva and Nandana Gunatilleke exchanged words over the latter’s declaration that the JVP, too, was subjected to investigation for violence unleashed during the 1987-1990 period. While the FSPer repeatedly declared that those who carried out directives issued by the party were arrested and in some cases killed, Nandana Gunatilleke took up the position that the party should be held accountable for crimes perpetrated during that period.

The interviewer posed Nandana Gunatilleke the question whether he was betraying his former comrades after joining the UNP. Nandana Gunatilleke shot back that he joined the UNP in 2015 whereas the JVP joined UNP as far back as 2009 to promote retired Army Chef Sarath Fonseka’s presidential ambition even though he wiped out the JVP presence in Trincomalee region during the second insurgency.

JVP’s accountability

Nandana Gunatilleke is adamant that the party should accept responsibility for the killings carried out at that time. The former JVPer declared that Vijaya Kumaratunga (Feb. 16, 1988), first Vice Chancellor of the Colombo University (March 08, 1989) Dr. Stanley Wijesundera, Ven. Kotikawatte Saddhatissa thera (Aug. 03, 1988) and Chairperson of the State Pharmaceutical Corporation Gladys Jayewardene (Sept. 12, 1989) were among those assassinated by the JVP. SPC Chairperson was killed for importing medicine from India, the former Marxist aligned with the UNP said, while actor-turned-politician Kumaratunga’s assassination was attributed to his dealings with President J.R. Jayewardene.

According to Nandana Gunatilleke, except for a few killings such as General Secretaries of the UNP Harsha Abeywickrema (Dec 23, 1987) and Nandalal Fernando (May 20, 1988), the vast majority of others were ordinary people like grama sevakas killed on mere accusation of being informants. The deaths were ordered on the basis of hearsay, Nandana Gunatilleke said, much to the embarrassment of others who represented the interest of the JVP at that time.

One quite extraordinary moment during the ‘Balaya’ programme was when Nandana Gunatilleke revealed their (JVP’s) direct contact with the Indian High Commission at a time the JVP publicly took an extremely anti-Indian stance. In fact, the JVP propagated a strong anti-Indian line during the insurgency. Turning towards Dr. Wasantha Bandara, Gunatilleke disclosed that both of them had been part of the dialogue with the Indian High Commission.

It reminds me of the late Somawansa Amarasinghe’s first public address delivered at a JVP rally in late Nov. 2001 after returning home from 12 years of self-imposed exile. Of the top JVP leadership, Somawansa Amarasinghe, who had been married to a close relative of powerful UNP Minister Sirisena Cooray, was the only one to survive combined police/military/paramilitary operations.

Amarasinghe didn’t mince his words when he declared at a Kalutara rally that his life was saved by Indian Premier V.P. Singh. Soft spoken Amarasinghe profusely thanked India for saving his life. Unfortunately, those who discuss issues at hand conveniently forget crucial information in the public domain. Such lapses can be both deliberate and due to negligence.

By Shamindra Ferdinando

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Midweek Review

Unexpected focus on ‘pieces of tin’ worn by military men

Published

2 days ago

2026/07/8

Sahan Weerasooriya

Maj. Lalith Jayasinghe with Kaushalya on his wedding day. Jayasinghe, receipient of Sri Lanka's highest military honour, has been credited with unprecedented raids behind the enemy lines. He died in late November, 2008, in the Vanni east.

Second Lieutenant S.U. Aladeniya, the first recipient of the Parama Weera Vibhushanaya, died fighting the LTTE in the second week of July, 1990. The young commanding officer of the isolated Kokavil Army detachment refused an opportunity to leave his wounded colleagues. Instead, he chose to set an extraordinary example. The fate of the Kokavil detachment, as well as the unprecedented military debacle that forced the Army to vacate the Kandy–Jaffna A9 road, north of Vavuniya, in 1990, happened due to the late President Ranasinghe Premadasa’s folly. Premadasa trusted the LTTE to such an extent, he ordered several hundred police officers, in the East, to surrender to appease the LTTE. The rest is history.

By Shamindra Ferdinando

Additional Solicitor General Dileepa Peiris recently questioned in court as to why retired Air Force officer Shantha Jayathilake appeared in court wearing armed forces medals.

The highly decorated war hero Flight Lieutenant Jayathilake represented himself under Section 260 of the Criminal Procedure Code in the trial of Maj. Gen. Suresh Sallay, the alleged mastermind of the 2019 Easter Sunday carnage.

During his submission, Dileepa Pieris looked at the medals worn by the retired officer and said: “He comes wearing pieces of tin.”

When Jayathilake objected to the ASG’s remark, Magistrate Pasan Amarasena warned the ex-officer not to interrupt proceedings. Then Peiris said that he couldn’t see Jayathilake’s medals properly. Jayathilake is the recipient of Weewa Wickrema Vibhushanaya (WWV), the second highest gallantry medal awarded to Sri Lankan military. The PWV is the highest gallantry decoration that can be received by a living military man. Jayathilake who joined the Air Force in 1989 at the height of the JVP-led insurgency, retired in 1999, and was also the recipient of the Rana Sura Padakkama (RSP).

Senior President’s Counsel Maithree Gunaratne, who represented Sallay in court, said: “The problem is not with your eyes, but with the red-tinted glasses you are wearing. You wore blue-tinted glasses for a while, and now you wear red-tinted glasses, so the gallantry medals, earned with blood, sweat, and tears for the country, look like pieces of tin to you”

Gunaratne requested that Pieris’s comments on the ex-officer be formally recorded in court records. This happened in the Fort Magistrate’s court on 2 July, 2026. The court proceedings caused controversy with various interested parties expressing differing views on Jayathilake wearing medals to a courtroom.

Some found fault with him for wearing medals while others strongly backed him. The issue at hand received social media attention. Obviously some sought political advantage at the expense of the government and the Attorney General’s Department. Others lambasted the former State Intelligence Service (SIS) Chief Sallay (2029-2024) for causing unnecessary developments. However, the gallantry medals worn by military, both officers and men, cannot be ridiculed by anyone, regardless of his/her position in the society. Gallantry medals remind the country of immense and untold sacrifices made by the military, during the war, and any attempt to dilute them should be strongly opposed.

Those who silently backed or publicly take action against war-winning Army Chief General (retd.) Sarath Fonseka, in 2010, after his defeat at the 2010 January presidential election, shouldn’t see the incident at the Fort Magistrate court as an opportunity.

Although Sri Lanka has been deeply divided over investigations into the conduct of armed forces during the war and after, no issue caused controversy like the arrest of Sallay, a post-war head of the Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI) over the 2019 Easter Sunday carnage. Sallay served as the Director of State Intelligence Service (SIS) from 2019 to 2024 before President Anura Kumara Dissanayake replaced him. Perhaps President Gotabaya Rajapaksa shouldn’t have brought Sallay as Director, SIS, contrary to the practice of SIS always being headed by a senior police officer or he was quite right in bringing in a serving military officer with a proven intelligence track record, knowing the shameful behaviour of responsible top police officers in the run up to the Easter Sunday suicide attacks, despite there having been adequate advance intelligence warnings to prevent them.

The intervention made by the retired Air Force officer triggered an unexpected reaction from the Attorney General’s top representative and the subsequent continuing controversy influenced The Island to discuss the awarding of gallantry medals, namely Parama Weera Vibhushanaya (PWV), the highest, followed by Weera Wickrema Vibhushanaya (WWV), Rana Wickrema Padakkama (RWP) and Rana Sura Padakkama (RSP). The fourth medal, Weeradhara Vibhushanaya, is awarded for bravery, regardless of the risks to one’s own life, but for voluntary interventions outside the battlefield.

Bravery of an exceptional kind

During the war, Sri Lanka awarded 32 PVWs posthumously. The Army, Navy and Air Force shared 29, 2 and 1, respectively. The PVW is awarded to all ranks of armed forces, both regular and volunteer, for individual acts of bravery in the face of enemy, disregarding the risks to one’s own life. Of the 32 recipients of the PVW, the extraordinary case of Maj. J.A.L. Jayasinghe (Lalith Jayasinghe), posthumously promoted to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel, captured unprecedented public attention.

On many occasions, PWVs were awarded posthumously for sacrifices made in defensive action, while the armed forces were responding to enemy action. However, Lalith had initiated action deep within the enemy-held territory and his efforts reflected the overall military strategy.

The 29 recipients consisted of 27 Army: Second Lieutenant S.U Aladeniya, Lance Corporal (LC) Y.G.G. Kularatne (Hasalaka Gamini), Second Lt. K.W.T. Nishshanka, Staff Sgt. H.P.B. Gunasekera, LC W.I.M. Seneviratne, Lt. Col. A.F Lafir, Capt. G.S. Jayanath, Maj. J.A.L. Jayasinghe, Maj. K.A. Gamage, Capt. U.G.A.S. Samaranayake, H.G.M.K.I. Megawarna, Sgt H.G.S. Bandara, Corporal P.N. Suranga, Corporal P.M.N. Pushpakumara, Corporal D.N\M.S. Chandrasiri Bandara, LC K. Chandana, Private R.M.D.M. Ratnayake, LC A.M.M.P. Abeysinghe, recruit A.M.B.H.G. Abeyratne Banda, private T.G.R. Dayananda, Lt. P.N. Punsiri, Second Lt W.D. Jayathilake, Sgt. K.G.N.L.R. Perera, Corporal K.P.D.T. Gunasekera, LC H.A. Nilantha Kumara, LC S.V.A.M. Pushpamal. Navy: Lt. J.L.D.S. Wijetunga, Petty Officer K.G. Shantha and Air Force: Squadron Leader T.D.S. Silvapulle.

Although Jayasinghe paid the supreme sacrifice, while serving the Special Forces, he had been a proud member of the Gemunu Watch (GW). GW veteran Maj. Gen. K.B. Egodawele in his Hewayekuge Mathaka Satahan (Memories of a soldier), first launched in 2012, declared that Jayasinghe had been among four GW personnel, namely Captain U.G.A.S. Samaranayake, Captain H.P.M.K. Meghawardena and Corporal D.M.A.M. Pushpakumara to receive the PWV, posthumously.

All of them received the highest gallantry award for actions on the Vanni east region during Eelam War IV (2006 August to 2009 May).

Jayasinghe’s wife Kaushalya accepted the PVW on 19 May, 2012, at the annual Victory Day parade. Maj. Gen. Kamal Gunaratne read the awardee’s official citation. Kaushalya had been five months pregnant at the time Jayasinghe mounted a raid deep inside the LTTE-held territory in the Vanni east region. Gunaratne, the wartime General Officer Commanding (GoC) of the 53 Division declared that Jayasinghe had been in command of an LRRP (Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol)/Deep Penetration Unit tasked to eliminate LTTE leaders. That unit had moved about 40 kms into the enemy held territory in Oddusuddan and was positioned alongside the Mankulam-Oddusuddan road to kill LTTE leaders, on 26 November, 2008.

Suddenly, Jayasinghe had fallen sick but joined other members of the LLRP to fight the enemy after fierce fighting erupted between the two sides. In spite of having an opportunity to retreat, Jayasinghe, hero of many previous battles, suffered grievous injuries during the battle and succumbed to his injuries.

Jayasinghe had been an extraordinary soldier and was the recipient of the second highest gallantry medal, WWV, on three or four occasions. In one such occasion, Jayasinghe had received two WWVs at one ceremony and recalled retired Maj. Gen. Dhammi Hewage, who received the RSP at the same event. Hewage spoke admirably about what he called high risk and extraordinary LRRP operations undertaken by Jayasinghe over a period of time. Let me give you an opportunity to know more about Hewage whose no holds barred examination of the Army during the war received public attention ( https://island.lk/a-special-forces-officers-narrative/)

Those who risked their lives to earn battlefield recognition played a significant role in transforming the armed forces, particularly the Army. Gallantry medals had been earned by armed forces officers and men in various circumstances but the deadly LRRP strikes, deep within the LTTE held territory, made quite a difference in the overall direction of the war. Those who operated in enemy territory in a way functioned as suicide cadres/units as the probability of them being intercepted by the LTTE was very high. But, regardless of severe risks, they ventured out of government-held areas to infiltrate deep inside enemy held territory to carry out operations. The LRRP team, led by Jayasinghe, is a case in point.

Clandestine operations received public attention in the run-up to the 2001 December parliamentary election when UNP leader Ranil Wickremesinghe all of a sudden alleged that the Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI) was planning to assassinate him. Within weeks after the UNP victory at the parliamentary election, the UNP unleashed the police on the DMI. The police raided the DMI safe house at Millennium City, Athurugiriya. In spite of Army Chief, the late Lt. Gen. Lionel Balagalle, personally assuring the UNP that there was absolutely no basis for such claims, Wickremesinghe was not prepared to change his political strategy. He gave Minister John Amaratunga in charge of police the go ahead for planned action.

The January 2, 2002, raid led to the arrest of Captain Mohamed Nilam, Staff Sgt. P. Ananda Udulagama, Staff Sergeant I. Edirisinghe Jayamanne, Corporal H.M. Nissanka Herath, Lance Corporal H. Mohamed Hilmy and an LTTE operative identified as Niyaz/Subashkaran. Others involved in that particular operation had been living in the East and were called into join operations, depending on the requirement. On the instructions of Lt. Gen. Balagalle, those tasked with carrying out attacks on selected targets received the opportunity to train under Special Forces instructors from Maduru Oya. They underwent training at the Panaluwa Test Firing Range, where firing special weapons was a key element in the training schedule.

In a bid to ensure secrecy, those operatives mostly operated on their own, and had their own arsenal, which included a range of weapons, including claymore mines. In fact, those involved in such operations functioned on a need-to-know basis. Even senior DMI officials, as well as the Army top brass, except a few, hadn’t been aware of what was going on. Even the then powerful Deputy Defence Minister, the late Anuruddha Ratwatte, hadn’t been told of the Millennium City safe-house, though he knew of the ongoing hits behind enemy lines.

Shortly after the exposure of the DMI operation, Balagalle met Premier Wickremesinghe to explain the secret operations undertaken against the LTTE. The Army chief had been accompanied by officials, including Hendarawithana, while one-time Attorney General Tilak Marapana, National List MP holding the Defence portfolio, and Minister Milinda Moragoda, too, were present.

“Except for Minister Moragoda, the others obviously didn’t realise what we were doing. They acted as if we were conspiring to do away with the political leadership so as to undermine the Norwegian initiative,” a source familiar with the dynamics of the project said. “We quickly realised we were up against a government, which simply wanted to negotiate a deal with the LTTE at any cost. The LTTE and the Norwegians exploited the situation to the hilt.”

Success in the East

Hitting the enemy in the area under its control had been Balagalle’s idea. The DMI hadn’t been successful in its first and the second attempts to take two specific targets. The targeted area had been Batticaloa south and the first and the second operations were mounted on 18 July 2001 and 12 September 2001. But both actions went awry and the targeted men identified as Jim Kelly (commander of Jeyanthan regiment) and Jeevan escaped death.

But, they succeeded on 17 September 2001. Operatives carried out a successful attack on ‘Major’ Mano Master, who was at that time in charge of the communications network in the Ampara-Batticaloa area.

But immediately after the UNP’s victory, the government terminated all such operations. The treacherous government betrayed those who risked their lives for the country. Ex-LTTEers and others who worked for the Army were exposed and the LTTE hunted them down. Scores of men were killed. Some were tortured and killed.

Apart from Mano Master, the secret raids claimed the lives of Batticaloa District Intelligence Head Lt. Col Nizam and Capt. Thevathasan.

Among those killed in the north were LTTE Air Wing Head Col. Shankar (Vaithilingam Sornalingam) and Sea Tiger Deputy Commander Lt. Col Kangai Amaran.

S.P. Thamilselvan, his Deputy Major S. Thangan, Vavuniya Special Commander Col. Jeyam and Deputy Military Chief Col. Balraj were believed to have been targeted in the North but escaped. In the East, among those who escaped targeted killings, were Col. Karuna, Karikalan, Jim Kelly and Intelligence Chief Lt. Col. Ramanan.

In spite of the LTTEers, particularly its leaders on a heightened state of alert, the Army ambushed Karikalan’s vehicle on 18 October, 2001. The destruction of the vehicle fuelled speculation of Karikalan’s demise, with a section of the media reporting him killed in a special operation. Shortly before the attack on Karikalan’s vehicle, the Army intercepted a radio conversation between Karikalan and his wife, a medical doctor by profession, serving in the Northern Province. “She simply begged him to leave Batticaloa and take refuge in the North to avoid the Army’s deep penetration operations,” a source familiar with LRRP operations told the writer many years ago.

The Army struck again on 26 November, 2001. ‘Major’ Swarnaseelan and ‘Captain’ Devadas were eliminated in the Pulipanjikkal area. It was the last operation before the December 5 General Election.

The UNP terminated the operation. But, the Army revived the strategy after the eruption of hostilities in 2005.

It would be pertinent to mention that hit and run attacks, deep within the LTTE held territory, troubled them to such an extent, they took up the issue with Norway. Fearing a relentless campaign, the LTTE got Norway to include LRRP operations in their negotiations, leading to a one-sided Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) signed in February 2002 by the Wickremesinghe regime. That CFA revealed the existence of a secret Army project to target the LTTE in their own area. The CFA called for termination of LRRP operations.

Three PVWs

Lieutenant J.L.D.S. Wijetunga was the first Navy recipient of the Parama Weera Vibhushanaya (PWV), Sri Lanka’s highest gallantry award given posthumously. Wijetunga, Commanding Officer of the Israeli built Dvora Fast Attack Craft (FAC), maneuvered his vessel to intercept an explosives-laden Sea Tiger suicide boat approaching a troop transport ship off Point Pedro on 30 March, 1996. Wijetunga, in spite of knowing his action was suicidal, went ahead with the risky maneuver that saved the lives of a large contingent of off duty servicemen on their way to Trincomalee from Kankesanthurai (KKS).

The Navy earned its second PWV on 1 November, 2008, off Point Pedro, during the Eelam war IV. A Petty Officer of elite Special Boat Squadron K.G. Shantha rammed an explosives-laden Sea Tiger suicide craft with his Arrow boat (Z-142 ). Shantha and his three SBS colleagues were blasted to smithereens, though their action saved an Inshore Patrol Craft (IPC) carrying a dozen SBS personnel.

Wing Commander T.D.S. Silvapulle received the nation’s highest gallantry award PWV for attacking Sea Tiger boats firing at Army defences south-east of Elephant Pass on 19 December, 1999. Silvapulle, flying a Mi 24 helicopter gunship in adverse weather conditions, regardless of the threat posed by surface-to-air missiles, engaged the enemy craft. Silvapulle compelled the enemy to flee but was hit during the confrontation. His individual act of gallantry was recognized in 2012, four years after the eradication of the LTTE. The then President Mahinda Rajapaksa conferred the PWV at a ceremony held on 19 May, 2012. Maj. Lalith Jayasinghe received his PWV at the same ceremony.

The betrayal of the armed forces in October, 2015, at the Geneva-based Human Rights Council, by the treacherous Sirisena-Wickremesinghe regime, underscored the mentality of those who wielded political power. The calling of gallantry medals ‘pieces of tin’ reminded the country of the pathetic and disgraceful state of affairs.

Midweek Review

Poor, little upper-middle income country

Published

2 days ago

2026/07/8

Sahan Weerasooriya

“Sri Lanka has been ranked among the least happy countries in the latest World Happiness Report 2026…standing alongside Ethiopia”- The Sunday Island March 2026

Sri Lanka was officially declared an Upper-Middle Income country by the World Bank in July 2026, regaining the classification it had in 2019.

On the 30th of June, the IMF delegation meeting the President at the Presidential Secretariat praised the government: “…IMF praised the government’s economic programme and noted that Sri Lanka has made greater progress than many other countries implementing IMF-supported programmes. The delegation commended the government for maintaining macroeconomic stability despite a series of external shocks and for remaining firmly committed to its reform agenda…” (Presidential Media Division, 30 June 2026)

Meanwhile, a UN-backed World Happiness Report 2026 compiled by the Wellbeing Research Centre at the University of Oxford, ranked Sri Lanka 134th out of 147 nations. A daily newspaper which ran the story on the 19th of March 2026, added that the report showed that “Sri Lanka has slipped one place from its 133rd ranking in 2025, now standing alongside Ethiopia. The country also trails behind its South Asian neighbours, with India ranked 116th, Pakistan and Bangladesh positioned significantly higher.”

Good News, Bad News

The Upper-Middle Income classification was declared by the World Bank during the Yahapalana government in July 2019. 6 months later, the Yahapalana government was swept out at elections.

Only 2 years later, in April 2022, the country was declared bankrupt, and by July that year the newly elected President was toppled by a people’s uprising for the first time in the country’s history.

To fill the vacuum, an unlikely combination of an unelected MP from the Opposition who was made President by the Parliament and an unpopular government that had barely survived the uprising, governed the country together. It was massively defeated by the people only 2 years later in 2024, despite ‘stabilising’ the economy.

An Upper-Middle Income status may give the impression of a prosperous people, but prosperous people are not an unhappy people. The World Bank report 2026 (World Bank, Sri Lanka Development Update) notes the anomaly: “the recovery is unfinished and has not translated into widespread improvements in welfare.”

The report adds:

* Real output remains below 2018 levels.

* Although poverty is projected to decline in 2025, it remains double the 2019 levels.

* Vulnerability remains high with an additional 10 percent of the population living just above the poverty line.

* Malnutrition continues to be elevated.

* The labour market recovery is slow with real wages and labor force participation well below 2019 levels.

The World Bank’s Poverty and Equity Brief (October 2025) sheds further light:

* Poverty is projected at 22.3-22.4 percent in 2025 and around 20 percent until 2027 without stronger inclusive growth.

* Real earnings remain below pre-crisis levels.

So, are Top of the Class in the IMF index and almost Bottom of the Class in the Happiness Index related?

As a friend who is a highly-placed economist explained to me, if people are poorer, undernourished, indebted, and insecure after stabilisation, then reserves, inflation, and primary balances alone cannot be relied on to judge the next IMF programme. Sri Lanka needs a national programme whose success metric is household recovery, jobs, nutrition, and productive capacity.

From the praise heaped on the President and this government’s strong leadership by the IMF for their performance thus far, sticking closely to the IMF conditionalities, we can only infer that things for the unhappy citizens will hardly get better as they negotiate the 18th IMF programme.

The AKD administration doesn’t haggle on behalf of the people. They see the rewards of that approach in fiscal consolidation and macroeconomic stability. This however, is not the only kind of stability they have to bear in mind, given recent history.

By the People, But Not for the People?

The new or renewed (from July 2019) ‘Upper-Middle Income’ classification has served to remind people where the government has failed, been weak, as much as where it has been strong and succeeded. The economy in the abstract is better off, but the majority of the people who gave the government a two thirds majority, are much worse off in material reality.

To return to my top economist friend, she explained that Sri Lanka should not reject fiscal discipline, but it must own the design of fiscal adjustment. The country needs a fairer tax mix, better tax administration, public investment discipline, and protection of health, education, nutrition, and climate-resilient infrastructure. Otherwise, fiscal discipline becomes socially brittle and growth-reducing.

The direction she recommended is hardly where the government is heading. The World Bank warns that the on-going reliance on regressive indirect taxes could worsen the poverty outlook, while the primary expenditure ceiling of 13 percent of GDP can constrain public investment and service delivery.

A leading financial daily (6 July) reported that at the CA Sri Lanka’s 5th Annual Economic and Tax Symposium, both the Government’s tax policies and the Inland Revenue Department (IRD) “came under sustained criticism from leading private sector tax professionals”. Gajma & Co. Senior Partner N.R. Gajendran argued that “…higher revenues had come largely from imposing a heavier burden on existing taxpayers rather than widening the tax base.”

He said that “When taxes become excessive and unbearable, and it is not coming from the widening of the base, it is coming from the same taxpayer, it erodes expenditure capabilities, it erodes saving capabilities, and it erodes investment capabilities,” warning that “sustained over-taxation ultimately weakens consumption, investment, and long-term economic growth.”

Sri Lanka has already lost a large number of skilled professionals who migrated in droves in the last two years. Factum reports (April 2026) that the annual departures for foreign employment have hovered above the 310,000 mark. This includes Healthcare Professionals (Doctors, nurses), Academics and Researchers (including 80-90% of State University graduates), Technologists and Engineers.

Will the Lawyers be next? The Island editorial of 6 July 2026 strongly supports the stand that the BASL has taken, (endorsed by the Colombo Law Society, Colombo High Court Lawyers Association, LAWASIA and the Commonwealth Lawyers Association) opposing the government’s effort to move a constitutional amendment to extend the retirement age of judges of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal, denouncing political interference in the judiciary and urging the government to avoid a Zimbabwean crisis.

None of this makes for a happy citizen, stability notwithstanding.

By the People, for the Creditors

So, what of all those promises made with such passion to do better than all previous governments since Independence in 1948?

The World Food Programme has this to report:

* Households unable to meet essential food needs increased from 14 percent in 2024 to 20 percent in 2026.

* If price trends continue, another 1.3 million people could be unable to afford essential food needs, including nearly 300,000 urban poor.

* Child nutrition remains worrying: stunting 10.1 percent, wasting 8.6 percent, and underweight 16.1 percent. (WFP, Food Security Under Pressure)

Economists warn that a programme that ‘stabilises’ the economy while households sell assets, cut food, reduce education and health spending, and slide into coping strategies, i.e., de-stabilises the household economy and lives, will not be socially, politically or developmentally sustainable.

Those who care for the people recommend that Sri Lanka’s own programme must place adaptive social protection, nutrition, and livelihoods at the very centre.

The promised re-negotiation of the 17th IMF package to make the necessary economic recovery less taxing (pun intended) for the people, less painful, and more sustainable overall, never happened. The government acted as if it was elected by the People for the Creditors.

We have been warned that Sri Lanka’s shift toward commercial borrowing and ISBs changed the debt-risk profile, with ISBs carrying high interest rates and short maturities. The government’s promised negotiations didn’t resemble anything like what was expected by the people, and went the way of the ISB holders who celebrated the victory in Canary Wharf toasting our President in absentia.

IMF Country Report No 26/111 indicates that even after restructuring, debt sustainability risks remain high. Public debt is projected at around 100.1 percent of GDP in 2026, with central government gross financing needs at 19.8 percent of GDP.

Economists remind us that Sri Lanka’s recent graduation to the Upper Middle-Income classification means that we will have to pay more in debt repayments as per the macro-linked bond of the debt restructuring settlement with the creditors.

IMF 18, going on 19?

Who’d have thought it? In the last 77 years, the most pro-people, pro-poor administration has certainly not been the AKD government. There were much better ones, even during the 30 year war, when policies were more enlightened and served the people; were undertaken with confidence and determination, and some still continue to provide the foreign exchange to pay for subsequent errors of judgment. And with the courage of their convictions and confidence in their capacity to deliver, those leaders didn’t feel the need to postpone any elections.

Stabilisation was an immediate necessity. But my economist friend spoke for us all when she told me “Sri Lanka cannot stabilise its way to prosperity. It should not risk turning emergency discipline into a permanent development model”.

With the current state of play, is that what we are looking at? There is little evidence that this administration has the capacity to design an independent programme, not subject to the whims and fancies of IFIs, but as my friend put it, “our own programme: fiscally responsible, socially protective, production-oriented, climate-resilient, and politically owned. The IMF can support that programme, but it cannot be the programme.”

An unhappy people is surely as much of an indicator of the real health of the economy, as the Gross National Income per capita calculated in US dollars by the World Bank. A Sunday newspaper quoted a young economist, Rehana Thowfeek, co-founder/director at Arutha Research, who says: “There is no point in celebrating becoming an upper-middle-income country while 1 in 4 of our people is in poverty, two out of every 5 Sri Lankans cannot afford a healthy diet and 1 out of 3 of our children under 5 years is malnourished.”

This is not a situation that should be allowed to prevail by an allegedly pro-people government, or indeed any government that has been granted the privilege to govern, through the people’s vote. The planning, the policy choices are all in the hands of the government. Will they choose a better path?

People are not unhappy because they are too mean to acknowledge what a wonderful job this government is doing, and give praise to this administration like the IMF at the Presidential Secretariat. It is because they are in pain, they are suffering, they are hungry, they cannot pay the bills, and they are looking at a future where none of these things are going away, but is set to get much worse, as the government slouches towards its next IMF programme and the next debt repayment.