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Anti-Terrorism Bill aimed at creating fascist dictatorship – II

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By Kalyananda Tiranagama 
(Continued from yesterday)

Under the ATB, committing a terrorist act resulting in murder is punishable with death penalty; under the CTB it was punishable with life imprisonment; Under both Bills in the case of any other offence of terrorism, with imprisonment for a term not exceeding 20 years and fine not exceeding Rs. one million. In addition, the Court may order forfeiture of all movable and immovable property of the offender – S.4

Penalty for attempt, abetment or conspiracy to commit any such offence is imprisonment tor a term not exceeding 15 years and fine not exceeding Rs. one million.

Once this Bill becomes law:

Government Medical Officers Association (GMOA) will not be able to resort to strike action to compel the government not go ahead with signing ETCA with India or Free Trade Agreement with Singapore or, as it is an act of wrongfully or illegally compelling the govt. of Sri Lanka to do or to abstain from doing any act and as such action results in causing serious risk to the health and safety of the public or section thereof

Trade unions in the Petroleum Corporation, Ceylon Electricity Board, Water Resources Board, Railways or any other sector directly affecting the life of the people will not be able to carry on a mass protest campaign combined with strike action against the moves of the government to privatize state institutions, as their action may result in causing serious obstruction or damage to essential services or supplies.

People’s organizations or opposition political parties will not be able to carry on any mass agitation campaign demanding the government to take steps to conduct provincial council or general elections as it is an act of wrongfully or illegally compelling the govt. of Sri Lanka to do any act and as such action may result in causing serious damage to property, including public or private property, any place of public use, a state or govt. facility, any public or private transportation system, or any infrastructure facility or environment.

Any People’s or professional organization or political party will not be able to carry on a protest campaign at the Indian High Commission against the signing of ETCA or granting of Mattala or Palaly Airports to India or at the British High Commission against sponsoring a Resolution against Sri Lanka at the Geneva UNHRC or at the US Embassy against setting up a naval facility at Trincomalee as it is an act of wrongfully or illegally compelling any other government to abstain from doing any act and as such action may result in causing serious damage to property, including public or private property, any place of public use, facility, any public or private transportation system, or any infrastructure facility or environment.

No People’s organization or political party will be able to carry on a protest campaign at the UNDP Office in Colombo protesting against the UNHRC Resolution against Sri Lanka or demanding the withdrawal of baseless allegations of war crimes against armed forces of Sri Lanka as it is an act of wrongfully or illegally compelling an international organization to abstain from doing any act and as such action may result in causing serious damage to property, including public or private property, any place of public use, facility, any public or private transportation system, or any infrastructure facility or environment.

Police Directives curtailing Freedom of Movement

S; 62 of the CTB and S. 61 of the ATB enables the Police to take pre-emptive action preventing any public protest being conducted. Under S.61 of the Bill, on receipt of information that an offence under this Act is likely to be committed, a police officer not below the rank of a SSP may issue any one or more of the following directives to the public:

not to enter any specified area or premises;

to leave a specified area or premises;

not to leave a specified area or premises and to remain within such area or premises;

not to travel on any road;

not to transport anything or not to provide transport to anybody;

to suspend the operation of a specified public transport system;

k. not to congregate at any particular location;

l. not to hold a particular meeting, rally or procession;

m. not to engage in any specified activity.

Directives to be issued with prior approval of a Magistrate.

Directives to be published in the gazette and given wide publicity through other means.

Period of operation of a directive not to exceed 24 hours continuously at a time, and for a total period of 72 hours.

Military assistance may be obtained to give effect to any such directive.

Police may cordon off such area to give effect to such directive.

During the period of operation of such directive and the following 24 hours, the police may,

stop, question and search any person found within the effective area of such directive; b. enter and search any premises; c. stop any person who may attempt to enter or remain in the effective area of such directive.

Police may arrest any person who may act contrary to the directive.

Acting contrary to any such directive is an offence punishable by a Magistrate with imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year or a fine not exceeding Rs. 5000/- or both.

Any person who – a. violates or acts in contravention of an order made in terms of this Act; or b. wilfully fails or neglects to comply with a direction issued in terms of this Act; c. fails to provide information or provide false or misleading information in response to a question put to him by a police officer conducting an investigation under this Act, or; d. wilfully prevents or hinders the implementation of a lawful order or directive issued under this Act is guilty of an offence punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years and a fine not exceeding Rs, 500,000. – S. 14

Police Power to intercept letters and other private Communications

Police given power to intercept letters and other private communications and listen to telephone conversations for investigation purposes under these Bills. To determine whether one or more persons are conspiring, planning, preparing or attempting to commit an offence under this Act, a Police Officer not below the rank of a SP may obtain a Court order to intercept, read, listen or record any postal message, electronic mail, or any telephone, voice, internet or video conversation or conference or any communication through any other means. – S. 67 CTB; S. 66 ATB

All Responsible Officers Liable to be Punished

When a people’s organization or a professional association is charged with an offence under this Bill, the entire leadership of the association will become liable to be punished. According to S. 97 of the Bill, where an offence is committed by a body of persons, every director, principal executive officer, every officer of that body responsible for its management and control, shall be deemed to be guilty of such offence.

Creeping Emergency Regulations into the Bill arming the President with Extraordinary Dictatorial Powers to Curb Democratic Rights

Review and Repeal of the Public Security Ordinance is one of the Recommendations made by the UN HRC in its Periodic Reports on Sri Lanka. The Yahapalana government gave an undertaking to do that. As Public Security Ordinance is part of the Constitution, the government cannot repeal or amend it without amending the Constitution.

When there is a serious threat to the law and order or national security or maintenance of essential services, the government declares a state of emergency in the country and make emergency regulations to deal with the situation. State of Emergency has to be approved by Parliament once a month. Otherwise it will lapse. What the government has done is to creep some of the provisions generally brought into force under the Emergency Regulations into the Bill so that it will become part of the normal law of the country.

None of the following provisions are found in the PTA. They are generally found only in the Emergency Regulations made under the Public Security Ordinance. Under Ss. 81 – 82, 83, 84 and 85 of the CTB, the Minister has been entrusted with Emergency Powers to issue Proscription Orders – S. 81; Restriction Orders – S. 82; and Curfew Orders – S. 83; to declare prohibited places – S. 84; and call out Armed Forces – S. 85. Now by the ATB, the President will be vested with these powers.

Threat of Proscription of Organizations

Notwithstanding anything in any other written law, on a recommendation made by the IGP or at the request of a foreign government, the President may proscribe any organization, initially for a period of one year, where he has reasonable grounds to believe that such organization is engaged in any act amounting to an offence under this Act, or acting in an unlawful manner prejudicial to the national security of Sri Lanka or any other country.

To proscribe an organisation under the Bill it need not engage in any terrorist activity prejudicial to the national security of the country. Under S. 82 (1) of the Bill, notwithstanding anything in any other written law, the President can proscribe any organization where he has reasonable grounds to believe that such organization is engaged in any act amounting to an offence under the Act, or is acting in an unlawful manner prejudicial to the national security of Sri Lanka or any other country.

(2) A Proscription Order may be made by the President for giving effect to – (a) a recommendation made by the IGP; or (b) a request made by any foreign government.

A Proscription Order may include one or more of the following prohibitions : Prohibiting (a) any person being a member; (b) recruiting members; (c) any person acting in furtherance of its objectives; (d) meetings, activities and programs being conducted; ( e) use of bank accounts; (f) entering into contracts; (g) raising funds or receiving grants; (h) transferring funds and assets; (i) lobbying and canvassing; (j) any publication of any material in furtherance of its objectives. A Proscription Order remains valid for a period of one year. It can be extended for one year at a time.

The organisations like the GMOA, Inter University Students Federation, Trade Unions in all public institutions and services and Farmers’ organizations that frequently carry on strikes crippling health services or agitational campaigns obstructing highways to compel the government to do or to refrain from doing certain acts will not be able to carry on their campaigns without facing the danger of being proscribed.

Imposition of Restriction Orders

On a recommendation of the IGP, the President may, with sanction of the High Court, issue a Restriction Order on any person, where he has reasonable grounds to believe that such person is making preparations to commit an offence under the Act and the conduct of such person can be investigated without arresting him, restricting (a) his movement outside the place of his residence; (b) travelling overseas; (c) travelling within Sri Lanka; (d) travelling outside the normal route between his place of residence and place of employment; (e) communication or association or both with particular persons specified in the order; (f) engaging in certain specified activities facilitating the commission of an offence under the act; (g) requiring such person to report to any police station on a specified day. – S. 83

Though there was a somewhat similar provision in S. 11 of the PTA in relation to a person concerned in any terrorist activity as defined in the PTA, this is much wider.

Police Directives issued in the guise for the protection of the public under S. 62 of the Bill can also be issued only under the Emergency Regulations. There is no similar provision in the PTA.

Such restrictions may be imposed remaining valid for a period, not exceeding one month at a time, up to 6 months.

The Court shall cause the Order served on the person and require the IGP to take all necessary steps to enforce it.

This talk of obtaining High Court sanction and serving and enforcing the Order through the involvement of Court is a façade adopted to cover up the arbitrary and undemocratic nature of the executive acts with judicial authority.

In the Counter Terrorism Bill, it is not the Court, but the Minister who shall cause the Order served on the person and require the IGP to take all necessary steps to enforce it.

Acting in contravention of a Restriction Order is an offence punishable by High Court with imprisonment up to 3 years and a fine not exceeding Rs. 300,000. – S. 83 (7)

Issuing Curfew Orders

Under S. 84 of the Bill, notwithstanding the provisions in the Public Security Ordinance, the President, may by Order published in the Gazette, declare a Curfew Order covering the entire country or part of the country, for the purposes of (a) controlling, detecting or investigating the occurrence of systematic and widespread acts of terrorism and other offences under the Act; (b) for the protection of national and public security from such acts; or (c) to prevent the systematic and widespread committing of acts of terrorism and other offences under the Act.

It is lawful for a Police officer to use reasonable force as may be necessary to ensure compliance with a Curfew Order. Violation of a curfew order is an offence punishable by a Magistrate with a fine not exceeding Rs. 300,000. (To be continued)



Opinion

War with Iran and unravelling of the global order – II

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A US airstrike on Iran

Broader Strategic Consequences

One of the most significant strategic consequences of the war is the accelerated erosion of U.S. political and moral hegemony. This is not a sudden phenomenon precipitated solely by the present conflict; rather, the war has served to illuminate an already evolving global reality—that the era of uncontested U.S. dominance is in decline. The resurgence of Donald Trump and the reassertion of his “America First” doctrine reflect deep-seated domestic economic and political challenges within the United States. These internal pressures have, in turn, shaped a more unilateral and inward-looking foreign policy posture, further constraining Washington’s capacity to exercise global leadership.

Moreover, the conduct of the war has significantly undermined the political and moral authority of the United States. Perceived violations of international humanitarian law, coupled with the selective application of international norms, have weakened the credibility of U.S. advocacy for a “rules-based international order.” Such inconsistencies have reinforced perceptions of double standards, particularly among states in the Global South. Skepticism toward Western normative leadership is expected to deepen, contributing to the gradual fragmentation of the international system. In this broader context, the ongoing crisis can be seen as symptomatic of a more fundamental transformation: the progressive waning of a global order historically anchored in U.S. hegemony and the emergence of a more contested and pluralistic international landscape.

The regional implications of the crisis are likely to be profound, particularly given the centrality of the Persian Gulf to the global political economy. As a critical hub of energy production and maritime trade, instability in this region carries systemic consequences that extend far beyond its immediate geography. Whatever may be the outcome, whether through the decisive weakening of Iran or the inability of external powers to dismantle its leadership and strategic capabilities, the post-conflict regional order will differ markedly from its pre-war configuration. In this evolving context, traditional power hierarchies, alliance structures, and deterrence dynamics are likely to undergo significant recalibration.

A key lesson underscored by the war is the deep interconnectivity of the contemporary global economic order. In an era of highly integrated production networks and supply chains, disruptions in a single strategic node can generate cascading effects across the global system. As such, regional conflicts increasingly assume global significance. The structural realities of globalisation make it difficult to contain economic and strategic shocks within regional boundaries, as impacts rapidly transmit through trade, energy, and financial networks. In this context, peace and stability are no longer purely regional concerns but global public goods, essential to the functioning and resilience of the international system

The conflict highlights the emergence of a new paradigm of warfare shaped by the integration of artificial intelligence, cyber capabilities, and unmanned systems. The extensive use of unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs)—a trend previously demonstrated in the Russia–Ukraine War—has been further validated in this theatre. However, unlike the Ukraine conflict, where Western powers have provided sustained military, technological, and financial backing, the present confrontation reflects a more direct asymmetry between a dominant global hegemon and a Global South state. Iran’s deployment of drone swarms and AI-enabled targeting systems illustrates that key elements of Fourth Industrial Revolution (4IR) warfare are no longer confined to technologically advanced Western states. These capabilities are increasingly accessible to Global South actors, lowering barriers to entry and significantly enhancing their capacity to wage effective asymmetric warfare. In this evolving context, technological diffusion is reshaping the strategic landscape, challenging traditional military hierarchies and altering the balance between conventional superiority and innovative, cost-effective combat strategies.

The war further exposed and deepened the weakening of global governance institutions, particularly the United Nations. Many of these institutions were established in 1945, reflecting the balance of power and geopolitical realities of the immediate post-Second World War era. However, the profound transformations in the international system since then have rendered aspects of this institutional architecture increasingly outdated and less effective.

The war has underscored the urgent need for comprehensive international governance reforms to ensure that international institutions remain credible, representative, and capable of addressing contemporary security challenges. The perceived ineffectiveness of UN human rights mechanisms in responding to violations of international humanitarian law—particularly in contexts such as the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and more recently in Iran—has amplified calls for institutional renewal or the development of alternative frameworks for maintaining international peace and security. Moreover, the selective enforcement of international law and the persistent paralysis in conflict resolution mechanisms risk accelerating the fragmentation of global norms. If sustained, this trajectory would signal not merely the weakening but the possible demise of the so-called liberal international order, accelerating the erosion of both the legitimacy and the effective authority of existing multilateral institutions, and deepening the crisis of global governance.

Historically, major wars have often served as harbingers of new eras in international politics, marking painful yet decisive transitions from one order to another. Periods of systemic decline are typically accompanied by instability, uncertainty, and profound disruption; yet, it is through such crises that the contours of an emerging order begin to take shape. The present conflict appears to reflect such a moment of transition, where the strains within the existing global system are becoming increasingly visible.

Notably, key European powers are exhibiting a gradual shift away from exclusive reliance on the U.S. security umbrella, seeking instead a more autonomous and assertive role in global affairs. At the same time, the war is likely to create strategic space for China to expand its influence. As the United States becomes more deeply entangled militarily and politically, China may consolidate its position as a stabilising economic actor and an alternative strategic partner. This could be reflected in intensified energy diplomacy, expanded infrastructure investments, and a more proactive role in regional conflict management, advancing Beijing’s long-term objective of reshaping global governance structures.

However, this transition does not imply a simple replacement of Pax Americana with Pax Sinica. Rather, the emerging global order is likely to be more diffuse, pluralistic, and multilateral in character. In this sense, the ongoing transformation aligns with broader narratives of an “Asian Century,” in which power is redistributed across multiple centers rather than concentrated in a single hegemon. The war, therefore, may ultimately be understood not merely as a geopolitical crisis, but as a defining inflection point in the reconfiguration of the global order.

Conclusion: A New Era on the Horizon

History shows that major wars often signal the birth of new eras—painful, disruptive, yet transformative. The present conflict is no exception. It has exposed the vulnerabilities of the existing world order, challenged U.S. dominance, and revealed the limits of established global governance.

European powers are beginning to chart a more independent course, reducing reliance on the U.S. security umbrella, while China is poised to expand its influence as an economic stabiliser and strategic partner. Through energy diplomacy, infrastructure investments, and active engagement in regional conflicts, Beijing is quietly shaping the contours of a more multipolar world. Yet this is not the rise of Pax Sinica replacing Pax Americana. The emerging order is likely to be multilateral, fluid, and competitive—a world in which multiple powers, old and new, share the stage. The war, in all its turbulence, may therefore mark the dawn of a genuinely new global era, one where uncertainty coexists with opportunity, and where the next chapter of international politics is being written before our eyes.

by Gamini Keerawella
(First part of this article appeared yesterday (08 April)

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Opinion

University admission crisis: Academics must lead the way

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130,000 students are left out each year—academics hold the key

Each year, Sri Lanka’s G.C.E. Advanced Level examination produces a wave of hope—this year, nearly 175,000 students qualified for university entrance. Yet only 45,000 will be admitted to state universities. That leaves more than 130,000 young people stranded—qualified, ambitious, but excluded. This is not just a statistic; it is a national crisis. And while policymakers debate infrastructure and funding, the country’s academics must step forward as catalysts of change.

Beyond the Numbers: A National Responsibility

Education is the backbone of Sri Lanka’s development. Denying access to tens of thousands of qualified students risks wasting talent, fueling inequality, and undermining national progress. The gap is not simply about seats in lecture halls—it is about the future of a generation. Academics, as custodians of knowledge, cannot remain passive observers. They must reimagine the delivery of higher education to ensure opportunity is not a privilege for the few.

Expanding Pathways, Not Just Campuses

The traditional model of four-year degrees in brick-and-mortar universities cannot absorb the demand. Academics can design short-term diplomas and certificate programmes that provide immediate access to learning. These programmes, focused on employable skills, would allow thousands to continue their education while easing pressure on degree programmes. Equally important is the digital transformation of education. Online and blended learning modules can extend access to rural students, breaking the monopoly of physical campuses. With academic leadership, Sri Lanka can build a reliable system of credit transfers, enabling students to begin their studies at affiliated institutions and later transfer to state universities.

Partnerships That Protect Quality

Private universities and vocational institutes already absorb many students who miss out on state admissions. But concerns about quality and recognition persist. Academics can bridge this divide by providing quality assurance and standardised curricula, supervising joint degree programmes, and expanding the Open University system. These partnerships would ensure that students outside the state system receive affordable, credible, and internationally recognised education.

Research and Advocacy: Shaping Policy

Academics are not only teachers—they are researchers and thought leaders. By conducting labour market studies, they can align higher education expansion with employability. Evidence-based recommendations to the University Grants Commission (UGC) can guide strategic intake increases, regional university expansion, and government investment in digital infrastructure. In this way, academics can ensure reforms are not reactive, but visionary.

Industry Engagement: Learning Beyond the Classroom

Sri Lanka’s universities must become entrepreneurship hubs and innovation labs. Academics can design programmes that connect students directly with industries, offering internship-based learning and applied research opportunities. This approach reduces reliance on classroom capacity while equipping students with practical skills. It also reframes education as a partnership between universities and the economy, rather than a closed system.

Making the Most of What We Have

Even within existing constraints, academics can expand capacity. Training junior lecturers and adjunct faculty, sharing facilities across universities, and building international collaborations for joint programmes and scholarships are practical steps. These measures maximise resources while opening new avenues for students.

A Call to Action

Sri Lanka’s university admission crisis is not just about numbers—it is about fairness, opportunity, and national development. Academics must lead the way in transforming exclusion into empowerment. By expanding pathways, strengthening partnerships, advocating for policy reform, engaging with industry, and optimizing resources, they can ensure that qualified students are not left behind.

“Education for all, not just the fortunate few.”

Dr. Arosh Bandula (Ph.D. Nottingham), Senior Lecturer, Department of Agricultural Economics & Agribusiness, Faculty of Agriculture, University of Ruhuna

by Dr. Arosh Bandula

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Opinion

Post-Easter Sri Lanka: Between memory, narrative, and National security

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As Sri Lanka approaches the seventh commemoration of the Easter Sunday attacks, the national mood is once again marked by grief, reflection, and an enduring sense of incompleteness. Nearly seven years later, the tragedy continues to cast a long shadow not only over the victims and their families, but over the institutions and narratives that have since emerged.

Commemoration, however, must go beyond ritual. It must be anchored in clarity, accountability, and restraint. What is increasingly evident in the post-Easter landscape is not merely a search for truth, but a contest over how that truth is framed, interpreted, and presented to the public.

In recent times, public discourse has been shaped by book launches, panel discussions, and media interventions that claim to offer new insights into the attacks. While such contributions are not inherently problematic, the manner in which certain narratives are advanced raises legitimate concerns. The selective disclosure of information particularly when it touches on intelligence operations demands careful scrutiny.

Sri Lanka’s legal and institutional framework is clear on the sensitivity of such matters. The Official Secrets Act (No. 32 of 1955) places strict obligations on the handling of information related to national security. Similarly, the Police Ordinance and internal administrative regulations governing intelligence units emphasize confidentiality, chain of command, and the responsible use of information. These are not mere formalities; they exist to safeguard both operational integrity and national interest.

When individual particularly those with prior access to intelligence structures enter the public domain with claims that are not subject to verification, it raises critical questions. Are these disclosures contributing to justice and accountability, or are they inadvertently compromising institutional credibility and future operational capacity?

The challenge lies in distinguishing between constructive transparency and selective exposure.

The Presidential Commission of Inquiry into the Easter Sunday Attacks provided one of the most comprehensive official examinations of the attacks. Its findings highlighted a complex web of failures: lapses in intelligence sharing, breakdowns in inter-agency coordination, and serious deficiencies in political oversight. Importantly, it underscored that the attacks were not the result of a single point of failure, but a systemic collapse across multiple levels of governance.

Yet, despite the existence of such detailed institutional findings, public discourse often gravitates toward simplified narratives. There is a tendency to identify singular “masterminds” or to attribute responsibility in ways that align with prevailing political or ideological positions. While such narratives may be compelling, they risk obscuring the deeper structural issues that enabled the attacks to occur.

Equally significant is the broader socio-political context in which these narratives are unfolding. Sri Lanka today remains a society marked by fragile intercommunal relations. The aftermath of the Easter attacks saw heightened suspicion, polarisation, and, in some instances, collective blame directed at entire communities. Although there have been efforts toward reconciliation, these fault lines have not entirely disappeared.

In this environment, the language and tone of public discourse carry immense weight. The framing of terrorism whether as a localized phenomenon or as part of a broader ideological construct must be handled with precision and responsibility. Overgeneralization or the uncritical use of labels can have far-reaching consequences, including the marginalization of communities and the erosion of social cohesion.

At the same time, it is essential to acknowledge that the global discourse on terrorism is itself contested. Competing narratives, geopolitical interests, and selective historiography often shape how events are interpreted. For Sri Lanka, the challenge is to avoid becoming a passive recipient of external frameworks that may not fully reflect its own realities.

A professional and unbiased approach requires a commitment to evidence-based analysis. This includes:

· Engaging with primary sources, including official reports and judicial findings
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· Cross-referencing claims with verifiable data
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· Recognizing the limits of publicly available information, particularly in intelligence matters

It also requires intellectual discipline the willingness to question assumptions, to resist convenient conclusions, and to remain open to complexity.

The role of former officials and subject-matter experts in this discourse is particularly important. Their experience can provide valuable insights, but it also carries a responsibility. Public interventions must be guided by professional ethics, respect for institutional boundaries, and an awareness of the potential impact on national security.

There is a fine balance to be maintained. On one hand, democratic societies require transparency and accountability. On the other, the premature or uncontextualized release of sensitive information can undermine the very systems that are meant to protect the public.

As Sri Lanka reflects on the events of April 2019, it must resist the temptation to reduce a national tragedy into competing narratives or political instruments. The pursuit of truth must be methodical, inclusive, and grounded in law.

Easter is not only a moment of remembrance. It is a test of institutional maturity and societal resilience.

The real question is not whether new narratives will emerge they inevitably will. The question is whether Sri Lanka has the capacity to engage with them critically, responsibly, and in a manner that strengthens, rather than weakens, the foundations of its national security and social harmony.

In the end, justice is not served by noise or conjecture. It is served by patience, rigor, and an unwavering commitment to truth.

Mahil Dole is a former senior law enforcement officer and national security analyst, with over four decades of experience in policing and intelligence, including serving as Head of Counter-Intelligence at the State Intelligence Service of Sri Lanka and a graduate of the Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies in Hawai, USA.

by Mahil Dole
Former Senior Law Enforcement Officer National Security Analyst; Former Head of Counter-Intelligence, State Intelligence Service)

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