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Opinion

Anti-Terrorism Bill aimed at creating fascist dictatorship – II

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By Kalyananda Tiranagama 
(Continued from yesterday)

Under the ATB, committing a terrorist act resulting in murder is punishable with death penalty; under the CTB it was punishable with life imprisonment; Under both Bills in the case of any other offence of terrorism, with imprisonment for a term not exceeding 20 years and fine not exceeding Rs. one million. In addition, the Court may order forfeiture of all movable and immovable property of the offender – S.4

Penalty for attempt, abetment or conspiracy to commit any such offence is imprisonment tor a term not exceeding 15 years and fine not exceeding Rs. one million.

Once this Bill becomes law:

Government Medical Officers Association (GMOA) will not be able to resort to strike action to compel the government not go ahead with signing ETCA with India or Free Trade Agreement with Singapore or, as it is an act of wrongfully or illegally compelling the govt. of Sri Lanka to do or to abstain from doing any act and as such action results in causing serious risk to the health and safety of the public or section thereof

Trade unions in the Petroleum Corporation, Ceylon Electricity Board, Water Resources Board, Railways or any other sector directly affecting the life of the people will not be able to carry on a mass protest campaign combined with strike action against the moves of the government to privatize state institutions, as their action may result in causing serious obstruction or damage to essential services or supplies.

People’s organizations or opposition political parties will not be able to carry on any mass agitation campaign demanding the government to take steps to conduct provincial council or general elections as it is an act of wrongfully or illegally compelling the govt. of Sri Lanka to do any act and as such action may result in causing serious damage to property, including public or private property, any place of public use, a state or govt. facility, any public or private transportation system, or any infrastructure facility or environment.

Any People’s or professional organization or political party will not be able to carry on a protest campaign at the Indian High Commission against the signing of ETCA or granting of Mattala or Palaly Airports to India or at the British High Commission against sponsoring a Resolution against Sri Lanka at the Geneva UNHRC or at the US Embassy against setting up a naval facility at Trincomalee as it is an act of wrongfully or illegally compelling any other government to abstain from doing any act and as such action may result in causing serious damage to property, including public or private property, any place of public use, facility, any public or private transportation system, or any infrastructure facility or environment.

No People’s organization or political party will be able to carry on a protest campaign at the UNDP Office in Colombo protesting against the UNHRC Resolution against Sri Lanka or demanding the withdrawal of baseless allegations of war crimes against armed forces of Sri Lanka as it is an act of wrongfully or illegally compelling an international organization to abstain from doing any act and as such action may result in causing serious damage to property, including public or private property, any place of public use, facility, any public or private transportation system, or any infrastructure facility or environment.

Police Directives curtailing Freedom of Movement

S; 62 of the CTB and S. 61 of the ATB enables the Police to take pre-emptive action preventing any public protest being conducted. Under S.61 of the Bill, on receipt of information that an offence under this Act is likely to be committed, a police officer not below the rank of a SSP may issue any one or more of the following directives to the public:

not to enter any specified area or premises;

to leave a specified area or premises;

not to leave a specified area or premises and to remain within such area or premises;

not to travel on any road;

not to transport anything or not to provide transport to anybody;

to suspend the operation of a specified public transport system;

k. not to congregate at any particular location;

l. not to hold a particular meeting, rally or procession;

m. not to engage in any specified activity.

Directives to be issued with prior approval of a Magistrate.

Directives to be published in the gazette and given wide publicity through other means.

Period of operation of a directive not to exceed 24 hours continuously at a time, and for a total period of 72 hours.

Military assistance may be obtained to give effect to any such directive.

Police may cordon off such area to give effect to such directive.

During the period of operation of such directive and the following 24 hours, the police may,

stop, question and search any person found within the effective area of such directive; b. enter and search any premises; c. stop any person who may attempt to enter or remain in the effective area of such directive.

Police may arrest any person who may act contrary to the directive.

Acting contrary to any such directive is an offence punishable by a Magistrate with imprisonment for a term not exceeding one year or a fine not exceeding Rs. 5000/- or both.

Any person who – a. violates or acts in contravention of an order made in terms of this Act; or b. wilfully fails or neglects to comply with a direction issued in terms of this Act; c. fails to provide information or provide false or misleading information in response to a question put to him by a police officer conducting an investigation under this Act, or; d. wilfully prevents or hinders the implementation of a lawful order or directive issued under this Act is guilty of an offence punishable with imprisonment for a term not exceeding two years and a fine not exceeding Rs, 500,000. – S. 14

Police Power to intercept letters and other private Communications

Police given power to intercept letters and other private communications and listen to telephone conversations for investigation purposes under these Bills. To determine whether one or more persons are conspiring, planning, preparing or attempting to commit an offence under this Act, a Police Officer not below the rank of a SP may obtain a Court order to intercept, read, listen or record any postal message, electronic mail, or any telephone, voice, internet or video conversation or conference or any communication through any other means. – S. 67 CTB; S. 66 ATB

All Responsible Officers Liable to be Punished

When a people’s organization or a professional association is charged with an offence under this Bill, the entire leadership of the association will become liable to be punished. According to S. 97 of the Bill, where an offence is committed by a body of persons, every director, principal executive officer, every officer of that body responsible for its management and control, shall be deemed to be guilty of such offence.

Creeping Emergency Regulations into the Bill arming the President with Extraordinary Dictatorial Powers to Curb Democratic Rights

Review and Repeal of the Public Security Ordinance is one of the Recommendations made by the UN HRC in its Periodic Reports on Sri Lanka. The Yahapalana government gave an undertaking to do that. As Public Security Ordinance is part of the Constitution, the government cannot repeal or amend it without amending the Constitution.

When there is a serious threat to the law and order or national security or maintenance of essential services, the government declares a state of emergency in the country and make emergency regulations to deal with the situation. State of Emergency has to be approved by Parliament once a month. Otherwise it will lapse. What the government has done is to creep some of the provisions generally brought into force under the Emergency Regulations into the Bill so that it will become part of the normal law of the country.

None of the following provisions are found in the PTA. They are generally found only in the Emergency Regulations made under the Public Security Ordinance. Under Ss. 81 – 82, 83, 84 and 85 of the CTB, the Minister has been entrusted with Emergency Powers to issue Proscription Orders – S. 81; Restriction Orders – S. 82; and Curfew Orders – S. 83; to declare prohibited places – S. 84; and call out Armed Forces – S. 85. Now by the ATB, the President will be vested with these powers.

Threat of Proscription of Organizations

Notwithstanding anything in any other written law, on a recommendation made by the IGP or at the request of a foreign government, the President may proscribe any organization, initially for a period of one year, where he has reasonable grounds to believe that such organization is engaged in any act amounting to an offence under this Act, or acting in an unlawful manner prejudicial to the national security of Sri Lanka or any other country.

To proscribe an organisation under the Bill it need not engage in any terrorist activity prejudicial to the national security of the country. Under S. 82 (1) of the Bill, notwithstanding anything in any other written law, the President can proscribe any organization where he has reasonable grounds to believe that such organization is engaged in any act amounting to an offence under the Act, or is acting in an unlawful manner prejudicial to the national security of Sri Lanka or any other country.

(2) A Proscription Order may be made by the President for giving effect to – (a) a recommendation made by the IGP; or (b) a request made by any foreign government.

A Proscription Order may include one or more of the following prohibitions : Prohibiting (a) any person being a member; (b) recruiting members; (c) any person acting in furtherance of its objectives; (d) meetings, activities and programs being conducted; ( e) use of bank accounts; (f) entering into contracts; (g) raising funds or receiving grants; (h) transferring funds and assets; (i) lobbying and canvassing; (j) any publication of any material in furtherance of its objectives. A Proscription Order remains valid for a period of one year. It can be extended for one year at a time.

The organisations like the GMOA, Inter University Students Federation, Trade Unions in all public institutions and services and Farmers’ organizations that frequently carry on strikes crippling health services or agitational campaigns obstructing highways to compel the government to do or to refrain from doing certain acts will not be able to carry on their campaigns without facing the danger of being proscribed.

Imposition of Restriction Orders

On a recommendation of the IGP, the President may, with sanction of the High Court, issue a Restriction Order on any person, where he has reasonable grounds to believe that such person is making preparations to commit an offence under the Act and the conduct of such person can be investigated without arresting him, restricting (a) his movement outside the place of his residence; (b) travelling overseas; (c) travelling within Sri Lanka; (d) travelling outside the normal route between his place of residence and place of employment; (e) communication or association or both with particular persons specified in the order; (f) engaging in certain specified activities facilitating the commission of an offence under the act; (g) requiring such person to report to any police station on a specified day. – S. 83

Though there was a somewhat similar provision in S. 11 of the PTA in relation to a person concerned in any terrorist activity as defined in the PTA, this is much wider.

Police Directives issued in the guise for the protection of the public under S. 62 of the Bill can also be issued only under the Emergency Regulations. There is no similar provision in the PTA.

Such restrictions may be imposed remaining valid for a period, not exceeding one month at a time, up to 6 months.

The Court shall cause the Order served on the person and require the IGP to take all necessary steps to enforce it.

This talk of obtaining High Court sanction and serving and enforcing the Order through the involvement of Court is a façade adopted to cover up the arbitrary and undemocratic nature of the executive acts with judicial authority.

In the Counter Terrorism Bill, it is not the Court, but the Minister who shall cause the Order served on the person and require the IGP to take all necessary steps to enforce it.

Acting in contravention of a Restriction Order is an offence punishable by High Court with imprisonment up to 3 years and a fine not exceeding Rs. 300,000. – S. 83 (7)

Issuing Curfew Orders

Under S. 84 of the Bill, notwithstanding the provisions in the Public Security Ordinance, the President, may by Order published in the Gazette, declare a Curfew Order covering the entire country or part of the country, for the purposes of (a) controlling, detecting or investigating the occurrence of systematic and widespread acts of terrorism and other offences under the Act; (b) for the protection of national and public security from such acts; or (c) to prevent the systematic and widespread committing of acts of terrorism and other offences under the Act.

It is lawful for a Police officer to use reasonable force as may be necessary to ensure compliance with a Curfew Order. Violation of a curfew order is an offence punishable by a Magistrate with a fine not exceeding Rs. 300,000. (To be continued)



Opinion

Sri Lanka’s geopolitical positioning for future prosperity

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Kariyawasam

By Chula Goonasekera
For the LEADS Forum (admin@srilankaleads.com)

Sri Lanka’s future prosperity will depend on how effectively it positions itself within an increasingly complex global environment. At a recent LEADS Forum discussion (https://youtu.be/Bbr3e_qU1Fw), veteran diplomat Prasad Kariyawasam, former Secretary to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, High Commissioner to India, Ambassador to the United States, Ambassador /Permanent Representative to the UN in New York and Geneva —outlined the strategic choices Sri Lanka must make to secure long term stability and economic advancement. Kariyawasam offered a rare blend of historical perspective, diplomatic experience and practical guidance.

His central message was clear: Sri Lanka must exercise strategic agency—engaging all major partners while safeguarding its national interests.

Foreign Policy as an Extension of National Aspirations

Foreign policy, Kariyawasam emphasised, is inseparable from domestic priorities. As your text notes, “foreign relations often reflect the medium- and long-term aspirations of a country’s people and its leadership.” Governments must therefore craft external relations that reflect the public’s economic and social expectations, avoiding short-term political impulses that undermine long-term national interests.

For a small nation, foreign policy cannot be symbolic or personality driven. It must be purposeful, pragmatic and directed towards the security and prosperity of the people.

A History of Global Connectivity

Sri Lanka’s history demonstrates that the island has never been isolated. From ancient ties with India and Southeast Asia to Arab, Persian and Chinese maritime networks, the island prospered when connected to the wider world. We must realise that “geography creates opportunity, but geography alone does not create prosperity.” Institutions, infrastructure and policy determine whether geographic advantage becomes economic success.

Colombo’s emergence as a cosmopolitan trading hub and Galle’s role as a resupply station for Indian Ocean shipping in colonial times , illustrate how deeply Sri Lanka has been embedded in global commerce for centuries.

Lessons from Asia’s High Performers

Kariyawasam highlighted the experiences of Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore and Vietnam. Their paths differ, but their success rests on common foundations:

• investment in human capital and infrastructure

• merit based institutions

• integration into global markets

• attraction of investment and technology

• export oriented industries

• strategic engagements with both China and Western economies

The lesson for Sri Lanka is not imitation but continuous adaptation and constructive integration with the global economy.

India: Sri Lanka’s Closest Major Partner

India’s transformation into a global economic power presents Sri Lanka with both opportunity and responsibility. India is already Sri Lanka’s largest source of tourists and a major investor. Kariyawasam states, “The larger question is how effectively Sri Lanka can participate in and benefit from India’s growth.”

A partnership should encompass modern, more open pathways for trade, investment, logistics, energy, technology, digital services, education and professional mobility—And asymmetry between the two economies must be handled with maturity and foresight, seeking special and differential treatment .

China and Other Global Partners

China remains a significant economic partner. Sri Lanka must avoid viewing this relationship through a zero sum lens. The goal should be productive and transparent engagement, ensuring better terms of trade and meaningful technology transfer.

Equally Important relations must be nurtured with the United States, European Union, United Kingdom, Japan, Australia, ASEAN and the Gulf.

All these relationships can be vibrant partnerships that does not lead towards , dependency but mutually beneficial pragmatic arrangements .

A Fragmenting International System

Global geopolitics is becoming more volatile. Trade tensions, wars, sanctions, supply chain disruptions, climate change and technological competition increasingly shape national security. We must realise, “foreign policy cannot be separated from economic policy.”

Sri Lanka’s recent economic crisis demonstrated the importance of international confidence, access to finance and resilient supply chains. Energy security, food security, cybersecurity and digital infrastructure are now core elements of national strategy.

Strategic Agency: The Guiding Principle

Sri Lanka must avoid becoming an arena for great power competition. Strategic agency means making decisions based on national interest, expanding Sri Lanka’s choices, not restricting them.

India is essential. China is important. The United States, Europe, Japan, Australia, ASEAN and the Gulf are important. The objective is a web of partnerships that strengthens resilience and autonomy.

Sri Lanka’s Strategic Assets

1. Location: Sri Lanka’s geography is a long standing advantage. Ports such as Colombo, Hambantota, Trincomalee and Galle can become specialised hubs—if connected to logistics, manufacturing, services and exports.

2. Digital Connectivity: Submarine cables, data centres, cloud services and cybersecurity are now as important as physical geography. Sri Lanka can turn its location into both a maritime and digital advantage.

3. Tourism and Natural Heritage: The focus should shift from tourist numbers to value creation—wellness, heritage, ecotourism, cruise tourism, education and MICE tourism.

4. Human Resources and Demographics: High literacy is no longer enough. Skills in technology, engineering, AI, logistics and advanced manufacturing are essential, especially with an ageing population.

5. Migrant Workforce: Migrant workers are a strategic asset, not merely a source of remittances. Bilateral labour agreements, skills recognition and diaspora engagement should be central to foreign policy.

Requirements for Sustained Prosperity

Sri Lanka’s future depends on:

• peace and security

• access to international markets

• productive investment

• a skilled, productive workforce

• modernised agriculture

• higher value tourism

• demographic preparedness

• climate resilience

• strong, predictable institutions

Please note that “foreign policy can open doors. Domestic institutions determine whether we can walk through them.”

The Role of the State

Sri Lanka does not need a larger state—only a more capable one. Policy continuity, professional institutions, predictable regulation and reduced corruption are essential. Geography does not change; long-term national interests do not change. Intentional relationships built over decades should not be reinvented with each election cycle.

Building Trust Internationally

Trust is a strategic asset. Sri Lanka must be known as a country that honours commitments and maintains predictable policies. This is vital not only for diplomacy but also for investment and long term partnerships.

Avoiding Zero Sum Geopolitics

Sri Lanka does not need to choose between India and China, or between Asia and the West. The task is to identify what each relationship can contribute to national development while protecting sovereignty and freedom of decision making.

Sri Lanka’s geography is an inheritance, but prosperity is not guaranteed. The world is changing rapidly—great-power competition, technological disruption, and climate vulnerability demand a foreign policy that is pragmatic, adaptive, and anchored in national interest.

Sri Lanka must build partnerships without dependencies, maintain strategic agency without isolation, and integrate with the global economy while strengthening domestic capacity.

“We cannot change where Sri Lanka is. We can, however, determine what Sri Lanka becomes because of where it is”

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Opinion

A tariff deal with the US? Make haste slowly

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by Gomi Senadhira

Sri Lanka’s former ambassador to the United States Mahinda Samarasinghe is back in Sri Lanka lobbying for speedier finalisation of a new tariff deal with the United States. According to news reports, delivering the keynote address at the Sri Lanka Institute of Directors’ Annual Meeting last week, he stated, “I have recommended very strongly to the government that we need to conclude the agreement so that we can lock in the very favourable tariff rate that Sri Lanka has got up to now“.

I do not understand why the former ambassador is urging the government to expedite the finalisation of a new tariff deal or what is “the very favourable tariff rate” he refers to in his speech. However, given the ongoing terrible tariff turbulence in the United States and the fragile economic situation in Sri Lanka, I believe, this is not the right time to rush into finalising any trade agreement with the United States. I am also of the opinion that at this juncture Sri Lanka should maintain strategic patience and explore all available options.

Lessons from the countries that rushed for trade deals

To better comprehend this, let’s look at experiences of the countries that rushed to conclude tariff deals with the United States after President Donald Trump declared his “reciprocal tariffs” under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) in April 2025. As Samarasinghe stated in his keynote, “The bottom line on all these negotiations was that every country that finally agreed to sign the agreement had to give either complete duty-free access for American exports into those markets, or near complete duty-free access.” In exchange for these tariff concessions and other market access commitments these countries managed to get the newly introduced country specific “reciprocal tariffs” reduced.

However, in February 2026, the Supreme Court of the United States (SCOTUS) struck down these “reciprocal tariffs” under the IEEPA. With that, the market access gains these countries received in exchange for complete duty-free access for American exports into their markets evaporated under U.S. domestic law. By moving too fast to conclude bilateral tariff agreements with the United States these countries are now bound to strict obligations whereas the benefits they bargained from the U.S. administration are not worth the paper those were written on.

Sri Lanka’s experience

In April 2025, President Trump declared his “reciprocal tariffs” and labelled Sri Lanka as the worst offender, imposing one of the highest additional duties at 44%. Since then, Ambassador Samarasinghe and other negotiators have managed to negotiate this down to 20%. I do not know what the deal was through which Sri Lanka managed to reduce the 44% tariff to 20% or what we gave in return for this “concession.” However, what we received in return has absolutely no value after the decision by the SCOTUS.

Current state of US tariffs

After the decision by SCOTUS, the U.S. administration introduced a temporary 10% additional tariff on all countries for 150 days. At the end of that period, this 10% tariff was replaced by a new “forced labor tariff ” of 10% to 12.5% on all trading partners under Section 301 of U.S. trade law. Twenty-five U.S. states and several small businesses have already filed lawsuits against these tariffs in U.S. courts. This new “forced labour tariff ” on Sri Lanka was first fixed at 12.5%. Later, after President Anura Kumara Dissanayake issued a gazette notice prohibiting the importation of goods produced using forced labour, it was reduced to 10%. That means Sri Lanka has already made a substantial commitment to receive this “tariff concession,” and I presume our negotiators understand the implications of this commitment.

Make haste slowly

After President Trump imposed 44% “reciprocal tariffs” on Sri Lanka, through an article published in The Island on 25th April 2026 (), I urged the government to engage immediately with the US administration on these tariffs. However, I also emphasised that the best way to move forward was to make haste slowly.

Two millennia ago, Augustus Caesar, the first emperor of Rome, frequently used the phrase, “make haste slowly”, because he detested rashness and haste in his military commanders. It was the recurring guiding maxim that he emphasised throughout his 40-year imperial rule. After 2000 years, this classical oxymoron remains a definitive golden rule for professional trade negotiators. More importantly it is the exact blueprint required when navigating turbulence in trade negotiations with the Trump administration.

The endgame – The most dangerous moment in trade negotiation

Samarasinghe has also stated the agreement is 90% complete. Any experienced trade negotiator should know that the final 10% contains high-stakes provisions and is the most dangerous moment in a trade negotiation. A single misplaced comma or ambiguous product description in a tariff schedule can cost millions through unintended loopholes. Rushing this last stretch to secure a deal can permanently expose Sri Lanka to sudden shifts in American trade policy, heavy compliance costs, or strict enforcement under Section 301 regarding supply-chain labour standards. Hence, this is the time for strategic patience.

(The writer can be reached at senadhiragomi@gmail.com)

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Opinion

Buddhist law and constitutional amendments

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Upon reading the article titled “Prof. Pieris says Buddha Dhamma recognized as source of law under Constitution” (Island, September 12, 2026), the classical Sinhala idiom “Yanne Koheda? Malle Pol” immediately comes to mind. The expression, translating literally to answering “I have coconuts in my bag” when asked “Where are you going?”, underscores a complete disconnect in logic. Because it is uncertain whether the article accurately represents the professor’s precise words, the following critique addresses the contents of the report rather than the speaker himself.

The central premise of the report concerns a statement delivered by the Chief Justice regarding a petition filed against the 22nd Amendment to the Constitution. According to the report, the Chief Justice’s observation that the determination would be made strictly on the basis of established law rather than Buddhist teachings was characterised as a “cavalier dismissal” of the Buddha Dhamma. This assertion carries a host of unexamined assumptions. Had the writer specified precisely which tenets of the Buddha Dhamma were violated, a direct legal or philosophical evaluation could take place. However, no specific Buddhist tenet or law was identified as having been transgressed, and for good reason: no such statutory legal framework exists within the Buddha’s teachings.

To understand the flaw in this argument, one must examine the constitutional context alongside the canonical meaning of the terms involved. Article 9 of the 1978 Constitution of Sri Lanka mandates that the Republic shall give Buddhism the foremost place and that it shall be the duty of the State to protect and foster the Buddha Sasana, while guaranteeing the fundamental rights of all religions under Articles 10 and 14(1)(e).

While “Buddhism” and “Buddha Dhamma” are frequently used as interchangeable terms in casual dialogue, they represent distinct concepts. “Buddhism” is an umbrella term coined by 19th-century Western scholars to classify the global institutionalised religion, incorporating its diverse sects, cultural traditions, rituals, and socio-political histories. Conversely, Sasana is the ancient term designating the structural framework established by the Buddha to preserve and transmit his teachings, comprising the monastic order (Sangha) and its supporting institutions.

In classical Theravada commentarial literature, the Sasana operates as a functional three-tiered structure. It encompasses Pariyatti Sasana, the preservation and study of sacred texts; Paṭipatti Sasana, the practical execution of the doctrine through ethical conduct and meditation; and Paṭivedha Sasana, the direct experiential realization of ultimate truth, or enlightenment. This structural breakdown raises fundamental questions about state capacity. While a state can readily support Pariyatti Sasana through academic institutions, textual preservation, and educational funding, it cannot legislate or enforce Paṭipatti or Paṭivedha. Practical engagement and spiritual realisation are inherently internal, first-person experiences. Expecting the state to codify or guarantee enlightenment is a conceptual impossibility.

Furthermore, the Buddha Dhamma refers specifically to the unconditioned truths of existence and the teachings imparted to realize them, including the Four Noble Truths, the Eightfold Path, and Dependent Origination. As the late Venerable Professor Kotagama Wachissara Thera observed, there is no rigid ideologue or “ism” in the core Dhamma. The teachings do not constitute a system of divine commandments or a legal statute enforced through reward and punishment. Rather, Buddhist ethics function as self-directed guidelines for psychological clarity and moral inquiry. Even the Vinaya Pitaka, which contains explicit rules of conduct, functions as an internal monastic code rather than a civil or criminal law intended for the laity.

Throughout the Pali Canon, guidance regarding governance focuses on the moral character of leadership and the social duties of statecraft rather than rigid legal codification. In discourses such as the Cakkavatti Sihanada Sutta (DN 26), the Buddha observes that social instability and crime cannot be eliminated solely through punitive measures, emphasising instead that states must provide economic opportunities, fair wages, and resource distribution to maintain societal balance. Crucially, in the Maha Parinibbana Sutta (DN 16), the Buddha explicitly highlights the importance of respecting established laws and traditions rather than enacting arbitrary regulations.

The natural laws articulated in the Dhamma, such as the law of cause and effect or the three characteristics of existence, govern all phenomena universally, regardless of legal statutes or personal belief. They are not human laws to be applied or suspended by a court of law. Therefore, characterizing the Chief Justice’s adherence to constitutional jurisprudence over religious doctrine as a “cavalier dismissal” lacks logical and textual foundation. Framing the judiciary’s adherence to legal precedent as an attack on the Dhamma distracts from fundamental constitutional principles and risks misguiding the public for political ends.

Geewananda
Gunawardana,
Ph.D.

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