Features
Adhering to Foreign Affairs Constitutional Mandate?
by Austin Fernando
Many criticisms are directed at the Ministry of Foreign Relations (MFR) (previously Ministry of Foreign Affairs -MFA) for alleged operational failures. Incidentally, the successes of MFR are not spoken much, not for want, but that is life!
For example, currently, there are criticisms against the ‘withdrawal threat of the Generalised Scheme of Preferences Plus (GSP+)’, and the March 2021 UNHRC Resolution. Even previously we have heard criticisms against Yahapalanaya over ‘co-sponsoring the UNHRC Resolution- 2015.’ The Mahinda Rajapaksa government faced criticisms over the handling of UNHRC Resolutions (2009-2013), and the withdrawal of GSP+. While some appreciated President R Premadasa for the Gladstone Affair, others criticised him. Criticisms were directed against President JR Jayewardene over the Falklands War issue. If looked at apolitically, every government has had its share of criticisms.
Constitutional Mandate for Foreign Affairs
It is appropriate to review the MFR/MFA operations through a constitutional prism. First, let us look at the fountain of power or the mandate for ‘foreign affairs.’ The Sri Lankan Constitutions maintained a centralised nature until the 13th Amendment introduced devolution and restructured administration. It demarcated the functions of the State. Accordingly, the functions of ‘Foreign Affairs’ in the List II- Reserved List were:
“This would include-
(a) Foreign Affairs: all matters which bring the Government of Sri Lanka into relations with any foreign country;
(b) Diplomatic consular and trade representation;
(c) United Nations Organization;
(d) Participation in international conferences, associations, and other bodies and implementing of decisions made thereat;
(e) Entering into treaties and agreements with foreign countries and implementing treaties, agreements, conventions with foreign countries.
In (a) above, two terms i. e. “all matters”, and “with any foreign country,” are important for MFR functioning. If the Constitutional intentions are to be satisfied, the MFR, other political and administrative hierarchies should adhere to this constitutional mandate.
The last few decades’ experiences show that adherence to these two ‘terms’ was seen sparingly. High political authorities have ignored these terms. We did not see any public outcry or even a restricted or nominal concern shown by the MFR, and its predecessors, against non-adherence, though occasional political outbursts happened. Examples for ‘outbursts’ were observed when the Indo- Lanka Accord was signed, UNHRC Resolution was co-sponsored, when the Indian Peace Keeping Force was invited, etc. These related to “international relations”, but with minute, or no stakeholder consultation before embarking. Looking at mandate (b), (d), and especially (e), obviously the role of the MFR spreads on a wide canvass.
Regarding mandate (c) the MFR holds sway. Many recent criticisms on (c) were on human rights, the Prevention of Terrorism Act, disappearances, reconciliation, returning refugees and repatriated workers suffering from COVID 19, etc. These have domestic political attachments and are complex
The list of violations of the 13A- List II stipulations is long. I recall a few experiences in my short service as a diplomat. (I have many more!)
Recent Foreign Relation Experiences
Following-up Agreements, Treaties, Conventions, diplomatic meetings are expected from the MFR. Coordinating with stakeholders inclusive of missions abroad, keeping them abreast of decisions matters. Does this happen? Yes, it happens in the breach. An example of default in information sharing by MFR was exposed when MFR requested the Delhi Mission for the proceedings and minutes of President Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s delegate meetings with Indian dignitaries while knowing that quite unconventionally none from the Mission accompanied the President! Really, the Mission should have requested them from MFR!
More seriously, I mention how decisions at President Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s discussions with Indian dignitaries were followed. During the 40 days of service after the President’s visit until I was recalled, the Delhi Mission did not receive any follow-up directives on the visit. Is it the respect to PM Modi and interest shown toward India, the outcomes of the visit, or is it only the non-adherence of the mandate? Indians are a sensitive and sensible lot!
Though PM Modi offered a 450-million-dollar Line of Credit as “India’s full assistance in taking” Sri Lanka “in the path of rapid development,” MFR did not exhibit that urgency, rapidity, reflected from lacking public knowledge about Indian projects since this pledge. These are the criteria exhibiting the direction of the path of rapid development.
Anyhow, the bi-lateral concerns were never conveyed to the Delhi Mission either by the Presidential Secretariat or MFR, and hence there was no mission follow-up. The mission could not automatically know items to follow up, being absent at presidential deliberations. Nevertheless, the citizens must know the outputs/outcomes of PM Modi’s pledges. We do not hear of new project information, or even whether Sri Lanka has formally accepted the pledges. After twenty months of the visit, it is not the best outcome for relations building for the President with the closest neighbour, friend, sometimes called the relative, especially when Indians reflect President’s relationships with China. The MFR’s mandate accommodates such review and information dissemination.
Observing fast-moving Chinese projects, the Indians wonder whether the Modi Pledges have been relegated to the backburner, and preference is elsewhere. This is of security and political connotations to Indians.
To my understanding, only the Solar Alliance’s $100 million offered for solar power projects are being processed. Concurrently, ADB-assisted solar projects in the Jaffna Islands and other projects such as road construction, the de-silting of the Tissamaharama tank commenced after Modi’s pledges; they are carried by Chinese firms. Balancing the Indian concerns as regards the Chinese power project in the Jaffna Islands could have been easy if the Solar Alliance project had been used. (Yahapalanaya was also responsible for this delay.) Indian drone surveillance of our coastlines also would have been redundant.
For comparison, I quote another Indian experience. Having provided $ 1.4 billion assistance to the Maldives, Indians again focused on the Maldives, which has a population of 530,953 (2019), financing major infrastructure development that included a $100 million grant and $400 million new line of credit. Indian External Affairs Minister Dr. S Jaishankar announced the creation of an air bubble with the Maldives to facilitate movement and the commencement of the cargo ferry service between the two countries.
The reason for such relationship-building by the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) was the Chinese- Maldivian bond, which perturbed India. For India, it should have similar concerns with us as well. When similar Indian responses are not observed under even worse circumstances, it makes one wonder why. When India delays finalising the US$ 1,000 million facilitation requested by our government while Indian-Maldivian relations expand, one asks why. Have we failed to reach the promised “very high level” bilateralism, enunciated by President Rajapaksa in Delhi?
PM Modi pledged $450 million when President Gotabaya Rajapaksa visited India. Our former Presidents visiting India did not experience this kind of generosity. PM Modi showed similar generosity to the Maldivian President (US $ 1.4 billion), Bhutanese PM (Indian Rs. 4,500 crores), on their first visits. This may have made President Rajapaksa state that “he would strive to take his country’s bilateral relationship with India to a “very high level”. I doubt whether his effort has reached fruition.
Shouldn’t the MFR be held accountable for non-adherence to its mandate?
The Maldives succeeded while we were haggling over the Eastern Container Terminal (ECT), the Trinco Tank Farm Project (TTFP), Mattala, etc. Maybe, the Maldives accommodated Indian development activities. I do not support endorsing every Indian project as demanded. It is not necessary. Yet, considering the Indian marketplace economics, it is appropriate to finding middle-ground as we did in the case of the Colombo Port City. Commencing negotiations with Indians on the Western Container Terminal is a positive response.
For comparison, Nepal received Rs. 2,802 crores from Indian Annual Neighborhood Financing – 2020 provisions (irrespective of the brewing Kalapani boundary dispute), while Sri Lanka received only Rs. 2,317 crores over a decade. A few days before President Rajapaksa visited Delhi, without any MFR direction, I brought the neighborhood financing viz. Sri Lankan receipts issue with the Indian hierarchy, and the Indians convinced of the need to assist us. Probably, the sum of $ 450 million reflected this thinking. The MFR must study the reasons and pursue action to attract Indians.
At the request of Dr. Indrajit Coomaraswamy, Governor of the Central Bank of Sri Lanka (CBSL), the Mission negotiated with Indian authorities a $400 million Swap, and the CBSL succeeded. To save Sri Lanka from being placed on the “grey list” of the Financial Action Task Force, regarding money-laundering, the Mission intervened, and CBSL succeeded, not on MFA initiations, but the personal request of friendly Governor Coomaraswamy. Such rare interventions come under the purview of items (a) and (e) of the Mandate, but rarely used.
I would like to mention a lesson learned from PM Modi to prove how the Indians take foll-up action. In 2018, returning from the Maldives, he stopped over in Colombo, and the MoU 2017 would have been discussed. He sent a few officials, led by Dinesh Patnaik, Additional Secretary MEA to meet Colombo-based agencies. My understanding is that the MFA and my Delhi Mission had no role to play. This move or its outputs were never conveyed to the Delhi Mission. We learned it from MEA friends. This lack of cohesive adherence to items (a) and (e) of the Mandate by MFR and other stakeholders, bungles relations building.
MEA Minister S Jaishankar visited Colombo and met the representatives of the incumbent adminstration and demonstrated India’s interest and support. It was a total embarrassment to us to receive information about this visit from ‘Indian Express’ journalist Subarjit Roy, and not from MFR! True to MFA/ MFR tradition, no intimation was conveyed to the Delhi Mission Long live the ‘dead’ Mandates (a) and (e)!
Diplomatic formalities
Apart from the constitutional mandate formalities in foreign affairs are serious businesses so much so, in India, there are no shortcuts available to foreign envoys to access the higher levels of administration without approaching the MEA.
In Sri Lanka, we have observed all superior politicians and administrators meet diplomats without reference to the MFR/MFA. Indians probably do so selectively due to logistical reasons. Here, I experienced this due to personal attitudes toward the Foreign Office. The proceedings of such discussions at higher levels are not shared with the MFR. It prevents informed diplomatic decision-making. The tacit fault lies in those who permit direct access and refrain from reporting to MFR.
In India, a representative of the MEA always sits at discussions. At one-on-one meetings with the Prime Minister, for instance, such representation is absent. From the manner matters are pursued by the MEA, it is obvious that the contents of such discussions are shared with the MEA.
While MEA does not permit direct access to State Government authorities without MEA clearance, we have generally ambassadors directly dealing with our provincial authorities, which could create difficult managerial issues. During my tenure in Delhi, I remember a Governor of a Province, and previously even Chief Ministers showed keenness to deal with India and State Governments, which is ‘dangerous.’ Mandate (a) helps manage this issue.
MoU -2017- A Specific Study
I take the case regarding a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed between Sri Lanka and India in 2017 for economic cooperation, to prove how these Mandates default. I suspect the MFR pursued this MoU only as a reference to a Cabinet Memorandum, though it had much broader implications.
I may quote an issue from the MoU i.e., the Trincomalee Tank Farm Project (TTFP)– as a case study to prove where the silence of the MFA and general apathy and uncertainty of governments create problems even to successor governments. The TTFP had been an undecided issue before the 2017 MoU. The TTFP 2003- Agreement was followed by the government from 2011 to 2018, but dilly-dallying was observed throughout.
For the 2017 MoU Cabinet Memorandum, observations were submitted on TTFP by two Ministers, namely Ravi Karunanayaka, ‘noting’ the Memorandum, and Chandima Weerakkody on the structure of the Project. A ‘confirmed’ Cabinet decision was taken to sign the MoU with stakeholder consultation. But the signed MoU has detailed the Cabinet-approved MoU, though the Cabinet decision has drawn conditions (i.e., further “consultation”, and “separate Cabinet memoranda pertaining to the joint projects.”)
Conceptually, there are two major issues- i.e., the structure of the Project and land ownership. The latter is a crucial issue with Attorney General’s and Cabinet’s decisions showing mixed responses. On these, can someone challenge the legality of revisions in Section iv of the signed MoU? These could have been avoided through “stakeholder consultations” and “separate Cabinet Memoranda” as agreed by the Cabinet. These issues may rekindle negativity and delay finality.
I quote the Supreme Court’s LMS judgment that declared: “A pre-condition laid down in paragraph 1.3 is that an alienation or disposition of State land within a Province shall be done in terms of the applicable law only on the advice of the Provincial Council. The advice would be of the Board of Ministers communicated through the Governor, the Board of Ministers being responsible in this regard to the Provincial Council.” (Sri Lanka Law Reports [2008] 1 Sri L.R: page 172) Considering this status, I contend that the work steps applicable to Section iv of the signed MoU need review. If not, cannot Section iv be challenged on “procedural invalidity?”
Now that the Eastern Container Terminal (ECT), Mattala, the Sampur Solar Power projects (in 2017 MoU) have not been carried out, Indians will naturally pursue the TTFP vehemently. Financially strong parties coerce or intrude on allied economic issues through emergent openings. I am not a lawyer, and I contend that due to the country’s financial crisis, we have provided such an opening to India through TTFP. India may have deliberately strategised indecisiveness on the $1,000 million facilitation. It could resurface if/when Finance Minister Basil Rajapaksa negotiates the financial facilitation. Can he also strategize negotiating on the quoted “procedural invalidities”?
To my mind, the TTFP could also become an economically exciting allied project. Unfortunately, this is not much discussed publicly. In the MoU 2017, Section v reads as “v. A Port, Petroleum Refinery, and other industries in Trincomalee, for which GOSL and GOI will set up a JWG by end June 2017.” These openings will allure renegotiation to reach middle ground, and newly negotiated terms to evolve paths to lessen political embarrassment and summon economic prosperity.
Conclusion
There may be other Missions and personnel with experience with non-adherence to the Constitutional Mandate. Such experiences and issues must be made use of by those concerned in executing the Constitutional Mandate for Foreign Affairs.
I have mentioned India because whenever Indo-Sri Lanka relations deteriorate, Sri Lanka faces political and diplomatic embarrassment, as we have experienced in 1987 during the conflict, in 2013, and 2021 at the UNHRC. Avoiding such situation is the “job” of the main Mandate holder, the MFR.
Features
The Great AI Schism: When the Titans of Tech tell us to slow down
by Prof. C. A. Saliya
Something extraordinary happened in September 2026. The very people who have spent the last decade pouring tens of billions of dollars into building artificial intelligence, the visionaries, the investors, the CEOs, suddenly started telling the world to hit the brakes. It’s a bit like the captain of a speeding train leaning out of the window and shouting, “Actually, maybe we should slow down a bit!” The public, understandably, is confused. We’ve been told AI will cure cancer, solve climate change, and give us all free time. Now we’re being told it might kill us all. Welcome to the great AI schism.
To understand what’s happening, you have to listen to the people in the room. These are not wild-eyed doomsayers on the internet. They are the titans of the industry. And they are starting to argue with each other.
Dario Amodei: The Insider Who Wants to Hit Pause
Dario Amodei, the CEO of Anthropic (Claude AI), is the man who kicked the hornet’s nest. In a 3,800-word essay, posted on his website in mid-September 2026, he didn’t just suggest caution, he demanded a slowdown. “We must slow the pace at which we improve the capabilities of AI models,” he wrote. His reasoning is simple and terrifying: the technology is moving faster than our ability to control it. He warned that AI could be misused for cyberattacks, bioterrorism, and serious economic disruption.
What makes Amodei’s warning so chilling is that it comes from a man whose company, Anthropic, builds one of the most powerful AI models in the world, Claude. He’s not a critic on the sidelines. He’s in the driver’s seat, and he’s telling us the car might not have brakes. In an interview with CNN’s Anderson Cooper, he said he agreed with a departing Anthropic researcher who claimed AI could “kill us all” by the end of the decade. That researcher, 27-year-old Jacob Coxon, resigned in protest, saying the people building AI “earnestly believe that it could kill us all”. When the people building the technology start resigning because they’re afraid of it, you should pay attention.
Bill Gates: The Elder Statesman with a Warning
Bill Gates has been around long enough to know a paradigm shift when he sees one. The Microsoft co-founder, who spent decades warning the world about pandemics and climate change, has now turned his attention to AI. And he’s not mincing words. In September 2026, Gates warned that AI is “powerful enough to drive events that, you know, cause a billion deaths”.
Gates is not worried about Terminator-style robots. He’s worried about people. “There’s never been a weapon as powerful as the combination of people with ill intent using the latest AI tools,” he said. His solution is simple: regulation. “No one thinks self-regulation is enough,” he told NBC’s Meet the Press. He even offered to be the man to convince President Trump to regulate AI. Gates is a pragmatist. He knows the technology is coming. He just wants to make sure it doesn’t get us first.
Sam Altman: The Showman with a Conscience (Maybe)
Sam Altman, the CEO of OpenAI (Chat GPT), has always been the industry’s greatest showman. He’s the man who told us AGI (Artificial General Intelligence) is “just around the corner” and that AI will soon be a “genie that can grant any wish”. But even Altman is now singing a different tune. In September 2026, he ruled out an OpenAI IPO in 2026, citing safety concerns. He called even a 10% risk of AI causing human extinction “unacceptable”.
“I agree with Dario that we need to pace the frontier,” Altman posted on X. This is a remarkable shift. Altman has spent years being criticised for moving too fast, for prioritising profit over safety. Now, facing mounting evidence that AI models can cause real harm, from cyberattacks to mental health crises, he’s suddenly the voice of caution. Is it genuine? Or is it a PR move? The cynics will tell you it’s the latter. But the fact remains: when Sam Altman says we need to slow down, the world listens.
Elon Musk: The Provocateur Who Saw It Coming
Elon Musk has been warning about AI for over a decade. He’s the man who called AI “more dangerous than nuclear weapons” long before it was fashionable. So it’s no surprise that he joined the chorus of slowdown calls in September 2026. But Musk being Musk, he couldn’t resist a bit of dark humour. When asked if we’re all going to die within 10 years, he replied, “I don’t want to disappoint you, but we’re all going to die someday anyway”.
But behind the joke is a serious point. Musk believes AI models could escape their constraints, take control of military systems, and even launch nuclear weapons. His solution is mutual oversight: leading AI companies should test each other’s systems for safety before release, and he even suggested a deal with China to make it happen. Musk is a provocateur, but he’s also a visionary. And his vision is one where AI is a weapon that we might not be able to control.

Satya Nadella: The Quiet Strategist
While the others are shouting about doom, Satya Nadella is quietly building an empire. The Microsoft CEO doesn’t talk about extinction risks. He talks about “agentic AI”, AI that can act autonomously, which he calls “a new paradigm”. Microsoft’s Azure cloud platform, which powers these AI agents, grew 43% in the last quarter, surpassing $100 billion in annual revenue.
Nadella’s view is simple: don’t compete to build the most powerful model; compete to control the “orchestration layer”, the systems that connect different AI models. He wants to build the infrastructure that everyone else relies on. It’s a smart play, and it’s making Microsoft a fortune. But Nadella’s silence on safety is deafening. While Amodei and Altman wrestle with their consciences, Nadella is counting the money. It’s not that he doesn’t care; it’s that his business model depends on AI being adopted, not regulated.
Jacob Coxon: The Whistleblower Who Lit the Fuse
You may not have heard of Jacob Coxon. He’s not a billionaire. He’s not a CEO. He’s a 27-year-old researcher who worked at both OpenAI and Anthropic. And in September 2026, he resigned from Anthropic with a warning that shook the industry. “Neither company is acting responsibly,” he wrote on X. “They are launching themselves directly toward a superintelligence capable of self-improvement, and gambling with our lives”.
Coxon’s warning was remarkable because it came from inside the machine. He said the people building AI “earnestly believe that it could kill us all by the end of the decade”. He called for a temporary freeze on advanced AI training. His resignation triggered a wave of concern, and even Dario Amodei admitted he agreed with Coxon more than he disagreed. Coxon is the canary in the coal mine. And the canary is not looking well.
Donald Trump: The Wildcard
And then there’s Donald Trump. The US President has consistently downplayed AI fears, calling them a “hoax” and a “sick conspiracy”. But even Trump is starting to change his tune, sort of. In September 2026, he announced plans to create an “AI Force” and appoint an AI “Czar”. He said the government would look for “bad” uses of AI through the existing criminal and civil justice systems.
But Trump’s priority is clear: winning the AI race against China. “We will not in any way hinder or stifle the growth of this incredible industry,” he said. He wants AI to account for 25% of US GDP. Trump is not a technologist. He’s a businessman and a nationalist. He sees AI as a tool for economic dominance, not an existential threat. Whether he’s right or wrong, his stance puts him at odds with almost every expert in the field.
The Bottom Line: A House Divided
So where does this leave us? We have the CEOs of the world’s leading AI companies, Amodei, Altman, and Musk, all calling for a slowdown. We have Bill Gates, the elder statesman of tech, warning of a billion deaths. We have a whistleblower who says the industry is gambling with our lives. And then we have Satya Nadella, quietly building the infrastructure that powers it all, and Donald Trump, who wants to speed up.
The irony is hard to miss. The people who built the AI train are now telling us to slow down. The people who profit from the AI economy are the ones building the tracks. And the public is caught in the middle, trying to figure out who to believe.
Maybe the most honest thing anyone said came from Jacob Coxon, the 27-year-old researcher who quit. “The people building AI earnestly believe that it could kill us all by the end of the decade,” he wrote. “This is not a marketing stunt”.
If the people building the technology believe it could kill us, perhaps we should listen. Before it’s too late.
(Prof. C. A. Saliya, is a charted accountant, academic, researcher and former banker. He is the author of SAMAJA GAVESHAKAYA and Springer Publication DOING SOCIAL RESEARCH. He can be contacted at saliya.ca@gmail.com. The views expressed in this article are his own and do not necessarily represent those of the organisations with which he is affiliated.)
Features
Preventing grievances from becoming communal
by Jehan Perera
The death sentence on Sivarasa Anojan, a Sri Lankan citizen convicted of blasphemy in Saudi Arabia has taken a central place in national consciousness for the past several weeks. It has been in the headline news since it was first reported last month. There have been many initiatives taken locally to get a more lenient sentencing by the Saudi authorities. There is also an undercurrent that is critical of both the culture and religion from which this sentencing emanates. This also sustains the widespread publicity being given nationally to the issue. By way of contrast, the controversy caused by the forcible removal of the Thileepan statue in Jaffna has not significantly impacted upon the national consciousness. There was only passing mention of the incident in the national media which has been overtaken by other events.
However, in the north and east of the country, and in the diaspora, the removal of the Thileepan statue has become a major issue. It has led to protest marches led by university students and widespread condemnation by civil society and political groups. The issues underlying the Thileepan statue have deep undercurrents in the Tamil consciousness particularly in the north and east which time is unlikely to dispel. The real test of harmony in a multi-ethnic, multi-religious society like Sri Lanka is not whether communities coexist peacefully when nothing controversial is at stake. Rather, the test is how they respond when an event touches their identities and grievances. The death sentence imposed on Anojan in Saudi Arabia and the removal of the Thileepan statue in Jaffna carry the risk of becoming grievances to entire communities.
In the case of Anojan, a young Tamil migrant worker, he was first sentenced to five years imprisonment and a fine of three million Saudi riyals over a Facebook comment. Both he and the Saudi prosecution appealed, with the appeal court raising the sentence to death. This has led to public sympathy for him in Sri Lanka.
Appeals for clemency have come from the President, government and opposition leaders, clergy of all faiths and Muslim political leaders. At the same time there is a need to reject attempts to turn the case into a source of anti-Muslim sentiment or collective blame. Peacebuilding therefore has to be within Sri Lanka as well as diplomatic. Religious leaders and civil society in the country should be ready to quell rumour, even as Muslim, Buddhist, Hindu and Christian leaders stand together publicly.
Thileepan Statue
The Thileepan controversy has had a different trajectory. Many Tamils admire Thileepan, the LTTE name of Rasaiah Parthipan, who died on 26 September 1987 after a twelve-day fast. His demands were addressed to India but included matters pertaining to the Sri Lankan government including the release of detainees held under the Prevention of Terrorism Act. The statue put up during this year’s commemoration was removed by police in the early hours of 27 September, a day after the commemoration ended. The government’s legal concern, as articulated by its spokesperson, was the LTTE remains a proscribed organisation and before removing the statue, police had presented facts to the court. But law and memory answer different questions and the depth of Tamil anguish cannot be disregarded.
For many Tamils, remembrance of Thileepan is connected to their sense of loss and historical memory. The memorial has been destroyed and rebuilt more than once, and each destruction has added to the meaning it carries. Many who mourn Thileepan are grieving a young man who died without violence and by his own fast. They also grieve an era of loss of the struggle for Tamil rights and self-determination for which Thileepan has become a symbol. The Office for Reparations Act, No. 34 of 2018, provides for collective reparations and gives the Office for Reparations a role in policies on memorialisation. This does not automatically permit any particular statue, nor does it override laws on public places or proscribed organisations. But it shows that memorialisation is recognised within Sri Lanka’s framework for reparations and reconciliation. There is also a wider question of equality.
The JVP that now leads the NPP government was itself once proscribed when it took up arms against the state in which tens of thousands died, later entered democratic politics, and now for many years has publicly commemorated its own fallen. The opportunity to remember those who died should not belong to one community alone.
A commitment to peacebuilding requires that the same trust that has been given to former militants of one community needs to be given to members of other communities if equal citizenship and equal rights are to have meaning. Further, the Office for Reparations Act provides for reparations through livelihood. It is today a fact that those former LTTE members who went through the government’s rehabilitation process find it difficult to get jobs in the private sector.
Private sector employers are reluctant to come under surveillance for employing former LTTE members. There needs to be equal access to employment and removal of unjustified barriers to reintegration, with targeted public programmes where necessary. Until this situation is realized on the ground, the government needs to consider employing those who went through the government’s rehabilitation process and still unable to find suitable employment.
Continuing Peace
The challenge that post-war Sri Lanka faces, a full 17 years after the end of war, is to strengthen the foundations of trust between communities rather than deepen existing suspicions. Anojan is an individual Sri Lankan citizen facing a severe sentence in another country. His case should not become a reason to blame Sri Lankan Muslims. Thileepan is remembered differently by different communities, but the dispute over his memorial should not become a reason to revive the communal divisions of the past. The cases are also mirror images in an important respect. In the Anojan case, the state is an advocate pleading before another government. In the Thileepan case, the state is the actor whose decision is being judged. The first calls for quiet diplomacy and restraint in public language. The second calls for fairness and explanation, and the burden on the state is heavier.
The common roots of the two cases lie in mistrust that does not belong to one community alone. It has been produced by experiences of discrimination, violence, insecurity and loss that have been interpreted differently by different communities. Grievances turn communal when an individual is seen as a representative of a community, when institutions seem to treat communities unequally, and when people feel their pain goes unacknowledged. Each of these can be addressed. The system change that the Sri Lankan people voted for in 2024 would need to include a government that rejects collective blame, acknowledges grief and explains its decisions openly. It also requires state institutions to act transparently and consistently, so that no citizen feels that the law protects some communities more than others.
This peacebuilding imperative requires enlightened leadership as much as legal authority. It requires leaders who will speak to their own communities against prejudice, even when this is politically inconvenient. It requires religious leaders who will demonstrate solidarity across religious boundaries. And it requires civil society to recognise that peacebuilding is not simply preventing violence after tensions have risen, but is addressing the mistrust and grievances that allow tensions to rise in the first place. Sri Lanka has learned, at great cost, that communal divisions can become much larger than the events that initially give rise to them. The Anojan and Thileepan cases give Sri Lanka an opportunity to demonstrate that it has learned from its past. The test of Sri Lanka’s continuing peace is whether we can address difficult grievances without turning them into communal ones.
Features
Sri Lanka Cricket Bill: Governance reform is not yet a cricket strategy – Part II
By Sarath S. Kodithuwakku
President, Institute of Management of Sri Lanka; Senior Professor, University of Peradeniya
(Continued from yesterday)
Representation, Independence and Decision-Making
The membership-based electoral structure should provide representation without becoming a substitute for executive management. The seven Elected Directors would bring the perspectives of the SLC membership into the Board, while the seven Independent Directors would provide additional professional expertise and independence. The model’s effectiveness will, therefore, depend on whether the Board can integrate these perspectives into coherent strategic decisions while maintaining a clear boundary between governance and day-to-day management.
The equal division between Elected and Independent Directors also raises a governance-design question. An even-numbered Board can create a tie. The Bill addresses this directly: in the event of equality, the Chairperson has a casting vote; in the Chairperson’s absence, the Deputy Chairperson has a casting vote; and if both are absent, an Independent Director, elected to preside, has the casting vote. The issue is, therefore, not whether a tie can be resolved, but how this mechanism affects the balance between representation, independence and accountability.
The leadership structure reinforces this balance: the Chairperson is elected from among the Independent Directors and the Deputy Chairperson from among the Elected Directors. The casting-vote arrangement makes the Chairperson’s role and perceived independence particularly important, especially when a major strategic decision divides the two components of the Board.
The Bill’s committee provisions could support a disciplined model of delegation, but implementation will depend heavily on the terms of reference adopted by the new Board. The framework could be strengthened by requiring a published cricket-development strategy, a clear division of powers among the Board, executives and selection committees, transparent principles for major development allocations, and periodic reporting on outcomes across men’s, women’s, schools and domestic cricket. These measures would strengthen accountability without legislating the details of team selection or tournament scheduling.
From Measurement to Strategic Accountability
If the Board is to hold management accountable for strategy rather than simply for short-term results, it needs a performance framework that captures both outcomes and the capabilities that produce them.
SLC should consider requiring an explicit multi-year cricket-development strategy, supported by measurable objectives and an annual strategy review. Such a strategy should identify the development pathway from schools and grassroots cricket through domestic competitions to high performance; define major capability priorities such as coaching, sports science, data and analytics; set resource-allocation principles; and establish indicators against which progress can be assessed.
The purpose would not be to turn cricket into a bureaucratic exercise. Strategic accountability simply creates a disciplined basis for asking whether the organisation is doing what it said it would do, whether its assumptions remain valid, and whether resources are producing the intended results.
From Measurement to Organisational Learning
SLC should, therefore, consider adopting a formal Balanced Scorecard. Rather than measuring success solely through international match results or annual financial audits, the framework could track four interdependent perspectives:
Financial Sustainability:
commercial growth, financial discipline and compliance.
Internal Processes:
domestic tournament quality, development pathways and selector-process integrity.
Stakeholder Value:
grassroots development, school cricket and women’s cricket expansion.
Strategic Capability:
coaching quality, sports science, talent development, data and analytics capability, and the organisation’s ability to convert investment into sustainable performance.
The purpose of such a framework would not be to reduce cricket development to a collection of numbers. Rather, it would create a disciplined process for asking four fundamental management questions:
What did we expect to achieve?
What actually happened?
Why was there a difference?
What should we change as a result?
Evaluating these dimensions periodically would help SLC move beyond performance reporting towards genuine organisational learning.
ICC as a Stakeholder in Governance Reform
The ICC is another important stakeholder whose interests should be recognised in the reform process. SLC’s governance arrangements do not operate solely within Sri Lankan law; they also have to be compatible with the governance obligations associated with ICC membership. The ICC’s Articles of Association require each Member to provide for free and democratic elections (or nominees from outside its members) and to manage its affairs autonomously, without government or other public-body interference in the governance, regulation or administration of cricket.
International experience demonstrates that ICC engagement in member governance restructuring is not unusual. In the United States, after the ICC expelled the old national association for chronic governance failures, the ICC directly oversaw a multi-year project to design a new governance model. The ICC Board formally approved the constitution for a replacement body (USA Cricket) before it was adopted. The resulting structure combined elected constituent directors with independent directors, showing that an ICC-backed framework can accommodate both forms of representation.
In Nepal, the ICC established a Nepal Advisory Group comprising stakeholders from across the game to recommend constitutional amendments, with adoption of the revised constitution and subsequent elections forming part of the conditions for reinstatement of ICC membership.[8] The ICC subsequently facilitated an independent panel that included ICC nominees together with representatives of Nepal’s National Sports Council and the existing cricket administration to map the election process, guidelines and timelines.[9] More recently, in 2026, an ICC delegation visited Bangladesh to engage with stakeholders on governance and electoral matters.[10] The ICC has also reported that its Deputy Chair and another ICC Board representative visited Sri Lanka and met relevant stakeholders to assess ongoing developments, while the ICC Board reiterated the need for elections to be held as soon as possible.
These precedents make the ICC a legitimate stakeholder in considering the governance implications of the proposed Bill. This does not mean that the ICC should determine Sri Lanka’s domestic legislation, nor that every feature of the Bill requires prior ICC approval. It does, however, suggest that early and formal engagement with the ICC would be prudent, particularly where the proposed arrangements concern Board independence, elections, government involvement and the transition to the new governance structure.
This is particularly relevant because the Bill creates two institutional arrangements that deserve careful scrutiny from an autonomy perspective. The Transformation Committee is responsible for managing the transition until the First Board is constituted, while the Nomination Committee, although structurally independent of the SLC Board, includes representatives connected with the Sports Ministry and the National Sports Council. Neither arrangement, by itself, establishes government interference. However, taken together, they make it important that the independence of the incoming Board is demonstrable through transparent procedures rather than assumed from the structure alone.
Given the professional calibre and international exposure of the members of the Transformation Committee, it would be reasonable to expect that the importance of ICC engagement would have been recognised. Although any such consultation has not been evident in the public domain, it is therefore reasonable to expect that the ICC has either already been consulted or will be consulted before the Bill is enacted. Such engagement would allow potential incompatibilities to be identified before the new structure is enacted and implemented, rather than after the fact.
The Transition Is Itself a Governance Challenge
The transition provisions introduce a significant organisational-change challenge. Replacing the existing club- and association-based governance structure with a new hybrid Board and governance architecture is not simply a legal exercise; it is an organisational change programme. The Sri Lanka Cricket Transformation Committee is required to manage the transition until the First Board is constituted and, during that period, to establish rules covering matters including tournament structure, domestic governance, selection committee appointments, committee terms of reference, the Nomination Committee process and the election of the Elected Directors.
Structural reform on paper can encounter resistance from established interests, institutional habits and existing routines. The implementation phase will therefore require a clear change-management framework, including stakeholder engagement, transparent onboarding for Independent Directors, clarification of decision rights, alignment of legacy committees, and careful transfer of information and responsibilities.
Without attention to these organisational factors, cultural friction could undermine the intended administrative improvements. The success of the reform will therefore depend not only on the text of the legislation but also on the quality of the rules, appointments, delegation arrangements and organisational behaviours that follow it.
From Governance Reform to a Cricket Strategy
The Bill deserves credit for addressing how SLC is constituted and for creating places for specialist advice. It should not be dismissed simply because it does not prescribe a batting order or a domestic fixture list. Those are not appropriate tasks for legislation.
Its limitation is more precise: the proposed governance arrangements do not, by themselves, assure the strategic capability of the Board or the quality, independence and accountability of the decisions made beneath it. They establish the architecture. The future Board and management must supply the strategy, capabilities, discipline and learning mechanisms that make the architecture work.
A stronger reform would connect four elements: a Board selected for collective strategic capability; professional cricket management with clear delegated authority; transparent but non-mechanical selection and investment processes; and systematic evaluation of development outcomes. Within the first of these, information technology and computer science should be recognised as distinct from the broader capability to understand and govern data science, analytics and emerging AI-enabled decision support.
Ultimately, the governing question is not only who gets a seat at the SLC Board table. It is whether that Board can build, fund, execute and learn from a credible strategy for Sri Lankan cricket.
References
1. Department of Government Printing, Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka Cricket Bill, Gazette Supplement, Part II of September 25, 2026, issued on 28 September 2026.
2. International Cricket Council. Media release, 15 July 2026, reporting the ICC Board discussion of Sri Lanka Cricket and the need for elections to be held as soon as possible.
3. Sport New Zealand – Ihi Aotearoa. Nine Steps to Effective Governance, particularly Step 1: Define and Agree the Board’s Role; Step 4: Provide Strategic Leadership; Step 5: Employ and Support a Chief Executive; and Step 8: Get the Right People on Board.
4. Cricket South Africa. Governance and management frameworks, including the delegation-of-authority framework, Board committees, Cricket Committee, Cricket Pipeline Committee and CEO accountability.
5. International Cricket Council. ICC Articles of Association, provisions requiring free and democratic elections and autonomous administration without government or other public-body interference. ICC. https://images.icc-cricket.com/image/upload/prd/f7vm88yw1933dc38cgtg.pdf
6. International Cricket Council. “ICC outlines proposed USACA constitution.” ICC, 2017. https://www.icc-cricket.com/news/icc-outlines-proposed-usaca-constitution
7. International Cricket Council. “Approved constitution marks historic landmark for cricket in USA.” ICC, 2017. https://www.icc-cricket.com/media-releases/approved-constitution-marks-historic-landmark-for-cricket-in-usa
8. International Cricket Council. “ICC welcomes Nepal Special General Meeting to adopt revised constitution.” ICC, 2018. https://www.icc-cricket.com/media-releases/icc-welcomes-nepal-special-general-meeting-to-adopt-revised-constitution
9. International Cricket Council. “Independent Panel meet to progress Nepal elections under revised constitution.” ICC, 2018. https://www.icc-cricket.com/media-releases/independent-panel-meet-to-progress-nepal-elections-under-revised-constitution
10. International Cricket Council. “ICC delegation visits Bangladesh to engage with stakeholders on governance and electoral matters.” ICC, 2026. https://www.icc-cricket.com/media-releases/icc-delegation-visits-bangladesh-to-engage-with-stakeholders-on-governance-and-electoral-matters
11. International Cricket Council. “ICC Board approves governance, membership and member support decisions.” ICC, 2026; see also “ICC Board Meeting,” 2026, reporting ICC representatives’ meetings with stakeholders in Sri Lanka. https://www.icc-cricket.com/media-releases/icc-board-approves-governance-membership-and-member-support-decisions
(Concluded)
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