Connect with us

Features

Adhering to Foreign Affairs Constitutional Mandate?

Published

on

by Austin Fernando

Many criticisms are directed at the Ministry of Foreign Relations (MFR) (previously Ministry of Foreign Affairs -MFA) for alleged operational failures. Incidentally, the successes of MFR are not spoken much, not for want, but that is life!

For example, currently, there are criticisms against the ‘withdrawal threat of the Generalised Scheme of Preferences Plus (GSP+)’, and the March 2021 UNHRC Resolution. Even previously we have heard criticisms against Yahapalanaya over ‘co-sponsoring the UNHRC Resolution- 2015.’ The Mahinda Rajapaksa government faced criticisms over the handling of UNHRC Resolutions (2009-2013), and the withdrawal of GSP+. While some appreciated President R Premadasa for the Gladstone Affair, others criticised him. Criticisms were directed against President JR Jayewardene over the Falklands War issue. If looked at apolitically, every government has had its share of criticisms.

Constitutional Mandate for Foreign Affairs

It is appropriate to review the MFR/MFA operations through a constitutional prism. First, let us look at the fountain of power or the mandate for ‘foreign affairs.’ The Sri Lankan Constitutions maintained a centralised nature until the 13th Amendment introduced devolution and restructured administration. It demarcated the functions of the State. Accordingly, the functions of ‘Foreign Affairs’ in the List II- Reserved List were:

“This would include-

(a) Foreign Affairs: all matters which bring the Government of Sri Lanka into relations with any foreign country;

(b) Diplomatic consular and trade representation;

(c) United Nations Organization;

(d) Participation in international conferences, associations, and other bodies and implementing of decisions made thereat;

(e) Entering into treaties and agreements with foreign countries and implementing treaties, agreements, conventions with foreign countries.

In (a) above, two terms i. e. “all matters”, and “with any foreign country,” are important for MFR functioning. If the Constitutional intentions are to be satisfied, the MFR, other political and administrative hierarchies should adhere to this constitutional mandate.

The last few decades’ experiences show that adherence to these two ‘terms’ was seen sparingly. High political authorities have ignored these terms. We did not see any public outcry or even a restricted or nominal concern shown by the MFR, and its predecessors, against non-adherence, though occasional political outbursts happened. Examples for ‘outbursts’ were observed when the Indo- Lanka Accord was signed, UNHRC Resolution was co-sponsored, when the Indian Peace Keeping Force was invited, etc. These related to “international relations”, but with minute, or no stakeholder consultation before embarking. Looking at mandate (b), (d), and especially (e), obviously the role of the MFR spreads on a wide canvass.

Regarding mandate (c) the MFR holds sway. Many recent criticisms on (c) were on human rights, the Prevention of Terrorism Act, disappearances, reconciliation, returning refugees and repatriated workers suffering from COVID 19, etc. These have domestic political attachments and are complex

The list of violations of the 13A- List II stipulations is long. I recall a few experiences in my short service as a diplomat. (I have many more!)

Recent Foreign Relation Experiences

Following-up Agreements, Treaties, Conventions, diplomatic meetings are expected from the MFR. Coordinating with stakeholders inclusive of missions abroad, keeping them abreast of decisions matters. Does this happen? Yes, it happens in the breach. An example of default in information sharing by MFR was exposed when MFR requested the Delhi Mission for the proceedings and minutes of President Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s delegate meetings with Indian dignitaries while knowing that quite unconventionally none from the Mission accompanied the President! Really, the Mission should have requested them from MFR!

More seriously, I mention how decisions at President Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s discussions with Indian dignitaries were followed. During the 40 days of service after the President’s visit until I was recalled, the Delhi Mission did not receive any follow-up directives on the visit. Is it the respect to PM Modi and interest shown toward India, the outcomes of the visit, or is it only the non-adherence of the mandate? Indians are a sensitive and sensible lot!

Though PM Modi offered a 450-million-dollar Line of Credit as “India’s full assistance in taking” Sri Lanka “in the path of rapid development,” MFR did not exhibit that urgency, rapidity, reflected from lacking public knowledge about Indian projects since this pledge. These are the criteria exhibiting the direction of the path of rapid development.

Anyhow, the bi-lateral concerns were never conveyed to the Delhi Mission either by the Presidential Secretariat or MFR, and hence there was no mission follow-up. The mission could not automatically know items to follow up, being absent at presidential deliberations. Nevertheless, the citizens must know the outputs/outcomes of PM Modi’s pledges. We do not hear of new project information, or even whether Sri Lanka has formally accepted the pledges. After twenty months of the visit, it is not the best outcome for relations building for the President with the closest neighbour, friend, sometimes called the relative, especially when Indians reflect President’s relationships with China. The MFR’s mandate accommodates such review and information dissemination.

Observing fast-moving Chinese projects, the Indians wonder whether the Modi Pledges have been relegated to the backburner, and preference is elsewhere. This is of security and political connotations to Indians.

To my understanding, only the Solar Alliance’s $100 million offered for solar power projects are being processed. Concurrently, ADB-assisted solar projects in the Jaffna Islands and other projects such as road construction, the de-silting of the Tissamaharama tank commenced after Modi’s pledges; they are carried by Chinese firms. Balancing the Indian concerns as regards the Chinese power project in the Jaffna Islands could have been easy if the Solar Alliance project had been used. (Yahapalanaya was also responsible for this delay.) Indian drone surveillance of our coastlines also would have been redundant.

For comparison, I quote another Indian experience. Having provided $ 1.4 billion assistance to the Maldives, Indians again focused on the Maldives, which has a population of 530,953 (2019), financing major infrastructure development that included a $100 million grant and $400 million new line of credit. Indian External Affairs Minister Dr. S Jaishankar announced the creation of an air bubble with the Maldives to facilitate movement and the commencement of the cargo ferry service between the two countries.

The reason for such relationship-building by the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) was the Chinese- Maldivian bond, which perturbed India. For India, it should have similar concerns with us as well. When similar Indian responses are not observed under even worse circumstances, it makes one wonder why. When India delays finalising the US$ 1,000 million facilitation requested by our government while Indian-Maldivian relations expand, one asks why. Have we failed to reach the promised “very high level” bilateralism, enunciated by President Rajapaksa in Delhi?

PM Modi pledged $450 million when President Gotabaya Rajapaksa visited India. Our former Presidents visiting India did not experience this kind of generosity. PM Modi showed similar generosity to the Maldivian President (US $ 1.4 billion), Bhutanese PM (Indian Rs. 4,500 crores), on their first visits. This may have made President Rajapaksa state that “he would strive to take his country’s bilateral relationship with India to a “very high level”. I doubt whether his effort has reached fruition.

Shouldn’t the MFR be held accountable for non-adherence to its mandate?

The Maldives succeeded while we were haggling over the Eastern Container Terminal (ECT), the Trinco Tank Farm Project (TTFP), Mattala, etc. Maybe, the Maldives accommodated Indian development activities. I do not support endorsing every Indian project as demanded. It is not necessary. Yet, considering the Indian marketplace economics, it is appropriate to finding middle-ground as we did in the case of the Colombo Port City. Commencing negotiations with Indians on the Western Container Terminal is a positive response.

For comparison, Nepal received Rs. 2,802 crores from Indian Annual Neighborhood Financing – 2020 provisions (irrespective of the brewing Kalapani boundary dispute), while Sri Lanka received only Rs. 2,317 crores over a decade. A few days before President Rajapaksa visited Delhi, without any MFR direction, I brought the neighborhood financing viz. Sri Lankan receipts issue with the Indian hierarchy, and the Indians convinced of the need to assist us. Probably, the sum of $ 450 million reflected this thinking. The MFR must study the reasons and pursue action to attract Indians.

At the request of Dr. Indrajit Coomaraswamy, Governor of the Central Bank of Sri Lanka (CBSL), the Mission negotiated with Indian authorities a $400 million Swap, and the CBSL succeeded. To save Sri Lanka from being placed on the “grey list” of the Financial Action Task Force, regarding money-laundering, the Mission intervened, and CBSL succeeded, not on MFA initiations, but the personal request of friendly Governor Coomaraswamy. Such rare interventions come under the purview of items (a) and (e) of the Mandate, but rarely used.

I would like to mention a lesson learned from PM Modi to prove how the Indians take foll-up action. In 2018, returning from the Maldives, he stopped over in Colombo, and the MoU 2017 would have been discussed. He sent a few officials, led by Dinesh Patnaik, Additional Secretary MEA to meet Colombo-based agencies. My understanding is that the MFA and my Delhi Mission had no role to play. This move or its outputs were never conveyed to the Delhi Mission. We learned it from MEA friends. This lack of cohesive adherence to items (a) and (e) of the Mandate by MFR and other stakeholders, bungles relations building.

MEA Minister S Jaishankar visited Colombo and met the representatives of the incumbent adminstration and demonstrated India’s interest and support. It was a total embarrassment to us to receive information about this visit from ‘Indian Express’ journalist Subarjit Roy, and not from MFR! True to MFA/ MFR tradition, no intimation was conveyed to the Delhi Mission Long live the ‘dead’ Mandates (a) and (e)!

Diplomatic formalities

Apart from the constitutional mandate formalities in foreign affairs are serious businesses so much so, in India, there are no shortcuts available to foreign envoys to access the higher levels of administration without approaching the MEA.

In Sri Lanka, we have observed all superior politicians and administrators meet diplomats without reference to the MFR/MFA. Indians probably do so selectively due to logistical reasons. Here, I experienced this due to personal attitudes toward the Foreign Office. The proceedings of such discussions at higher levels are not shared with the MFR. It prevents informed diplomatic decision-making. The tacit fault lies in those who permit direct access and refrain from reporting to MFR.

In India, a representative of the MEA always sits at discussions. At one-on-one meetings with the Prime Minister, for instance, such representation is absent. From the manner matters are pursued by the MEA, it is obvious that the contents of such discussions are shared with the MEA.

While MEA does not permit direct access to State Government authorities without MEA clearance, we have generally ambassadors directly dealing with our provincial authorities, which could create difficult managerial issues. During my tenure in Delhi, I remember a Governor of a Province, and previously even Chief Ministers showed keenness to deal with India and State Governments, which is ‘dangerous.’ Mandate (a) helps manage this issue.

MoU -2017- A Specific Study

I take the case regarding a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) signed between Sri Lanka and India in 2017 for economic cooperation, to prove how these Mandates default. I suspect the MFR pursued this MoU only as a reference to a Cabinet Memorandum, though it had much broader implications.

I may quote an issue from the MoU i.e., the Trincomalee Tank Farm Project (TTFP)– as a case study to prove where the silence of the MFA and general apathy and uncertainty of governments create problems even to successor governments. The TTFP had been an undecided issue before the 2017 MoU. The TTFP 2003- Agreement was followed by the government from 2011 to 2018, but dilly-dallying was observed throughout.

For the 2017 MoU Cabinet Memorandum, observations were submitted on TTFP by two Ministers, namely Ravi Karunanayaka, ‘noting’ the Memorandum, and Chandima Weerakkody on the structure of the Project. A ‘confirmed’ Cabinet decision was taken to sign the MoU with stakeholder consultation. But the signed MoU has detailed the Cabinet-approved MoU, though the Cabinet decision has drawn conditions (i.e., further “consultation”, and “separate Cabinet memoranda pertaining to the joint projects.”)

Conceptually, there are two major issues- i.e., the structure of the Project and land ownership. The latter is a crucial issue with Attorney General’s and Cabinet’s decisions showing mixed responses. On these, can someone challenge the legality of revisions in Section iv of the signed MoU? These could have been avoided through “stakeholder consultations” and “separate Cabinet Memoranda” as agreed by the Cabinet. These issues may rekindle negativity and delay finality.

I quote the Supreme Court’s LMS judgment that declared: “A pre-condition laid down in paragraph 1.3 is that an alienation or disposition of State land within a Province shall be done in terms of the applicable law only on the advice of the Provincial Council. The advice would be of the Board of Ministers communicated through the Governor, the Board of Ministers being responsible in this regard to the Provincial Council.” (Sri Lanka Law Reports [2008] 1 Sri L.R: page 172) Considering this status, I contend that the work steps applicable to Section iv of the signed MoU need review. If not, cannot Section iv be challenged on “procedural invalidity?”

Now that the Eastern Container Terminal (ECT), Mattala, the Sampur Solar Power projects (in 2017 MoU) have not been carried out, Indians will naturally pursue the TTFP vehemently. Financially strong parties coerce or intrude on allied economic issues through emergent openings. I am not a lawyer, and I contend that due to the country’s financial crisis, we have provided such an opening to India through TTFP. India may have deliberately strategised indecisiveness on the $1,000 million facilitation. It could resurface if/when Finance Minister Basil Rajapaksa negotiates the financial facilitation. Can he also strategize negotiating on the quoted “procedural invalidities”?

To my mind, the TTFP could also become an economically exciting allied project. Unfortunately, this is not much discussed publicly. In the MoU 2017, Section v reads as “v. A Port, Petroleum Refinery, and other industries in Trincomalee, for which GOSL and GOI will set up a JWG by end June 2017.” These openings will allure renegotiation to reach middle ground, and newly negotiated terms to evolve paths to lessen political embarrassment and summon economic prosperity.

Conclusion

There may be other Missions and personnel with experience with non-adherence to the Constitutional Mandate. Such experiences and issues must be made use of by those concerned in executing the Constitutional Mandate for Foreign Affairs.

I have mentioned India because whenever Indo-Sri Lanka relations deteriorate, Sri Lanka faces political and diplomatic embarrassment, as we have experienced in 1987 during the conflict, in 2013, and 2021 at the UNHRC. Avoiding such situation is the “job” of the main Mandate holder, the MFR.



Continue Reading
Advertisement
Click to comment

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *

Features

Sri Lanka’s new govt.: Early promise, growing concerns

Published

on

President Anura Kumara Dissanayake’s demeanour, body language, and speaking style appear to have changed noticeably in recent weeks, a visible sign of embarrassment. The most likely reason is a stark contradiction between what he once publicly criticised and analysed so forcefully, and what his government is actually doing today. His own recent speeches seem to reflect that contradiction, sometimes coming across as confused and inconsistent. This is becoming widely known, not just through social media, YouTube, and television discussions, but also through speeches on the floor of Parliament itself.

Doing exactly what the previous government did

What is now becoming clear is that instead of doing things the way the President promised, his government is simply carrying on with what the previous administration, particularly Ranil Wickremesinghe’s government, was already doing. Critically, some of the most senior positions in the state, positions that demand the most experienced and capable officers, are being filled by people who are loyal to the JVP/NPP party but lack the relevant qualifications and track record.

Such politically motivated appointments have already taken place across various government ministries, some state corporations, the Central Bank, the Treasury, and at multiple levels of the public service. There have also been forced resignations, bans on resignations, and transfers of officials.

What makes this particularly serious is that President Dissanayake has had to come to Parliament repeatedly to defend and “clean up” the reputations of officials he himself appointed. This looks, at times, like a painful and almost theatrical exercise.

The coal procurement scandal, and a laughable inquiry

The controversy around the country’s coal power supply has now clearly exposed a massive disaster: shady tenders, damage to the Norochcholai power plant, rising electricity bills due to increased diesel use to compensate, a shortage of diesel, higher diesel prices, and serious environmental damage. This is a wide and well-documented catastrophe.

Yet, when a commission was appointed to investigate, the government announced it would look into events going back to 2009, which many have called an absurd joke, clearly designed to deflect blame rather than find answers.

The Treasury scandal, 10 suspicious transactions

At the Treasury, what was initially presented as a single transaction, is alleged to involve 10 transactions, and it is plainly a case of fraud. A genuine mistake might happen once or twice. As one commentator said sarcastically, “If a mistake can happen 10 times, it must be a very talented hand.” These explanations are being treated as pure comedy.

Attempts to justify all of this have sometimes turned threatening. A speech made on May 1st by Tilvin Silva is a case in point, crude and menacing in tone.

Is the government losing its grip?

Former Minister Patali Champika has said the government is now suffering from a phobia of loss of power, meaning it is struggling to govern effectively. Other commentators have noted that the NPP/JVP may have taken on a burden too heavy to carry. Political cartoons have depicted the NPP’s crown loaded with coal, financial irregularities, and political appointments, bending under the weight.

The problem with appointing loyalists over qualified professionals

Appointing own supporters to senior positions is not itself unusual in politics. But it becomes a betrayal of public trust when those appointed lack the basic qualifications or relevant experience for the roles they are given.

A clear example is the appointment of the Treasury Secretary, someone who was visible at virtually every NPP election campaign event, but whose qualifications and exposure/experiences may not match the demands of such a critical position. Even if someone has a doctorate or professorship, the key question is whether those qualifications are relevant to the role, and whether that person has the experience/exposure to lead a team of seasoned professionals.

By contrast, even someone without formal academic credentials can succeed if they have the right skills and surround themselves with advisors with relevant exposure. The real failure is when loyalty to a political party overrides all other considerations, that is a fundamental betrayal of responsibility.

The problem is not unique to this government. In 2015, the appointment of Arjuna Mahendran as Central Bank Governor was a similar blunder. His tenure ended in scandal involving insider dealing and bond market manipulation. However, in that case, the funds involved were frozen and later confiscated by the following government, however legally questionable that process was.

The current Treasury losses, by contrast, may be unrecoverable. Critics say getting that money back would be next to impossible.

The broader damage: Demoralisation of capable officials

When loyalists are placed above competent career officials in key positions, it demoralises the best public servants. Some begin to comply in fear; others lose motivation entirely. The professional hierarchy breaks down. Junior officials start looking over their shoulders instead of doing their jobs. This collective dysfunction is ultimately what destroys governments.

Sri Lanka’s pattern: every government falls

This pattern is deeply familiar in Sri Lankan history. The SWRD Bandaranaike government, which swept to power in 1956 on a wave of popular support, had declined badly by 1959. The coalition government, which came to power reducing the opposition to eight seats, lost in 1977, and, in turn, the UNP, which came in on a landslide, in 1977, crushing the SLFP to just eight seats, suffered a similar fate by 1994.

Mahinda Rajapaksa came to power in 2005 by the narrowest of margins, in part because the LTTE manipulated the Northern vote against Ranil Wickremesinghe. But he was re-elected in 2010 on the strength of ending the war against the LTTE. Still, by 2015, he was voted out, because the benefits of winning the war were never truly delivered to ordinary people, and because large-scale corruption had taken root in the meantime. Gotabaya Rajapaksa didn’t even last long enough to see his term end.

Now, this government, too, is showing early signs of the same decline.

The ideological contradiction at the heart of the NPP

There is another challenge: though the JVP presents itself as a left-wing, Marxist-socialist party, many of those who joined the broader NPP coalition, businesspeople, academics, professionals, do not hold such ideological views. Balancing a left-leaning party with a centre-right coalition is extremely difficult. The inevitable tension between the two pulls the government in opposite directions.

The silver lining, however, is that this has produced a growing class of “floating voters”, people not permanently tied to any party, and that is actually healthy for democracy. It keeps governments accountable. Independent election commissions and civil society organisations have a major role to play in informing these voters objectively.

In more developed democracies, voters receive detailed candidate profiles and well-researched information alongside their ballot papers, including, for example, independent expert analyses of referendum questions like drug legalisation. Sri Lanka is still far from that standard. Here, many people vote the same way as their parents. In other countries, five family members might each vote differently without it being a scandal.

Three key ministries, under the President himself, all in trouble

President Dissanayake currently holds three of the most powerful portfolios himself: Defence, Digital Technology, and Finance. All three are now widely seen as performing poorly. Many commentators say the President has “failed” visibly in all three areas. The justifications offered for these failures have themselves become confused, contradictory, and, at times, just plain pitiable.

The overall picture is one of a government that looks helpless, reduced to making excuses and whining from the podium.

A cautious hope for recovery

There are still nearly three years left in this government’s term. There is time to course-correct, if they act quickly. We sincerely hope the government manages to shed this sense of helplessness and confusion, and finds a way to truly serve the country.

(The writer, a senior Chartered Accountant and professional banker, is Professor at SLIIT, Malabe. The views and opinions expressed in this article are personal.)

Continue Reading

Features

Cricket and the National Interest

Published

on

The appointment of former minister Eran Wickremaratne to chair the Sri Lanka Cricket Transformation Committee is significant for more than the future of cricket. It signals a possible shift in the culture of governance even as it offers Sri Lankan cricket a fighting possibility to get out of the doldrums of failure. There have been glorious patches for the national cricket team since the epochal 1996 World Cup triumph. But these patches of brightness have been few and far between and virtually non-existent over the past decade. At the centre of this disaster has been the failures of governance within Sri Lanka Cricket which are not unlike the larger failures of governance within the country itself. The appointment of a new reform oriented committee therefore carries significance beyond cricket. It reflects the wider challenge facing the country which is to restore trust in public institutions for better management.

The appointment of Eran Wickremaratne brings a professional administrator with a proven track record into the cricket arena. He has several strengths that many of his immediate predecessors lacked. Before the ascent of the present government leadership to positions of power, Eran Wickremaratne was among the handful of government ministers who did not have allegations of corruption attached to their names. His reputation for financial professionalism and integrity has remained intact over many years in public life. With him in the Cricket Transformation Committee are also respected former cricketers Kumar Sangakkara, Roshan Mahanama and Sidath Wettimuny together with professionals from legal and business backgrounds. They have been tasked with introducing structural reforms and improving transparency and accountability within cricket administration.

A second reason for this appointment to be significant is that this is possibly the first occasion on which the NPP government has reached out to someone associated with the opposition to obtain assistance in an area of national importance. The commitment to bipartisanship has been a constant demand from politically non-partisan civic groups and political analysts. They have voiced the opinion that the government needs to be more inclusive in its choice of appointments to decision making authorities. The NPP government’s practice so far has largely been to limit appointments to those within the ruling party or those considered loyalists even at the cost of proven expertise. The government’s decision in this case therefore marks a potentially important departure.

National Interest

There are areas of public life where national interest should transcend party divisions and cricket, beloved of the people, is one of them. Sri Lanka cannot afford to continue treating every institution as an arena for political competition when institutions themselves are in crisis and public confidence has become fragile. It is therefore unfortunate that when the government has moved positively in the direction of drawing on expertise from outside its own ranks there should be a negative response from sections of the opposition. This is indicative of the absence of a culture of bipartisanship even on issues that concern the national interest. The SJB, of which the newly appointed cricket committee chairman was a member objected on the grounds that politicians should not hold positions in sports administration and asked him to resign from the party. There is a need to recognise the distinction between partisan political control and the temporary use of experienced administrators to carry out reform and institutional restructuring. In other countries those in politics often join academia and civil society on a temporary basis and vice versa.

More disturbing has been the insidious campaign carried out against the new cricket committee and its chairman on the grounds of religious affiliation. This is an unacceptable denial of the reality that Sri Lanka is a plural, multi ethnic and multi religious society. The interim committee reflects this diversity to a reasonable extent. The country’s long history of ethnic conflict should have taught all political actors the dangers of mobilising communal prejudice for short term political gain. Sri Lanka paid a very heavy price for decades of mistrust and division. It would be tragic if even cricket administration became another arena for communal suspicion and hostility. The present government represents an important departure from the sectarian rhetoric that was employed by previous governments. They have repeatedly pledged to protect the equal rights of all citizens and not permit discrimination or extremism in any form.

The recent international peace march in Sri Lanka led by the Venerable Bhikkhu Thich Paññākāra from Vietnam with its message of loving kindness and mindfulness to all resonated strongly with the masses of people as seen by the crowds who thronged the roadsides to obtain blessings and show respect. This message stands in contrast to the sectarian resentment manifested by those who seek to use the cricket appointments as a weapon to attack the government at the present time. The challenges before the Sri Lanka Cricket Transformation Committee parallel the larger challenges before the government in developing the national economy and respecting ethnic and religious diversity. Plugging the leaks and restoring systems will take time and effort. It cannot be done overnight and it cannot succeed without public patience and support.

New Recognition

There is also a need for realism. The appointment of Eran Wickremaratne and the new committee does not guarantee success. Reforming deeply flawed institutions is always difficult. Besides, Sri Lanka is a small country with a relatively small population compared to many other cricket playing nations. It is also a country still recovering from the economic breakdown of 2022 which pushed the majority of people into hardship and severely weakened public institutions. The country continues to face unprecedented challenges including the damage caused by Cyclone Ditwah and the wider global economic uncertainties linked to conflict in the Middle East. Under these difficult circumstances Sri Lanka has fewer resources than many larger countries to devote to both cricket and economic development.

When resources are scarce they cannot be wasted through corruption or incompetence. Drawing upon the strengths of all those who are competent for the tasks at hand regardless of party affiliation or ethnic or religious identity is necessary if improvement is to come sooner rather than later. The burden of rebuilding the country cannot rest only on the government. The crisis facing the country is too deep for any single party or government to solve alone. National recovery requires capable individuals from across society and from different sectors such as business and civil society to work together in areas where the national interest transcends party politics. There is also a responsibility on opposition political parties to support initiatives that are politically neutral and genuinely in the national interest. Not every issue needs to become a partisan battle.

Sri Lanka cricket occupies a special place in the national consciousness. At its best it once united the country and gave Sri Lankans a sense of pride and international recognition. Restoring integrity and professionalism to cricket administration can therefore become part of the larger task of national renewal. The appointment of Eran Wickremaratne and the new committee, while it does not guarantee success, is a sign that the political leadership and people of the country may be beginning to mature in their approach to governance. In recognising the need for competence, integrity and bipartisan cooperation and extending it beyond cricket into other areas of national life, Sri Lanka may find the way towards more stable and successful governance..

by Jehan Perera

Continue Reading

Features

From Dhaka to Sri Lanka, three wheels that drive our economies

Published

on

Court vacation this year came with an unexpected lesson, not from a courtroom but from the streets of Dhaka — a city that moves, quite literally, on three wheels.

Above the traffic, a modern metro line glides past concrete pillars and crowded rooftops. It is efficient, clean and frequently cited as a symbol of progress in Bangladesh. For a visitor from Sri Lanka, it inevitably brings to mind our own abandoned light rail plans — a project debated, politicised and ultimately set aside.

But Dhaka’s real story is not in the air. It is on the ground.

Beneath the elevated tracks, the streets belong to three-wheelers. Known locally as CNGs, they cluster at junctions, line the edges of markets and pour into narrow roads that larger vehicles avoid. Even with a functioning rail system, these three-wheelers remain the city’s most dependable form of everyday transport.

Within hours of arriving, their importance becomes obvious. The train may take you across the city, but the journey does not end there. The last mile — often the most complicated part — belongs entirely to the three-wheeler. It is the vehicle that gets you home, to a meeting or simply through streets that no bus route properly serves.

There is a rhythm to using them. A destination is mentioned, a price is suggested and a brief negotiation follows. Then the ride begins, edging into traffic that feels permanently compressed. Drivers move with instinct, adjusting routes and squeezing through gaps with a confidence built over years.

It is not polished. But it works.

And that is where the comparison with Sri Lanka becomes less about what we lack and more about what we already have.

Back home, the three-wheeler has long been part of daily life — so familiar that it is often discussed only in terms of its problems. There are frequent complaints about fares, refusals or the absence of meters. More recently, the industry itself has become entangled in politics — from fuel subsidies to regulatory debates, from election-time promises to periodic crackdowns.

In that process, the conversation has shifted. The three-wheeler is often treated as a problem to be managed, rather than a service to be strengthened.

Yet, seen through the experience of Dhaka, Sri Lanka’s system begins to look far more settled — and, in many ways, ahead.

There is a growing structure in place. Meters, while not perfect, are widely recognised. Ride-hailing apps have added transparency and reduced uncertainty for passengers. There are clearer expectations on both sides — driver and commuter alike. Even small details, such as designated parking areas in parts of Colombo or the increasing standard of vehicles, point to an industry slowly moving towards professionalism.

Just as importantly, there is a human element that remains intact.

In Sri Lanka, a three-wheeler ride is rarely just a transaction. Drivers talk. They offer directions, comment on the day’s news, or share local knowledge. The ride becomes part of the social fabric, not just a means of getting from one point to another.

In Dhaka, the scale of the city leaves less room for that. The interaction is quicker, more direct, shaped by urgency. The service is essential, but it is under constant pressure.

What stands out, across both countries, is that the three-wheeler is not a temporary or outdated mode of transport. It is a necessity in dense, fast-growing Asian cities — one that fills gaps no rail or bus system can fully address.

Large infrastructure projects, like light rail, are important. They bring efficiency and long-term capacity. But they cannot replace the flexibility of a three-wheeler. They cannot reach into narrow streets, respond instantly to demand or provide that crucial last-mile connection.

That is why, even in a city that has invested heavily in modern rail, Dhaka still runs on three wheels.

For Sri Lanka, the lesson is not simply about what could have been built, but about what should be better managed and valued.

The three-wheeler industry does not need to be politicised at every turn. It needs steady regulation — clear fare systems, proper licensing, safety standards — alongside encouragement and recognition. It needs to be seen as part of the solution to urban transport, not as a side issue.

Because for thousands of drivers, it is a livelihood. And for millions of passengers, it is the most immediate and reliable form of mobility.

The tuk-tuk may not feature in grand policy speeches or infrastructure blueprints. It does not run on elevated tracks or attract international attention. But on the ground, where daily life unfolds, it continues to do what larger systems often struggle to do — show up, adapt and keep moving.

And after watching Dhaka’s streets — crowded, relentless, yet functioning — that small, three-wheeled vehicle feels less like something to argue over and more like something to get right.

(The writer is an Attorney-at-Law with over a decade of experience specialising in civil law, a former Board Member of the Office of Missing Persons and a former Legal Director of the Central Cultural Fund. He holds an LLM in International Business Law)

 

by Sampath Perera recently in Dhaka, Bangladesh 

Continue Reading

Trending