Features

2024 SL presidential election: A significant shift towards liberal leftist politics

Published

2 years ago

2024/09/24

Sahan Weerasooriya

Anura Kumara

By Amarasiri de Silva

The 2024 Sri Lankan presidential election is considered a watershed moment for several key reasons. One of the most significant aspects is the peaceful transfer of power from a neoliberal administration to the left-oriented National People’s Power (NPP), led by Anura Kumara Dissanayake. The NPP, supported by the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), marked a significant shift in the country’s political landscape. Historically, the JVP was involved in two armed uprisings in 1971 and 1989 in attempts to seize control through revolutionary means, both of which failed and were violently suppressed by the government.

The election results in 2024 reflect the public’s disillusionment with traditional political parties, particularly in light of the economic crises that have plagued Sri Lanka since 2022. Ranil Wickremesinghe, the neoliberal incumbent, played a pivotal role in stabilising the economy after widespread protests ousted the Rajapaksa government. However, despite his efforts to gain public trust, the voters, particularly the younger generation, demanded change and were drawn to the progressive and socialist policies of the NPP.

The peaceful electoral victory of the NPP, with such a revolutionary past, marks a new chapter in Sri Lankan politics. This election reflects a shift from armed struggle to democratic participation, cementing the NPP’s position as a legitimate political force. Moreover, this outcome challenges the entrenched political elite and signals a potential restructuring of Sri Lanka’s political and economic system. Originating from a farming community in Anuradhapura, Dissanayake embodies the character of an ordinary citizen, contrasting with the traditional rulers of the country who come from the Radala high caste or high-class families. This marks a significant shift in Sri Lanka’s political landscape.

The 2024 Sri Lankan presidential election result, which saw the victory of the leftist NPP, backed by the JVP, is not just a change of government but a direct challenge to the long-standing political elite that has dominated the country for decades. This entrenched political class, primarily represented by parties like the UNP and the SLFP, or the SLPP or Pohottuwa, has been heavily associated with neoliberal policies, dynastic politics, and a failure to address deep socio-economic inequalities. The victory of the NPP, a party with socialist leanings, marks a significant departure from this status quo.

The shift signals a potential restructuring of both the political and economic systems in Sri Lanka. Politically, the NPP’s rise reflects a growing rejection of elite control and the consolidation of power among a few families, like the Rajapaksas, Bandaranaikes, and Wickremesinghe’s political lineage. For years, these elites shaped the country’s policies, focusing on liberal economic reforms, often criticized for favouring the wealthy and exacerbating income disparities. The NPP’s success, bolstered by the JVP’s revolutionary past, suggests a new direction, focusing on redistributing political power and fostering a more egalitarian economic structure. Although the percentage increase of the NPP in the presidential election is attributed to the division between the UNP and the SJB, it is deeply rooted in the people’s desire for a fundamental system change. This is clearly reflected in the significant increase in the NPP’s voter base. This dramatic rise underscores the growing public demand for change and the NPP’s ability to capture the sentiments of a population eager for a new political direction. The electorate’s growing disillusionment with traditional political parties and failure to address socio-economic inequalities and governance issues has driven voters to seek an alternative in the NPP, reflecting a broader demand for transformative change in the country’s political and economic landscape.

Ranil Wickremesinghe, representing the UNP, and Sajith Premadasa, leading the SJB, have each garnered substantial support. However, their division has fragmented the votes that would otherwise likely consolidate under one party. This indicates that if the UNP and SJB had remained unified or had formed a coalition, they would have likely outperformed the NPP, reducing the latter’s influence and growth in parliamentary electoral results.

The fragmentation in the centre-right and centre-left political spaces, dominated by the UNP and SJB, has thus contributed to a scenario where a previously smaller political force like the NPP can make significant gains, as the Opposition’s division has weakened their ability to retain a majority vote share. Therefore, the NPP’s rise does not solely reflect an increase in its inherent support but rather the strategic consequences of a divided Opposition.

Economically, the NPP victory signals a potential shift toward policies prioritising social welfare, public ownership, and economic equity. The neoliberal approach championed by past governments, which included deregulation, privatisation, and aligning with global financial institutions like the IMF, faced strong opposition from the NPP and JVP. The NPP has advocated for state intervention in key sectors, wealth redistribution, and addressing the economic needs of the working class, a stark contrast to the elite-driven policies that favoured corporate interests and foreign investments.

This outcome also challenges the traditional role of Sri Lanka in the global economy. As a small developing nation, Sri Lanka has long depended on foreign aid, loans, and investment from international actors, especially during its economic crisis. The NPP’s victory may signal a recalibration of these relationships, as the party has criticized the terms of engagement with global financial institutions, calling for more autonomy and a greater focus on domestic development. In summary, the 2024 election represents more than just a change in leadership; it signals a broader transformation in Sri Lanka’s political and economic system, aiming to dismantle elite control and refocus governance on social justice and economic equity.

Despite the strong backing of the NPP from the oppressed and working-class voters in the 2024 Sri Lankan Presidential Election, a noticeable gap emerged in support from ethnic minorities, particularly in the North and upcountry regions. These regions are home to significant and Muslim and Tamil populations, who have historically been marginalized and continue to face social, political, and economic discrimination.

While the NPP’s platform of social justice, equity, and anti-elite rhetoric resonated with many of the country’s Sinhalese working class, the party’s message did not seem to fully address the complex grievances and historical trauma faced by these ethnic minorities. The Tamil population in the Northern Province, for instance, has long held concerns over unresolved issues from the civil war, such as the demand for justice, truth-seeking for alleged war crimes, and a genuine political solution that would grant them greater autonomy. The electoral results from the Batticaloa district reveal that the Tamil population in the region has yet to demonstrate significant allegiance to the NPP in recent elections. Batticaloa, located in the Eastern Province of Sri Lanka, is predominantly inhabited by Tamils and Muslims. Tamil nationalist sentiments and concerns over ethnic rights, governance, and autonomy have historically shaped the political landscape in this region.

The NPP, primarily identified with the Sinhala-majority JVP, has traditionally struggled to gain traction in the Tamil electorate. This is mainly due to the party’s historical associations and lack of focus on the specific grievances of the Tamil community, such as demands for regional autonomy, post-war reconciliation, and devolution of power. The NPP’s broader, more nationalist platform has not resonated as strongly with the Tamil voters, who tend to align with parties that explicitly advocate for Tamil rights and representation, such as the Tamil National Alliance (TNA) and other regional parties.

This trend was visible in the 2020 parliamentary elections and other recent elections. The NPP failed to make significant inroads in Batticaloa, with most Tamil voters favouring more localised, ethnic-based parties that they perceive as better representing their political aspirations. This lack of support for the NPP in Batticaloa can also be attributed to the deep-rooted ethnic tensions in Sri Lanka’s political sphere. Many Tamil voters may view the NPP as part of the broader Sinhala-majority political establishment, which has historically been in opposition to Tamil demands for autonomy and justice for wartime grievances. Thus, the Batticaloa results underscore the NPP’s challenges in gaining support among Tamil populations, who remain more aligned with parties that advocate for their specific ethnic and regional concerns. This reflects a broader pattern in Sri Lankan politics, where ethnic identities and regional issues often dictate voting patterns.

The NPP’s position on these matters, while generally supportive of reconciliation, may have been perceived as insufficiently robust or sensitive to the specific needs of the Tamil community. Similarly, in the upcountry regions, which Tamil-speaking plantation workers of Indian origin largely inhabit, there remains a deep history of socio-economic deprivation. While the NPP’s economic agenda could benefit these groups, there may have been doubts about whether the party could deliver on its promises, given its primary appeal to a predominantly Sinhalese electorate. Ethnic minorities in these areas may also have been wary of aligning with a party rooted in Sinhalese-majoritarian political culture despite the NPP’s efforts to position itself as a multi-ethnic, inclusive political force.

The gap in minority support likely reflects a broader historical pattern in Sri Lankan politics, where minority communities have been cautious about backing new political movements, especially those with a strong base among the Sinhalese majority. Instead, many of these voters may have supported more established minority-friendly parties or candidates, such as the TNA in the North or the UNP, which was traditionally seen as more accommodating to minority concerns. This divergence underscores the deep ethnic and regional cleavages that continue to shape Sri Lankan electoral politics, even in the context of a broader desire for change.

The 2024 presidential election results highlight significant challenges for the new NPP government, led by Anura Kumara Dissanayake. Despite their platform advocating for a unified and ethnically cohesive government, the election results show that the message has not fully resonated with the country’s ethnic minorities, particularly the Tamils in the North and the upcountry Tamil communities, as well as the Muslim population. This poses a significant challenge for the NPP, which must now find ways to reconcile these disparities while fostering ethnic harmony in both economic and political spheres.

The JVP, which forms the core of the NPP, has historically struggled to build a strong base among ethnic minorities. The JVP’s revolutionary roots and prior engagement in Sinhalese-majoritarian politics during the 1971 and 1989 uprisings may have contributed to a lingering perception among minorities that the party is more focused on Sinhalese interests. Although the NPP campaigned on a platform of equality and inclusivity, it seems that these promises did not sufficiently convince the Tamil and Muslim communities, who have long demanded autonomy, recognition of their identity, and solutions to lingering post-war grievances. For the Tamil population in the Northern Province, for instance, issues such as war crimes accountability, land rights, and devolution of power remain unresolved, and the NPP’s messaging on these fronts may have lacked the specificity or reassurance they were seeking.

In the upcountry regions, where Tamil-speaking plantation workers of Indian origin face entrenched socio-economic hardships, the NPP’s broader economic reforms, while potentially beneficial, did not seem to connect with the unique struggles of these communities. Similarly, Sri Lanka’s Muslim population has faced increasing marginalization and targeted violence in recent years, and the NPP’s ability to address these concerns may be viewed with skepticism, given the JVP’s lack of a strong track record in minority issues.

The new NPP government now faces a critical challenge: how to build trust with ethnic minorities and integrate them into its broader vision of economic and political development. Achieving ethnic harmony in a deeply divided country will require more than rhetoric; it will necessitate concrete policy measures that address these communities’ historical injustices and grievances. The NPP will need to engage in meaningful dialogue with minority leaders, create mechanisms for greater political autonomy in the North and East, and ensure that economic development reaches all parts of the country, especially those that have historically been left behind. These efforts are essential not only for the success of the NPP government but also for the long-term stability and unity of Sri Lanka.

The NPP enjoyed overwhelming support from Sinhalese-majority districts in southern Sri Lanka, particularly from areas like Hambantota, Matara, and Galle. These regions are traditionally strongholds of the working and middle classes, including lower-middle-class workers, small-scale farmers, and rural laborers, including fisher folk. Many in these communities have faced longstanding economic hardships exacerbated by social disparities, stagnating wages, and a lack of equitable development. The NPP’s promise of economic reform, social justice, and redistributive policies appealed to these voters, who saw the NPP as a chance for significant change after decades of economic neglect by successive governments.

However, this support also presents a challenge for the NPP government. These regions have high expectations for concrete improvements in living standards, income growth, and social equity. The disparity between wealthier urban centers and rural southern districts has deepened over the years, and many rural voters feel marginalized by neoliberal policies that have primarily benefited Colombo and other urban hubs. Issues like insufficient access to quality education, healthcare, infrastructure development, and fair wages are critical concerns for these communities.

To redress these grievances, the NPP government must focus on policies that address rural economic development, ensure better income distribution, and enhance social welfare systems. Programmes to improve agricultural productivity, provide subsidies for small businesses, and increase state investment in public services, like healthcare and education, will be key to bridging the socioeconomic gap. Additionally, addressing structural inequalities and creating more inclusive economic growth models will be necessary to ensure that the benefits of development are shared across the country, particularly in these southern districts that supported the NPP so strongly. In short, the NPP’s support base in the south reflects deep dissatisfaction with the status quo, and delivering on their expectations will require focused, equitable development strategies to tackle the economic and social challenges that have hindered growth in these communities.

Finally, in addition to the policies they propose for the country’s development, the NPP should consider adopting practical policies proposed by their Opposition, particularly the SJB.

An essential suggestion from the SJB involves introducing a system of digital economy, including providing a digital wallet for each individual. This system would allow citizens to manage their daily transactions and major purchases in a streamlined, secure digital format. Implementing such a policy could have far-reaching benefits for the new NPP government. Firstly, a digital economy with an integrated wallet system could increase government revenue by formalizing many aspects of the informal economy. It would enable a more efficient tax collection system, helping to reduce the gap between government expenditure and income. Moving towards a direct income tax system where financial transactions are monitored and taxed appropriately, this policy could generate significant revenue quickly. This would provide the necessary funds to meet the current fiscal challenges as the state grapples with a high expenditure-income gap that demands urgent solutions.

Moreover, the digital wallet could ease day-to-day financial transactions for citizens, fostering greater economic inclusivity, particularly among marginalized or underbanked communities. Creating more transparency and encouraging savings through digital means lay the foundation for a more modernized financial infrastructure.

As the NPP forms its new government, many are eager to see whether it will adopt such forward-thinking policies. Another key concern is how the NPP, with only three members in Parliament, will approach governance. There is speculation that the NPP might quickly dissolve Parliament and call for general elections. In such a scenario, the party could potentially gain enough seats to form a majority government. However, navigating the parliamentary process and creating a robust governance structure will be critical to maintaining the public’s trust and ensuring that policies like the digital economy are implemented effectively. I personally congratulate Anura Kumara Dissanayake, the new President of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka.

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Features

Blueprint for Sri Lanka’s road to 7% growth by 2029 – II

Published

15 hours ago

2026/06/19

Thilina Walpola

Beyond Stabilisation:

“Development is not about where you are today, but where you can be tomorrow if you make the right investments today.” – Lee Kuan Yew

The first part of this article yesterday (18) asked what growth model Sri Lanka should pursue.

The second seeks to show how to achieve it; how much investment is needed; where it should go, and how progress should be measured. It should move decisively from economic philosophy to economic architecture or from Economic Diagnosis to Economic Engineering.

Introduction: The Missing Growth Blueprint

Sri Lanka’s economic debate has reached an important turning point.

For three years, policymakers, economists, international institutions, and business leaders have focused primarily on stabilization. Inflation has been controlled, foreign reserves have improved, debt restructuring has progressed, and government revenue has increased significantly.

These achievements were necessary. But they are not sufficient.

The question facing Sri Lanka today is no longer whether the economy can be stabilized. The more important question is whether the country can transform itself into a dynamic, investment-driven, export-oriented economy capable of achieving sustained growth of 7% by 2029.

This requires moving from economic diagnosis to economic engineering.

Engineering demands numbers, targets, institutions, timelines, and accountability.

The challenge is therefore straightforward:

What investment strategy can lift Sri Lanka from a 3-4% growth path to a 7% growth path by 2029?

How Much Investment Is Needed To Reach 7% Growth?

Economic growth does not occur by declaration. It requires investment.

Historically, countries that achieved sustained growth rates above 6% maintained investment levels of approximately 30-35% of GDP. Sri Lanka currently invests considerably less (i.e., 27%) than this benchmark.

Assuming Sri Lanka’s real economy (currently US$88 billion) reaches approximately US$100 billion by 2029, total annual investment requirements could exceed US$30 billion. Given current investment levels, the country may need an additional US$8-10 billion annually in productive investment by the end of the decade. This investment cannot come solely from government spending.

A realistic financing framework could include:

· Domestic private investment – 40%

· Foreign direct investment – 30%

· Public infrastructure investment – 20%

· Development finance and PPPs – 10%

The real policy challenge is not simply attracting more investment.

It is attracting the right investment.

Which Sectors Can Generate 7% Growth?

Sri Lanka cannot achieve 7% growth through tourism alone, nor through agriculture alone.

Growth must be diversified across several strategic sectors.

Export Manufacturing & import substitution such as Green Energy (2.0 percentage points)

Manufacturing should become the largest contributor to future growth.

Priority sectors include:

· Electronics assembly

· Medical devices

· Rubber-based products

· Engineering components

· Boat building

· Food processing

Integration into Asian production networks could dramatically expand manufacturing exports.

Information Technology And Knowledge Services (1.0 percentage point)

Sri Lanka already possesses strong human capital advantages.

The country can expand:

· Software development

· Artificial intelligence applications

· Business process outsourcing

· Financial technology services

· Professional consulting exports

· Tourism And Hospitality (1.0 percentage point)

The objective should be quality rather than quantity.

Higher-value tourism can generate greater foreign exchange earnings without excessive environmental pressure.

Logistics And Maritime Services (1.0 percentage point)

Sri Lanka’s geographical location remains one of its greatest assets.

Port development, shipping services, logistics hubs, and regional distribution centres could create a powerful growth engine.

Agriculture And Dairy Modernisation (0.5 percentage point)

Modern agriculture should focus on productivity rather than acreage expansion.

Dairy development alone could reduce imports while increasing rural incomes.

Innovation And Entrepreneurship (0.5 percentage point)

A stronger startup ecosystem (i.e, Entrepreneurs and innovators, Investors and venture capital funds, Banks and financial institutions, Universities and research centers , Government agencies and policies, Business incubators and accelerators, Legal, accounting, and consulting services) could become a significant source of future growth and employment.

Collectively, these sectors could generate the foundations for a 7% growth trajectory.

Why RCEP Could Add One To Two Percentage Points To Growth

One of the most under-discussed opportunities in Sri Lanka’s economic future is regional integration. The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) encompasses some of the world’s fastest-growing economies and production networks. The success stories of Vietnam, Malaysia, and Thailand demonstrate that participation in regional value chains often matters more than domestic market size.

RCEP membership or deep integration could generate benefits through:

Greater Market Access

Sri Lankan exporters would gain improved access to rapidly expanding Asian markets.

Increased Foreign Direct Investment

Investors frequently prefer locations connected to large trade agreements.

Technology Transfer

Regional production networks facilitate knowledge diffusion and technology acquisition.

Supply Chain Participation

Sri Lanka could specialise in selected components, services, and logistics activities rather than atte

mpting complete industrial self-sufficiency.

The strategic significance of RCEP extends far beyond trade.

It represents a gateway into the economic architecture of Asia.

The National Growth Dashboard 2026-2029

One weakness of Sri Lankan policymaking has been the absence of measurable national performance indicators.

A National Growth Dashboard should be publicly reported every quarter.

Growth Indicators

· GDP growth rate

· Per capita income growth

· Labour productivity growth

Investment Indicators

· Total investment as a percentage of GDP

· Foreign direct investment inflows

· Public infrastructure investment

Export Indicators

· Total exports

· High-value export share

· Export diversification index

Innovation Indicators

· Research expenditure

· Patents registered

· Startup creation

Human Capital Indicators

· Graduate employment rates

· Technical skills certification

· Labour force participation

Rural Development Indicators

· Agricultural productivity & Extensive cooperatives

· Dairy self-sufficiency ratio

· Rural household income

What gets measured gets managed. What is not measured is usually ignored.

Lessons from Singapore: Strategic Investment Targeting

Singapore never relied on chance.

It deliberately identified sectors capable of transforming the economy and directed institutions, incentives, infrastructure, and education towards those priorities.

The country’s Economic Development Board became one of the most successful investment agencies in the world.

The lesson for Sri Lanka is clear:

Investment promotion must become strategic rather than reactive.

The country should actively pursue investors in sectors aligned with national growth priorities.

Lessons from Vietnam, Ireland, South Korea, And New Zealand

Vietnam

Vietnam teaches the importance of export-oriented manufacturing and integration into regional value chains.

Ireland

Ireland demonstrates how education, foreign investment, and technology can transform a small economy into a global innovation hub.

South Korea

South Korea illustrates the power of long-term industrial policy, export discipline, and technological upgrading.

New Zealand

New Zealand provides lessons in agricultural productivity, governance quality, and value-added exports.

The common lesson from all four countries is simple:

Growth was planned, targeted, measured, and relentlessly pursued.

None relied on policy improvisation.

Why Sri Lanka Remains Trapped In Economic Diagnosis

Sri Lanka has no shortage of economic diagnoses.

For decades economists have identified:

· weak exports,

· low productivity,

· inadequate investment,

· poor innovation,

· Governance weaknesses.

The diagnosis has remained remarkably consistent.

Yet implementation has remained weak.

Three factors explain this.

First

Policy discontinuity across governments.

Second

A tendency to prioritise short-term political considerations over long-term economic strategy.

Third

The absence of a national consensus on the desired economic model.

Countries succeed when political parties compete over implementation.

Sri Lanka often debates fundamentals repeatedly without resolving them.

The Need For A National Economic Transformation Compact

Achieving 7% growth cannot be the responsibility of a single government.

It requires a national compact involving:

· Government

· Opposition

· Private sector

· Universities

· Trade unions

· Development partners

The objective should be a shared commitment to a growth strategy extending beyond electoral cycles.

Economic transformation requires consistency.

Investors place capital where policies are predictable and institutions are credible.

The greatest gift Sri Lanka can provide to investors is confidence in policy continuity.

Summary

Sri Lanka’s next challenge is not stabilisation but transformation.

To achieve sustained growth of 7% by 2029, the country may require an additional US$8-10 billion in productive investment annually.

Growth should be driven by six strategic sectors:

· Export manufacturing

· Information technology and knowledge services

· Tourism and hospitality

· Logistics and maritime services

· Agriculture and dairy modernisation

· Innovation and entrepreneurship

Regional integration through RCEP could add one to two percentage points to long-term growth by improving market access, attracting investment, and integrating Sri Lanka into Asian supply chains.

A National Growth Dashboard should monitor progress through measurable indicators and improve policy accountability. Most importantly, Sri Lanka must move beyond diagnosing economic problems and begin engineering practical solutions.

Conclusion

History will not judge Sri Lanka by how successfully it emerged from the crisis of 2022. History will judge whether the country used that crisis as a platform for transformation.

The choice facing Sri Lanka is stark.

One path leads to recurring cycles of stabilisation, modest growth, debt accumulation, and periodic crises. The other leads to investment-led growth, export expansion, technological upgrading, and deeper integration with Asia.

The difference between these two futures is not luck. It is strategy.

The time has come for Sri Lanka to stop asking why growth is insufficient and start designing the institutions, policies, and investments required to achieve it.

Economic diagnosis has served its purpose. The next chapter must be economic engineering. Only then can Sri Lanka transform recovery into prosperity and aspiration into achievement.

I believe this second article is potentially more important than the first because it introduces something largely missing from Sri Lanka’s policy discourse: a quantified growth framework linking investment → sectors → exports → RCEP integration → measurable outcomes. It shifts the debate from “what is wrong?” to “what exactly must be done, by whom, and by when?”—which is where genuine policy innovation begins.

*The writer, among many, served as the Special Advisor to the Office of the President of Namibia from 2006 to 2012 and was a Senior Consultant with the UNDP for 20 years. He was a Senior Economist with the Central Bank of Sri Lanka (1972-1993). He can be reached via asoka.seneviratne@gmail.com

by Prof. Asoka S. Seneviratne

Features

Maritime security cooperation with India – A strategic imperative for Sri Lanka’s sovereignty and progress

Published

15 hours ago

2026/06/19

Thilina Walpola

As a retired Senior Superintendent of Police with decades of experience in intelligence, counter-terrorism, and strategic security coordination, I have repeatedly seen how short-sighted decisions undermine long-term national resilience. The adage “penny wise, pound foolish” perfectly encapsulates Sri Lanka’s vulnerabilities exposed during the 2022 economic collapse. Austerity measures, delayed reforms, and isolationist tendencies conserved minor resources in the moment but inflicted catastrophic costs in stability, public trust, and security capacity. Today, as we consolidate recovery under the National People’s Power government, embracing deeper maritime security cooperation with India stands as a wise counter to such false economies, investing prudently now to safeguard our sovereignty, economy, and peace for generations.

The 2002 Norway-brokered Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) with the LTTE is now a closed chapter in our history. Formally abrogated by the government in 2008, it paved the way for the decisive military victory in 2009 that ended three decades of separatist terrorism. Its present status is one of hard-earned reflection: a reminder of the perils of fragile truces without genuine political will, but also of the enduring success of intelligence-led, whole-of-government strategies that delivered a unified Sri Lanka.

Post-2009, with no active internal armed conflict, our security focus has evolved to hybrid and transnational threats, drug trafficking, IUU fishing, arms smuggling, terrorist financing, and great-power manoeuvring in the Indian Ocean. The 2022 crisis, however, tested this peace. Fuel shortages, power blackouts, and protest strains diverted naval and police resources, highlighting how economic fragility directly erodes maritime domain awareness and operational readiness.

India’s role as the indispensable first responder during that crisis, extending nearly USD 4 billion in credit lines, currency swaps, and essential supplies, prevented total collapse and laid the groundwork for today’s elevated partnership. What began as economic solidarity has matured into structured defence cooperation.

The landmark April 2025 MoU on Defence Cooperation, signed during Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Colombo, represents a pivotal shift. This five-year framework, the first comprehensive bilateral defence pact in decades, building on the 1987 Indo-Sri Lanka Accord, institutionalizes training, equipment support, joint exercises, intelligence sharing, and maritime operations. It directly counters the “pound foolish” risks of under-investment that plagued our 2022 response.

Maritime security is the linchpin. Sri Lanka’s vast Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and position astride critical sea lanes make it a natural hub, and a potential chokepoint, for regional stability. Threats like narcotics smuggling through porous sea routes, illegal fishing by foreign vessels, and potential infiltration demand robust monitoring. India has stepped up decisively: operationalising the Maritime Rescue Coordination Centre (MRCC) for the Sri Lanka Navy in 2024, supporting Indian aircraft surveillance from Trincomalee, and facilitating regular hydrographic surveys and ship visits. Annual exercises like SLINEX-2025 have enhanced naval interoperability, with joint patrols and drills reinforcing rule-based maritime order. Participation in the Colombo Security Conclave (CSC), alongside Maldives, Mauritius, Bangladesh, Seychelles, and others, extends this into practical multilateralism focused on Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA), counter-terrorism, cyber security, and disaster response.

From an intelligence practitioner’s lens, honed at the State Intelligence Service Counter Terrorism Desk and during high-profile event security for CHOGM and World Cups this cooperation amplifies our HUMINT and technical capabilities without sacrificing autonomy. Shared information through platforms like the Information Fusion Centre-Indian Ocean Region (IFC-IOR) closes gaps that economic crises widen. It echoes our LTTE defeat: proactive, collaborative disruption of threats before they escalate. Post-Easter Sunday 2019 lessons on inter-agency coordination find new expression in these bilateral mechanisms, reducing vulnerabilities to hybrid warfare, disinformation, and economic espionage.

Critics may invoke sovereignty concerns or past sensitivities, but pragmatism demands we reject penny-wise isolation. The 2025 MoU includes termination clauses for flexibility, ensuring decisions remain Colombo-driven. Diversification is key: balancing ties with India alongside China (via BRI projects), Japan (drones and hydrography), the US, UK, and Gulf partners prevents over-dependence while maximizing gains. The CSC framework exemplifies inclusive, non-exclusionary regionalism, precisely the model needed to navigate Indo-Pacific dynamics.

Economically, maritime security underpins recovery. Secure sea lanes boost tourism, fisheries, and trade, sectors devastated in 2022. Joint capacity building (over 1,200 annual training slots for Sri Lankan forces) and blue economy initiatives create jobs and resilience, averting future “pound foolish” collapses. In a climate-vulnerable nation, cooperation on sustainable fisheries and disaster response further mitigates risks.

Sri Lanka must assertively embrace and lead multilateral Indo-Pacific cooperation as the indispensable driver of its long-term progress, security, and sovereignty. The hard lessons of the 2022 crisis leave no room for hesitation: penny-wise short-termism must give way to pound-wise strategic vision. We should fully operationalize the India defence MoU through sustained joint and intelligence fusion, while elevating the Colombo Security Conclave into a robust, action-oriented Indo-Pacific platform for maritime domain awareness, counter-trafficking, cyber resilience, and humanitarian response.

Sri Lanka is uniquely positioned to play a bridging leadership role, convening island nations, advancing inclusive initiatives under frameworks like the Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative, and fostering minilateral and multilateral ties that include India, the Quad partners, ASEAN, and other responsible actors, without compromising our traditional non-alignment.

Bipartisan political consensus on these pillars, insulated from electoral politics, is urgent and non-negotiable. Isolationism invites exploitation and repeats past failures; assertive multilateral leadership in the Indo-Pacific secures our sea lanes, rebuilds economic vitality, strengthens interfaith harmony, and honours the sacrifices that delivered victory over terrorism in 2009. By championing such cooperative architectures, Sri Lanka transforms its strategic geography from vulnerability into enduring strength. The moment demands bold action, our nation’s destiny, regional stability, and future generations require nothing less.

( 34 sources )

Mahil Dole, SSP (Retired), is fthe former Head of the Counter-Terrorism Division of the State Intelligence Service of Sri Lanka, and has served as Head of the Sri Lankan Delegation at three BIMSTEC Security Conferences. With over 40 years of experience in policing and intelligence, he writes on regional security, interfaith relations, and geopolitical strategy.

This opinion draws on public records and professional experience. The views expressed are personal.

By Mahil Dole
Superintendent of Police (Retd.) and Former Member,
Sri Lanka Wakfs Board (Served Additional Terms)
Colombo, June 2026

Features

Dudley: Remembering gentleman Prime Minister on his 113th birth anniversary

Published

15 hours ago

2026/06/19

Thilina Walpola

Dudley with M. D. Banda

When Dudley Senanayake died in 1973, nearly 1.8 million people lined the streets of Colombo to say goodbye to their much-loved leader. In a country of 12 million, that was one in every seven persons. It wasn’t a state-mobilised crowd or a political rally. They were mostly farmers from the Dry Zone who worked on the lands he had irrigated, teachers who benefitted from his school expansion scheme, civil servants, traders, students—ordinary people who walked for hours just to stand in silence as his cortege passed.

They came because they had never seen him act like a ruler. He lived like one of them: refusing special queues, apologising for accidental bumps, paying for things himself, treating political opponents with respect. For many, it was the first time they had grieved a leader they had never met personally, but whose decency they trusted. His funeral became less about death and more about a public reaffirmation that integrity in politics was possible, and that the people had noticed it.

The reluctant heir

Dudley was born under an auspicious sign. His father, D. S. Senanayake was at a temple ceremony in Bothale, Mirigama, when the news came. The temple astrologer predicted a great future for the child. History proved him right, though not in the way most expected. Dudley’s greatness lay not in how much power he wielded, but in how little he clung to it.

Dudley left S. Thomas’ College, Mount. Lavinia, as its best all-round student—equally at home in classrooms, on the cricket field, the football pitch, on the rugby grounds and the athletic track. At Cambridge, he won a Blue in cricket and earned degrees in Natural Sciences and Law. He returned to practise law, and entered politics only because his father persuaded him to do so. Public life was not his ambition; it became his duty.

As Prime Minister four times, twice in the 1950s and twice in the 1960s; his signature is on the irrigation schemes and agricultural programmes that fed the Dry Zone. But those who met him remember something more: his humanity.

The man without pretension

The following information was shared by Dr. Karunasena Kodithuwakku and the late Rukman Senanayake during informal conversations.

When the Queen of England, Queen Elizabeth II and the British Parliament decided to confer a Knighthood (the title ‘sir’) on Hon Dudley Senanayake in the 1950’s and informed him accordingly, Dudley declined the Honour graciously, declaring “I prefer to be known as plain Dudley Senanayake like now, rather than as ‘Sir Dudley Senanayake.”

Dudley with JRJ

In Kandy during his third term, Dudley accidentally bumped into a senior government valuer in the corridor of Queen’s Hotel. Before the man could speak, Dudley apologised. Later that day at the YMBA foundation stone laying ceremony, officials joked that they expected a larger donation from him. He opened his cheque book, looked at it, and said, “Give me the cheque I gave. Rs. 250? That’s my brother’s signature. I don’t have even that much.”

He had his hair cut at a salon in Colpetty. When the head barber tried to move him ahead of the queue, Dudley said, “No, no, I will wait for my turn.”

A senior politician from Kegalle visited him urgently in 1965. The secretary told him to be at Woodlands before 7 a.m. When Dudley saw him, he invited him to breakfast. The man was overwhelmed. “I can’t believe how I am welcomed here,” he said. “At my former leader’s house, I’m not even allowed to sit on a low bench.”

Dudley was however careful to protect the dignity of the country that he represented. As Prime Minister, he received an invitation to the Royal Coronation of Queen Elizabeth II in 1953. After accepting the invitation with due honour, Dudley went to England and was staying in a hotel when a high official of the British government paid him an unexpected visit. This was to appraise him of a change in plans.

“Hon. Prime Minister, I’m sorry to inform you that a difficulty has arisen regarding providing you with a separate horse carriage as informed earlier. Would you please share a carriage with Hon. (so and so) of Africa and grace the occasion?” Dudley was very annoyed, and told the official “Please inform your government that I expect a separate horse carriage to be provided for me too, just like for all the other Leaders as promised. Otherwise, I would consider it an insult to my country and will return to my country immediately without attending the Royal event.” It is reported that the British government promptly complied with Dudley’s request.

Simplicity that disarmed everyone

Even as Prime Minister, Dudley refused the trappings of office. One day in 1965-70 he told his security not to follow him and drove his Triumph Coupe alone to Mirissa. He spent the day photographing the beach and drove back safely. The police kept watch from a distance. Another morning he set off for Nuwara Eliya for a round of golf, again asking his security officers to stay back. A few hours later they found him at Ramboda Pass, sitting on a culvert smoking his pipe, the radiator of his car boiling over. He was relieved to see them and asked them to take him for his game—in their vehicle.

Traffic police once chased a speeding car only to find the PM at the wheel, pipe in hand. On Galle Road, he spotted an old friend at a bus stop, stopped the official car, and said, “Hey, what are you doing here? Jump in!” He took the man to Woodlands for tea and snacks, then drove him to Fort Railway Station himself. The friend was a Tamil gentleman who had captained Royal when Dudley captained S. Thomas’. Titles meant nothing to him.

Dudley

His humour was self-deprecating. At an All Ceylon Agricultural Officers Association AGM, the president pleaded with him and Minister M.D. Banda to “breed and recruit” more officers for the five-year plan. Dudley replied, “You all know I am not capable of breeding humans. You’ll have to ask the Honourable Minister—he’s already produced seven children!” The hall erupted in laughter.

A leader remembered

The day after the 1970 election defeat, party members went to see him in their numbers. Our family too was amongst them. He came up to our mother and said softly, “I’m very sorry, Mrs. Banda.” Even in defeat, his first thought was for others, especially for people like M.D. Banda, who had never lost an election before.

Dudley drew crowds not with slogans, but with sincerity. He never asked people to lower themselves to meet him. He met them where they were. In an age of political theatre, he was simply, stubbornly, decent.

During the period 1965-1970, when Dudley was Prime Minister, the Opposition led by Madam Sirima Bandaranayake, made allegations against Robert Senanayake (Dudley’s brother) regarding certain Foreign Exchange issues in Parliament. Dudley got up and urged the Speaker to

a. Appoint a Parliamentary select committee to investigate the allegations against his brother.

b. Appoint a Member of Parliament from the Opposition as its Chairman

c. Appoint the majority of the Select Committee members also from the Opposition.

According to the findings of the Select Committee and as reported to Parliament later, Robert Senanayake was completely exonerated. The entire leadership of the Opposition apologised profusely to Dudley.

An important point about this episode is a statement made by Dudley himself in Parliament prior to appointing the Select Committee. He declared that if his brother was found guilty of having indulged in any malpractice by word or deed, he (Dudley) would forthwith resign as PM.

That is why Sri Lanka remembers him not as a politician, but as “the gentleman Prime Minister.”

On 19 June, the day of his birthday, it is heartening to remember that such leadership once walked amongst us.

(The writer is the late Minister M.D. Banda’s eldest son.)

By Gamini Leeniyagolla