Connect with us

Features

2019 Easter Sunday Carnage: An Intelligence Perspective

Published

on

By Merril Gunaratne

Retired Senior DIG

The predicament of those in the highest echelons of defence and police bring to my mind past serious failures, not entirely dissimilar to the massacre on “Easter Sunday” in 2019. Somewhere in the mid 1980s, an LTTE group, led by their Mannar leader Victor Fulgencius ,entered the Anuradhapura sacred city and brutally mowed down a large number of Buddhist pilgrims in broad daylight. The Coordinating Officer of Anuradhapura, SSP of the area and those below them, must have been “deaf and blind”, for they could not have been oblivious to the bursts of gunfire, and the plea of countless witnesses who naturally would have looked upto them for intervention. No positive efforts were made even to stall the retreat of the terrorists after the carnage to Mannar. Nor were inquiries instituted to hold senior army and police officers accountable for their shocking inertia. Likewise in broad daylight, a terror group, the TELO, stormed Chavakachcheri police station and razed it to the ground, killing all police officers in the station. The Coordinating Officer of Palaly, when questioned by the President at the National Security Council meeting following the disaster, stated that in such situations, “each service should look after itself”. The question raised was whether the Army should have engaged in an immediate and timely intervention. Here too no inquiry was initiated to identify accountability for the shocking failures. The “PLOTE” group of Uma Maheswaran came untrammelled up to the Nikaweratiya police station, in the Kurunegala district, attacked it and caused mayhem. No inquiries were held: none were held accountable. In the 1990s, the Katunayake Air Force base was attacked by the LTTE and the JVP, separately, causing death and destruction. None were called upon to shoulder the blame. Again, in the early 90’s, the LTTE ruthlessly killed over 600 police officers in the Ampara sector, because the IGP at the time ordered the fighting officers to surrender on an assurance from political leaders that the LTTE would release them. No Commissions nor inquiries were held in this regard.

There is however an essential difference between these instances and the 2019 Easter Sunday carnage. Ample intelligence from India, backed by a plethora of evidence and reports of dangers from the National Thowheed Jamath [NTJ] stored with the State Intelligence Services [SIS], the CID, and the Terrorist investigation Division [TID], had been in the possession of SIS, well before the disaster took place. Therefore the credibility of intelligence received from India was not in doubt, as also time and space available to adopt schemes to plan arrests and flood the country with optimum security. In such a context, the failure of defence and police officers to evolve plans to nip terror in the bud, differ sharply with previous instances. In previous cases, the security forces were taken by surprise. In the case of the “Easter Sunday” carnage, intelligence was available well in advance, so that ample opportunity was available to forestall terror plans.

THE STATUS OF THE STATE INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (SIS) IN DEFENCE

An aspect that came under scrutiny was whether the Director of the SIS had informed the President about the information received from the Indian counterparts. It may not be inappropriate to deal with two matters which find relevance in seeking to understand what ideally should have been done.

First, the SIS is the premier “Intelligence” service in the country, since it is expected to collect and collate intelligence of the police special branch, the CID and the TID, in addition to their own efforts. It is also responsible to monitor political targets, in addition to those connected with subversion, terrorism and espionage. It also enjoys wiretapping apparatus to enhance its capability.

Second, the Director of the SIS is virtually “primus inter pares” amongst members of the national security council [NSC], when it comes to access to the head of state, and in relation to his vital role of leading deliberations at meetings of the NSC with suitable briefs. Each and every director of the national intelligence service in its long history, will vouch for the veracity of this arrangement. From as far back as 1950’s, even superintendents of police in- charge of national intelligence had far more access to the head of state than the IGP; and the IGP did not often know what the Intelligence head had discussed with the President. The authority of the Director of the SIS therefore at times exceeded that of not only the IGP, but many others in the NSC as well. At the time I was Director of the National Intelligence Bureau, President Jayewardene would see only me before 8.00 am, prior to leaving for Cabinet meetings.

Though in pecking order, the Chief of National Intelligence (CNI) is superior to the Director of the SIS, in actual fact, the latter wields far more authority since all agents and informers are controlled by the SIS. In addition, CNI only plays a supervisory role, while the Director of the SIS is the actual operational head of the intelligence agency.

SUBMISSION OF “SPECIAL”OR “SERIAL” REPORTS BY DIRECTOR SIS TO THE PRESIDENT

Being in a position of such privilege, whenever credible intelligence is received, the Director of the SIS has to take two immediate steps. First, he should immediately, through the shortest possible route, despatch a written, classified report to the President, with copies to the Secretary of Defence and Chief of National Intelligence [CNI]. Traditionally, a special ‘Box’ has been used for such despatch to the President, keys available at both ends to unlock and retrieve reports. The ‘Box’ would impress the president that the document inside was of an urgent nature. Depending on the gravity, nature and the urgency of such intelligence, as with the NTJ of Zahran, the Director may even decide to despatch copies to Secretary to President, IGP and Service Commanders as well. He has to concurrently speak on the telephone to each of the recipients of his report, emphasise the credibility and the grave nature of such intelligence, and also propose that the NSC be convened for discussion without delay. Such a standard arrangement of despatch of reports and telephone calls wherever the intelligence is of a grave and urgent nature, is a precedent in vogue from as far back as 1950s. The role of the SIS is to help the NSC to proact, rather than react. The prototypes of the SIS in the service and the police will play a supportive, rather than a leading role. The Director of SIS therefore can galvanise the National Security Council to act, or “put it to sleep”. There has been no indication from the Easter Sunday Commission findings reported in the media that the Director of SIS had despatched a written, classified report to the President.

 

FLAWED “INFORMATION” REPORT SENT TO IGP.

The ‘Information report” which the IGP received from the CNI, enclosed a note from the Director of SIS. It referred to the plans of Zahran and the NTJ to commit terror attacks, and suggested that further inquiries should be carried out. This report is “flawed” because it is not an Intelligence report. If the Intelligence received was credible (in this instance it obviously was), the report should have been in two parts. In the first part, the piece of information should have been reflected. The second part titled “Assessment or Analysis” is the far more important one, where the Director , harnessing his knowledge of the reliability of the source of information, along with his acquaintance of the background and history of the NTJ available in the subject and personal files stored in the SIS registry, should have stated with conviction that the information was not only reliable, but should be discussed as early as possible, and plans evolved to nip the threat in the bud without delay. A question that arises is whether the report of the Director sans an assessment was adequate to galvanise his superiors to ponder about the gravity of the piece of intelligence received. Even though flawed, the recipients yet had material in the report to discuss and plan on an urgent basis. Of course, a proper intelligence report may possibly have woken them up from slumber. In short, the report or note of the director of the SIS was not exactly an Intelligence report in the classic context. Adrian Weale in his book, “The Army of Evil” said, “Broadly speaking, intelligence is information that is gathered and analysed before informing decisions. Without the crucial analysis step …it is of no-value”

 

DEFENCE AND POLICE OFFICIALS TREATING THE INFORMATION WITH LEVITY

It had been unfortunate that senior officials such as the Defence Secretary, Chief of National Intelligence, Director of the SIS, the IGP and his deputies had acted in an amateurish fashion. They were not minions who should have been inactive, amidst such serious information, simply because the President was out of the country. If Defence Secretary , goaded and galvanised by Director of National Intelligence, summoned members of the NSC for discussion, many salutary proposals leading to an effective security plan may have emerged. The Defence Secretary was empowered on his own to summon members of the N.S.C. for discussion at any time. His “inertia” baffles imagination. In an overall context, none of those who received the somewhat “flawed” information in their enclaves considered it prudent to at least ‘put their heads together’ and discuss what should have been done.

 

ACCESS TO SENSITIVE RECORDS IN THE REGISTRY OF THE SIS.

The SIS, by virtue of being the national intelligence agency, is responsible, apart from ferreting intelligence through it’s own network of agents and informers, to collect and collate all overt and covert information from the CID, the Terrorist Investigation Division (TID), and even from intelligence channels in the armed forces. The comprehensive records that they thereby accumulate, are stored in “subject” and “personal” files in respect of each subversive or terrorist target they monitor. These records are suitably classified ‘secret’ or ‘confidential’ so that only those authorised to see them can have access to such records.

The Director of the SIS, apart from the submission of ‘single piece’ intelligence reports to the Head of State, the Defence Secretary and possibly some other members of the National Security Council, also had to periodically compile periodic reports, based on the comprehensive records stored in respect of a particular target in the registry. Each such report will make a mature analysis of the activities and growth of the target, alert the government to their ramifications and sinister designs, and offer salutary proposals to nip or stall their activities. Such periodic reports are described as ‘special’ or ‘basic’ reports, and are invariably classified secret. This discipline too has been in vogue for a very long time. Such reports help the government to monitor, review and proact against terror threats periodically.

In view of the fact that omissions and lapses of the SIS leading to the massacre of innocents were under scrutiny by the presidential Commission the records in the Registry of the SIS could have been made available to the Commission to assist the probe. Terror groups like the National Thowheed Jamat (NTJ) are extremely clandestine when they plant their underground network in the silent, ‘preparatory’ phase. This is a phase where terrorists are extremely elusive because of their obsession with stealth and secrecy. The activities of this preparatory phase can be discerned only through agents and informers, so that the SIS alone will have records which police, the CID and TID would not possess. The latter are predominantly investigators’ of acts after their occurrence. It is the SIS which should have good intelligence about external and internal links of the NTJ, their financiers, safe houses, military or weapons training etc. This is the kind of intelligence which helps the SIS to submit comprehensive, periodic “special” reports to the government.

Perhaps, the Commission could have been authorised access to the periodic reports and files of the SIS in respect of the NTJ. Such classified material would have been valuable in the quest for the roots and ramifications of the NTJ. Most of the witnesses who appeared before the Commission for evidence may not have possessed the type knowledge of the NTJ and its ramifications which only SIS officers would have possessed.

The SIS usually seeks to protect the identity of their officers as well as their records, for risk of exposure. Such safeguards may be necessary in normal circumstances. However, the carnage and massacre on Easter Sunday in 2019 due mainly to inadequacies of those in Defence and Police echelons, had led to a high level probe by a Presidential Commission, and evoked considerable public concern and interest. The entire tragedy has been in the public domain. It may therefore have been unreasonable if the records of the SIS had been withheld from the probe.



Continue Reading
Click to comment

Leave a Reply

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *

Features

Now is the time to rethink trade

Published

on

ranil - sajith - anura

by Gomi Senadhira

During the presidential election campaign, the importance of trade, particularly exports, to Sri Lanka’s was emphasised by President Anura Kumara Dissanayake (AKD) and the other two main contenders in the fray, namely Sajith Premadasa (SP) and Ranil Wickremesinghe (RW) in their manifestos. These three candidates together polled more than 90 percent of the votes at the presidential elections. During the parliamentary elections the political parties which based their campaign on these manifestos – Jathika Jana Balawegaya (NPP), Samagi Jana Balawegaya (SJB) and New Democratic Front (NDF) together polled more than 83%. Therefore, the electoral support for these pro-trade policies is undisputed. For the Sri Lankan export community this should be a superb development, as for many years, the trade policy had been, one of the more contentious areas of island’s politics. Our main trading partners and the foreign investors would also welcome this policy convergence.

Pro- trade policies in the policy statements of RW and SJ were not unexpected. But the pro-trade approach in the AKD’s manifesto surprised many, mainly because all other parties had repeatedly warned the people against voting for AKD as he would turn Sri Lanka into another North Korea or Cuba.

For example, during the election campaign, at a conference organised by the National Bankers Association, RW stated, “On September 4th, MP Anura Kumara Dissanayake emphasised the importance of focusing on exports for our country’s businessmen and industrialists. While this principle is commendable, there is a concern. Their policy statement suggests that Sri Lanka plans to cancel its free trade agreements.

This raises a significant question: how can we develop an export industry without these agreements? Such contradictions pose challenges.” Since then, he had repeated these comments at several other meetings.  In the same way, SP’s trade policy wonks also had spread similar misinformation on NPP policies.  However, the NPP policy statement clearly states its position on Free Trade Agreements, that is “… updating of existing free trade agreements and negotiating new free trade agreements.” The updating of the trade agreements certainly does mean cancelling of these agreements. All FTAs need to be reviewed and updated periodically.

During the election seasons, politicians sometimes manipulate public opinion about the crucial issues by arousing fear. But this is not the time to deliberately mislead the public in general and, more particularly, the business community and our trading partners with false information on trade policy. At this juncture, what we need are facts. Not scare tactics and false information. So, let’s hope our politicians would avoid such scare tactics in the future and join together to strengthen this consensus on export-oriented, outward-looking trade policy.

To those who are familiar with the way the NPP policies evolved in the recent past, their shift towards pro-trade policies is not a surprise. After all, if the NPP and AKD want a socialist model to emulate, they have many examples of socialist governments, other than North Korea and Cuba, to draw lessons from. For example, the success story of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. While cautiously staying away from the labels AKD’s policy statement refers to Vietnam, Bangladesh, and South Korea (and not North Korea) as export success stories, Sri Lanka can acquire lessons from. More importantly, Vietnam’s success story was also highlighted at the top of RW’s policy statement and by the trade experts in the SJB as a success story to follow. What is needed now is to strengthen this consensus further and develop a pro-export national trade strategy approved by the parliament. That would help to attract much-needed foreign investments and export orders.

If we already have a general consensus on pro-trade and pro-export policies, then why do we need to rethink trade policies now?

From export-oriented economy to import dependent economy

Sri Lanka was the first country in South Asia to liberalise trade policies with the ‘open’ economy introduced in the late 1970s. However, the open economy introduced then was not fully open. It had a strong focus on the expansion of the export of goods while discouraging imports, particularly nonessential imports. A special cess was imposed on the nonessential imports to protect local farmers and manufacturers and to collect funds for export development.

The main thrust of the trade policy was exports. During that period, the government proactively managed to get an adequate level of market access to Sri Lankan exports through multilateral trade rules (GATT/WTO rules) as well as the distortions to those rules (textile quotas). These policies worked well, and during the 1980s and 90s, Sri Lanka’s exports registered almost a fivefold increase, from US$1.35 billion in 1981 to US$6.37 billion by the year 2000. The exports-to-GDP ratio increased from 30.46% in 1981 to 39.02% in 2000. During the period, Sri Lanka was slowly but surely progressing into an export-oriented economy.

Unfortunately, during the next two decades, the export growth slowed down and only increased from US$6.37 billion (in 2000) to US$13.03 billion (in 2020). The exports-to-GDP ratio also declined substantially during this period. At 15.46% in 2020, it was the lowest ever recorded. More alarmingly, the growth of exports during the last decade was almost stagnant, and it increased only from US$ 10 billion in 2013 to US$ 12 billion in 2023. During the same period, Vietnam’s exports increased from US$132 billion in 2013 to US$370 billion in 2023.

Hijacking of trade policy by importers and profiteers

The main reason for this decline was the absence of interest in export development by the successive governments and the influence of the importers, the profiteers and perhaps even hawaladars on trade policy formulations. If one analyses the trade policy formulation in the recent years, it is easy to understand how trade policies and even free trade agreements were directed towards import promotion at the expense of export development. After signing Sri Lanka’s first bilateral FTA with India in December 1998 and second with Pakistan in August 2002, and the enhanced GSP arrangement in the EU, no new tangible initiatives were taken by the government to develop market access for Sri Lankan exports.

During the last decade the situation deteriorated further and even the free trade agreements, which countries normally negotiate at the request and on behalf of their exporters to get better levels of market access for them in other countries, were negotiated at the request of the exporters of other countries to provide them with enhanced market access into Sri Lanka without reciprocal concessions for Sri Lankan exporters. The free trade agreements Sri Lanka signed with Singapore and Thailand are clear examples of this approach.

These agreements were negotiated under RW’s leadership, first as the prime minister and then as the president. Despite his rhetoric about the critical need to swiftly transform Sri Lanka into an export-oriented economy, as stabilising the economy alone would not solve Sri Lanka’s problems due to the country’s heavy dependence on imports, it was under RW’s leadership that the trade policy got blatantly hijacked by the importers mafia and profiteers.

Another adverse development during the last two decades was the relaxation of foreign exchange regulations. Due to this Sri Lanka also does not fully benefit even from the limited amount of exports, as a substantial portion of the export proceeds are not repatriated. In July 2022 the Central Bank revealed that less than 20% of export proceeds are being repatriated by the exporters. Though this may have improved since then, the conversion rate remains below accepted levels. In addition to that, a significant amount of money is transferred out through trade misinvoicing by the exporters and importers.

As the elections are over now it is the time for a new beginning. It is the time to intensify analysis and advocacy regarding the numerous ways that trade agreements and po8licies must be reformed and strengthen the consensus on trade policies and adjust them to undo decades of capture by the importers’ mafia, profiteers, and hawaladars.

(The writer, a retired public servant and diplomat, can be reached at senadhiragomi@gmail.com)

Continue Reading

Features

Navigating Sri Lanka’s economic recovery: Opportunities and risks in the aftermath of Cyclone Fengal

Published

on

by Prof. Chanaka Jayawardhena,
Professor of Marketing, University of Surrey, UK.
Chanaka.j@gmail.com

Sri Lanka finds itself at a crossroads. The devastation caused by Cyclone Fengal, which displaced over half a million people, destroyed critical infrastructure, and claimed numerous lives, highlights the country’s vulnerability to natural disasters. At the same time, the nation is tentatively emerging from its first-ever sovereign debt default, buoyed by a $12.5 billion bond swap and an IMF bailout. Together, these events pose an urgent question: Can Sri Lanka navigate the treacherous path of recovery without derailing its fragile economic stability?

The answer lies in the delicate balance the government must strike. Cyclone Fengal is more than just a natural disaster—it is a stress test for the economic goodwill painstakingly built up over the past year. How Sri Lanka’s policymakers respond could define the trajectory of its recovery for years to come. This is not just about reconstruction; it is about rethinking priorities, leveraging the current crisis as an opportunity to build resilience, and ensuring the hard-won economic gains are not squandered in the process.

Cyclone Fengal: A Catalyst for Change or a Step Backward?

The immediate economic impact of Cyclone Fengal is staggering. Agriculture, one of the backbones of Sri Lanka’s economy, has suffered significant losses, with thousands of acres of paddy fields and tea plantations—critical export sectors—being submerged. Damaged transport networks have disrupted supply chains, delaying the movement of goods and escalating costs for businesses and consumers alike. The government now faces the twin challenges of financing disaster relief and rebuilding vital infrastructure, all within the constraints of a tight fiscal envelope.

The human cost is equally dire. Families have lost homes, livelihoods, and loved ones. The socio-economic fallout of such displacement is long-lasting, with vulnerable communities pushed further into poverty. Moreover, the environmental damage, including soil erosion and the destruction of ecosystems, adds another layer of complexity to recovery efforts.

Yet, there is an opportunity amidst this tragedy. Disasters often serve as catalysts for long-overdue reforms. Cyclone Fengal could prompt Sri Lanka to implement policies aimed at climate resilience, investing in infrastructure that can withstand future storms and floods. Such investments would not only protect lives and livelihoods but also reduce the economic disruptions caused by such events. However, realising this opportunity requires vision, coordination, and a clear commitment to long-term planning—qualities that have not always been hallmarks of Sri Lankan governance.

The risks, however, are equally pronounced. With limited fiscal space and the need to adhere to IMF conditionalities, there is a real danger that recovery efforts might siphon funds away from critical economic reforms. If mismanaged, this could erode investor confidence, putting at risk the progress made in stabilising the economy. The government must guard against the temptation to prioritise short-term relief over the long-term restructuring that is vital for sustainable growth.

Debt Restructuring: The Elephant in the Room

Sri Lanka’s recent $12.5 billion bond swap was a bold move to address its debt crisis, but the relief it offers is conditional. Investors and international institutions are closely watching how the government navigates its commitments to fiscal discipline and structural reform. Cyclone Fengal has now added an unexpected layer of complexity to this equation.

The IMF bailout, which released $333 million in its latest tranche, demands not only fiscal prudence but also tangible progress in revenue generation and state enterprise restructuring. These measures, while necessary, are politically sensitive and require a stable economic environment to succeed. The cyclone’s aftermath threatens to upset this balance, with rising expenditure on disaster relief potentially crowding out these reforms.

Moreover, the bond swap itself is not without controversy. While it offers breathing room, it also raises questions about the sustainability of Sri Lanka’s debt strategy. With global interest rates on the rise, the cost of future borrowing could escalate, particularly if the government fails to demonstrate fiscal discipline. In this context, the pressure to deliver results has never been greater. Successfully managing this dual challenge of recovery and reform will be the ultimate test of Sri Lanka’s political and economic leadership.

Lessons from other economies

Sri Lanka is not the first country to face the dual challenge of disaster recovery and economic reform. Indonesia’s response to the 2004 tsunami offers valuable lessons. By channelling international aid into long-term development projects and maintaining fiscal discipline, Indonesia turned a crisis into an opportunity for economic transformation. Key to its success was the establishment of a dedicated reconstruction agency that ensured transparency and accountability in the use of funds.

Bangladesh, another country prone to natural disasters, has demonstrated how investing in disaster preparedness—through early warning systems, robust infrastructure, and community education—can mitigate economic losses. These measures have not only saved lives but also reduced the financial impact of natural disasters, enabling the economy to recover more quickly.

Sri Lanka would do well to follow these examples. The establishment of a specialised disaster management authority with a clear mandate and adequate funding could go a long way in ensuring a coordinated and effective response. Such an agency could also play a critical role in securing international aid, which is often contingent on transparent governance and accountability. Ensuring such mechanisms are in place will be crucial to sustaining international goodwill and ensuring long-term economic stability.

Investing in Resilience

The case for strategic investment in resilience is clear. Renewable energy projects, for instance, could reduce the country’s reliance on costly fuel imports while aligning with global sustainability trends. Sri Lanka’s abundant natural resources—sunlight, wind, and hydro potential—position it well to transition to a greener energy mix. Such investments would not only lower energy costs but also make the economy less vulnerable to global fuel price shocks.

Rebuilding transport and communication networks with a focus on durability would also yield significant benefits. Modern, resilient infrastructure is essential for economic growth, facilitating trade, tourism, and investment. Furthermore, the construction phase itself could create jobs, providing a much-needed stimulus to the domestic economy.

Public health must also be a priority. The cyclone has triggered a surge in dengue cases, exposing gaps in the healthcare system’s ability to respond to emergencies. Strengthening healthcare infrastructure and preventive measures could yield significant economic and social dividends. Healthier populations are more productive, and the costs of prevention are far lower than those of treatment and lost productivity.

Building on Goodwill

Sri Lanka enters this challenging phase with a degree of goodwill that is rare for a country emerging from economic collapse. The Central Bank’s policy rate reforms and the government’s efforts to stabilise public finances have been cautiously welcomed by investors. Moody’s recent decision to place Sri Lanka’s credit rating under review for a potential upgrade reflects this optimism.

However, goodwill is a finite resource. The government must tread carefully, avoiding populist measures that could derail its reform agenda. Transparency in disaster relief spending and clear communication about the trade-offs involved in balancing recovery with reform are essential. Failure to do so could erode the trust of both domestic and international stakeholders.

The risk of political complacency is real. The government’s recent electoral mandate, while overwhelming, should not be taken as a licence to abandon fiscal prudence. Populist policies, such as unsustainable subsidies or tax cuts, could undo the progress made and jeopardise long-term stability.

A Path Forward

Cyclone Fengal has exposed the vulnerabilities in Sri Lanka’s economic and social fabric, but it has also provided an opportunity to address them. The government’s response must be both immediate and strategic, balancing the urgency of disaster relief with the long-term necessity of economic reform.

First, the government must prioritise investments that yield both short-term relief and long-term benefits. For example, rebuilding flood-damaged roads and bridges with climate-resilient materials can create jobs today while reducing costs in the future. Second, it must strengthen institutions to ensure that recovery funds are used effectively and transparently. Third, it must actively engage with international partners, not only for financial support but also for technical expertise in disaster management and economic planning.

Sri Lanka’s recovery is not just a matter of economics; it is a test of governance, competence, and foresight. By investing in resilience, maintaining fiscal discipline, and leveraging international goodwill, the country can navigate this crisis and emerge stronger. The stakes are high, but so are the potential rewards. This is a moment for bold but measured action—a chance to turn adversity into a turning point for sustainable growth.

The eyes of the world are on Sri Lanka. Let this be the moment when it rises to the challenge.

Continue Reading

Features

Protecting blue carbon ecosystems, a key to climate resilience

Published

on

By Ifham Nizam

Blue carbon ecosystems, such as mangroves and sea grasses, are emerging as critical players in global climate mitigation strategies. However, these ecosystems face mounting challenges due to coastal development, climate change, and mismanagement.

Speaking to The Island, renowned expert Dr. Mat Vanderklift, Director of the Indian Ocean Blue Carbon Hub, who is on a short visit to Sri Lanka stressed the urgency of integrating high-integrity principles and sustainable practices to safeguard these vital habitats.

Excerpts of the interview

Q: Dr. Can you elaborate on the unique challenges that blue carbon ecosystems, such as mangroves and sea grasses, face compared to terrestrial carbon sinks like forests? 

A:Mangroves and sea grasses are located on the coastal margins, which places them in areas where many activities occur and competition for space is high. Most people live near coasts, so there are pressures from development as well as infrastructure such as ports. They are also spaces where activities like aquaculture and fishing can lead to degradation if they are not done in a sustainable way.

 Q: How do you assess the long-term effectiveness of blue carbon ecosystems in carbon sequestration, especially in the face of climate change impacts like rising sea levels and extreme weather? 

A: Mangroves and ecosystems can cope with sea level rise well enough as long as there is space for them to retreat to – although seawalls, roads and other infrastructure can block them. In some places that can simply rise vertically by accumulating sediment. Extreme weather events like heatwaves are a growing problem, and can cause death of vegetation over large areas.

 Given the complexities of carbon credit markets, what do you believe are the most promising strategies to ensure that blue carbon credits maintain high environmental integrity? We need to follow principles to ensure that our desire to generate credits does not create further damage or infringe on people’s rights. Principles like doing no harm, respecting rights, empowering people, acting and sharing benefits equitably, and using the best available knowledge. We can follow a ‘mitigation hierarchy’ in which we ensure that we protect first, and restore when we need to.

Q: What role do you see for governments in regulating the emerging market for blue carbon credits to ensure its effectiveness in climate mitigation efforts?” 

A: Each government will take a different approach, but some regulation can be helpful. Regulations can help ensure that high integrity principles are followed. Regulations can also help ensure that the right kind of knowledge is generated for a national context. Most nations, including Sri Lanka, have international commitments, and regulation can help make sure that those commitments are realised.

 Q: What are some innovative financial models or partnerships that have shown success in attracting private sector investment for the restoration of blue carbon ecosystems? 

A: Sometimes we don’t need innovation because the mechanisms already exist, we just need to make them work properly. Carbon and biodiversity markets are an example – they have promise, but are not as successful as they could be because there are barriers to effective implementation.

 Q: How can smaller nations or communities with rich blue carbon ecosystems access funding or investment to protect and restore these vital habitats?

A: In some situations, there might be potential to engage with the private sector, and building public-private partnerships can help. These are mostly used for infrastructure projects, but could be harnessed towards climate mitigation and nature protection. In other contexts, some international investment might be needed – the recent climate meeting in Baku finalised some of the international rules under which this can occur.

 Q: You mentioned the importance of blue carbon ecosystems for supporting livelihoods, particularly in fisheries and tourism. How can we ensure that the restoration of these ecosystems also benefits local communities economically?

A: This is fundamental, and part of building markets with integrity. Local peoples need to be involved all the way through projects and need to receive an equitable share of benefits. This might mean a share in revenue from the sale of credits, but it might also mean new business or livelihood generation opportunities. If lives are not improved, there will be little support for climate action or nature protection.

 What are the potential risks or unintended consequences for coastal communities if blue carbon financing schemes are not properly designed or implemented? In some situations, destructive activities are simply displaced elsewhere, so there is no net benefit. In others, locals do not receive an adequate share of benefits, so trust and long-term success is eroded.

 Q: What are some of the key metrics used to assess the health and carbon sequestration potential of blue carbon ecosystems? How reliable are these metrics across different regions? 

A: Measuring carbon is relatively easy. Measuring other benefits, such as improvements in fisheries or improved resilience of a community, is much harder but just as important. We need to put more effort into measuring these other benefits.

 Q: In terms of monitoring blue carbon projects, what are the most significant technical or logistical challenges that need to be addressed? 

A: Cost is often the main barrier. The methods and technologies exist but can be expensive. This can be a barrier in two ways. One is that it makes projects so expensive that revenue from sale of credits does not offset the cost of doing the project. Another is that poorer nations and communities can be left behind. Ensuring that we have low-cost methods that work in developing countries is important for international equity.

Q: As we look to the future, do you think blue carbon credits will become as established and integrated into global carbon markets as terrestrial carbon credits? 

A:Yes, they already are. The scale is not as great as it is for forests, but blue carbon credits from the protection and restoration of mangroves and sea grasses are being generated in multiple countries.

 Q: How do you envision the evolution of blue carbon and biodiversity financing over the next decade, especially in terms of its role in achieving international climate targets like those in the Paris Agreement?” 

A:My aspiration is that we continue to break down the barriers that prevent protection and restoration of blue carbon ecosystems. This can include finance, and developing low-cost technologies and building capacity is key. Just as important will be adoption of high integrity principles and development of an enabling regulatory environment. Some things governments and communities can already do, they just need a little help or a clearer mandate. The emergence of broader nature and biodiversity markets also has potential to reward good ecosystem stewards who are currently locked out of carbon markets.

Continue Reading

Trending