Opinion

13A and federalism: US manoeuvrings since 1980s

Published

4 years ago

2023/02/17

By Daya Gamage
Former US State Department
Foreign Service National Political Specialist

Activating the 13th Amendment and devolution of power – possibly with the merger of two provinces –seems to have returned to the national agenda with President Ranil Wickremasinghe taking a lead role. He undertook a similar endeavour as the prime minister in 2001-2004 during the Bush Administration with its Secretary of State Gen. Colin Powell and his deputy Richard Armitage playing a significant role during the Norwegian-initiated peace talks.

Washington policymakers and lawmakers had a very clear agenda: having a strong belief that Sri Lanka’s minority Tamils were discriminated against by the Sinhalese ‘chauvinists’ and their ‘Sinhalese-controlled’ administration, and Tamil grievances could be redressed only with the adoption of a federal system.

The US policy toward Sri Lanka’s ethnic issue has long been guided by the comforting notion that Tamil self-government within a decentralised Sri Lankan state would satisfy the legitimate needs of that minority community and shield it from Sinhalese oppression. The system of dispersing power federally is so deeply rooted in the US political culture that Americans tend to be uncritical in assessing its implications for governance, national unity and social justice. In the light of America’s mixed experience with federalism, one could question whether it is reasonable for Washington to press a small island nation to adopt a federal system when the evidence suggests that beyond a certain degree of administrative and political de-concentration, it would not be a good fit.

Washington believed that the Tamil community (accounting for 12% of the Sri Lankan population) had fewer economic and employment opportunities when compared to the ‘advantaged’ 74% Sinhalese majority, and it would benefit from a federal system.

Washington policymakers arrived at this determination way back in the 1980s, long before the signing of the infamous Indo-Sri Lanka Accord. That determination governed the mindset of the policymakers and lawmakers in the U.S. through 2009 and to date.

Vital documents

I will now disclose contents of two 1980s documents developed in Washington, and they formed Washington’s foreign policy agenda in respect of Sri Lanka, and it to date, in my belief, has remained unknown to Sri Lankan policymakers. Ignorant of these policy determinations, Sri Lanka during those years engaged in discourses with international players

It is also vital to disclose how the Political Office of the United Nations (UN) – always a domain of retired US Foreign Service (FS) Officers – in collaboration with State Department and White House officials – endeavoured to prepare a path to ‘impose’ a federal system in Sri Lanka in keeping with the determinations of those two documents, which escaped the attention of Sri Lankan authorities and prevented them from formulating Sri Lanka’s own independent foreign and national policies beneficial to all ethnic communities.

Washington’s ignorance of the demographic formation of Sri Lanka, caste factor especially among the northern Tamil community, which initially sparked the northern rebellion, dueling nationalisms, economic factors that have affected all ethnic groups, influenced the formulation of the US foreign policy agenda.

Classified 1984/1986 US Documents Advocating Federalism

Here are the two United States Government documents that underpin its policy toward Sri Lanka. The naïve manner in which Sri Lanka has handled its foreign policy dealings and its national agenda placed it on a slippery slope.

In June 1984, the Directorate of Intelligence (CIA) and the State Department’s Near East and South Asia Bureau (NEA) jointly prepared a document called ‘Failure to Share Political Power with Minority Groups’. Declaring President Jayewardene’s commitment to his Sinhalese-Buddhist constituency at the height of the July 1983 communal riots, it said “by the general election of 1956 Sinhalese-dominated parties had gained control of the government and driven the small Tamil parties out of the mainstream political life.”

Another document dated September 02, 1986 and authored jointly by the CIA and the NEA noted that ‘northern insurgency’ had politicised Sri Lanka’s Sinhalese and Tamil communities. The ethnic rivalry is at the heart of the conflict, the document says, adding that the Tamils believe – with some adjustments – they need some devolution of power to their districts and that they are victims of political and economic discrimination, suggesting that Washington refrain from providing military assistance to the Sri Lanka administration, as it noted even in another document that Washington shouldn’t get involved in a battle between two ethnic communities.

These three documents laid the foundation for the subsequent structure of Washington’s foreign policy toward Sri Lanka all the way until the end of the separatist Eelam War IV in May 2009 and well beyond.

Washington sentiments

Washington sentiments were amply reflected in this 1984 classified document. This June 1984 document, subsequently declassified, had most revealing sentiments that played a major role in subsequent years during Washington’s intervention in Sri Lanka’s national issues, one of which was the proposal for a federal system in Sri Lanka solely and exclusively focusing on minority Tamil issues.

Washington’s initial (1984) understanding was that a federal structure would extensively satisfy the Tamil demands. The document states, “Tamil demands probably would be satisfied by a federal structure that would guarantee Tamils control over security and economic development where they comprise the majority of the population”. This belief was notably expressed by State Department Foreign Service Officers (FSOs) at frequent intervals in subsequent years when Washington intervened in Sri Lankan national affairs; in keeping with this agenda the USAID in 2005, with active participation of top officials of the U.S. Embassy in Colombo, continuously for three months, convened nationwide public seminars with the assistance of civil society groups underscoring the merits of federalism.

This writer and his State Department associate, Senior Foreign Service (FSO) and Intelligence Officer Dr. Robert K. Boggs, have already addressed these issues deeply in a manuscript currently being prepared – ‘Defending Democracy: Lessons in Strategic Diplomacy from U.S.-Sri Lanka Relations’. It is to be released through an international publisher soon. The two authors’ thirty-year experience, knowledge and understanding of Washington’s foreign policy dealings with the South Asian region centering Sri Lanka and India, and their subsequent research and collection of (mostly hidden) data – most of which the Sri Lankan policymakers never knew even existed (or their infantile approach to national issues never took those seriously) will be featured in this book with their (unconventional) interpretations and analyses. Both authors had extensive experience and gained vast knowledge of Washington’s foreign policy trajectory in the South Asian region and its dealings with Sri Lanka and India during their official engagements in Colombo, New Delhi, Mumbai and Washington.

The June 1984 classified ‘intelligence assessment’ expressed fear that if Washington was seen associating with a regime that battles a minority group it could “damage the U.S. prestige in the region and in parts of the Third World and that highly politicised Tamil minority in Sri Lanka might even turn to the Soviet Union for support.” (It is with this rationale that Washington deeply engaged during the 2002-2004 peace talks that it believed could bring favourable acceptance in the international community).

The direct quote is: “Increased identification with Jayewardene at this time could damage US prestige in the region and in parts of the Third World. It could be perceived by other small ethnic groups as acceptance by the United States of the use of repression against minorities. Moreover, elements of the highly politicised Tamil minority in Sri Lanka might even turn to the Soviet Union for support.”

The June 1984 ‘Intelligence Assessment’ further declares “Tamil demands probably would be satisfied by a federal structure that would guarantee Tamils control over security and economic development where they comprise the majority of the population” – meaning the North-East region of Sri Lanka.

The document opined that Washington believed “the Tamils have become convinced that they should have an autonomous homeland with economic and security control.”

What the June 1984 document says about the United States refusal to extend military assistance to the (American-friendly) Jayewardene regime’s request to combat the LTTE terrorism and its total blocking of the supply of military gear to the subsequent Rajapaksa regime during (2006-2009) its military offensive against the separatist movement led to Washington’s strict belief that such military equipment could be used for “repressive measures against the Tamils.”, and that other avenues need to be found such as devolution of power and setting up a federal structure.

Lalith Athulathmudali

The then National Security Minister Athulathmudali reached to this writer somewhere in May 1987 to convey the regime’s displeasure at the U.S. ambassador the US Department of Defence’ (USDOD) administrative action preventing American arms manufacturing corporations selling combat equipment to Sri Lanka; the matter was extensively discussed in a tense atmosphere at a National Security Council session chaired by President Jayewardene.

The document justifying Washington’s refusal to provide military assistance says, “Some of these weapons would have been useful beyond immediate internal security needs.”

Following are taken from ‘Sri Lanka: The Challenge of Communal Violence’ , a joint intelligence assessment by the Directorate of Intelligence (CIA) Office of Near Eastern and South Asia Bureau of the State Department. June 1984 Secret document subsequently declassified:

1. President Jayewardene’s failure to deal with the demands of Sri Lanka’s Tamil minority – 18 percent of the population – has brought the Tamils to the brink of open insurrection. In our judgment, Jayewardene, through his political manoeuvering since his election in 1977, has contributed to the deterioration of communal relations by failing to share political power with minority groups

2. Tamil demands probably would be satisfied by a federal structure that would guarantee Tamils control over security and economic development where they comprise the majority of the population.

3. The Tamils, according to Embassy and scholarly reports, have become convinced that they should have both an autonomous homeland and control over security forces and access to more economic development projects.

4. We believe the frustrations of the last year have convinced even moderate Tamils they must press for a separate homeland with the hope of achieving at least a federal relationship with Colombo.

Subsequent U.S. Manipulation for a Federal System

In early 2012, under the auspices of the Office of the Under Secretary-General of the United Nations (Political Affairs) B. Lynn Pascoe, attended by many professionals that included President Barack Obama’s close confidante and information czar Prof. Cass Sustein and his wife Dr. Samantha Power, the U.S. President’s human rights-war crimes-genocide crusader in the National Security Council, to start a process of restructuring several developing Third World nations’ constitutional arrangements to promulgate federalism as an answer to ethnic minority grievances.

The Under-Secretary-General (Political) B. Lynn Pascoe was a retired career diplomat from the US State Department.

Since the early 2012-process commenced a number of closed-door meetings and seminars at which the partition of UN member states has been discussed. Most of the meetings have been held under the direction of the UN Interagency Framework for Coordination on Preventive Action (the Framework Team or FT). The control of the FT fell into the domain of the under-secretary-general of Political Affairs Jeffrey Feltman, who took over from Pascoe in June 2012.The UN slot in the Department of Political Affairs, for decades, has always been assigned to a retired American Foreign Service officer (FSO), and it is the second most influential position next to the Secretary-General.

When a former American FSO occupies the Number Two slot of the UN, the State Department has extensive leverage over the operation of the United Nations, and it has been seen that both branches – the Department of Political Affairs and the US State Department – work together to achieve common objectives. As much as the state department and its representative – US ambassador to UN- maintain jurisdiction over the Human Rights Commission in Geneva under internal UN arrangement, during this period, the Under-Secretary (Political) Jeffrey Feltman oversaw the functioning of UNHRC.

When the process commenced in 2012, Sri Lanka, apart from Nepal, was also a target for the identity federalism engineers.To promote a ‘serious devolution to the peripheral regions’ – whether one calls it federal structure or otherwise – Dr. Samantha Power, who initially attended the Framework Team in early 2012 with the UN Department of Political Affairs, travelled to Sri Lanka in November 2015. So was the UN Under-Secretary-General (Political) Jeffrey Feltman travelled to Sri Lanka for talks in July 2017, during the Sirisena-Wickremesinghe administration.

Richard Boucher, in his capacity as assistant secretary for South Asia in the state department, in one of his official visits to Sri Lanka, at a press conference in Colombo on June 1, 2006, expressed the US policy in this manner: “Although we reject the methods that the Tamil Tigers have used, there are legitimate issues that are raised by the Tamil community and they have a very legitimate desire, as anybody would, to be able to control their own lives, to rule their own destinies and govern themselves in their homeland; in the areas they’ve traditionally inhabited”.

Boucher’s recognition of the “homeland concept” and “traditionally inhabited” areas, the right to “govern themselves in their homeland,” and inalienable right to “control their own lives,” reflect the 1984/1986 initial formation of the policy.

In 1999 Victor L. Tomseth, who was assistant secretary at the State Department in Washington for South Asia (1982–1984), was asked in an interview by Charles Stuart Kennedy for the Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training if they were “involved at all in trying to moderate or do anything about the Tamil movement in Sri Lanka.” Tomseth confirmed that Washington and the embassy in Colombo “were fairly proactive in that…But we, the U.S., were trying to do what we could to encourage some kind of dialogue with responsible Tamil political leaders and pushing on the government a bit to think in terms of some kind of structure through federalism or regionalism that would address a lot of the concerns that a lot of Tamils had, not just the radicals,” he declared.

Mr. Tomseth was later (1984–1986) assigned to Colombo as the deputy chief of mission at the US Embassy.

U.S. Misconceptions and Fallacies – What GoSL Never Understood The U.S. apparently never seriously challenged the fundamental notion that the LTTE represented the interests of all Sri Lankan Tamils and the entire population of the two provinces it claimed as the Tamil homeland. Some 45 percent of all Sri Lankan Tamils (excluding plantation Tamils) live outside the North and East in the South among the Sinhalese, including many of the best educated and most professionally accomplished members of the community.

Pertaining to the northern caste structure, the LTTE was dominated by leaders from only a narrow segment of the caste hierarchy. Given the deep-seated tensions among the various Tamil castes, it is unlikely that many members of either the dominant caste (the Vellarlas comprising about half of the total community) or of the so-called low castes (about 15 percent of the Tamil population) would have agreed that the LTTE spoke for them. In the Eastern Province, which the LTTE claimed in entirety as part of its historical homeland, Tamils of all castes constitute only about 39% of the population there. The Northern Vellarlas think that the Eastern Tamils, known as “Mukkuwars,” rank low in Tamil society. Eastern Tamils expressed, in conversation with this writer, during several tours in the 1980s their deep resentment at northerners’ near-control of the administrative structure of the East.

The US contributed to legitimising the LTTE by exempting it from the organisations being targeted in its war on terrorism (GWoT). Then the international community made a concession of enormous value to the LTTE without receiving any concessions in return. By accepting the Tigers’ claim to be the sole representative of the Tamil people, the West (the US in particular) boosted the LTTE’s prestige, lobbying clout and fund-raising capacity unchallenged by the Sri Lanka governments.

In 2001 the U.S. signed on to a peace process that essentially granted the LTTE diplomatic parity with the Sri Lankan government and artificially limited the discussion to just the two antagonists.

Illegality of the Accord and 13A

Given the persistent salience of the 13th Amendment in Indo-Sri Lankan diplomatic discourse, it would be appropriate to mention the underlying legality of the amendment and its checkered implementation. First, there is a reasonable argument to be made that the bilateral accord – the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord of 1987 – that mandated the devolutionary restructuring of the Sri Lankan government was illegal from the very inception. Although signed by President Jayewardene the accord was crafted and implemented by India by using threat of military action. The threat of forcible intervention must have been perceived as real to persuade President Jayewardene to agree to Indian occupation of the North although that surely added fuel to the Sinhalese insurrection in the South. Lt. Gen. A.S. Kalkat, the Commander of the IPKF during 1987-1990, explained in an interview that Rajiv Gandhi had felt compelled by domestic political pressures from Tamil Nadu to launch the military intervention and that he had extracted the Accord from President Jayewardene by the show of power projection, which was the infamous food drop. The General opined that the Accord, opposed by both the Sri Lankan people and the LTTE, was fundamentally flawed in granting autonomy to one fifth of the population in an area comprising one third of the area of the island. The lesson for India and the US., he said, is that “an outside power cannot give a political dispensation; only the government of the country could give [that to] its citizens.”

But the 13th Amendment was imposed on the country under duress rather than being legislated through democratic debate, and it remains politically controversial. What is less debatable is that the Indian airdrop and intimidatory diplomatic communications from New Delhi to Colombo prior to the IPKF were violative of at least the spirit of Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter. That UN Article enjoins all member states to “refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State.” Both the Security Council and the General Assembly have adopted numerous resolutions that contain implicit or explicit references to Article 2(4), condemning, deploring or expressing concern about acts of aggression or the launching of armed intervention. A number of resolutions have included calls for withdrawing troops from foreign territories.

In addition, Article 51 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties states that an “expression of a state’s consent to be bound by [a] treaty which has been procured by coercion of its representative through acts or threats directed against him shall be without legal effect.” Similarly, Article 52 of the same Convention provides that “a treaty is void if its conclusion has been procured by the threat or use of force in violation of the principles of international law embodied in the Charter of the United Nations.”

Some Indian commentators have argued that Sri Lanka cannot withdraw from the 1987 Accord—and by extension the Amendment—by reason of the Vienna Convention because neither Sri Lanka nor India are signatories to the Convention. The United States has never ratified the Vienna Convention, but its Department of State as early as 1971 acknowledged that the Convention constituted “the authoritative guide to current treaty law and practice,” even for non-parties. Despite being a non-signatory, the U.S. Government has frequently brought cases before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) based on alleged violations of the Vienna Convention. In short, neither India nor the USG has standing under international law to press the Sri Lanka to honor commitments imposed on it illegally.

The Thirteenth Amendment was enacted in the Sri Lanka Constitution as a result of this illegal Indo-Sri Lanka Accord of 1987.

In conclusion, it is essential to state that demographic formation in Sri Lanka is largely ignored by Washington, and Sri Lanka never used it as a negotiating tool. US diplomats who promoted the federal system did not take into account the shifting demography. More Tamils live among the Sinhalese than ever before in the history of the Sri Lankan nation. Tamils in significant numbers left the north and east to settle in the south; they purchase houses and land in Sinhalese-majority areas mostly in the suburban areas. (In fact, no Tamil or any other ethnic community member who has no ancestral roots in the District of Jaffna is allowed to acquire land in that district under the Thesavalamai Law, which is in Sri Lanka’s statute books). In 1981, at the time the LTTE commenced its armed insurrection, 608,144 or 32.8% of Tamils lived outside the northern and eastern provinces. In 2001, approximately 736,480 Tamils lived outside those two provinces. A conservative estimate since December 2004 has been that close to 40% of minority Tamils were domiciled among the Sinhalese outside the two provinces. The Department of Census and Statistics for 2014 reveals that 54% Tamils are living outside north and east. In the capital of Colombo within the city limits and surrounding areas alone the Tamil community is estimated at 30% of the total population of the area.

Another factor that has been ignored: Sri Lanka is 77 percent rural, 19 percent Urban and 5 percent plantation. 77% Rural, Monaragala, Ratnapura, Kegalle. Hambantota in the Sinhalese-majority South, and Vanni, Kilinochchi, Mannar, parts of Trincomalee and Batticaloa in the (total) Tamil districts are included. These rural sectors experience sub-standard education and health facilities, employment issues and less infrastructure facilities. Which means the Sinhalese and Tamils as well as Muslims experience these anomalies. In the Urban 19% sector, the Sinhalese, Tamils and Muslims enjoy all the facilities the Rural Sector population doesn’t enjoy. Extremely well nurtured educational and health facilities, the best infrastructure, employment opportunities and upward mobility in the society is found in these Urban Sectors such as Jaffna, Colombo, Kandy, Galle, Trincomalee in which all three ethnic communities enjoy the fruits of government patronage. These facts have escaped the attention of the Western nations. When going into negotiations Sri Lanka never focused on these.

The devolution, federal structure and Thirteenth Amendment are being discussed without the above-mentioned facts being taken into account.

(The writer is a retired Foreign Service National Political Specialist of the United States Department of State accredited to the Political Section of the U.S. Embassy, Colombo, Sri Lanka from 1980 through 1995. Previous ten years he was engaged in Public Affairs for the State Department. In 2017, he published a research-analytical book ‘Tamil Tigers’ Debt to America: U.S. Foreign Policy Adventurism & Sri Lanka’s Dilemma’)

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Opinion

If Sri Lanka wants ‘real’ stability, only one way to achieve it, in a short time

Published

3 days ago

2026/09/10

Sahan Weerasooriya

by Sunil Abhayawardhana

After the economic crisis of 2022, and the IMF programme that followed, some are of the opinion that ‘stability’ was achieved, but followed by ‘not out of danger yet’. Where is the ‘stability’ then?

We know that the cause of the crisis was a lack of foreign exchange. However, the IMF programme focused on the fiscal aspects, not one that enhanced export earnings. So, we are once again in a situation, facing the same problem, with the ‘fiscal discipline’ thrust on us.

Therefore, it is clear that if we seriously want to achieve ‘real’ stability, we need to use our heads much more and get out of the ‘epistemic insularity’ that has been around for so long. (Epistemic insularity is a state where an individual or group becomes isolated from alternative perspectives, data, and frameworks of knowledge. It occurs when individuals, groups or communities construct a protective bubble around their beliefs, making them resistant to outside evidence or challenging viewpoints).

It applies also to guys who have recently got into the bubble and being taught Neo-liberal lessons.

Fixing targets for budget deficits and tax collection is ok if it is in relation to a development drive. If not, it would only increase the misery of a higher cost of living. That development drive is what is missing in Sri Lanka.

A development drive comes after formulating a development plan, which is not an instant production, takes much time and effort. Therefore, Sri Lanka needs right now an accelerated ‘urgent’ project, that would bring ‘real’ stability, in the shortest possible time. Once ‘real’ stability is achieved, the focus should shift towards a greater development plan.

The only way

The only way for Sri Lanka to achieve ‘real’ stability is by enhancing its export earnings by at least $ 20-25B. Most of the projects that are being thought of are not capable of bringing in earnings on the scale required, in the shortest possible time.

Over the years, tea, rubber and coconut was the first base of exports. Then there were many smaller products such as gems and petroleum products that were not developed, tough the potential was there, followed by garments and IT, which were small in scale.

Continuing on the same path, is not going to change the story. A radical change of stance is urgently needed. What is amazing is that it has not yet been realised.

A point to note is that a World Bank report issued a few years ago, highlighting the possibility of enhancing exports by the present exporters by as much as $10B, if provided with some assistance, was not even considered. However, this should be an ongoing programme, but conditions of the IMF programme may not be able to give the required support to these industries.

Historically, since Independence, the path chosen has not been able to bring the desired results. Should we then, not change our thinking, to be able to bring about the urgently required outcomes?

Widespread development is going to take time with the existing conditions. The governments programmes would at best, bring in an additional $5B by 2030 at best. Therefore, targeting one specific sector and industry, with total focus for about a year or two, has a better chance of success.

Even if total investment is around 10% of GDP and half of it is diverted to a single project capable of increasing export revenue by 100%, that bold decision should be taken. The shortfall in public investment for a short time should be tolerated.

Sri Lanka has never embarked on such a programme and is the only way it could achieve ‘real’ stability.

Therefore, after much research, the only single project, capable of enhancing export figures by as much as $20 -25B was identified as mentioned below.

Oil refinery in Trincomalee

This is a project that should have been started at the time of Independence in 1948, when the funds were available from the Sterling Balances Agreement. However, it did not materialise and the country paid a heavy price.

Now, to be able to generate $20-25B, a refinery with at least a 400,000 b/d refinery is urgently required to be set up in Trincomalee. India is planning to set up eight new refineries in the coming years. The world’s largest refinery is located in Jamnagar, India, with a capacity of around 1.6 million b/d, owned by Reliance Industries.

The funding of such a project has many options, Multi-lateral sources, Joint Ventures and many more. (However, for a country that could release $2-3B for vehicle imports, should be able to work that out).

An idea of the cost could be determined by the Chinese cost for a 200,000 b/d refinery, which works out to around $3.7B. Sourcing equipment from China is considerably lower, compared with other western sources.

Sourcing the correct equipment, from suppliers at a price that the project can afford becomes critical. Equipment from the west is highly inflated, while Chinese equipment is now available at a much lower price.

The shortest time a refinery has been established is one year, in South Korea, and Singapore’s first refinery, a little over a year. There are many hurdles that have to be got over and a government has the ability to do so, if it is really determined. Most of it is paperwork and environment issues, with site selection.

The Ceylon Petroleum Corporation has been in existence and operating the 50,000 b/d refinery from the late 1960s and should be able to handle such a project, if not outside help would have to be deployed.

Most governments do not see the long- term benefits of such a project, due to the normal long- time frame to commence such a project. However, this is where ‘urgency’ has to be understood. As the CPC is the only institution involved, apart from the state bureaucracy, there is no reason for delay. If there is a strong will, there would always be a way of getting it off the ground, in the shortest possible time.

The discussions already commenced regarding the UAE, India, SL project, could be beneficial. A joint venture with India, is a strong possibility. The pipeline distribution would reduce delivery costs. However, total dependence on the Indian market would not be a good strategic or business decision.

The second refinery

China offered to establish a 200,000 b/d refinery in Hambantota, three years ago. Obviously, the government is under tremendous external pressure on this. This is where diplomacy at its best is required.

Sri Lanka had this ability in the 1960s and early 70s and later in the 1990s and early 2000s. This ability does not seem to be around at present, but needs to be revived.

I remember in the early 1970s during the Bangladesh war, Pakistan requested permission to fly via Colombo to East Pakistan. No one expected Sri Lanka to grant permission. But it was granted, keeping the relationship with India intact.

The proportion to be released to the local market and tax concession, should be worked out with the best interests of the country in mind. Even though the original percentage to be released to the local market was 20%, a further 20% would reduce the export earnings, but would save importing that amount, as SL imports around 100.000 b/d of refined petroleum.

Tax concessions face obstacles with the IMF programme, which could be solved via negotiations, that convince the IMF of the greater benefits to the country, but requires skill, as mentioned earlier.

A project of this nature, which brings immediate results, has never been seen in SL and lacks the confidence needed, but has to be built up to take bold decisions. It would face many obstacles, but as mentioned earlier, if there is a will, it could be done.

The Hambantota refinery could easily add another $10-15B to the aggregate earnings from petroleum exports, which would total around $ 35-40B in total.

Would that not bring ‘real stability’ to the economy?

No other project or projects could bring in the foreign exchange on the scale that these two could. In fact, expanding the refinery capacity in Trincomalee and Hambantota, could be considered later.

Other possibilities

While aiming for ‘real’ stability, it should not be forgotten to bring ‘real’ stability to the farming community in the country.

The mistakes of the past in relation to agriculture development needs to be corrected by the farmer being the ultimate beneficiary from agriculture development. It is ridiculous in an under developed economy like Sri Lanka, where the farmer toils so hard, while the big millers get the ultimate benefit.

Therefore, the thinking should change, where the farmer sells rice, with milling by farmer coops and linking the farmer to the rice market.

Once stability has been achieved and a sizeable reserve built up via earning as against borrowings, Sri Lanka should set its sights on development and not stop at stability. Listed below are a few projects that could be initiated.

* An iron and Steel mill for export in Trincomalee- which could bring in around $10-15B.

* Develop Colombo as The Gem and Jewelry center of the World $ 5-10B.

* R+D into graphene if could be used for semiconductors

* Aircraft repair and maintenance facilities to service the huge fleet in India

* Local IT companies registered in SL, operating out of Jaffna

* R+D to be incentivised in various fields

Opinion

Navigating Sri Lanka’s Israeli Dilemma

Published

4 days ago

2026/09/9

Sahan Weerasooriya

Sovereignty, Tourism, and the Law:

by Sasanka Perera
(The writer is on X as @sasmester)

On 28 October 2024, I wrote in this column an essay, titled ‘Israelis in Sri Lanka and the Advent of a ‘Neo’ Colonialism.’ My concern then was the disruption long-term Israeli tourists, often over-staying tourist visas, were causing particularly in the Eastern Province. Government intervention was mostly visible through relative inaction. Over the past year, Sri Lanka’s pristine coastal enclaves, from Hikkaduwa and Weligama in the west to Arugam Bay in the East, have found themselves at the centre of a complex and needless geopolitically-inflected controversy. As I explained in my earlier essay, too, the rapid growth of Israeli tourism has brought to light serious concerns regarding regulatory oversight, economic fairness, and national sovereignty. The latest controversy erupted in August 2026, in Hiriketiya, near Dickwella, in the country’s south. Unlike in the east, where the protesters were mostly from Muslim communities, in Hiriketiya, the protests were led by Buddhists, including monks.

At the centre of latest public debate is the establishment of a ‘Chabad House’, essentially a Jewish community and religious centre, catering to Israeli travellers. One of the primary demands the protesters made, was to investigate if this religious entity was established legally and if the activities of Israeli residents, including running businesses, were legal. In the context of the earlier controversy, Prime Minister Harini Amarasuriya is on record for clarifying in Parliament on 8 January, 2025, that neither the Ministry of Buddhasasana, Religious and Cultural Affairs nor any other government institution had granted official permission for the establishment of Israeli religious sites. In other words, what existed was illegal.

Chabad Houses as private business entities

Representatives of the local Chabad Houses, of which there are about six at present, claim they operate as registered private business entities. However, operating public religious and communal hubs on standard tourist or corporate permits violates local town planning and immigration guidelines. Besides, despite the claim, it is very unclear even if standard business licenses were issued in the first place. If religious entities were run under temporary business licenses, then, that itself is a clear violation of Sri Lankan law showing scant disregard to both the legal system in the country and its socio-political sensitivities.

This setup stands in stark contrast to how Sri Lanka’s own religious presence is managed in Israel. In Tel Aviv, a Sri Lankan Buddhist temple was established in 2013 to serve thousands of Sri Lankan migrant workers. The effort was facilitated by the Sri Lankan Embassy in the Israeli capital. To respect local Israeli laws and urban regulations, that temple operates discreetly inside a private apartment complex rather than as a prominent, independent public centre with an overt public religious personality as is usually the case with Buddhist temples globally. The Chief Incumbent of the temple, at the time it opened in 2013, Ven. Karavilakotuwe Dhammathilaka, is on record for stating very clearly that in keeping with the religious sensitivities in Israel, the inaugural ceremony itself was also held on a low scale without much publicity. This makes sense given the fact that Israel is one of the most religiously intolerant societies in the world as its track record amply demonstrates. This is more so in the last few years. What is important in the context of the opening of the Buddhist temple in Tel Aviv is, no laws were violated, the temple was meant for long term-residents, and respected local laws and sensitivities. It was also an effort formally facilitated by the Sri Lankan Embassy.

The comparison raises a fundamental question of parity: why should foreign nationals in Sri Lanka, including Israelis, establish public religious and cultural centres without municipal or government authorisation, while Sri Lankans abroad strictly abide by local constraints, as the nondescript Sri Lankan Buddhist temple in Tel Aviv clearly demonstrates?

The debate and anxieties around the Israeli presence in Sri Lanka occurs alongside another pressing concern. That is, the relatively precarious position of thousands of Sri Lankan workers in Israel who are mostly in the construction, agriculture and caregiving sectors. Recently, thousands of Sri Lankan migrant workers faced deportation from Israel due to job category violations, after switching from agriculture or caregiving to unauthorised sectors. The Sri Lankan Foreign Ministry reportedly actively intervened with Israeli authorities to negotiate regularisations and protect these workers. In my view, Illegality is illegality everywhere. If Sri Lankans violated Israeli law, that country had every right to deport them, and we should not have intervened. But I do understand the government’s position, too, as it relates to employment of citizens. Then, there should be a system where such regularisations are managed via the facilitation of the Sri Lankan Embassy, and if citizens do not make use of such a facility, they should clearly face the consequences of Israeli law.

Troubling double standard

Whichever way one looks at it, this highlights a very troubling double standard. That is, while Sri Lankan workers and the government have to cautiously navigate strict Israeli labour and visa laws, Israeli visitors in Sri Lanka frequently evade local visa laws without consequence. This mostly occurs as a result of the institutionalised spinelessness of our law enforcement when it comes to foreigners, and particularly seemingly ‘white’ foreigners. But surely, over 78 years after Independence, spineless meekness on our part must have clear limits. There needs to be clear reciprocity. Besides, Israelis are not here to work as the Sri Lankans in Israel are. They are supposed to be tourists. They should neither work nor establish religious edifices as they feel fit violating our laws and sensitivities as a matter of routine. This is why the ongoing Israeli activities reek of settler-colonialism.

Also, it is not only a matter of Israeli intransigence and official and public Sri Lankan apathy. The latter becomes possible when locals, who rent buildings to visa facilitate in running illegal Israeli businesses depriving their own citizens of legitimate incomes, are not even prosecuted by local law enforcement and judicial systems. As often is the case, foreign arrogance is built upon local meekness and lack of even the most basic sense of national pride. Of course, this does not apply to anyone, including Israelis who are operating a business in Sri Lanka legally, based on legitimate licenses issued by the government.

The proliferation of unlicensed, foreign-run businesses poses severe economic challenges to Sri Lanka’s local tourism industry. Many Israeli visitors enter this country on standard tourist visas but illegally set up guesthouses, surf camps, and cafes. Often operating exclusively in Hebrew, these businesses transact via informal channels or foreign accounts. When foreign visitors, including Israelis, run unregistered businesses, there are numerous local fallouts. For one thing, Sri Lanka loses substantial corporate, local government, and value-added tax revenues. Secondly, these activities severely undercut local livelihoods. Local vendors, tour guides, and small hoteliers are excluded by closed-loop and illegal Israeli operators. One of the common complaints where illegal Chabad Houses have been established is that they provide accommodation and meals to Israeli tourists, seriously disadvantaging local tourism-related businesses.

Adverse economic impact

Much of the income earned from these closed illegal operations, hardly comes to Sri Lanka in any way except for payment for supplies and rentals. Finally, since properties lease informally at inflated long-term rates to these operators, it drives up costs for Sri Lankan entrepreneurs and small business owners. But all this has become possible and so entrenched because of the established track record of relative inactivity of the Sri Lankan government in general as well as local governments and law enforcement in particular.

This brings to my mind the Israeli feature film, Arugam Bay. Directed by Marco Carmel and shot on location in Sri Lanka, including Ella and Arugam Bay. The film follows former Israeli soldiers using Sri Lanka’s coastal towns to process military combat trauma. The production received formal clearances for filming from the Sri Lanka Tourism Promotion Bureau in so far as publicly available information indicates. However, its narrative — framing Sri Lankan beach towns as retreats for Israeli military veterans — with blood in their hands and massive human rights violations to their credit, reaffirms local concerns about the island being used as a backdrop for Israeli human rights violations against Palestinians without sufficient regard for local perspectives.

It is precisely this kind of narrative, through word of mouth as well as social media, that creates an image of Sri Lanka as meek and trouble-free destination for Israelis intent on illegal activities. Do the Sri Lankan government or Sri Lankans want such a label attached to the country? I certainly don’t. It is quite shocking that the Sri Lanka Tourism Promotion Bureau gave permission for a such film to be shot locally. It shows both the Authority’s sorry view of what tourism is and scant disregard for ethical tourism.

Pushback mischaracterised as anti-Jewish sentiment

Public pushback against these illegal activities has sometimes been described by local as well as Israel supporters as anti-Jewish sentiment. But this completely mischaracterises the issue. Global condemnation of Israel’s military actions in Gaza and beyond and massive rights violations of entire Palestinian communities is rooted in international humanitarian law — not antisemitism. Differentiating between opposition towards violating state policies and hostility toward Jewish people is critical. Sri Lankans standing against Israeli military aggression or localised law-breaking are asserting human rights and national law as well as decent and legal behaviour by foreigners in our own country. This is not engaging in discrimination. That is, Israelis must be treated here as our people are treated in Israel. By law and by the book.

Sri Lanka must remain a welcoming host to international tourists. However, hospitality must not replace accountability. The government must strictly enforce visa restrictions, shut down unauthorised commercial and communal spaces, and protect local businesses. By upholding the rule of law uniformly, Sri Lanka can safeguard its economy, preserve its national sovereignty, and maintain harmony along its shores.

Opinion

Whatever on earth happened to meritocracy, pragmatism, and honesty in Sri Lanka?

Published

5 days ago

2026/09/8

Sahan Weerasooriya

Lee Kuan Yew

By A Concerned Aficionado

In 1959, just over a decade after Ceylon, as Sri Lanka was then known, gained Independence, a tiny, resource-barren island in many ways, named Singapore, elected a man called Lee Kuan Yew as their Prime Minister. Before that, having been ejected from the Malaysian Federation into forced independence, the founding fathers of independent Singapore looked across the Indian Ocean with envious eyes. The subject of their admiration was Ceylon: “The Pearl of the Indian Ocean.” Here was a nation in a pearl blessed with fertile land, a highly literate population, a functioning model of the civil service, robust infrastructure, and standard English education. Lee Kuan Yew openly declared that his ambition was for Singapore to emulate Ceylon.

Decades later, the tragedy that developed out of this historical juxtaposition is staggering. Singapore now sits comfortably in the first world, boasting a GDP per capita exceeding US Dollars 80,000, world-class institutions, and zero tolerance for corruption. Sri Lanka, meanwhile, lies in the ashes of sovereign default, a begging bowl in hand, passing from one economic crisis to the next, crippled by debt as well as rampant corruption and governed by political short-sightedness.

What went wrong? The answer can be found in a simple three-letter acronym popularised by Singaporean diplomat and academic, Professor Kishore Mahbubani, MPH: the acronym for Meritocracy, Pragmatism, and Honesty: the proven mantra of that country.

Mahbubani famously argued that any nation, regardless of size or origin, can achieve extraordinary success if it rigorously applies these three foundational doctrines. If Singapore stands as the global poster child for the triumph of the MPH model, Sri Lanka stands as its renowned antithesis; a tragic case study of what happens when a country systematically dismantles every single one of those three sacred creeds of good governance.

Meritocracy Dismantled: The Triumph of Nepotism and Tribalism in the Pearl

Meritocracy, in Mahbubani’s framework, demands that a nation relentlessly selects its best and brightest to lead its institutions, regardless of ethnicity, family lineage, or political affiliation. In Singapore, early leaders like S. Rajaratnam, a Sri Lankan Tamil, were elevated to the highest positions strictly on ability.

In Sri Lanka, we did the exact opposite. Almost immediately after independence, our political class realised that exploiting communal divisions was far more lucrative than building a meritocratic state. The Official Language Act of 1956 was the first lethal blow, substituting raw linguistic nationalism for competence. This was followed by media-wise standardisation policies in higher education, which effectively told our youth that their brainpower mattered less than their geographic or ethnic identity. In short, this was the political misdemeanour that destroyed the Sri Lankan nation.

The institutional decay spread rapidly into our civil service, which was once the envy of Asia. The Independent State Services Commission was systematically gutted and replaced by political patronage. State corporations, statutory boards, and diplomatic missions became dumping grounds for politicians’ children, loyalist party hacks, henchmen and henchwomen and despicable sycophants.

Instead of putting domain experts at the helm of economic, medical, and technical bodies, our rulers appointed cronies whose primary qualification was their willingness to bow and kneel before their political masters. The resulting brain drain has been catastrophic. For generations, Sri Lanka’s greatest export has not been tea or garments, but its finest minds, driven out by a system that rewards loyalty to a party over loyalty to intellectual competence.

Pragmatism abolished: Ideological Dogma and Economic Madness in the Pearl

Pragmatism means deserting ideological blinders and adopting policies simply because they work. As Singapore’s Dr Goh Keng Swee put it to Mahbubani: “No matter what problem Singapore encounters, somebody, somewhere has solved it. Let us copy the solution and adapt it.”

Sri Lanka, by contrast, has been a graveyard of economic dogmatism and harebrained experiments. Rather than copying proven global best practices, our policy decisions have consistently been driven by shortsighted populism, ideological posturing, and economic illiteracy.

Consider our economic history: alternating decades of closed-economy import substitution that strangled private enterprise, followed by unbridled, corrupt market deregulation without supervisory safeguards.

Perhaps the ultimate symbol of our anti-pragmatic hubris was the infamous overnight ban on chemical fertilisers in 2021. Ignoring every agricultural scientist and expert in the country, the government imposed a purely ideological and immediate “100% organic” policy by a Presidential Decree. The result was immediate and devastating: agricultural yields collapsed, food security evaporated, and tea production; our main foreign exchange earner, suffered disastrous damage. It was economic suicide masquerading as some kind of a vision of splendour.

Pragmatism requires looking at numbers, listening to experts, and adjusting and changing course when a policy fails. In Sri Lanka, political leaders routinely ignore basic arithmetic and even common sense to preserve their political narratives. They cut taxes when the treasury is empty, print trillions of rupees while inflation soars, and hold off on seeking IMF restructuring until the country literally runs out of foreign currency for fuel, medicines, and food.

Honesty is dead: The Culture of Systemic Corruption, the Misery of the Pearl

The third component, Honesty, is perhaps where Sri Lanka has fallen down the furthest. Professor Mahbubani notes that corruption is the single biggest reason why third-world countries fail. Singapore combated this by establishing near-zero tolerance for corruption, enforcing the strict rule of law, and ensuring that no public official, no matter how powerful, was above accountability.

In Sri Lanka, dishonesty is not merely an occasional scandal; it has become the fundamental operating system of the state. Corruption in Sri Lanka is institutionalised from the bottom to the absolute top. White-elephant infrastructure projects were financed through high-interest commercial loans: not because they offered viable economic returns, but because they offered massive kickbacks and inflated procurement contracts. Commissions were pocketed on everything from highways and airports to coal shipments, vaccines, and even basic food commodities.

Worse still, a culture of complete impunity took root. Commissions of inquiry were appointed not to uncover the truth, but to whitewash theft and buy political time. Files mysteriously vanished, prosecutors were pressured, and political deals were struck to protect corrupt figures across all political divides. The public watched in desperation as billions were drained from the national coffers, leaving the country bankrupt while the perpetrators enjoyed immunity, private jaunts, and even clandestine offshore accounts.

The Current Dispensation: Have They Got Their Wires Completely Crossed

If the public expected a sharp break from this pattern with political shifts in recent years, the disillusionment is totally complete. However, amidst a rhetoric towards a milk and honey nation, the aftermath has been everlasting desolation, as the stark reality has proven bitterly disappointing. The current political leadership appears to have got its wires completely crossed.

Instead of a sharp return to the MPH principles, what we witness is a baffling mix of improvised policies, misplaced priorities, and political double-speak. On the one hand, the government attempts to eloquently speak the language of reform and fiscal discipline to satisfy the gullible citizens and even the international lenders. On the other hand, it continues to rely on the same tired playbooks of executive heavy-handedness, administrative opacity, and political backroom deals.

Where is the true Meritocracy in the current administration? Key appointments in crucial public sectors are still dominated by political trade-offs and ideological echo chamber minions rather than competent people with independent, proven track records. Technical expertise is treated as a secondary consideration, way behind political compliance. The intense tragedy is the folly of ignoring and suppressing capable and efficient people and bringing in the henchmen and henchwomen.

Where is the Pragmatism? Rather than instituting big structural changes, modernising our public sector, and stripping away red tape to attract genuine foreign direct investment, the government remains addicted to piecemeal band-aid and bureaucratic control. Instead of fixing fundamental market distortions, it attempts to micro-manage the economy through top-down mandates, price controls, and extremely heavy taxation that burdens the middle class while leaving structural inefficiency untouched.

Where is the Honesty? Transparency remains a distant unattainable dream. Crucial state contracts, energy deals, and restructuring terms are still negotiated behind opaque doors. There is a glaring absence of genuine accountability for those whose past financial crimes pushed the nation into default. The rhetoric of “anti-corruption” is deployed aggressively against political adversaries, yet remains conveniently muted when it touches allies or organisational dishonesty within state institutions.

Instead of showing the public a clean, transparent roadmap for national recovery, the current regime seems intent on managing optics, suppressing dissent, and maintaining political survival at all costs.

The Path Forward: Can the Pearl be Restored?

Sri Lanka’s journey from being the envy of Asia in 1948 to a terribly bankrupt state in the 2020s is not a result of bad luck or external conspiracies. It is the direct consequence of our miserable choices. We chose tribalism over Meritocracy. We chose ideological populism over Pragmatism. We chose systemic corruption over sanctified honesty.

The Singapore story proves that natural resources, land size, and historical advantages do not determine a nation’s destiny. It has very clearly demonstrated that it is only the realism of proper governance that leads to prosperity. Singapore had no oil, no timber, no agriculture, and not even its own fresh water. What it had was a leadership obsessed with execution, integrity, and competence.

If Sri Lanka is ever to rise from the ashes of its self-inflicted ruin, it must abandon the political illusions that brought it to its knees. No amount of foreign loans, IMF bailouts, or geopolitical manoeuvring will save us if we do not transform the way we govern ourselves.

The formula is already written. It does not need to be reinvented. It has only to be implemented with untold dedication.

· Enforce absolute Meritocracy: Strip politicians of their power to appoint cronies to state bodies. Establish an independent, politically insulated mechanism for public sector leadership based entirely on competitive, verifiable competence.

· Embrace Pragmatism:

Kill economic dogma. Listen to experts, even when their opinions are unpleasant, copy proven global models, digitise state processes, and evaluate every public policy solely on one metric: would it or does it deliver measurable results for the people of our nation?

· Institutionalise Honesty:

Enforce an absolute, unyielding rule of law with zero tolerance for deceit and fraud. Empower independent anti-corruption agencies with real teeth, strip away immunity for financial crimes, and make asset declarations mandatory and publicly accessible for every elected official.

The time for empty political slogans, hereditary politics, and ideological arrogance should be over and, in fact, should be wiped out forever. Sri Lanka has run out of the flight runway. Until we, as a nation and the citizenry of a united nation, demand a radical pivot toward Meritocracy, Pragmatism, and Honesty, the “Pearl of the Indian Ocean” will remain nothing more than a tragic reminder of what it could have been.

It is never too late. All it needs is a supremely committed political and national obligation to the glorious vision of a prosperous future for the entire nation. However, we are forced to lament whether any of our current lot of so-called statesmen, or, for that matter, stateswomen, of any hue and rhetorically imbibed, are up to that committed task of getting the pearl back into its long-lost pristine glory.