Features
Why Do We Need An Anti-Terrorism Act When We Have A Public Security Ordinance?
by Dr Nihal Jayawickrama
It is difficult to comprehend why the Government is seeking to introduce a monstrosity of a Bill, ostensibly to combat terrorism, when it has, and has had at its disposal for several decades, a law with sufficient flexibility to prevent and deal with all forms of threats to the security of our country and its peoples.
The Public Security Ordinance
In June 1947, a few months before Ceylon’s first parliamentary election, the State Council enacted the Public Security Ordinance. It was a time when both the private and public sectors of the country were virtually crippled by strike action. Demanding better living conditions, higher wages, and trade union and political rights for government employees, nearly 50,000 workers had come out in what was then the biggest ever strike organized in the country. On June 5, 1947, the police opened fire on a demonstration in Colombo, killing a government clerk, V. Kandasamy. Five days later, the Minister of Home Affairs Mr. (later Sir) Arunachalam Mahadeva, presented the Public Security Ordinance in the State Council. He did not even attempt to disguise the fact that the Bill he was presenting was motivated by the general strike. Seventy-six years later, that law remains not only in our statute book, but also entrenched in the Constitution.
The Public Security Ordinance enables the President, by merely placing his signature on a proclamation, to declare a state of public emergency if it appears to him to be necessary to do so in the interests of public security and the preservation of public order, or for the maintenance of supplies essential to the life of the community. Upon his doing so, he is empowered to legislate through emergency regulations. An emergency regulation, which may even provide for the detention of persons, has the legal effect of over-riding, amending, or suspending the operation of any law other than the Constitution. It comes into force immediately upon it being made by the President, without the need for its publication.
The Public Security Ordinance has also conferred special powers on the President which he may exercise without declaring a state of public emergency.
He may call out the members of all or any of the armed forces to assist the police in the maintenance of public order in any area.
He may impose a curfew in any area.
He may declare any service to be an essential service, and any person who fails to provide that service, or impedes, obstructs, delays, or restricts the carrying on of that service will be guilty of an offence.
This immense power vested in the President is counter-balanced in several ways. The declaration of a state of public emergency is limited in duration to one month at a time. The making of a proclamation must be communicated to Parliament forthwith. The proclamation will expire after 14 days unless Parliament, by resolution, approves it. No proclamation may now remain in force beyond 90 days unless it is approved by Parliament by a two-thirds majority of all its members. These are some of the safeguards provided for in the Public Security Ordinance against the abuse of the extraordinary powers conferred by it on the President.
The following are some of the threats, or perceived threats, to public security which have been addressed by invoking the Public Security Ordinance.
The Hartal 1953
It was in 1953, during the second Parliament, that the Public Security Ordinance was invoked for the first time. In the budget presented that year by Finance Minister J.R. Jayewardene, the subsidy on rice was removed, postal rates and railway fares were increased, and the free midday meal was abandoned. To protest against these measures, the trade unions and left-wing political parties organized a “hartal” (a general stoppage of work) on August 12, 1953. In many parts of the country there were several outbreaks of violence and much damage to public property. Lorries carrying produce were set on fire, the Manning market was completely gutted, several schools were destroyed, and rail tracks were obstructed. On the same day, on the advice of Prime Minister Dudley Senanayake, the Acting Governor-General Sir Alan Rose declared a state of emergency and imposed a dawn to dusk curfew throughout the country. Several left-wing politicians were detained. Order was restored, but not until several deaths occurred at the hands of the military. The responsibilities he had to bear had a negative impact on the health of the Prime Minister who resigned his office two months later.
Communal conflict 1958
Communal tensions that had begun to simmer on the issue of language rights reached a crescendo with the presentation of the Official Language Bill in June 1956 in an empty House of Representatives that was barricaded with banks of barbed wire and guarded by steel-helmeted policemen. On Galle Face Green, Tamil parliamentarians who were performing satyagraha were physically attacked. The violence spread from Colombo to the eastern province, and continuing communal discord took a turn for the worse with a tar brush campaign when the Government introduced the “Sri” numberplate. The Bandaranaike-Chelvanayakam Pact brought Buddhist priests and Sinhalese extremists into the fray. In October 1957, a march to Kandy led by J.R. Jayewardene seeking spiritual aid to achieve the abrogation of the B-C Pact led to more violence. In May 1958, a wave of violence broke out in the North and East following the derailment of a train carrying delegates to the Federal Party Convention in Batticaloa. In Colombo, mobs attacked and looted Tamil businesses, set cars ablaze, and killed several Tamil persons. As the killing, arson and looting spread throughout the island like a prairie fire, the Governor-General invoked the Public Security Ordinance, declared a state of emergency, imposed a curfew, proscribed the Federal Party and the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna and placed their leaders under house arrest. Over 4,000 Tamils and 2,000 Sinhalese were transported to safety in convoys on the high seas. Peace eventually returned to the Island.
Assassination of the Prime Minister 1959
The third occasion for invoking the Public Security Ordinance was in 1959. At around 10 a.m. on September 25 of that year, Prime Minister S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike was shot at his residence by a Buddhist monk and was rushed to hospital, from where he issued a statement appealing for restraint and patience. At 11 a.m. the Governor-General Sir Oliver Goonetilleke, having spoken briefly with Mr. Bandaranaike in hospital, and apparently to prevent an angry multitude embarking on reprisals against Buddhist monks, invoked the Public Security Ordinance and declared a state of emergency throughout the country. At 8 a.m. on the following morning, the Prime Minister passed away. At 11.15 on the same day, following a meeting of the Cabinet at Queen’s House, the Governor-General appointed W. Dahanayake, the Acting Leader of the House, as Prime Minister.
Following Mr. Bandaranaike’s state funeral, a series of bizarre events took place. As speculation about the identity of Bandaranaike’s assassins reached fever pitch, and it was openly insinuated that people in very high places were privy to the conspiracy, a rigorous press censorship was introduced by emergency regulations, covering a variety of subjects including news of the murder probe. Following the arrest of the female Minister of Health and the brother of the Minister of Finance, the government parliamentary group expelled the Prime Minister, and the latter sacked ten of his Ministers. Finally, left with no alternative but to dissolve Parliament, due to a rapid erosion of support in both Houses, Prime Minister Dahanayake revoked the state of emergency on December 3, 1959. At the general election that followed, the Prime Minister was defeated in his own constituency.
Since 1961, the Public Security Ordinance was invoked on numerous occasions, by successive governments, to deal with a variety of governance issues. For example:
Civil Disobedience in the North 1961
On January 1, 1961, the Official Language Act became fully operative. Attempts to reach accord on the use of the Tamil language had been unsuccessful. On February 20. 1961, the Federal Party commenced a “satyagraha” in five centres – Jaffna, Mannar, Vavuniya, Batticaloa and Trincomalee, against the language policy of the Government, preventing access to kachcheris and other government office in those districts. When the Federal Party announced the establishment of their own postal service, police service and land kachcheris, the Government declared a state of emergency on April 18 “to take effective measures to deal with the situation”. The Federal Party was proscribed, detention orders were issued, and a curfew was imposed.
An Abortive Coup d’etat
On the night of January 27, 1962, while a state of emergency was in force, the Government received reliable information that certain senior officers of the police and armed forces had conspired to arrest some Ministers and other political leaders and to overthrow the Government. The arrests were scheduled to be made that night. The fact that the Public Security Ordinance was already in operation enabled the Government to arrest the coup leaders and to foil the plot and commence and complete an immediate investigation.
Electricity Department Strike
On March 5, 1964, a 30-day state of emergency was declared to deal with a strike in the Electricity Department. According to the Government, “the sewerage system in Colombo, oil, telecommunications, the loading and unloading of ships in the harbour – all are at a standstill. Many factories have come to a halt”. Following personal service orders served on certain electrical engineers, in pursuance of which they were taken to their places of work and compelled to work, the strike was called off and services restored.
Protests against the Tamil Language Regulations
On January 8, 1966, when regulations under the Tamil Language (Special Provisions) Act of 1958 were presented to Parliament, massive demonstrations organized by Opposition parties took place. A procession of nearly 10,000 persons, led by Buddhist monks, left the Vihara Maha Devi Park and commenced a march in the direction of Parliament. At Kollupitiya, the police opened fire after tear gas and baton-charging had failed. A Buddhist monk was killed, and several others injured. A state of emergency was declared, and a curfew imposed in Colombo and its suburbs.
Reduction in the rice ration
A state of emergency was suddenly declared at midnight on December 18, 1966, and all public meetings were banned, local authority elections were postponed, and demonstrations and processions permitted only with the approval of the competent authority in each district. On the following morning, Prime Minister Dudley Senanayake announced that, owing to a world shortage of rice, the ration of two measures would be reduced to one, and that would be issued free of charge. Matured by experience and conscious of the fact that “rice” was the most sensitive and explosive issue in the country, the Government struck what was obviously a pre-emptive blow. However, other measures were to follow. Devaluation, and the sealing of the “Jana Dina” newspaper were some of them. For reasons best known to the Government, the state of emergency continued to be renewed, with parliamentary approval, until January 18, 1969.
The JVP Insurgency
On March 1971, Governor-General William Gopallawa declared a state of public emergency. Prime Minister Sirima Bandaranaike explained to Parliament that information had been received that secret cells had been formed; that arms, ammunition and other deadly weapons were being collected or manufactured; that a large cache of hand bombs had exploded in a hut in Dedigama killing five persons; nine crates containing hand bombs had been discovered in a shrub jungle in Pindeniya; and that an explosion in the Peradeniya campus, which damaged the roof of Marrs Hall, had led to the discovery of hand bombs and large quantities of explosive material used in the manufacture of hand bombs. Despite this pre-emptive action, the Government was militarily unprepared for the concentrated armed attacks that were launched on April 5, 1971.
With shot guns, hand bombs and locally made hand grenades, a massive attack was launched on police stations throughout the country between April 5 – 11, a total of 93 police stations were attacked and overrun; 35 police stations went under insurgent control, and in these provincial towns and villages revolutionary government replaced the civil administration completely. However, powers under the Public Security Ordinance enabled the Government to bring the situation under control; to accommodate approximately 10,000 insurgents who had been arrested; to secure the surrender of an additional 6,000; to establish a special investigation unit; and to perform all the other tasks required to bring the leadership to trial and release the others progressively in such numbers as not to create any security problems in the areas to which they returned.
Conclusion
The Public Security Ordinance appeared to have lost its relevance when, in July 1979, the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act came into force. That law did not prevent the bloody ethnic conflict which commenced in that year and continued for the next 30 years. It did not prevent, even with all the information made available to the relevant authorities, the colossal Easter Sunday massacre. The fundamental difference between the Public Security Ordinance and the proposed Anti-Terrorism Act is that, while the former may be utilized only when the need arises, the latter will remain forever, not merely as a dark cloud over the heads of all the citizens of Sri Lanka, but as a permanent ogre, watching every movement, every normal act of human behaviour, waiting for the opportunity to swoop down and grab its prey.
Features
Relief without recovery
The escalating conflict in the Middle East is of such magnitude, with loss of life, destruction of cities, and global energy shortages, that it is diverting attention worldwide and in Sri Lanka, from other serious problems. Barely four months ago Sri Lanka experienced a cyclone of epic proportions that caused torrential rains, accompanied by floods and landslides. The immediate displacement exceeded one million people, though the number of deaths was about 640, with around 200 others reported missing. The visual images of entire towns and villages being inundated, with some swept away by floodwaters, evoked an overwhelming humanitarian response from the general population.
When the crisis of displacement was at its height there was a concerted public response. People set up emergency kitchens and volunteer clean up teams fanned out to make flooded homes inhabitable again. Religious institutions, civil society organisations and local communities worked together to assist the displaced. For a brief period the country witnessed a powerful demonstration of social solidarity. The scale of the devastation prompted the government to offer generous aid packages. These included assistance for the rebuilding of damaged houses, support for building new houses, grants for clean up operations and rent payments to displaced families. Welfare centres were also set up for those unable to find temporary housing.
The government also appointed a Presidential Task Force to lead post-cyclone rebuilding efforts. The mandate of the Task Force is to coordinate post-disaster response mechanisms, streamline institutional efforts and ensure the effective implementation of rebuilding programmes in the aftermath of the cyclone. The body comprises a high-level team, led by the Prime Minister, and including cabinet ministers, deputy ministers, provincial-level officials, senior public servants, representing key state institutions, and civil society representatives. It was envisaged that the Task Force would function as the central coordinating authority, working with government agencies and other stakeholders to accelerate recovery initiatives and restore essential services in affected regions.
Demotivated Service
However, four months later a visit to one of the worst of the cyclone affected areas to meet with affected families from five villages revealed that they remained stranded and in a state of limbo. Most of these people had suffered terribly from the cyclone. Some had lost their homes. A few had lost family members. Many had been informed that the land on which they lived had become unsafe and that they would need to relocate. Most of them had received the promised money for clean up and some had received rent payments for two months. However, little had happened beyond this. The longer term process of rebuilding houses, securing land and restoring livelihoods has barely begun. As a result, families who had already endured the trauma of disaster, now face prolonged uncertainty about their future. It seems that once again the promises made by the political leadership has not reached the ground.
A government officer explained that the public service was highly demotivated. According to him, many officials felt that they had too much work piled upon them with too little resources to do much about it. They also believed that they were underpaid for the work they were expected to carry out. In fact, there had even been a call by public officials specially assigned to cyclone relief work to go on strike due to complaints about their conditions of work. This government official appreciated the government leadership’s commitment to non corruption. But he noted the irony that this had also contributed to a demotivation of the public service. This was on the unjustifiable basis that approving and implementing projects more quickly requires an incentive system.
Whether or not this explanation fully captures the situation, it points to an issue that the government needs to address. Disaster recovery requires a proactive public administration. Officials need to reach out to affected communities, provide clear information and help them navigate the complex procedures required to access assistance. At the consultation with cyclone victims this was precisely the concern that people raised. They said that government officers were not proactive in reaching out to them. Many felt they had little engagement with the state and that the government officers did not come to them. This suggests that the government system at the community level could be supported by non-governmental organisations that have the capacity and experience of working with communities at the grassroots.
In situations such as this the government needs to think about ways of motivating public officials to do more rather than less. It needs to identify legitimate incentives that reward initiative and performance. These could include special allowances for those working in disaster affected areas, recognition and promotion for officers who successfully complete relief and reconstruction work, and the provision of additional staff and logistical support so that the workload is manageable. Clear targets and deadlines, with support from the non-governmental sector, can also encourage officials to act more proactively. When government officers feel supported and recognised for the extra effort required, they are more likely to engage actively with affected communities and ensure that assistance reaches those who need it most.
Political Solutions
Under the prevailing circumstances, however, the cyclone victims do not know what to do. The government needs to act on this without further delay. Government policy states that families can receive financial assistance of up to Rs 5 million to build new houses if they have identified the land on which they wish to build. But there is little freehold land available in many of the affected areas. As a result, people cannot show government officials the land they plan to buy and, therefore, cannot access the government’s promised funds. The government needs to address this issue by providing a list of available places for resettlement, both within and outside the area they live in. However, another finding at the meeting was that many cyclone victims whose lands have been declared unsafe do not wish to leave them. Even those who have been told that their land is unstable feel more comfortable remaining where they have lived for many years. Relocating to an unfamiliar area is not an easy decision.
Another problem the victims face is the difficulty of obtaining the documents necessary to receive compensation. Families with missing members cannot prove that their loved ones are no longer alive. Without official confirmation they cannot access property rights or benefits that would normally pass to surviving family members. These are problems that Sri Lanka has faced before in the context of the three decade long internal war. It has set up new legal mechanisms such as the provision of certificates of absence validated by the Office on Missing Persons (OMP) in place of death certificates when individuals remain missing for long periods. The government also needs to be sensitive to the fact that people who are farmers cannot be settled anywhere. Farming is not possible in every location. Access to suitable land and water is essential if farmers are to rebuild their livelihoods. Relocation programmes that fail to take these realities into account risk creating new psychological and economic hardships.
The message from the consultation with cyclone victims is that the government needs to talk more and engage more directly with affected communities. At the same time the political leadership at the highest levels need to resolve the problems that government officers on the ground cannot solve. Issues relating to land availability, legal documentation and livelihood restoration require policy decisions at higher levels. The challenge to the government to address these issues in the context of the Iran war and possible global catastrophe will require a special commitment. Demonstrating that Sri Lanka is a society that considers the wellbeing of all its citizens to be a priority will require not only financial assistance but also a motivated public service and proactive political leadership that reaches out to those still waiting to rebuild their lives.
by Jehan Perera
Features
Supporting Victims: The missing link in combating ragging
A recent panel discussion at the University of Peradeniya examined the implications of the Supreme Court’s judgement on ragging, in which the Court recognised that preventing ragging requires not only criminal penalties imposed after an incident occurs but also systems and processes within universities that enable victims to speak up and receive support. Bringing together perspectives from law, university administration, psychology and students, the discussion sought to understand why ragging continues to persist in Sri Lankan universities despite the existence of legal prohibitions. While the discussion covered legal and institutional dimensions, one theme emerged clearly: addressing ragging requires more than laws and disciplinary rules. It requires institutions that are capable of supporting victims.
Sri Lanka enacted the Prohibition of Ragging and Other Forms of Violence in Educational Institutions Act No. 20 of 1998 following several tragic incidents in universities, during the 1990s. Among the most widely remembered is the death of engineering student S. Varapragash at the University of Peradeniya in 1997. Incidents such as this shocked the country and revealed the consequences of allowing violent forms of student hierarchy to persist. The 1998 Act marked an important legal intervention by recognising ragging as a criminal offence. The law introduced severe penalties for individuals found guilty of engaging in ragging or other forms of violence in educational institutions, including fines and imprisonment.
Despite the existence of this law for nearly three decades, prosecutions under the Act have been extremely rare. Incidents continue to surface across universities although most are not reported. The incidents that do reach university administrations are dealt with internally through disciplinary procedures rather than through the criminal justice system. This suggests that the problem does not lie solely in the absence of legal provisions but also in the ability of victims to come forward and pursue complaints.
The tragic reminders; the cases of Varapragash and Pasindu Hirushan
Varapragash, a first-year engineering student at the University of Peradeniya, was forced by senior students to perform extreme physical exercises as part of ragging, resulting in severe internal injuries and acute renal failure that ultimately led to his death. In 2022, the courts upheld the conviction of one of the perpetrators for abduction and murder. The case illustrates not only the brutality of ragging but also how long and difficult the path to justice can be for victims and their families. Even when victims speak about their experiences, they may not always disclose the full extent of what they have endured. In the case of Varapragash, the judgement records that the victim told his father that he was asked to do dips and sit-ups. Varapragash’s father had testified that it appeared his son was not revealing the exact details of what he had to endure due to shame.
More than two decades after the death of Varapragash, the tragedy of ragging continues. The 2025 Supreme Court judgement arose from the case of Pasindu Hirushan, a 21-year-old student of the University of Sri Jayewardenepura, who sustained devastating head injuries at a fresher’s party, in March 2020, after a tyre sent down the stairs by senior students struck him. He became immobile, was placed on life support, and returned home only months later. If the Varapragash case exposed the deadly consequences of ragging in the 1990s, the Pasindu Hirushan case demonstrates that universities are still failing to prevent serious violence, decades after the enactment of the 1998 Act. It was against this background of continuing institutional failure that the Supreme Court issued its Orders of Court in 2025. Among the key mechanisms emphasised by the judgement is the establishment of Victim Support Committees within universities.
Why do victims need support?
Ragging in universities can take many forms, including verbal humiliation, physical abuse, emotional intimidation and, in some instances, sexual harassment. While all forms of ragging can have serious consequences, incidents involving sexual harassment often present additional barriers for victims who wish to come forward. Victims may hesitate to complain due to weak institutional mechanisms, fear of retaliation, or uncertainty about whether their experiences will be taken seriously. In many cases, those who speak out are confronted with questions that shift attention away from the alleged misconduct and onto their own behaviour: why did s/he continue the conversation?; why did s/he not simply disengage, if the harassment occurred as claimed?; why did s/he remain in the environment?; or did his/her actions somehow encourage the accused’s behaviour? Such responses illustrate how easily victims can be subjected to a second layer of scrutiny when they attempt to report incidents. When individuals anticipate disbelief, minimisation or blame, silence may appear safer than disclosure. In such circumstances, the presence of a trusted institutional body, capable of providing guidance, protection and support, become critically important, highlighting the need for effective Victim Support Committees within universities.
What Victim Support Committees must do
As expected by the Supreme Court, an effective Victim Support Committee should function as a trusted institutional mechanism that places the safety and dignity of victims at the centre of its work. The committee must provide a safe and confidential point of contact through which victims can report incidents of ragging without fear of intimidation or retaliation. It should assist victims in understanding and pursuing available complaint procedures, while also ensuring their immediate protection where there is a risk of continued harassment. Recognising the psychological harm ragging may cause, the committee should facilitate access to counselling and emotional support services. At a practical level, it should also help victims document incidents, record statements, and preserve evidence that may be necessary for disciplinary or legal proceedings. The committee must coordinate with university authorities to ensure that complaints are addressed promptly and responsibly, while maintaining strict confidentiality to protect the identity and well-being of those who come forward. Beyond responding to individual cases, Victim Support Committees should also contribute to broader awareness and prevention efforts, within universities, helping to create an environment where ragging is actively discouraged and students feel safe to report incidents. Without such support, the process of pursuing justice can become overwhelming for individuals who are already dealing with the emotional impact of abuse.
Making Victim Support Committees work
According to the Orders of Court, these committees should include representatives from the academic and non-academic staff, a qualified counsellor and/or clinical psychologist, an independent person, from outside the institution, with experience in law enforcement, health, or social services, and not more than three final-year students, with unblemished academic and disciplinary records, appointed for fixed terms. Further, universities must ensure that committees consist of individuals who possess both expertise and genuine commitment in areas such as student welfare, psychology, gender studies, human rights and law enforcement, in line with the spirit of the Supreme Court’s directions, rather than consisting largely of ex officio positions. If treated as routine administrative positions, rather than responsibilities requiring specialised knowledge, sensitivity and empathy, these committees risk becoming symbolic rather than functional.
Greater transparency in the appointment process could strengthen the credibility of these committees. Universities could invite expressions of interest from individuals with relevant expertise and demonstrated commitment to supporting victims. Such an approach would help ensure that the committees benefit from the knowledge and dedication of those best equipped to fulfil this role.
The Supreme Court judgement also introduces an important safeguard by giving the University Grants Commission (UGC) the authority to appoint members to university-level Victim Support Committees. If exercised with integrity, this provision could help ensure that these committees operate with greater independence. It may also help address a challenge that sometimes arises within institutions, where individuals, with relevant expertise, or strong commitment to addressing issues, such as violence, harassment or student welfare, may not always be included in institutional mechanisms due to internal administrative preferences. External oversight by the UGC could, therefore, create opportunities for such individuals to contribute meaningfully to Victim Support Committees and strengthen their effectiveness.
Ultimately, the success of the recent judgement will depend not only on the directives it issued, the number of committees universities establish, or the number of meetings they convene, or other box-checking exercises, but on how sincerely those directives are implemented and the trust these committees inspire among students and staff. Laws can prohibit ragging, but they cannot by themselves create environments in which victims feel safe to speak. That responsibility lies with institutions. When universities create systems that listen to victims, support them and treat their experiences with seriousness, universities will become places where dignity and learning can coexist.
(Udari Abeyasinghe is attached to the Department of Oral Pathology at the University of Peradeniya)
Kuppi is a politics and pedagogy happening on the margins of the lecture hall that parodies, subverts, and simultaneously reaffirms social hierarchies.
by Udari Abeyasinghe
Features
Big scene … in the Seychelles
Several of our artistes do venture out on foreign assignments but, I’m told, most of their performances are mainly for the Sri Lankans based abroad.
However, the group Mirage is doing it differently and they are now in great demand in the Seychelles.
Guests patronising the Lo Brizan pub/restaurant, Niva Labriz Resort, in the Seychelles, is made up of a wide variety of nationalities, including Russians, Chinese, French and Germans, and they all enjoy the music dished out by Mirage, and that is precisely why they are off to the Seychelles … for the fifth time!
The band is scheduled to leave this month and will be back after three weeks, but their journey to the Seychelles will continue, with two more assignments lined up for 2026.
In August it’s a four-week contract, and in December another four-week contract that will take in the festive celebrations … Christmas and the New Year.

Donald’s birthday
celebrations
According to reports coming my way, it is a happening scene at the Lo Brizan pub/restaurant, Niva Labriz Resort, whenever Mirage is featured, and the band has even adjusted its repertoire to include local and African songs.
They work three hours per day and six days per week at the Lo Brizan pub/restaurant.

Donald Pieries:
Leader, vocalist,
drummer
Led by vocalist and drummer Donald Pieries, many say it is his
musical talents and leadership that have contributed to the band’s success.
Donald, who celebrated his birthday on 07 March, at the Irish Pub, has been with the group through various lineup changes and is known for his strong vocals.
He leads a very talented and versatile line up, with Sudham (bass/vocals), Gayan (lead guitar/vocals), Danu (female vocalist) and Toosha (keyboards/vocals).
Mirage performs regularly at venues like the Irish Pub in Colombo and also at Food Harbour, Port City.
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