Features
WHO BURNT THE JAFFNA LIBRARY?
Excerpted from SDIG (Retd.) Edward Gunawardena’s memoirs
The burning of the Jaffna public library in 1981 is not only a controversial subject, it is a sensitive one. Much has been written on it mainly for propaganda purposes and political advantage. It is significant that nobody who was a witness to the incident or was even present in Jaffna at the time of the incident has written anything on the subject.
Having kept mum for three decades, except once in 2006 when I was compelled to come out with the truth when an admirer of Anton Balasingham, writing to a Sri Lankan newspaper, alleged that I was responsible for the burning of the library, I decided that I should write particularly to dispel the untruths clouding this event; of what I witnessed, what I came to know of and the deductions and conclusions I arrived at particularly with my training and experience as an intelligence officer. I will elaborate this later in this chapter.
I thought the best way to make a start on this all important narrative is to present the reader with a reminder of the common perceptions regarding the burning of the library that existed in the eighties and even prevails to the present day. An article on the subject that appeared in a Sri Lankan newspaper in 2008 projecting the common perceptions in a nutshell provided me with a suitable platform to commence this effort.
‘Burning Memories’
A journalist named Aboorvan Prabanjana (I don’t know whether this was a real name or a pseudonym) writing on ‘Tamil Matters’ in the Sunday Lakbima of October 16. 2008, has opened his article titled, ‘Burning Memories’, thus: “The burning of the Jaffna library in 1981 is an event that has left indelible imprints in the minds of Sri Lankan Tamils. It marked the destruction of the intellectual heritage preserved down the ages by the Jaffna community. It is now an open secret that the crime was plotted and perpetrated by the politicians of the then ruling party”.
This article written twenty 27 years after the event has been meant primarily to draw attention to a documentary film entitled ‘Burning Memories’ directed by one S. Someetharan. Among other things this article alleges:
a)
“Mobs brought to Jaffna from the southern part of the country allegedly led by a prominent politician of the then ruling party who was active during the campaign for the District Development Council elections of 1981, created a frenetic situation in Jaffna. The mobs were reportedly aided by the police. They set fire to several important buildings in the Jaffna town including the public library”.
b)
“President Ranasinghe Premadasa who in a public speech hinted about the culprits responsible for the wanton act, speaking at a Muslim College in Puttalam in October 1991, in the aftermath of the impeachment against him sponsored by the UNP dissidents Lalith Athulatmudali and Gamini Dissanayake, reportedly said,
“During the District Development Council elections in 1981, some of our party members took people from other parts to the North, created havoc and disrupted the elections in the North. If you wish to find out who burnt the priceless collection of books in the Jaffna library you have only to look at the faces of those opposing us”.
The above assertions of Prabanjana, to me who was an eye witness to the happenings in Jaffna including the library going up in flames, are baseless and unsubstantiated. The present generation has been fed on writings of this nature and made to believe that mobs, politicians and police officers were the culprits. All these assertions have to be critically looked at without bias to arrive at any reasonable conclusion as to “Who burnt the Jaffna library”.
In the penultimate paragraph of Prabanjana’s article he has made an observation on the formal opening of the renovated library, an observation that will become increasingly significant as we go along. The narrator of Someetharan’s documentary has stated that the renovated library began to function without any formal opening as “opposition grew to the Government’s and Municipal Council’s willingness to declare open the library”.
But Prabanjana, wittingly or unwittingly adds, “There is however another version of this story relating to the canceled opening ceremony which the documentary fails to mention. Many a ‘Dalit’ activist has pointed out that the move to declare open the library faced strong opposition because the event was to be headed by the then Jaffna Mayor Sellan Kanthaiyah who was from an oppressed caste. It is said that those who belonged to the dominant caste in Jaffna could not tolerate the public library being declared open under the chairmanship of a ‘low caste’ man”,
The question that comes to my mind and should to any prudent person is: if the dominant caste in Jaffna (vellala) could not tolerate a ‘low caste’ man opening the renovated library, with what restraint would the ‘low caste’ non vellala community have for decades tolerated the existence of the library which was symbolic of the intellectual and social superiority of the vellalas? Did they bide their time and wait for an opportune moment to destroy this symbolic edifice of the Hindu aristocracy? It was the oppressed non vellala castes that comprised the bulk of the Prabahakaran led LTTE.
To this LTTE with its unquestionable caste foundation “the destruction of the intellectual heritage preserved down the ages”, was of little or no consequence. In fact it was not too long ago that the library was the exclusive preserve of the Vellalas. There is reason to believe that Prabahakaran and his young followers imbued with Marxist thinking would have viewed the public library symbolic of the establishment — the intellectually and socially superior elite Hindu vellala aristocracy. This was indeed a major stumbling block to the forward march of ‘the boys’. They certainly could not have had any qualms even of destroying this symbol if it were to give a turbo-boost to their ambitions.
The Beginnings of LTTE Terrorism
The lies and dubious assertions – all of which can be countered by facts – repeated over and over again even in our not so prestigious parliament, by individuals who pose as intellectuals interested in the so-called ethnic question and by mercenary NGO’s have come to be believed without question. The propagandists of the LTTE undoubtedly got maximum mileage out of the burning of the library as people in Sri Lanka and abroad had been made to believe that it was the work of Sinhalese politicians, police officers and goons.
More importantly, the present generation believes or has been made to believe that the LTTE’s quest for a separate state of Eelam through a war characterized by terrorism was motivated solely by acts such as the burning of the library and the anti-tamil riots of 1983.
If I were to recount briefly from memory, sporadic acts of terrorism began to emerge particularly with the promulgation of the Republican Constitution of 1972. As far back as May 1972 attempts were made by militant youths to topple a key high-tension electricity tower and also kidnap the children of a Tamil cabinet minister, Chelliah Kumarasuriyar.
Organized Terrorism
Organized Terrorism began to emerge by the mid-seventies. Alfred Duraiappah was personally assassinated by Prabahakaran. Police officers including retired officers and police informants began to be brutally killed. Robberies of banks, co-operatives, petrol filling stations and even passenger bus collections had become the order of the day.
Before the end of the seventies the LTTE had advanced to become a well-knit terrorist outfit that was seeking world attention. The meticulous planning that went into the explosion of the Air Ceylon Avro aircraft on Sept. 7, 1978 showed that the ‘boys’ had come of age. Fortunately the plan misfired. The explosion that was planned to take place over the Galle Face Green when the ceremonies connected with the promulgation of the new constitution were taking place, in fact occurred before the Avro took off from Ratmalana. Had it exploded as planned it would certainly have hit the world headlines like the Lockerbie crash.
Another sensational act of terrorism in the same year, in April if I remember right, was the brutal killing after much torture of IP Bastiampillai, SI Perampalam, PS Balasingham and PCD Siriwardena at Murunkan. The first information was of four decomposing bodies received by the Intelligence Services Division (ISD) of the Police of which I was the Director at the time.
It was about this time, 1979 to be more precise, when I was the Director of Intelligence that I accompanied Brigadier ‘Bull’ Weeratunga to Jaffna. His mandate from President Jayewardene was ‘to eliminate terrorism from the peninsula’. But the militant youths who began to be hunted down fled to India where they continued their training by Indian and the PLO experts on terrorism. By 1981 most of the trained youths had returned to commit murders and robberies with impunity. Their ranks were also beginning to swell, with more youth enamored by the adventurous nature of the movement, joining it.
It was in this atmosphere that the government decided to hold the District Development Council (DDC) elections. The Jayewardene government believed that the strengthening of the state’s hold over the peninsula by holding elections and having a democratic peripheral administration would help to break the back of the Tigers. To the latter, who by then not only had the backing of India, but had announced to the world of their existence as a formidable group of ‘freedom fighters,’ it provided a challenge of a different nature.
Anton Balasingham who by then was firmly in the saddle as the mentor of Prabahakaran was to tell the ‘boys’ that under no circumstances should the government of J.R. Jayewardene be allowed to take political control of Jaffna. The Indira Gandhi government that had strained relations with JR was also interested in ensuring that the central government did not have control over Jaffna. India wished for a manipulable power set-up in the North of Sri Lanka. Indian intelligence, (RAW) – Research and Analysis Wing – had been given the task of disrupting the DDC elections. I shall later recall an incident where I had an encounter with a RAW agent during the elections in Jaffna.
Reaching maturity
It is indeed significant that when the eighties commenced the separatist movement of the Tigers had reached a high degree of maturity. Splinter groups had been eliminated and Prabahakaran who had built up an image as a strong and dynamic leader had become the supreme commander. Uma Maheswaran who believed that a separate state could be achieved by resorting to urban guerilla tactics had lost his appeal.
Prabahakaran firmly believed that a well planned multi-pronged approach was required. He had realized the need for a sound theoretical base that would appeal to the youth, the importance of the collection of funds and getting the support of the western world where there were Tamils in influential positions in many cities. Above all he was determined to make the world know that the LTTE had launched a liberation struggle for the oppressed Tamil people.
The shrewd Prabahakaran also realized that to win the sympathy of the West he had to demonstrate an affinity with the Catholic faith. By indirectly portraying the Vellalas as the protectors of the Hindu tradition he had successfully won over the Catholic bishops to his cause. Dr. Anthonypillai Stanislaus Balasingham, a Catholic Marxist theoretician married to an Australian radical had become
Prabahakaran’s main propaganda organizer. Pamphlets craftily authored by Balasingham even with a map demarcating the boundaries of the proposed Eelaam were being circulated in all western capitals. These were freely available even in Pettah, Wellawatta and Wattala.
Balasingham who authored a book entitled, “Towards a Socialist Eelaam”, was also a member of the Communist Party of Britain. A keen student of world terrorist movements he had hardened himself as a brutal strategist not opposed to the killing of non — Christians for the furtherance of the movement he represented. Had he not died before the war ended in 2009, perhaps he would have successfully used his clout with powerful elements in Europe, America and Canada or even Australia to provide safe passage out of the country for Prabahakaran, Nadesan and others.
(To be continued next week)
Features
Regime change and the vacuum:Strategic lessons of Iraq and Libya
by Col. (R) Nalin Herath
There is a question that the international community must periodically ask itself: What happens to a State after its regime has been ousted?
The question is particularly relevant when examining Iraq and Libya. Saddam Hussein and Muammar Gaddafi were authoritarian rulers. Their governments were associated with political repression, human-rights violations and the suppression of political opposition. None of this should be ignored or excused. But recognising the failures of authoritarian rule does not prevent us from asking another, equally important strategic question:
Did the removal of these regimes adequately prepare for what came next?
The experience of Iraq and Libya suggests that removing a ruler is considerably easier than replacing the political, administrative and security architecture around that ruler.
Danger of confusing regime change with State reconstruction
A state is more than its leader. It consists of institutions, security forces, civil servants, courts, political structures, infrastructure, economic systems and, perhaps most importantly, an accepted monopoly over the legitimate use of force. When an authoritarian system has concentrated enormous power around one individual, removing that individual can expose weaknesses that were previously hidden. The strategic mistake is to assume that once the dictator has gone, a democratic and stable state will naturally emerge. History does not support such an assumption. The aftermath of Iraq demonstrates this particularly clearly. Following the 2003 invasion, the Coalition Provisional Authority issued Order No. 2, formally dissolving the Iraqi Ministry of Defence and the Iraqi Army, among other security institutions. A US congressional report later documented the enormous consequences of this decision, including the disappearance of hundreds of thousands of military personnel from the institutional framework of the state. Whatever the intentions behind the decision, the strategic consequence was that an established security structure had to be rebuilt while the country was simultaneously experiencing political upheaval and growing violence. That is a dangerous combination.
Iraq: Removing the structure before building the replacement
Saddam Hussein’s government was unquestionably authoritarian. It also reflected a complicated sectarian and political structure in which members of the Sunni minority occupied disproportionate positions of power despite being a demographic minority. But the question for strategic planners should not simply be whether Saddam deserved to remain in power. The question should have been:
What institutional structure would replace the system once he was removed?
An army can be politically controlled without being politically representative. A bureaucracy can serve an authoritarian government while still providing essential state functions. A security institution can be reformed without necessarily being destroyed. The distinction between reforming institutions and eliminating institutions is therefore critical. The post-2003 experience demonstrated the consequences of institutional disruption. Security vacuums contributed to insurgency and instability, while the process of rebuilding Iraq’s security forces took place amid an increasingly deteriorating security environment. The lesson is not that authoritarian institutions should never be reformed. The lesson is that state capacity should not be casually destroyed without a credible replacement.
Libya: prosperity, authoritarianism and institutional fragility
Libya presents an even more complicated case. Gaddafi’s government was authoritarian and deeply personalised. Political freedom was severely restricted, and the security apparatus was deliberately structured around regime survival. Yet Libya, under Gaddafi, also used substantial oil revenues to fund education, healthcare, infrastructure and social services. World Bank data from around the end of the Gaddafi era show life expectancy reaching approximately 75 years by 2011, skilled attendance at birth at 100 percent and measles immunisation at 98 percent. This does not prove that Gaddafi’s system was politically legitimate. It demonstrates something different: economic and social outcomes can coexist with authoritarian political structures.
The Great Man-Made River illustrates the scale of Libya’s investment ambitions. The World Bank described the project as one of the world’s largest engineering schemes, involving thousands of kilometres of planned pipelines to transport water from deep desert aquifers toward the populated coastal belt. The original project was estimated at approximately US$ 25 billion over several phases. Again, this should not become nostalgia for dictatorship. It should become a lesson in state capacity.
What happened after Gaddafi?
The post-2011 experience is perhaps the clearest illustration of the vacuum problem. Libya did not simply move from dictatorship to a consolidated democratic state. Instead, competing armed groups, political factions and institutions emerged. A UN economic and social affairs analysis concluded that the fall of the Gaddafi regime exposed weak state institutions and that the post-Gaddafi period was characterised by the proliferation of armed militias and institutional fragmentation.
The World Bank has similarly described how the security vacuum allowed armed groups to expand, while attempts to integrate them into the formal security apparatus produced a hybrid system in which state institutions and powerful armed groups operated alongside one another. This is the heart of the lesson. The consequences of regime change were also evident in Libya. The 2012 Benghazi attack, later portrayed in 13 Hours: The Secret Soldiers of Benghazi, illustrated the security vacuum that emerged after Gaddafi’s fall. The collapse of central authority allowed militias and competing armed groups to fill the space left by weakened state institutions. The lesson is clear: removing a regime may achieve military victory, but without a credible plan to rebuild the state, victory can quickly become a security vacuum.
When the state withdraws, something else occupies the space. If the replacement is not a legitimate national institution, the vacuum can be filled by militias, tribes, ideological movements, criminal networks or competing political authorities. The vacuum does not remain empty.
Terrorism question
There is another uncomfortable issue. Authoritarian regimes frequently suppress political and armed movements through coercive security systems. When those systems disappear abruptly, previously contained organisations can find new operating space. This does not mean that dictatorship is an appropriate method of counterterrorism. It means that counterterrorism cannot be separated from State capacity. The international community therefore needs to distinguish between defeating a particular terrorist organisation and maintaining the institutional conditions that prevent multiple armed actors from competing for power. The destruction of one regime does not automatically eliminate the forces that created insecurity. Sometimes it creates an environment in which those forces multiply.
Strategic mistake: winning the war but losing the peace
Military intervention can have a clearly defined operational objective. State reconstruction does not. A military campaign may successfully remove a government in weeks or months. Building legitimate institutions can take decades.This creates a fundamental strategic asymmetry. The shorter the planning horizon for intervention, the greater the danger of a long-term vacuum. The international community therefore needs to think beyond the first question: How do we remove the regime?
It must ask: Who governs the country the next morning? Who controls the borders? Who controls the security forces? Who pays government employees? Who maintains electricity, water and hospitals? Who protects critical infrastructure? Who administers justice? Who prevents armed groups from becoming alternative governments? Who provides political legitimacy? And perhaps most importantly: Who possesses the authority to enforce the decisions of the new state? If there are no convincing answers, regime change is only the beginning of the problem.
The lesson should not be that the United States or its allies should never intervene. Nor should it be that Saddam Hussein or Muammar Gaddafi should be rehabilitated as models of governance. The lesson is more practical. Regime change must never be confused with state-building.
Before dismantling an established political order, external powers need a credible understanding of the institutions that will replace it. Security-sector reform should normally distinguish between individuals who must be removed and institutions that must be preserved. A national army may need reform. A ministry may need restructuring. A security service may need accountability and civilian oversight. But destroying institutional capacity without having an operational replacement can create consequences far beyond the original objective.
Wider geopolitical lesson
The consequences of Iraq and Libya did not remain within their borders. State fragmentation affects neighbouring countries, migration, organised crime, arms trafficking, terrorism, energy markets and regional power competition. In today’s interconnected world, a failed transition in one country can become a security problem for an entire region. That is why intervention planning should include not only military objectives but also political, economic, humanitarian and security-sector objectives. The most important planning document may therefore not be the operational plan for removing the regime. It may be the plan for Day One after the regime has disappeared.
History should not be written as a simple choice between dictatorship and democracy. The real strategic challenge is more complicated. Saddam Hussein and Muammar Gaddafi were dictators. Their governments committed serious abuses, and their populations had legitimate grievances. But the failures of authoritarian rule do not automatically justify the destruction of state institutions without a credible plan for rebuilding them. The experience of Iraq and Libya demonstrates a fundamental principle of international security: A political vacuum is not neutral space. Someone will fill it. If legitimate national institutions cannot fill that space, armed groups, sectarian interests, extremist organisations or foreign-backed factions may do so. The ultimate lesson for the United States, its allies and the wider international community is therefore straightforward:
Removing a regime may win the immediate battle. Building a legitimate, functioning and secure state determines whether the intervention succeeds in the long term. The world should learn to ask not only “How do we remove the dictator?”. It must also ask:
“What happens to the country when he is gone?”
That may be the most important strategic question of all.
(The writer is the Secretary General of the Ceylon Chamber of Shipping, former Director General of the Institute of National Security Studies (INSS), and former Spokesman of the Ministry of Defence. He is also a Non-Resident Fellow at the London Dialogue. His areas of expertise include international relations, geopolitics, maritime affairs, national security, economic policy, and strategic governance. He is a consultant at JITT Group and a member of World Pace Board.).
Features
‘Death at the Sign of the Rook’
Tales of Mystery and Suspense – 23
By Prof. Rajiva Wijesinha
As I have noted with regard to the adventures of John Rebus, I am indebted to Dinali Fernando and her husband Steve for whole hosts of thrillers. The latter strongly recommended Kate Atkinson when I borrowed four books. I wondered about this, for I had not been too impressed with her debut novel, Behind the Scenes at the Museum, which was amongst the entries I had to judge for the Eurasian section of the Commonwealth Writing Prize. Two decades later, I had forgotten what it had been about.
But I am glad Steve persuaded me to read her. Kate Atkinson is distinctively British, and Death at the Sign of the Rook is set in a country house and the surrounding village, and seems a modern descendant of the laidback Agatha Christies I so much enjoy.
There are, however, many differences in that we have a policeman who can go rogue, like Rebus, with again a female sidekick who has a mind of her own, again like Rebus. But Jackson Brodie has retired and set up as a private investigator, while Reggie, a young lady, is still in the police.
There is a lesbian couple living in the converted dairy of the manor house, as has occurred in Agatha Christie too, in A Murder is Announced. But they are peripheral to the story, unlike Ben, the brother of one of them who left the army after losing a leg in Afghanistan. When he turns up at the Manor House to shelter from a snowstorm, along with its chatelaine, Lady Milton, he is asked to answer the door as various characters turn up, including Jackson and Reggie, who then starts fantasising about him.
The others who turn up are two couples, one from America, who have paid for a murder weekend at the hotel. The family is impoverished, and has sold lots of pictures to survive, but most recently a Turner had been stolen, almost certainly by Lady Milton’s housekeeper Sophie, who vanished one night along with the picture. Reggie had been involved in that investigation, but there had been no trace of either picture or young lady.
Jackson Brodie suspects a connection between that theft and the one he has been called in to investigate, which has not been reported to the police. The picture hung opposite the bed of an old woman whose carer vanished after she died, along with it. Her children, adopted twins, have asked Jackson to investigate and also try to trace the carer, though he suspects something strange in that they did not go to the police.
Brodie, in studying the stolen art, is also struck by the disappearance of a Rembrandt from a house in Scotland, along with a member of the cleaning staff. He thinks the three women might be the same one.
But Brodie’s assumption that the three women who vanished when valuable pictures did were identical would not have helped except that Beatrice, as she was also called, kept turning up, including to the funeral home where the old lady’s body was kept. And then that picture turned up, in the village church, and was found by the local vicar, Simon Cate, whose life story is also a prominent feature of the novel. He was an aspiring actor but then smitten by faith, and became a priest, but in time he lost his faith. His wife left him after the death of their son, and he is now in this backwater, where he feels he is of no use to anyone. But he has a great feel for living beings, and his most successful service has been one in which he blessed pets. And he was deeply concerned about the bees that Ben looks after for his sister and her wife.
He too staggers into the manor house in the midst of the storm, in which everyone concerned loses their way comprehensively. But amongst those Ben lets in is a man in a tracksuit with cuts and bruises, who then vanishes after he has been led to a bedroom, when Ben went in search of brandy. We soon work out that it is the escaped murderer about whom Reggie has been alerted.
Simon also turns up, through the back door, carrying the picture and also a gun, for he has found the dead body of one of his parishioners when he went to her house in search of his mobile phone. She had been shot and he had picked up the gun he found there. But he could not tell the police, for though he called he had lost his voice, and for the last few days had communicated only through writing.
This chaotic mix of characters at the manor house is further complicated by the group of players putting on the murder mystery play though some members have either cried off or died before reaching the venue. So, there is much doubling up and confusion over who is an actor and who is not.
The grand now largely empty rooms of the manor house, and its various odd passages and multiple doors, make it a splendid set for the lunacy that runs on and on. Reggie finds herself in a pantry Atkinsonwith a dead body, though this turns out to be the nanny who fell down the stairs and was put there by Lady Milton’s younger son. And there is high drama on the roof when the murderer nearly kills Ben, but he is saved by Reggie, and when he tries to kill Brody with an axe, he is shot by Beatrice, who has been the maid who served at the dinner before the murder mystery play, and explains to Brody how she has managed all her thefts.
And then in the melee, she vanishes on a motorbike, along with the daughter of the old lady’s adopted daughter, the only person who seemed to grieve at the funeral, and to whom the old lady had left her house in a codicil to
her will, which her children have not known about. She leaves the picture to the carer, but it is brought to Simon Cate as he lies in hospital, recovering from a heart attack which adds confusion to the play.
Wonderfully convoluted, but all very clear, despite the headlong pace of the book and its shifts from one scene to another, from one character to another (or rather combinations of them) and from one-time span to another. A writer and a detective well worth looking out for. e more books by her on Dinali’s shelves.
Features
Safety, security and teamwork in aviation
by Capt. (Ret.).G.A. Fernando, MBA
There are three essential components to a commercial airline operation: safety, security and teamwork.
Aviation and teamwork at the ‘sharp’ end of a commercial aircraft, i.e. the flight deck, is unique. Unlike many other teams, it may be quite literally the first and the last time a particular combination of small teams of two, three, or four individual airmen (or women) will fly together. Sometimes even in the same airline that employs them.
Therefore, to make conditions safe and practical, while understanding and trusting tech other, they have to rely on a series of Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs), and ‘Normal’ and ‘Emergency’ checklists for every conceivable situation. That is, to be able to do the right things, and do things right. In fact, there is a saying in aviation to the effect that ‘if you make a mistake in aviation, be original and make a new one’.
To ensure that safety standards are constantly maintained, airline pilots’ proficiency is tested every six months, in simulators, under the supervision of examiners from the civil aviation regulator. In Sri Lanka that organisaton is the Civil Aviation Authority-Sri Lanka (CAASL). Three simulator checks are conducted every 12 months in keeping with the tenet that ‘practice makes perfect’. A pithy adage not confined to the world of aviation warns that ‘prior preparation prevents piss-poor performance’.
The simulator exercises include rejected takeoffs, including in cross-wind situations, landings, engine fires and/or engine failures from a variety of causes, cabin pressurisation failure, precision and non-precision approaches, and landings in bad visibility – amongst other conditions that could be expected in actual flight.
In addition, a flight in a real airplane, on a regular passenger service under the supervision of an examiner from the airline, is undertaken to ensure that the company’s standard practices and procedures are carried out and maintained as prescribed in the airline’s manuals. These publications are in turn approved by the national regulator.
Finally, flight crew members must take a written test annually, on emergency equipment locations and procedures, with 90% as the pass mark.
Since the mid-1980s it has been mandatory for airline pilots to undertake a Crew Resource Management (CRM) programme once every two years. This training essentially emphasises what to do and what not to do to, in a specific emergency situation, or even during normal operations, to make the team cohesive and effective. During the course, the CRM facilitators discuss recent incidents and accidents that have occurred. Results of those events are recorded and could be retrieved, when necessary, by the official aviation bodies.
Not unexpectedly, it is demanding on a pilot to fulfill these requirements on a regular basis throughout his/her career, along with presenting for a bi-annual medical examination, all with the objective of retaining one’s licence to operate an aircraft. It may not be understood, therefore, by persons outside the aviation industry, or even some working in other aspects of an airline organisation, that it is often the passion for flight that keeps many pilots doing what they do to earn a living.
Security
Another important factor is the challenge of maintaining security in all aspects of airline operations, not least in the cockpit. The challenges are many, with new ones surfacing almost every day. It is therefore essential to be always prepared for the activities and ‘methods’ of perpetrators seeking to wreak evil on an aircraft and its occupants. As it is impossible for any airline or national security organisation to cover all aspects, systematic management of risks to effect a safe outcome becomes imperative.
Flydubai Incident
In the recent Flydubai incident of 30 September, 2026, a first officer (co-pilot) attacked the captain of the flight with a crash axe to accomplish his sinister motives, into which investigations are continuing. For the time being, it prompts the questions: should the crash axe be easily accessible to the flight crew? Or even be there at all? I believe it is a case of assessing the greater risk.
With regard to that event, and the circumstances that led to it, other deterrents could have been applied more thoroughly. For example, more thorough screening of pilots’ and other crewpersons’ backgrounds, with emphasis on their mental health, ideological affiliations and previous employment history. Separately, during a time of conflict in the Middle East, should Flydubai have even been operating between Dubai and Tel Aviv? Notwithstanding that cost-cutting and profit maximisation are key aims of any business, an airline’s apparent failure to conduct adequate psychological profiling of flight crew members, while continuing to operate ‘profitable’ routes, regardless of potential danger, can only be regarded and condemned as greed and disregard for human lives.
( Captain. Fernando, RCyAF, SLAF, Air Ceylon, Air Lanka, Singapore Airlines (SIA), SriLankan Airlines, Former Chief Pilot, Air Lanka Boeing 737, Former Deputy Chief Pilot, Lockheed L 1011, Former Crew Resource Management (CRM) Facilitator, SIA, Former Deputy Director (Air Operations) CAASL, Former President, Aircraft Owners and Operators Association Sri Lanka (AOAOASL), President, The Colombo Flying Club, Representative for Aviation, Organisation of Professional Associations (OPA), Hony, and Member Sri Lanka Society of Transport and Logistics.)
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