Features
When two Richards fought for Kelaniya in the 1956 elction

By Avishka Mario Senewiratne
Eight years after independence, Ceylon – relatively new to democracy and independent rule, though looking good on the global canvas – was on the verge of the humiliating defeat of its ruling government led by the United National Party (UNP). The vast masses of Ceylon had been disillusioned by the pro-elite UNP politics and were persuaded to vote for the Mahajana Eksath Peramuna (MEP) led by S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike, the leader of the Sri Lanka Freedom Party (SLFP). Though toxic for the future, the majority were inclined to see the implementation of the Sinhala Only Act, canvassed by the MEP in a favourable light.
Since the early 1940s, Junius Richard Jayewardene was known to be a highly accomplished and methodical politician. He served as the Minister of Finance in the Cabinet of D. S. Senanayake (1947-1952) and Dudley Senanayake (1952-53), and as Minister of Agriculture and Land (1953-56) in Sir John Kotelawala’s regime. Undoubtedly, he was second in line to be the leader of the UNP as well as to be Ceylon’s Prime Minister. However, in 1956, despite his excellent track record in politics, there was little he could do to retain his parliamentary seat in Kelaniya when Richard Gotabaya Senanayake challenged him.
Uncle and Nephews of the UNP
The story began with one man who did not live beyond 1901. This was Mudaliyar D. C. G. Attygalle, a father of four; three daughters and a son. The three daughters married John Kotelawala Sr. (father of Sir John), F. R. Senanayake (father of R. G. and brother of D. S.) and Col. T. G. Jayewardene (uncle of J. R.). When Ceylon received independence in 1948, the sons and nephews of all these esteemed gentlemen were prominent members of the United National Party, and in high office or eagerly waiting their entry.
The UNP was chartered in 1946 by D. S. Senanayake, who would be PM a year later. His successors were to be his son and nephew. Some high officials of the party were related to him, as well. For these obvious reasons, critics of the UNP ridiculed the party acronym as “Uncle-Nephew Party” and also pilloried it as “Unge Neyange Paksaya” – ‘their relations’ party’ (Weerawardana, p. 121).
The subjects of this essay, J. R. Jayewardene and R. G. Senanayake were thus related to each other and had a friendship since their childhood. When R. G. Senanayake entered politics in 1944, his friend J. R. was a well-established politician. Despite being a victim of polio and unable to be as active as he would wish, RG strived to serve his people with great charm, enthusiasm and sincerity. According to Prof. K. M. de Silva, RG hardly made an impact in the legislature, and if not for his being the son of F. R. Senanayake, many may have questioned his appointment as Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Defence and External Affairs in 1947 (de Silva and Wriggins, p. 266). This Ministry was under his uncle DS, the Prime Minister.
The two Richards in San Francisco
In September 1951, all was set for the Japanese Peace Treaty Conference in San Francisco. However, Prime Minister D. S. Senanayake declined to travel for the event despite being Minister of External Affairs as his knowledge of foreign affairs was limited to the sub-continent. He suggested that JR should represent Ceylon. At JR’s request, DS appointed RG to accompany him, along with a private secretary, R. Bodinagoda later Chairman of Lake House. The only other person on the entourage was JR’s wife, Elena Jayawardene.
Not only was this delegation small but it also was poorly equipped, given its lack of informed aides and stenographers unlike delegations of other countries at the San Francisco Conference. Nevertheless, for JR this was a great opportunity and the beginning of a long association with Japan. His 15-minute speech created a major impact on the conference stressing Japan’s right to be a free state. JR became an instant global celebrity and PM Yoshida of Japan shook his hand with tears of joy in his eyes.
This was an unexpected triumph for Ceylon and its future leader, JR. Young R. G. Senanayake received a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity to watch how his senior colleague won over leaders of the world in San Francisco. JR and RG along with Sir Claude Corea, the Ambassador of Ceylon to the USA, travelled to various parts of the US visiting the Ceylonese diaspora in that country.
Two Richards, two foes
With the passing of time, RG developed ambitions for high office. However, the presence of his cousins in senior positions deprived him of the opportunity to quickly achieve his political goals. Though concealed by his charm and winning ways, there was little RG could do to prevent displayng his true goals and envy of his cousins. He believed that Prime Minister D. S. Senanayake had taken over his own father’s destiny (F. R. Senanayake died prematurely in 1926) of becoming Ceylon’s first prime minister, and that his cousin Dudley was in the position which would otherwise have been his (see de Silva and Wriggins, pp. 265-266).
Soon, however, a major rift between JR and RG began to appear and their lifelong friendship was over by early 1952. Apart from his political ambitions, the tension between JR and RG was aggravated by a family dispute over RG’s association with his future wife, Erin. The bitterness in their personal lives spilled over into the political field and soon they were enemies.
Yankee Dicky Vs China Dicky
Despite the obvious signs of the careerist in RG, when Dudley was made Premier upon the untimely death of his father, he appointed his cousin RG as Minister of Trade and Commerce, while Jayewardene was re-appointed as Minister of Finance. In this capacity, RG built a formidable name for himself when he convinced the Government of Ceylon to sign the Rubber-Rice Pact with China in 1952. This was the crowning achievement of RG’s political career and it won him the name “China Dicky”.
Realising the demand for rubber in China and his country’s need for rice at the cheapest possible price, RG urged his government to forget their political differences with China and reach a Rubber – Rice Agreement. Though PM Dudley and his Cabinet strongly backed RG’s strategy, the Minister of Finance, now labelled “Yankee Dicky”, was not in favour of the Pact and vehemently opposed it. This was well reported in the Times of Ceylon. Dudley Senanayake believed that the Pact would solve Ceylon’s food shortage and boost the economy to a great extent as well as help find opportunities to seek new markets (see Amarasingam, where ??? p. 3).
JR was critical of the Pact for two reasons. One was that the USA would be (they later were) concerned and critical of Ceylon’s association with China. At a time when Ceylon was seeking entry to the UN, how would other nations perceive such a stance? The other was how China might influence the economy of Ceylon as they were to have a monopoly on the purchase of Ceylon’s rubber.
Nevertheless, the Pact was a great success and, after being renewed every five years, remained in effect till 1982. The supply of rice to Ceylon by China at prices below the world market resulted in a net benefit of about Rs. 92 million in 1953 alone. RG’s popularity was secured in comparison to that of the Minister of Finance. Consequently, the bitterness and envy between the two Richards further deepened.
RG leaves the Cabinet
A year later in 1953, with the infamous Hartal, the sensitive Dudley Senanayake resigned from his office as Prime Minister and thus Sir John Kotelawala – who had been expected to succeed DS in 1952 – was made Ceylon’s third PM. While R. G. Senanayake was re-appointed as Minister of Trade, J. R. Jayewardene was given a new portfolio; that of Minister of Agriculture and Land. JR was Sir John’s most trusted lieutenant and the new PM held him in high esteem and confidence.
On the other hand, Sir John’s relationship with his cousin RG deteriorated by 1954 when the latter opposed the Premier’s contemplated visit to the USA. RG had feared that Sir John would reach a deal with the Americans and break away from Ceylon’s policy of remaining neutral in foreign affairs. Furthermore, RG was critical of the appointment of Sir Oliver Goonetilleke as Governor-General, as well as Sir John’s attempts to seek a solution to the problems of the Indians in Ceylon’s polity.
Partly for these reasons, RG resigned from the Cabinet. However, it was well known that the real reason for his resignation was his opposition to JR whom he severely disliked. Deeply embarrassed by RG’s actions, Sir John later wrote the following in his memoirs: “The good God gave me friends, but the devil gave me my relations. It is an irony of fate that at critical stages of my public career some of my relations, instead of rallying around me, have caused me the most embarrassment and trouble.” (An Asian Prime Minister’s Story, p. 130)
An early election in 1956
1956 was a key year in the annals of Ceylon’s history as the majority of Buddhists were preparing to celebrate the 2500th Buddha Jayanthi. The Buddhist clergy had asked the government to keep the year free of political agitation. On the other hand, the movement to do away with English as the State language and implement Sinhala Only was making strong headway. The leader of the SLFP, S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike was clamouring for it along with his large coalition of parties (the MEP).
The feudal-style UNP regime had lost much of its credibility with the public as the government failed to cater to their demands despite being a stable regime with much promise. Influenced by the advice of Sir Oliver Goonetilleke, Sir John was keen to hold the elections as early as April 1956. Being neutral on the language policy, on the insistence of many of his aides including JR, Sir John decided to give into Sinhala Only in early 1956.
By doing this last-minute volte-face, Sir John expected the UNP to score a comfortable win. However, he had gravely misread the trends of the day. The majority of Sinhalese had reposed much faith in the MEP while most of the Tamils were angered by Sir John’s last-minute policy shift on the language issue and refused to join forces with him at the election.
JR realised that his party was about to face an inevitable defeat. Furthermore, Sir John Kotelawala’s comments in the press on various social issues made him and his regime even more unpopular. It was in such a milieu that Parliament was dissolved in February 1956 although it could go on until January 1958. Accordingly, nominations were to be handed in by March 8 and the election was to be held on three days – April 5, 7 and 10.
The Kelaniya Electorate
J. R. Jayewardene first entered the State Council through a by-election held in the Kelaniya constituency in 1943. The previous holder of that seat was the most revered Sir Don Baron Jayatilaka who retired from politics and asked JR to succeed him. JR, however, had an opponent in the person of E. W. Perera, the famous freedom fighter. However, the poll favoured of JR as he amassed 21,765 votes against Perera’s 11,570 (Ceylon Daily News, 19.11.1943). Winning this historic election by over 10,000 votes was a great boon in the political life of JR. Through his grandmother (Helena Wijewardene’s) benevolent services to the famous temple of Kelaniya, this constituency was by all means related to JR. Kelaniya was a rural but growing electorate and consisted predominantly of Sinhala Buddhists.
In the subsequent election of 1947, JR once again ran at Kelaniya, under the banner of the newly formed UNP. This time he had a comfortable victory against Bodhipala Waidyasekera of the LSSP by over 7,000 votes (The Parliament of Ceylon 1947, p. 31). At the 1952 General Election, JR’s opponents were his aunt Wimala Wijewardene contesting from the SLFP and Vivienne Goonawardene of the LSSP. Based on this election result, JR reckoned that Kelaniya was not a safe seat for him any more as his majority against these two female candidates was less than 2,000. This was not a good record for JR as 1952 was a year the UNP was at its zenith. Therefore, he calculated that contesting again in Kelaniya was a risk, quite apart from the other troubles the UNP faced in 1956.
RG declares war on JR
R. G. Senanayake who was a Parliamentarian since 1947, had run at Dambadeniya successfully. He won both the 1947 and 1952 elections under the UNP banner with overwhelming majorities. He was expected to contest in the same seat again as he had won great respect and acceptance in this electorate. RG, unlike JR, was more of a people’s man, who rallied around the village folk and listened to their grievances. Wimala Wijewardene, a formidable opponent in the last election, had changed her seat to Mirigama and was expecting a comfortable win. However, until late 1955 there was no idea of whom to nominate for Kelaniya under the SLFP banner or that of any other party.
It was then that R. G. Senanayake declared that he would contest the Kelaniya electorate as an Independent candidate. He would also contest Dambadeniya as an Independent. This came as a great surprise to both JR and the MEP. Everyone knew that this move was to settle a personal vendetta against JR, and the MEP was initially reluctant to support RG, knowing his intentions and temperament. Senior journalist K. K. S. Perera once related to the writer that RG had at once said that he was coming to Kelaniya to remove a bad tooth from the next parliament!
It was clear that there was no other opponent in the calibre of RG who would defeat the all-powerful JR, the second in command in the UNP. For this reason, the MEP backed RG in Kelaniya. They would have good reason to remove JR from Parliament for they knew what a capable, methodical and shrewd politician he was. RG’s popularity under his father’s legacy, as well as the success he gained through the Rubber-Rice Pact, were well noted by the common men and women throughout the country. Another opponent JR had to face in Kelaniya was Ven. Mapitigama Buddharakkita Thera, who was not only the head of the Kelani Temple but also a leader of the Eksath Bikku Peramuna. He too supported RG to force JR’s exit from Kelaniya.
Times of Ceylon, January 28, 1956
JR’s unenthusiastic campaign and fate
After parliament was dissolved, JR holidayed for three days in Wilpattu and returned to Colombo with a much-relaxed mind but well aware of the apprehensions of the UNP. He had few doubts that he would lose his seat. However, he realised he did not have the time to campaign for the UNP in other parts of the country, even though his party needed his support now more than ever. Within a week or two into the campaign, JR fathomed that the UNP and his seat were doomed. Sir John’s blunders and controversial remarks made him unwittingly the MEP’s best campaigner (see de Silva and Wriggins, pp. 307-308). Visiting his own constituency, JR realised that his support had eroded.
He did attract crowds at his meetings in Kelaniya, but nothing similar to RG’s. Soon there were many jeers at these meetings, and stones were being thrown at JR’s car. What was more disappointing to him was to see Mrs. Robert Senanayake, Dudley’s sister-in-law (who was RG’s sister) campaigning against JR. This gave the notion that the Senanayakes were disillusioned with the UNP (see Dissanayaka, p. 40). Though Sir John visited Kelaniya on February 28, few were convinced that JR was winning. Day by day, attendance at JR’s meetings seemed to be diminishing in number.
The election was held on three separate days. The UNP selected those electorates where they were strongest to be held on the first two days. If they had done well on those two dates, it was possible that this would help change the electoral mood in constituenceis they were weak in. JR’s election was scheduled for the third day. However, the rout was clear when the UNP won only eight seats on the first day. The next two days brought the UNP no wins. The MEP, at this election, secured 51 seats with 40.7% of the vote.
The LSSP and the Federal Party won 14 and 10 seats each with vote percentages of 10.2% and 5.4%, respectively. The UNP, though holding 27.3% of the total vote, won just eight seats. Almost all its powerful Ministers, including JR, were defeated. Sir John comfortably won Dodangaslanda and M.D. Banda were among the eight UNPers to win their seats. Eight Independents and three members of the Communist Party were also elected. It was the worst defeat the UNP faced in the 20th century.
The results in Kelaniya were equally humiliating. As expected, RG topped Kelaniya with 37,023 votes (76%) whereas JR received only 14,187 (24%) votes (The Parliament of 1956, p. 21). JR was badly defeated and RG had accomplished his goal also winning Dambadeniya as an Independent with 94% of the votes against the hapless UNP candidate. This was the first time a single MP was represented two seats in Parliament. JR, knowing his fate, arrived at the Colombo Kachcheri where the votes were counted leaving the place after the results were declared amidst insults and jeers.
His car was hit with stones and rotten fruits as it left the premises. Escorted by the police, JR arrived at Braemar, his home in Ward Place. His driver was in tears and so was his younger brother, H. W. Jayewardene. However, JR remained calm and collected retaining his normal composure despite the humiliating defeat. He retired to his room in silence. A few days later, the man was seen back to normal with his spirits up, interacting with his family and, of course, planning his next election!
Aftermath
JR spoke very little of this episode, but nearly 40 years later in the preface to his memoir, Men and Memories, referred to the 1956 election as an “Electoral Holocaust”. He went on to say, “I had done much for the electorate but was defeated by an intruder in April 1956” (p. ix). With the defeat, one depressing outcome that emerged was that many of his close friends and relatives stayed away from him.
However, with much free time at his disposal, he went into serious reading, especially the six volumes of Winston Churchill’s History of the Second World War. It was through this book that he derived the motto, “In Defeat, Defiance”. JR used his defeat to focus on himself and opted to partner his old friend Dudley Senanayake to rebuild the UNP. Fortunes were such that the defiant JR would go on to become Sri Lanka’s first Executive President in 1978.
RG, on the other hand, was reappointed to the portfolio which he had previously relinquished. He worked closely with the new PM, S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike. Though being asked to resign from one of his two parliamentary seats by the new PM, and also by the press, RG refused to do so (Manor, p. 264). It was once said that during parliamentary votes RG used to raise both hands as he represented both Kelaniya and Dambadeniya!
However, after Bandaranaike’s untimely assassination, RG never came to prominence as a Cabinet Minister in any of the future regimes of 1960 or 1965. Despite being ill, he once again contested in two electorates in 1970 (Dambadeniya and Trincomalee) losing both badly. He passed away prematurely aged 59 in December 1970. He was widely respected for his integrity and sincere care for the common people he represented.
“Defeat is never fatal. Victory is never final. It’s courage that counts.” – Sir Winston Churchill
References
Amarasingam, S. P., (1953), Rice and Rubber: The Story of China-Ceylon Trade, Ceylon Economic Research Association
De Silva, K. M. and Wriggins, H., (1988), J.R. Jayewardene of Sri Lanka, Volume 1, Anthony Blonde/Quartet
Dissanayake, T. D. S. A., (1975), Dudley Senanayake of Sri Lanka, Swasthika
Fernando, J. L., (1963), Three Prime Ministers of Ceylon: An Inside Story, M. D. Gunasena
Jayewardene, J. R., (1992), Men and Memories: Autobiographical Recollections and Reflections, Vikas
Kotelawala, Sir J., (1956), An Asian Prime Minister’s Story, George Harrop & Co.
Manor, J., (1989), The Expedient Utopian: Bandaranaike and Ceylon, Cambridge
The Parliament of 1947,
The Ceylon Daily News
The Parliament of 1956,
The Ceylon Daily News
Times of Ceylon,
January 28, 1956
Weerawardana, I. D. S., (1960), Ceylon General Election
Features
Challenges to addressing allegations during Sri Lanka’s armed conflict

A political commentator has attributed the UK sanctions against four individuals, three of whom were top ranking Army and Navy Officers associated with Sri Lanka’s armed conflict, to the failure of successive governments to address human rights allegations, which he describes as a self-inflicted crisis. The reason for such international action is the consistent failure of governments to conduct independent and credible inquiries into allegations of war crimes; no ‘effective investigative mechanism’ has been established to examine the conduct of either the Sri Lankan military or the LTTE.
He has not elaborated on what constitutes an “effective investigative mechanism. He has an obligation and responsibility to present the framework of such a mechanism. The hard reality however is that no country, not even South Africa, has crafted an effective investigative mechanism to address post conflict issues.
INVESTIGATIVE MECHANISMS
The hallmark of a credible investigative mechanism should be unravelling the TRUTH. No country has ventured to propose how such a Mechanism should be structured and what its mandate should be. Furthermore, despite the fact that no country has succeeded in setting up a credible truth-seeking mechanism, the incumbent government continues to be committed to explore “the contours of a strong truth and reconciliation framework” undaunted by the failed experiences of others, the most prominent being South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission.
South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission is often cited as the gold standard for post conflict Mechanisms. Consequently, most titles incorporate the word “Truth” notwithstanding the fact that establishing the “Truth” was a failure not only in South Africa but also in most countries that attempted such exercises.
Citing the South African experience, Prof. G. L. Peiris states: “pride of place was given to sincere truth-telling which would overcome hatred and the primordial instinct for revenge. The vehicle for this was amnesty…… Despite the personal intervention of Mandela, former State President P. W. Botha was adamant in his refusal to appear before the Commission, which he deemed as ‘a fierce unforgiving assault’ on Afrikaaners” (The Island, 01 April, 2025). In the case of Sri Lanka too, disclosures to find the “Truth” would be all about the other party to the conflict, thus making Truth seeking an accusatory process, instead of a commitment to finding the Truth. The reluctance to engage in frank disclosure is compounded by the fear of recrimination by those affected by the Truth.
Continuing Prof. Peiris cites experiences in other countries. “Argentina, the power to grant amnesty was withheld from the Commission. In Columbia, disclosure resulted not in total exoneration, but in mitigating sentences. In Chile, prosecutions were feasible only after a prolonged interval since the dismantling of Augusta Pinochet’s dictatorship ….” (Ibid).
The mechanisms adopted by the countries cited above reflect their own social and cultural values. Therefore, Sri Lanka too has to craft mechanisms in keeping with its own civilisational values of restorative and not retributive justice for true reconciliation, as declared by President J. R, Jayewardene in San Francisco as to what the global attitude should be towards Japan at the conclusion of World War II. Since the several Presidential Commissions appointed under governments already embody records of alleged violations committed, the information in these commission reports should be the foundation of the archival records on which the edifice of reconciliation should be built.
ESTABLISHING DUE CONTEXT
The suggestion that an independent and credible inquiry be conducted into allegations of war crimes reflects a skewed understanding of the actual context in which the armed conflict in Sri Lanka occurred. Even the UNHRC has acknowledged that the provisions of “Article 3 common to the four Geneva Conventions relating to conflicts not of an international character is applicable to the situation in Sri Lanka, as stated in para. 182 of the OISL Report by the UNHRC Office. Therefore, the correct context is International Humanitarian Law with appropriate derogations of Human Rights law during an officially declared Emergency as per the ICCPR.; a fact acknowledged in the OISL report.
Consequently, the armed conflict has to conform to provisions of Additional Protocol II of 1977, because “This Protocol, which develops and supplements Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions is the due context. There is no provision for “alleged war crimes” in the Additional Protocol. Although Sri Lanka has not formally ratified Additional Protocol II, the Protocol is today accepted by the Community of Nations as Customary Law. On the other hand, “war crimes” are listed in the Rome Statute; a Statute that Sri Lanka has NOT ratified and not recognized as part of Customary Law.
Therefore, any “investigative mechanism” has to be conducted within the context cited above, which is Additional Protocol II of 1977.
SRI LANKAN EXPERIENCE
On the other hand, why would there be a need for Sri Lanka to engage in an independent and credible inquiry into allegations, considering the following comment in Paragraph 9.4 and other Paragraphs of the Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC)?
“In evaluating the Sri Lankan experience in the context of allegations of violations of IHL (International Humanitarian Law), the Commission is satisfied that the military strategy that was adopted to secure the LTTE held areas was one that was carefully conceived in which the protection of the civilian population was given the highest priority”
9.7 “Having reached the above conclusion, it is also incumbent on the Commission to consider the question, while there is no deliberate targeting of civilians by the Security Forces, whether the action of the Security Forces of returning fire into the NFZs was excessive in the context of the Principle of Proportionality…” (Ibid)
The single most significant factor that contributed to violations was the taking of Civilians in the N Fire Zone hostage (NFZ) by the LTTE. This deliberate act where distinction between civilian and combatant was deliberately abandoned, exposed and compromised the security of the Civilians. The consequences of this single act prevent addressing whether military responses were proportionate or excessive, or whether the impact of firing at make-shift hospitals were deliberate or not, and whether limiting humanitarian aid was intentional or not. These issues are recorded and addressed in the Presidential Commission Reports such as LLRC and Paranagama. This material should be treated as archival material on which to build an effective framework to foster reconciliation.
UK SANCTIONS
Sanctions imposed by the UK government as part of an election pledge for Human Rights violations during the armed conflict is a direct act of intervention according to Article 3 of the Additional Protocol of 1977 that is the acknowledged context in which actions should be judged.
Article 3 Non-intervention states:
1 “Nothing in the Protocol shall be invoked for the purpose of affecting the sovereignty of a State or the responsibility of the government by all legislative means, to maintain or re-establish law and order in the State or to defend the national unity and territorial integrity of the State”.
2 “Nothing in the Protocol shall be invoked as a justification for intervening directly or indirectly, for any reason whatsoever, in the armed conflict or in the internal or external affairs of the High Contracting Party in the territory on which the conflict occurs”.
Targeting specific individuals associated with the armed conflict in Sri Lanka is a direct assault of intervention in the internal affairs of Sri Lanka. The UK government should be ashamed for resorting to violating International Law for the sake of fulfilling an election pledge. If Sri Lanka had issued strictures on the UK government for not taking action against any military officers responsible for the Bloody Sunday massacre where 26 unarmed civilians participating in a protest march were shot in broad daylight, Sri Lanka would, in fact be intervening in UK’s internal affairs.
CONCLUSION
The UK’s action reflects the common practice of making election pledges to garner targeted votes of ethnic diasporas. The influence of ethnic diasporas affecting the conduct of mainstream politics is becoming increasingly visible, the most recent being the Tamil Genocide Education Week Act of Ontario that was dismissed by the Supreme Court of Canada on grounds the Provincial Legislations have no jurisdiction over Federal and International Laws.
However, what should not be overlooked is that the armed conflict occurred under provisions of common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions. This Article is developed and supplemented by Additional Protocol II of 1977. Therefore, since all Geneva Conventions are recognised as Customary Law, so should the Additional Protocol II be, because it is a development of common Article 3.
Imposing sanctions under provisions of Additional Protocol II amounts to Intervention in internal affairs of a State as stated in Article 3 of the Protocol; II cited above. Such interventions are prohibited under provisions of international law.
The need to revive independent and credible inquiries after the lapse of 16 years is unrealistic because those who were perpetrators and victims alike cannot be identified and/or located. Furthermore, the cost of disclosure because of the possibility of retribution would compromise their security. A realistic approach is to use the material recorded in the Presidential Commission Reports and treat them as archival records and use the lessons learnt from them to forge a workable framework that would foster unity and reconciliation with the survivors in all communities This is not to live in the past but to live in the here and now – the present, which incidentally, is the bedrock of Sri Lanka’s civilisational values.
by Neville Ladduwahetty
Features
The Silent Invasion: Unchecked spread of oil palm in Sri Lanka

Sri Lanka’s agricultural landscape is witnessing a silent yet profound transformation with the rapid expansion of oil palm plantations. Once introduced as a commercial crop, the oil palm (Elaeis guineensis) is now at the center of a heated debate, with environmentalists and scientists warning of its devastating ecological consequences.
Speaking to The Island research scientist Rajika Gamage, said: “The spread of oil palm in Sri Lanka is not just a concern for biodiversity, but also for water resources, soil stability, and even local economies that rely on traditional crops.”
A Brief History of Oil Palm Cultivation
Oil palm, originally from West and Central Africa, was first cultivated for commercial purposes in Java in 1948 by Dutch colonists. It reached Malaysia and Indonesia by 1910, where its lucrative potential drove large-scale plantations.
According to Gamage, in Sri Lanka, the first significant oil palm plantation was established in 1968 at Nakiyadeniya Estate by European planters, initially covering a mere 0.5 hectares. Today, oil palm cultivation is predominantly concentrated in Galle, Matara, and Kalutara districts, with smaller plantations in Colombo, Rathnapura, and Kegalle.
Over the decades, he says the commercial viability of oil palm has prompted its expansion, often at the cost of native forests and traditional agricultural lands. Government incentives and private investments have further accelerated the spread of plantations, despite growing concerns over their environmental and social impacts.
Economic Boon or Environmental Curse?
Supporters of oil palm industry argue that it is the most efficient crop for vegetable oil production, yielding more oil per hectare than any other alternative. Sri Lanka currently imports a significant amount of palm oil, and expanding local production is seen as a way to reduce dependence on imports and boost local industries. However, Gamage highlights the hidden costs: “Oil palm plantations deplete water sources, contribute to soil erosion, and threaten native flora and fauna. These are long-term damages that far outweigh the short-term economic benefits.”
One of the primary environmental concerns is the aggressive water consumption of oil palm, which leads to the depletion of underground aquifers. This is particularly evident in areas such as Kalu River and Kelani River wetlands, where native ecosystems are being severely affected. Additionally, soil degradation caused by extensive monoculture farming results in loss of fertility and increased vulnerability to landslides in hilly regions.
Furthermore, studies show that oil palm plantations disrupt the natural habitats of endemic species. “Unlike rubber and coconut, oil palm does not support Sri Lanka’s rich biodiversity. It alters the soil composition and prevents the regeneration of native plant species,” Gamage explains. The loss of forest cover also exacerbates human-wildlife conflicts, as displaced animals venture into human settlements in search of food and shelter.
A Threat to Indigenous Agriculture and Culture
Beyond environmental concerns, oil palm is also threatening traditional crops like kitul (Caryota urens) and palmyrah (Borassus flabellifer), both of which hold economic and cultural significance. “These native palms have sustained rural livelihoods for centuries,” says Gamage. “Their gradual replacement by oil palm could lead to economic instability for small-scale farmers.”
Kitul tapping, an age-old tradition in Sri Lanka, provides a source of income for thousands of families, particularly in rural areas. The syrup extracted from kitul is used in local cuisine and traditional medicine. Similarly, palmyrah has deep roots in Sri Lankan culture, particularly in the Northern and Eastern provinces, where its products contribute to food security and local industries.
The rise of oil palm plantations has led to the clearing of lands that once supported the traditional crops. With large-scale commercial investments driving oil palm expansion, small-scale farmers are finding it increasingly difficult to sustain their livelihoods. Gamage warns, “If we allow oil palm to replace our native palms, we risk losing not just biodiversity, but also a vital part of our cultural heritage.”
The Global Perspective: Lessons from Other Nations
Sri Lanka is not the first country to grapple with the consequences of oil palm expansion. Malaysia and Indonesia, the world’s leading producers of palm oil, have faced severe deforestation, biodiversity loss, and socio-economic conflicts due to unchecked plantation growth.
In Indonesia, for example, vast tracts of rainforest have been cleared for palm oil production, leading to habitat destruction for endangered species such as orangutans and Sumatran tigers. Additionally, indigenous communities have been displaced, sparking legal battles over land rights.
Malaysia has attempted to address some of these issues by introducing sustainability certifications, such as the Malaysian Sustainable Palm Oil (MSPO) standard. However, implementation challenges remain, and deforestation continues at an alarming rate.
Sri Lanka can learn valuable lessons from these experiences. Implementing strict land-use policies, promoting agroforestry practices, and ensuring transparency in plantation expansion are crucial steps in mitigating environmental damage while supporting economic development.
The Urgent Need for Action
Despite these concerns, Sri Lanka has yet to enforce strict regulations on oil palm expansion. Gamage urges authorities to intervene: “It is imperative that we implement policies to control its spread before it is too late. The unchecked expansion of oil palm will lead to irreversible environmental damage.”
To address this issue, experts suggest a multi-pronged approach:
Stronger Land-Use Policies
– The government must enforce restrictions on oil palm cultivation in ecologically sensitive areas, such as wetlands and forest reserves.
Reforestation and Rehabilitation
– Efforts should be made to restore degraded lands by reintroducing native tree species and promoting sustainable agroforestry.
Supporting Traditional Agriculture
– Incentives should be provided to farmers growing traditional crops like kitul and palmyrah, ensuring that these industries remain viable.
Public Awareness and Education
– Raising awareness among local communities about the environmental and social impacts of oil palm can empower them to make informed decisions about land use.
Sustainable Alternatives
– Encouraging research into alternative vegetable oil sources, such as coconut oil, which has long been a staple in Sri Lankan agriculture, could reduce reliance on palm oil.
As Sri Lanka stands at a crossroads, the decisions made today will determine the country’s ecological and agricultural future. While the economic benefits of oil palm are undeniable, its long-term environmental and social costs cannot be ignored. The challenge now is to strike a balance between economic growth and environmental sustainability before the damage becomes irreversible.
In conclusion Gamage said, “We must act now. If we allow oil palm to spread unchecked, future generations will bear the cost of our inaction.”
Sri Lanka has the opportunity to take a different path—one that prioritises biodiversity conservation, sustainable agriculture, and the well-being of local communities. The time for decisive action is now.
By Ifham Nizam
Features
A plea for establishing a transboundary Blue-Green Biosphere Reserve in Gulf of Mannar and Palk Bay

Blue-green land and waterscapes act as ecological corridors across land and water in creating an ecological continuity in order to protect and restore the habitats of native and naturalised species.
In addition, these ecological corridors also help to conserve and improve the habitats of migratory species, as well. One of the main objectives of establishing blue-green land-waterscapes is to reconcile increasing local/regional development and human livelihood challenges in a sustainable manner while, at the same time, safeguard biodiversity and their habitats/ecosystems, as far as possible.
While green landscapes are natural and semi-natural terrestrial vegetation types like natural forests and grasslands, blue waterscapes are aquatic or semi-aquatic vegetation types such as seagrass meadows, mangroves and coastal and other wetlands. These vegetated coastal ecosystems known as ‘blue carbon’ ecosystems are some of the most productive on Earth and located at the interfaces among terrestrial, freshwater and marine environments. They provide us with essential ecosystem services, such as serving as a buffer in coastal protection from storms and erosion, spawning grounds for fish, filtering pollutants and contaminants from coastal waters thus improving coastal water quality and contributing to all important food security.
In addition, they capture and store “blue” carbon from the atmosphere and oceans at significantly higher rates per unit area than tropical forests (Figure 1) and hence act as effective carbon sinks. By storing carbon, these ecosystems help to reduce the amount of greenhouse gas in the atmosphere, thus contributing significantly to mitigate the effects of climate change.

Figure 1: Carbon storage in different vegetation types (Source – What Is Blue Carbon and Why Does It Matter? – Sustainable Travel International)
.Blue-green Carbon Markets
The recognition of blue carbon (BC) ecosystems (primarily mangroves, seagrasses and tidal marshes) as an effective natural climate solution paved the way for their inclusion within carbon markets. Blue carbon is the marine analog of green carbon, which refers to carbon captured by terrestrial (i.e., land-based) plants. The blue-green carbon market involves buying and selling carbon credits from projects that protect and restore coastal and marine ecosystems (blue carbon) and terrestrial ecosystems (green carbon). Since Blue Carbon ecosystems have higher carbon sequestration (capture and store) potential compared to their terrestrial counterparts, blue Carbon credits are worth over two times more than green carbon credits. They offer opportunities for commercial enterprises to offset carbon emissions and in turn support climate action.
Blue Carbon projects are expected to grow twofold in the near future. With the recent surge in international partnerships and funding, there is immense growth potential for the blue carbon market. However, it is critically important to look beyond the value of the carbon sequestered to ensure the rights and needs of local communities that are central to any attempt to mitigate climate change using a blue and green carbon project.
Blue Carbon projects can serve as grassroot hubs for sustainable development by developing nature-based solutions in these ecosystems thus contributing to both climate change mitigation and adaptation. Globally, numerous policies, coastal management strategies, and tools designed for conserving and restoring coastal ecosystems have been developed and implemented. Policies and finance mechanisms being developed for climate change mitigation may offer an additional route for effective coastal management. The International Blue Carbon Initiative, for example, is a coordinated, global program focused on conserving and restoring coastal ecosystems for the climate, biodiversity and human wellbeing.
Until recently, most of these opportunities focus on carbon found in the above ground vegetative biomass and do not account for the carbon in the soil. On the other hand, blue carbon, in particular has the potential for immense growth in carbon capture economics in the near future and can provide significant socioeconomic and environmental benefits. Consequently, blue -green carbon habitats in the Gulf of Mannar – Palk Bay region represent invaluable assets in climate change mitigation and coastal ecosystem conservation and sustainable development.
Gulf of Mannar and Palk Bay Trans-boundary Region
The Gulf of Mannar and Palk Bay region form a transboundary area within the waters of southeastern India and northwestern Sri Lanka. This region supports dense seagrass meadows having a high level of marine biodiversity including marine mammals such as dugong. Sea turtles are frequent visitors to the gulf while sharks, dolphins, sperm and baleen whales too, have been reported from this area. The Mannar region is recognized as an Important Marine Mammal Area (IMMA) of the world by IUCN (Figure 2) and also an Important Bird Area by Birdlife International. This region as a whole is a store house of unique biological wealth of global significance and as such is considered as one of the world’s richest regions from a marine biodiversity perspective.

Figure 2. Gulf of Mannar and Palk Bay IMMA (Source – IUCN Joint SSC/WCPA Marine Mammal Protected Areas Task Force, 2022 IUCN-MMPATF (2022)
Gulf of Mannar Biosphere Reserve – India
India has already declared a part of this region as the UNESCO Gulf of Mannar Biosphere Reserve covering an area of 10,500 km2 of ocean with 21 islands and the adjoining coastline. The islets and coastal buffer zone include beaches, estuaries, and tropical dry broadleaf forests, while the surrounding seascape of the Marine National Park (established in 1986) and a 10 km strip of the coastal landscape that include seaweed communities, seagrass communities, coral reefs, salt marshes and mangrove forests form the coastal and marine component of the biosphere reserve on the Indian side of the Gulf of Mannar.
Sri Lankan ‘Proposed’ Biosphere Reserve
On the Sri Lankan side of the Palk Bay there is a semi-enclosed shallow water body between the southeast coast of India and Sri Lanka, with a water depth maximum of 13 m. To the south, a chain of low islands and reefs known as Adam’s Bridge or Rama Setu (Rama’s Bridge), separates Palk Bay from the Gulf of Mannar. The Palk Bay leads to Palk Strait (Figure 3). Palk Bay is one of the major sinks for sediments along with the Gulf of Mannar. Sediments discharged by rivers and transported by the surf currents as littoral drift settle in this sink.
On the Sri Lankan side of the Palk Bay, studies are being conducted by the Dugong and Seagrass Conservation Project to establish an additional 10,000 hectares of Marine Protected Area to support the conservation of dugongs and their seagrass habitat in the Gulf of Mannar and Palk Bay. This project will involve the preparation of a multiple-community-based management plan in conjunction with government, fishing communities and the tourism industry.
With this valuable information emerging from projects of this nature, Sri Lanka has real opportunities to create a large marine protected area in the Gulf of Mannar and Palk Bay region and eventually merging them together with the Gulf of Mannar Biosphere Reserve of India to form a trans-boundary biosphere Reserve.
Terrestrial cum Marine Spatial Plan for the Gulf of Mannar and Palk Bay Region
Therefore, an excellent opportunity awaits both the Governments of Sri Lanka and India to collaborate in preparing of a terrestrial and marine spatial plan for this region, a prerequisite before going further on designing and implementing large scale development plans in establishing wind energy farms, mineral sand extraction, fishing industry, oil exploration and tourism development.
Coastal and Marine Spatial Planning (CMSP) is an integrated, place-based approach for allocating coastal and marine resources and space, while protecting the ecosystems that provide these vital resources.
On the Indian side, the Gulf of Mannar Biosphere reserve is well established and functional. On the Sri Lankan side, already there are three DWLC managed protected areas i) Adam’s Bridge Marine National Park (# 29 in the map – 18,990 ha declared in 2015), ii) Vedithalathiv Nature Reserve (# 35 -29,180 ha declared in 2016) and iii) Vankalai Sanctuary ( # 97 -4839 ha declared in 2008) (Figure 4) which can serve as the core zone of the Sri Lankan counterpart of a trans-boundary biosphere reserve. Due to the integrated nature of shallow wetland and terrestrial coastal habitats, Vankalai Sanctuary, in particular is highly productive, supporting high ecosystem and species diversity.

Figure 4: Protected Areas in Norther Sri Lanka Managed by the Department of Wildlife Conservation Source: DWLC
This site provides excellent feeding and living habitats for a large number of water bird species, including annual migrants, which also use this area on arrival and during their exit from Sri Lanka.
Having several coastal and marine protected areas already within the Sri Lankan territory provide an excellent opportunity to establish the Gulf of Mannar – Palk Bay blue-green Biosphere Reserve (Sri Lanka) initially and eventually to join up seamlessly with the already established Gulf of Mannar Biosphere Reserve on the Indian side to create a trans-boundary blue-green biosphere reserve.
This makes perfect sense because unlike sedentary plant species, mobile animal and plant groups (phytoplankton, in particular) do not respect human demarcated territorial boundaries. The provision of a common and unhindered protected coastal and marine passage for their customary movement for food and raising young is therefore of crucial importance in conservation management. Scientific evidence-based selection of additional areas, if necessary and their respective boundaries are best be determined in consultation with expert groups on marine mammals and reptiles, birds, fish, coastal vegetation conservation, sociology and industrial development from both sides of the divide.
Proper spatial planning needs to be done before large-scale development plans are designed and implemented in order to avoid conflicts of interest leading to inordinate delays and teething problems in project initiation. As a priority, the protected blue-green core and buffer regions need to be demarcated for their conservation. This could best be done in this narrow passage of land and water between Sri Lanka and India
( Palk Strait & Gulf of Mannar) by preparing a marine and terrestrial spatial plan along the UNESCO Man and Biosphere conceptual guidelines differentiating core, buffer and transition zones. While the protected areas in the core and buffer zone provide all important ecosystem services that would also serve as breeding ground for fish, crustaceans, marine reptiles, birds and mammals thereby provisioning sustainable industries to be developed in the surrounding transition areas demarcated in the joint spatial plan.
In addition, the Satoyama Global Initiative established by the Japanese at UNESCO as a global effort in 2009 to realise ‘societies in harmony with nature’ in which – Satoumi – specifically referring to the management of socio-ecological production landscapes in marine and coastal regions, is also a good model to be considered for conservation of biodiversity and co-existence between humans and nature.
Final Plea
In order to take this proposal forward from the Sri Lankan side, a number of useful baseline reports are already available including, but not limited to, the following: i. Biodiversity Profile of the Mannar District (CEJ & USAID 2022), ii. The Gulf of Mannar and its surroundings (IUCN 2012), iii) Atlas of Mangroves, Salt Marshes and Sand Dunes of the Coastal Area from Malwathu Oya to Pooneryn in the Northwestern Coastal Region, Sri Lanka (Ecological Association of Sri Lanka, Peradeniya, Sri Lanka, 2020). iv. Integrated Strategic Environment Assessment of the Northern Province of Sri Lanka (CEA 2014).
If this proposal to establish a Trans-boundary Blue-Green Biosphere Reserve in the Gulf of Mannar and Palk Bay is acceptable in principle to the Governments of Sri Lanka and India, it would be ideal if the Man and the Biosphere (MAB) program UNESCO which is an intergovernmental scientific program whose mission is to establish a scientific basis for enhancing the relationship between people and their environments to partner with the relevant Government and non-governmental agencies in both countries in making it a reality. This proposed concept has all the necessary elements for developing a unique sustainable conservation cum industrial development strategy via nature-based solutions while at the same time contributing to both climate change mitigation and adaptation.
by Emeritus Professor Nimal Gunatilleke,
University of Peradeniya
-
News4 days ago
Bid to include genocide allegation against Sri Lanka in Canada’s school curriculum thwarted
-
Sports5 days ago
Sri Lanka’s eternal search for the elusive all-rounder
-
News6 days ago
Gnanasara Thera urged to reveal masterminds behind Easter Sunday terror attacks
-
Sports1 day ago
To play or not to play is Richmond’s decision
-
News5 days ago
ComBank crowned Global Finance Best SME Bank in Sri Lanka for 3rd successive year
-
Features5 days ago
Sanctions by The Unpunished
-
Features5 days ago
More parliamentary giants I was privileged to know
-
Latest News3 days ago
IPL 2025: Rookies Ashwani and Rickelton lead Mumbai Indians to first win