Features
WAKE UP SRI LANKA ……Presidential Elections 2024
by Mohan Mendis
The 2019 and 2024 Sri Lankan presidential elections saw significant shifts in political leadership and voter preferences.
In 2019, Gotabaya Rajapaksa, representing the Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna (SLPP), won with 52.25% of the vote, defeating Sajith Premadasa of the Samagi Jana Balawegaya (SJB), who garnered 41.99%. Rajapaksa’s victory was driven by promises of strong governance, national security, and economic stability, but his administration faced severe challenges due to the economic crisis that led to his resignation in 2022.
In 2024, Anura Kumara Dissanayake, leader of the Marxist National People’s Power (NPP), emerged as the victor with 42.31% of the vote, surpassing Premadasa, who secured 32.76%. Dissanayake’s victory reflected widespread public dissatisfaction with the traditional political elite, as he campaigned on a platform of anti-corruption and working-class representation. His win signaled a major political shift, particularly in light of the country’s ongoing economic recovery following the 2022 crisis. While Dissanayake did not secure an outright majority, he won after a second round of vote redistribution, marking a historic moment in Sri Lanka’s politics, as he represented a break from the dominance of traditional political families like the Rajapaksas and Premadasa.
Here’s a statistical comparison between the 2019 and 2024 Sri Lankan
presidential election results:
2019 Presidential Election Results:
Winner: Gotabaya Rajapaksa (Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna – SLPP)
Votes: 6,924,255
Percentage: 52.25%
Runner-up: Sajith Premadasa (Samagi Jana Balawegaya – SJB)
Votes: 5,564,239
Percentage: 41.99%
Voter Turnout: 83.72%
2024 Presidential Election Results:
Winner: Anura Kumara Dissanayake (National People’s Power – NPP)
Votes: 5,740,179
Percentage: 42.31%
• Runner-up: Sajith Premadasa (SJB)
Votes: 4,530,902
Percentage: 32.76%
Voter Turnout: 76%
Key Differences:
1. Winning Margin:
= 2019: Rajapaksa won by a margin of 10.26%.
= 2024: Dissanayake won with 9.55% fewer votes than Rajapaksa did in 2019, and his margin over Premadasa was 9.55%.
2. Performance of Sajith Premadasa:
= 2019: Premadasa received 41.99% of the vote.
= 2024: Premadasa’s vote share dropped to 32.76%, a decrease of
9.23%.
3. Turnout:
2019: Turnout was higher at 83.72%.
2024: Turnout fell to 76%, indicating slightly lower voter participation This comparison reflects a shift from the dominance of traditional political figures to a more left-wing, anti-establishment candidate in 2024.
If Sajith Premadasa and Ranil Wickremesinghe had contested together in the 2024
Sri Lankan presidential election, their combined vote total could have significantly altered the outcome.
Premadasa’s 2024 vote share: 4,530,902 votes (32.76%)
Wickremesinghe’s 2024 estimated vote share: Although Wickremesinghe ran as an independent in 2024, his support base would primarily come from his long-time affiliation with the United National Party (UNP). Given his recent governance, we can estimate his vote base to be around 8-10%, based on the fragmented political landscape after the 2022 economic crisis
Combined Vote Estimate:
If we add an estimated 8-10% support for Wickremesinghe to Premadasa’s 32.76%, their combined vote share could have reached:
Around 40-43% of the total vote, with around 6-6.5 million votes.
This combination would likely have outperformed Anura Kumara Dissanayake’s 42.31% (5,740,179 votes), potentially leading to a victory for the combined opposition. However, this scenario depends on various factors:
Voter behavior: Not all of Wickremesinghe’s supporters might have automatically backed a Premadasa-Wickremesinghe alliance.
Strategic alignment: Wickremesinghe’s pro-market policies and Premadasa’s more populist stances may not fully align, possibly affecting voter turnout and support.
In conclusion, a joint candidacy could have statistically won the election, but the actual dynamics would depend on the coherence of their combined platform and voter perception.
The 2024 Sri Lankan presidential election saw a drop in voter turnout, an increase in the number of rejected votes, and a larger voter base due to demographic changes compared to 2019. Let’s break down these elements:
1. Voter Turnout:
2019: Voter turnout was 83.72%, reflecting high engagement during a time when national security and economic concerns were dominant.
2024: Turnout dropped to 76%, which is a significant decline
Factors Contributing to the Drop in Turnout:
Disillusionment with traditional political parties: Voters became frustrated with the old political guard due to their perceived role in Sri Lanka’s economic collapse. This disenchantment likely discouraged voter participation, especially for Ranil Wickremesinghe and Sajith Premadasa, whose parties were part of the “establishment.”
Economic instability and voter fatigue: After a severe economic crisis in 2022, many citizens felt the political process did not adequately address their concerns, further lowering voter enthusiasm.
Frustration with political elites: The dissatisfaction with traditional political families (such as the Rajapaksas and the Wickremesinghe-led UNP) led many voters to feel their votes wouldn’t significantly change the status quo
Reduced enthusiasm: After the crisis in 2022, many voters were struggling with day-to-day survival, leading to a decreased interest in political participation.
Large-Scale Emigration Since 2022: Following the 2022 economic collapse, an estimated 500,000 to 700,000 Sri Lankans left the country. Many were professionals, skilled workers, and members of the middle class, who were seeking better economic opportunities abroad due to the high inflation, shortages of basic goods, and the general economic instability in Sri Lanka
Loss of eligible voters: A significant portion of those who left were eligible voters. Since Sri Lanka does not have an established mechanism for absentee voting for citizens living abroad, these individuals were effectively excluded from the 2024 election process.
2. Impact of Economic Migration on Voter Motivation:
Frustration and disengagement: Many who remained in Sri Lanka may have felt disillusioned by the lack of effective governance, leading to voter apathy.
The exodus likely signaled a deep disconnection between citizens and the political system, as those who left may have represented a politically active demographic.
• Diaspora influence: While Sri Lankans living abroad typically maintain strong ties with their homeland, their inability to vote could have dampened political enthusiasm among their families and networks at home. This may have further contributed to the sense of futility in voting, reducing turnout.
3. Economic Hardships and Focus on Survival:
= Those remaining in the country continued to struggle with the aftermath of the economic collapse, including high taxes, inflation, and daily hardships. For many, political engagement took a backseat to focusing on economic survival. When citizens are burdened with meeting basic needs, voter participation can decline as political engagement becomes less of a priority
4. Lower Middle-Class and Professional Exodus:
The people who left were often from urban, educated, and professional backgrounds, a group that traditionally had higher political engagement.
Their absence directly impacted turnout, as many who typically participate in elections had left the country. This reduction was compounded by the youth and first-time voters who supported Anura Kumara Dissanayake, balancing the overall turnout to an extent, but not fully compensating for the exodus.
5. Lack of Trust in the Political System:
With Ranil Wickremesinghe taking over after the 2022 crisis and enacting austerity measures, many citizens felt betrayed by both the government and the opposition. The traditional political parties failed to regain trust, and this disillusionment likely led to a sense of hopelessness among voters, reducing their participation further. The combination of large-scale migration, disenchantment with the political system, and economic hardships all contributed to the reduced voter turnout in 2024. The lack of absentee voting rights for Sri Lankans abroad compounded the issue, as many potential voters were unable to participate in the electoral process, contributing to the overall decline in turnout
LESSONS LEARNT TO BE LEARNT BY ALL THREE MAJOR CANDIDATES BASED ON THE ELECTION VOTES
Based on the 2024 Sri Lankan presidential election results, each of the three major candidates — Anura Kumara Dissanayake, Sajith Premadasa, and Ranil Wickremesinghe — can draw important lessons to improve their future political strategies:
1. Anura Kumara Dissanayake (NPP):
= Key Lesson: Sustain Popular Momentum with Broader Appeal
Victory and Support from Youth and Left-Wing Voters: Dissanayake’s victory in 2024 reflected his success in capturing the youth vote, as well as those frustrated with traditional political elites. His anti-corruption and antiestablishment stance appealed to many who wanted change after the economic crisis
Challenge
: He must now expand his appeal beyond his core base. Though his 42.31% vote share brought him victory, it wasn’t an outright majority. His Marxist platform and revolutionary background make financial and business circles wary, which could hamper economic reforms and stability Lesson: To secure broader support, Dissanayake will need to moderate his economic policies to reassure businesses while staying true to his progressive base. He must also deliver on promises of systemic change, which was key to his support among younger voters.
2. Sajith Premadasa (SJB):
= Key Lesson: Reinvent Campaign Strategy and Unite the Opposition Failure to Build Momentum: Despite his 32.76% vote share, Premadasa failed to capitalize on the public’s discontent with traditional politics. His drop in support from the 41.99% in 2019 reveals that he could not gain the trust of those seeking change Challenge: Premadasa’s policies may not have stood out enough to differentiate him from the very system voters were rejecting. His inability to consolidate the opposition vote, especially in the face of Ranil Wickremesinghe’s split candidacy, further diminished his chances of winning. Lesson: Premadasa needs to reform his image and policy platform to offer a clear alternative to the status quo. Additionally, building alliances and uniting fragmented opposition forces, including Wickremesinghe’s supporters, would increase his chances in future elections.
3. Ranil Wickremesinghe (UNP):
Key Lesson: Address Public Discontent and Reform Political Strategy Economic Stabilization but Political Defeat: Wickremesinghe’s focus on economic recovery, including debt restructuring with the IMF, may have stabilized inflation and foreign reserves, but his low voter support (estimated 8-10%) showed a significant disconnect with the electorate).
His austerity measures were unpopular, as they were perceived as benefiting the elite while burdening ordinary citizens with higher taxes and costs. Challenge: Wickremesinghe’s political brand has become synonymous with the establishment, which is seen as partly responsible for the country’s crises. This made it difficult for him to attract a broad voter base despite his economic reforms.
Lesson
: He needs to rebuild public trust, particularly by demonstrating empathy for ordinary citizens affected by austerity measures. Engaging in more transparent governance and incorporating social welfare policies into economic recovery plans could help him regain public favor.
Additional Lessons for All Candidates:
Address Voter Disenchantment: The 7.72% drop in voter turnout and rise in rejected votes signal widespread disillusionment. All candidates must focus on rebuilding trust in democratic institutions by addressing the public’s core concerns, especially economic hardships and corruption
Incorporate the Diaspora: Given the significant exodus of Sri Lankans overseas, candidates should advocate for mechanisms such as absentee voting to engage the diaspora, many of whom still hold strong ties to the country and could be influential voters.
Offer Clear Policy Alternatives: The growing complexity of voter issues, particularly in the post-crisis landscape, requires candidates to offer clear, actionable policy proposals that address both short-term survival (inflation, employment) and long-term reforms (corruption, education, economic diversification).
These lessons highlight the importance of trust, clarity of message, and broad-based coalitions in an evolving political environment marked by economic uncertainty and widespread public dissatisfaction.
If Sajith Premadasa and Ranil Wickremesinghe had contested together in the 2024
Sri Lankan presidential election, their combined vote total could have significantly altered the outcome.
Potential Combined Vote Share (Premadasa + Wickremesinghe):
Premadasa’s 2024 vote share: 4,530,902 votes (32.76%)
Wickremesinghe’s 2024 estimated vote share: Although Wickremesinghe ran as an independent in 2024, his support base would primarily come from his long-time affiliation with the United National Party (UNP). Given his recent governance, we can estimate his vote base to be around 8-10%, based on the fragmented political landscape after the 2022 economic crisis
Combined Vote Estimate:
If we add an estimated 8-10% support for Wickremesinghe to Premadasa’s 32.76%, their combined vote share could have reached:
Around 40-43% of the total vote, with around 6-6.5 million votes. This combination would likely have outperformed Anura Kumara Dissanayake’s 42.31% (5,740,179 votes), potentially leading to a victory for the combined opposition. However, this scenario depends on various factors:
Voter behavior: Not all of Wickremesinghe’s supporters might have automatically backed a Premadasa-Wickremesinghe alliance.
Strategic alignment: Wickremesinghe’s pro-market policies and Premadasa’s more populist stances may not fully align, possibly affecting voter turnout and support. In conclusion, a joint candidacy could have statistically won the election, but the actual dynamics would depend on the coherence of their combined platform and voter perception.
The United National Party (UNP) and the Samagi Jana Balawegaya (SJB), despite their shared origins, remain divided as a united political force for several key reasons:
1. Leadership Rift between Ranil Wickremesinghe and Sajith Premadasa:
The primary reason for the division is the personal and leadership rivalry between Ranil Wickremesinghe, the long-time leader of the UNP, and Sajith Premadasa, who broke away to form the SJB in 2020.
Premadasa’s frustration: Premadasa had long sought a leadership role within the UNP, but Wickremesinghe’s reluctance to step down or share power with younger leaders created tension within the party. This frustration culminated in Premadasa forming the SJB ahead of the 2020 parliamentary elections .
Wickremesinghe’s dominance: Wickremesinghe’s control over the UNP and his reluctance to pass the torch exacerbated internal tensions. Many UNP members felt that under Wickremesinghe, the party was becoming disconnected from voters, but they couldn’t reform leadership, leading to the SJB split
2. Ideological and Policy Differences:
While both parties have roots in the UNP’s center-right liberalism, the SJB has taken a more populist and centrist approach under Premadasa. The SJB focuses on social welfare programs and expanding public services, making it more appealing to working-class voters.
UNP’s pro-market policies: Under Wickremesinghe, the UNP continued to champion pro-market, neoliberal economic policies, favoring privatization, foreign investments, and austerity measures. These policies became particularly unpopular after the 2022 economic crisis, further alienating a segment of voters who felt left behind
The SJB’s attempt to distance itself from these neoliberal policies was a critical reason for Premadasa’s breakaway and remains a central division between the two parties.
3. Public Perception of the Parties:
The UNP’s popularity sharply declined after the 2019 presidential election, where Wickremesinghe’s leadership was seen as ineffective in addressing key national issues, including the Easter Sunday attacks and the economic downturn. The party’s inability to stop the rise of the Rajapaksas was also a sore point for many supporters.
SJB’s formation was seen as a fresh start and an opportunity for renewal. Premadasa’s SJB quickly gained traction as a stronger opposition force against the Rajapaksas, winning more seats than the UNP in the 2020 parliamentary elections .
Public distrust of the UNP after the 2022 crisis, where Wickremesinghe was appointed president following Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s resignation, has reinforced the perception of the UNP as part of the old political guard that failed to protect the country from economic collapse.
4. Strategic Differences:
Premadasa’s SJB has focused on grassroots mobilization and appealing to the general public’s frustration with the status quo. His campaign style is more people-centric, offering populist measures that address immediate economic concerns.
Wickremesinghe’s UNP, in contrast, relies on institutional experience and positioning itself as the party with the capability to manage macroeconomic issues, especially in navigating complex financial negotiations with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). However, these strategies have not resonated with the broader electorate, which is looking for immediate relief.
5. Electoral Competition and Political Ambitions:
Both Premadasa and Wickremesinghe harbor strong political ambitions. Premadasa, as the leader of the SJB, sees himself as the face of Sri Lanka’s opposition, while Wickremesinghe continues to hold the presidency and remains determined to maintain his political relevance.
Competition for leadership: A merger between the two parties would likely force a power-sharing agreement, something neither leader seems willing to compromise on. This leadership struggle and competition for dominance in the opposition landscape make a merger highly unlikely without significant concessions
6. Party Structures and Grassroots Support:
The SJB’s infrastructure and voter base have been growing rapidly since its formation, attracting disillusioned former UNP members and voters, particularly from rural areas. On the other hand, the UNP’s support base has dwindled, particularly after its near-total defeat in the 2020 parliamentary elections, where it won just one seat.
This asymmetry in organizational strength and grassroots support makes it difficult for both parties to merge, as the SJB now commands the larger voter base and structure, while the UNP relies on its institutional history and Wickremesinghe’s position as president.
Conclusion:
The rivalry between Premadasa and Wickremesinghe, combined with policy differences, strategic ambitions, and diverging party infrastructures, makes it difficult for the UNP and SJB to unite as a political force. While they share a common origin, their leadership conflicts and differing visions for the country’s future have created significant barriers to reconciliation and unity in Sri Lankan politics. For the people of Sri Lanka striving for a new beginning—focused on prosperity, corruption-free governance, the rule of law, and unity among diverse communities—the following guiding lessons are crucial:
1. Strong Rule of Law and Accountability:
To ensure a corruption-free society, it is vital that Sri Lanka strengthens its legal and institutional frameworks:
• Transparent governance: Implement transparency in government contracts, spending, and policies. This includes creating robust mechanisms to audit public officials, ensuring that corruption and mismanagement are detected and addressed.
• Independent judiciary: Strengthening the judiciary so that it is free from political influence will restore faith in legal systems. Citizens must trust that laws will be applied equally, regardless of political or social status.
• Anti-corruption institutions: Fully empower institutions such as the Commission to Investigate Allegations of Bribery or Corruption (CIABOC), giving them the resources and independence to investigate and prosecute corruption effectively
2. Inclusive Economic Development:
For Sri Lanka to achieve sustainable prosperity, it is crucial that economic growth is inclusive and benefits all regions, ethnicities, and social classes:
• Equitable growth: Economic policies must focus on bridging the urban-rural divide and ensure equitable access to opportunities. Special emphasis should be placed on regions affected by the civil war, such as the North and East, where communities continue to struggle with poverty and infrastructure deficits.
• Investment in education and skills: The country’s future prosperity depends on education reform and equipping youth with modern skills for global markets. Investments in STEM (science, technology, engineering, and mathematics) education can boost innovation and create more job opportunities.
• Support for small businesses and entrepreneurs: Encourage local entrepreneurship through microfinance programs, innovation hubs, and support for agriculture and tourism industries, which have the potential to uplift rural economies
3. Strengthening Democracy and Civic Engagement:
The 2022 mass protests, where people demanded government accountability, show a shift towards active civic engagement. To maintain momentum:
• Participatory governance: Citizens should be encouraged to engage in local decision-making processes. Decentralization of government functions can bring decision-making closer to the people, ensuring their voices are heard.
• Civic education: Programs that educate citizens, particularly the youth, on democratic values and their role in governance can foster a politically conscious population that holds leaders accountable.
• Reform political institutions: There must be significant reforms in electoral laws to reduce the influence of money and political dynasties. Ensuring that elections are free, fair, and competitive is critical for democracy to flourish
4. Promoting National Unity Across Ethnic and Religious Lines:
Sri Lanka’s diverse ethnic and religious fabric has historically been both its strength and a source of conflict. Building a unified nation requires a genuine commitment to:
• Reconciliation and healing: Post-civil war reconciliation must move beyond superficial initiatives. Policies that address the grievances of Tamil, Muslim, and other minority communities should focus on restoring cultural autonomy and rebuilding trust through transitional justice processes that include reparations, truth-telling, and recognition of past wrongs.
• Inclusive leadership: Leaders must work to break down ethnic and religious divides. National discourse should celebrate diversity and encourage interfaith dialogue to foster mutual understanding.
• Balanced development: Ensure that all regions and communities, regardless of ethnic makeup, receive equal access to resources, infrastructure, and education. This creates a shared sense of belonging and reduces regional disparities
5. Building Trust through Transparent Economic Recovery:
Given the economic crisis of 2022, public trust in governance has eroded:
• Debt transparency: Sri Lanka must adopt clear and transparent debt management policies, allowing citizens to understand how foreign loans and aid are utilized. Public access to information about IMF and other foreign assistance programs will help reduce skepticism.
• Fair tax policies: Implement tax reforms that do not overly burden the working class but ensure the wealthy contribute fairly to economic recovery. Equitable tax policies can foster trust that recovery efforts are being handled responsibly
6. Sustainable and Environmentally-Conscious Policies:
• Environmental stewardship: Protecting Sri Lanka’s natural resources is crucial for long-term prosperity. Policies should promote sustainable development that balances economic growth with environmental preservation, particularly in industries like tourism and agriculture.
• Disaster preparedness: As a nation vulnerable to climate change, Sri Lanka must prioritize disaster resilience through investments in infrastructure, water management, and sustainable agriculture practices
7. Ending Political Dynasties and Cronyism:
One of the most pressing issues in Sri Lanka’s politics has been the dominance of political families (e.g., Rajapaksas), which has led to allegations of corruption and cronyism:
Features
Sri Lanka’s rice conundrum: Time to stop managing crises and start fixing the system
Prof. Ranjith Senaratne,
Emeritus Professor in Crop Science and former Vice-Chancellor,
University of Ruhuna and General President of the Sri Lanka Association for the Advancement of Science (2023) and
Prof. Prasad Jayaweera,
Dean, Faculty of Computing, University of Sri Jayawardenapura
Rice is not merely another crop in Sri Lanka. It is our staple food, an integral part of our history and culture, and a foundation of the civilisation that flourished around our ancient hydraulic systems. Revered as Buddha Bhogaya, the Buddha’s crop, rice has sustained our people for more than two millennia. Yet, remarkably, a country with such a profound relationship with rice continues to lurch from one rice crisis to another.
At one time, we have a surplus. At another, we face shortages. Prices rise sharply, consumers complain, farmers struggle to obtain remunerative prices, millers and traders become the focus of public attention, imports are hurriedly arranged, and governments announce yet another set of measures to contain the crisis. Then, after the immediate problem subsides, the matter recedes from the national agenda, until the next crisis arrives.
Why does this keep happening despite decades of agricultural research, policy interventions, expert committees and public debate?
Perhaps because we have been asking the wrong question. The fundamental problem is not simply how to produce more rice. Nor is it merely a question of prices, imports, fertiliser, farmers, millers or markets. The rice conundrum is a complex national systems problem.
We cannot solve a system by fixing its parts in isolation
Sri Lanka’s rice sector is an intricate web of interconnected systems involving agriculture, land, water, climate, technology, finance, energy, transport, markets, trade, governance, institutions and consumer behaviour. A decision made in one part of this system can have consequences, sometimes unintended, in another.
A change in fertiliser policy, for example, can affect productivity and production costs, which in turn influence farmer profitability, market prices and the need for imports. Irrigation decisions affect not only production, but also water availability, energy use and environmental sustainability. Guaranteed prices influence farmers’ cropping decisions, while import policies can simultaneously protect consumers and weaken incentives for domestic production. Likewise, market concentration can affect both the price received by farmers and the price paid by consumers. This is precisely why isolated interventions so often produce disappointing results. We keep treating symptoms while leaving the underlying system largely untouched.
For decades, we have generated valuable scientific knowledge on individual aspects of rice production and marketing. But knowledge generated within disciplinary and institutional silos does not automatically translate into solutions to complex real-world problems. What is needed now is a fundamentally different way of thinking.
From a “rice crop” to a “rice system”
The first step is to stop looking at rice simply as something that is grown in a paddy field.
The rice system begins with land, water, seed, inputs, technology and finance. It extends through cultivation, harvesting, drying, milling, storage, transport, wholesale and retail marketing, and finally to the consumer’s table. At every stage, there are different interests, incentives, constraints and actors: farmers, farmer organisations, input suppliers, machinery operators, millers, traders, wholesalers, retailers, financial institutions, government agencies, researchers and consumers.
And hovering over the entire system are climate change, changing consumer preferences, technological transformation and national economic conditions. A weakness anywhere in this chain can compromise the performance of the whole system.
Consider post-harvest losses. If significant quantities of rice are lost because of inadequate drying, storage or processing facilities, increasing production alone cannot solve the problem. Similarly, if farmers produce efficiently but face weak markets and poor bargaining power, productivity gains may not translate into improved livelihoods.
The question, therefore, should not be “How much rice can we produce?” but “How can we make the entire rice system work better?”
That requires us to see the connections.
The missing ingredient: reliable, real-time information
There is another fundamental weakness that deserves urgent attention: we still lack a comprehensive, integrated, interoperable and reliable national information system for rice. Information is scattered among different institutions, often collected using different methodologies and not necessarily available when decisions need to be made.
How much rice will actually be produced? How much is in storage? What is the likely demand? Where are the emerging production shortfalls? What are the stocks held by different actors? How are prices moving along the value chain? What are the likely consequences of climate conditions? Without timely and reliable answers to such questions, policymakers are forced to make critical decisions with incomplete information. This is not merely an administrative inconvenience. It is a national food-security vulnerability.
Sri Lanka should therefore seriously consider establishing a National Rice Intelligence and Decision Support System (NRIDSS), an integrated digital platform that brings together relevant real-time information from agriculture, meteorology, irrigation, markets, trade, statistics and other institutions. Such a system could support production forecasting, market monitoring, import decisions, early warning and evidence-based policy formulation. In an increasingly uncertain climate and volatile global economy, this should no longer be regarded as a luxury. It is becoming an essential component of national food-system governance.
The deeper problems cannot be ignored
A systems approach would also force us to confront some uncomfortable structural realities. Why does productivity remain relatively low despite decades of research? Why are so many holdings too small to achieve economies of scale? Why are modern technologies and precision agriculture not being adopted more rapidly? Why do farmers often have limited bargaining power? Why do substantial losses occur after harvesting? Why can market power become concentrated in a relatively small number of actors? Why are guaranteed prices sometimes announced too late to influence farmers’ production decisions? Why are policy interventions so often reactive rather than proactive? And how will droughts, floods, temperature extremes, changing rainfall patterns and emerging pests affect the stability of rice production in the years ahead? These are not separate questions. They are parts of the same system.
From crisis management to systems governance
Sri Lanka does not need another isolated discussion about rice. What is needed is a national policy dialogue and action forum that brings all relevant actors together, not merely to exchange speeches, but to develop a shared understanding of the system and agree on what needs to be done. Such collaboration must go beyond consultation or the exchange of views. The different parties need to work together from problem definition through to implementation, bringing their diverse knowledge, perspectives, interests and practical experience into a common process.
Farmers bring contextual and experiential knowledge; industry actors understand market realities and operational constraints; scientists contribute evidence and analytical capabilities; policymakers bring institutional and regulatory perspectives; while technology and data specialists can provide new tools for understanding and managing the system. When these different perspectives are brought together systematically, they can reveal interdependencies, challenge assumptions, identify feasible interventions and generate solutions that are evidence-based, practically implementable and socially acceptable.
This is the essence of a transdisciplinary systems approach: not simply working across disciplines, but bringing together multiple stakeholders and multiple forms of knowledge to co-create solutions and share responsibility for outcomes. The process should therefore go beyond presentations and speeches. It should involve systems mapping, causal analysis, stakeholder dialogue, scenario planning and the participatory identification of the critical bottlenecks and leverage points in the rice system. Most importantly, it should distinguish between what is urgent and what is important, and between interventions that merely alleviate symptoms and those capable of changing the underlying behaviour of the system itself.
We need an implementation roadmap, not another report
There is, however, one important caveat. Sri Lanka has no shortage of reports, recommendations and policy documents. What we often lack is sustained implementation. Any national initiative on the rice conundrum must therefore end not with another set of broad recommendations but with a prioritised national action roadmap. It should identify short-, medium- and long-term actions, assign institutional responsibilities, establish timelines and define measurable indicators of progress. The ultimate objective should be to move Sri Lanka from reactive crisis management to proactive systems governance.
A national opportunity
The rice conundrum may, in fact, provide Sri Lanka with an opportunity that extends well beyond rice to deal with other important crops. If we can demonstrate that a complex national problem can be addressed by bringing together science, policy, stakeholder knowledge, real-time information and systems thinking, the approach could become a model for addressing other persistent challenges, from climate resilience and water security to energy, food systems and disaster risk.
The choice before us is therefore quite stark. We can continue responding to each rice crisis as it emerges, adjusting prices, arranging imports, appealing to millers, reassuring consumers and supporting farmers, only to repeat the cycle later. Or we can step back and ask a more fundamental question:
What is it about the way our rice system is structured and governed that continually produces these crises?
That is the question that needs to be answered. Sri Lanka has the scientific expertise, institutional capacity and stakeholder knowledge required to do so. What is needed now is the willingness to bring these fragmented sources of knowledge together and examine the rice sector as one interconnected system.
Our ancient civilisation understood the importance of interconnectedness: land, water, agriculture and society were organised as parts of a larger whole. Perhaps, in confronting the modern rice conundrum, we need to rediscover that systems wisdom, this time supported by modern science, technology, real-time data and transdisciplinary thinking. The time has come to stop merely managing the rice crisis. It is time to fix the system that keeps producing it.
It is against this backdrop that the Sri Lanka Association for the Advancement of Science (SLAAS) proposes to convene shortly a “National Policy Dialogue and Action Forum on the Rice Conundrum in Sri Lanka”, bringing together the key stakeholders across the rice system. The Forum is intended to provide a platform for moving beyond piecemeal and reactive interventions towards a coordinated, evidence-based and transdisciplinary systems approach, one capable of generating lasting and pragmatic solutions to what has become an “island-shaking national issue”.
Features
This curse of partisan politics in Sri Lanka
78 Years of Demagoguery, Not Democracy
by Brigadier Ranjan de Silva
rpcdesilva@gmail.com
On the 4th of February every year, we raise the lion flag and speak of democracy. We speak of 78 years of “self-rule.” But honesty demands we ask: what kind of rule have we actually had? It was not democracy. Democracy is government for the common good, constrained by law, informed by reason, and accountable to truth.
What Sri Lanka has had for 78 years is demagoguery — government by manipulation, by party, and by passion.
Defining the Curse:
The dictionary defines demagoguery as “political activity that seeks support by appealing to the desires and prejudices of ordinary people rather than by rational argument.” Its tools are simple: divide the people, promise the impossible, demonize the opponent, and govern for the next election, not the next generation. That is the political culture we inherited in 1948 and perfected since.
78 Years of Evidence:
The record is not ambiguous. Policy by Pendulum – 1948–2024. Instead of a national development plan, we got a partisan wrecking ball. 1956: The “Sinhala Only Act” was passed not after linguistic study, but as an election mobilization tool. 1970-77: The SLFP nationalized private enterprise and imposed import controls. 1977: The UNP reversed course with an open economy overnight. 2005-2014: Mega infrastructure was built on Chinese loans with no feasibility transparency. 2015-2019: Those same projects were called “white elephants” and stalled. 2020-2021: The organic fertilizer ban was announced as a populist “green” policy, reversed 6 months later after it collapsed agriculture and food prices. The Colombo Port City, Hambantota Port, and the Central Expressway all followed the same pattern: started, stopped, rebranded. The country pays twice. The party takes credit once. Economics as Election Candy. Demagoguery is expensive. 1960s: Subsidized rice to win rural votes, leading to the 1971 food crisis.
2005-2014:
Fuel subsidies and public sector hiring sprees that doubled the wage bill. 2019:
Unfunded tax cuts that removed Rs. 500 billion in annual revenue with no offset. By April 2022, external debt hit $51 Billion and we defaulted for the first time. The party that cut taxes was not in power to manage the IMF program. The party that inherited it was blamed for the austerity. This is the cycle. Institutions captured. A democracy needs referees. We turned them into party cadres. The 17th Amendment 2001 created independent commissions. The 18th Amendment 2010 abolished them. The 19th 2015 restored them. The 20th 2020 gutted them again. Police transfers, university vice-chancellors, and state bank chairmen have all been decided by party headquarters, not merit.
When the institution serves the party, the citizen gets leftovers.
Identity over Ideas: From 1956 to 1983 to 2009 to 2022, our elections have been won on fear, not spreadsheets. “They will erase your language.” “They will sell the country.” “Only we can protect Buddhism/the minorities/the nation.”
Rational debate on debt, productivity, or climate adaptation never wins a rally. Prejudice does. That is demagoguery by definition.
Party Interest subverted the National Interest. The core damage of 78 years of partisan politics is this: the nation became secondary to the party. Need power sector reform? Impossible, because our unions will strike. Need to cut 300,000 ghost employees? Impossible, because our voters will defect. Need a 20-year education and export plan? Impossible, because it won’t show results before the next election. So, we borrowed. We patched. We lied. The result: a railway system that still runs on 1950s engines, hospitals without paracetamol in 2022, and a brain drain of 300,000+ skilled workers since the crisis. The parties rotated. The country declined.
The Opposition’s Original Sin and here, all parties share guilt equally. In opposition, the job is not to govern. It is to destroy. The UNP in the 60s called the SLFP “communist.” The SLFP in the 70s called the UNP “imperialist.” The JVP called both “traitors.” The SJB, SLPP, and NPP today use the same script with new logos. Every tax is “anti-people.” Every reform is “a sell-out.” Every crisis is proof the other side is evil and must be removed at any cost. Then they win. And implement 80% of what they opposed. Because demagoguery has no principles, only positions. 78 years of unmerciful, bad-faith criticism has not produced accountability. It has produced cynicism. The public now believes all politicians are the same — because for 78 years, they have behaved the same.
Breaking the Curse:
Changing the party in power will not end this. We must change the incentives that reward demagoguery. Three reforms are non-negotiable: Bind future Parliaments to national policy. Pass 10-year frameworks for energy, education, and public debt with 2/3 majority protection. Infrastructure and fiscal rules should outlast one government, as they do in Chile and New Zealand. Depoliticize the state. Independent commissions for police, elections, public service, and bribery must have constitutional budgets and appointment panels that exclude MPs. No more 18th/20th Amendment style rollbacks. Demand better from voters We must stop rewarding the best slogan and start demanding the best spreadsheet. Town halls over rallies. Costings over promises. A 5-year plan over a 5-minute speech.
In 1948, we did not inherit democracy. We inherited an election. For 78 years we have used that election to choose our favourite demagogue. The prize has been debt, division, and decay. The curse of partisan politics will only end when citizens and leaders agree on one principle: Party second. Country first. Until then, February 4th will remain a ceremony, not a celebration.
Features
Developing markets for fruits, vegetables and flowers in the Gulf
Export diversification – Missing the wood for the trees – Part II
by Gomi Senadhira
Sri Lanka established its diplomatic presence in the Gulf region only in the early 1980s. First, a small embassy was opened in Abu Dhabi, covering the UAE. Then in 1982, embassies were opened in Jeddah and Kuwait. The embassy in Jeddah covered Saudi Arabia while Kuwait was responsible for Kuwait, Oman, Qatar and Bahrain. Commercial Diplomats were also assigned to these two embassies. A senior private sector executive, with experience in marketing, was posted to Jedda as the commercial counsellor. I was posted to Kuwait as a second secretary (Commercial). Our instructions were very clear. Focus not only on traditional exports. Product diversification was a priority.
Developing Markets for Agricultural Products
At that time, Minister Lalith Athulathmudali had just launched his Export Production Villages (EPV) programme. He believed that the EPVs working closely with the exporters would provide an ideal opportunity for rural households to directly benefit from the government’s new open trade policy. Agricultural products, particularly fruits and vegetables, were a key component of this approach and the ministry thought that the Gulf countries, with large Sri Lankan communities, would have a ready-made market for these items. Thus, from day one we were compelled to explore the market for nontraditional exports; fruits and vegetables (F&Vs) were on the top of our priority list.
From cane baskets to cardboard boxes
Fortunately, the market for the F&Vs products in the region was at a very early stage of development. That provided an opportunity for Sri Lankan exporters, who were also inexperienced, to work with the importers and grow together. For example, in Kuwait, one of our first customers for F&Vs was a small supermarket where the manager was a Sri Lankan. After the first shipment arrived, he invited me to inspect the shipment. I visited the supermarket and was shocked by what I saw. While produce from other countries was packed nicely in cardboard boxes, our packaging mirrored transport to Manning market, cane baskets! As a result, fresh produce had suffered significant damage. A long report, with photographs, to the trade ministry produced an immediate response. After all, this was a pet project of the Minister. Within weeks, shipments were packed in cardboard boxes. Immediately afterwards, an expert on packaging from the Commonwealth Secretariat was sent to Kuwait with an official from the EDB to study the problem.
By then, we had also managed to develop a friendship with the management of the Salmiya supermarket, a large upmarket supermarket patronised by wealthy Kuwaitis and expats. It was a cooperative and the chairman was a Kuwaiti public servant. I could only meet him after 6 PM when his large office functioned as a diwaniya, a cherished cultural space in Kuwaiti society. Guests moved in and out the room. I had to spend time with them sipping many cups of tea. Though that meant at least two hours on each visit, it helped greatly to develop a close relationship. The general manager was an efficient and friendly Palestinian. After many visits we had succeeded in getting an order for F&Vs. The day after the first shipment arrived, I got an urgent call from the GM to come and inspect it. Once again, I was in for a surprise. Inside the cold room, the consignments from other countries were stacked neatly on top of each other, while vegetable boxes from Sri Lanka had collapsed once placed on top of each other, crushing the produce within.
Fortunately, our packaging experts arrived in Kuwait soon after this incident. They spent two days in the Salmiya Supermarket, studying the packaging from other origins. We were also successful in assuring the GM our packaging would improve. After that, packaging improved and exports moved smoothly. With that, Sri Lanka emerged as a small but reliable supplier to the mainstream market, not just the ethnic segment of the market.
Export of Fresh Vegetables by Sea
Towards the end of my tour, a Sri Lankan businessman requested me to find a buyer for cabbages, which he was prepared to export in large quantities by sea. I introduced him to the largest fruit and vegetable importer in Kuwait. Their regular suppliers of similar vegetables were Jordan, Lebanon and Syria. Luckily, the company was keen to diversify the supply sources. A few weeks later, the first container load of cabbages from Sri Lanka arrived in Kuwait. Immediately after the arrival of the container, I visited the company. They were pleased with the quality and the price and were looking forward to importing more fruits and vegetables. Unfortunately, that turned out to be a one-off event. Later on, when I was back in Sri Lanka, the exporter informed me that he couldn’t continue with it due to the problems with the local supply chains.
Floriculture
During the period I was asked by the EDB to explore the market for floricultural products, more particularly for cut flowers. At that time Kuwait was a relatively large importer of cut flowers and live plants. The main suppliers were the Netherlands and Colombia. Importers were also reluctant to move out of the established supply chain, particularly due to “snob value” associated with the product from Europe. However, after some difficulties, one importer agreed to place a pre-paid trial order. After the arrival of that shipment, he was impressed by the quality of the product and the orders expanded rapidly. As a result, by the end of 1985 Kuwait had become a major buyer of Sri Lanka’s floricultural products.
From village to global markets
As a result of the proactive promotional work undertaken by the EDB and the embassies in the region, by 1985, Sri Lanka had managed to acquire a small but significant share of the F&V and floriculture markets in the GCC countries. We had also identified domestic supply chain issues that hindered exports. All that was done, long before Southeast Asian or African countries even entered into that market. In fact, my Southeast Asian colleagues used to contact me often to reserve “durian” for them at the “Sri Lankan supermarket”.
Most importantly, a substantially large share of produce from Sri Lanka in Kuwaiti supermarkets originated in the EPVs. Of course, that didn’t just happen. The ministry (or the minister) using the carrot and stick approach “encouraged” exporters to buy the produce directly from the newly established EPVs. (The writer can be reached at senadhiragomi@gmail.com)
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