Features
WAKE UP SRI LANKA ……Presidential Elections 2024
by Mohan Mendis
The 2019 and 2024 Sri Lankan presidential elections saw significant shifts in political leadership and voter preferences.
In 2019, Gotabaya Rajapaksa, representing the Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna (SLPP), won with 52.25% of the vote, defeating Sajith Premadasa of the Samagi Jana Balawegaya (SJB), who garnered 41.99%. Rajapaksa’s victory was driven by promises of strong governance, national security, and economic stability, but his administration faced severe challenges due to the economic crisis that led to his resignation in 2022.
In 2024, Anura Kumara Dissanayake, leader of the Marxist National People’s Power (NPP), emerged as the victor with 42.31% of the vote, surpassing Premadasa, who secured 32.76%. Dissanayake’s victory reflected widespread public dissatisfaction with the traditional political elite, as he campaigned on a platform of anti-corruption and working-class representation. His win signaled a major political shift, particularly in light of the country’s ongoing economic recovery following the 2022 crisis. While Dissanayake did not secure an outright majority, he won after a second round of vote redistribution, marking a historic moment in Sri Lanka’s politics, as he represented a break from the dominance of traditional political families like the Rajapaksas and Premadasa.
Here’s a statistical comparison between the 2019 and 2024 Sri Lankan
presidential election results:
2019 Presidential Election Results:
Winner: Gotabaya Rajapaksa (Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna – SLPP)
Votes: 6,924,255
Percentage: 52.25%
Runner-up: Sajith Premadasa (Samagi Jana Balawegaya – SJB)
Votes: 5,564,239
Percentage: 41.99%
Voter Turnout: 83.72%
2024 Presidential Election Results:
Winner: Anura Kumara Dissanayake (National People’s Power – NPP)
Votes: 5,740,179
Percentage: 42.31%
• Runner-up: Sajith Premadasa (SJB)
Votes: 4,530,902
Percentage: 32.76%
Voter Turnout: 76%
Key Differences:
1. Winning Margin:
= 2019: Rajapaksa won by a margin of 10.26%.
= 2024: Dissanayake won with 9.55% fewer votes than Rajapaksa did in 2019, and his margin over Premadasa was 9.55%.
2. Performance of Sajith Premadasa:
= 2019: Premadasa received 41.99% of the vote.
= 2024: Premadasa’s vote share dropped to 32.76%, a decrease of
9.23%.
3. Turnout:
2019: Turnout was higher at 83.72%.
2024: Turnout fell to 76%, indicating slightly lower voter participation This comparison reflects a shift from the dominance of traditional political figures to a more left-wing, anti-establishment candidate in 2024.
If Sajith Premadasa and Ranil Wickremesinghe had contested together in the 2024
Sri Lankan presidential election, their combined vote total could have significantly altered the outcome.
Premadasa’s 2024 vote share: 4,530,902 votes (32.76%)
Wickremesinghe’s 2024 estimated vote share: Although Wickremesinghe ran as an independent in 2024, his support base would primarily come from his long-time affiliation with the United National Party (UNP). Given his recent governance, we can estimate his vote base to be around 8-10%, based on the fragmented political landscape after the 2022 economic crisis
Combined Vote Estimate:
If we add an estimated 8-10% support for Wickremesinghe to Premadasa’s 32.76%, their combined vote share could have reached:
Around 40-43% of the total vote, with around 6-6.5 million votes.
This combination would likely have outperformed Anura Kumara Dissanayake’s 42.31% (5,740,179 votes), potentially leading to a victory for the combined opposition. However, this scenario depends on various factors:
Voter behavior: Not all of Wickremesinghe’s supporters might have automatically backed a Premadasa-Wickremesinghe alliance.
Strategic alignment: Wickremesinghe’s pro-market policies and Premadasa’s more populist stances may not fully align, possibly affecting voter turnout and support.
In conclusion, a joint candidacy could have statistically won the election, but the actual dynamics would depend on the coherence of their combined platform and voter perception.
The 2024 Sri Lankan presidential election saw a drop in voter turnout, an increase in the number of rejected votes, and a larger voter base due to demographic changes compared to 2019. Let’s break down these elements:
1. Voter Turnout:
2019: Voter turnout was 83.72%, reflecting high engagement during a time when national security and economic concerns were dominant.
2024: Turnout dropped to 76%, which is a significant decline
Factors Contributing to the Drop in Turnout:
Disillusionment with traditional political parties: Voters became frustrated with the old political guard due to their perceived role in Sri Lanka’s economic collapse. This disenchantment likely discouraged voter participation, especially for Ranil Wickremesinghe and Sajith Premadasa, whose parties were part of the “establishment.”
Economic instability and voter fatigue: After a severe economic crisis in 2022, many citizens felt the political process did not adequately address their concerns, further lowering voter enthusiasm.
Frustration with political elites: The dissatisfaction with traditional political families (such as the Rajapaksas and the Wickremesinghe-led UNP) led many voters to feel their votes wouldn’t significantly change the status quo
Reduced enthusiasm: After the crisis in 2022, many voters were struggling with day-to-day survival, leading to a decreased interest in political participation.
Large-Scale Emigration Since 2022: Following the 2022 economic collapse, an estimated 500,000 to 700,000 Sri Lankans left the country. Many were professionals, skilled workers, and members of the middle class, who were seeking better economic opportunities abroad due to the high inflation, shortages of basic goods, and the general economic instability in Sri Lanka
Loss of eligible voters: A significant portion of those who left were eligible voters. Since Sri Lanka does not have an established mechanism for absentee voting for citizens living abroad, these individuals were effectively excluded from the 2024 election process.
2. Impact of Economic Migration on Voter Motivation:
Frustration and disengagement: Many who remained in Sri Lanka may have felt disillusioned by the lack of effective governance, leading to voter apathy.
The exodus likely signaled a deep disconnection between citizens and the political system, as those who left may have represented a politically active demographic.
• Diaspora influence: While Sri Lankans living abroad typically maintain strong ties with their homeland, their inability to vote could have dampened political enthusiasm among their families and networks at home. This may have further contributed to the sense of futility in voting, reducing turnout.
3. Economic Hardships and Focus on Survival:
= Those remaining in the country continued to struggle with the aftermath of the economic collapse, including high taxes, inflation, and daily hardships. For many, political engagement took a backseat to focusing on economic survival. When citizens are burdened with meeting basic needs, voter participation can decline as political engagement becomes less of a priority
4. Lower Middle-Class and Professional Exodus:
The people who left were often from urban, educated, and professional backgrounds, a group that traditionally had higher political engagement.
Their absence directly impacted turnout, as many who typically participate in elections had left the country. This reduction was compounded by the youth and first-time voters who supported Anura Kumara Dissanayake, balancing the overall turnout to an extent, but not fully compensating for the exodus.
5. Lack of Trust in the Political System:
With Ranil Wickremesinghe taking over after the 2022 crisis and enacting austerity measures, many citizens felt betrayed by both the government and the opposition. The traditional political parties failed to regain trust, and this disillusionment likely led to a sense of hopelessness among voters, reducing their participation further. The combination of large-scale migration, disenchantment with the political system, and economic hardships all contributed to the reduced voter turnout in 2024. The lack of absentee voting rights for Sri Lankans abroad compounded the issue, as many potential voters were unable to participate in the electoral process, contributing to the overall decline in turnout
LESSONS LEARNT TO BE LEARNT BY ALL THREE MAJOR CANDIDATES BASED ON THE ELECTION VOTES
Based on the 2024 Sri Lankan presidential election results, each of the three major candidates — Anura Kumara Dissanayake, Sajith Premadasa, and Ranil Wickremesinghe — can draw important lessons to improve their future political strategies:
1. Anura Kumara Dissanayake (NPP):
= Key Lesson: Sustain Popular Momentum with Broader Appeal
Victory and Support from Youth and Left-Wing Voters: Dissanayake’s victory in 2024 reflected his success in capturing the youth vote, as well as those frustrated with traditional political elites. His anti-corruption and antiestablishment stance appealed to many who wanted change after the economic crisis
Challenge
: He must now expand his appeal beyond his core base. Though his 42.31% vote share brought him victory, it wasn’t an outright majority. His Marxist platform and revolutionary background make financial and business circles wary, which could hamper economic reforms and stability Lesson: To secure broader support, Dissanayake will need to moderate his economic policies to reassure businesses while staying true to his progressive base. He must also deliver on promises of systemic change, which was key to his support among younger voters.
2. Sajith Premadasa (SJB):
= Key Lesson: Reinvent Campaign Strategy and Unite the Opposition Failure to Build Momentum: Despite his 32.76% vote share, Premadasa failed to capitalize on the public’s discontent with traditional politics. His drop in support from the 41.99% in 2019 reveals that he could not gain the trust of those seeking change Challenge: Premadasa’s policies may not have stood out enough to differentiate him from the very system voters were rejecting. His inability to consolidate the opposition vote, especially in the face of Ranil Wickremesinghe’s split candidacy, further diminished his chances of winning. Lesson: Premadasa needs to reform his image and policy platform to offer a clear alternative to the status quo. Additionally, building alliances and uniting fragmented opposition forces, including Wickremesinghe’s supporters, would increase his chances in future elections.
3. Ranil Wickremesinghe (UNP):
Key Lesson: Address Public Discontent and Reform Political Strategy Economic Stabilization but Political Defeat: Wickremesinghe’s focus on economic recovery, including debt restructuring with the IMF, may have stabilized inflation and foreign reserves, but his low voter support (estimated 8-10%) showed a significant disconnect with the electorate).
His austerity measures were unpopular, as they were perceived as benefiting the elite while burdening ordinary citizens with higher taxes and costs. Challenge: Wickremesinghe’s political brand has become synonymous with the establishment, which is seen as partly responsible for the country’s crises. This made it difficult for him to attract a broad voter base despite his economic reforms.
Lesson
: He needs to rebuild public trust, particularly by demonstrating empathy for ordinary citizens affected by austerity measures. Engaging in more transparent governance and incorporating social welfare policies into economic recovery plans could help him regain public favor.
Additional Lessons for All Candidates:
Address Voter Disenchantment: The 7.72% drop in voter turnout and rise in rejected votes signal widespread disillusionment. All candidates must focus on rebuilding trust in democratic institutions by addressing the public’s core concerns, especially economic hardships and corruption
Incorporate the Diaspora: Given the significant exodus of Sri Lankans overseas, candidates should advocate for mechanisms such as absentee voting to engage the diaspora, many of whom still hold strong ties to the country and could be influential voters.
Offer Clear Policy Alternatives: The growing complexity of voter issues, particularly in the post-crisis landscape, requires candidates to offer clear, actionable policy proposals that address both short-term survival (inflation, employment) and long-term reforms (corruption, education, economic diversification).
These lessons highlight the importance of trust, clarity of message, and broad-based coalitions in an evolving political environment marked by economic uncertainty and widespread public dissatisfaction.
If Sajith Premadasa and Ranil Wickremesinghe had contested together in the 2024
Sri Lankan presidential election, their combined vote total could have significantly altered the outcome.
Potential Combined Vote Share (Premadasa + Wickremesinghe):
Premadasa’s 2024 vote share: 4,530,902 votes (32.76%)
Wickremesinghe’s 2024 estimated vote share: Although Wickremesinghe ran as an independent in 2024, his support base would primarily come from his long-time affiliation with the United National Party (UNP). Given his recent governance, we can estimate his vote base to be around 8-10%, based on the fragmented political landscape after the 2022 economic crisis
Combined Vote Estimate:
If we add an estimated 8-10% support for Wickremesinghe to Premadasa’s 32.76%, their combined vote share could have reached:
Around 40-43% of the total vote, with around 6-6.5 million votes. This combination would likely have outperformed Anura Kumara Dissanayake’s 42.31% (5,740,179 votes), potentially leading to a victory for the combined opposition. However, this scenario depends on various factors:
Voter behavior: Not all of Wickremesinghe’s supporters might have automatically backed a Premadasa-Wickremesinghe alliance.
Strategic alignment: Wickremesinghe’s pro-market policies and Premadasa’s more populist stances may not fully align, possibly affecting voter turnout and support. In conclusion, a joint candidacy could have statistically won the election, but the actual dynamics would depend on the coherence of their combined platform and voter perception.
The United National Party (UNP) and the Samagi Jana Balawegaya (SJB), despite their shared origins, remain divided as a united political force for several key reasons:
1. Leadership Rift between Ranil Wickremesinghe and Sajith Premadasa:
The primary reason for the division is the personal and leadership rivalry between Ranil Wickremesinghe, the long-time leader of the UNP, and Sajith Premadasa, who broke away to form the SJB in 2020.
Premadasa’s frustration: Premadasa had long sought a leadership role within the UNP, but Wickremesinghe’s reluctance to step down or share power with younger leaders created tension within the party. This frustration culminated in Premadasa forming the SJB ahead of the 2020 parliamentary elections .
Wickremesinghe’s dominance: Wickremesinghe’s control over the UNP and his reluctance to pass the torch exacerbated internal tensions. Many UNP members felt that under Wickremesinghe, the party was becoming disconnected from voters, but they couldn’t reform leadership, leading to the SJB split
2. Ideological and Policy Differences:
While both parties have roots in the UNP’s center-right liberalism, the SJB has taken a more populist and centrist approach under Premadasa. The SJB focuses on social welfare programs and expanding public services, making it more appealing to working-class voters.
UNP’s pro-market policies: Under Wickremesinghe, the UNP continued to champion pro-market, neoliberal economic policies, favoring privatization, foreign investments, and austerity measures. These policies became particularly unpopular after the 2022 economic crisis, further alienating a segment of voters who felt left behind
The SJB’s attempt to distance itself from these neoliberal policies was a critical reason for Premadasa’s breakaway and remains a central division between the two parties.
3. Public Perception of the Parties:
The UNP’s popularity sharply declined after the 2019 presidential election, where Wickremesinghe’s leadership was seen as ineffective in addressing key national issues, including the Easter Sunday attacks and the economic downturn. The party’s inability to stop the rise of the Rajapaksas was also a sore point for many supporters.
SJB’s formation was seen as a fresh start and an opportunity for renewal. Premadasa’s SJB quickly gained traction as a stronger opposition force against the Rajapaksas, winning more seats than the UNP in the 2020 parliamentary elections .
Public distrust of the UNP after the 2022 crisis, where Wickremesinghe was appointed president following Gotabaya Rajapaksa’s resignation, has reinforced the perception of the UNP as part of the old political guard that failed to protect the country from economic collapse.
4. Strategic Differences:
Premadasa’s SJB has focused on grassroots mobilization and appealing to the general public’s frustration with the status quo. His campaign style is more people-centric, offering populist measures that address immediate economic concerns.
Wickremesinghe’s UNP, in contrast, relies on institutional experience and positioning itself as the party with the capability to manage macroeconomic issues, especially in navigating complex financial negotiations with the International Monetary Fund (IMF). However, these strategies have not resonated with the broader electorate, which is looking for immediate relief.
5. Electoral Competition and Political Ambitions:
Both Premadasa and Wickremesinghe harbor strong political ambitions. Premadasa, as the leader of the SJB, sees himself as the face of Sri Lanka’s opposition, while Wickremesinghe continues to hold the presidency and remains determined to maintain his political relevance.
Competition for leadership: A merger between the two parties would likely force a power-sharing agreement, something neither leader seems willing to compromise on. This leadership struggle and competition for dominance in the opposition landscape make a merger highly unlikely without significant concessions
6. Party Structures and Grassroots Support:
The SJB’s infrastructure and voter base have been growing rapidly since its formation, attracting disillusioned former UNP members and voters, particularly from rural areas. On the other hand, the UNP’s support base has dwindled, particularly after its near-total defeat in the 2020 parliamentary elections, where it won just one seat.
This asymmetry in organizational strength and grassroots support makes it difficult for both parties to merge, as the SJB now commands the larger voter base and structure, while the UNP relies on its institutional history and Wickremesinghe’s position as president.
Conclusion:
The rivalry between Premadasa and Wickremesinghe, combined with policy differences, strategic ambitions, and diverging party infrastructures, makes it difficult for the UNP and SJB to unite as a political force. While they share a common origin, their leadership conflicts and differing visions for the country’s future have created significant barriers to reconciliation and unity in Sri Lankan politics. For the people of Sri Lanka striving for a new beginning—focused on prosperity, corruption-free governance, the rule of law, and unity among diverse communities—the following guiding lessons are crucial:
1. Strong Rule of Law and Accountability:
To ensure a corruption-free society, it is vital that Sri Lanka strengthens its legal and institutional frameworks:
• Transparent governance: Implement transparency in government contracts, spending, and policies. This includes creating robust mechanisms to audit public officials, ensuring that corruption and mismanagement are detected and addressed.
• Independent judiciary: Strengthening the judiciary so that it is free from political influence will restore faith in legal systems. Citizens must trust that laws will be applied equally, regardless of political or social status.
• Anti-corruption institutions: Fully empower institutions such as the Commission to Investigate Allegations of Bribery or Corruption (CIABOC), giving them the resources and independence to investigate and prosecute corruption effectively
2. Inclusive Economic Development:
For Sri Lanka to achieve sustainable prosperity, it is crucial that economic growth is inclusive and benefits all regions, ethnicities, and social classes:
• Equitable growth: Economic policies must focus on bridging the urban-rural divide and ensure equitable access to opportunities. Special emphasis should be placed on regions affected by the civil war, such as the North and East, where communities continue to struggle with poverty and infrastructure deficits.
• Investment in education and skills: The country’s future prosperity depends on education reform and equipping youth with modern skills for global markets. Investments in STEM (science, technology, engineering, and mathematics) education can boost innovation and create more job opportunities.
• Support for small businesses and entrepreneurs: Encourage local entrepreneurship through microfinance programs, innovation hubs, and support for agriculture and tourism industries, which have the potential to uplift rural economies
3. Strengthening Democracy and Civic Engagement:
The 2022 mass protests, where people demanded government accountability, show a shift towards active civic engagement. To maintain momentum:
• Participatory governance: Citizens should be encouraged to engage in local decision-making processes. Decentralization of government functions can bring decision-making closer to the people, ensuring their voices are heard.
• Civic education: Programs that educate citizens, particularly the youth, on democratic values and their role in governance can foster a politically conscious population that holds leaders accountable.
• Reform political institutions: There must be significant reforms in electoral laws to reduce the influence of money and political dynasties. Ensuring that elections are free, fair, and competitive is critical for democracy to flourish
4. Promoting National Unity Across Ethnic and Religious Lines:
Sri Lanka’s diverse ethnic and religious fabric has historically been both its strength and a source of conflict. Building a unified nation requires a genuine commitment to:
• Reconciliation and healing: Post-civil war reconciliation must move beyond superficial initiatives. Policies that address the grievances of Tamil, Muslim, and other minority communities should focus on restoring cultural autonomy and rebuilding trust through transitional justice processes that include reparations, truth-telling, and recognition of past wrongs.
• Inclusive leadership: Leaders must work to break down ethnic and religious divides. National discourse should celebrate diversity and encourage interfaith dialogue to foster mutual understanding.
• Balanced development: Ensure that all regions and communities, regardless of ethnic makeup, receive equal access to resources, infrastructure, and education. This creates a shared sense of belonging and reduces regional disparities
5. Building Trust through Transparent Economic Recovery:
Given the economic crisis of 2022, public trust in governance has eroded:
• Debt transparency: Sri Lanka must adopt clear and transparent debt management policies, allowing citizens to understand how foreign loans and aid are utilized. Public access to information about IMF and other foreign assistance programs will help reduce skepticism.
• Fair tax policies: Implement tax reforms that do not overly burden the working class but ensure the wealthy contribute fairly to economic recovery. Equitable tax policies can foster trust that recovery efforts are being handled responsibly
6. Sustainable and Environmentally-Conscious Policies:
• Environmental stewardship: Protecting Sri Lanka’s natural resources is crucial for long-term prosperity. Policies should promote sustainable development that balances economic growth with environmental preservation, particularly in industries like tourism and agriculture.
• Disaster preparedness: As a nation vulnerable to climate change, Sri Lanka must prioritize disaster resilience through investments in infrastructure, water management, and sustainable agriculture practices
7. Ending Political Dynasties and Cronyism:
One of the most pressing issues in Sri Lanka’s politics has been the dominance of political families (e.g., Rajapaksas), which has led to allegations of corruption and cronyism:
Features
Trump’s tariffs, AKD’s gazette and Sri Lanka’s diplomatic slumber
“We are rather respectable in Colombo. We go to bed fairly early, and we remain there till morning. “
According to Sri Lanka’s diplomatic folklore, the late S.W. R. D. Bandaranaike uttered these words while explaining the reasons for Sri Lanka’s abstention on the UN resolution condemning the Soviet invasion of Hungary. Apparently, SWRD’s foreign ministry officials were asleep at home when the diplomatic cable seeking instructions was received from New York. In those days, there were no cell phones, Internet, or even fax or telex machines. The diplomatic cables were sent through post offices. Decoding them was a slow and time-consuming process. Thus, the government could not provide appropriate instructions to our mission in New York in time, and the Sri Lankan delegation abstained on that sensitive UN vote.
Sri Lanka’s Absence from Section 301 Consultations
But then, how does one explain Sri Lanka’s absence from the crucial bilateral consultation held in Washington by the Office of the United States Trade Representative (USTR) during March-April on “Forced Labour” under the Section 301 of the US Trade Act of 1974? Didn’t our foreign and trade ministries send appropriate instructions to Washington in time? Even if the instructions from the foreign ministry were transmitted to our embassy in Washington by pigeon carriers, there was enough time for Sri Lanka to participate in those meetings.
In March, the USTR initiated these 301 investigations on 60 trading partners, and invited all of them for confidential consultations. Out of the 60, 46 participated in these consultations. Sri Lanka was not one of them. Other countries that didn’t participate in these consultations included China, Russia, and Venezuela! In addition to that, the Section 301 Committee conducted a public hearing with interested parties on April 28 and 29. Washington-based diplomats, representatives from few trade ministries as well as representatives from many foreign trade associations and chambers participated in these hearings. Sri Lanka was once again conspicuously absent.
As a result, when the USTR published the proposed forced labour tariffs on June 2nd, Sri Lanka ended up with a 12.5% duty. Pakistani and Indonesian diplomats participated in these consultations and took appropriate follow-up measures, and managed to enter the 10% duty category. As even a threat of a modest tariff hike could disrupt supply chains and reduce competitiveness, particularly in an industry such as garments, I discussed this issue on 15 June and underscored the importance of Sri Lanka’s participation at the next hearing, which was scheduled to be held from July 7th .
Awakening from Diplomatic Slumber and AKD’s Gazette
Fortunately, Sri Lanka finally awoke from weeks of diplomatic slumber, and Ambassador Mahinda Samarasinghe participated in the public hearing on 9 July, and promised, “…. · We have agreed to the text in our negotiations with the USTR on forced labour, …. The gazette as we speak is being printed and I’m getting the gazette tomorrow morning, and the gazette will be shared with USTR as I get it“.
As promised, President Anura Kumara Dissanayake issued a gazette on 10 July banning the imports of goods produced by forced labour. These new regulations are very similar to what Pakistan and Indonesia enacted in April, after their consultations with USTR in March. Why couldn’t we do it in April? Why did we wait till the very last minute?
Challenges ahead
“War is too important to be left to generals alone,” is a famous saying attributed to former French Premier Georges Clemenceau. Similarly, monitoring our main markets is too important to be left to diplomats alone. The United States is the largest single-country market for Sri Lanka. Therefore, Sri Lankan trade chambers and associations should become more proactive in these markets and participate in these events. For example, the chairman of the Pakistani apparel exporters association participated in the April hearings. Similarly, representatives from the Indian Agricultural and Processed Food Products Export Development Authority, the Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry, the Confederation of Indian Industry, and Reliance Industries also participated in July hearings. At an event where each speaker is given only five minutes (strictly enforced), having a number of speakers from a country is an advantage. The presence of industry representatives in these kinds of events also help them understand the market dynamics and the future challenges. This is important, particularly because there will be many more challenges with Trump’s tariffs.
With the gazette issued on 10 July, Sri Lanka has imposed a prohibition on the importation of goods produced with forced labour. Now, the challenge will be to effectively enforce the prohibition. And what are the goods produced with forced labour? The USTR list only focuses on aluminum, cotton, electronics, lithium-ion batteries, rice, and tobacco. However, according to the U.S. Department of Labour, the list is much longer. Hence, this list may change continuously during the next two years and tariffs may fluctuate once again.
So, this is definitely not the time to slumber.
(The writer, a retired public servant, can be reached at senadhiragomi@gmail.com)
by Gomi Senadhira ✍️
Features
Tales of Mystery and Suspense 10 Casino for Sale
After the overwhelming grotesquerie of J K Rowling’s latest Cormoran Strike novel (written, I should have noted, as the others were, under the pseudonym Robert Galbraith), I thought I should return to the world of fun, and also a much shorter description since this thriller moves quickly without the layers of detail that Rowling engages in.
I then move to the second comic thriller by Caryl Brahms and S J Simon. This, their second story to feature Vladimir Stroganoff and Adam Quill, was Casino for Sale, as lunatic a romp as the first, though without the emphasis on the ballet that characterized A Bullet in the Ballet.
This one begins with the impresario Stroganoff buying a casino cheap from Baron Sam de Rabinovich, only to find that it was a rundown place, not the grand casino of La Bazouche, a resort on the Frenc+h Riviera, as he had initially thought. The grand one belonged to Lord Buttonhooke, and Stroganoff could not compete, until he thought of bringing the Ballet Stroganoff to the casino – which of course leads to Buttonhooke deciding to have ballet performances in his Casino too.
Stroganoff invites Quill to visit him, which Quill decides to do since he has left Scotland Yard, having come into a legacy. No one believes this, and he has to face questions as to what he did to have been sacked, with sympathy for having been found out.
The day he arrives in La Bazouche there is a murder, of a vitriolic critic called Citrolo, in Stroganoff’s office. He had been going to write a damning review of the opening night of the ballet and Stroganoff, when he realizes Citrolo cannot be swayed, drugs him and dictates the review himself to the papers. He leaves Citrolo sleeping and finds him shot the next morning, whereupon he decides to muddy the waters and leave a suicide note and lots of other murder weapons. So much overkill, as it were, of course ensures that he is arrested.
But the excitable French detective who makes the arrest follows up his suggestion that Buttonhooke was also involved, and so the two casino owners find themselves in cells next door to each other, with the detective Gustave quite happy to provide creature comforts for a fee.
Quill decides he must investigate, and finds Gustave most cooperative, since he has a laid back attitude to work. So it is Quill that finds a notebook which makes it clear Citrolo is an accomplished blackmailer, and that there are lots of possible murderers, including Stroganoff’s croupier, who was crooked, Rabinovich, who was now working for Buttonhooke, a confidence trickster called Kurt Kukumber, whose prospectus for a dud gold mine was found in the office and Prince Alexis Artishok who was engaged in a deal to buy diamonds from the ballerina Dyra Dyrakova.
Stroganoff had been trying to get Dyrakova to dance for him, but having done so previously she had refused. But then to Stroganoff’s chagrin she agreed to dance for Buttonhooke. The clearly crooked Artishok had told Buttonhooke’s mistress Sadie Souse, who was not very bright, that Dyrakova possessed diamonds she was willing to sell cheap, and Sadie was determined to have them.
Quill meanwhile finds out that there was a secret passage to Stroganoff’s office, the obvious solution to what had begun as a locked room mystery, and that this was known by almost everyone apart from Stroganoff himself. And then Rabinovich is murdered, just after Gustave had released his two original suspects, leading him to blame Quill for having insisted on that and thus allowing them to kill again.
Soon afterwards Dyrakova arrives, and the town is full of posters announcing that she will appear in the casinos, elaborate posters for either one, since Stroganoff is determined that she will dance for him, and if she does not come willingly, he has devised a scheme to make her do so unwillingly. So, though Buttonhooke has her taken off to his yacht immediately she arrives at the station, Quill along with Arenskaya gets her into a launch and to Stroganoff’s casino, where she performs to tumultuous applause, not knowing for whom she is dancing.
When Quill asked her about the diamonds, she said she had sold them long ago, and that gave Quill the solution to the mystery. Rabinovich had known about this, and Artishok had killed him to prevent Sadie learning it from him, he had killed Citrolo who had recognized him for an accomplished card sharper, not a Russian prince at all. But before he is arrested, he gets away in a boat, and the police launch that pursues him is on the point of catching him up when it runs out of petrol.
Again, lots of excitement, and entertaining references – Gustave grows marrows – and if not quite as brilliant as its predecessor, Casino was certainly a delightful read.
Features
The challenge of being positive about SAARC
It was a few years back that a former President of Sri Lanka took it on himself to pronounce SAARC ‘dead’. Since then there have been other sections of Sri Lankan opinion that have joined the critics of SAARC and taken the solemn stance that SAARC has indeed died what may be called a natural death.
Their fatalism is understandable. SAARC has failed to meet at heads of government or state level for the past several years to take the SAARC process notably forward. Regional cooperation has more or less been only an appealing idea. No substantive concrete projects have taken off to make the idea a hard reality. ‘Inner paralysis’ seems to be SAARC’s lot. Hence the fatalism in these circles.
However, being one of the worst cash-strapped regions of the world and a teemingly populated one with people virtually left to their devices, what choices do the ‘SAARC Eight’ have other than to try their best to band together and continue with their cooperation efforts, however small they may be?
There is no escaping the mounting debt trap for many of these countries and bankrupt Sri Lanka is a glaring example, but ‘throwing in the towel’ and abandoning themselves entirely to the diktats of the strongest economies and their agencies will prove a ‘living death’ for many countries in the SAARC fold.
The gains may be meagre but giving-up on SAARC cooperation in full would prove self-defeating for the organization and South Asia. Right now, the collective intention ought to be to salvage what the region could from the tenuous cooperative efforts. Moreover, such initiatives could go some distance to generate a degree of goodwill among the Eight and help in sustaining a dialogue process.
Given this backdrop it proved ‘a stich in time’ for the Regional Centre for Strategic Studies (RCSS), Colombo, to recently host the SAARC Secretary General Ambassador Md. Golam Sarwar to a round table discussion on the unifying potential of SAARC and its future possibilities, besides other related issue areas.
Held on June 24th and moderated by RCSS Executive Director and former ambassador Ravinatha Aryasinha, the forum brought together a vibrant, wide ranging audience comprising academicians, diplomats, senior public servants, civil society activists and many others. Following the presentation by Ambassador Golam Sarwar titled, ‘Reigniting SAARC: Achievements, Challenges and the Way Ahead’, a lively Q&A followed.
The above forum could be described as an act of lighting the proverbial ‘candle’ rather than ‘cursing the darkness.’ It surely is a ‘darkness’ that could be seen as daunting considering that the region’s pivotal powers, India and Pakistan, are failing to act in a spirit of accord but are engaged in bitter finger-pointing on a number of questions of vital importance to SAARC.
On the other hand, what is the rest of the region doing to bring the above sides together? It is disappointing that to date the rest of SAARC has failed to launch a major diplomatic drive to bring peace between the feuding regional heavyweights. It needs to act without delay and establish its earnestness and this effort would need to prove SAARC’s staying power in the unfolding months and even years.
In assessing SAARC’s seeming failure local opinion in particular has failed to factor in what could be described as weak leadership. Since Sheikh Mujibur Rahman of Bangladesh, the founding father of SAARC, the region has failed to produce a visionary leader who could advance the SAARC cause with charisma and drive.
Among other reasons, weak leadership accounts considerably for the faltering and stuttering status, as it were, of SAARC. Badly needed are leaders who could go the extra mile, think less of narrow national interests and work diligently towards the collective well being of the region but SAARC’s millions of ordinary people have been made to wait in vain for leaders of such stature. Instead, they have been burdened with politicians who seem to be relishing the apparently moribund state of SAARC.
Looking back, it could be said that it was the dynamic leadership factor that led to the launching of the Non-Aligned Movement and for its sustenance for a few decades. True, it could be seen in some quarters that NAM is no more, but as in the case of SAARC, the former too has been unfortunate to be burdened over the years with politicians who lack the vision and drive to unflaggingly advance the fortunes of the South. NAM and SAARC lack the dynamism and vision of leaders of the stature of Jawaharlal Nehru, for example, to give them the required guidance and intellectual depth.
The reasons are complex for there not being among us currently political leaders with the vision and the steadfast commitment to advance the legitimate interests of the South. However, it could be stated with conviction that the majority of Southern leaders have too easily caved in to the demands of the global North and its financial agencies.
These leaders have failed to see, for instance, that the largely market economy oriented Northern governments would not view with favour a centrist economic model that attaches priority to the interests of the dis-empowered publics of the South. This realization ought to have dawned on the current government in Sri Lanka, for instance, some while ago but it has no choice but to abide by IMF dictates since economic survival at present is unthinkable without the latter’s succour.
Accordingly for SAARC this should be the time for some soul-searching. Priority needs to be attached to ending the feuding between India and Pakistan since at present the material fortunes of the region hinge largely on these regional giants giving peaceful relations among them a try. This is no easy challenge to meet but some daring, visionary diplomacy needs to take hold among the rest of SAARC.
There is some sense in SAARC bringing the peoples of the region together through programs that address their best collective interests. A meeting of minds among SAARC nations could enable SAARC and its agencies to build a region-wide people’s movement for progressive political and economic change that could in turn lead to the region’s political leaders sensitizing themselves more to the neglected needs of their publics.
However, the time is ‘now’ for the initiation of these progressive changes and the voice of SAARC well wishers would need to drown out those of their critics.
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