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The New Constitution and political intrigues

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Excerpted from volume ii of Sarath Amunugama’s autobiography

One of the important pledges made by the UNP at the 1977 election was the abolition of the 1972 Constitution of the United Front, associated with Colvin R de Silva, and the introduction of it new constitution w ith an Executive Presidency. This far reaching proposal had been made by JRJ many years earlier in an address to the Ceylon Association for the Advancement of Science. As with all of JRJ’s proposals from the days of the Ceylon National Congress and the State Council, they were novel, well considered and designed to make a significant change in the ‘status quo’.

It was not taken seriously even by the UNP of the time which was under Dudley’s leadership. However, JRJ as usual was serious and thorough. He discussed its implications primarily with his top legal advisors led by his brother Harry and J.L. Cooray – a constitutional expert. He also consulted two scholars of constitution making – Kingsley de Silva and A.J. Wilson, both of Peradeniya University. With the requisite ffive sixths majority in Parliament he gained in 1977, the stage was set to enact the revolutionary constitutional changes he had advocated years earlier.

It was no secret that JRJ would introduce a radically new constitution for the country. He had advocated the need for a constitution with a powerful Executive Presidency both at public meetings and in Parliament. Within two months of his victory, he set up a select committee of Parliament to “consider the revision of the Constitution and other written laws as the Committee may consider necessary”. By November these changes were presented as the second amendment to the 1972 Constitution to Parliament and passed with more than a two third majority.

Consequently, JRJ took his oaths as Executive President on Independence Day February 4, 1978 on Galle Face Green. In our discussions regarding the oath taking JRJ with his usual panache said that he wanted the oath taking to be before a large gathering of the people. He proposed the Galle Face green. Our Ministry proposed that the morning ceremony be followed by a mass musical show on Galle Face Green in the evening. That was a sure way of filling the grounds and GVP Samarasinghe who chaired the preparatory meeting gave us his enthusiastic support.

To improve on the shining hour I asked the SLBC to get down the top popular singers of Hindi film songs for the musical show. This was not difficult because Hindi film makers depended on SLBC broadcasts on their India beam to popularize their products. We had a virtual monopoly of All India broadcasts. Consequently, we got down Mohammed Rafi, Mahendra Kapoor and Asha Bhosle.. The show was announced by SLBC over the airwaves.

From early morning crowds began to throng the green and JRJ’s dream of swearing in before a multitude of people was realized. He may have thought that they all came to cheer him. GVP was happy to receive accolades on our behalf for his stage arrangements. JRJ gifted the pen he used to sign the pledge to the national archives.

We in the Information Ministry had no role in planning the new constitution, unlike in the case of the 1972 constitution which I have described in Volume One. But we could comprehend the background to JRJ’s move in our informal discussions with Ministers and other Parliamentarians. The first information was that JRJ had been traumatized by the 1956 defeat of the UNP and his own defeat in the Kelaniya electorate. He had continuously represented Kelaniya for several decades from the State Council days.

Yet he had been easily defeated by R.G. Senanayake whose sole objective was to get personal revenge. In 1956 the UNP had actually won more votes than the MEP. But due to the prevailing electoral system the UNP had won only a few seats. JRJ concluded that the solution was to find away to give value to every vote through the ‘Proportional Representation’ system. PR had the added advantage in his view, that it would always provide for a strong opposition in Parliament which would prevent radical and hasty legislation. The second imperative was to strengthen the role of the Party; mainly because the UNP had been up to then the largest and best organized political party in the country. His original idea was to have an election in which the voter would only vote for a party of his choice.

On the allocation of seats depending on the number of votes polled, the relevant Party, through its Secretary, would nominate its quota of members to Parliament. To further strengthen the hold of the Party, any MP crossing over would forfeit his seat. Younger advisors Lalith and Gamini however suggested that the conferring of all powers to the Party officials would discourage their grass roots supporters who tend to gather round individual leaders. It was too heavily stacked in favour of the seniors who were not necessarily more intelligent or popular.

Accordingly the original proposal was amended to include a preferential ballot system which would enable the voter to choose three candidates from the party list. That proposal, which was adopted, came from Athulathmudali. But the biggest change was the introduction of the Executive Presidency. The Executive President would be elected on the basis of a nationwide poll. He would form a cabinet from the MPs and one of whom would be the Prime Minister whose basic responsibility would be to ensure the passage of legislation as proposed by the Cabinet led by the President.

He was essentially a manager of Parliamentary affairs whom Premadasa derisively said was ‘no more than a peon’. Thus, the legislature is brought in as an accessory to the Executive President who any way had the power to dissolve parliament after one year of its term. The President also appointed the senior judges and the Judicial and Public Service Commissions. It was a constitution in which the President is supreme.

The Constitutional scholar A.J. Wilson called it a ‘Gaullist Constitution’ though in reality it was an amalgam of the French and American Executive Presidential systems. The concentration of powers in the hands of the President was its primary objective. It alarmed the Opposition precisely because of that. As Dr. N.M. Perera, himself a constitutional expert, said “What if the President goes mad?” thereby highlighting the danger of an individualistic approach to the use, or abuse, of State power.

Some safeguards were included no doubt but, as we saw later, they were insufficient. At the base of this transformation however was the five sixths majority that JRJ had obtained in the 1977 election. The new constitution with PR was designed to ensure that it did not happen again. It did because President Gotabaya Rajapaksa managed to win nearly a two third majority in Parliamentary election of 2020.

JRJ with his long political experience and commitment to Parliamentary values may have hoped to tailor a constitution which could promote quick economic growth while maintaining basic human rights. But a series of unfortunate decisions led to a sense of bitterness in the Opposition that did not auger well for a consensual approach which was necessary if the new Constitution was not to descend to autocracy.

Parliament

The 1977 Parliament was like no other. The long-standing balance between the Government and the Opposition did not prevail. For the first time the Parliamentary Opposition could not be considered a government in waiting. Also for the first timer the Leader of the Opposition was not a Sinhalese. The Sirimavo regime was routed in 1977 because JRJ had cunningly removed all the props of the SLFP-led United Front. The Left, particularly the LSSP and the CP, were alienated from Mrs. B And after bringing a damning no—confidence motion against her personally, they formed their own Left Alliance. At the hustings they criticized Mrs. B and the SLFP more than the UNP. The Left even promoted a breakaway group of SLFPers, including Mrs. B’s relative, Nanda Ellawela, to join them, which added to the misery of the PM.

Then JRJ deftly neutralized the JVP. Wijeweera and his top leadership who were languishing in prison, struck a deal whereby they would be released after a UNP victory. Reciprocally, the JVP then attacked Mrs. B thinking that by sinking the SLFP they could sweep up the anti-UNP votes and become the main opposition in the country. After isolating Mrs. Bandaranaike, JRJ made overtures through Colombo Tamil businessmen to the TULF These businessmen were smarting under the austerity measures of the SLFP regime and its promotion of favourite Sinhala Mudalalis.

Finally he reached out to disgruntled SLFPers like R.S. Perera, Maithripala Senanayake and Kalugalle who had been attacked by the UK returned Anura Bandaranaike. Anura was angry that JRJ’s offer to get him to Parliament unopposed from a Rajarata seat was sabotaged by Maitripala and his supporters. All these maneuvers worked and the SLFP was decimated. The SLFP defeat was so decisive that they trailed behind the TULF in numbers in the opposition. As a result, Amithalingam, the TULF leader was made the Leader of the Opposition and Mrs. B was made to eat humble pie. There was mounting criticism of her rule from within the party. She had to expend her energy in keeping the warring SLFP groups together. To make matters worse her son and favourite, Anura turned against her.

Inherent Problems

In retrospect all these maneuvers may be seen as a JRJ exercise in overkill. He had, by trying to be too smart, created an environment which came back to haunt him later, particularly during his second term. By marginalizing Mrs. B and the SLFP he pushed them to an extreme Sinhala nationalist position. Their only concern then became to wrong foot JRJ and his policies at any cost. By making Amirthalingam the Leader of the Opposition, JRJ provided him with many facilities to peddle a separatist line which added to the fears of the Sinhalese.

This soured ethnic relations even further. JRJ’s solution was to promote Cyril Mathew as the voice of Sinhala Buddhist nationalism within his Cabinet. Mathew went on the rampage alienating not only the Tamils but also middle of the road Sinhalese who wanted to settle the ethnic issue peacefully. Since Mathew was Esmond’s friend I knew through him that it was JRJ who was behind his outbursts. But the net result of these stratagems was a rapid worsening of ethnic relations in the country.

To make matters worse Mrs. B used her considerable influence with Indira Gandhi to paint the new Government as Anti-Indian and Pro-American. Unfortunately for Sri Lanka this was a time when there was a radical shift in Indian foreign policy wherein Indira Gandhi adopted a theory of ‘Bharat as a regional hegemon’. Indian strategic think tanks were promoting a concept of the ‘Indian sphere of influence’. The open economy and globalization that JRJ and Ronnie turned to was interpreted as a ‘test case’ and a challenge to Indian interests in the region.

This led to a special concern in the fate of the Tamils particularly as Indira Gandhi, pushed into the opposition, wished to play the ‘Tamil Nadu’ card in the increasingly murky political atmosphere of the time. This was particularly ironic because the northern dominated Indian Government had just emerged from a grueling linguistic conflict with its southern states which resisted the imposition of Hindi as the national language over Tamil and other regional languages. This conflict between the North and South of India had been resolved with the acceptance of the notion of ‘linguistic states’ – a development which did not go unnoticed by the Sri Lankan Tamils.

While JRJ’s tactics were Applauded by the UNP, the country was slipping step by step into a quagmire of regional misunderstandings and domestic ethnic conflict which finally destabilized the country for three decades and blunted the trajectory of economic growth which had started with much promise in 1977. The new President could not see it coming. Nor did his advisors and our Foreign Ministry which was still dominated by the ‘Anti-Indianist’ officials. As Gabriel Marques has written “It is easy to start a war but it is not easy to stop one.” Sri Lanka was on the slippery slope to an ethnic war.

Tension was intensified with the deprivation of the civic rights of Mrs. B, Felix and several senior officials. Whatever may have been the reasons given for this decision, which was facilitated by the Government’s steamroller majority in Parliament, it was clear that there were other, and less altruistic, motives for this drastic move. One obvious need was to eliminate the prospect of Mrs. B being JRJ’s rival at the next Presidential election. Since under the new constitution a President could have two terms of office, JRJ was the automatic choice of the UNP for the election due in 1983. Mrs. B would equally have been the automatic choice of the SLFP as his rival.

Without her the SLFP would be at a disadvantage since it had no other leader of her stature. The numerous aspirants to succeed her began to fight with each other. At that time the talk in town was that there was something more personal in JRJ’s insistence on depriving his rival of her civic rights. The President believed, it was said, that Mrs. B had deliberately ordered the arrest of his only son Ravi during the early days of the 1971 JVP uprising. Ravi was an Olympic level marksman and it was not difficult for rumor mongers to convince her that he had a hand in training insurgents in the use of firearms.

A few days later, after JRJ had made representations, Ravi was released. But it was said that he harbored a grudge because “my son was forced eat out of a tin plate”. Since I was in Temple Trees in April 1971, as I have described in Volume One of my Autobiography, I knew personally that Mrs. B had at that time, no grudge against JRJ or Ravi and she quickly released him after she was informed of his arrest and Police clearance was obtained. But in the poisoned atmosphere of the time facts did not matter and revenge was high on the agenda.

I too felt that it was not proper to deprive the former PM of her civic rights. Many prevailed on my friend minister Gamini Dissanayake to try and stop this misadventure. Among those who advised Gamini were many Kandyans who said that Mrs. B did not deserve this treatment. At that time Gamini was cannily wooing the Kandyans in Colombo who were it considerable number. JRJ, in a typical sleight of hand, sought to put this matter before Cabinet. Gamini was requested by many to intervene in Cabinet on Mrs. B’s behalf.

He, on the other hand faced a dilemma because he knew that JRJ was the author of this convoluted scenario and would not be pleased if his cabinet paper was challenged. Gamini, who did not want to alienate the supporters of Mrs B decided to have a top secret meeting with Hector Kobbekaduwa who at that time was living in Aloe Avenue. Unfortunately for him, Gamini Athukorale, at that time a UNP Junior minister, also lived in Aloe Avenue and spotted Minister Dissanayake sneaking into Kobbekaduwa’s house. The following day he reported this to JRJ, who was furious.

He even spoke to his friends about removing Gamini from the Cabinet on grounds of breaching Cabinet confidentiality. That night Gamini came to my house at Siripa road in a panic. He told me that I could help him by persuading my Minister Anandatissa to defend him at the Cabinet meeting and also raise his voice against JRJ’s proposal. By this time Amanda had told me that he too was unhappy about this move. So it was not difficult for me to approach him on Gamini’s behalf. When I spoke to him, I got the feeling that the canny Gamini, fighting for his political life, had got others also to influence my Minister. The upshot was that Ananda made a strong case on Mrs. B’s behalf at the Cabinet meeting.

Though he and Gamini were out voted, JRJ noted that there was resistance especially because many other Ministers kept silent during the discussion. He made up with Gamini and good relations were re-established; but Mrs. B was stripped of her civic rghts. There is a postscript to this episode. Mrs. B was grateful to Gamini for his gesture and would treat him with great courtesy when he and I saw her during our DUNF days. In the days of the Premadasa impeachment she had absolute confidence in Gamini and allowed her party to join Lalith and Gamini in their reckless bid to take revenge from Premadasa.

I was told that Mrs. B cried when she heard of Gamini’s death. This episode also created an enmity between Gamini and Athukorale which persisted up till the former’s death. Premadasa cashed in on this enmity and appointed Athukorale as the successor Minister to Gamini in the Mahaweli Ministry. Athukorale immediately began a witch hunt and wanted to implicate Wickrema Weerasooria in a land deal, but he was not successful. Later in the Gamini–Ranil conflict in the UNP, Athukorale became Ranil’s chief supporter. But here again he failed because Gamini beat Ranil by one vote in the leadership contest. Then Ranil and Athukorale tried hard to sabotage Gamini’s Presidential bid.



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Sri Lanka’s Foreign Policy amid Geopolitical Transformations: 1990-2024 – Part I

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President Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev after signing the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty in 1987, signalling the end of the Cold War

Sri Lanka’s survival and independence have historically depended on accurately identifying foreign policy priorities, selecting viable strategies as a small island state, and advancing them with prudence. This requires an objective assessment of the shifting geopolitical landscape through a distinctly Sri Lankan strategic lens. Consequently, foreign policy has been central to Sri Lanka’s statecraft, warranted by its pivotal location in the Indian Ocean—adjacent to South Asia yet separated by a narrow stretch of water.

Amid pivotal geopolitical transformations in motion across South Asia, in the Indian Ocean, and beyond, the formulation and implementation of Sri Lanka’s foreign policy has never been more critical to its national security. Despite the pressing need for a cohesive policy framework, Sri Lanka’s foreign policy, over the past few decades, has struggled to effectively respond to the challenges posed by shifting geopolitical dynamics. This article examines the evolution of Sri Lanka’s foreign policy and its inconsistencies amid shifting geopolitical dynamics since the end of the Cold War.

First

, the article examines geopolitical shifts in three key spaces—South Asia, the Indian Ocean, and the global arena—since the end of the Cold War, from Sri Lanka’s strategic perspective. Building on this, second, it analyses Sri Lanka’s foreign policy responses, emphasising its role as a key instrument of statecraft. Third, it explores the link between Sri Lanka’s foreign policy dilemmas during this period and the ongoing crisis of the post-colonial state. Finally, the article concludes that while geopolitical constraints persist, Sri Lanka’s ability to adopt a more proactive foreign policy depends on internal political and economic reforms that strengthen democracy and inclusivity.

Shifting South Asian Strategic Dynamics

Geopolitical concerns in South Asia—Sri Lanka’s immediate sphere—take precedence, as the country is inherently tied to the Indo-centric South Asian socio-cultural milieu. Sri Lanka’s foreign policy has long faced challenges in navigating its relationship with India, conditioned by a perceived disparity in power capabilities between the two countries. This dynamic has made the ‘India factor’ a persistent consideration in Sri Lanka’s strategic thinking. As Ivor Jennings observed in 1951, ‘India thus appears as a friendly but potentially dangerous neighbour, to whom one must be polite but a little distant’ (Jennings, 1951, 113).The importance of managing the ‘India Factor’ in Sri Lankan foreign policy has grown further with India’s advancements in military strength, economic development, and the knowledge industry, positioning it as a rising global great power on Sri Lanka’s doorstep.

India’s Strategic Rise

Over the past three decades, South Asia’s geopolitical landscape has undergone a profound transformation, driven by India’s strategic rise as a global great power. Barry Buzan (2002:2) foresees this shift within the South Asian regional system as a transition from asymmetric bipolarity to India-centric unipolarity. India’s continuous military advancements have elevated it to the fourth position in the Global Firepower (GFP) index, highlighting its formidable conventional war-making capabilities across land, sea, and air (Global Firepower, 2024). It currently lays claims to being the world’s third-largest military, the fourth-largest Air Force, and the fifth-largest Navy.

India consistently ranks among the fastest-growing major economies, often surpassing the global average. According to Forbes India, India is projected to be the world’s fifth-largest economy in 2025, with a real GDP growth rate of 6.5% (Forbes, January 10, 2025). India’s strategic ascendance is increasingly driven by its advancements in the knowledge industry. The country is actively embracing the Fourth Industrial Revolution (4IR) and emerging as the Digital Public Infrastructure (DPI) hub of South Asia. However, India’s rise has a paradoxical impact on its neighbours. On one hand, it offers them an opportunity to integrate into a rapidly expanding economic engine. On the other, it heightens concerns over India’s dominance, leaving them feeling increasingly overshadowed by the regional giant.

Despite significant geo-strategic transformations, the longstanding antagonism and strategic rivalry between India and Pakistan have persisted into the new millennium, continuing to shape South Asia’s security landscape. Born in 1947 amid mutual hostility, the two countries remained locked in a multi-dimensional conflict encompassing territorial disputes, power equilibrium, threat perceptions, accusations of interference in each other’s domestic affairs, and divergent foreign policy approaches. The acquisition of nuclear weapons by both countries in 1998 added a new dimension to their rivalry.

The SAARC process has been a notable casualty of the enduring Indo-Pakistani rivalry. Since India’s boycott of the Islamabad Summit in response to the 2016 Uri attack in Kashmir, the SAARC process has remained in limbo. Countries like Sri Lanka, which seek to maintain equally amicable relations with both India and Pakistan, often find themselves in awkward positions due to the ongoing rivalry between them. One of the key challenges for Sri Lanka’s foreign policy is maintaining strong relations with Pakistan while ensuring its ties with India remain unaffected. India now actively promotes regional cooperation bodies in South Asia, excluding Pakistan, favouring broader frameworks such as BIMSTEC. While Sri Lanka can benefit greatly from engaging with these regional initiatives, it must carefully navigate its involvement to avoid inadvertently aligning with India’s efforts to contain Pakistan. Maintaining this balance will require sharp diplomatic acumen.

India’s expansive naval strategy, especially its development of onshore naval infrastructure, has positioned Sri Lanka within its maritime sphere of influence. As part of the Maritime Infrastructure Perspective Plan (MIPP) launched in 2015 to enhance operational readiness and surveillance capabilities, India is developing an alternative nuclear submarine base for the Eastern Command under Project Varsha (Deccan Chronicle, 22.11.2016). This base is located in Rambilli village, 50 km southwest of Visakhapatnam and 1,200 km from Colombo (Chang, 2024). Additionally, INS Dega, the naval air base at Visakhapatnam, is being expanded to accommodate Vikrant’s MiG-29K and Tejas fighter aircraft.

Another key strategic development in India’s ascent that warrants serious attention in Sri Lanka’s foreign policy formulation is India’s progress in missile delivery systems (ICBMs and SLBMs) and nuclear-powered submarines. In 1998, India made it clear that its future nuclear deterrence would be based on a nuclear triad consisting of land-based Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and strategic bombers (Rehman, 2015). Since then, India has steadily advanced in this direction. The expansion of India’s missile delivery systems, including ICBMs and SLBMs, serves as a reminder that Sri Lanka exists under the strategic shadow of a major global power.

The development of India’s nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) accelerated after 2016. The first in this class, INS Arihant (S2), was commissioned in August 2016, followed by the launch of INS Arighat in November 2021. Designed for strategic deterrence, INS Arighat is equipped to carry the Sagarika K-4 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), with a range of 3,500 kilometers, as well as the K-5, a long-range SLBM capable of reaching 5,000 kilometers. The submarine is based at INS Varsha (Deb, 2021).

India has significantly advanced its missile delivery systems, improving both their range and precision. In 2021, it successfully tested the Agni-5, a nuclear-capable intercontinental ballistic missile with a range of 5,000 kilometers. On March 11, 2024, India joined the ranks of global powers possessing Multiple Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicle (MIRV) technology (The Hindu, January 4, 2022). These advancements elevate the Bay of Bengal as a pivotal arena in the naval competition between India and China, carrying profound political and strategic implications for Sri Lanka, which seeks to maintain equally friendly relations with both countries.

Further, India’s remarkable strides in space research have cemented its status as a global power. A defining moment in this journey was the historic lunar landing on 23 August 2023, when Chandrayaan-3 successfully deployed two robotic marvels: the Vikram lander and its companion rover, Pragyan. They made a graceful touchdown in the Moon’s southern polar region, making India the fourth nation to achieve a successful lunar landing. This milestone has further reinforced India’s position as an emerging great power, enhancing its credentials to assert itself more confidently in South Asian, Indian Ocean, and global power dynamics.

India envisions a stable and secure South Asia as essential to its emergence as a great power in the Indian Ocean and global strategic arenas. However, it does not consider Pakistan to be a part of this stability that it seeks. Accordingly, when India launched the ‘Neighbourhood First Policy’ in 2008 to strengthen regional ties, Pakistan was excluded. India’s ‘Neighbourhood First Policy’ gained renewed momentum after 2015 under Prime Minister Narendra Modi. His approach to South Asia is embedded in a broader narrative emphasising the deep-rooted cultural, economic, and social exchanges between India and other South Asian countries over centuries. India’s promotion of heritage tourism, particularly the ‘Ramayana Trail’ in Sri Lanka, should be viewed through this strategic lens as part of its broader strategic narrative.

Evolving Indian Ocean Geo-political Dynamics

The Indian Ocean constitutes the next geopolitical frame for Sri Lanka’s foreign policy. The Indian Ocean is a huge bay bordered by the Afro-Asian landmass and Australia on three sides and the South Asian peninsula extends into the Indian Ocean basin centrally. Situated at the southern tip of South Asia, Sri Lanka extends strategically into the heart of the Indian Ocean, shaping its geopolitical significance and strategic imperatives for maintaining sovereignty. Historically, Sri Lanka has often been caught in the power struggles of extra-regional actors in the Indian Ocean, repeatedly at the expense of its independence.

Sri Lanka’s leadership at the time of independence was acutely aware of the strategic significance of the Indian Ocean for the nation’s survival. The first Prime Minister D.S. Senanayake, who was also the Minister of Defence and External Affair, stated in Parliament that: “We are in a dangerous position, because we are on one of the strategic highways of the world. The country that captures Ceylon would dominate the Indian Ocean. Nor is it only a question of protecting ourselves against invasion and air attack. If we have no imports for three months, we would starve, and we have therefore to protect our sea and air communications” (Hansard’s Parliamentary Debates, House of Representative. Vol. I, 1 December 1947, c. 444)

As naval competition between superpowers during the Cold War extended to the Indian Ocean, following the British naval withdrawal in the late 1960s, Sri Lanka, under Prime Minister Sirimavo Bandaranaike, played a key diplomatic role in keeping the region free from extra-regional naval rivalry by mobilising the countries that were members of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). In 1971, Sri Lanka sponsored a proposal at the UN General Assembly to establish the Indian Ocean as a Peace Zone (IOPZ). While the initiative initially gained traction, it stalled at the committee stage and ultimately lost momentum.

The maritime security architecture of the Indian Ocean entered a new phase after the end of the Cold War. The United States became the single superpower in the Indian Ocean with an ocean-wide naval presence bolstered by the fully fledged Diego Garcia base. Correspondingly, the regional strategic linkages that evolved in the context of the Cold War were eventually dismantled, giving way to new strategic relationships. Additionally, three key developments with profound implications for Sri Lanka should be noted: India’s projection of political and naval power into the deeper Indian Ocean, China’s rapid economic and military rise in the region, and the entry of other extra-regional powers into Indian Ocean politics. Although Sri Lanka adopted a broader strategic perspective and a more proactive foreign policy in the 1970s, its approach to geopolitical developments in the Indian Ocean in the post-Cold War era became increasingly shaped by domestic challenges—particularly countering the LTTE threat and addressing post-war exigencies.

India’s Expanding Naval Diplomatic Role in the Indian Ocean

Parallel to its strategic rise, India has intensified its engagement in the broader strategic landscape of the Indian Ocean with renewed vigor. This expansion extends beyond its traditional focus on the South Asian strategic theatre, reflecting a more assertive and multidimensional approach to regional security, economic connectivity, and maritime diplomacy. India’s active participation in multilateral security frameworks, infrastructure investments in critical maritime hubs and strategic alignments with major global powers signify its role in the changing naval security architecture of the Indian Ocean. India’s shifting strategic posture in the Indian Ocean is reflected in the 2015 strategy document Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy. It broadens the definition of India’s maritime neighbors beyond those sharing maritime boundaries to include all nations within the Indian Ocean region (Ensuring Secure Seas, p. 23).

In 2015, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi launched his signature Indian Ocean diplomacy initiative, Security and Growth for All in the Region (SAGAR) to foster trust and transparency, uphold international maritime norms, respect mutual interests, resolve disputes peacefully, and enhance maritime cooperation. Strategic engagement with the littoral states in the Indian Ocean region, especially Sri Lanka, the Maldives, Seychelles, and Mauritius and Madagascar has emerged as a key component of India’s Indian Ocean naval diplomacy.

The Seychelles archipelago, located approximately 600 miles east of the Diego Garcia base, holds particular significance in India’s maritime strategy. During Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s official visit to Seychelles in March 2015, India and Seychelles signed four agreements. A key strategic outcome of the visit was Seychelles’ agreement to lease Assumption Island, one of its 115 islands, to India—a move that reinforced Seychelles’ alignment with India’s broader naval diplomacy in the Indian Ocean

Similarly, Mauritius holds a central position in India’s naval diplomacy in the Indian Ocean. During Prime Minister Modi’s visit to Mauritius in March 2015, India signed a Memorandum of Understanding with Mauritius to establish a new base on North Agalega Island, a 12-kilometer-long and 1.5-kilometer-wide Island. The base is crucial for air and surface maritime patrols in the southwest Indian Ocean. It will also serve as an intelligence outpost. In September 2016, defense and security cooperation between India and Mauritius deepened alongside the signing of the ‘Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Partnership Agreement’ (CECPA).

India’s expanding strategic interests across the Indian Ocean are reflected in its growing economic, educational, and defense collaborations with Madagascar. In 2007, India established its first overseas listening post in northern Madagascar to monitor shipping activities and intercept marine communications in the Indian Ocean. This initiative provided India with a naval foothold near South Africa and key sea-lanes in the southwestern Indian Ocean. The significance of India’s defense ties with Madagascar is further highlighted by Madagascar’s participation in China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). As a crucial hub along the Maritime Silk Road connecting Africa, Madagascar’s strategic importance is underscored in the broader geopolitical landscape.

Another element of India’s expanding naval diplomacy in the Indian Ocean is its participation in both unilateral and multilateral anti-piracy operations. India’s commitment to regional security was reinforced in 2008 when it established a ‘Strategic Partnership’ with Oman, securing berthing and replenishment facilities for its navy, along with a strategically significant listening post in the Western Indian Ocean. India’s naval presence in the Arabian Gulf gains additional significance amid reports of a new Chinese naval base in Djibouti and recent submarine deployments. Successful anti-piracy missions in the western Indian Ocean underscore India’s growing influence in the region’s evolving naval security architecture.

India increasingly views its vast Diaspora as a soft power tool to bolster its status as an Indian Ocean power. In June 2014, it launched the Mausam project to reinforce its cultural ties across the region, showcasing its heritage, traditions, and contributions to global arts, literature, cinema, yoga, and cuisine. This initiative complements India’s expanding naval diplomacy and strategic presence in the Indian Ocean. Over the years, it has established listening facilities, airfields, and port infrastructure in key locations such as northern Madagascar, Agaléga Island (Mauritius), and Assumption Island (Seychelles). This has led India Today to ask: “Could this mark the emergence of an Indian ‘String of Flowers’ to counter China’s ‘String of Pearls’?” (The be continued)

by Gamini Keerawella

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Greener Pastures, Mental Health and Deception in Marriage:

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Exploring Sunethra Rajakarunanayake’s Visachakayo

Sunethra Rajakarunanayake’s Sinhala novel Visachakayo (published in 2023) is a thriller in its own sense due to its daring exploration of social themes that modern Sinhala writers fail to touch. To me, the novel is a mosaic that explores pressing issues that middle-class Sri Lankans go through in the 21st Century. The narrative is seen from the perspective of Akshara, a Tamil girl whom the reader first meets in an infamous ‘Visa Queue’ to get her passport to go to England.

Akshara lives with her grandmother ‘Ammamma’ and her aunt ‘Periyamma’ (the younger sister of her mother). Both Ammamma and Periyamma look after her in the absence of her mother, Chinthamani who passed away a long time ago. Akshara’s father lives in Jaffna, with the kids of the second marriage. Later, we are told that Akshara’s father had to marry the second wife due to the loss of his wife’s first husband, who was an LTTE cadre. The second marriage of men seems to be a common theme in the novel due to their commitments to the family as an act of duty and honour.

The most iconic character in the novel is Preethiraj, ‘the man with a big heart’ who functions as a father figure to the other characters in the novel. It is through Preethiraj’s memory that the reader becomes aware of sociological themes in the novel: displacement and immigration, the institution of marriage and mental health issues. Preethiraj (fondly known as Preethi) is the son of Pushpawathi, the second wife of Akshara’s grandfather. Preethi goes to Royal College, but he has to relocate to Jaffna in 1958. Preethi endures social injustice in both public and private spheres. His studious sister, a medical student, labels him as a ‘lunatic’, while his mother condemns him as the ‘odd one’.

The novel intersects between the three themes: immigration and displacement, mental health issues and the institution of marriage. Almost all the characters have to go through displacement, suffer from intricacies of love laws and marriage rules like in The God of Small Things by Arundathi Roy. The writer offers a nuanced analysis of these three themes. For example, take mental health issues. The novel portrays a spectrum of mental health issues, such as schizophrenia, psychosis, Othello Syndrome, depression, autism and even malingering. At times, the representation of such ailments is extremely sarcastic:

“Hm… Canadian citizenship is an easy solution to secure those opportunities. However, unless I am asked to intervene, I will not meddle with their affairs. The son of one of my friends was introduced to a pretty girl. They liked her, not because of her money, but because of her looks and her ability to play the piano. But later, they discovered she has schizophrenia. Now their son follows whatever she says to save the marriage. My friend says she has lost her son” (p.20).

“Those opportunities” refer to material wealth including money and property in Colombo. Here, Rajakarunanayake does not fail to capture the extreme materialism and consumerism. However, in general, her representation of human follies is extremely humane.

   The title ‘Visachakayo’ is another interesting coinage that reflects the plight of Sri Lankans who migrate to the ‘global north’ in search of greener pastures. Akshara’s friend, Subhani, who has migrated to England, explains that the term ‘Visachaya’ captures the in-between status of immigrants who are waiting for PR in a foreign country. Subhani mockingly says that they are equal to beggars who beg for visas. Subhani’s coinage and other accounts of Sri Lankan immigrants in England, the novel shows how difficult it is for an immigrant from the ‘global south’ to fight for a living in a country like England where immigrants come to resolve their financial struggles back home.

The novel is an eye-opener in many ways. First, it is an attempt to bridge the gap caused by the Sinhala-Tamil ethnic strife. It is also a cultural mosaic that captures both the joys and sorrows of Sinhala, Tamil and Burgher families in Sri Lanka. The novel also delves into mental health issues, categorically tied to marriage, a daring task even for a seasoned writer. However, Rajakarunanayake’s writing style compels the reader to adopt a more humane and empathetic approach towards individuals grappling with mental health challenges at various stages of their lives. The linguistic technique of using ‘ne’ tag at the end of sentences creates a conversational tone, making the narrative as if it is a conversation between a therapist and a patient. Her writing style also resembles that of Sri Lankan and Indian diasporic writers, a style that is used when writing about the motherland in exile, of which food becomes a critical trope in the narrative that unites the characters who live in exile.

Rajakarunanayake has done a commendable job in the representation of social issues, making this novel a must-read for anyone who is interested in researching social dynamics of contemporary Sri Lanka. It soon needs to be translated into English which will offer a unique experience to Sri Lankan English and international readers. A good book is something that affects the reader. Visachakayo has this quality, and it makes the reader revisit the past, reflect on the present and anticipate the future with hope for humanity just as Preethi does regardless of hardships he endured in the theatre of life.

By C. M. Arsakulasuriya

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A strategy for Mahaweli authority to meet future challenges amidst moves to close it down

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The potential available in lands under Mahaweli Project, which cover about one third of farming areas of the Dry Zone, could easily help the country become self-sufficient in healthy foods, provided it is managed properly. However, at present, the main focus of the Mahaweli Authority of Sri Lanka (MASL) is mainly on Operation & Maintenance of Canal network feeding the farms. Main purpose of the Mahaweli Restructuring & Rehabilitation Project (MRRP) funded by the World Bank in 2000 was to diversify that objective to cover enhancement of agriculture aspects also. System H Irrigation Systems covering about 20,000 Hectares commanded under Kalawewa Tank located in the Anuradhapura District was used as a pilot area to initiate this effort. However, only the Canal Rehabilitation component of the MRRP was attended because of the government policy at that time. Restructuring component is still awaiting to be completed. Only, a strategy called Water Quota was introduced under the MRRP to initiate the restructuring component. However, the management restructuring required addressing the agriculture component expected under MRRP is still not attended.

Propose Strategy

Total length of the canal network which needs seasonal maintenance is about 1,000 Km in a typical large-scale irrigation project such as Kalawewa. Main role of the Resident Project Managers (RPM) appointed to manage such projects should be to enhance the food production jointly with the Farmer Organizations. Therefore, the abbreviation used for RPM should be redefined as Resident Production Manager. The role of a Production Manager is not limited to maintenance of canal networks as adapted presently. In the current production phase, Irrigation projects should be perceived as a Food Producing “Factory” – where water is the main raw material. Farmers as the owners of the factory, play the role of the labour force of the factory. The Production Manager’s focus should be to maximize food production, deviating from Rice Only Mode, to cater the market needs earning profits for the farmers who are the owners of the “factory”. Canal systems within the project area which need regular maintenance are just “Belts” conveying raw materials (water) in a Typical Factory.

Required Management Shift

In order to implement the above management concept, there is a need for a paradigm shift in managing large scale irrigation projects. In the new approach, the main purpose of managing irrigation systems is to deliver water to the farm gate at the right time in the right quantity. It is a big challenge to operate a canal network about 1000 KM long feeding about 20,000 Hectare in a typical Irrigation System such as Kalawewa.

It is also very pathetic to observe that main clients of irrigation projects (farmers providing labor force) are now dying of various diseases caused by indiscriminate use of agrochemicals. Therefore, there is a need to minimize the damages caused to the ecosystems where these food production factories are located. Therefore, the management objectives should also be focused on producing multiple types of organically grown crops, profitably without polluting the soil and groundwater aquifers causing diseases like Kidney Failures.

Proposed Management Structure

Existing management staff should either be trained or new recruitments having Production Engineering background, should be made. Water should be perceived as the most limited input, which needs to be managed profitably jointly with the farming community. Each Production Manager could be allocated a Fixed Volume of water annually, and their performance could be measured in terms of $s earned for the country per Unit Volume of water, while economically upgrading a healthy lifestyle of the farmers by using climate smart agriculture.

In addition to the government salary, the production management staff should also be compensated in the form of incentives, calculated in proportion to income generated by them from their management areas. It should be a Win-Win situation for both farmers as well as officers responsible for managing the food production factory. Operation of the Main Canal to cater flexible needs of each factory is the main responsibility of the Resident Production Manager. In other countries, the term used to measure their performance is $ earned per gallon of water to the country, without damaging the ecosystem.

Recent Efforts

Mahaweli Authority introduced some of the concepts explained in this note during 2000 to 2006, under MRRP. It was done by operating the Distributary canals feeding each block as elongated Village Tanks. It was known as the Bulk Water Allocation (BWA) strategy. Recently an attempt was made to digitize the same concept, by independently arranging funds from ICTA / World Bank. In that project, called Eazy Water, a SMS communication system was introduced, so that they can order water from the Main Reservoir by sending a SMS, when they need rather; than depend on time tables decided by authorities as normally practiced.

Though the BWA was practiced successfully until 2015, the new generation of managers did not continue it beyond 2015.

Conclusion

The recent Cabinet decision to close down the MASL should prompt the MASL officers to reactivate the BWA approach again. Farmer Organisations at the distributary canal level responsible for managing canal networks covering about 400 Hectares can be registered as farmer cooperatives. For example, there are about 50 farmer cooperatives in a typical irrigation project such as Kalawewa. This transformation should be a gradual process which would take at least two years. I am sure the World Bank would definitely fund this project during the transition period because it is a continuation of the MRRP to address the restructuring component which was not attended by them in 2000 because of government policy at that time. System H could be used as a pilot demonstration area. Guidelines introduced under the MRRP could be used as tools to manage the main canal. World Bank funded Agribusiness Value Chain Support with CSIAP (Climate Smart Irrigated Agriculture Project) under the Ministry of Agriculture which is presently in progress could also provide necessary guidelines to initiate this project.

by Eng. Mahinda Panapitiya
Engineer who worked for Mahaweli Project since its inception

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