Features
The minister just missed seeing the Rolls Royce picking us up for a sugar traders’ lunch
More appointments and foreign visits
I have always believed that whatever you do, and whatever reputation you have gathered for yourself, an element of luck is necessary from time to time. This has been reflected in many ways, but one such outstanding example occurred when a delegation led by me was in London, on our way back home from Washington.
We were staying at a hotel where we found Mr. E. L.B. Hurulle, a Senior Minister also staying. We had met him in the lobby and spoken with him a few times. We happened to be in London, because we always made use of the opportunity of passing through London to Washington and back in order to have extensive discussions with our lawyers. When importing and shipping a large tonnage of food commodities, inevitably disputes arose. Some of these were settled amicably and by mutual agreement. But over some, we had to go in for arbitration in London, and some cases involved going to Court.
The Attorney-General in Sri Lanka could not handle all these matters himself. The volume was too great. We had therefore to have lawyers on the spot in London. Whilst in London, we usually spent about five to six working days sitting down with our lawyers and discussing each case coming up for trial or arbitration. Our departmental legal advisor brought with him 20-30 files, each of which constituted a dispute or a case.
Sometimes our Commercial Counselor in the High Commission joined our discussions, because he was our liaison with the lawyers on a regular basis. We kept him regularly posted with the facts of the various cases. Sometimes we had to see specialized counsel at consultations, in their chambers. When the discussions start we spent virtually a full working day with the lawyers, having a sandwich lunch at the conference table. Occasionally, when time permitted, we were taken out to a nearby pub for lunch.
Sometimes, the fact that we are in London gets around and then we get invited for lunch and sometimes dinner. Most luncheon invitations, we had to decline because of our work. There was one however, during this particular visit, that we couldn’t decline. This was a joint invitation from the major sugar trading firms, with which we had been doing business for a long time. This was to be a jointly hosted lunch by the Managing Directors of these companies.
On the one hand it would have been bad form for us to have declined. On the other, there was a distinct mutual advantage in meeting at this level, and exchanging views and discussing any problems. One also always learn at these discussions. We had been informed that they would send a car to pick us up at the hotel at 12 noon on the day of the lunch. This was to be a formal lounge suit affair. We were down in the lobby at about ten minutes to twelve to find Mr. Hurulle seated there. He was more casually dressed.
We exchanged pleasantries and were standing around chatting, when an old Ford Cortina drew up, somebody waved, Mr. Hurulle waved back, smiled at us and went with his host. The time was about three minutes to twelve. Sharp at noon, a splendid looking Rolls-Royce drew up and a tall liveried chauffeur strode to the front desk. We were lost, admiring the car, when I heard my name mentioned. I looked back and discovered that the Rolls-Royce was the car that had been sent to pick us up. On the way, the driver kept reporting as to where we were, over a radio communication system.
We all had the same thought. What would have been the impression created in Minister Hurulle’s mind, had he not left before we left and witnessed the splendour in which we were going to travel. We were certain that he would have gone back to Colombo and reported that we were living it up in London, and that Rolls-Royces were coming to pick us up. Most things when taken out of context would be damaging. But this would have been devastating. Explanations could come later. By that time lasting impressions could be generated and unfortunate suspicions aroused. Only a matter of three minutes saved us from the possibility of all these.
The lunch itself went off quite well. The heads of the sugar trading companies informed us that we enjoyed what they called Triple A status in the London sugar market. We did not know this. When we inquired what it meant they said that it meant that if we were to lift a phone in the Ministry in Colombo and say that we required a sugar cargo of 10,000 tons, they would ship it even without the opening of an L.C. They said that very few international customers enjoyed such a status. It was gratify ing to learn of this. I was tempted to tell them however, that their Rolls-Royce could have resulted in our relegation to triple F status in the Colombo market of innuendo and gossip.
Towards the end of 1981, the Queen and the Duke of Edinburgh visited Sri Lanka, and we fulfilled the customary duty of attending the garden party hosted by President and Mrs. Jayewardene. In a small society like Sri Lanka, such occasions can be a waste of time, since you happen to meet almost the same people most of the time. At the same time, they are important from the point of view of upholding settled international political social and diplomatic standards.
More appointments
In November 1981, 1 was appointed to the Board of Directors of the People’s Bank. This was in my capacity as Secretary, Cooperatives. As was well known, the People’s Bank had its genesis in the Co-operative movement, and continued to have a special relationship with the movement. I was also appointed to the Rural Credit Advisory Board of the Central Bank, a Board chaired by the Governor. These appointments meant more work and more time.
Visit to South Korea
In January 1982, I had to go to South Korea. This was in my capacity as a Director of the Ceylon Shipping Corporation. One day, Mr. Caspersz, the Chairman of the Corporation, told me in his own inimitable style, “Dharmasiri, we want you to go to South Korea, attend a lunch, reply to a toast, drink a glass of champagne and come back.” I asked “Since when has the government resorted to such extravagance?” The fact was. one of our container vessels, “Lanka Siri” built in a Korean shipyard was ready for delivery. My job was to go and formally accept it. The Minister of Food and the Minister of Shipping had agreed that I should go and the President had approved it.
I left for Seoul on January 31, accompanied by Mrs. Geetha Wijeyapala, Manager Legal and Insurance of the Shipping Corporation. The technical people had gone ahead and were already in Seoul. Sea trials of the ship were taking place. The expectation was that all the technical aspects would have been satisfactorily concluded, paving the way for the formal acceptance of the ship.
When I met the technical officers in Seoul however, I was not reassured by the manner they spoke. I did not detect a confident assertion from them after the conclusion of the sea trials that the ship was completely and fully sea-worthy and that I could proceed to accept it. They were hedging my questions.
Therefore, I went on probing, until it emerged that “A few matters” needed attention. At this point, I made it quite clear to all that I was not prepared to accept a ship which was not complete in all respects. We now had to go to Pusan where the ship had been built. In over a four hour Journey from Seoul by train, we saw something of the countryside. South Korea was a mountainous country with relatively limited arable land. The cold during this time of the year was intense, particularly to those who had come from a warm tropical climate. One had however to admire what the Koreans had achieved, in spite of war and an inhospitable terrain. This was obviously due to their energy, their industry and their focus. During this time..
There was still a curfew on after midnight for security reasons. After the trauma of the war, there was not unnaturally an obsession with security. Many important figures of government, from the President downwards, were figures with a military background. The people appeared to be obedient and disciplined. Their capacity for work seemed to be remarkable.
Both in Seoul and Pusan I had the experience of going down for breakfast at about 6.45 a.m. and being unable to find a seat in the quite large coffee shops in the hotels. At practically every table there were lounge suit clad businessmen with their brief cases opened, calculators, note pads and reams of documents spread out, avidly engrossed in business discussions. I had never seen such a sight of mass business discussions, at such an early hour anywhere else in the world. We were told that if we wished to have undelayed seating, 5.45 a.m. was a better time than 6.45 a.m!
Whilst in Pusan I had extensive discussions with our officers as well as representatives of the ship building firm and others. Things were that much more difficult for us because we did not at the time have an Embassy in South Korea. I had therefore to do a lot of drafting by hand, whilst the Legal and Insurance Manager kept hand written minutes of our various discussions.
By now the Korean parties were getting frantic, because the day had been fixed for the acceptance of the vessel and invitations had gone out to important people. My refusal to accept the vessel without further investigation was heading towards delay and loss of face for them. I sympathized but could not compromise. I had also discussed the whole matter in detail with our Legal and Insurance Manager who fully supported me.
I informed the technical people, that I would accept the ship as it was, only if they vouched in writing to me that they certify it was complete in all respects and that they recommend its formal acceptance. This they could not do. It was not easy to get through to Colombo, but I managed to speak to Mr. Caspersz on at least two occasions over an unclear line. He thought, we should accept the ship subject to an understanding to rectify defects. I disagreed. The stability of the vessel was in doubt, and this to me was fundamental, and once we accepted the vessel the problem was going to be with us.
I was not prepared to accept on this basis. Anybody else could do so. The whole thing had turned into a nightmare. We were isolated in Pusan, with no comfort or assistance from an Embassy. In the meantime, the Koreans were exerting heavy pressure on us to accept the ship on deadline. They appeared to be both upset and angry. I got our whole team together and made my position very clear. They had to agree that the main technical defects should be remedied and the contract amended.
I also telephoned Norway and spoke to our former consultants on shipping and fortified myself with their advice. I further contacted some UNDP. experts on shipping whom I had previously met. As a result of all this, it was decided to add the necessary ballast to stabilize the vessel fully. The Koreans commenced work on this immediately. But I wanted to see for myself. Therefore, one morning in the biting cold I boarded a launch with the technical officers and went on board the vessel to see the work in progress.
Some kind of large concrete blocks were being added to a part of the ship. By now it was clear that the ceremonial handing over could not take place on the scheduled date. The invitations would have to be cancelled. I was obviously not the most popular person with the Koreans, and the isolation, hard work and stress was perhaps making me a bit paranoid. Sometimes, the telephone by my bedside rang during the dead of night, when I was fast asleep. But when I lifted the receiver there was total silence.
I perhaps imagined that someone was trying to open my bedroom door. This was disturbing and I felt somewhat better after positioning against the door, a heavy armchair which was in my room.
In the end, there was no lunch and no champagne. The delivery of the vessel was postponed. I obtained a written guarantee on the ultimate stability of the vessel, from the ship builders. The letter of guarantee backed by a bank guarantee included the provision that any adjustments deemed necessary by the Classification Society would be made at their expense.
There also remained the question of some minor items of work. A separate agreement was signed that in respect of this work, both sides would jointly itemize and price this work, after which the Koreans would pay us that sum, so that we could get this work done in Colombo or elsewhere. Through all this, Geetha, the Legal and Insurance Manager was an unfailing source of competence and strength. It was fortunate that she came on this visit.
Thus ended for me the virtual saga of my first visit to South Korea. The reward lay in the satisfaction of overcoming numerous unforeseen obstacles, working hard, keeping one’s nerve and achieving a solution. There was an additional reward of Ministerial appreciation. My colleagues in the Ministry of Trade and Shipping told me, that on reading my report, Minister Lalith Athulathmudali .said, “Thank God, we sent Dharmasiri.”
A sudden visit to China and Pakistan
I had returned from the visit to South Korea and had barely settled down to work, when Lakshman de Mel rang me from the Trade Ministry, towards the middle of March 1982 and informed me that he and I with one or two others will have to go to China almost immediately, because the government had decided to purchase some extra rice for the buffer. This was completely unexpected, and our guess was that the government was thinking of some form of elections including perhaps a Presidential election, and wanted to ensure the availability of adequate food stocks. We already had the insurance of a buffer. This was going to be reinsurance.
Therefore, a delegation led by Lakshman, and consisting of Mr. Pulendiran, the Food Commissioner; Laurie Mariadasan, Director of Commerce; Mr. Dissanayake, Deputy Director Fiscal Policy, Ministry of Finance and myself left on March 21. The Chinese too, had to arrange this visit at very short notice. We were to have general discussions on food supplies and specifically negotiate for the purchase of 100,000 metric tons of rice.
Negotiations did not go as smoothly as before. The Chinese were really not prepared for this sudden visit. They did not have the quantity we needed in surplus with them. They therefore had to talk to Burma in order to procure stocks to meet the shortfall. The negotiation became tripartite. Beyond a point, the Chinese did not have control of the Burmese price. Rice shipped from Burma would cost us less due to the cheaper freight. We had to see that this advantage was not nullified in the overall result.
The negotiations did not go on, morning and afternoon. This was not the Chinese practice. There were sometimes half day breaks. On this particular occasion, these breaks sometimes even took longer because the Chinese had to consult the Burmese and await a reply from there. All in all, things dragged on. The Chinese, as was customary had arranged for our delegation to be flown out to the South-Western City of Kunming, known as the City of “Eternal Spring” close to the Burmese border, after the negotiations, for us to spend a few days there. The deadline for departure was now rapidly approaching, and we were still haggling over the price. We were to leave Beijing on March 27, but by the morning of the 26th, we had not yet reached agreement. Mr. Lakshman de Mel and I decided to stay on, and if necessary cancel the visit to Kunming.
(Excerpted from In Pursuit of Governance, autobiography of MDD Pieris) ✍️
Features
Australia’s social media ban: A sledgehammer approach to a scalpel problem
When governments panic, they legislate. When they legislate in panic, they create monsters. Australia’s world-first ban on social media for under-16s, which came into force on 10 December, 2025, is precisely such a monster, a clumsy, authoritarian response to a legitimate problem that threatens to do more harm than good.
Prime Minister Anthony Albanese hailed it as a “proud day” for Australian families. One wonders what there is to be proud about when a liberal democracy resorts to blanket censorship, violates children’s fundamental rights, and outsources enforcement to the very tech giants it claims to be taming. This is not protection; it is political theatre masquerading as policy.
The Seduction of Simplicity
The ban’s appeal is obvious. Social media platforms have become toxic playgrounds where children are subjected to cyberbullying, addictive algorithms, and content that can genuinely harm their mental health. The statistics are damning: 40% of Australian teens have experienced cyberbullying, youth self-harm hospital admissions rose 47% between 2012 and 2022, and depression rates have skyrocketed in tandem with smartphone adoption. These are real problems demanding real solutions.
But here’s where Australia has gone catastrophically wrong: it has conflated correlation with causation and chosen punishment over education, restriction over reform, and authoritarian control over empowerment. The ban assumes that removing children from social media will magically solve mental health crises, as if these platforms emerged in a vacuum rather than as symptoms of deeper societal failures, inadequate mental health services, overworked parents, underfunded schools, and a culture that has outsourced child-rearing to screens.
Dr. Naomi Lott of the University of Reading hit the nail on the head when she argued that the ban unfairly burdens youth for tech firms’ failures in content moderation and algorithm design. Why should children pay the price for corporate malfeasance? This is akin to banning teenagers from roads because car manufacturers built unsafe vehicles, rather than holding those manufacturers accountable.
The Enforcement Farce
The practical implementation of this ban reads like dystopian satire. Platforms must take “reasonable steps” to prevent access, a phrase so vague it could mean anything or nothing. The age verification methods being deployed include AI-driven facial recognition, behavioural analysis, government ID scans, and something called “AgeKeys.” Each comes with its own Pandora’s box of problems.
Facial recognition technology has well-documented biases against ethnic minorities. Behavioural analysis can be easily gamed by tech-savvy teenagers. ID scans create massive privacy risks in a country that has suffered repeated data breaches. And zero-knowledge proof, while theoretically elegant, require a level of technical sophistication that makes them impractical for mass adoption.
Already, teenagers are bragging online about circumventing the restrictions, prompting Albanese’s impotent rebuke. What did he expect? That Australian youth would simply accept digital exile? The history of prohibition, from alcohol to file-sharing, teaches us that determined users will always find workarounds. The ban doesn’t eliminate risk; it merely drives it underground where it becomes harder to monitor and address.
Even more absurdly, platforms like YouTube have expressed doubts about enforcement, and Opposition Leader Sussan Ley has declared she has “no confidence” in the ban’s efficacy. When your own political opposition and the companies tasked with implementing your policy both say it won’t work, perhaps that’s a sign you should reconsider.

The Rights We’re Trading Away
The legal challenges now percolating through Australia’s High Court get to the heart of what’s really at stake here. The Digital Freedom Project, led by teenagers Noah Jones and Macy Neyland, argues that the ban violates the implied constitutional freedom of political communication. They’re right. Social media platforms, for all their flaws, have become essential venues for democratic discourse. By age 16, many young Australians are politically aware, engaged in climate activism, and participating in public debates. This ban silences them.
The government’s response, that child welfare trumps absolute freedom, sounds reasonable until you examine it closely. Child welfare is being invoked as a rhetorical trump card to justify what is essentially state paternalism. The government isn’t protecting children from objective harm; it’s making a value judgment about what information they should be allowed to access and what communities they should be permitted to join. That’s thought control, not child protection.
Moreover, the ban creates a two-tiered system of rights. Those over 16 can access platforms; those under cannot, regardless of maturity, need, or circumstance. A 15-year-old seeking LGBTQ+ support groups, mental health resources, or information about escaping domestic abuse is now cut off from potentially life-saving communities. A 15-year-old living in rural Australia, isolated from peers, loses a vital social lifeline. The ban is blunt force trauma applied to a problem requiring surgical precision.
The Privacy Nightmare
Let’s talk about the elephant in the digital room: data security. Australia’s track record here is abysmal. The country has experienced multiple high-profile data breaches, and now it’s mandating that platforms collect biometric data, government IDs, and behavioural information from millions of users, including adults who will need to verify their age to distinguish themselves from banned minors.
The legislation claims to mandate “data minimisation” and promises that information collected solely for age verification will be destroyed post-verification. These promises are worth less than the pixels they’re displayed on. Once data is collected, it exists. It can be hacked. It can be subpoenaed. It can be repurposed. The fine for violations, up to AUD 9.5 million, sounds impressive until you realise that’s pocket change for tech giants making billions annually.
We’re creating a massive honeypot of sensitive information about children and families, and we’re trusting companies with questionable data stewardship records to protect it. What could possibly go wrong?
The Global Domino Delusion
Proponents like US Senator Josh Hawley and author Jonathan Haidt praise Australia’s ban as a “bold precedent” that will trigger global reform. This is wishful thinking bordering on delusion. What Australia has actually created is a case study in how not to regulate technology.
France, Denmark, and Malaysia are watching, but with notable differences. France’s model includes parental consent options. Denmark proposes exemptions for 13-14-year-olds with parental approval. These approaches recognise what Australia refuses to acknowledge: that blanket prohibitions fail to account for individual circumstances and family autonomy.
The comparison table in the document reveals the stark rigidity of Australia’s approach. It’s the only country attempting outright prohibition without parental consent. This isn’t leadership; it’s extremism. Other nations may cherry-pick elements of Australia’s approach while avoiding its most draconian features. (See Table)

The Real Solutions We’re Ignoring
Here’s what actual child protection would look like: holding platforms legally accountable for algorithmic harm, mandating transparent content moderation, requiring platforms to offer chronological feeds instead of engagement-maximising algorithms, funding digital literacy programmes in schools, properly resourcing mental health services for young people, and empowering parents with better tools to guide their children’s online experiences.
Instead, Australia has chosen the path of least intellectual effort: ban it and hope for the best. This is governance by bumper sticker, policy by panic.
Mia Bannister, whose son’s suicide has been invoked repeatedly to justify the ban, called parental enforcement “short-term pain, long-term gain” and urged families to remove devices entirely. But her tragedy, however heart-wrenching, doesn’t justify bad policy. Individual cases, no matter how emotionally compelling, are poor foundations for sweeping legislation affecting millions.
Conclusion: The Tyranny of Good Intentions
Australia’s social media ban is built on good intentions, genuine concerns about child welfare, and understandable frustration with unaccountable tech giants. But good intentions pave a very particular road, and this road leads to a place where governments dictate what information citizens can access based on age, where privacy becomes a quaint relic, and where young people are infantilised rather than educated.
The ban will fail on its own terms, teenagers will circumvent it, platforms will struggle with enforcement, and the mental health crisis will continue because it was never primarily about social media. But it will succeed in normalising digital authoritarianism, expanding surveillance infrastructure, and teaching young Australians that their rights are negotiable commodities.
When this ban inevitably fails, when the promised mental health improvements don’t materialize, when data breaches expose the verification systems, and when teenagers continue to access prohibited platforms through VPNs and workarounds, Australia will face a choice: double down on enforcement, creating an even more invasive surveillance state, or admit that the entire exercise was a costly mistake.
Smart money says they’ll choose the former. After all, once governments acquire new powers, they rarely relinquish them willingly. And that’s the real danger here, not that Australia will fail to protect children from social media, but that it will succeed in building the infrastructure for a far more intrusive state. The platforms may be the proximate target, but the ultimate casualties will be freedom, privacy, and trust.
Australia didn’t need a world-first ban. It needed world-class thinking. Instead, it settled for a world of trouble.
(The writer, a senior Chartered Accountant and professional banker, is Professor at SLIIT, Malabe. The views and opinions expressed in this article are personal.)
Features
Sustaining good governance requires good systems
A prominent feature of the first year of the NPP government is that it has not engaged in the institutional reforms which was expected of it. This observation comes in the context of the extraordinary mandate with which the government was elected and the high expectations that accompanied its rise to power. When in opposition and in its election manifesto, the JVP and NPP took a prominent role in advocating good governance systems for the country. They insisted on constitutional reform that included the abolition of the executive presidency and the concentration of power it epitomises, the strengthening of independent institutions that overlook key state institutions such as the judiciary, public service and police, and the reform or repeal of repressive laws such as the PTA and the Online Safety Act.
The transformation of a political party that averaged between three to five percent of the popular vote into one that currently forms the government with a two thirds majority in parliament is a testament to the faith that the general population placed in the JVP/ NPP combine. This faith was the outcome of more than three decades of disciplined conduct in the aftermath of the bitter experience of the 1988 to 1990 period of JVP insurrection. The manner in which the handful of JVP parliamentarians engaged in debate with well researched critiques of government policy and actions, and their service in times of disaster such as the tsunami of 2004 won them the trust of the people. This faith was bolstered by the Aragalaya movement which galvanized the citizens against the ruling elites of the past.
In this context, the long delay to repeal the Prevention of Terrorism Act which has earned notoriety for its abuse especially against ethnic and religious minorities, has been a disappointment to those who value human rights. So has been the delay in appointing an Auditor General, so important in ensuring accountability for the money expended by the state. The PTA has a long history of being used without restraint against those deemed to be anti-state which, ironically enough, included the JVP in the period 1988 to 1990. The draft Protection of the State from Terrorism Act (PSTA), published in December 2025, is the latest attempt to repeal and replace the PTA. Unfortunately, the PSTA largely replicates the structure, logic and dangers of previous failed counter terrorism bills, including the Counter Terrorism Act of 2018 and the Anti Terrorism Act proposed in 2023.
Misguided Assumption
Despite its stated commitment to rule of law and fundamental rights, the draft PTSA reproduces many of the core defects of the PTA. In a preliminary statement, the Centre for Policy Alternatives has observed among other things that “if there is a Detention Order made against the person, then in combination, the period of remand and detention can extend up to two years. This means that a person can languish in detention for up to two years without being charged with a crime. Such a long period again raises questions of the power of the State to target individuals, exacerbated by Sri Lanka’s history of long periods of remand and detention, which has contributed to abuse and violence.” Human Rights lawyer Ermiza Tegal has warned against the broad definition of terrorism under the proposed law: “The definition empowers state officials to term acts of dissent and civil disobedience as ‘terrorism’ and will lawfully permit disproportionate and excessive responses.” The legitimate and peaceful protests against abuse of power by the authorities cannot be classified as acts of terror.
The willingness to retain such powers reflects the surmise that the government feels that keeping in place the structures that come from the past is to their benefit, as they can utilise those powers in a crisis. Due to the strict discipline that exists within the JVP/NPP at this time there may be an assumption that those the party appoints will not abuse their trust. However, the country’s experience with draconian laws designed for exceptional circumstances demonstrates that they tend to become tools of routine governance. On the plus side, the government has given two months for public comment which will become meaningful if the inputs from civil society actors are taken into consideration.
Worldwide experience has repeatedly demonstrated that integrity at the level of individual leaders, while necessary, is not sufficient to guarantee good governance over time. This is where the absence of institutional reform becomes significant. The aftermath of Cyclone Ditwah in particular has necessitated massive procurements of emergency relief which have to be disbursed at maximum speed. There are also significant amounts of foreign aid flowing into the country to help it deal with the relief and recovery phase. There are protocols in place that need to be followed and monitored so that a fiasco like the disappearance of tsunami aid in 2004 does not recur. To the government’s credit there are no such allegations at the present time. But precautions need to be in place, and those precautions depend less on trust in individuals than on the strength and independence of oversight institutions.
Inappropriate Appointments
It is in this context that the government’s efforts to appoint its own preferred nominees to the Auditor General’s Department has also come as a disappointment to civil society groups. The unsuitability of the latest presidential nominee has given rise to the surmise that this nomination was a time buying exercise to make an acting appointment. For the fourth time, the Constitutional Council refused to accept the president’s nominee. The term of the three independent civil society members of the Constitutional Council ends in January which would give the government the opportunity to appoint three new members of its choice and get its way in the future.
The failure to appoint a permanent Auditor General has created an institutional vacuum at a critical moment. The Auditor General acts as a watchdog, ensuring effective service delivery promoting integrity in public administration and providing an independent review of the performance and accountability. Transparency International has observed “The sequence of events following the retirement of the previous Auditor General points to a broader political inertia and a governance failure. Despite the clear constitutional importance of the role, the appointment process has remained protracted and opaque, raising serious questions about political will and commitment to accountability.”
It would appear that the government leadership takes the position they have been given the mandate to govern the country which requires implementation by those they have confidence in. This may explain their approach to the appointment (or non-appointment) at this time of the Auditor General. Yet this approach carries risks. Institutions are designed to function beyond the lifespan of any one government and to protect the public interest even when those in power are tempted to act otherwise. The challenge and opportunity for the NPP government is to safeguard independent institutions and enact just laws, so that the promise of system change endures beyond personalities and political cycles.
by Jehan Perera
Features
General education reforms: What about language and ethnicity?
A new batch arrived at our Faculty again. Students representing almost all districts of the country remind me once again of the wonderful opportunity we have for promoting social and ethnic cohesion at our universities. Sadly, however, many students do not interact with each other during the first few semesters, not only because they do not speak each other’s language(s), but also because of the fear and distrust that still prevails among communities in our society.
General education reform presents an opportunity to explore ways to promote social and ethnic cohesion. A school curriculum could foster shared values, empathy, and critical thinking, through social studies and civics education, implement inclusive language policies, and raise critical awareness about our collective histories. Yet, the government’s new policy document, Transforming General Education in Sri Lanka 2025, leaves us little to look forward to in this regard.
The policy document points to several “salient” features within it, including: 1) a school credit system to quantify learning; 2) module-based formative and summative assessments to replace end-of-term tests; 3) skills assessment in Grade 9 consisting of a ‘literacy and numeracy test’ and a ‘career interest test’; 4) a comprehensive GPA-based reporting system spanning the various phases of education; 5) blended learning that combines online with classroom teaching; 6) learning units to guide students to select their preferred career pathways; 7) technology modules; 8) innovation labs; and 9) Early Childhood Education (ECE). Notably, social and ethnic cohesion does not appear in this list. Here, I explore how the proposed curriculum reforms align (or do not align) with the NPP’s pledge to inculcate “[s]afety, mutual understanding, trust and rights of all ethnicities and religious groups” (p.127), in their 2024 Election Manifesto.
Language/ethnicity in the present curriculum
The civil war ended over 15 years ago, but our general education system has done little to bring ethnic communities together. In fact, most students still cannot speak in the “second national language” (SNL) and textbooks continue to reinforce negative stereotyping of ethnic minorities, while leaving out crucial elements of our post-independence history.
Although SNL has been a compulsory subject since the 1990s, the hours dedicated to SNL are few, curricula poorly developed, and trained teachers few (Perera, 2025). Perhaps due to unconscious bias and for ideological reasons, SNL is not valued by parents and school communities more broadly. Most students, who enter our Faculty, only have basic reading/writing skills in SNL, apart from the few Muslim and Tamil students who schooled outside the North and the East; they pick up SNL by virtue of their environment, not the school curriculum.
Regardless of ethnic background, most undergraduates seem to be ignorant about crucial aspects of our country’s history of ethnic conflict. The Grade 11 history textbook, which contains the only chapter on the post-independence period, does not mention the civil war or the events that led up to it. While the textbook valourises ‘Sinhala Only’ as an anti-colonial policy (p.11), the material covering the period thereafter fails to mention the anti-Tamil riots, rise of rebel groups, escalation of civil war, and JVP insurrections. The words “Tamil” and “Muslim” appear most frequently in the chapter, ‘National Renaissance,’ which cursorily mentions “Sinhalese-Muslim riots” vis-à-vis the Temperance Movement (p.57). The disenfranchisement of the Malaiyaha Tamils and their history are completely left out.
Given the horrifying experiences of war and exclusion experienced by many of our peoples since independence, and because most students still learn in mono-ethnic schools having little interaction with the ‘Other’, it is not surprising that our undergraduates find it difficult to mix across language and ethnic communities. This environment also creates fertile ground for polarizing discourses that further divide and segregate students once they enter university.
More of the same?
How does Transforming General Education seek to address these problems? The introduction begins on a positive note: “The proposed reforms will create citizens with a critical consciousness who will respect and appreciate the diversity they see around them, along the lines of ethnicity, religion, gender, disability, and other areas of difference” (p.1). Although National Education Goal no. 8 somewhat problematically aims to “Develop a patriotic Sri Lankan citizen fostering national cohesion, national integrity, and national unity while respecting cultural diversity (p. 2), the curriculum reforms aim to embed values of “equity, inclusivity, and social justice” (p. 9) through education. Such buzzwords appear through the introduction, but are not reflected in the reforms.
Learning SNL is promoted under Language and Literacy (Learning Area no. 1) as “a critical means of reconciliation and co-existence”, but the number of hours assigned to SNL are minimal. For instance, at primary level (Grades 1 to 5), only 0.3 to 1 hour is allocated to SNL per week. Meanwhile, at junior secondary level (Grades 6 to 9), out of 35 credits (30 credits across 15 essential subjects that include SNL, history and civics; 3 credits of further learning modules; and 2 credits of transversal skills modules (p. 13, pp.18-19), SNL receives 1 credit (10 hours) per term. Like other essential subjects, SNL is to be assessed through formative and summative assessments within modules. As details of the Grade 9 skills assessment are not provided in the document, it is unclear whether SNL assessments will be included in the ‘Literacy and numeracy test’. At senior secondary level – phase 1 (Grades 10-11 – O/L equivalent), SNL is listed as an elective.
Refreshingly, the policy document does acknowledge the detrimental effects of funding cuts in the humanities and social sciences, and highlights their importance for creating knowledge that could help to “eradicate socioeconomic divisions and inequalities” (p.5-6). It goes on to point to the salience of the Humanities and Social Sciences Education under Learning Area no. 6 (p.12):
“Humanities and Social Sciences education is vital for students to develop as well as critique various forms of identities so that they have an awareness of their role in their immediate communities and nation. Such awareness will allow them to contribute towards the strengthening of democracy and intercommunal dialogue, which is necessary for peace and reconciliation. Furthermore, a strong grounding in the Humanities and Social Sciences will lead to equity and social justice concerning caste, disability, gender, and other features of social stratification.”
Sadly, the seemingly progressive philosophy guiding has not moulded the new curriculum. Subjects that could potentially address social/ethnic cohesion, such as environmental studies, history and civics, are not listed as learning areas at the primary level. History is allocated 20 hours (2 credits) across four years at junior secondary level (Grades 6 to 9), while only 10 hours (1 credit) are allocated to civics. Meanwhile, at the O/L, students will learn 5 compulsory subjects (Mother Tongue, English, Mathematics, Science, and Religion and Value Education), and 2 electives—SNL, history and civics are bunched together with the likes of entrepreneurship here. Unlike the compulsory subjects, which are allocated 140 hours (14 credits or 70 hours each) across two years, those who opt for history or civics as electives would only have 20 hours (2 credits) of learning in each. A further 14 credits per term are for further learning modules, which will allow students to explore their interests before committing to a A/L stream or career path.
With the distribution of credits across a large number of subjects, and the few credits available for SNL, history and civics, social/ethnic cohesion will likely remain on the back burner. It appears to be neglected at primary level, is dealt sparingly at junior secondary level, and relegated to electives in senior years. This means that students will be able to progress through their entire school years, like we did, with very basic competencies in SNL and little understanding of history.
Going forward
Whether the students who experience this curriculum will be able to “resist and respond to hegemonic, divisive forces that pose a threat to social harmony and multicultural coexistence” (p.9) as anticipated in the policy, is questionable. Education policymakers and others must call for more attention to social and ethnic cohesion in the curriculum. However, changes to the curriculum would only be meaningful if accompanied by constitutional reform, abolition of policies, such as the Prevention of Terrorism Act (and its proxies), and other political changes.
For now, our school system remains divided by ethnicity and religion. Research from conflict-ridden societies suggests that lack of intercultural exposure in mono-ethnic schools leads to ignorance, prejudice, and polarized positions on politics and national identity. While such problems must be addressed in broader education reform efforts that also safeguard minority identities, the new curriculum revision presents an opportune moment to move this agenda forward.
(Ramya Kumar is attached to the Department of Community and Family Medicine, Faculty of Medicine, University of Jaffna).
Kuppi is a politics and pedagogy happening on the margins of the lecture hall that parodies, subverts, and simultaneously reaffirms social hierarchies.
by Ramya Kumar
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