Features
The hidden social crisis of a middle-income country
The news that Sri Lanka has once again been classified as a middle-income country is undoubtedly one of the more encouraging developments after the severe economic crisis the country has experienced over the past few years. For a nation that went through foreign exchange shortages, debt default, high inflation, fuel queues and shortages of essential goods, such international recognition naturally creates a sense of hope.
It can be seen as a positive signal that Sri Lanka’s macroeconomy is gradually moving towards a degree of stability. However, as with any important statistical achievement, there is a deeper question we must ask before celebrating too quickly.
If Sri Lanka has once again become a middle-income country, have the lives of Sri Lankans also returned to a middle-income standard of living?
To answer this question honestly, we must look beyond statistics and examine the daily realities of ordinary people.
Even today, many families struggle to manage their monthly income. Within a few days of receiving their salaries, they have to pay for food, rent, electricity, water, transport, school expenses and loan instalments. Once these obligations are met, the rest of the month is often spent under severe financial pressure. This reality shows that there is still a significant gap between Sri Lanka’s official recognition as a middle-income country and the lived experience of a middle-income life.
To understand this gap, we must first recognise that a “country” and a “society” are not the same thing.
A country is often described through economic data, financial indicators and international comparisons. A society, however, is a living collection of human experiences that cannot be measured by numbers alone. It includes not only people’s income, but also their health, education, job security, social justice, confidence in the future and ability to live with dignity.
Therefore, a “middle-income country” is an economic classification. A “middle-income society” is a qualitative condition of development. When we fail to understand this difference, our interpretation of economic news becomes too narrow.
The World Bank classifies countries mainly according to Gross National Income per capita, or GNI per capita. This indicator divides a country’s total national income by its population and provides a useful basis for comparison between countries. It is an important and widely accepted method. But it measures an average. It does not tell us how income is distributed.
That is the central problem.
A country’s income may increase, but that income may not reach all sections of society equally. The economy may grow, but the living standards of many families may remain largely unchanged. The numbers may improve, while people’s hopes continue to decline.
This is why Amartya Sen, one of the most influential thinkers in economics and development studies, defines development not merely as an increase in income, but as the expansion of people’s capabilities to live the kind of life they value. This idea is especially relevant to Sri Lanka today. Real development is not only about improving the figures in government accounts. It is also about expanding the opportunities available to ordinary citizens.
Similarly, economists such as Joseph Stiglitz have long argued that national income and Gross Domestic Product are useful indicators of economic activity, but they do not fully reflect people’s well-being, social justice or quality of life. Therefore, treating statistical success and human development as the same thing is a serious policy mistake.
Sri Lanka now stands at such a crossroads.
On the one hand, macroeconomic indicators are improving. Inflation has been brought under control. Foreign reserves have strengthened to some extent. Tourism is recovering. Exports are showing signs of progress. These are important achievements, and they must be acknowledged.
On the other hand, the household economy remains under pressure. The cost of living is high. Real wage growth is limited. Debt burdens are heavy. Many young people see migration as their main hope. Many small businesses have not yet fully recovered. Therefore, we must clearly understand that macroeconomic stability and household economic recovery are not the same thing.
That is the central argument of this article.
Sri Lanka’s return to middle-income status is certainly an important achievement. But it is not the final destination. The real challenge is to transform this statistical achievement into a middle-income society where every citizen can live with dignity, security and hope.
Have the Numbers Recovered, Even Though Households Have Not?
When we speak about Sri Lanka’s economy today, we hear two different stories. The first is the story of the macroeconomy. Inflation has come down. Foreign exchange reserves are improving. Tourism is recovering. Exports show some progress. A measure of fiscal discipline is also being restored. From this perspective, it can be said that Sri Lanka is gradually emerging from the depths of the economic crisis.
But the second story is heard inside the homes of ordinary people. It is the story of daily life, which is not always visible in macroeconomic reports.
Many families today manage their monthly expenses not because their income has increased, but because they have reduced their needs. They change their food habits. They reduce nutrition. They give up leisure. They limit children’s private tuition classes. They postpone medical tests. They delay repairs to their homes. Instead of thinking about new investments, their main goal has become simply to maintain their present way of life.
This is not only a story of insufficient income. It is also a story of weakened purchasing power. Even if nominal wages have increased to some extent, their real value has not fully returned to pre-2022 levels for many families. As a result, the common feeling among people is clear: “They say the economy is recovering, but we still do not feel it in our lives.”
The condition of the middle class is particularly important. In any country, the middle class is a key pillar of economic stability. It pays taxes, invests in children’s education, buys homes, starts small businesses and contributes significantly to domestic consumption. But over the past few years, a large section of Sri Lanka’s middle class has moved backwards economically.
Their wages increased more slowly than the cost of living. Income tax burdens rose. Electricity, water and service charges increased. Housing loans and vehicle loans absorbed a significant part of monthly income. As a result, their capacity to save for the future declined, and their ability to face unexpected economic shocks weakened.
In economics, this is often described as “the squeezed middle.” It refers to a group that is not poor, but not secure either. This is the reality of many Sri Lankan families today.
The aspirations of the younger generation make this situation even clearer. A few decades ago, many young people dreamed of finding a good job and building their future in Sri Lanka. Today, for many, the dream is to leave the country. Doctors, engineers, IT professionals, accountants, nurses and skilled technicians are migrating in large numbers. This is more than a personal decision. It is a measure of the confidence a society has in its own future.
The most valuable resource of a country is not its natural resources, but its human capital. If that human capital begins to leave the country, it is a silent warning for development. This issue requires urgent national attention.
Small and medium-sized enterprises also deserve serious attention. SMEs create a significant share of employment in Sri Lanka. However, high interest rates, limited access to finance, rising input costs and weak domestic demand have prevented many businesses from fully recovering. Some businesses are not operating to make profits, but simply to avoid closure. In such an environment, the creation of new employment opportunities remains limited.
The situation in rural Sri Lanka is no different. Farmers face the triple challenge of rising production costs, market uncertainty and climate risks. Fishermen struggle with fuel and operational costs. Small traders suffer from declining consumer demand. These groups do not speak in the language of macroeconomic indicators. They speak about daily income and the cost of living.
This brings us to another important point. Economic growth and inclusive development are not the same thing. National income can rise. But if the benefits of that growth reach only a limited section of society, such growth is not socially sustainable. The real question of development is not only how much a country earns, but who receives the benefits, how they receive them and how widely those benefits are shared.
Therefore, Sri Lanka’s main challenge today is not only to build macroeconomic stability. It is to convert that stability into a visible improvement in the life of the ordinary family. The numbers seen in economic reports must become purchasing power in the marketplace. Investments must become decent jobs. Growth must become shared prosperity.
If this does not happen, Sri Lanka may be a middle-income country statistically, but it would still be difficult to call it a middle-income society in any meaningful social sense.
How Can a Real Middle-Income Society Be Built?
Joseph Stiglitz has repeatedly reminded us that GDP and national income may show a country’s production capacity, but they do not adequately measure well-being, income distribution or social justice. Therefore, policymakers must focus not only on increasing numbers, but also on sharing prosperity.
Michael Porter also reminds us that a country’s competitiveness is not built on low wages. It is built on higher productivity, innovation, strong institutions and skilled human capital. This message is highly relevant to Sri Lanka. If we are to escape the middle-income trap, we must move away from an economy that competes mainly on low cost and move towards an economy that creates knowledge, technology and higher value addition.
Countries that have successfully followed this path offer useful lessons. South Korea did not move from a war-torn poor country to a high-income economy merely through industrialisation. Its success was the result of long-term coordination between education, research, technology, industrial policy and strong state institutions. Vietnam has achieved rapid development by connecting itself to global value chains, strengthening exports, attracting investment and investing in human capital. Malaysia also gradually moved from a manufacturing-based economy towards a knowledge-based services economy.
These countries are different in many ways. But they teach us one common lesson. They did not simply chase numbers. They built institutions. They did not merely increase income. They strengthened productive capacity. They did not only grow the economy. They expanded the capabilities of their people.
Sri Lanka also needs such a long-term development framework. It should not be a collection of short-term programmes that change whenever governments change. It must be a national development compact that goes beyond party politics and looks ahead over the next two or three decades.
Such a framework must place productivity at the centre of national economic policy. Wages can rise sustainably only when productive capacity rises. Investment in education, vocational training and digital skills must be significantly increased. SMEs must be developed as engines of employment by expanding access to finance, technical support and new markets. Strong, transparent and accountable public institutions must be built to create trust among both investors and citizens. Development benefits must also reach rural communities, women, youth and vulnerable groups through an inclusive development model.
From Middle-Income Classification to a Middle-Income Society
In the end, Sri Lanka’s return to middle-income status reminds us of a simple but profound truth. The development of a country is not merely the beauty of numbers in public accounts. It is the quality of people’s lives. Does a child have access to a good school? Can a patient receive quality healthcare? Can a young person find decent employment? Does an entrepreneur have a fair opportunity? Can a retired person live without fear and insecurity? The answers to these questions are the true measure of a country’s development.
Therefore, we should not reject the international recognition that comes with being classified as a middle-income country. It is an important signal that Sri Lanka is moving towards some degree of stability after the economic crisis. But it would be a serious mistake to treat it as the end of the achievement. It must be seen as the beginning of a new development responsibility. A country being called middle-income and its people actually experiencing a middle-income quality of life are not the same thing.
Sri Lanka’s real challenge is not to obtain an income classification, but to strengthen the foundations that create income. If institutions are not strong, if human capital is not developed, if productivity does not rise, if competitiveness does not expand and if opportunities are not fairly distributed, the name “middle-income country” will not translate into a real improvement in people’s lives. It will remain a statistical label in an international report, without meaningful impact on the kitchen of an ordinary family, the classroom of a child, the job hopes of a young person or the daily struggle of an entrepreneur.
For this reason, Sri Lanka’s policy conversation must now move in a new direction. It should not end with the question, “Are we a middle-income country?” The more important question is, “What kind of society are we building?” Are we building a society with fair opportunities? A society where labour is respected? A society where talent can move forward? A society where poverty is not inherited? A society where migration is not the only hope for young people?
The policy answer is clear. First, macroeconomic stability must be maintained. But it should be treated not as the final goal, but as the foundation for broader human development. Second, productivity must be placed at the centre of national economic policy. Wages can rise in the long term not by command, but by increasing the value of labour, productive capacity and innovation. Third, education, vocational training, digital skills and lifelong learning must become the main investment areas of the future economy.
Fourth, small and medium-sized enterprises must be made the engines of job creation in Sri Lanka. This requires better access to finance, technical assistance, market access and a simpler regulatory environment. Fifth, Sri Lanka must build a public institutional system that both investors and citizens can trust. Policy stability, the rule of law, transparency, accountability and an efficient public service are essential for sustainable development. Sixth, the benefits of development must not be limited to Colombo and major urban centres. They must reach rural areas, women, youth, farmers, small entrepreneurs and vulnerable social groups in a fair and meaningful way.
For all this to succeed, Sri Lanka does not need another short-term programme. It needs a long-term national development compact that rises above party politics. It must not be confined to a five-year electoral cycle. It should be built on a national vision for at least the next twenty or thirty years. Without a development framework that connects institutions, education, skills, industry, exports, technology, social protection and regional development, it will be difficult to move from a middle-income country to a society with a higher quality of life.
Finally, we must remember that a country’s income level is an outcome, not a cause. The real causes are strong institutions, skilled people, higher productivity, innovation, fair opportunities and trustworthy governance. If these foundations are built, the journey from a middle-income country to a middle-income society, and eventually to a country with a high standard of living, will become a natural progression.
Sri Lanka’s return to middle-income status is therefore a development we can welcome. But it should not be used to comfort us. It should be used to awaken us. The final purpose of development is not to make numbers look beautiful. It is to make people’s lives better. Only then will the statement “Sri Lanka is a middle-income country” become not merely an international classification, but a reality felt in the life of every family.
by Prof. Ranjith Bandara
Features
From the missing to the missing truth and beyond
by Jehan Perera
The government is preparing to meet the challenge of the UN Human Rights Council next month. A Sri Lankan delegation led by Foreign Minister Vijitha Herath is expected to attend the 63rd session of the UNHRC in Geneva, where the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights will present a written update on Sri Lanka. The government has already submitted its response to the advance version of the report prepared by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights. The Foreign Minister, accompanied by officials from Colombo and Sri Lanka’s Permanent Mission in Geneva, is expected to explain the progress made on reconciliation, accountability and human rights. This is therefore an important moment for the government. It is an opportunity not merely to defend its record but to make new commitments.
The government has been criticised, as were its predecessors, for the manner in which it has dealt with past human rights violations, especially those connected with the thirty year war. The vexed issue of thousands of missing persons remains at the centre of this criticism. The government has sought to strengthen the Office on Missing Persons by providing it with additional staff and resources. It has also given support to the excavations at the Chemmani mass grave. Justice and National Integration Minister Harshana Nanayakkara has told Parliament that the government has allocated Rs. 57 million for the excavations and related legal work, though that figure has not been set against the cost of comparable forensic operations elsewhere.
The government also took the significant step of holding a national event in Jaffna to mark the International Day of the Victims of Enforced Disappearances. Minister Harshana Nanayakkara attended the event together with the Chairman of the Office on Missing Persons (OMP), Mahesh Katulanda, and other senior officials and political representatives. Their presence was meant to demonstrate the government’s commitment to addressing the issue. But on the victims’ side there is continuing dissatisfaction. The commemoration in Jaffna was met by a protest outside the District Secretariat, organised by families of the disappeared, who demanded to know what happened to relatives who, according to their accounts, surrendered to or were taken away by the military and were never heard from again.
Jaffna Protests
The protests in Jaffna are a reminder of the gap that remains between what the government is trying to do and what the victims expect. For these families, compensation and death certificates are not substitutes for knowing what actually happened to those they lost. The protests, and the police action taken against some of those who demonstrated, were reported by the international and Tamil media and by international human rights organisations, and overshadowed much of what the government had hoped to showcase at the Jaffna event. The OMP’s mandate is to establish the fate and whereabouts of missing persons, clarify the circumstances in which they went missing, and provide redress and assistance to their families. Accordingly, it has sought to verify complaints, remove duplicate entries, encourage people who have not yet made complaints to come forward, and facilitate compensation and other forms of assistance. The families of victims expect the OMP to do more to clarify the circumstances in which their loved ones went missing. An example would be the disappearance of 158 displaced Tamil persons from the Eastern University campus in Vantharumoolai, Batticaloa District, who were rounded up and forcibly removed in front of thousands of other similarly displaced persons, including the officer in charge Prof T Jayasingam.
The government has also increased the support available to families of the missing, and says it is accelerating the OMP’s investigations. But the scale of what remains undone is stark. There are around 11,000 complaints remaining to be investigated, according to the Justice Minister, while the OMP has reported that final information has been established in only 31 cases, communicated privately to the families concerned. On the government’s own figures, that puts the clearance rate for establishing fate and whereabouts at well under one percent of the outstanding caseload. There is a limit to what the OMP can do even with more resources and time. Its mandate is primarily to establish the fate and whereabouts of individual missing persons. It was not intended to produce the comprehensive, public account of the past that victims and the country as a whole require.
In 2015, the government headed by President Maithripala Sirisena and Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe committed itself to establishing such a commission as part of a comprehensive approach to dealing with Sri Lanka’s past. Human Rights Council Resolution 30/1, which the government co-sponsored, specifically welcomed the proposed establishment of a “commission for truth, justice, reconciliation and non-recurrence”, together with an Office on Missing Persons and an Office for Reparations. However, the commitment to a truth-seeking mechanism was never fulfilled. The government should consider setting one up now. There is a growing feeling among Tamil people in the North and East that the government is failing to deliver on promises that are important to them. On issues important to them, they feel this is once again a Sinhala-dominated government like all the ones that came before.
Establish Truth
For the past two years the government has been concentrating on problems that it deems are important to the country as a whole such as the economy, development, poverty alleviation and corruption and criminality. However, the government needs to demonstrate that national unity means addressing the concerns of all communities, including those whose wounds from the war remain unhealed. Some of its own institutions have begun to act on this. The Office for National Unity and Reconciliation recently staged a drama entitled From Yakaweva to Nandikadal, depicting relationships between people that transcend the destruction caused by war. The drama portrayed the sufferings as well as the prejudices on both sides of the divide, from the Kebithigollewa bus bombing to the final days of the war around the Nandikadal lagoon. Its central message is that without forgiveness there cannot be reconciliation.
Particularly moving was the fact that the actors themselves came from families touched by the violence on both sides. The son of an LTTE Black Tiger leader and the daughter of an Army officer were among those who performed, alongside others who had experienced and survived some of the sites of carnage. The fact that a state institution is taking this message of reconciliation forward is itself a testament to the government’s openness to dealing with the past. A government institution can reach a population far larger than any civil society campaign could reach on its own, simply because the machinery of the state is so much more extensive. It is in this context that the government needs to give serious thought to setting up a Truth and Reconciliation Commission as the next step in the truth-seeking process. Special care will need to be taken to ensure that those who are appointed are not only politically non-partisan, but are acceptable to all the communities.
A Truth and Reconciliation Commission cannot by itself resolve all the wounds of the past. Nor can it replace criminal investigations or judicial proceedings where these are necessary. But it can provide something that existing institutions cannot provide on their own. This would be a comprehensive national process through which victims can be heard and the truth can be established. The general population needs to understand what happened, so that the country can begin to acknowledge its past without passing it on indefinitely to future generations. The government has already taken several steps. It is supporting the search for the truth at Chemmani. It has begun reaching out to families of the disappeared. Its own institutions are producing messages of reconciliation. But these are still not delivering the results that the victims and their families want. The next step should be to bring these efforts together to begin the journey from the missing to the missing truth, and from there to comprehensive justice.
Features
The long road to educating Sri Lanka’s Bhikkhunis
A robe without recognition:
by Anushka Kahandagamage
Education is the right of every child. Yet somewhere between childhood and the robe, that right becomes precarious for many Buddhist women in Sri Lanka, threatening not only their social standing, but their fundamental access to learning and the institutional discrimination they face. This piece is not about Buddhist disciplinary rules, which discriminates women, rather about how the state’s refusal to fully recognise bhikkhunis as bhikkhunis quietly determines what they are, and are not, permitted to learn.
Unlike dasasil mathas, who occupy a distinct and unofficial category within Buddhist renunciation, bhikkhunis belong to a formally ordained order recognised within Buddhist monastic tradition itself. Dasa sil mata means ‘ten-precept mother.’ They are women who observe the ten precepts (rather than the fuller Vinaya) and live a renunciant, celibate life, often in robes, but formal ordination has not translated into formal recognition by the state. Even after a Supreme Court ruling affirmed their right to be identified as bhikkhunis on their National Identity Cards, many still do not hold one. This stems from the hesitation of the male-dominated Buddhist hierarchy to recognise these women as part of the Theravada tradition, specifically refusing to validate their higher ordination. The identity card lists her title as Dasa Sil Mata. The ruling exists on paper, but they are still waiting for their identity cards. This is not a small bureaucratic oversight. It is the first link in a longer chain, one that reaches, eventually, into the classroom.
A Name Withheld
In Sri Lanka, there are 827 pirivenas, traditional monastic colleges that have, for centuries, served as the primary institutions of Buddhist education. Of these, only 12 are dedicated to female renunciants at all, and of those 12, just five serve fully ordained nuns specifically. The imbalance is stark on its face: 827 institutions for monks, five for fully ordained nuns. But the discrimination here is not only a matter of numbers, but it is also written into the very language used to name these institutions. Monks’ schools are called pirivena, a term carrying centuries of institutional weight, historical continuity, and state recognition under Sri Lanka’s education laws. Bhikkhunis’ schools, by contrast, are not called pirivenas at all. They are designated Buddha Sravika Meheni Adhyapana Ayathanaya (Institute for the Education of Buddha’s Female Disciples), a separate, parallel term that, however similar in function, withholds from bhikkhuni institutions the same legal and institutional status that the word ‘pirivena’ confers. Since there are ten-precept mothers, the institutes have not given the same name as the pirivena and lack the official as well as social recognition they deserve.
A Pattern a Century in the Making
Following the decline of the Buddhist nun (bhikkhuni) order after the Polonnaruwa period, the first woman to be robed again was ordained in 1905 as a dasasil matha. Although dasasil mathas have long served important religious and societal roles, they have historically lacked access to formal education. Unfortunately, today also, this pattern continuous to exist. Education, in this context, is never just about literacy or dhamma study. It is the currency of religious authority. A bhikkhuni denied equivalent education or educated in an institution the state refuses to name a pirivena, is denied that religious authority. She may know the Tipitaka as well as any monk yet will lack the institutional stamp that would make a lay community trust her reading of it. It was not indifference from the public; it was the accumulated effect of a system that has spent centuries teaching devotees, implicitly, that a woman’s robe does not carry the same weight as a man.
The female renunciants, both dasasil mathas and bhikkunis, although they wear robes, have not been regarded as individuals capable of comprehending or preaching dhamma, simply because they are women. This is most visible in education, the pirivena system, developed historically to train bhikkhus, offered dasasil mathas and bhikkunis no equivalent institutional pathway, no comparable curriculum, certification, or state recognition. This exclusion is notable because it runs counter to Sri Lanka’s broader educational trends, where women have historically outnumbered men in general university enrolment, the gap here is specific to monastic/religious education rather than a reflection of wider societal restrictions on women’s schooling. The country’s National Education Commission Policy has a section on Pirivena education. However, it does not address the education of Buddhist nuns, nor does it mention nuns within the policy. I recently learned that the policy was being reviewed, with a committee appointed by the Ministry of Education, scheduled to begin the review on the 1st of September. This presents an important opportunity to raise the issue of nuns’ education and advocate for its inclusion in the revised policy.
The monks and nuns’ education institutes are funded by the government, which allocates only 5,000–6,000 LKR per student for the entire year. This sum is grossly inadequate to cover even basic institutional needs, accommodation, food, learning materials, and the maintenance of the physical premises, let alone to support any meaningful expansion of the curriculum. With this level of funding, these education institutes are struggling to sustain themselves, and many are forced to rely almost entirely on external support simply to remain operational. This is where the disparity becomes most visible. As female renunciants have historically not been taken seriously, regarded neither as authoritative teachers of dhamma nor as figures worthy of the same reverence extended to their male counterparts, their education centres receive far fewer lay offerings than those for male renunciants. The result is a widening resource gap that mirrors and reinforces the very discrimination that caused it. Underfunded institutions produce fewer well-trained female scholars, which in turn reinforces the perception that female renunciants are less capable, a perception that then justifies continued underinvestment. Without deliberate intervention, either through equitable government allocation or targeted lay support, this cycle is likely to persist rather than resolve on its own.
Sitting Alone at the Bo Tree
I was at Jaya Sri Maha Bodhi in Anuradhapura, where a few monks sat preaching in the shade of the Bo Tree, each surrounded by small clusters of lay devotees. Nearby, I noticed a few female Buddhist renunciants, though I could not immediately tell whether they were bhikkhunîs or dasasil mathas, since visually, in their robes and demeanour, they appeared indistinguishable to an outside observer. Most of them sat alone, without the small crowds of devotees gathered around the monks nearby. This, too, is not incidental. Because women cannot enter the sâsana through the same pathway to ordination, available to men, many Buddhist female renunciants remain dasasil mathas, a status that carries the appearance of monastic life without its legitamised spiritual standing. They observe the 10 precepts, wear robes, and live in renunciation, yet occupy a lower, unofficial rung in the religious hierarchy, one that grants them neither the ordination lineage nor the institutional recognition given to monks. However, in June last year, the Supreme Court of Sri Lanka delivered a landmark majority ruling in SC/FR/218/2013, affirming that fully ordained Buddhist nuns have the fundamental right to use the title ‘Bhikkhuni’ on their National Identity Cards, legally recognising the de facto existence of the Bhikkhuni Sanga.
A Closed Loop
Social discrimination and educational discrimination feed each other in a closed loop. Because bhikkhunis have fewer, less recognised institutions, fewer are formally trained to a standard the public recognises. Because fewer are recognised as authoritative teachers, fewer devotees seek them out or support them. Because they attract fewer devotees, the education institutions of female renunciants remain under-resourced and easy to overlook in state budgets and in popular imagination alike. A dasasil matha or bhikkhuni without an active following also lacks the economic support that following brings, since in Sri Lanka’s monastic economy, devotees are patrons as much as students. The precarity is not only spiritual or bureaucratic; it is material, and it compounds across a lifetime spent in robes.
Until bhikkhunis’ education is named, funded, and recognised on the same terms as that of bhikkhus, this will remain a story not only about missing ID cards or under-resourced schools, but about an education system that continues to decide, quietly and continuously, which students are worth investing in. Education was supposed to be the one place where the women can speak for themselves, instead, for these women, it has become just another place where women have to ask permission to be heard.
(Anushka is a Sociologist who is working on contemporary Buddhist movements. She was formerly attached to the University of Colombo)
Kuppi is a politics and pedagogy happening on the margins of the lecture hall that parodies, subverts, and simultaneously reaffirms social hierarchies.
Features
‘Memories of Milton – Live in Concert’ to enchant Dubai
Sri Lankan music knows no borders. Wherever our people go, our melodies follow — and our musicians make sure of it.
From Qatar’s Exit, to Melbourne’s EBONY, to Toronto’s Ceymphony, and Dubai’s Seven Notes, Sri Lankan bands abroad continue to keep the community connected to home, through song.
In July, Rajiv Sebastian set the Dubai stage alight with the band Seven Notes, creating an unforgettable night for Sri Lankans in the UAE. And the live-wire behind that magic? Niluk Uswaththa of Seven Notes.
Well, Niluk says he isn’t stopping there.
Now, Dubai is preparing for something truly special — ‘Memories of Milton – Live in Concert’, a grand musical tribute to one of Sri Lanka’s most beloved voices: Milton Mallawarachchi.
For more than a decade, Milton Mallawarachchi was a trending force in Sri Lankan music. With nearly 850 songs and over 35 albums to his name, he gave us melodies that became the soundtrack to our lives — songs of love, longing, and life itself.
On Saturday, 26th September 2026, from 8:00 PM to 3:00 AM, the Mercure Hotel, Al Barsha Heights, Dubai, will transform into a space of nostalgia.

Ranil Mallawarachchi; Carrying forward his father’s legacy / Yenuli Neriah
With the spotlight on Ranil Mallawarachchi — Milton’s eldest son, carrying forward his father’s legacy — along with Yenuli Neriah and Tharaka, the evening will certainly bring Milton’s timeless classics back to life … on one stage.
Seven Notes will do the needful, providing the live music that made Dubai dance before.
According to Niluk, this isn’t just a concert.
“It’s designed as a nostalgic musical journey — to bring cherished memories and beloved songs back to life,” he says.
And he promises: 26th September will be a night to remember.
In fact, Niluk Uswaththa has become a driving force for Sri Lankan entertainment in Dubai.
Through Seven Notes, he ensures the community always has something special to look forward to — especially when it comes to music that feels like home.
The success of these overseas shows naturally raises one big question back in Sri Lanka.
Yes, music lovers, in Sri Lanka, are keen to know whether the Seven Notes band will pop up in Colombo, sometime soon, for a live performance?
Music lovers, island-wide, will be watching … and waiting!
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