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The Executive Presidency as JRJ saw it

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(Excerpted from Men and Memories by JR Jayewardene)

(The elected Executive Presidency was adopted in Sri Lanka in 1978. The original idea was mine and there is controversy about it in Sri Lanka now. I explained the Constitution in this lecture delivered in July 1991.)

The first suggestion to introduce the Executive Presidency system of Government in Sri Lanka was made by me while I was a Minister in the Dudley Senanayake Government of 1965-1970, in a speech to the Science Students Association of the Colombo University in December 1966. Some of the remarks I made then were as follows:

In some countries, the executive is chosen directly by the people and is not dependent on the legislature during the period of its existence, for a specified number of years. The new French Constitution is a combination of the British and the American systems. Such an executive is a strong executive, seated in power for a fixed number of years, not subject to the whims and fancies of an elected legislature; not afraid to take correct but unpopular decision because of censure from its parliamentary party. This seems to me a very necessary requirement in a developing country faced with grave problems such as we are faced with today.

The next occasion I raised this questions was when I was in the Opposition. Mrs. Bandaranaike’s government was considering amending the Constitution, to introduce the Republican Constitution of 1972. I suggested to the United National Party Working Committee that we put forward our views supporting the Executive Presidential system at the Constituent Assembly. The Party did not agree. But Dudley Senanayake who did not support it, stated that we must remember that the most powerful country in the world today, America, has attained that stature under an Executive Presidential system.

On July 2, 1971, at the Meeting of the Constituent Assembly, I was permitted to propose that we adopt the Executive Presidential system in place of the Westminster model. R. Premadasa, who was in the Opposition with me, seconded the proposal. We received no support and the motion was defeated.

One reason for adopting the Presidential system was the instability that was attached to a government under the Westminster type of Constitution. Let us look at our own country since we attained independence in 1948.

At the General Election of 1947, no party obtained an overall majority. The UNP under D.S. Senanayake had the largest number of members and was invited by the Governor to form a government which he did. He was able to carry on his work through a parliamentary majority which had the support of 21 Independent members, who called the tune. The Independents could defeat the government at any time by voting against its proposals. The support of the Independents was obtained largely through the influence and stature that D.S. Senanayake wielded as “Father of the Nation” and one chiefly responsible for obtaining freedom from the British.

On his (D.S. Senanayake’s) death in March 1952, Dudley Senanayake, the new Prime Minister, called for a General Election within a month and he was returned with a two-thirds majority. However, there was much trouble within the Government Parliamentary Party. A few Cabinet Ministers combined together to make it difficult for Dudley Senanayake to govern.

As a result of the resignation of Dudley Senanayake in 1953, Sir John Kotelawala became the Prime Minister. He too, facing trouble from within the party, called for elections in February 1956, fifteen months before the life of the Parliament was over.

S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike formed a government with the aid of other parties, after the 1956 elections. He found it difficult to maintain the government as several parties that had helped him to form a coalition government were pulling in various directions. Resort to a long prorogation did not help. His death in September 1959 deepened the crisis and Parliament was dissolved soon after his death by his successor W. Dahanayake, after a regime that lasted three and a half months.

As a result of this dissolution, a ‘Hung Parliament’ was elected in April 1960. Dudley Senanayake leading the UNP had the largest number of members in the House but did not have a majority in Parliament. Being defeated on the Throne Speech debate, he dissolved Parliament.

Mrs. Srimavo Bandaranaike’s Party had the largest number of members in the June 1960 elections and in December 1964, after a long prorogation which did not help, the government was defeated and she dissolved Parliament before her term was over in 1965.

The 1965 April elections put Dudley Senanayake in office with a majority in Parliament and he was able to govern the country,, for the full period from 1965 to 1970. It was the first occasion since independence in 1948 that a political party was able to govern the country for a full period of five years.

Mrs. Bandaranaike won the 1970 General Election, this too with the help of several other parties and she formed a coalition government. She extended her period of five years which ended in 1975 by another two years with the help of all the coalition members. As some of the coalition members left soon after, she also decided to go to the electorate and dissolved Parliament in 1977.

In the 1977 July elections, the UNP was returned with a five sixths majority and I became the Prime Minister. With the consent of the Cabinet and the Parliamentary Group, we introduced the Executive Presidential system of government in the Constitution Bill of 1978, a few months after the government was formed in July-August 1977. The Bill was passed in Parliament by a two thirds majority, after a Parliamentary Committee of all parties considered the Draft Constitution Bill at public sittings.

In the Westminster form of government which we had followed from 1947 to 1972 and as a Republic from 1972 to 1977, the executive power lies in the Parliament and is exercised through the Prime Minister and the Cabinet of Ministers. The Prime Minister is chosen only if he has a majority of members in the Legislature and can command their support. If he loses that support in the United Kingdom, the monarch can request him to resign and call upon another member to be the Prime Minister, or dissolve Parliament.

With slight amendments, this is the system adopted by most of the dependencies of the UK now free, and the self-governing dominions. We too had a similar Constitution though we became a Republic in 1972.

The Executive Presidency was followed in the USA and later in France, under President De Gaulle. The founders of the American Constitution, after they defeated the British, made the President elected by the whole country, the executive authority, and the Legislature consisting of the House of Representatives and the Senate, both elected, the Legislative Authority. The President could choose his Cabinet from any American citizen, except a member of the Legislature.

An Independent Judiciary; the power of the Legislature vis-a-vis the President, which enabled it to act as a check on Presidential power, and an Independent Press, were the checks and balances which made the Constitution work democratically.

The French Constitution of De Gaulle followed the same pattern with a few differences. For example, the President had to choose his Cabinet from elected members of the Legislature and once they were chosen they had to resign their seats.

The Constitution maintained continuity while effecting change. Some countries had written constitutions, some were governed by conventions and some had none. The USA, France, Sri Lanka, India and many countries had written constitutions. The UK was an example of a country having no written constitution but governed by consent, conventions and ad hoc laws. Some had no constitutions. It was better that they did not have because they were governed by Dictators and under Military Authority.

Sri Lanka was a monarchy under Asian dynasties, Sinhalese and Dravidian, till 1815; and Western till 1972. It was till then one of the oldest monarchies in the world, having an unbroken history since 600 BC, from King Vijaya to Queen Elizabeth II, when we became a Republic in 1972.

From 1815 till 1931, all executive authority was exercised by the Governor on behalf of the monarch. In 1931, the Donoughmore Constitution created the Executive Committee system and the Legislature performed two functions-legislative functions as a State Council as it was called, and executive functions by the State Council through Executive Committees to which its Members were elected by the Council. The Ministers were the elected Chairmen of these Committees. The State Council and all its members were elected by universal franchise. The Sri Lankans were the first people in Asia to enjoy this privilege.

In 1947, under the Soulbury Constitution, the Westminster Constitution was introduced, where following the British pattern the British Minister who led the majority in the Legislature was appointed as such by the Governor General.

In February 1948, Sri Lanka was given the status of a Dominion by an Independence Act introduced in the British House of Commons and she became a Free and Independent Member of the British Commonwealth of Nations. In 1972, after the Constituent Assembly had met and deliberated and accepted a new Constitution, Ceylon was made a Republic, but the Westminster model was retained.

In February 1978, a complete change took place with the executive power vested in a President elected by the whole country with a 50 per cent majority and legislative power being vested in the elected Legislature.

The 1978 Constitution had been tailor-made for a democracy. Let us examine its provisions under the heading made famous by the American President Abraham Lincoln’s speech in 1863, opening the memorial to the dead, commemorating the decisive victory of the Federal forces at Gettysburg. He defined Democracy as “a government of the People; by the People; for the People”.

Chapter 1, Sec. 3, proclaims the sovereignty of the People and Sec. 4 states how it is exercised; (a) the legislative power by Parliament consisting of elected representatives of the People and by the People at a Referendum; (b) the executive power by the President of the Republic elected by the People; (c) the judicial power by Parliament through Courts, etc. created and established or recognized by the Constitution or created and established by law. This Section also refers to fundamental rights and the franchise.

The Cabinet of Ministers shall consist of the President as the Head, and the Prime Minister and Ministers from among the Members of Parliament, (Chapter VIII, 5.43 and 5.44.) The Sections dealing with the sovereignty of the people and certain Fundamental Rights cannot be amended without a two-thirds majority in Parliament and approved by the people at a Referendum.

Similar approval is necessary for legislation to extend the term of office of the President or the duration of Parliament for over six years. This is a unique feature for even if the whole Parliament votes in favour of such an extension, unless approved by the people at a Referendum, it does not become law.

I think no democratic nation in the world has this unique power given to the people by its legislature. It was with this power that the people extended the period in office of the Parliament elected in 1977 by six years. All previous extensions for example in 1975, were by parliamentary approval only, or by an Order-in-Council before freedom.

The government is clearly based on an elected President, with executive powers, responsible to Parliament as Head of an elected Cabinet, chosen from Parliament; charged with the direction and control of the government; and collectively responsible and answerable to Parliament (Chapter VIll).

Many interesting questions for discussion can arise on an interpretation of the sections dealing with the Cabinet of Ministers and their executive powers. Do they derive them as agents of the Executive President or with power vested in them when they are charged under S.43(1) with the direction and control of the government? I leave this question for constitutional experts to decide.

To complete the part dealing with sovereignty of the People, the Independence of the Judiciary is vital. While the Judiciary is clearly stated as exercising the judicial power of the people, they do so through courts, tribunals and institutions that are created by Parliament. Their independence is secured in various ways spelled out from Sections 107 to 117.

Appointments to the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal are by the President by warrant under his hand. They shall not be removed unless the majority in Parliament so address the President to remove them. Their salaries, once determined by Parliament, shall not be reduced after appointment. Judges of the High Court are also appointed by the President and are subject to disciplinary control of the President on the recommendation of the Judicial Service Commission.

All other judges are appointed by the Judicial Service Commission which consists of the Chief Justice and two other judges of the Supreme Court. Disciplinary action is also taken by them.

Under the previous Constitution of 1972, all the minor Judiciary appointments were made by the Cabinet of Ministers. This Constitution attempts as far as humanly possible to create conditions for the Judiciary to be independent; the rest is in the hands of the Judges themselves, “who must be men of courage, men of wisdom”.

There are other sections of the Constitution which deal with Buddhism (Chap. II), Language (Chap.IV), and Citizenship (Chap.V); also with Superior Courts (Chap.XVI), Parliamentary Commissioner (Chap. XIX), Emergency Laws S.15 & 16 and (Chap. XVIII).

A government of the people and by the people, is adequately provided for and protected. Only through approval by the people at a Referendum can these provisions be amended or taken away democratically.

It should be mentioned, however, that fundamental rights may be temporarily restricted in the interests of national security, racial and religious harmony, national economy and a few other reasons mentioned in Chapter III, Section 15.

The power to make regulations under the Public Security Ordinance which can overrule, amend or suspend the operation of the provisions of any law except the provisions of the Constitution, is dealt with in Chapter (XVIII). Within 14 days of the Proclamation of an Emergency, Parliament must be informed and approve it, see (Chapter XVIII, Section 155(6).

No earlier Constitution required the approval of Parliament for the Declaration of an Emergency or the operation of Emergency Laws.

The emergence of a multi-party system so essential for a democracy is made possible by the inclusion among the “Fundamental Rights” to every citizen of Freedom of Speech, Publication, Assembly, Trade Union rights, etc. In section 14(1). The part dealing with “for the people” is also not forgotten.

In Chapter VI-S.27 to 29, these are enumerated. I need cite’ only one Section S. 27(2). If it is possible to fully implement these economic and social policies, it must bring peace and prosperity, but terrorism and other forms of violence are a hindrance. Also it must be remembered that from June 1960 to 1964 and 1970 to 1977, we had governments following Communist principles which even the Soviet Union has now abandoned. Recovery from these policies had begun from 1977-1983 with the Free Market Policy and other policies laid-down in the Constitution when terrorism reared its head and hit us like a tornado from 1983 onward.



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From Windrush to Brexit: Redrawing Britain’s Migration Map

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A file photo of an anti-immigration protest in Dover

For much of its modern history, Britain was an imperial power connected to every corner of the globe, yet it was not a major destination for large-scale international migration. Different waves of newcomers arrived over the centuries, but the overall foreign-born population remained relatively small by contemporary standards. The 1901 Census recorded 82,844 people from Eastern Europe living in Britain, while the Chinese population numbered just 387. Even at the beginning of the 20th century, migrants from Asia and other parts of the world constituted only a tiny fraction of the country’s population. Britain was a nation shaped by migration, but not yet one transformed by it. That would begin to change dramatically in the aftermath of the Second World War.

One of the most significant changes in Britain’s migration patterns after World War II came from the former colonies of the British Empire. Faced with acute labour shortages and the demands of post-war reconstruction, the government introduced the British Nationality Act of 1948, granting citizens of the Commonwealth the right to live and work in the United Kingdom. Although immigration controls were tightened through legislation, such as the Commonwealth Immigrants Act of 1962, migration from former colonies continued. Many of those who arrived belonged to the educated middle classes of their home countries. Having passed through education systems established by Britain during the colonial period, they were already familiar with the English language, British institutions and aspects of British culture. For them, Britain represented a land of opportunity, professional advancement and social mobility.

A different set of motivations drove migration from continental Europe, particularly from Eastern European countries. For these migrants, the United Kingdom offered significantly higher wages, stronger labour markets and living standards that often exceeded those available in their countries of origin. This trend accelerated further after Britain joined the European Economic Community in 1973, initiating a period in which citizens of member states gradually acquired rights to move, work, study and establish businesses across national borders. The expansion of the European Union in the early 21st century, particularly the accession of several Eastern European states in 2004, would later transform these flows on an unprecedented scale.

Immigration has rarely been determined solely by economic forces; it has also reflected the priorities of governments in power. During the period between 1997 and 2010, when the Labour Party was in power, immigration policies became comparatively more open in several key areas. Combined with economic growth and labour demand, these policies contributed to a substantial increase in migration, with net migration reaching levels that had few historical precedents in modern Britain. The debate over whether this growth was an economic necessity, a policy success or a political miscalculation continues to influence British politics to this day.

The next major turning point came with the Brexit referendum of 2016 and Britain’s eventual departure from the European Union. For decades, European citizens had enjoyed relatively unrestricted access to the British labour market through the principle of free movement. As the post-Brexit immigration system took shape, that privilege largely disappeared. The result was not the end of migration, but a significant shift in its composition. Labour shortages remained across sectors, ranging from healthcare and social care to information technology, logistics and higher education. As European migration declined, employers increasingly turned to other parts of the world to meet these demands.

This created new opportunities for migrants from countries such as India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and several other Asian nations. In many respects, these arrivals filled a vacuum left by the reduction in European labour mobility. The overall pattern suggests that Britain’s economy continued to require migrant labour even as its immigration framework underwent fundamental change. Migration flows did not disappear; rather, they were redirected.

Yet this shift has done little to calm public anxieties surrounding immigration. If anything, concerns over migration have remained a central feature of British political debate. Governments of different political persuasions, including those that once defended relatively liberal immigration policies, have increasingly adopted tougher rhetoric and stricter measures aimed at reducing migration levels. Across the political spectrum, there is growing pressure to demonstrate greater control over borders, tighten visa pathways and, in some cases, encourage or require migrants to leave once their economic or educational purpose has ended.

This pressure has translated into a series of policy changes. In 2025, the government announced new restrictions designed to reduce migration and increase employer reliance on the domestic workforce. Among the most significant measures were plans to shorten the list of occupations for which employers could sponsor workers from overseas and to introduce tougher compliance requirements for sponsoring organisations. Social care, a sector that had become heavily dependent on international recruitment, was particularly affected, with employers facing tighter limitations on recruiting care workers from abroad. These changes reflected a broader political commitment to lowering migration numbers, even as many sectors continued to report persistent staffing shortages.

The higher education sector has also found itself at the centre of this debate. International students have become one of the most important contributors to Britain’s universities and local economies. They pay tuition fees that help sustain institutions, support jobs in university towns and cities, and contribute billions of pounds annually through spending on housing, transport and everyday living expenses. For many students, however, studying in Britain is not merely an educational experience but a substantial personal and financial investment made with the expectation that it will open pathways to professional opportunities.

Against this backdrop, proposals to reduce the standard length of the graduate visa have generated considerable concern. The graduate route has allowed international students to remain in the United Kingdom after completing their studies in order to gain work experience and establish careers. Supporters of restrictions argue that student visas should not become a long-term migration pathway. Critics counter that reducing post-study opportunities risks making Britain less attractive in an increasingly competitive global market for talent. Countries such as Canada, Australia and Germany continue to compete aggressively for skilled international graduates, and students weighing their options may choose destinations that offer clearer prospects after graduation.

These debates often frame migration as a problem to be solved through numerical reductions. Yet, what should be noted here is that many of the pressures commonly attributed to immigration are connected to wider economic and political challenges. The decade following Britain’s departure from the European Union has been marked by an unusual degree of political instability. Since the Brexit referendum, the country has seen seven prime ministers, with governments frequently changing direction on economic strategy, public spending and immigration policy. Such instability has contributed to uncertainty about Britain’s long-term trajectory and has complicated efforts to build a consistent approach to migration.

Public concerns about immigration are real and cannot simply be dismissed. Anti-immigration demonstrations and calls for stricter border controls continue to attract significant support in some parts of the country. At the same time, these concerns often become a focal point through which broader anxieties about housing, public services, economic stagnation and national identity are expressed. Immigration is therefore not merely a migration issue; it is also a lens through which deeper social and political tensions are debated.

The increasingly restrictive tone of migration policy has also raised questions about community cohesion and the treatment of migrants already living in Britain.

While much public attention focuses on new arrivals, long-term residents can also find themselves affected by changing rules and enforcement practices. Earlier proposals such as the Rwanda asylum plan, announced in 2022, sought to relocate certain asylum seekers to Rwanda for the processing of their claims, though the policy was never ultimately implemented. More recently, cases involving migrants being instructed to leave the country despite having established families, employment and community ties have generated public debate. One widely discussed example involved Chamila Dilrukshi, a Sri Lankan mother, who was instructed by the Home Office to leave the United Kingdom with her three children while her husband remained in Britain. Cases such as these illustrate how immigration policy extends beyond statistics and labour markets, affecting family life, community relationships and the sense of belonging experienced by migrants who have built their lives in the country.

This raises a more fundamental question than the familiar debate over whether immigration numbers should rise or fall. If Britain continues to face an ageing population, labour shortages in critical sectors and increasing competition for global talent, can it realistically sustain economic growth while simultaneously reducing its reliance on migrants? Equally important, can successive governments build a migration system that balances economic necessity, public confidence and social cohesion at a time of continuing political uncertainty? The answer may prove decisive not only for Britain’s future migration policy, but for the broader question of what kind of society, economy and national identity the United Kingdom hopes to shape in the decades ahead.

by Viran Maddumage
Assistant Lecturer & PhD(Reading) Department of Human Geography and Migration, Macquarie University, Australia
and Sanduni Rathnayake

Lecturer (Probationary) Faculty of Law, General Sir John Kotelawala Defence University

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Tolerance and Diversity

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Today all the major religions of the world must respond to a double challenge. On one side is the challenge of secularism, a trend which has swept across the globe, battering against the most ancient strongholds of the sacred and turning all man’s movements towards the Beyond into a forlorn gesture, poignant but devoid of sense. On the other side is the meeting of the great religions with each other. As the most far-flung nations and cultures merge into a single global community, the representatives of humankind’s spiritual quest have been brought together in an encounter of unprecedented intimacy, an encounter so close that it leaves no room for retreat. Thus, at one and the same time each major religion faces, in the amphitheater of world opinion, all the other religions of the earth, as well as the vast numbers of people who regard all claims to possess the Great Answer with a skeptical frown or an indifferent yawn.

In this situation, any religion which is to emerge as more than a relic from humanity’s adolescence must be able to deal, in a convincing and meaningful manner, with both sides of the challenge. On the one hand it must contain the swelling tide of secularism, by keeping alive the intuition that no amount of technological mastery over external nature, no degree of proficiency in providing for humanity’s mundane needs, can bring complete repose to the human spirit, can still the thirst for a truth and value that transcends the boundaries of contingency. On the other hand, each religion must find some way of disentangling the conflicting claims that all religions make to understand our place in the grand scheme of things and to hold the key to our salvation. While remaining faithful to its own most fundamental principles, a religion must be able to address the striking differences between its own tenets and those of other creeds, doing so in a manner that is at once honest yet humble, perspicacious yet unimposing.

In this brief essay, I wish to sketch the outline of an appropriate Buddhist response to the second challenge. Since Buddhism has always professed to offer a “middle way” in resolving the intellectual and ethical dilemmas of the spiritual life, we may find that the key to our present problematic also lies in discovering the response that best exemplifies the middle way. As has often been noted, the middle way is not a compromise between the extremes but a way that rises above them, avoiding the pitfalls into which they lead. Therefore, in seeking the proper Buddhist approach to the problem of the diversity of creeds, we might begin by pinpointing the extremes which the middle way must avoid.

The first extreme is a retreat into fundamentalism, the adoption of an aggressive affirmation of one’s own beliefs coupled with a proselytizing zeal towards those who still stand outside the chosen circle of one’s co-religionists. While this response to the challenge of diversity has assumed alarming proportions in the folds of the great monotheistic religions, Christianity and Islam, it is not one towards which Buddhism has a ready affinity, for the ethical guidelines of the Dhamma naturally tend to foster an attitude of benign tolerance towards other religions and their followers. Though there is no guarantee against the rise of a militant fundamentalism from within Buddhism’s own ranks, the Buddha’s teachings can offer no sanctification, not even a remote one, for such a malignant development.

For Buddhists the more alluring alternative is the second extreme. This extreme, which purchases tolerance at the price of integrity, might be called the thesis of spiritual universalism: the view that all the great religions, at their core, espouse essentially the same truth, clothed merely in different modes of expression. Such a thesis could not, of course, be maintained in regard to the formal creeds of the major religions, which differ so widely that it would require a strenuous exercise in word-twisting to bring them into accord. The universalist position is arrived at instead by an indirect route. Its advocates argue that we must distinguish between the outward face of a religion — its explicit beliefs and exoteric practices — and its inner nucleus of experiential realisation. On the basis of this distinction, they then insist, we will find that beneath the markedly different outward faces of the great religions, at their heart — in respect of the spiritual experiences from which they emerge and the ultimate goal to which they lead — they are substantially identical. Thus, the major religions differ simply in so far as they are different means, different expedients, to the same liberative experience, which may be indiscriminately designated “enlightenment,” or “redemption,” or “God-realization,” since these different terms merely highlight different aspects of the same goal. As the famous maxim puts it: the roads up the mountain are many, but the moonlight at the top is one. From this point of view, the Buddha Dhamma is only one more variant on the “perennial philosophy” underlying all the mature expressions of man’s spiritual quest. It may stand out by its elegant simplicity, its clarity and directness; but a unique and unrepeated revelation of truth it harbors not.

On first consideration the adoption of such a view may seem to be an indispensable stepping-stone to religious tolerance, and to insist that doctrinal differences are not merely verbal but real and important may appear to border on bigotry. Thus, those who embrace Buddhism in reaction against the doctrinaire narrowness of the monotheistic religions may find in such a view — so soft and accommodating — a welcome respite from the insistence on privileged access to truth typical of those religions. However, an unbiased study of the Buddha’s own discourses would show quite plainly that the universalist thesis does not have the endorsement of the Awakened One himself. To the contrary, the Buddha repeatedly proclaims that the path to the supreme goal of the holy life is made known only in his own teaching, and therefore that the attainment of that goal — final deliverance from suffering — can be achieved only from within his own dispensation. The best known instance of this claim is the Buddha’s assertion, on the eve of his Parinibbana, that only in his dispensation are the four grades of enlightened persons to be found, that the other sects are devoid of true ascetics, those who have reached the planes of liberation.

The Buddha’s restriction of final emancipation to his own dispensation does not spring from a narrow dogmatism or a lack of good will, but rests upon an utterly precise determination of the nature of the final goal and of the means that must be implemented to reach it. This goal is neither an everlasting afterlife in a heaven nor some nebulously conceived state of spiritual illumination, but the Nibbana element with no residue remaining, release from the cycle of repeated birth and death. This goal is effected by the utter destruction of the mind’s defilements — greed, aversion and delusion — all the way down to their subtlest levels of latency. The eradication of the defilements can be achieved only by insight into the true nature of phenomena, which means that the attainment of Nibbana depends upon the direct experiential insight into all conditioned phenomena, internal and external, as stamped with the “three characteristics of existence”: impermanence, suffering, and non-selfness. What the Buddha maintains, as the ground for his assertion that his teaching offers the sole means to final release from suffering, is that the knowledge of the true nature of phenomena, in its exactitude and completeness, is accessible only in his teaching. This is so because, theoretically, the principles that define this knowledge are unique to his teaching and contradictory in vital respects to the basic tenets of other creeds; and because, practically, this teaching alone reveals, in its perfection and purity, the means of generating this liberative knowledge as a matter of immediate personal experience. This means is the Noble Eightfold Path which, as an integrated system of spiritual training, cannot be found outside the dispensation of a Fully Enlightened One.

Surprisingly, this exclusivistic stance of Buddhism in regard to the prospects for final emancipation has never engendered a policy of intolerance on the part of Buddhists towards the adherents of other religions. To the contrary, throughout its long history, Buddhism has displayed a thoroughgoing tolerance and genial good will towards the many religions with which it has come into contact. It has maintained this tolerance simultaneously with its deep conviction that the doctrine of the Buddha offers the unique and unsurpassable way to release from the ills inherent in conditioned existence. For Buddhism, religious tolerance is not achieved by reducing all religions to a common denominator, nor by explaining away formidable differences in thought and practice as accidents of historical development. From the Buddhist point of view, to make tolerance contingent upon whitewashing discrepancies would not be to exercise genuine tolerance at all; for such an approach can “tolerate” differences only by diluting them so completely that they no longer make a difference. True tolerance in religion involves the capacity to admit differences as real and fundamental, even as profound and unbridgeable, yet at the same time to respect the rights of those who follow a religion different from one’s own (or no religion at all) to continue to do so without resentment, disadvantage or hindrance.

Buddhist tolerance springs from the recognition that the dispositions and spiritual needs of human beings are too vastly diverse to be encompassed by any single teaching, and thus that these needs will naturally find expression in a wide variety of religious forms. The non-Buddhist systems will not be able to lead their adherents to the final goal of the Buddha’s Dhamma, but that they never proposed to do in the first place. For Buddhism, acceptance of the idea of the beginningless round of rebirths implies that it would be utterly unrealistic to expect more than a small number of people to be drawn towards a spiritual path aimed at complete liberation. The overwhelming majority, even of those who seek deliverance from earthly woes, will aim at securing a favorable mode of existence within the round, even while misconceiving this to be the ultimate goal of the religious quest.

To the extent that a religion proposes sound ethical principles and can promote to some degree the development of wholesome qualities such as love, generosity, detachment and compassion, it will merit in this respect the approbation of Buddhists. These principles advocated by outside religious systems will also conduce to rebirth in the realms of bliss — the heavens and the divine abodes.

Buddhism by no means claims to have unique access to these realms, but holds that the paths that lead to them have been articulated, with varying degrees of clarity, in many of the great spiritual traditions of humanity. While the Buddhist will disagree with the belief structures of other religions to the extent that they deviate from the Buddha’s Dhamma, he will respect them to the extent that they enjoin virtues and standards of conduct that promote spiritual development and the harmonious integration of human beings with each other and with the world. (Courtesy Buddhist Publication Society.)

by Bhikkhu Bodhi

 

 

 

 

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Seeing things as they truly are

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Buddhism offers a profound moral and philosophical framework aimed at guiding individuals toward enlightenment and alleviating suffering. A key aspect of this journey is understanding reality through the lens of the Three Marks of Existence, a concept deeply rooted in Buddhist scriptures and teachings. This understanding can often become obscured by delusion and ignorance, hindering our ability to perceive the true nature of reality and trapping us in cycles of suffering.

The Three Marks of Existence, also known as the Three Universal Truths, are (1) impermanence (Anicca), (2) suffering or unsatisfactoriness (Dukkha), and (3) non-self or insubstantiality (Anatta). These principles, articulated by the Buddha over 2,500 years ago, reveal universal truths applicable to all beings and serve as a foundation for deeper insights into life. They emphasise that all phenomena are transient, that lasting happiness is elusive, and that the notion of a fixed self is fundamentally illusory.

In the Pali Canon, teachings highlight that all conditioned phenomena (saṅkhārāā) are subject to Anicca and Dukkha, while Anatta extends even further, applying to all dhammas. As stated in the Anatta-lakkhana Sutta, the Buddha underscores the reality that there is no enduring self within the five aggregates, indicating that the belief in “I” or “mine” is a source of Dukkha that must be relinquished. Understanding Anatta encourages practitioners to recognise the emptiness of the self and to understand how clinging to identity leads to suffering.

These three characteristics are incontrovertible facts that apply to both animate and inanimate things. Whether Buddhas arise or not, these truths exist in the world. In Buddhism, to see things as they truly are means to consistently view them through the lens of the Three Marks. Failing to do so, or deceiving oneself about their reality and range of application, is the defining mark of ignorance (avijja). This ignorance of our true nature and the true nature of our surroundings leads to actions based on delusions, accumulating karma that keeps us bound to the cycle of rebirth and death.

Dissolving that ignorance through direct insight into the Three Marks is said to bring an end to samsara and the resulting suffering (dukkha nirodha or nirodha sacca, as described in the third of the Four Noble Truths). To perceive things as they truly are, one must cultivate an understanding of these truths—not merely through intellectual contemplation but also through insights gained from personal experiences. A deeper comprehension of the Three Universal Truths fosters wisdom and leads to liberation from the cycle of rebirth, culminating in Nibbana, the ultimate goal of Buddhism.

Recognising the interplay of these three characteristics in our lives is essential. Ignorance of these truths breeds delusion and results in actions that generate karma, confining us to a persistent cycle of birth, death, and rebirth. Gaining direct insight into the Three Marks of Existence enables us to transcend suffering (Dukkha Nirodha), aligning with the third of the Four Noble Truths.

Moreover, a lack of understanding regarding these universal truths can lead to frustration and despair. Conversely, a clear grasp of the Three Marks equips us to navigate life’s complexities, allowing for realistic expectations, resilient acceptance of suffering, and protection against misleading beliefs.

The Satipatthana Sutta highlights mindfulness as a vital tool for engaging with reality as it is. By observing our thoughts, feelings, and sensations without attachment or aversion, we cultivate a clearer perception of impermanence, suffering, and non-self. The realisation that all phenomena are fleeting allows us to develop a compassionate response to ourselves and others, breaking the cycle of craving and clinging that fuels suffering.

Rev. Nyanapoke further articulates that the Three Marks are observable in every facet of existence—physical, emotional, mental, and social. He notes that natural cycles, shifts in emotions, evolving thoughts, and changing relationships epitomise the transient nature of life. Even when contemplating minute aspects of life, we encounter an immense variety of living forms, from microbes to humans, demonstrating that these three basic features are common to everything that possesses animate existence. Through this comprehensive understanding, we can better navigate the complexities of life and deepen our connection to the essence of existence.

By reflecting on the first of the Three Marks of Existence, the universal truth of impermanence, we come to understand the stark reality that everything we acquire and hold dear—possessions, achievements, cherished relationships, and loved ones—will ultimately succumb to time and cease to exist. This notion is poignantly captured by the philosopher Heraclitus, who famously remarked, “No man ever steps in the same river twice,” underscoring the idea that both the river and the man are in constant flux, the transient nature of existence.

This idea of impermanence also resonates with the biblical acknowledgement, “Why do you not even know what will happen tomorrow? What is your life? You are but a mist that appears for a little while and then vanishes” (James 4:14). The first truth, impermanence, is intricately connected to all aspects of our existence.

The second characteristic. Dukkha is an important concept in Buddhism, commonly referred to as suffering. It is the first of the Four Noble Truths. Suffering is an inescapable part of life, and it can come in many forms. It refers to the habitual experience of mundane life as fundamentally unsatisfactory and painful. There are many times in our lives when we feel overwhelmed by our suffering and wonder how we can overcome it. Dukkha refers to the inherent unsatisfactoriness and suffering present in life. It encompasses a broad range of experiences, including physical pain, emotional distress, and existential dissatisfaction. In other words, dukkha can vary from minor irritations to profound suffering, and it is not limited to overt suffering. It also highlights the subtle discomfort that arises from life’s impermanence and the transient nature of happiness. Even moments of joy are often tinged with the knowledge that they are fleeting, leading to a perpetual sense of longing or fear of loss. The Buddha applies the characteristic of suffering to all conditioned things in the sense that for living beings, everything conditioned is a potential cause of experienced suffering and is, at any rate, incapable of giving lasting satisfaction.

Buddha says, “The world is established on suffering, is founded on suffering” (Dukkha loko patitthito). His whole doctrine rests on the pivot of suffering. He perceived the universality of suffering and propounded a remedy (Noble Eightfold Path) for the universal sickness of humanity. By that, Buddhism does not denote an attitude of hopelessness and pessimism toward life. Buddha did not expect his adherents to be constantly brooding over the ills of life and so make their lives unhappy.

If you look at the world with dispassionate discernment, it becomes abundantly clear that there is only one problem in the world, which is suffering, dukkha. Today, people all over the world suffer untold suffering and agony, and there is so much misery all around us. People’s lives are plucked at a young age. Many people suffer from incurable diseases and tragic deaths. Humanity is continuously grappling with many natural disasters and destruction. Yet, through ignorance, people go chasing after shadows, dwelling in delusion, unable to confront the adversities that life brings. Suffering appears and passes away, only to reappear in other forms. All forms of suffering are either physical or psychological. All is in a whirl; nothing escapes this inexorable, unceasing change.

Understanding Dukkha is crucial for practitioners, as it invites introspection about the nature of existence and our responses to experiences. Instead of viewing suffering as something to be avoided, Buddhism encourages us to confront it, recognize its roots, and understand its universal presence in human life. This acknowledgement allows us to cultivate compassion for ourselves and others who are also caught in this cycle of suffering. By facing Dukkha with awareness, we can begin to unravel the causes of our suffering and start the journey toward alleviation.

The third truth, Anatta, embraces the concept of non-self or insubstantiality, suggesting that there is no permanent, unchanging self within us. This realisation challenges the deeply ingrained belief in a fixed identity or essence. Instead, Buddhism teaches that what we consider the “self” is actually a collection of ever-changing physical and mental components, known as the five aggregates: form, sensation, perception, mental formations, and consciousness.

Understanding Anatta is liberating in that it encourages us to let go of attachments to our identities, beliefs, and notions of self. When we cling to a fixed identity, we create suffering through desires and fears related to maintaining that identity. By recognising that the self is contingent and fluid, we can reduce suffering and anxiety associated with self-identity and experience greater freedom. Embracing Anatta allows individuals to break free from the confines of ego, leading to a deeper connection with the world and others.

Together, the truths of Dukkha and Anatta highlight the importance of understanding suffering and the illusion of self in the journey toward enlightenment. By facing these truths, practitioners can cultivate wisdom, compassion, and ultimately find liberation from the cycles of rebirth and suffering.

by Dr. Justice Chandradasa Nanayakkara

 

 

 

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