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THE BANKING COMMISSION

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CHAPTER 9

(Excerpted from N.U. JAYAWARDENA The first five decades)

NU, aged 26, published his first important article on the Sri Lankan economy, in the Ceylon Observer Centenary Issue of 4 February 1934 – two months before he was to begin work at the Banking Commission. It was a sweeping 100-year survey of the economy between 1834 and 1934, written in his clear style. As he stated:

“One of the arresting features of the economic history of Ceylon during the last hundred years is the phenomenal growth of her trade. Between 1834 and 1926, when the peak was reached, the value of trade increased nearly two hundred fold. In the same period there also occurred a complete change in its character and distribution. From a few staple articles, the schedule of imports and exports has expanded into a numerous list, which, particularly in regard to imports, is continually increasing.”

The article not only described imports and exports over the period and issues concerning the balance of trade, but also the fluctuations in the economy, and cyclical recessions, including the collapse of the coffee industry in the late 1870s. NU wrote about the five-year recession (1880-85) caused by the coffee crisis, the “annihilation of capital values,” and the collapse of the Oriental Banking Corporation in 1884, one of the country’s early ventures in banking. The period 1900 to 1913 he styled the “Good Years,” a unique period of “universal progress and real prosperity”; and he claimed that there was “no comparable period in the history of Ceylon trade,” in tea, rubber, coconut and graphite. NU, who would soon be involved in analysing the need for a national bank, described the crash of that banking corporation in 1884 as follows:

It was one of the most terrible blows that ever fell on Ceylon. The effect was disastrous for a time, but the courageous action of the Governor in guaranteeing the discredited notes of the defunct bank saved the country from far more serious evils.

“Afghan” man (Pathan)

What NU called an “unparalleled development” occurred from 1886 to 1900 when tea, coconut and minor products flourished with “the rush of tea” becoming “a veritable stampede,” resulting in large exports and increased imports. This boom “of the first magnitude” ended with the First World War of 1914-18 which was a “cataclysm” and “universal upheaval.” The rubber and graphite industries, which had soared due to wartime demands, “fell headlong” in 1918. This was followed by what NU referred to as “the craziest boom in history,” with a “terrible orgy of spending” occurring between the decades 1919 to 1929, when the value of both exports and imports soared. But fluctuations continued and the “Good Years” ended in the Depression of 1929-33:

The Wall Street Crash in the summer of 1929 heralded the advent of the depression. In the next five years it raged in full force; tea, rubber and coconut all withering before its icy blast. The destruction it wrought and the misery it fostered form recent history and require no repetition. Trade shrank in value to pre-war figures…

The bottom was not reached until 1932, when exports receded to what they were 22 years ago. (ibid)

He concluded by asking the question: “Is this only a passing ripple before a gathering storm or an omen of better times to come?”

The Economic Depression of 1929-33

NU would have been profoundly affected by the Depression. He not only witnessed the impoverishment of his country through economic collapse, but would also have seen the value of his rubber holdings fall sharply. ‘From rags to riches’ was a phrase NU often used (speaking of himself ), but the period 1929 to 1933 was a case of the opposite – as the country descended from the ‘boom years’ of the mid-1920s, to the hard times of the Depression. The following figures from H.A. de S. Gunasekera (1962, p.165) vividly illustrate the extent of the drastic fall in the prices of tea and coconut as well as the “ruinous slump in the rubber industry” (ibid, p.66).

Another adverse consequence of the 1929-33 Depression was linked to imports – mainly foodstuffs and manufactured goods. The fall in the prices of Sri Lanka’s exports – mainly primary products – was greater than the fall in the price of industrial goods, leading to a serious adverse balance of trade (ibid, p.174).

As Gunasekera (ibid, p.174) comments: “The largest deficit occurred in 1932 when the value of exports declined to nearly onethird of its value in 1926 while the value of imports had fallen only one-half.”( The prices of exports in this period, taking 1925 as the base year, were calculated by Professor Das Gupta (quoted in Kumari Jayawardena, 1972, p.311)

The Depression resulted in grave financial difficulties for local capitalists, who had few sources of credit. These difficulties were a cause for concern since foreign banks were also reluctant to give credit to locals. In 1929 the labour leader A.E. Goonesinha said, “never since British rule has the country been faced with such a terrible plight” (K. Jayawardena, 1972, p.310). He was not exaggerating. All classes – capitalists, landowners, clerks and workers – were hit by the dramatic slide in the economy, and the country was exposed to the worst hazards of the trade cycle. As a consequence, plantations and factories were forced to close down, and government and private firms had to lay off employees, resulting in severe unemployment among skilled, unskilled and white-collar workers. This created many social problems.

Some consequences of these events included the increase in communal clashes fuelled by trade union leaders, who in a situation of unemployment, raised slogans calling for the ‘deportation’ of workers from Kerala (Malayalis), who were part of the Colombo workforce. Moreover, ethnic tensions spread to the middle classes who, affected by the Depression, denounced the South Indian Chettiars for their grip on credit facilities.

The Chettiar Phenomenon

The need for a national Bank of Ceylon was keenly felt in the years of the Depression. The British banks did not think locals were creditworthy, and as there were no national commercial banks at this time, Sri Lankan borrowers were dependent on a rather primitive credit system run by the Nattukottai Chettiars. As W.S. Weerasooria, in his book on the Chettiars, wrote:

For most Ceylonese the Chettiars were the only source of credit, whether long term or short term. They made loans for the purchase and development of estates as well as for trade, production and consumption… Whatever

Ceylonese enterprise existed was largely indebted to the assistance provided by the Chettiars. Ceylonese exporters and importers, retailers and small ‘boutique-keepers’, estate owners, coconut millers and arrack renters… had to obtain accommodation from the Chettiars… [who] were responsible for the thin trickle of credit which found its way to internal trade and production. (Weerasooria, 1973, p.28)

Weerasooria notes the “alliance” between the British banks and the Chettiars. These banks loaned the Chettiars over Rs. 25 million in the years between 1900 to 1925, and “the Ceylonese who borrowed from the Chettiars paid high interest rates referred to in business

circles as the ‘Chetty rate of interest’” (ibid, p.xv). The emergent local capitalists, merchants and plantation owners – who up to the 1920s had done well – were also heavily dependent on Chettiars for credit from the 19th century onwards. Lavish weddings were held and large dowries given with loans obtained from Chettiars, and often at these weddings the Chettiar had an honoured place. As H.A. de S. Gunasekera (1962, p.196) commented, the Chettiar was: …ready to accommodate the genuine businessman… the speculator and spendthrift. He lent as readily to the exporter of desiccated coconut as to the impecunious landowner trying to raise a dowry for his daughter.

In fact, many government servants – some from the highest levels of government – were reliant on the Chettiars for loans. According to Vernon Gunasekera (1981, pp.34-35), in the 1920s and early 1930s it was not an uncommon sight to find Chettiars waiting outside government or mercantile offices, in Colombo or provincial towns, to lend money or collect repayment. The problem became so acute that the first State Council of 1931 amended legislation, making it a penal offence for moneylenders to demand payment in person at anyone’s residence or place of work. This was initiated after “a plaintiff-creditor tried to serve writ on a legislator entering the Council.”

NU at his desk

The managerial staff of the foreign banks was European, while the clerical staff consisted of Sri Lankans. The Banking Commission reported on the social distance between local investors and the foreign bankers:

An ordinary Ceylonese has no opportunity to meet a European bank manager or even a junior officer, in his daily life, but a European merchant can almost daily meet his banker in the club or on the sports field.” (Weerasooria, pp.30-31, quoting from the Ceylon Banking Commission Report)

The problems culminated in 1925 when a Chettiar firm collapsed, the banks stopped giving loans to Chettiars. During “The Chetty Crisis,” as it was called, the Chettiars began to foreclose on local borrowers. Weerasooria (p.xvi) referred to:

…the spate of litigation initiated by the Chettiars against their Ceylonese borrowers who had defaulted in payment. Many a Ceylonese landowner lost his property to the Chettiar and many a Ceylonese debtor ended up in the Insolvency Court at the instance of his Chettiar creditor.

The “Chetty Crisis” of 1925 revealed not only the dangers of indiscriminately advancing unsecured loans, but also the gross inadequacies of the prevailing credit system and the need for a national bank.

The Banking Commission

H.A. de S. Gunasekera (1962, p.200) has observed that:

At a certain stage in the history of every colonial country, there grows up an indigenous capitalist class increasingly anxious not only to take over political responsibility, but also to play a larger role in the economic life of the country.

There was a public outcry at the worsening economic situation, inspired by growing national sentiment among politicians, local traders and landowners. In the State Council, George E. de Silva, the member for Kandy (known for his reformist and nationalist leanings), proposed in November 1932 that a commission be appointed “to go into the system of commerce, banking and insurance of this island.” This resulted in the appointment of the Ceylon Banking

Commission with Sir Sorabji N. Pochkhanawala, an Indian banker, as chairman, along with Sir Marcus Fernando and Dr. S.C. Paul as members. Professor B.B. Das Gupta served as Secretary, and N.U. Jayawardena as Assistant Secretary to the Commission. Pochkhanawala had worked as an accountant in two banks in Mumbai, the Bank of India Ltd – a private bank established in 1906 – and another private bank named the Central Bank of India Ltd, Bombay, founded in 1911.

He belonged to the Parsi community of India which, from the 19th century onwards, dominated the local entrepreneurial, banking and managerial sectors in India, and were renowned for their pioneering activities in Indian capitalist development in colonial times. Amiya Bagchi writes that the Central Bank of India Ltd.: “was the outcome of the Herculean efforts of… S.N. Pochkhanawala, who prevailed upon Sir Pherozeshah Mehta to be its chairman.

” By 1923 this bank was “the biggest Indian joint-stock private bank in terms of capital and reserves” (Bagchi, 1997, p.103). By 1934 Pochkhanawala, who had been knighted for his services to the banking sector, had become the managing director of the Central Bank of India Ltd., and in later years became its chairman. Pochkhanawala was to help Sri Lanka launch its first national bank. Pochkhanawala’s earlier “Herculean efforts” were, no doubt, qualities that inspired NU, who worked closely with him in the arduous work of the Banking Commission.

Public sittings of the Banking Commission were held, during which evidence was taken from 287 individuals and institutions. Many moving accounts of bankruptcy, indebtedness and financial ruin were related at those sittings, providing NU with an in-depth exposure to the hardships endured at that time. The findings and evidence contained in two volumes were published as Sessional Papers Nos. XXII and XXIII in November 1934.

George E. de Silva, who had proposed the establishment of this Commission, gave important evidence at the sessions, voicing the concerns of all classes of Sri Lankans during the Depression years – including the entrepreneurs, merchants and government servants. Speaking as a nationalist politician, his main grievance was the foreign control of banks in Sri Lanka and “the tremendous price the country is paying in allowing their banking to be done by foreigners.” In his words:

It is curious that none of the banks working in Ceylon is owned by Ceylonese. I should be surprised if Ceylonese held shares in these banks. These banks have not brought capital from abroad but are working here by collecting and utilizing the money of this country. They pay a small rate of interest on their deposits and that money is again lent to people of this country through the intermediary of Shroffs and Chettiars at a high rate of

interest, sometimes 15 to 18 per cent. The interest that is ultimately paid by the borrower is so high that his business or production can hardly bear it. The result of this system could be nothing but collapse and failure in the end. (Banking Commission, 1934, vol.2, pp.419-21)

George E. de Silva also criticized the absence of a “national policy,” and the failure of the banks to train locals, and elaborated on the lack of investment and therefore of economic development. He stated:

The existing banking system lacks national policy, which would certainly be in the forefront if the institutions were in our own hands. There would then be the desire to assist in the growth of our economic resources. The present bankers have not that patriotism to guide them. Their object is merely to make money and assist the trade and industries of their countries… [They] have deliberately kept out people of the Island from responsible posts. It would have been something if they had realized their responsibility to Ceylon and tried to train our own men in the banking profession. (as quoted in Ceylon Banking Commission, vol. 2, 1934, pp.419-21)

The impact of the economic depression on local investors was deplored by de Silva. He also blamed the policies of the foreign-owned banks during these years of crisis. If national banks had existed then, they “would have adopted more sympathetic policies,” he added. Gunasekara notes that this problem was common in a colonial situation:

The failure of foreign banks to integrate themselves fully with the internal economy has been a common phenomenon in countries which have been the field of capital investment by overseas countries. (Gunasekera, pp. 204-5)

The problems and hardships facing the local plantation owners were described by de Silva:

Our people borrow money for developing estates and they pay exorbitant rates of interest. As soon as the estates approach bearing point they find themselves in difficulties and cannot meet their obligations. Ultimately the land has to be sold and the borrower loses all his inheritance and life savings.

The plight of low-income groups such as clerks was also referred to by de Silva:

The people are heavily in debt. Moneylenders, particularly the Afghan [Pathan] type, do a thriving business charging poor unlucky persons sometimes over 100 per cent by way of interest. Mostly poor people and clerks

get into their clutches and they are ultimately ruined. (as quoted in Ceylon Banking Commission, vol. 2, 1934, pp.419-21)

An “Invaluable Document”

The Ceylon Banking Commission Report, according to Weerasooria, “is looked upon as one of the best and most authentic and authoritative accounts of the financial and economic condition of the island at that time” (Weerasooria, 1973, p.xvii). Gunasekera (1962, p.201), describes the Commission Report as: an exhaustive analysis of every aspect of credit in Ceylon, ranging from the organized credit institutions such as the commercial banks and the State Mortgage Bank, to the Chettiars, pawnbrokers, ‘boutique keepers’ and Afghan moneylenders who were the main suppliers of credit to the Ceylonese population.

The Commissioners acknowledged the work of NU, stating at the end of the Report that they “wished to place on record our appreciation of the able help that we have received from our Assistant Secretary with his knowledge and experience of Government Departments.” NU claimed that “the brunt of the work” of the Commission fell on him, especially as the Secretary, Das Gupta, served only on a part-time basis. Interestingly, as NU progressed upwards in his career, he would work again with Das Gupta in different capacities, first in the University College of Ceylon and then later in the Central Bank, when NU became Deputy Governor.

NU not only contributed to the work of the Banking Commission but also would have learned much from this important exercise, benefiting from interaction with Pochkhanawala and Das Gupta and also from listening to the evidence presented from a variety of sources. For NU, whose Economics degree had given him a theoretical understanding of the subject, the shocking stories of financial ruin of Sri Lankans during the Depression exposed him to the practical economic problems that people faced. It was a lesson in the economic realities of colonial rule, the backward nature of the economy, the need for local financial institutions, the class structure of Sri Lankan society and the role of foreigners – both British and Indian – in controlling credit. Being associated with a key commission on banking would have further bolstered NU’s interest in the banking sector, with which he remained closely involved for the rest of his life.

For NU, the experience was of tremendous value. Many years later, in 1961 as a Senator, NU, in a debate on the Budget and the Bank of Ceylon, would refer to the Banking Commission as being
the place where he cut his “financial teeth.” (N.U. JAYAWARDENA The First Five Decades Chapter 8 can read online on https://island.lk/early-career-and-londondegree/)

By Kumari Jayawardena and Jennifer Moragoda ✍️
Such financial teeth as I possess were cut with the Commission that was appointed to examine the banking system of this country – the Pochkhanawala Commission – of which I was Assistant Secretary.(N.U. Jayawardena, Senate Debate, 3 Oct. 1961, Hansard, p.832)



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Dirty Money

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How Criminal Networks Launder Billions Across the World

Illegal foreign exchange, Undiyal, Hawala and money laundering: A four-part investigative series

The invisible financial empire – II

The Businessman Who Never Sold Anything

Ranjan owns a small export company in Colombo. On paper, business has never been better. His shipments of cinnamon and coconut-based products to a trading partner in Dubai have tripled in declared value over eighteen months. His bank statements show steady, healthy growth. His tax filings are immaculate. His accountant calls him a model client.

There is only one problem. Ranjan’s actual cinnamon exports have not tripled. They have barely changed at all.

What has changed is the invoice. Each shipment of cinnamon worth roughly $50,000 is now declared on customs paperwork as being worth $150,000. The Dubai buyer, who is not really a buyer in any ordinary sense, pays the full invoiced amount without complaint. The extra $100,000 that flows back to Ranjan’s company with each shipment did not come from selling cinnamon. It came from somewhere else entirely: the proceeds of an offshore gambling operation that needed a way to bring money into Sri Lanka looking like ordinary export earnings.

No bank flagged it. No customs officer questioned it. The cinnamon was real. The shipment was real. Only the price was a lie, and that lie was enough to turn dirty money into the cleanest thing in the world: a profitable Sri Lankan export business.

This is money laundering. And it is far more sophisticated, far more pervasive, and far more damaging to ordinary economies than most people realise.

Why Laundering Matters More Than the Crime Itself

Money laundering is not merely about hiding cash under a mattress. It is the financial infrastructure of organised crime. Every major criminal enterprise, from narcotics trafficking and cyber fraud to corruption, tax evasion, illegal mining, human trafficking, and terrorism financing, ultimately depends on one single capability: the ability to convert illicit proceeds into apparently legitimate assets.

Without laundering, crime does not pay, not in any usable sense. A drug trafficker sitting on millions in cash cannot buy a house, send a child to university abroad, or invest in a business without first explaining where the money came from. Laundering is the bridge between criminal proceeds and a normal life. Remove the bridge, and the profit motive for organised crime collapses.

This is why the international community treats money laundering as a standalone crime, separate from and in addition to the original offence. According to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, global money laundering is estimated at between 2% and 5% of world GDP, somewhere between USD 800 billion and USD 2 trillion every single year.

The Three Stages: Placement, Layering, Integration

Despite enormous variation in method, almost every laundering scheme, from a street-level drug operation to a sophisticated transnational network, follows the same underlying three-stage structure first formally identified by international regulators and now codified by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and adopted by Sri Lanka’s own Financial Intelligence Unit. (See Graph 1) 

Crucially, as Sri Lanka’s FIU and the FATF both note, these three stages do not always occur neatly in sequence. They can happen simultaneously, separately, or overlap entirely, and critically, the offence of money laundering occurs at each individual stage, not merely at the end of the process. (See Table 1)

Trade-Based Money Laundering: Hiding in Plain Sight

Of all these methods, trade-based money laundering deserves special attention, because it is, by most expert estimates, the largest channel of all. According to FTI Consulting’s anti-financial-crime specialists, TBML accounts for an estimated 87% of all global illicit financial flows, which could translate to USD 800 billion to USD 2 trillion annually. Despite this staggering scale, court cases worldwide identified only about USD 60 billion tied to TBML between 2011 and 2021, meaning the overwhelming majority of trade-based laundering is never detected, let alone prosecuted.

The reason is structural. Banks process the payments behind a trade transaction, but they rarely verify the physical goods being shipped. Customs authorities inspect the goods but focus on tariffs and contraband, not financial crime. Between these two gaps sits an enormous blind spot that traders like Ranjan, real or hypothetical, can exploit with remarkable ease. (See Graph 2)

Under Invoicing

Over-invoicing and under-invoicing are the two basic tools. In over-invoicing, the declared value of a shipment is inflated, allowing the buyer to transfer excess funds to the seller, disguised as a trade payment. Under-invoicing works the opposite way, understating the value to move money in the reverse direction, or to evade customs duties on the true value of the goods.

More sophisticated variants include multiple invoicing of the same shipment, misrepresenting the quantity or quality of goods, and outright phantom shipments where no goods move at all.

Money laundering does not exist in isolation. It is the connective tissue linking together a genuinely global criminal ecosystem, and the methods described above are used across an enormous range of predicate crimes.

The Cost to Nations

The damage caused by money laundering is rarely visible in the way a robbery or a bombing is visible. It is slower, quieter, and in some ways more corrosive, because it operates by corrupting the very institutions meant to prevent it. (Table 2)

These costs are not abstract for institutions caught facilitating them, even unknowingly. Canada’s TD Bank was fined USD 3 billion in 2024 for failing to prevent criminals from transferring hundreds of millions of dollars in illegal funds through its systems. The UK’s Barclays Bank was fined a combined £42 million (approximately USD 56 million) in 2025 across two separate AML failings. Globally, the first half of 2025 alone saw USD 1.23 billion in AML fines, a 417% increase over the prior year, reflecting both the scale of the problem and intensifying regulatory pressure.

Sri Lanka’s Challenges: Preparing for a High-Stakes Test

Sri Lanka’s own experience with money laundering and its enforcement architecture offers an instructive case study, one with significant stakes attached in the immediate future.

Sri Lanka’s Financial Intelligence Unit, established under the Financial Transactions Reporting Act No. 6 of 2006 and operating within the Central Bank, is unusual among its global peers: although administrative in type, it has direct powers to freeze accounts, suspend transactions, and impose penalties for noncompliance, powers many FIUs around the world lack. The Prevention of Money Laundering Act No. 5 of 2006 backs this with serious criminal penalties: imprisonment of between five and twenty years, and fines of up to three times the value of laundered property, with the burden of proof placed on defendants to justify the legality of their assets.

Yet deficiencies remain. The absence of explicit conspiracy clauses limits prosecutors’ ability to charge coordinated networks rather than individuals. Predicate crimes such as drug trafficking, corruption, and trade-based manipulation generate significant illicit proceeds, but tracing those funds and linking them conclusively to offenders remains genuinely difficult, a challenge shared with every FIU in the world, not a uniquely Sri Lankan failing.

The stakes for getting this right have rarely been higher. Sri Lanka was grey-listed by the FATF in 2017 following “strategic deficiencies” identified in its AML/CFT regime, and was subsequently blacklisted by the European Union, a designation only lifted after extensive remedial work by the FIU and Central Bank. Sri Lanka now faces its third FATF mutual evaluation, scheduled for 2026, under a revised methodology that prioritises measurable enforcement outcomes, convictions, confiscations, and inter-agency coordination, over the mere existence of laws on paper.

“The bottom line, simply, is that we cannot afford to be grey-listed again,” FIU Director Dr. Subhani Keerthiratne has said. “We must somehow avoid it, because we are still recovering from the 2019 Easter Sunday attacks, the Covid pandemic, and recent economic crisis.” Grey-listing carries real economic consequences: it increases transaction costs, subjects correspondent banking relationships to stricter oversight, and reduces foreign investment, costs the Central Bank itself has acknowledged Sri Lanka cannot currently absorb.

In preparation, Sri Lanka has taken concrete steps: a High-Level Task Force on AML/CFT was appointed in February 2025; the Proceeds of Crime Act, passed in 2024, gave regulators new powers to freeze and manage confiscated assets; the FIU signed information-sharing agreements with bodies including the Commission to Investigate Allegations of Bribery or Corruption (CIABOC) and counterpart FIUs in Oman, Mongolia, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and the United States; and the UK’s HM Treasury has provided direct technical assistance ahead of the 2026 evaluation.

What Comes Next

But the landscape of illicit finance is changing faster than most regulators can track. In Part III of this series, “The Digital Underground: Forex Platforms, Cryptocurrency, AI and the New Financial Battlefield”, we turn to the technology reshaping this entire ecosystem: legitimate and fraudulent online forex platforms, the explosive growth of crypto-enabled laundering, and the artificial intelligence tools now being deployed on both sides of this contest.

(The writer, a senior Chartered Accountant and professional banker, is Professor at SLIIT, Malabe. Views expressed in this article are personal.)

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The Right of Passage of Ships in the Straits of Hormuz

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The long drawn out imbroglio in the straits of Hormuz and the blockades to navigation of ships through these straits by the warring parties to the US and Israel war against Iran was causing immeasurable economic disruption and suffering to people in the region and around the world. The signing of the Memorandum of Understanding and the ceasefire was received with cautious optimism and it is to be hoped that the fragile ceasefire endures. The seas are the paths of navigation and to the flow of goods and trade around the world. This is why freedom of navigation in the seas has always been the most important principle of the international law relating to the seas. Hence the right of innocent passage of ships even in territorial waters of coastal states and in international straits, has been retained despite claims of territorial sovereignty by coastal states.

The ongoing negotiations and the possibilities of a final settlement and permanent opening of the straits of Hormuz requires us to look at the international law of the sea and the question of passage of ships through territorial waters and international straits as also the rights of the different parties I.e the right of the coastal state or states, and the rights of third states in these waters which is what this article seeks to set out.

The law of the Seas has not been static. It has been dynamic and evolving in response to economic and political factors and new dimensions in science and technology. In Roman law the sea was regarded as ‘Res communes’ open to all. Subsequently there was the, closed sea doctrine and around the 16th century doctrine of the open seas ‘Mare Liberum’ espoused by the Dutch Jurist Grotius, which served the interests of the maritime and colonial powers like Holland and England. However in the 20th Century with new states in Asia, South America and Africa coming into being, there was a curtailment of this freedom as these states wished to control the resources of the seas adjoining their coasts, and hence the coastal states began to have greater areas of the sea under their sovereignty, as in the territorial sea, the exclusive economic zones, and under the sea, in the continental shelf of the seabed. These new zones were recognised under the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention. However, in order to protect the right of navigation in the seas the customary international law right of innocent passage of ships in the High seas was extended into the Territorial waters and Exclusive economic zones of coastal states and to international straits. This right has been codified and incorporated into the United Nations Law of the Sea treaty 1982, (UNCLOS), to which a large number of states are party.

Territorial seas

– It must be pointed out that in the territorial sea i.e. the seas adjoining the territory of States with maritime boundaries, it has always been recognised that the State exercises a sovereign right which extends not only over the Sea but also over the Air space. In the Sea up to a certain limit, which was earlier recognised as extending to 3 miles which was then the canon shot limit of coastal defenses. Today under UNCLOS it extends to 12 miles of territorial sea. Under the traditional law of the sea as set out by ‘Colombos’ a classical authority on “the International law of the Sea”, the Coastal State exercised well defined rights of control over foreign ships of war and merchant vessels in respect of police, customs and revenue functions, which implies right to collect tolls, fishing rights, maritime ceremonial and right to establish defense zones. In so far as the State exercises all these powers there is little to distinguish between territorial waters and internal waters. But there is one important point of difference and that is the Right of innocent passage, which is also provided for in United Nations Convention on the Law off the Sea (UNCLOS). As it is also a customary right of international law, it binds even non-parties to the Law of the Sea Convention such as the United States of America.

Innocent passage is defined under the convention as navigation through the territorial sea for the purpose of traversing the sea without entering internal waters or of making for internal waters, or for making for the high seas from internal waters i.e. Ports. The earlier 1958 Convention, defines it as “one that is not prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of the coastal state.” The 1982 Convention sets out what activities would be prejudicial and this includes any threat of force against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of any State or in any other manner in violations of the principles of international law in the Charter of the United Nations”. A new feature is the addition of any acts of willful and serious pollution contrary to the Convention. The Coastal State is also empowered to make laws and regulations relating to innocent passage as well as designated traffic separation schemes. Foreign ships exercising this right must comply with the laws and regulations of the coastal state. The question of the right of innocent passage of war ships is not specifically provided for in the Convention, however state practice indicates that they may require prior authorisation as in the case of India, Sri Lanka and other states such as Soviet Union, France, Norway etc.

The Coastal State may take the necessary steps to prevent passage which is not innocent. Furthermore it is the Coastal State that has the right to characterise the Passage. If the Coastal State deems the passage to be ‘Not Innocent’ it may refuse such passage. Hence although foreign ships have such right the Coastal State exercises a considerable degree of Control. As regards the Strait of Hormuz this falls within the territorial waters of Iran and Oman, and these states exercise this jurisdiction. Under UNCLOS all Coastal states have a territorial sea of up to 12 nautical miles and a contiguous zone of 12 nautical miles. In the case of States with opposite or adjacent coasts as in the case of Iran and Oman, the territorial waters are divided between them by agreement or by a median or lateral line.

The Strait of Hormuz is regarded as an international strait. International straits are narrow natural waterways connecting two parts of the high seas or Exclusive Economic zones with a High sea. UNCLOS provides for transit passage for ships in such Straits. Transit passage unlike innocent passage allows for continuous and expeditious transit for ships, submarines and Aircraft. However the Straits of Hormuz does not connect two parts of the High seas as for example the Straits of Malacca connects the Indian Ocean to the Pacific Ocean, or the Straits of Gibraltar connects the Atlantic Ocean to Mediterranean Sea. The Straits of Hormuz actually connects two parts of the same water body i.e. the ‘Persian Gulf’, and the Gulf of Oman which is not a separate ocean or sea. The Persian Gulf and Gulf of Oman are both parts of what is in the nature of an inland sea as for example the Baltic Sea. However as it has been regarded as an international straits over a long period of time it may not be possible to change its designation.

In any event even if there is some doubt as to whether these are international straits and hence there is no transit passage in these straits, there is nevertheless the right of innocent Passage. In the case of transit passage, it ensures freedom of Navigation and over flight solely for continuous and expeditious transit. The ships or Aircraft must proceed without delay, refrain from threat of force and comply with safety and environmental regulations. So we can see that freedom of navigation is assured and while Iran as the coastal state can claim that their action to close the strait was an act to protect their sovereignty, the blockade by the United States was illegal as it is contrary to the Treaty and customary international law of the Sea.

Way forward – Under the Charter of the United Nations it is the Security Council which has the primary responsibility for maintaining the peace and security of the world. Unfortunately this has not been the case in respect of the war in the region and threats to freedom of Navigation. Furthermore States whose interests were affected who should have made a collective effort to resolve the issue amicably keeping in mind the Sovereignty and territorial integrity of the States through whose territorial waters the straits are situated, namely Iran and Oman failed to intervene. It must also be kept in mind that the Coastal State in this instance Iran, has presented its action of Closure of these Straits as a defensive measure against an unprovoked armed attack and use of force by third states namely US and Israel. An attack which was not carried out under the mandate of the United Nations Security Council which alone has the right to initiate collective military action to restore international peace.

A fragile ceasefire under constant pressure remains in doubt and the recent signing of a Memorandum of Understanding between Iran and USA through the mediation of Pakistan, Oman and Qatar is still in place while negotiations continue. Once Peace is restored with guarantees for non-renewal of attacks, Iran can be called upon to fully open the straits, which were open before the commencement of the attacks. The Freedom of Navigation which is the underlying principle of the law of the Sea can then be restored and the right of passage in the straits of Hormuz restored.

The writer LL.B (Cey), LL.M (Cantab), Ph.D.(Col), Attorney–at–Law.

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From Manifesto to Action without delay

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The prison violence in Negombo has become the first major crisis to confront the government since it came to power. The government may or may not be responsible for creating the conditions that have accumulated over decades and made the prison system a powder keg. The fact is the government’s Ratama Ekata anti-drug crackdown boosted the countrywide prison population from 28,000, in late 2024, to 41,000, in 2026. The conditions of imprisonment include chronic overcrowding, poor infrastructure, inadequate staffing, the penetration of organised crime and drug networks into prisons, and the long neglect of prison reform by successive governments. The Negombo Prison was housing approximately 2,600 inmates at the time of the clashes although it was built for only about 650. By the time order was restored, 29 people, including seven prison officers, had lost their lives and more than 100 others had been injured.

Justice Minister Harshana Nanayakkara accepted responsibility before Parliament, visited the Prison and announced immediate measures, including legislative changes to facilitate bail and alternatives to remanding prisoners. The NPP government needs to accept responsibility for its failure to anticipate the danger, to respond with sufficient speed and competence once the problem had erupted. A dangerous situation can be observed countrywide with more than 42,000 prisoners being held in prisons designed to accommodate about 10,000 inmates. The magnitude of the Negombo Prison tragedy needs to be understood not merely as an isolated incident but as a warning that the government cannot postpone structural reforms indefinitely. A government elected on the promise of changing the system cannot justify repeating the failures of its predecessors on the basis that it is sincere and uncorrupt unlike them.

The failure to move beyond promises has become evident in several other sectors as well. Farmers continue to agitate over unresolved problems. Plantation workers continue to seek meaningful integration into national life. Many of them, who were victims of Cyclone Ditwah, continue to live in miserable conditions due to the government’s slowness in dealing with their problems of their lack of ownership of lands and homes. The Mylathamadu cattle farmers of Batticaloa have issues once again even after two presidents, President Ranil Wickremesinghe and now President Anura Kumara Dissanayake ordered evacuation of intruders in terms of court orders. But the local police and the Mahaweli Authority officials seem slow to take any actions, even to the extent of not complying with judicial decisions. Victims of past human rights violations and thousands of families of missing persons are still waiting for justice. The promised repeal of the Prevention of Terrorism Act has yet to materialise. Prison reform has now joined this growing list of deferred commitments.

NPP Pledges

The National People’s Power election manifesto promised not merely honest government but systemic transformation. Under the section dealing with prisons, it pledged to restructure the prison system, reduce overcrowding, expand open prison facilities, strengthen rehabilitation through education, vocational training and psychological support, establish a formal parole system and transform prisons from places of punishment into centres of rehabilitation and reintegration. Those promises reflected international best practice and recognised that a humane prison system is essential to a democratic society. Yet nearly two years into its term little visible progress has been made in implementing these reforms.

Sri Lanka has witnessed different types of prison violence. Some have erupted spontaneously because of intolerable prison conditions, overcrowding and frustration. Others have occurred under circumstances that raised alarming questions about state complicity. The massacre of 53 Tamil political prisoners inside Welikada Prison during the anti-Tamil violence of July 1983 remains one of the darkest chapters in the country’s history. Those prisoners were not protected despite being under state custody. The Mahara Prison violence of November 2020, in which 11 inmates were killed after protests over Covid conditions, similarly generated serious allegations regarding the targeted use of weapons and led to widespread calls for an independent investigation.

Following the deadly violence at Mahara Prison during the Covid pandemic, then Opposition party leader Anura Kumara Dissanayake declared in Parliament that “those who are remanded and imprisoned are under the custody of the state. Therefore, the primary responsibility for the safety of the lives of the prisoners and detainees who are in state custody lies with the government.” He further said that “it is entirely unacceptable in a democratic nation that upholds human rights for prisoners, who are under the protection of the state, to be gunned down while in government custody.” But in the Negombo tragedy once again the state, with President Dissanayake at the helm, was unable to protect the inmates though there is no evidence that the government orchestrated the violence. Being in power for two years there is a rightful expectation that it could have taken better preventive action.

Urgency Needed

There are two special conditions, however, that make the Negombo Prison tragedy a possible turning point rather than merely another episode in Sri Lanka’s long history of prison violence. The first is that until these events the country had enjoyed an extended period without major organised political or communal violence. This improvement was recognised internationally when Sri Lanka rose 30 places in the 2025 Global Peace Index to rank 67 among 163 countries. The Index measures countries on three broad indicators, namely the level of societal safety and security, the extent of ongoing domestic and international conflict, and the degree of militarisation. The improvement reflects the country’s recovery from the years of political upheaval and economic collapse and suggests that Sri Lanka is moving towards a more peaceful future.

The second distinguishing feature is that the present government has no known links to organised crime or the underworld that has so often been associated with sections of the political establishment in the past. This is one of its greatest strengths. President Anura Kumara Dissanayake has spoken publicly about the nexus between organised crime, drug trafficking, money laundering and politics, and has challenged political parties to take action against members who maintain links with criminal networks. That willingness to confront organised crime gives the government a credibility that previous governments lacked. But integrity by itself is not enough. Honest intentions must be matched by administrative competence and political will. A government that seeks to change the system must demonstrate that it can reform and manage the institutions of the state more effectively than those who came before it. The Negombo tragedy suggests that this remains a major challenge.

The government’s greatest asset remains the trust that the public has placed in its sincerity. Unlike many previous governments, it is not burdened by allegations of protecting organised crime or profiting from corruption. That gives it a unique opportunity to undertake reforms that others could not credibly pursue. But it must not rest on its laurels in the belief it is superior to the rest. The Negombo Prison tragedy should become the catalyst for implementing the wider programme of reform promised in the election manifesto. Prison reform cannot be viewed in isolation. It is part of the broader commitment to change the system, strengthen public institutions and ensure that the state serves the people with competence as well as integrity. The reforms promised to rice farmers, cattle herders, plantation communities, victims of past human rights violations and all those who looked to the government for a new beginning deserve the same sense of urgency. Other priorities cannot justify postponing the structural changes that the NPP promised and the country has waited for decades.

by Jehan Perera

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