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Reviewing Sri Lanka’s Foreign Policy

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By Neville ladduwahetty

I t is reported that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs has tasked the Lakshman Kadirgamar Institute (LKI) “with reviewing Sri Lanka’s foreign policy and making recommendations on the structure of the island’s diplomatic apparatus” (The Sunday Morning, October 30, 2022). According to the Executive Director Dr. D. L. Mendis of the LKI, “once the consultations are completed, recommendations on a new foreign policy will be presented to the President and later to Parliament (Ibid). Continuing, Dr. Mendis stated: “Sri Lanka comes first. But we have to also be mindful of our neighbourhood. As a result, our relations should be a bit better with countries in the region, especially India. The Indians also expect us to take that into consideration. The recent Yuan Wang 5 vessel visit is an example.” (Ibid).

The report cited above was followed soon after by a report in the Daily News of October 31, citing the full text of a speech delivered by the Prime Minister, Dinesh Gunawardena at the Convocation of the Bandaranaike International Diplomatic Training Institute (BIDTI). The text of PM’s speech states: “Sri Lanka’s foreign policy is based on neutrality in international affairs and we extend a hand of friendship to every country. But this neutrality should not be taken as a weakness. It is merely a detached neutrality in regional or international power games. Though neutral, we will not allow anybody to use our soil against a third country. In such attempts we zealously safeguard our sovereignty”. The policy of “Neutrality” adopted by Sri Lanka and stated by the PM would in no uncertain terms serve Sri Lanka’s interests better in the background of increasing Great Power Rivalries in and around Sri Lanka in the Indian Ocean with the formation of the strategic security alliance of the United States, India, Japan and Australia known as the Quad on the one hand, and China on the other. The fact that the policy of “Neutrality” is backed by the codified provisions in the “Hague Convention (V) Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in Case of War on Land”, entered into force January 26, 1910 would add strength to “zealously safeguard” Sri Lanka’s sovereignty as evidenced by the Articles of the Convention cited below. The Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers Article 1.

The territory of neutral Powers is inviolable. Art. 2. Belligerents are forbidden to move troops or convoys of either munitions of war or supplies across the territory of a neutral Power. Art. 3. Belligerents are likewise forbidden to: (a) Erect on the territory of a neutral Power a wireless telegraphy station or other apparatus for the purpose of communicating with belligerent forces on land or sea; (b) Use any installation of this kind established by them before the war on the territory of a neutral Power for purely military purposes, and which has not been opened for the service of public messages. Art. 4. Corps of combatants cannot be formed nor recruiting agencies opened on the territory of a neutral Power to assist the belligerents. Art. 5. A neutral Power must not allow any of the acts referred to in Articles 2 to 4 to occur on its territory. It is not called upon to punish acts in violation of its neutrality unless the said acts have been committed on its own territory. Art. 6. The responsibility of a neutral Power is not engaged by the fact of persons crossing the frontier separately to offer their services to one of the belligerents. Art. 7. A neutral Power is not called upon to prevent the export or transport, on behalf of one or other of the belligerents, of arms, munitions of war, or, in general, of anything which can be of use to an army or a fleet. Art. 8. A neutral Power is not called upon to forbid or restrict the use on behalf of the belligerents of telegraph or telephone cables or of wireless telegraphy apparatus belonging to it or to companies or private individuals. Art. 9. Every measure of restriction or prohibition taken by a neutral Power in regard to the matters referred to in Articles 7 and 8 must be impartially applied by it to both belligerents. A neutral Power must see to the same obligation being observed by companies or private individuals owning telegraph or telephone cables or wireless telegraphy apparatus. Art. 10. The fact of a neutral Power resisting, even by force, attempts to violate its neutrality cannot be regarded as a hostile act. In the context of today’s technological advances some of the provisions in the Articles cited above have lost their relevance.

Despite this, sufficient provisions exist to justify any country that adopts a policy of Neutrality to “zealously” protect its sovereignty and territorial integrity. Neutrality in relation to India If the foreign policy of Sri Lanka is Neutral, its conduct in its relations with other countries has to reflect its core value of impartiality. This means Sri Lanka cannot afford to have special relations with some to the exclusivity of others. For instance, the common perception in Sri Lanka is that both geography and history of Sri Lanka and India are so closely knit together that its relations with India must necessarily be different to that with any other State. However, this perception that is founded on history and geography is based on an India that was so vastly different to what India is today. The past relations and bonds that Sri Lanka developed was with an India that consisted of several princely States.

While some of them had a profound influence in molding the culture and heritage of Sri Lanka, with the “gift” of Buddhism from one of these States to Sri Lanka, other States in the South of the subcontinent repeatedly plundered, vandalized and laid waste what was cherished by Sri Lanka. The India that the world sees today was crafted under British Colonial Rule when the entire Indian subcontinent was unified and eventually partitioned at an unimaginable human cost in the process of granting independence to India and Pakistan. It is in such a context that Sri Lanka has to fashion its policy of Neutrality, and not on a past that does not exist today. While Sri Lanka’s security and territorial integrity in the past was dependent on the ambitions of Empires in the Indian subcontinent, by a quirk of fate and circumstance, the security and territorial integrity of today’s India depends on the security and territorial integrity of Sri Lanka. For instance, IF the Northern and Eastern Provinces of Sri Lanka were to separate from the rest of Sri Lanka, as attempted by the LTTE, the support of Tamil Nadu that was given so willingly on grounds of common kinship would have contributed immeasurably towards furthering Tamil Nadu’s own separatist ambitions; a process that would encourage other Southern States to eventually follow suit, with serious consequences on India’s existing territorial integrity, without which its aspiration to be recognized as a global power would have been dented.

It was to prevent such an outcome that India undertook a military mission to defeat the LTTE. Having failed, much to its embarrassment, all India could do was to come up instead with devolution of power to the Provinces in Sri Lanka under the 13th Amendment; a position from which India would not budge because of the unintended consequences that could follow. The common belief is that the choice of Province as the unit of devolution had more to do with appeasing Tamil Nadu instead of devolution to Districts that would have assured Sri Lanka’s territorial integrity and through it assured India’s territorial integrity too. The lesson to be learnt is that both India and Sri Lanka have to adopt policies that assure each other’s territorial integrity because it is in each other’s own self-interests to do so.

Viewed from the perspective presented above it is in India’s selfinterest to help Sri Lanka overcome its current debt crisis. Whatever contribution India has made towards this effort is to ensure that Sri Lanka gets over this crisis, because if Sri Lanka fails, other global powers are bound to exploit the situation at a serious cost to India’s self-interests. This means that any help extended to Sri Lanka is in the pursuit of India’s own self-interest. The important review process that the LKI is tasked to engage in, should develop a fresh perspective in respect of relations with India that is in keeping with current global developments, instead of being influenced by a past that has ceased to exist. Such a perspective should acknowledge that India’s aspirations to become a global power depends on its territorial integrity being intact.

This means axiomatically, that India makes sure that Sri Lanka’s territorial integrity stays intact too. This endeavour should make the relationship between India and Sri Lanka as equal partners engaged in the joint task of ensuring each other’s territorial integrity and not as a big brother or sister of Sri Lanka as believed by some. Sri Lanka’s policy of Neutrality must underscore this sense of reality. Practice of a neutral foreign policy How does a policy of Neutrality manifest itself in practice? First, it means a country that adopts a policy of Neutrality “extend a hand friendship to every country” as stated by the PM at the BIDTI Convocation. Second, such a country cannot be partial to any country over any other or others. Thirdly it must promote and live by the rule of law. This means, a Neutral country cannot pick and choose countries to parcel out infrastructure projects, as for instance to hand over the East Container Terminal to India and Japan and consider offering the West Container Terminal to The Adani Group of India along with a Solar Power Project in Mannar and/or Trincomalee.

 Another instance on similar lines was to offer the Hambantota Harbour first to the United States, then to India and finally to China. The practice instead, should be for Sri Lanka to prepare relevant project proposals and call for Expressions of Interest for evaluation and selecting the offer that best suits Sri Lanka’s interests. This means unsolicited proposals have no place in the scheme of a Neutral country. The tendency of Sri Lanka to be influenced by the security concerns of India should have rational and meaningful limits. For instance, objecting to the award of a solar power project to a Chinese Company on the basis of Asian Development Bank procedures by India on grounds of security, should not have been entertained if Sri Lanka is to assert its independence, because no concrete reasons had been presented for India’s objections similar to the decision taken in regard to Yuan Wang 5 of China. As a Neutral State, Sri Lanka has every right to comply with the provisions relating to the “Rights and Duties of a Neutral State” cited above when it comes to addressing requests from other countries.

The exercise of a Neutral policy in a manner that is credible means the ability to act independently. To exercise that independence, Sri Lanka has to be economically independent. Such economic independence comes with food and energy security. Sri Lanka has to focus on these two areas if its Neutrality is not to be compromised. Conclusion The statement by the Prime Minister Dinesh Gunawardena on the occasion of the Convocation of Bandaranaike International Diplomatic Training Institute that “Sri Lanka’s foreign policy is based on Neutrality, is bold and courageous because he has dared to charter a new direction from the long held policy of Non-Alignment.

 He has done right by Sri Lanka to recognize the altered geopolitical architecture and adopted a policy to guide Sri Lanka’s relations with the rest of the world in a manner that enables Sri Lanka to accommodate the rivalries developing in an around Sri Lanka made intense by the strategic location destined on the People of Sri Lanka. Unlike the specificity of the policy of Neutrality, the lack of specificity of the former policy of NonAlignment was perhaps the reason for the directionless and lackadaisical performance of the Foreign Ministry and its “diplomatic apparatus” that caused its performance to depend entirely on the leadership given by the Foreign Minister in how Sri Lanka conducted its foreign relations. This was most evident in Sri Lanka’s performance in Geneva. This new beginning means a new direction as to how Sri Lanka and its governments conduct themselves in a manner that makes the policy of neutrality alive as far as its relations with the rest of the world are concerned. If the policy of Neutrality is practiced as recommended above, there is a strong possibility that Sri Lanka would emerge from the crisis that is affecting all the countries without exception, with minimum cost to its image and its dignity.



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Coercive laws recipe for future misrule

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by Jehan Perera

The NPP government is going after powerful figures from the past and present who have engaged in corruption, fraud and criminal activity in a way that no previous government in Sri Lanka has done. Former ministers, politicians and senior state officials are among those facing investigations and legal proceedings. The government has placed before Parliament a document listing 50 cases involving corruption, fraud and other crimes. These include not only financial offences but also cases relating to the Easter Sunday attacks, the killings of Lasantha Wickrematunge and Wasim Thajudeen, the disappearance of Prageeth Ekneligoda and attacks on journalists Keith Noyahr and Upali Tennakoon.

The significance of this effort is that it can demonstrate that nobody is above the law, regardless of political connections or social standing, which will help restore public confidence in institutions that have long been distrusted. It could also recover public resources, improve the investment climate and strengthen the foundations for a more prosperous and just Sri Lanka. When criticised for focusing on the past and not the present, the government position is that these investigations were initiated under earlier governments, particularly between 2015 and 2019, and that it is now allowing investigators to proceed to deal with the backlog without political interference.

But there is an aspect of the government’s approach that is less justifiable. While pursuing past wrongdoing by powerful individuals, it is also advancing a triumvirate of draft laws that could give the state sweeping powers over citizens, organisations and dissent in the present and future. The draft Prevention of Terrorism legislation, the Prevention of Organised Crimes Bill and the NGO Registration and Supervision Bill raise serious questions about the over-centralisation of power. Each of these laws strengthens the powers of the state while weakening the rights and safeguards that protect people from their misuse and thus questions the basic rights of people in democracy where ‘the power of the people is vested in the government’. This is a recipe for future misrule rather than the rule of law. As the well-known saying goes, power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely.

Proposed Laws

The real test of system change, for which the government obtained an overwhelming mandate, requires not only a government willing to hold others accountable, but one prepared to subject itself to the same principles of legality, transparency and restraint. The three proposed laws that are particularly important in this regard are the Protection of the State from Terrorism Bill, the Prevention of Organised Crimes Bill and the NGO Registration and Supervision Bill. Each of these draft laws has been presented as serving a legitimate purpose. Preventing terrorism, combating organised crime and ensuring that NGOs do not facilitate money laundering or terrorist financing are proper responsibilities of the state. Sri Lanka has international obligations in these areas, and no responsible government can disregard them. However, the existence of a legitimate objective does not justify every means adopted to achieve it.

The proposed Protection of the State from Terrorism Bill illustrates the problem. Although its definition of terrorism draws on a model developed by a former United Nations Special Rapporteur, the Human Rights Commission of Sri Lanka has warned that the definition of terrorism extends beyond the model and could bring legitimate political protest, trade union action and civil disobedience within the scope of counter-terrorism legislation. Its concerns also include prolonged detention, inadequate judicial oversight and restrictions on access to legal counsel. These are objections that go to the heart of the relationship between the citizen and the state. The government cannot credibly promise to protect democratic freedoms while creating powers that could be used to restrict them. It is necessary for the government to reassess the draft through transparent consultation and revise provisions that could criminalise legitimate dissent.

The Prevention of Organised Crimes Bill raises similar concerns. It is presented as giving effect to the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime, which Sri Lanka ratified in 2006. The Centre for Policy Alternatives (CPA) has argued that the convention does not require many of the bill’s provisions. The proposed law extends to a broad range of offences, permits detention orders lasting up to a year, makes confessions to police admissible for purposes of legal evidence, and introduces extensive surveillance powers. A law intended to dismantle criminal networks should not create a parallel system of exceptional powers that could be applied far beyond organised crime. Nor should safeguards developed through years of experience with abuses under the Prevention of Terrorism Act be weakened through legislation bearing a different name. The government should review whether or not existing laws could be used effectively to control these crimes or whether each exceptional power is necessary.

Civil Society

The proposed NGO Registration and Supervision Bill presents another test of the government’s intentions. The government may reasonably seek transparency in the finances of organisations receiving public or foreign funds, including measures to prevent money laundering and terrorist financing. It seeks to justify its overreach on the grounds of meeting the internationally mandated requirements of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) for the Asia-Pacific region. But these objectives do not justify placing civil society and NGOs under excessive administrative control when even the FATF ranks them as low to medium risks. The draft bill would require registration and renewal, impose extensive obligations on organisations and empower authorities to suspend or deregister them on broadly framed grounds. It is important to redraft provisions that confer excessive discretion over registration, renewal, suspension and deregistration of NGOs.

Among the concerns raised by United Nations human rights special rapporteurs with regard to the draft NGO law are provisions requiring organisations to align with government policies and restrictions that could affect advocacy, dissent and freedom of association. The implications extend well beyond organisations that engage directly with the government. Community groups, human rights organisations, independent researchers and organisations working on reconciliation or accountability could find their activities constrained by uncertainty over how these provisions might be interpreted. Organisations that criticise government policies are not thereby working against the country. Their freedom to do so is part of what distinguishes a democracy from a system in which the government determines which opinions and activities are acceptable.

The government has generated considerable public goodwill through its pursuit of corruption and criminality. It should not assume that this goodwill gives it an unlimited mandate to strengthen the coercive powers of the state. The NPP knows from its own history that governments can treat dissent as a threat and use the machinery of the state against their opponents. There is still time to correct the drafts through transparent public consultation, narrow definitions of offences, meaningful judicial control over detention and surveillance, and effective remedies against arbitrary decisions. A government that pursues corruption while weakening safeguards against state abuse risks undermining its own achievements. Besides bringing to light the abuse of power by previous governments, the NPP government needs to build a system in which no future government can abuse power in the belief they can get away with it.

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Quality assurance without quality enhancement: The irony of university QA

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By Ramya Kumar

According to the Quality Assurance Council (QAC) of the University Grants Commission (UGC), quality assurance (QA) refers to “the means (i.e. the policies, attitudes, actions, procedures, etc.), by which an institution can guarantee with confidence and certainty, that the standards and quality of its educational provision are being maintained and enhanced”.

An expansive structure has been in place since 2005 to govern and implement QA processes within the state university system. The QAC is the focal point at the UGC that implements external reviews of state universities and institutes. Each university has its own Centre for Quality Assurance (CQA) tasked with performing QA in line with QAC directives. Faculties, in turn, have Internal Quality Assurance Cells (IQAC) performing their own QA; they are answerable to the CQA.

The big question is whether this all-encompassing top-down QA system, that in many ways undermines the internal dynamics of university governance, actually supports universities to enhance the quality of education. This article highlights some concerns.

Top-down check-box activities

The QAC conducts external reviews of universities and degree programmes. A review team appointed by the UGC (who may or may not have experience in the institution/programme in question) examines the self-evaluation report submitted by the said institution/programme. The team then conducts a site visit to verify the claims made in the university’s self-evaluation report, clarify issues identified during the desk review, and examine how QA procedures operate in practice. The team holds meetings with the university administration, members of the Council and Senate, Deans, Heads of Departments, academic and non-academic staff, students, and others. Following the visit, a draft report is submitted to the relevant institution/programme for comment before final publication. The reviewed institution/programme then prepares and publishes an action plan addressing the recommendations, with subsequent monitoring of progress.

There are some worthy QA initiatives under implementation, such as improving facilities for students with disabilities and strengthening mechanisms to address sexual- and gender-based violence. However, for the most part, QA activities have little to do with improving the quality of education. They are mostly preoccupied with monitoring faculty and department websites, digital transformation, student feedback, subject evaluation, course evaluation, peer evaluation, and, more recently, staff appraisal. These activities, which consume an inordinate amount of time—so precious at understaffed universities—have become check-box activities completed to generate evidence for the next review. Below is an excerpt of a conversation between two academics (1 and 2) that conveys how QA plays out at universities (reproduced with permission).

1: … .it’s like social media you know, like posting things on Facebook or twitter or Instagram. When people do a lot of social media, everything they do, they do thinking, “okay I’m going to post it in this way… this I have to put on my Instagram.” QA is a little like that… everything is considered in light of, “ah we can use this for the review, as evidence… for example very recently we were encouraged to have all the things that we do in our department in the faculty newsletter so then they can put in the review. Every little thing has to be noted down….

2: And with pictures and all…

1: At the very least it has to be written so that you have written evidence .. you can’t be doing something for the sake of doing something or because it is good for the department … and sometimes people tell me “oh yea that’s a good idea we can fit that under this x, y section of the review..”

2: Yea, and nobody really thinks about the actual outcome… whether it’s actually helping anyone..

1: I also find that a lot of the words that we used in different ways have now been co-opted to the QA discourse ..including quality.. I can’t actually say what I want as an “outcome”, for example, that the outcome of this workshop is that my students “think about” … then I am told “ah but no that’s not one of the Bloom’s taxonomy words, “think about”.…

2: And the worst part is these medical and agriculture people, these types of people go around spreading it like some kind of gospel!

1: Yea, this cookie cutter way of doing things, they think is the height of innovativeness or creativity, when actually it is so mundane … for me the most awful thing about it is like some fungus of mundanity has taken over through QA reviews.

2: yea, when you say QA, my mind closes off immediately and I stop listening…

Auditing everything but power

QA leaves out crucial aspects of university governance. For instance, there is no review or assessment of the “quality” of university administrations under Criterion 1 or the integrity of procedures governing the promotion of academic staff under Criterion 6 of the institutional reviews.

The majority in the Council—the university’s executive and governing body, which is responsible for selecting the Vice-Chancellor (VC)—are appointed in ad hoc fashion. Apart from the Ex-Officio members in the Council (VC, Deans, etc.), and the two members elected by the Senate, the remainder are appointed by the UGC with no formal consultation or vetting procedure. The VC appointment process described in UGC Circular No. 03/2023 exemplifies how an ostensibly technical process can become entangled in political sycophancy. The Registrar invites applications for the position of VC through advertisement. Applicants must submit a curriculum vitae, a statement of vision for the university and supporting documents. The University Council appoints a three-member Search Committee of senior academics to encourage “eminent persons” to apply, while the UGC appoints a former VC from another university to “observe” the selection process.

A Special Meeting of the University Council is convened. Candidates are interviewed and must make a presentation to the Council Members, followed by questions. Each Council member “gives marks” for seven prescribed criteria: strategic focus (20%), effective leadership (20%), holistic thinking/conceptual skills (10%), academic and research excellence (15%), personal integrity (10%), professional communication (10%) and managerial competence (15%). Marks are averaged, and the Council recommends three candidates to the UGC in rank order. The UGC-appointed observer separately submits a confidential report on the selection process.

This procedure is expected to guarantee quality, but does it? Applications are submitted to the Council Members, who have been appointed on questionable bases, and who are expected to review the applications and give scores, based on objective assessments. But, in reality, most Council Members are manipulated by VC candidates, who often have personal ties with them. The UGC-appointed observer usually has no genuine interest in the outcome. And there is no way for anyone to actually question the Council’s decision once it is made. Although the highest-ranked candidate may ultimately be appointed, the selection remains a political decision made by the President, who retains the discretion to appoint any one of the three.

External reviews also do not look into the promotions of academic staff, except to scrutinise whether there are policies and procedures in place to govern promotion. Academic staff may apply for promotion to Professor once they satisfy the prescribed eligibility requirements, which typically include the period of service, academic qualifications, research and publication achievements, teaching experience, and contributions to the university and wider community. Applications are evaluated against specified criteria, with research output and academic contributions assessed through documentary evidence and expert evaluation. Under the UGC’s scheme for Professors, two experts from outside the applicant’s institution assess specified aspects of research and knowledge dissemination. Again, beneath this technical process, which is externally evaluated, lies a problematic points-based scheme that can be manipulated and abused with impunity.

Rethinking university QA

Like the VC election process and the schemes of promotion for academic staff, QA reviews are open to manipulation. Before a review, there is a chaotic rush to complete evidence gathering and reporting. Academics leave all other work aside, including at times their teaching, to focus on completing documentation and preparing reports. The standardised criteria in the review manuals and scoring sheets often do not reflect differences in disciplines and institutional contexts. But this does not really matter because any serious problems experienced by institutions or programmes are hastily brushed under the carpet to conceal any evidence that could taint the review. The goal is to obtain an A or at least a B grade at whatever cost.

QA may result in positive change if it moves beyond top-down check-box activities towards internally designed and owned processes encompassing all aspects of university governance, led by departments and faculties, and supported by adequate resources. The current QA system needs to be dismantled and replaced by procedures that are accountable, not to the UGC, but to our students and the communities we serve.

(Ramya Kumar is attached to the Department of Community and Family Medicine, Faculty of Medicine, University of Jaffna)

. Kuppi is a politics and pedagogy happening on the margins of the lecture hall that parodies, subverts, and simultaneously reaffirms social hierarchies.

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Down Memory Lane — the Grand 20th Edition!

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Down Memory Lane: Ready to sing again

Yes, Down Memory Lane, the beloved Sing-Along concert series that first struck a chord, way back in 1997, returns for its landmark 20th edition this Saturday, 17th October, at the beautiful Bolgoda Grand Resort, Moratuwa town centre.

Having celebrated its glorious 25th anniversary with the show in 2023, this milestone 20th concert promises to be even more special.

The organisers, the ever-popular Moratuwa Arts Forum, are pulling out all the stops to present yet another unforgettable evening, brimming with camaraderie, fellowship, and pure nostalgia.

Get ready for two-and-a-half hours of non-stop singing as veteran vocalists, from the Moratuwa Arts Forum, will take the stage to lead and inspire the happy audience to sing, sing and sing to their hearts’ content.

The repertoire? Absolutely magical, according to the organisers.

Veteran Arun Dias Bandaranaike: Will handle the evening’s proceedings / Priya Peiris: Event Conceptor

Around 40 golden oldies — from timeless English vintage evergreens and hits from the 50s to the 90s, to toe-tapping calypsos, soulful American plantation melodies, rousing cowboy and Dixieland favourites, aa well as cherished Sinhala standards. All to be sung with much gusto!

This year’s dedicated organising committee comprises Brian Coorey (Chairman), Priya Peiris (Event Conceptor), Hiran Fernando, Suranga Fernando, Viranjan Perera, Hemka Fernando and Neelesh Silva. Guidance and support comes from Moratuwa Arts Forum President Sarana Guneratne and Secretary Chandani Silva.

Adding his signature charm to the evening, as Master of Ceremonies, will be the veteran Arun Dias Bandaranaike.

Don’t miss this landmark celebration of music and memories!

For further details, contact Hiran Fernando on 0772636446 or WhatsApp 0783636446.

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