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Presidential authority in times of emergency:A contemporary appraisal

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‘The Supreme Court of Sri Lanka had recently to deal with this issue frontally (Ambika Satkunanathan v. Attorney General). This is a watershed decision because, for the first time in our legal history, the Supreme Court held that an Acting President of the Republic had violated the fundamental rights of the People, enshrined in the Constitution, by the declaration of a State of Emergency.’

Keynote Address Delivered at the International Research Conference of the Faculty of Law, University of Colombo, on 12 December 2025.

1. The Policy Dilemma

One of the great challenges of modern public law is to reconcile traditional principles relating to the rule of law and the separation of powers with the exigencies of crises which threaten the destruction of society itself. To what extent must protective mechanisms developed by systems of law over the ages give way to the need for physical survival in the throes of life-threatening crises? What is the right balance to be struck, as a matter of public policy?

The classic statement is by John Locke, who insisted that, in emergencies, the government should have legally unfettered power “to act according to discretion, for the public good, without the prescription of the law, and sometimes even against it” (Second Treatise of Government). This is an ancient idea which goes back to Roman times, when Cicero, in his famous oration, Pro Milone, declared: “Inter arma silent leges” (“Amid the clash of arms, the laws are silent”).

This received expression in the present century in the work of Carl Schmitt, who insisted that “The sovereign is he who decides on the state of exception” (Political Theology:Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty). According to him, not only is the sovereign’s authority untrammelled during emergency, but the declaration of emergency is his right alone, dependent solely on the exercise of his subjective judgment. This unqualified power springs from the supreme law of nature—-the safety of the people.

Judicial pronouncements across the world explicitly reflect this point of view. Justice Story, on behalf of the Supreme Court of the United States, famously declared: “The question arises, by whom is the exigency to be judged and decided? We are all of opinion that the authority to decide whether the exigency has arisen, belongs exclusively to the President, and that his decision is conclusive upon all other persons” (Martin v. Mott).In Ghulam Sarwar v. Union of India, Subba Rao CJ, speaking for the Supreme Court of India, observed: “The question whether there is grave emergency is left to the satisfaction of the Executive, for it is obviously in the best position to judge the situation”.

There is, however, equally emphatic opinion to the contrary. Khanna J, in a celebrated dissent, was scathing in his denunciation of the opposite approach: “The position would be that, so far as executive officers are concerned, in matters relating to life and personal liberty of citizens, they would not be governed by any law, they would not be answerable to any court, and they would be wielding more or less despotic powers” (Additional District Magistrate, Jabalpur v. Shivakant Shukla).

These competing postulates have been articulated with equal passion.

II. A Landmark Pronouncement by the Supreme Court of Sri Lanka

The Supreme Court of Sri Lanka had recently to deal with this issue frontally (Ambika Satkunanathan v. Attorney General). This is a watershed decision because, for the first time in our legal history, the Supreme Court held that an Acting President of the Republic had violated the fundamental rights of the People, enshrined in the Constitution, by the declaration of a State of Emergency.

The circumstances against the backdrop of which this historic ruling was made, are well known. A serious depletion of foreign reserves resulted in a severe shortage of basic amenities like fuel, cooking gas, electricity, staple food items, and medicine. In the context of an unprecedented default in the repayment of foreign loans and significant depreciation of the rupee, extended power cuts and galloping inflation led to acute economic hardship. These circumstances culminated in unrest on a scale never seen before on the Island.

Violence included the brutal murder of a Member of Parliament, the torching of residences of the Prime Minister and more than 70 other political personalities, forcible occupation of the Presidential Secretariat, the President’s official residence and the Office of the Prime Minister, with almost a million people gathered in Colombo demanding the resignation of the President. The elected President had fled the country, and a date had been set for an urgent meeting of Parliament to elect the President in accordance with procedure spelt out in the Constitution. An unruly mob had encircled Parliament, threatening to prevent this meeting from taking place. This was the situation in which Acting President Ranil Wickemesinghe declared a State of Emergency.

He did so in terms of provision in the Public Security Ordinance, which empowered him to take this action, if he was of opinion that this was “expedient in the interests of public security and the preservation of public order, or for the maintenance of supplies and services essential to the life of the community”(section 2).

The decision was that of a divided Supreme Court. The majority consisted of Murdu Fernando CJ and Yasantha Kodagoda J, while there was a vigorous dissent by Arjuna Obeyesekere J. The minority held that the circumstances warranted the opinion entertained by the Acting President, while the plurality declared themselves prepared to make this assumption. This, then, was common ground. The difference of opinion pertained to another vital issue.

Once the Acting President (hereinafter referred to as the President), had reached this conclusion, he had four optional courses of action available to him:

(i) He could have recourse to the routine law, principally the provisions of the Penal Code and the Criminal Procedure Code, to deal with the situation;

(ii) He could invoke Part III of the Public Security Ordinance, which would enable him to take particular actions such as calling out the Armed Forces to supplement the Police, prevent public gatherings on highways and in the vicinity of bridges and other specified locations, and declare curfew. These measures could be taken, short of proclamation of a State of Emergency;

(iii) He could take the “drastic step”, under Part II of the Public Security Ordinance, to bring into force the provisions contained within that section, in terms of which an Emergency could be declared, applicable to the whole Island;

(iv) While declaring an Emergency under Part II, he could confine its operation to particular parts of the Island.

This is where the difference of opinion between the plurality and the minority of the court manifested itself. The majority was of opinion that the President’s satisfaction relating to the existence of objective conditions justifying declaration of Emergency did not automatically entitle him to go the full length of bringing into being a nationwide Emergency under Part II, but obligated him further to consider whether measures of a more limited nature, contemplated by Part III, would be sufficient to deal effectively with the situation.Failure to do so, according to their ruling, would involve a breach of the Constitution.

By contrast, the minority was convinced that “Once the President has come to the conclusion that a state of public emergency exists, there is no purpose in mandating a consideration of other options”, and that “Requiring the President to embark on whether the ordinary laws or other various provisions or options would be adequate to deal with a public or national emergency, would be unreasonable and an unprecedented step”. On this basis, the minority held that the President’s actions were entirely within the Constitution, and entailed no liability for contravention of fundamental rights.

A great deal hinged, in practical terms,

on the divergence between these points of view.

III. Categories of Emergency: Uniform or Disparate Rules?

Contemporary trends in the law acknowledge marked differences in scale, intensity, and duration among types of emergency which precipitate varying degrees of government paralysis.

South African law incorporates one comprehensive definition of a State of Emergency, capable of invocation when “the life of the nation is threatened by war, invasion, general insurrection, disorder, natural disaster, or other public emergency” (Constitution, Article 37(1)(a)). Preferable, by far, is the position under the Emergencies Act of Canada, which recognises four different kinds of emergencies— natural disasters, threats to public order, international emergencies, and states of war (Section 18(2)). This enables different degrees of Parliamentary scrutiny and control.

The Constitution of India provides another example of this approach. Article 352 envisages a threat to the security of India or any part of the country by reason of war, external aggression or armed rebellion, while Article 356 contemplates a failure of constitutional government in any Indian state, and the context of Article 360 is jeopardy to the financial stability or credit of India.

In the spectrum of gravity, peril to the very existence of the state, in the degree present in the Sri Lankan situation, attracts the highest concern. In circumstances of potential government breakdown, “facile distrust” is not the recommended counsel. The courts of India have cautioned that “When there is a crisis situation, it is necessary to trust the government with extraordinary powers in order to enable it to overcome such crisis” (Bhagvati J. in Shivakant Shukla).

Undue concern about a lawless situation, typified by unbridled executive power, is not realistic. Emergency legislation has rightly been characterized as “extra-legislative legislation”. Far from there being a legal vacuum, systems of law have furnished practical safeguards, while enabling public order to be maintained.

One of these is the imaginative “super-majority escalator” technique, characteristic of South African law. Only a simple majority of Parliament is required to approve a State of Emergency operative for a maximum period of 21 days, and to extend it up to 3 months. Beyond that, a 60% majority is compulsory for further extensions (Article 37). Here, then, is a successful reconciliation of competing objectives.

Article 16 of the Constitution of the Fifth Republic in France empowers the President to determine not only the sufficiency of conditions warranting the declaration of a State of Emergency, but also its appropriate duration. Restraints on Presidential power in France are weak because the President, although required to consult the Conseil Constitutionel (Constitutional Court), is not bound by its advisory opinion, in the event of contrary advice.

Relative amplitude of Presidential power in emergency situations in France has been justified by a prominent French jurist, François Saint-Bonnet, on the basis that the curtailment of emergency powers at the disposal of the Executive carries the risk of deprivation of the very tools which the government finds indispensable to combat the threat.

Germany’s Basic Law, although wary of emergency powers because of the harrowing experience of Article 48(2) of the Constitution of the Weimar Republic, which paved the way for the rise of Hitler, nevertheless does not balk at recognizing “internal emergencies” which enable intervention by the Executive, albeit subject to control by the Federal Parliament.

Constitutional provisions in different jurisdictions, irrespective of the approach selected, envisage substantial executive power in times of emergency, curtailed by surveillance on the part of the elected Legislature.

IV. Restraints on Judicial Intervention

The decided cases in many countries are replete with examples of indicia which concede to the Executive great latitude in these contexts. The recurring feature is the urging of restraint in the exercise of judicial review in keeping with a suitably benign construction, consistent with constitutional standards. This is reflected in unimpeachable academic authority, as well.

It has been insisted that executive decisions “should be taken seriously as a bona fide attempt to solve whatever social problem they set out to tackle”(Aileen Kavanagh).The caution has been administered that judges should exercise great caution before concluding that the government has violated constitutional rights(Prof. T. R. S. Allan) and,in public emergencies threatening the life of the nation, elected officials should be permitted “to err, if at all, on the side of safety”(Lord Bingham).The courts “should resist the temptation to substitute their own preferred solutions to questions of public policy”(Allan).

This is so, for a number of reasons. One of them is that the public authority is entitled to latitude because it has “a kind of responsibility to advance the public interest that a court does not have”(Brooke L.J.).This is reinforced by other considerations. For instance, possession of special expertise by the executive authority is an important factor.

The nature of the subject matter, for this very reason, has a vital bearing on the issue. Judges have been conscious that “the more political the question is, the more appropriate it will be for political resolution, and the less likely it is to be an appropriate matter for judicial decision”(Lord Bingham).

A responsible and representative system of democratic governance brings into sharp focus “the degree of democratic accountability of the original decision maker, and the extent to which other mechanisms of accountability may be available”(Murray Hunt).Basic values of constitutionalism identify Parliamentary controls as infinitely preferable, in this regard, to judicial intervention.

This has to do with the nature and legitimate confines of the judicial function. Mirza Beg J, speaking for the Supreme Court of India, has candidly conceded that “the judicial process suffers from inherent limitations”(Shivakant Shukla).This is essentially because a court “can neither have full and truthful information, nor the means to such information”(Chandrachud J in Shivakant Shukla),especially in respect of classified information.

An absolute imperative is that the distinction between judicial review and substitution of judgment must be scrupulously observed. Admittedly contextual, this principle is of overriding significance because it is “wrong to expect executive bodies to replicate the style of analysis adopted by courts in determining allegations of violation of rights”(T. R. S. Allan).

It is crucial for the rule of law that the dividing line between these two distinct functions should not become inadvertently blurred. It is not necessary for the public authority to address itself to the same legal arguments as the court(Court of Appeal of England in the Begum case),the judicial function being restricted by the consideration that “the court is usually concerned with whether the decision maker reached his decision in the right way, rather than whether he got what the court might think to be the right answer”(Lord Hoffmann).

The raison d’etre underpinning executive intervention in these extraordinary situations should be constantly borne in mind. The reality is the absence of a practical substitute. “Neither the legislature nor the judiciary is capable of swift, energetic action, which leaves the executive by default as the authoritative body”(David Dyzenhaus).For this inescapable reason, there has been constant emphasis that executive actors “should not be deterred from engaging in the very activity needed,and contemplated, to deal with the crisis”.

The overarching object of policy is the preservation of public confidence. “The faster and more effective the response, the smaller the overall damage to society, as a whole. The best way for government to respond to these fears is to do something large and dramatic to reassure the populace”(Bruce Ackerman).

The weight attaching to these elements of public policy is self-evident. (To be continued)

By Professor G. L. Peiris

D. Phil. (Oxford), Ph. D. (Sri Lanka); Rhodes Scholar,Quondam Visiting Fellow of the Universities of Oxford, Cambridge and London; Former Vice-Chancellor and Emeritus Professor of Law of the University of Colombo.



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The quiet habits behind wealth: Without chasing appearances

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by Prof. C. A. Saliya

When people picture wealth, they often imagine luxury cars, large homes and expensive holidays. But financial advisers who work with wealthy clients describe a different picture: people who spend carefully, keep cash aside, invest patiently and understand the risks they take.

A recent Research NZ report, based on interviews with financial advisers, found that many wealthy people are discreet about money. They tend to live within their means, maintain emergency savings, take calculated investment risks and pay close attention to tax and financial structures.

For Sri Lankan families facing high living costs, loan repayments and uncertainty about the future, the lesson is not that everyone must become rich overnight. It is that better financial habits can create greater security over time.

Wealth is often quiet

One of the strongest habits associated with long-term financial stability is controlled spending. Many people with high incomes do not automatically increase their lifestyle every time they earn more. Instead, they decide in advance what they can afford, save consistently and avoid treating every salary increase as permission to spend more.

This does not mean denying life’s small pleasures. It means knowing the difference between a need, a want and a purchase made only to impress others.

In Sri Lanka, where social pressure can sometimes encourage visible spending on weddings, vehicles, clothing or celebrations, this is a difficult but useful principle. A household that earns well but spends everything may look prosperous while remaining financially fragile. By contrast, a family that saves even a modest amount regularly can build options: education for children, a medical reserve, a home deposit or capital for a small business.

The Central Bank of Sri Lanka’s financial-literacy survey found that bank-account ownership is high, but financial behaviour remains a concern. Its later roadmap notes that Sri Lankans show satisfactory financial knowledge compared with other countries, while positive everyday financial behaviour still lags behind.

Knowledge, in other words, is not enough. People also need routines.

Keep an emergency fund before taking bigger risks

The wealthy people described in the RNZ article often kept readily available savings for genuine emergencies and avoided using these funds for ordinary spending.

This is perhaps the most practical lesson for an average family. An emergency fund is not money that “does nothing.” It is money that protects a household from making a desperate decision when illness, job loss, vehicle repairs or an unexpected school expense arrives.

For some, the first target may be one month of essential expenses. Over time, it can be increased. The point is not perfection; it is having a buffer.

Without one, families may turn to costly borrowing, informal lenders or repeated credit-card debt. Research on household finance shows that weak credit knowledge, cross-borrowing and reliance on informal debt can increase the risk of over-indebtedness.

Saving alone may not be enough—but investing requires care

Saving is the starting point, not always the final destination. Money kept entirely in cash or low-return accounts can lose purchasing power over time, especially when prices rise. This is why financially secure people often invest—not recklessly, but with an understanding that long-term returns usually require some level of risk.

The key phrase is calculated risk. That means asking basic questions before investing: What is the business model? Is the institution regulated? How easily can I access my money? What happens if the investment falls in value? Am I being promised unusually high returns? Do I understand where my money is going?

A proper investment plan should not depend on rumours, social-media tips or promises of “guaranteed” profits. It should be diversified where possible—spread across suitable assets rather than placed in a single company, property deal or scheme.

For a young worker, investing may begin with a small, regular contribution. For a business owner, it may mean reinvesting carefully in a viable enterprise. For a family nearing retirement, capital protection and predictable income may matter more than aggressive growth. There is no single plan for everyone.

Debt can build wealth or destroy it

The RNZ article also makes a more controversial point: wealthy people sometimes use other people’s money, through debt or outside equity, to build businesses or buy assets. When investment returns exceed borrowing costs, borrowing can magnify gains. But the reverse is equally true: when returns fall or income is interrupted, debt magnifies losses.

This distinction is crucial in Sri Lanka.

Debt used for a productive purpose—such as a well-researched business, equipment that generates income, or an asset with manageable repayments—can be different from debt used for consumption. Borrowing for status purchases, repeated expenses or a lifestyle beyond one’s income can quickly become a burden.

Before taking a loan, families should calculate the monthly repayment under difficult conditions, not only favourable ones. Could the instalment still be paid if income falls? Is the interest rate fixed or variable? Is there enough emergency savings left after the initial payment? These questions may feel cautious, but caution is often what keeps a financial setback from becoming a crisis.

Pay attention to taxes and paperwork

Another quiet habit of financially successful people is paying attention to tax. They understand that the amount earned is not the same as the amount kept. They keep records, claim lawful deductions where applicable and structure businesses or investments properly.

The quiet habits

For self-employed people and small-business owners, this can be especially important. Clear records of income, expenses, invoices and taxes are not merely administrative chores. They help owners understand whether a business is truly profitable and make it easier to obtain formal finance when needed.

This is not an argument for avoiding tax. It is an argument for understanding the rules, meeting obligations and using legitimate options available under the law. When in doubt, taxpayers should seek advice from a qualified professional.

The human side of money

The most important lesson is that wealth is rarely created by one dramatic decision. It is usually built through repeated small choices: saving before spending, avoiding unnecessary debt, learning before investing, and staying patient when others are chasing quick gains.

A literature review of household finance supports this practical view. Studies consistently associate financial literacy, planning, self-control and budgeting with better saving and investment decisions. At the same time, the research warns that financial outcomes are shaped by income, access to formal financial services and economic conditions—not simply by individual discipline.

That matters in Sri Lanka, where many households are working hard simply to meet daily needs. Advice about wealth should never become blame. Not everyone starts with the same income, family support or opportunity.

But the habits that strengthen financial resilience are available in some form to most people: keep records, build a buffer, question easy-money promises, borrow carefully and make decisions based on long-term goals rather than short-term appearances. (See table)

Wealth may not always look glamorous. Often, it looks like an emergency fund nobody sees, an investment made patiently, a loan avoided, and a family that sleeps more peacefully because it has planned ahead.

(Prof. C. A. Saliya, is a charted accountant, academic, researcher and former banker. He is the author of SAMAJA GAVESHAKAYA and Springer Publication DOING SOCIAL RESEARCH. He can be contacted at saliya.ca@gmail.com. The views expressed in this article are his own and do not necessarily represent those of the organisations with which he is affiliated.)

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Tusker Kavantissa’s death exposes Sri Lanka’s wildlife conservation crisis

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Kavantissa

by Prof. Ranjith Bandara,
Emeritus Professor, University of Colombo

This article examines why community exclusion, excessive bureaucratic control, unequal distribution of conservation benefits, weak institutional accountability, and short-sighted political leadership continue to undermine wildlife conservation in Sri Lanka.

The death of Tusker Kavantissa is more than the loss of one of Sri Lanka’s most remarkable wild elephants. It exposes uncomfortable questions about how we protect our natural heritage, how conservation decisions are made, and why repeated warnings have failed to produce meaningful reforms. His death should compel us to examine not only what happened to one extraordinary animal, but also the deeper weaknesses in our wildlife conservation system.

Tusker Kavantissa, one of Sri Lanka’s most prominent wild tuskers, died on 16 October, 2026, after receiving veterinary treatment for an injury, reportedly caused by gunfire. Although the wound had shown some improvement, his health subsequently deteriorated. The precise cause of death requires confirmation through a proper post-mortem examination. Nevertheless, the circumstances raise serious questions about preventive protection, wildlife management, and institutional preparedness.

The wider picture is equally disturbing. According to recently reported figures, Sri Lanka has lost an average of approximately 402 elephants and 138 people annually, since 2019, due to human–elephant conflict. These figures reflect a continuing national tragedy affecting both wildlife and rural communities.

What Sri Lanka faces today is not merely a wildlife conservation problem. It is also a crisis of environmental governance, shaped by institutional weaknesses, political decisions, and the failure to recognise the economic and social realities of conservation.

Conservation without communities

One of the fundamental weaknesses of our conservation approach is that local communities are often treated as subjects of regulation rather than partners in conservation. They are expected to bear the risks, respect restrictions, and cooperate with government programmes, yet their influence over decisions affecting their lives remains limited.

For rural families living alongside wild elephants, conservation is not an abstract environmental objective. It directly affects their safety, agricultural income, property, and everyday lives.

Farmers frequently possess valuable knowledge about elephant movements, vulnerable locations, seasonal changes, and practical protection measures. Yet conservation interventions are sometimes designed without adequately considering this experience.

When decisions are imposed from above, communities may feel excluded from programmes they are expected to support. This weakens trust, reduces cooperation, and ultimately undermines conservation outcomes.

We must recognise that protecting elephants and protecting farmers are not conflicting objectives. Both are essential. A conservation policy that safeguards wildlife while neglecting human security cannot be considered successful.

The real challenge is to replace conservation imposed on communities with conservation undertaken alongside them. Meaningful participation requires more than consultation meetings. Communities must have a genuine role in planning, implementing, monitoring, and evaluating conservation activities.

Bureaucratic authority versus public accountability

Wildlife conservation requires strong institutions, professional expertise, and effective regulations. However, excessive bureaucratic control can become an obstacle when administrative authority takes precedence over practical outcomes.

Decision-making in Sri Lanka’s conservation system remains heavily dependent on central institutions. Administrative procedures, overlapping responsibilities, and limited coordination can delay responses to urgent problems.

More importantly, excessive centralisation can discourage local innovation and prevent communities from contributing practical solutions.

When administrative authority becomes more important than results, conservation risks becoming an exercise in controlling people rather than protecting nature.

This criticism should not be confused with questioning the dedication of frontline wildlife officers and veterinarians. Many work under difficult conditions with limited resources. The efforts undertaken to save Tusker Kavantissa deserve recognition.

However, individual commitment cannot compensate indefinitely for institutional weaknesses.

We must ask whether our conservation institutions have the capacity to identify risks early, protect vulnerable animals, coordinate emergency responses, and evaluate the effectiveness of their interventions.

Public accountability should, therefore, extend beyond compliance with administrative procedures to measurable conservation outcomes.

Who bears costs, and who receives benefits?

Perhaps the most neglected dimension of wildlife conservation in Sri Lanka is the unequal distribution of its economic costs and benefits.

Wild elephants contribute substantially to tourism, biodiversity, cultural heritage, and the country’s international image. Their conservation generates benefits enjoyed by society as a whole.

Yet the financial and personal costs are concentrated among rural communities living within elephant habitats.

A study published in 2023, involving 300 farming households in southern Sri Lanka, revealed a striking imbalance. Although these households lived near two national parks, none received economic benefits from tourism. Meanwhile, 57 percent had experienced elephant-related crop damage.

The findings raise a fundamental economic question: if the entire country benefits from elephant conservation, why should a relatively small and vulnerable section of society bear a disproportionate share of its costs?

Conservation cannot remain economically sustainable when its benefits are widely enjoyed but its costs are concentrated among those least able to bear them.

A separate study, published in 2024, involving 439 affected farming households, examined the possibility of financing compensation through tourism revenue. It demonstrated the potential for tourism-based financial mechanisms to support human–elephant coexistence.

The policy implications are significant

A proportion of wildlife tourism revenue could be directed towards affected communities through transparent benefit-sharing arrangements. Such measures could support compensation, village protection, local employment, community enterprises, and agricultural improvements.

However, financial compensation alone is insufficient. The 2023 study also indicated that fear of elephants and concerns about crop damage strongly influenced community attitudes. People must feel safe in their homes and farms, not merely receive payment after suffering losses.

Equitable benefit-sharing is, therefore, more than an act of generosity. It is an economic and social requirement for sustainable conservation.

Political decisions and absence of long-term vision

The weaknesses in wildlife conservation cannot be attributed solely to public officials. Political leadership must accept its share of responsibility.

Poor land-use planning, habitat fragmentation, obstruction of elephant movement corridors, and development decisions that inadequately consider environmental consequences have contributed to human–elephant conflict.

Political decisions made for immediate gains can create environmental and economic costs lasting for decades.

Another weakness is the preference for visible, short-term interventions.

Constructing electric fences, relocating elephants, and launching emergency operations can attract considerable publicity. However, such interventions should be evaluated according to their effectiveness, not their visibility.

Political leadership should be judged not by the number of conservation programmes announced, but by the lives protected, conflicts prevented, and long-term improvements achieved.

There is also a serious problem of policy continuity. Conservation cannot be governed according to electoral cycles or changing political priorities.

Elephant habitats, migration patterns, and ecological processes do not change with governments. Successful conservation, therefore, requires consistent national commitments extending beyond individual political administrations.

Without such continuity, public investment may be wasted while the underlying problems remain unresolved.

Problem is not always a lack of policy

Sri Lanka’s conservation crisis cannot be explained simply by a shortage of scientific knowledge or policy recommendations.

In many instances, the greater challenge lies in translating available knowledge into coordinated, adequately funded, and politically supported action.

The National Action Plan for the Mitigation of Human–Elephant Conflict, prepared in 2020, proposed a science-based approach that emphasised community participation, protection of villages and agricultural land, and more effective conflict-management strategies.

Yet an important question remains: how much of this plan has been implemented successfully?

Have implementation difficulties arisen from inadequate resources, weak institutional coordination, administrative resistance, or insufficient political commitment?

An independent assessment of the plan’s implementation would help identify these obstacles and establish clear responsibilities.

We must also recognise that a substantial proportion of Sri Lanka’s wild elephants live outside protected areas. Attempting to confine all elephants within national parks and forest reserves is, therefore, neither realistic nor sustainable.

Effective conservation requires land-use policies informed by elephant ecology, settlement patterns, agricultural needs, and the practical realities of human–wildlife coexistence.

A sound policy that remains largely unimplemented offers little protection to either elephants or people.

Towards more responsible conservation system

Sri Lanka needs a fundamental change in how wildlife conservation is governed.

Four priorities deserve immediate attention.

First, local communities must become genuine partners in conservation management, with meaningful responsibilities and decision-making opportunities.

Second, conservation benefits must be distributed more fairly. Wildlife tourism should contribute directly to protecting the livelihoods and safety of communities that bear conservation costs.

Third, existing national conservation plans should be independently reviewed to identify implementation gaps and establish a realistic timetable for corrective action.

Fourth, conservation institutions must become more accountable for measurable outcomes, including reductions in human deaths, elephant mortality, crop losses, and property damage.

These reforms require cooperation among wildlife, forestry, agriculture, land, irrigation, and local government institutions.

They also demand political leadership willing to prioritise long-term results over short-term publicity.

For exceptional animals, such as Tusker Kavantissa, improved risk monitoring, preventive protection, and timely veterinary responses are particularly important. However, conservation should not be limited to protecting a few well-known animals.

Every wild elephant has ecological value, just as every person living alongside elephants has an equal right to safety.

The objective must be a system that protects both.

Lesson tusker Kavantissa leaves behind

The death of Tusker Kavantissa should not become another moment of national sorrow that gradually fades from public memory. It should mark a turning point in how Sri Lanka approaches wildlife conservation.

A proper investigation into his death is essential. Equally important is an honest examination of the conservation system within which such tragedies continue to occur.

The real challenge is not choosing between people and elephants. It is creating a system in which both can coexist safely, and where the responsibilities, costs, and benefits of conservation are shared fairly.

This requires more than scientific expertise and stronger regulations. It demands accountable institutions, meaningful community participation, economic fairness, and political leadership guided by a clear long-term vision.

Our greatest failure would not be the loss of Tusker Kavantissa alone. It would be allowing the same weaknesses in our conservation system to claim more lives while we continue to avoid the reforms that could prevent them.

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Equality before the Law as foundation of Sri Lanka’s recovery

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Gnanasara Thera brought to court, dressed in lay attire

by Jehan Perera

The government appears set to overcome the first major challenge to one of its foundational principles. It has faced down demands from sections of the Buddhist clergy and opposition parties to release Ven. Galagodaatte Gnanasara from his prison sentence for contempt of court.

Ven Gnanasara is best known as the general secretary of the Bodu Bala Sena, a nationalist Sinhala grouping. The government seemed unfazed by a protest march organised by Buddhist monks and the opposition parties and its supporters organised an even bigger march to support the government’s position. It is notable that the general population did not get involved in either march in any substantial number. The issue has now become a test of whether the government will uphold its commitment to apply the law equally, irrespective of a person’s position or status, even when doing so brings it into conflict with a powerful constituency.

The case has a specific legal history. Ven. Gnanasara was sentenced to six years’ imprisonment by the Court of Appeal in 2018 for contempt of court in a case involving former military personnel where he disrupted the proceedings. The Supreme Court rejected his appeal in 2018. Former President Maithripala Sirisena subsequently granted him a presidential pardon in 2019. Last month, the Supreme Court invalidated that pardon. The initial demand by Buddhist monks and their lay supporters was that Ven. Gnanasara should be permitted to wear his Buddhist robes when appearing in public before the courts. The government has indicated its willingness to examine the procedures governing the treatment of Buddhist monks in prison, in consultation with the relevant religious authorities. However, the initial demand has now been escalated into a demand for a presidential pardon.

One of the central promises of the National People’s Power (NPP) during its election campaign two years ago was to apply the law equally to all. This commitment has shaped the government’s approach to allegations of corruption and criminality involving individuals who previously wielded political power. The NPP government was swept into power on a wave of antipathy towards those in previous governments who were perceived to have abused their positions for private gain. The economic collapse Sri Lanka experienced in 2022, and the hardships endured across society, remain vivid in the public memory. The past two years have seen the government pursuing those accused of corruption and other offences. Several high-ranking members of previous governments have faced arrest and legal proceedings and been sentenced to jail.

Religious Concerns

The ability of opposition parties to mobilise widespread resistance against proceedings involving their leaders has been limited, as much of the general population continues to favour accountability for past financial crimes. However, the case of Ven. Gnanasara is different. It does not concern allegations of financial corruption, but the relationship between religious authority, the courts and the law of the land. This is where the distinction between respecting religious traditions and upholding the law becomes crucial. There is a sense among sections of the general population that Buddhist monks should not be treated on a par with others and that requiring Ven. Gnanasara to appear in court without his robes was unjust and contrary to the national ethos. Such sentiments reflect the special place Buddhism occupies in Sri Lanka’s history and society. Sinhala Buddhist nationalism has been a potent political force throughout the country’s history, drawing on a heritage that extends back more than two millennia. The question is whether respect for Buddhism needs to also entail the exemption of individual monks from the ordinary requirements of the law and thereby treat them differently.

The challenge would be to accommodate legitimate religious concerns through rational and lawful procedures without allowing religious status to become a source of legal privilege. The government has been amenable to addressing the issue of monastic robes, but has so far resisted the demand to release Ven. Gnanasara through a new pardon. President Anura Kumara Dissanayake and government members have made it clear that the government would not bend the law to accommodate any individual. They have taken the position that any shortcomings in existing rules should be addressed by changing the rules through proper procedures, rather than by making an exception for a particular individual. If the government holds its position, it will demonstrate that its commitment to the rule of law extends even to constituencies that have historically enjoyed considerable political influence.

This is important not only for the country’s democratic institutions but also for its economic future. Sri Lanka is seeking to recover from its economic collapse and establish the foundations for sustained growth. The International Monetary Fund’s analysis of Sri Lanka’s governance weaknesses has repeatedly emphasised the economic costs of corruption and institutional deficiencies. Its 2024 analysis of governance and growth concluded that comprehensive and coherent reforms could bring significant macroeconomic benefits. The IMF’s 2025 assessment also highlighted the importance of sustained governance reforms in unlocking the country’s growth potential. Investors, both domestic and foreign, need confidence that public institutions function according to predictable rules, that contracts and property rights are protected, and that political connections or social status will not determine how the law is applied.

Sensitive Issue

Sri Lanka has long sought the leap towards prosperity that has proved elusive under successive governments. Economic reform alone will not achieve it. The connection between the rule of law and economic prosperity is direct. Businesses are more likely to invest when they can expect disputes to be resolved fairly, public resources to be managed transparently and regulatory decisions to be made on rational grounds. No country can achieve a durable economic take-off if its institutions are perceived to operate according to political favour, inherited privilege or communal pressure. Sri Lanka cannot afford to return to a political culture in which powerful interests are shielded from accountability while ordinary citizens bear the costs.

Changing a political culture that has evolved over the decades if not centuries is a difficult undertaking, particularly in a country where political leaders have long relied on religious and communal identities to consolidate their support. It requires not only firmness but also sensitivity, dialogue and a willingness to reform laws and institutions where genuine deficiencies exist. The present controversy offers an opportunity to demonstrate that these objectives need not be in conflict. The government can respect the Buddhist clergy’s concerns about the treatment of monks in prison while refusing to grant an individual an exemption from a judicial sentence. It can recognise the importance of Buddhism to the country while maintaining that no religious or political authority stands above the law.

The question is whether national traditions and ethos are interpreted in ways that strengthen justice, responsibility and social harmony, or invoked to defend privileges that undermine them. The country needs a transformation in public expectations from privilege to accountability, from communal claims to equal citizenship, and from personal discretion to institutions governed by law.

The government’s handling of the case involving Ven. Gnanasara is therefore about more than one monk or one sentence. This particular case will determine whether the government can build a system in which no government, religious authority or politically influential individuals can place themselves beyond the law. A just society must be able to honour both its traditions and its commitment to equality before the law.

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