Features
Pointers for our foreign policy in the coming new world
“The old world is dying, and the new world struggles to be born: now is the time of monsters”
Antonio Gramsci, (around 1930).
Reflection on W.B.Yeats poetry, composed in the immediate aftermath of World War I, during the Russian Revolution, and amid the Irish War of Independence:
“Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold;
Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world…
…And what rough beast, its hour come round at last,
Slouches towards Bethlehem to be born.” (The Second Coming, 1919).
This mood of apocalypse hangs over the world today, more than two months since the start of the US/Israel war against Iran, with no end in sight. Leaders speak of the old world order as “ruptured” ( Canadian Prime Minister at Davos), “bent” or “gone for good”(WTO Director-General Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala), so how should small developing countries navigate in the new era without the old framework of globalization, free trade, a rules based international order, reliance on UN led multilateralism?
The Canadian Prime Minister called for the middle powers to come together to offer an alternative global leadership, different coalitions for different issues based on common values and interests. Will this new global leadership benefit the developing countries? Despite the high rhetoric, we in Sri Lanka know that international human rights standards for instance, are applied selectively – Canada’s criticism of Sri Lanka’s conduct of its armed conflict has been coloured by their domestic politics where the Tamil migrant diaspora wields influence.
By contrast, the view from Beijing, which is receiving many high level visits these days, offers a more equitable stance on multilateralism emphasizing that developing countries should prioritize the right to economic development over civil and political liberties. Taking the lead, China has recently offered to remove tariffs on almost all African exports.
Some argue we should look to the past for guidance when Sri Lanka diplomacy “punched above our weight”. Yet, what is the relevance of discussing Sri Lanka’s leadership in the UN Law of the Sea Conference and on initiatives like IOPZ (Indian Ocean Peace Zone) when on March 4, a US nuclear submarine sank the Iranian Navy frigate IRIS Dena with a torpedo off our coast, causing over 100 deaths and leaving Sri Lanka to conduct a humanitarian operation search and rescue in the aftermath . In April, the US forces intercepted and fired upon the tanker Tifani carrying 300,000 tons of crude oil in the high seas, some 700 km south east of Sri Lanka. Where is the hope, let alone the guarantee of freedom of the high seas inscribed in UNCLOS art.87?
Why theorize endlessly over non-alignment and neutrality? As far back as 1956, SWRD Bandaranaike, the first Sri Lankan Prime Minister to address the UN General Assembly, suggested standards which still stand: “friendship towards all, enmity towards none,” and “dynamic neutralism,” advocating moral force over military power, peace, anti-colonialism and sovereignty.
NAM is still relevant as we see a less known principle being tested today in the Gulf countries which had hitherto sheltered under the US security umbrella. This NAM principle prohibits the joining of regional security arrangements and the stationing of foreign troops or foreign bases on your soil. Thus in 1957 the Sri Lanka government had abrogated the 1947 United Kingdom–Ceylon Defence Agreement, which had granted Britain access to military facilities including air and naval bases at Trincomalee, Katunayake (RAF Negombo), and Batticaloa. Some argue that Sri Lanka missed the opportunity to join ASEAN at its founding but at the time our leaders saw it as a regional security pact which targeted China.
Today, the stationing of foreign military personnel comes under the guise of the donation of defence equipment and needs for training/maintenance. Remember the controversy which broke recently over the Dornier aircraft project in the Maldives where some 67 foreign military personnel had to be recalled and replaced by technical personnel. Sri Lanka also has a Dornier project but how many foreign military personnel are attached and for how long, is not known, since recent bilateral defence agreements with India are shrouded in secrecy. Is it not preferable to try to build some consensus in Parliament with the Opposition on such vital agreements instead of secrecy which only builds suspicion and resentment of the Big Neighbour?
Foreign policy making in any integrated far- sighted manner has been crippled by the never ending natural and man-made disasters that have hit this island, a 30-year armed conflict, a tsunami, covid, economic bankruptcy. Yet Sri Lanka has emerged from it all due to its national resilience systems and sustained cooperation with the international community. It has continued to provide examples on development, from its universal health and education systems to a unique experiment today to reduce the size of the Cabinet of Ministers. Thus Vijitha Herath is the first Foreign Minister to also head key Ministries of Foreign Employment and Tourism. This experiment where the aim is to curtail expenditure and simplify Ministerial lifestyles is welcomed by foreign donors. However the problem is that it comes at the cost of efficiency.
This style of government requires a frank admission of our diminished ability to project power abroad even as the economic crisis and domestic needs are shrinking our diplomatic footprint. A sign of this is that professional diplomats heading key posts in Paris, Berlin and Beijing are returning home at the end of their terms while new appointments, defying the diplomatic convention, are still awaited.
Under these circumstances, can we expect a far-sighted independent foreign policy to take shape? Should we not accept the alternative of flexible forms of cooperation to prevail, “bandwagoning” or “hedging” with states as and when the need arises.
Yet, going into this new era, one thing is certain, Sri Lanka must first move towards a stronger domestic economy and national self reliance. Facing the “largest energy crisis in history” (Fatih Birol ,the head of IEA (the International Energy Agency) , the prioritization of energy and food security, trade and finance arrangements reducing the foreign leverage that enables coercion, sustainable development to face the global climate crisis, has to come to the forefront of domestic policy making , which will shape foreign policy.
In fact, some positive results have already emerged in Sri Lanka. On energy, the crisis in the Gulf has led the government to take action to reduce dependence on costly fossil fuels and harness natural resources such as the renewables, hydro, wind and solar. Finally the government has taken the policy decision to move on storage, commissioning the 12 new battery storage BESS projects with a domestic firm. This may lead to decentralizing the power grid and sharing of power within the country, enhancing energy self sufficiency without looking to foreign firms to build huge power plants and costly plans for electricity sharing through building a grid or under sea pipelines with the Big Neighbour.
As vigils gather to remember the 40th anniversary of the Chernobyl disaster, the worst nuclear plant accident the world has known, another major policy decision should be applauded, this government’s refusal of the nuclear power plant offer by Russia, heeding our local scientists who warn that the risks far outweigh the advantages.
What of the plans for a Trinco oil hub? Sri Lanka certainly needs to make better use of the Trinco tank farm given the present limited fuel storage at Kolonnawa and Muthurajawela. Yet why is refurbishing more of the tanks being coupled with the costly building of an oil pipeline to India? Such a pipeline laid through sensitive marine environments runs the risk of either accidental or deliberate sabotage. Who will pay for such damage, jeopardizing our domestic fisheries and tourism with adverse impacts lasting several generations?
This line of thinking would be heresy to some who argue that our future lies in linking up with our nearest Big Neighbour under a “connectivity” agenda. But while remaining grateful to India’s quick support to our requests in times of humanitarian need, we must think clearly of our own national interest in any investment or cooperation partnership. Already Indian foreign investment is capturing Sri Lankan companies and strategic port assets from the Adani joint cooperation in the Colombo Port to the more recent take over of Colombo Dockyard by India’s state-owned Mazagon Dock.
Colombo Dockyard which was a regional player and has been building ships and yachts for Europe and earning dollars – will it be now reduced to repairing dredging vessels and being paid in Indian rupees? The currency exchange scheme with India apparently is still one way, that is Indians can pay Indian rupees for goods and services in Sri Lanka but it seems Sri Lankans cannot pay for goods and services in India with Sri Lankan rupees. Direct currency exchange agreements are useful when reciprocal, avoiding the costly intermediary of the US dollar, an example being the old Asian Currency Union where Sri Lanka is able to settle outstanding balances by the end of the month.
On trade, many have been calling for Sri Lanka to enter into more free trade agreements (FTA) to address the current crisis by boosting exports. While the search for new markets must continue and exporters should be supported by the government, should they not first look into whether existing FTAs are fulfilling their goals? The Indian FTA for example is often shown as a success because bilateral trade had grown by leaps and bounds since it came into operation in 2000. Yet closer examination has shown that 80% of bilateral trade with India is conducted outside the FTA apparently due to non-tariff barriers, customs and regulatory forces as well as the unavoidable block at the nearest point, the Tamil Nadu factor.
Does the final solution lie in our building consensus on domestic policy despite the inherited system of confrontational politics? Our Nordic friends once pointed to the seating in our parliament which pits the Government against the Opposition, in contrast with the Nordic tradition of seating members according to the regions to promote cooperation within the region and planning together for the future. In this context, the recent decision to appoint a leading member of the Opposition as head of the Cricket Board is welcome. The new Board will be tested by the legal challenges to building a cricket stadium for Jaffna on Nanditivu island. This should be re-located to save Nanditivu’s pristine environment, special biodiversity and people’s traditional livelihoods.
(Sarala Fernando retired from the Foreign Ministry as Additional Secretary, her last Ambassadorial appointment was as Permanent Representative to the UN and International Organizations in Geneva. Her Ph.D was on India-Sri Lanka relations and she writes now on foreign policy, public diplomacy and protection of heritage).
by Dr. Sarala Fernando
Features
Coercive laws recipe for future misrule
by Jehan Perera
The NPP government is going after powerful figures from the past and present who have engaged in corruption, fraud and criminal activity in a way that no previous government in Sri Lanka has done. Former ministers, politicians and senior state officials are among those facing investigations and legal proceedings. The government has placed before Parliament a document listing 50 cases involving corruption, fraud and other crimes. These include not only financial offences but also cases relating to the Easter Sunday attacks, the killings of Lasantha Wickrematunge and Wasim Thajudeen, the disappearance of Prageeth Ekneligoda and attacks on journalists Keith Noyahr and Upali Tennakoon.
The significance of this effort is that it can demonstrate that nobody is above the law, regardless of political connections or social standing, which will help restore public confidence in institutions that have long been distrusted. It could also recover public resources, improve the investment climate and strengthen the foundations for a more prosperous and just Sri Lanka. When criticised for focusing on the past and not the present, the government position is that these investigations were initiated under earlier governments, particularly between 2015 and 2019, and that it is now allowing investigators to proceed to deal with the backlog without political interference.
But there is an aspect of the government’s approach that is less justifiable. While pursuing past wrongdoing by powerful individuals, it is also advancing a triumvirate of draft laws that could give the state sweeping powers over citizens, organisations and dissent in the present and future. The draft Prevention of Terrorism legislation, the Prevention of Organised Crimes Bill and the NGO Registration and Supervision Bill raise serious questions about the over-centralisation of power. Each of these laws strengthens the powers of the state while weakening the rights and safeguards that protect people from their misuse and thus questions the basic rights of people in democracy where ‘the power of the people is vested in the government’. This is a recipe for future misrule rather than the rule of law. As the well-known saying goes, power corrupts and absolute power corrupts absolutely.
Proposed Laws
The real test of system change, for which the government obtained an overwhelming mandate, requires not only a government willing to hold others accountable, but one prepared to subject itself to the same principles of legality, transparency and restraint. The three proposed laws that are particularly important in this regard are the Protection of the State from Terrorism Bill, the Prevention of Organised Crimes Bill and the NGO Registration and Supervision Bill. Each of these draft laws has been presented as serving a legitimate purpose. Preventing terrorism, combating organised crime and ensuring that NGOs do not facilitate money laundering or terrorist financing are proper responsibilities of the state. Sri Lanka has international obligations in these areas, and no responsible government can disregard them. However, the existence of a legitimate objective does not justify every means adopted to achieve it.
The proposed Protection of the State from Terrorism Bill illustrates the problem. Although its definition of terrorism draws on a model developed by a former United Nations Special Rapporteur, the Human Rights Commission of Sri Lanka has warned that the definition of terrorism extends beyond the model and could bring legitimate political protest, trade union action and civil disobedience within the scope of counter-terrorism legislation. Its concerns also include prolonged detention, inadequate judicial oversight and restrictions on access to legal counsel. These are objections that go to the heart of the relationship between the citizen and the state. The government cannot credibly promise to protect democratic freedoms while creating powers that could be used to restrict them. It is necessary for the government to reassess the draft through transparent consultation and revise provisions that could criminalise legitimate dissent.
The Prevention of Organised Crimes Bill raises similar concerns. It is presented as giving effect to the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organised Crime, which Sri Lanka ratified in 2006. The Centre for Policy Alternatives (CPA) has argued that the convention does not require many of the bill’s provisions. The proposed law extends to a broad range of offences, permits detention orders lasting up to a year, makes confessions to police admissible for purposes of legal evidence, and introduces extensive surveillance powers. A law intended to dismantle criminal networks should not create a parallel system of exceptional powers that could be applied far beyond organised crime. Nor should safeguards developed through years of experience with abuses under the Prevention of Terrorism Act be weakened through legislation bearing a different name. The government should review whether or not existing laws could be used effectively to control these crimes or whether each exceptional power is necessary.
Civil Society
The proposed NGO Registration and Supervision Bill presents another test of the government’s intentions. The government may reasonably seek transparency in the finances of organisations receiving public or foreign funds, including measures to prevent money laundering and terrorist financing. It seeks to justify its overreach on the grounds of meeting the internationally mandated requirements of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) for the Asia-Pacific region. But these objectives do not justify placing civil society and NGOs under excessive administrative control when even the FATF ranks them as low to medium risks. The draft bill would require registration and renewal, impose extensive obligations on organisations and empower authorities to suspend or deregister them on broadly framed grounds. It is important to redraft provisions that confer excessive discretion over registration, renewal, suspension and deregistration of NGOs.
Among the concerns raised by United Nations human rights special rapporteurs with regard to the draft NGO law are provisions requiring organisations to align with government policies and restrictions that could affect advocacy, dissent and freedom of association. The implications extend well beyond organisations that engage directly with the government. Community groups, human rights organisations, independent researchers and organisations working on reconciliation or accountability could find their activities constrained by uncertainty over how these provisions might be interpreted. Organisations that criticise government policies are not thereby working against the country. Their freedom to do so is part of what distinguishes a democracy from a system in which the government determines which opinions and activities are acceptable.
The government has generated considerable public goodwill through its pursuit of corruption and criminality. It should not assume that this goodwill gives it an unlimited mandate to strengthen the coercive powers of the state. The NPP knows from its own history that governments can treat dissent as a threat and use the machinery of the state against their opponents. There is still time to correct the drafts through transparent public consultation, narrow definitions of offences, meaningful judicial control over detention and surveillance, and effective remedies against arbitrary decisions. A government that pursues corruption while weakening safeguards against state abuse risks undermining its own achievements. Besides bringing to light the abuse of power by previous governments, the NPP government needs to build a system in which no future government can abuse power in the belief they can get away with it.
Features
Quality assurance without quality enhancement: The irony of university QA
By Ramya Kumar
According to the Quality Assurance Council (QAC) of the University Grants Commission (UGC), quality assurance (QA) refers to “the means (i.e. the policies, attitudes, actions, procedures, etc.), by which an institution can guarantee with confidence and certainty, that the standards and quality of its educational provision are being maintained and enhanced”.
An expansive structure has been in place since 2005 to govern and implement QA processes within the state university system. The QAC is the focal point at the UGC that implements external reviews of state universities and institutes. Each university has its own Centre for Quality Assurance (CQA) tasked with performing QA in line with QAC directives. Faculties, in turn, have Internal Quality Assurance Cells (IQAC) performing their own QA; they are answerable to the CQA.
The big question is whether this all-encompassing top-down QA system, that in many ways undermines the internal dynamics of university governance, actually supports universities to enhance the quality of education. This article highlights some concerns.
Top-down check-box activities
The QAC conducts external reviews of universities and degree programmes. A review team appointed by the UGC (who may or may not have experience in the institution/programme in question) examines the self-evaluation report submitted by the said institution/programme. The team then conducts a site visit to verify the claims made in the university’s self-evaluation report, clarify issues identified during the desk review, and examine how QA procedures operate in practice. The team holds meetings with the university administration, members of the Council and Senate, Deans, Heads of Departments, academic and non-academic staff, students, and others. Following the visit, a draft report is submitted to the relevant institution/programme for comment before final publication. The reviewed institution/programme then prepares and publishes an action plan addressing the recommendations, with subsequent monitoring of progress.
There are some worthy QA initiatives under implementation, such as improving facilities for students with disabilities and strengthening mechanisms to address sexual- and gender-based violence. However, for the most part, QA activities have little to do with improving the quality of education. They are mostly preoccupied with monitoring faculty and department websites, digital transformation, student feedback, subject evaluation, course evaluation, peer evaluation, and, more recently, staff appraisal. These activities, which consume an inordinate amount of time—so precious at understaffed universities—have become check-box activities completed to generate evidence for the next review. Below is an excerpt of a conversation between two academics (1 and 2) that conveys how QA plays out at universities (reproduced with permission).
1: … .it’s like social media you know, like posting things on Facebook or twitter or Instagram. When people do a lot of social media, everything they do, they do thinking, “okay I’m going to post it in this way… this I have to put on my Instagram.” QA is a little like that… everything is considered in light of, “ah we can use this for the review, as evidence… for example very recently we were encouraged to have all the things that we do in our department in the faculty newsletter so then they can put in the review. Every little thing has to be noted down….
2: And with pictures and all…
1: At the very least it has to be written so that you have written evidence .. you can’t be doing something for the sake of doing something or because it is good for the department … and sometimes people tell me “oh yea that’s a good idea we can fit that under this x, y section of the review..”
2: Yea, and nobody really thinks about the actual outcome… whether it’s actually helping anyone..
1: I also find that a lot of the words that we used in different ways have now been co-opted to the QA discourse ..including quality.. I can’t actually say what I want as an “outcome”, for example, that the outcome of this workshop is that my students “think about” … then I am told “ah but no that’s not one of the Bloom’s taxonomy words, “think about”.…
2: And the worst part is these medical and agriculture people, these types of people go around spreading it like some kind of gospel!
1: Yea, this cookie cutter way of doing things, they think is the height of innovativeness or creativity, when actually it is so mundane … for me the most awful thing about it is like some fungus of mundanity has taken over through QA reviews.
2: yea, when you say QA, my mind closes off immediately and I stop listening…
Auditing everything but power
QA leaves out crucial aspects of university governance. For instance, there is no review or assessment of the “quality” of university administrations under Criterion 1 or the integrity of procedures governing the promotion of academic staff under Criterion 6 of the institutional reviews.
The majority in the Council—the university’s executive and governing body, which is responsible for selecting the Vice-Chancellor (VC)—are appointed in ad hoc fashion. Apart from the Ex-Officio members in the Council (VC, Deans, etc.), and the two members elected by the Senate, the remainder are appointed by the UGC with no formal consultation or vetting procedure. The VC appointment process described in UGC Circular No. 03/2023 exemplifies how an ostensibly technical process can become entangled in political sycophancy. The Registrar invites applications for the position of VC through advertisement. Applicants must submit a curriculum vitae, a statement of vision for the university and supporting documents. The University Council appoints a three-member Search Committee of senior academics to encourage “eminent persons” to apply, while the UGC appoints a former VC from another university to “observe” the selection process.
A Special Meeting of the University Council is convened. Candidates are interviewed and must make a presentation to the Council Members, followed by questions. Each Council member “gives marks” for seven prescribed criteria: strategic focus (20%), effective leadership (20%), holistic thinking/conceptual skills (10%), academic and research excellence (15%), personal integrity (10%), professional communication (10%) and managerial competence (15%). Marks are averaged, and the Council recommends three candidates to the UGC in rank order. The UGC-appointed observer separately submits a confidential report on the selection process.
This procedure is expected to guarantee quality, but does it? Applications are submitted to the Council Members, who have been appointed on questionable bases, and who are expected to review the applications and give scores, based on objective assessments. But, in reality, most Council Members are manipulated by VC candidates, who often have personal ties with them. The UGC-appointed observer usually has no genuine interest in the outcome. And there is no way for anyone to actually question the Council’s decision once it is made. Although the highest-ranked candidate may ultimately be appointed, the selection remains a political decision made by the President, who retains the discretion to appoint any one of the three.
External reviews also do not look into the promotions of academic staff, except to scrutinise whether there are policies and procedures in place to govern promotion. Academic staff may apply for promotion to Professor once they satisfy the prescribed eligibility requirements, which typically include the period of service, academic qualifications, research and publication achievements, teaching experience, and contributions to the university and wider community. Applications are evaluated against specified criteria, with research output and academic contributions assessed through documentary evidence and expert evaluation. Under the UGC’s scheme for Professors, two experts from outside the applicant’s institution assess specified aspects of research and knowledge dissemination. Again, beneath this technical process, which is externally evaluated, lies a problematic points-based scheme that can be manipulated and abused with impunity.
Rethinking university QA
Like the VC election process and the schemes of promotion for academic staff, QA reviews are open to manipulation. Before a review, there is a chaotic rush to complete evidence gathering and reporting. Academics leave all other work aside, including at times their teaching, to focus on completing documentation and preparing reports. The standardised criteria in the review manuals and scoring sheets often do not reflect differences in disciplines and institutional contexts. But this does not really matter because any serious problems experienced by institutions or programmes are hastily brushed under the carpet to conceal any evidence that could taint the review. The goal is to obtain an A or at least a B grade at whatever cost.
QA may result in positive change if it moves beyond top-down check-box activities towards internally designed and owned processes encompassing all aspects of university governance, led by departments and faculties, and supported by adequate resources. The current QA system needs to be dismantled and replaced by procedures that are accountable, not to the UGC, but to our students and the communities we serve.
(Ramya Kumar is attached to the Department of Community and Family Medicine, Faculty of Medicine, University of Jaffna)
. Kuppi is a politics and pedagogy happening on the margins of the lecture hall that parodies, subverts, and simultaneously reaffirms social hierarchies.
Features
Down Memory Lane — the Grand 20th Edition!
Yes, Down Memory Lane, the beloved Sing-Along concert series that first struck a chord, way back in 1997, returns for its landmark 20th edition this Saturday, 17th October, at the beautiful Bolgoda Grand Resort, Moratuwa town centre.
Having celebrated its glorious 25th anniversary with the show in 2023, this milestone 20th concert promises to be even more special.
The organisers, the ever-popular Moratuwa Arts Forum, are pulling out all the stops to present yet another unforgettable evening, brimming with camaraderie, fellowship, and pure nostalgia.
Get ready for two-and-a-half hours of non-stop singing as veteran vocalists, from the Moratuwa Arts Forum, will take the stage to lead and inspire the happy audience to sing, sing and sing to their hearts’ content.
The repertoire? Absolutely magical, according to the organisers.

Veteran Arun Dias Bandaranaike: Will handle the evening’s proceedings / Priya Peiris: Event Conceptor
Around 40 golden oldies — from timeless English vintage evergreens and hits from the 50s to the 90s, to toe-tapping calypsos, soulful American plantation melodies, rousing cowboy and Dixieland favourites, aa well as cherished Sinhala standards. All to be sung with much gusto!
This year’s dedicated organising committee comprises Brian Coorey (Chairman), Priya Peiris (Event Conceptor), Hiran Fernando, Suranga Fernando, Viranjan Perera, Hemka Fernando and Neelesh Silva. Guidance and support comes from Moratuwa Arts Forum President Sarana Guneratne and Secretary Chandani Silva.
Adding his signature charm to the evening, as Master of Ceremonies, will be the veteran Arun Dias Bandaranaike.
Don’t miss this landmark celebration of music and memories!
For further details, contact Hiran Fernando on 0772636446 or WhatsApp 0783636446.
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