Midweek Review

North: Focus on security, concerns over Vadamarachchi camp pullout

Published

2 years ago

2024/11/27

Political compulsions cannot override military requirements. A sensible government won’t give in to unfair demands, regardless of consequences. The Yahapalana government betrayed the war-winning armed forces when it co-sponsored a US-led accountability resolution in early Oct. 2015. Over the years, governments blundered when dealing with those spearheading the separatist project. President Ranasinghe Premadasa foolishly vacated strategically important camps during the 1989-1990 period thinking that it would help to win over the Tigers. The vacated camps included Point Pedro and Valvettiturai. Premadasa granted presidential pardon for convicted LTTE terrorists. Also in line with his overall flawed strategy, Premadasa facilitated the setting up of the political wing of the LTTE and funded the group to the time of Rs 125 mn during 1989-1990 period. Some of the funding was made available after the LTTE resumed hostilities in June 1990, following 14-month long honeymoon with the UNP leader.

Finally, he himself paid the supreme price for such follies when a Tiger suicide bomber, who had infiltrated his inner circle, carried out one of the most daring suicide attacks during the May Day celebrations of 1993 in Colombo.

By Shamindra Ferdinando

SLPP National List MP Namal Rajapaksa, on Nov. 20, expressed serious concerns over the planned vacation of an Army camp in the Jaffna peninsula. War-winning President Mahinda Rajapaksa’s eldest son and former Minister tweeted: “According to reports, an Army camp in the North has been withdrawn, for land to be released back to civilians, and many more such camps are to be withdrawn in the coming months. While the release of lands is not an issue, if it is done in consultation with the security forces, it should not be done at the cost of compromising national security. SL fought 30 years to defeat terrorism and today all communities enjoy freedom at the cost of thousands of lost lives. It is of utmost importance that national security is maintained, whether it is in the North or South.”

Contrary to his declaration, the strategically located detachment, a company headquarters of a Sinha Regiment battalion, hadn’t been vacated yet. A highly placed defence official told the writer, last weekend, that the military negotiated with landowners regarding the handing over of the camp. Negotiations that had been initiated during the tail end of Ranil Wickremesinghe’s presidency were finalized and the pullout would be completed in two weeks, the official said. Karkovalam is situated south of Point Pedro light house area.

Lawmaker Rajapaksa alluded the proposed removal of the camp to an understanding between President Anura Kumara Dissanayake’s National People’s Power (NPP) government and the Northern community, plus the Tamil Diaspora that enabled his party to secure all electoral districts in the Northern and Eastern provinces, except Batticaloa. Both lawmaker Rajapaksa and the defence official were referring to troops based at Karkovalam, near the coast of Manalkadu in Vadamaratchchy (north). The Navy maintains a base at Point Pedro, north of Karkovalam. The emphasis should also be on neutralizing smuggling operations across the Palk Straits.

Jaffna peninsula consists of three sectors, namely Waligamam, Thennamaratchchy and Vadamarachchi.

In a story headlined ‘Sri Lankan army camp in Jaffna ordered to disband after decades of occupation’, posted on Nov, 20, The Tamil Guardian declared the vacated three acres of land would be returned to its rightful owners. The Tamil Guardian claimed that: “It is the first move to dismantle the intense militarization of the Tamil homeland in years.”

Obviously, there hadn’t been any order in respect of the Karkovalam pullout. The whole exercise had been conducted in an orderly manner, through negotiations between the military and the landowners.

The SLPPer’s tweet, pertaining to Karkovalam pullout, should be examined taking into account the criticism directed at the NPP government over the opening of the Palali-Achchuveli main road that remained closed for over 15 years, after the successful conclusion of the war. Newly elected President Anura Kumara Dissanayake, who is also the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, in his capacity as the Defence Minister ordered the Palai-Achchuveli main road opened two weeks before the general election held on Nov. 14.

One cannot find fault with MP Rajapaksa for taking up the issue against the backdrop of the humiliating defeat suffered at the recently concluded general election. The only Rajapaksa in Parliament after the political tsunami brought the SLPP down to just three MPs (two elected and one appointed), the former Hambantota District lawmaker had no option but grab any opportunity to hog the limelight. Despite the humiliating performance at the two recent national polls, the SLPP won handsomely at the two preceding Presidential and General elections. Unfortunately, the SLPP took the massive mandates received on those occasions for granted.

The issue at hand is whether the NPP would pursue an agenda inimical to national security, as alleged by the SLPP and other interested parties. Did the opening of the Palali-Achchuveli main road, and the vacation of Karkovalam, undermined the overall security in the Jaffna peninsula?

The new government has been accused of bending backwards to appease the Northern community and the Tamil Diaspora. Interested parties took advantage of a congratulatory message issued by the influential Canadian Tamil Congress (CTC) on the NPP’s victory at the general election. The CTC dealt with six specific issues, including two that pertained to the deployment of the armed forces, and the security sector. Let me reproduce them verbatim:

(a) Restoration of Land Rights: The CTC called for the return of privately-owned lands in the Northern and Eastern provinces that are currently occupied by the military, as well as a cessation of illegal land acquisitions, to rebuild trust and restore rightful ownership.

(b) Reform of the Security Sector: The letter emphasized the need to align the military presence in the Northern and Eastern provinces with the rest of the country and to discontinue military involvement in commercial ventures, such as farming and hospitality, which hinder local businesses and farmers.

The presidential and general elections delivered a knockout blow to the Diaspora groups. The CTC is no exception. Actually, the CTC’s call to reduce the military presence in the Northern and Eastern areas is irrelevant. Such declarations are only meant to deceive the gullible public and appease those who cannot bear the LTTE’s defeat.

The war-winning Mahinda Rajapaksa government authorized the releasing of both state and privately-owned land in the Jaffna peninsula during Lt. Gen. Jagath Jayasuriya’s tenure as the Commander of the Army (15 July 2009 – 31 July 2013).

Gradual releasing of land continued throughout the post-conflict period as successive governments thinned military presence in the Northern and Eastern regions. Therefore, the opening of the Palali-Achchuveli main road, and vacation of Karkovalam, shouldn’t be a cause for unnecessary concern but considered in line with the government overall security posture.

Perhaps, the best way to promote post-war national reconciliation is countering unsubstantiated war crimes allegations that were utilized by the US to move an accountability resolution, targeting Sri Lanka, in early Oct. 2015. The treacherous Yahapalana government co-sponsored that resolution, thereby betraying the war-winning military and the political leadership. Whatever the shortcomings on the part of the Rajapaksas and those aligned with them, they cannot be deprived of the nation’s gratitude for sustaining the war effort in the face of daunting challenges, both domestic and external.

Pre-2005 Jaffna

Those who complain of saturation of the Northern and Eastern regions with military and police conveniently forget whichever political party that had been in power was compelled to face the LTTE’s conventional military challenge, as well as meticulously planned operations, conducted in areas under government control, in order to sow chaos.

At the time Eelam War IV erupted in the second week of August 2006, the largest deployment of troops was in the Jaffna peninsula, that was brought under government control during the 1995-1996 period. Karkovalam area had been captured during that period.

In 2006, the LTTE had approximately 15,000 square kms under its control in the Northern and Eastern regions and the group posed quite a significant threat to the government. Their main concentration of troops and firepower had been aimed at preventing the Army from trying to push southwards across the Muhamalai defence line. Jaffna military bases had been within the range of the LTTE’s long range artillery. The group had considerable firepower that overwhelmed the Army on many occasions, particularly those battalions deployed along Kilali-Muhamalai-Nagarkovil frontline before they were brought down to their knees during the Aug. 2006-May 2009 all-out campaign to defeat the might of the separatist LTTE.

The LTTE almost succeeded in overwhelming Jaffna during the 2000-2001 period but the military managed to stabilize the peninsula before Eelam war IV erupted in August. There had been four Divisions, plus troops, deployed in the peninsula, and two of them, 53 and 55 Divisions, joined large scale operations on the Vanni east front in late 2008. The combined armed forces brought the war to a successful conclusion in May 2009 against the assertions of pundits here and abroad.

Having eradicated the LTTE within three years, the winding down of security forces deployment began in the absence of an LTTE threat. Although some foreign governments and sections of media asserted that the LTTE could resume hit and run attacks and engagements were likely to continue for years, such a situation didn’t materialize. That was primarily due to over 12,000 cadres, both hardcore and child soldiers, surrendering to the advancing Army. The LTTE simply lacked the will, or the wherewithal, to engage the Army in hit and run attacks.

Had the LTTE retained at least a minor post-war ‘operational’ capacity, the gradual reduction of troops from the North and East could never have taken place. The Tamil community and the Tamil Diaspora should appreciate the total destruction of the LTTE that enabled the gradual disassembling of what can be described as ‘security structure’ in place in the North with the ending of the needless bloodshed.

Regardless of the restoration of civil administration, the government cannot, under any circumstances, lower its guard. The deployment of armed forces must be the exclusive prerogative of the government of the day.

Gradual decrease in strength

Rapid recruitment during Eelam War IV resulted in almost doubling of the Army’s strength. By the time the combined security forces eradicated the LTTE menace in May 2009, the regular and volunteer strength of the Army alone had been 205,000 officers and men. Now, the strength is down to 8,600 officers (both regular and volunteer) and 130,000 other rankers (both regular and volunteer). Of course, in the absence of war, there is no need to maintain wartime recruitment levels but the government must ensure sufficient strength necessary to meet any eventuality. The current political leadership, under no circumstances, should absolve itself of the responsibility for maintaining adequate strength in the armed forces to ensure that we do not go back to having mere ceremonial three branches of the armed forces wholly inadequate to take on any threat to the sovereignty of the nation.

During Wickremesinghe’s presidency, that government suddenly declared that the Army would be reduced to 135,000 by the end of 2024 and 100,000 by 2030. Perhaps, the NPP government should disclose its position on the previous government declarations.

Regardless of the developing political-economic-social challenges against the backdrop of bankruptcy, it would be the responsibility of the military top brass to brief the political leadership of the ground situation. Post-war national security requirements shouldn’t be looked at only on the basis of economic indicators. That would be suicidal. In other words, the country is in such a precarious situation, the political leadership may tend to conveniently ignore basics, especially to please various interested parties, thereby jeopardizing national security.

Declaration that the SLA would be reduced to 100,000 by 2030 means the total strength would be cut by half, from its peak.

Over 15 years after the conclusion of the war, the Jaffna peninsula remains the top priority with quite considerable strength assigned to the Vanni theatre. The NPP handsomely won the Jaffna and Vanni electoral districts at the general election but peace secured at a tremendous cost cannot be undermined.

At the height of the war, the overall Jaffna deployment, including islands, surpassed 45,000. But, troop levels had been gradually brought down though three infantry Divisions (51, 52 and 55) are deployed therein. The Army raised the 51 and 52 Divisions during CBK’s presidency to carry out ‘Operation Riviresa’ that brought the Jaffna peninsula under government control by 1996. The Army engaged in ‘Operation Jayasikurui’ struggling on the Vanni front, raised the 55 Division in Dec. 1996.

In the Vanni theatre, there are five Divisions (54, 21, 56, 59 and 64) and one of them is expected to be moved out soon. It would be pertinent to mention that the Vanni deployment covered three administrative districts, namely Vavuniya, Mannar and Mullaitivu.

Commenting on the planned Karkovalam pullout, a senior retired officer asserted that it could be viewed as part of a broader initiative by President Dissanayake’s government to return lands occupied by the military. The NPP move represents a significant step toward reconciliation though it elicited mixed reactions, the emeritus Maj. General said. He asserted that the government shouldn’t make hasty decisions by releasing lands in quick succession. “Instead, a detailed assessment of both present and future security threats should be conducted. Decisions regarding the removal of military bases should be carefully evaluated, while ensuring a robust reserve force is maintained for national security.”

Another senior officer, who had served with the Special Forces, asserted that new thinking was necessary. Referring to experience in the Vadamaratchchi sector, the veteran said that the overall deployment strategy should be changed with several large bases in strategic locations with the ability to carry out rapid deployment in case of an emergency.

There should be consensus that the new government should decide on further reductions taking into consideration both private and state land released since 2010. There is no doubt that Defence Secretary, retired AVM Sampath Thuiyakontha, wartime Commanding Officer of Mi-24 helicopter gunship squadron, and Deputy Defence Minister, retired Maj. General Aruna Jayasekara, would look into the entire gamut of issues pertaining to vacation of bases.

Those demanding that the military deployment in the Northern and Eastern regions align with the rest of the country shouldn’t forget that civilians would have been still in camps for the displaced if not for Sri Lanka’s triumph over terrorism. CTC or some other Diaspora grouping cannot decide on Sri Lanka’s defence needs as an economically weakened country shouldn’t risk its security by weakening the military.

The forthcoming Local Government polls will help the government to ascertain the developing situation. Having increased its tally at the general election just within weeks after the presidential poll, the NPP should tread carefully possible scenarios that could crop up not only in the Northern and Eastern regions but other areas as well.

Perhaps, the government should disclose the total land area vacated since the end of war 15 years ago. The understanding is that closer to 80 percent of land that had been once occupied by the military has already been released by successive governments. Those eternally upset about military presence must be reminded that the armed forces and police are the main blood donor in the North. Regardless of caste issues that are still paramount in that community, thousands of Tamils over the years during the war and after received blood donated by the country’s servicemen whenever there were requirements without any issues.

CFA factor

The Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) entered into in February 2002 among other objectives was meant to cunningly reduce the military strength, particularly in the Northern region. The UNP-led UNF had no sense of responsibility, therefore agreement was reached on reduction of military strength, and the proposed subsequent abolition of high security zones in the Jaffna peninsula, sent shock waves through the armed forces.

If not for the forthright stand taken by the then Jaffna Security Forces Commander Maj. Gen. Sarath Fonseka, the government may have had given up high security zones. Had that happened, our fate could have been different and the LTTE probably could have overwhelmed the Divisions deployed in the Jaffna peninsula.

How can we forget that in the wake of the Elephant Pass debacle in April 2000, the then government pleaded with India to evacuate the armed forces and police deployed in the Jaffna peninsula? Had India stepped in, that could have resulted in the breaking up of the country. The loss would have been irreversible. India’s refusal compelled the Army to fight back as there was absolutely no alternative but to face the enemy. In spite of considerable losses, the Army managed to halt the LTTE advance on Jaffna and slowly turn back the tide. They held on to new frontline at Muhamalai. Less than six years later, the Army transformed into a lethal fighting force that conducted offensive operations over a period of two years and 10 months until elusive Prabhakaran was killed on the banks of the Nanthikadal lagoon.

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Midweek Review

Opp. caught up in CIABOC offensive

Published

3 days ago

2026/06/24

Sahan Weerasooriya

Mahinda Rajapaksa leaving CIABOC on 12 June, 2026

The Commission to Investigate Allegations of Bribery or Corruption (CIABOC) on 12 June questioned former President Mahinda Rajapaksa regarding the USD 2 Mn bribe allegation directed at the late SriLankan CEO Kapila Chandrasena, whose body was found on 8 May in a close relative’s home in Kollupitiya. Chandrasena’s alleged suicide sent shock waves through political circles and interested parties questioned the circumstances leading to him being granted bail on 6 May on cash bail of Rs. 500,000 with three sureties of Rs. 10 million each. The Colombo Magistrate court also imposed a travel ban. The issue at hand is as to how Mohamed Riswan and Mohamed Irshan stood as sureties for Chandrasekera. Of all the investigations undertaken by the CIABOC, the USD 2 Mn bribe case is the most politically charged probe.

Of the Rajapaksas, former State Minister Shasheendra Rajapaksa is so far the last to be indicted. CIABOC on 19 June filed indictments before the Colombo High Court against him and two others Sepalika Saman Kumari and Keerthi Bandara Kotagama. According to the charges, the accused are alleged to have committed the offence of corruption and aided and abetted the commission of the offence by using official influence to pressure certain government officials, attached to the Office for Reparations, to obtain compensation amounting to Rs. 8.85 million for a property built on a state land by Shasheendra and destroyed by marauding Aragalaya mobs.

By Shamindra Ferdinando

The ruling National People’s Power (NPP) government last week emphasised, in no uncertain terms, that it wouldn’t tolerate the growing Opposition challenge.

Amidst the growing controversy over the continuing detention of retired Maj. Gen. Suresh Sallay. in terms of the draconian Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA), under humiliating conditions, in connection with the ongoing investigations into the 2019 Easter Sunday carnage, police arrested Sugeeshwara Bandara, leader of the New People’s Front (NPF). The Central Crime Investigation Bureau (CCIB) apprehended him on 18 June and the Fort Magistrate’s Court remended him till 1 July..

The CCIB also apprehended Binoy Hettiarachchi who was accompanying Bandara. Hettiarachchi served as a media coordinator at the former President Ranil Wickremesinghe’s Flower Road Office. Police intercepted their vehicle at Kollupitiya where the arrests were made like in an action-packed movie. Hettiarachchi was freed four hours later.

But, it would be better to identify Bandara as the former private secretary to President Gotabaya Rajapaksa as well as the Director General of Special Projects at the Presidential Secretariat in the wake of Ranil Wickremesinghe taking over the presidency.

Accused of receiving two salaries simultaneously, under the President’s Expenditure Head, Bandara who managed the media for Gotabaya Rajapaksa, in the run-up to the 2019 presidential election, is under investigation for abuse of government vehicles and employing government workers for political work.

Having launched his political career as the Colombo District organiser of the alliance New People’s Front, a breakaway faction of the UPFA, in February, 2024, Bandara contested the November, 2024, parliamentary polls on the New Democratic Front (NDF) ticket. But, of late, Bandara, as the leader of NPF, became one of the most active opposition activists, aligned with the political grouping, dubbed People’s United Opposition, operating from Ranil Wickremesinghe’s Flower Road Office.

Bandara drew the wrath of the government when he launched a noisy protest outside Finance Secretary Dr. Harshana Suriyapperuma’s residence at Akuregoda, Pelawatta, on 26 April, where he and his protesting supporters were given a shower of excreta. The group, led by Bandara, demanded the Finance Secretary’s resignation over the theft of USD 2.5 mn from the Treasury. No less a person than President Anura Kumara Dissanayake reacted angrily to Bandara’s actions.

Acknowledging the right for legitimate protests, the President warned against protests directed at residences of officials. On 18 April, Bandara led a protest outside Agriculture Minister K.D. Lal Kantha’s recently built luxury residence at Weliwita, Kaduwela, where he questioned how the JVPer managed to build such a home as he was on record as having repeatedly said that he lived a difficult life.

The police apprehended Bandara as he was returning from a meeting between senior representatives of the People’s United Opposition and the IMF Colombo at the Tiki Bar, Shangri-La. In spite of negligible parliamentary presence, with those elected on the NDF ticket at the last parliamentary election not really speaking in one voice, the Flower Road project has become a headache for the government.

In fact, the Flower Road operation has been causing continuous harassment to the NPP, while the Samagi Jana Balawegaya (SJB) struggled to play its anticipated role as the main Opposition. Instead of conducting a cohesive campaign against the cocky NPP government, members of the SJB seem to be pulling in different directions at the expense of the common opposition front.

Regardless of the Wickremesinghe-led grouping vowing to press ahead with its campaign, the arrest of Bandara is obviously meant to have a detrimental impact on the activities of the Opposition.

It would be pertinent to mention that Bandara had been among those who stayed with President Gotabaya Rajapaksa at the President’s House, in Colombo, as a massive protest erupted on 9 July, 2022. Bandara was among the last to flee the President’s House as the military withdrew, amidst mounting pressure on their positions.

The police arrested Bandara as former President Gotabaya Rajapaksa moved the Court of Appeal in terms of Article 140 of the Constitution to prevent him being arrested under the PTA. The wartime Defence Secretary sought the court intervention in the wake of police probing the 2019 Easter Sunday carnage and obtaining a travel ban against him.

The court heard Romesh de Silva PC’s submissions on behalf of the ex-President on 18 June. The court deferred the hearing to 24 June. The crux of the matter is that the ex-President fears that the CID is about to arrest him on the basis of a statement made by fugitive Azad Moulana, in Paris, linking Sallay directly with the Easter Sunday carnage.

NPP intensifies pressure

The NPP seems confident of its current course of action meant to pin down the Opposition. In spite of unbridled corruption being the major issue on the post-war election platform, no political party succeeded in going flat-out against the political opposition.

However, the NPP allowed the judicial process to continue. The first major sentencing was announced on 2 April, 2025, just six months after the parliamentary polls, handsomely won by the NPP. The Commission to Investigate Allegations of Bribery or Corruption (CIABOC) moved the Colombo High Court successfully against the former Chief Minister of the North Central Province S.M. Ranjith Samarakoon.

Colombo High Court No. 01 Judge Adithya Patabendige sentenced him in terms of Section 70 of the Bribery Act. The HC declared the former CM perpetrated malpractices by ordering fuel to his personal secretary’s vehicle. The personal secretary happened to be Shanthi Chandrasena, wife of his brother S.M. Chandrasena, a former Cabinet Minister and one of the most powerful Ministers to represent the North Central province.

The ex- Chief Minister and the second accused, his personal secretary, were convicted guilty of two charges. Both were sentenced to 16 years rigorous imprisonment and were also ordered to pay a fine of Rs. 200,000/- with an additional two-year prison term in case of default.

Deputy Director General Asitha Anthoney appeared on behalf of the Commission to Investigate Allegations of Bribery or Corruption.

There had never been any really coordinated CIABOC campaign against corruption. No political party, or a particular family, felt threatened by CIABOC. Both those in and outside Parliament acted with impunity. They feared no one. There was no need to be because the powerful and the influential operated above the law.

Just a couple of weeks after sentencing of S.M. Ranjith Samarakoon and Shanthini Chandrasena, the CIABOC arrested the latter’s husband, one-time Deputy Economic Development Minister and Special Projects Minister, S.M. Chandrasena. The CIABOC took him into custody on 4 July, 2025.

The CIABOC accused the former Minister of causing loss to the government by distributing seed corn, imported at a cost of Rs 25 mn, in 2024, among the farmer community in the Anuradhapura district, at a subsidised price. The distribution had taken place ahead of the 2015 presidential election contested by Mahinda Rajapaksa and estranged former SLFP General Secretary Maithripala Sirisena. The CIABOC alleged that Chandrasena exerted undue influence on the Director (Planning) and other officers of the District Secretariat and distributed seeds through his political allies to gain an advantage in the 2015 presidential election and incurred a loss to the government.

Chandrasena was granted bail on 1 August, 2025. He was indicted on 12 June before the Colombo High Court.

Before further discussing the ongoing anti-corruption campaign, let me introduce the top leadership of CIABOC. The Commission consists of Justice W.M.N.P. Iddawela (Chairman), K.B. Rajapakse and Chethiya Goonesekera P.C, with High Court judge R.S.A. Dissanayake as its Director General.

The sentencing of the S. M. Ranjith Samarakoon didn’t really bother his side. The arrest of his brother S.M. Chandrasena, too, didn’t really upset those facing charges. But, sentencing of former Minister Mahindananda Aluthgamage and former Sathosa Chairman and former Trade Minister Nalin Fernando on 29 May, 2025, sent shock waves through the Opposition.

The Colombo High Court Trial-at-Bar sentenced Aluthgamage and Fernando for committing the offence of corruption by purchasing 14,000 carrom boards and 11,000 checkers boards through Sathosa, allegedly to distribute to schools and sports clubs selected by the Sports Ministry, and distributing them to party offices of the government, during the 2015 presidential election campaign thereby, causing a loss of over 53 million rupees to the government, stunned the Opposition.

Aluthgamage was sentenced to 20 years of rigorous imprisonment, Fernando received a sentence of 25 years of rigorous imprisonment. Additionally, a fine of Rs. 100,000 (hundred thousand) was imposed for each count.

The CIABOC’s Assistant Director General Mrs. Anuththara Jayasinghe and Assistant Director General Mrs. Thushari Dayaratne conducted the prosecution.

During the Yahapalana government Aluthgamage spearheaded a high profile anti-corruption campaign, dubbed ‘Yahapalana Top 10 kamba horu’. The then Joint Opposition (JO) group, led in Parliament by Dinesh Gunawardena, published a 750-page book, targeting the Yahapalana ministers. Mahindananda, who spearheaded that campaign, is now serving a long sentence.

The JO group consists of UPFA lawmakers who declined to throw their weight behind the then President Sirisena aligned with the UNP.

Let me mention the names of those against whom the accusations were made by the JO.

Yahapalana corruption

The JO dealt with 10 major cases. (1) The Treasury bond scams perpetrated in 2015 and 2016. Accusations were directed at Ranil Wickremesinghe, Ravi Karunanayake and Governor Central Bank Arjuna Mahendran. The losses were estimated at Rs 26 bn. (2) causing losses amounting to Rs 10 bn through the fraudulent import of vehicles. Ravi Karunanayake was named the chief culprit (3) Misappropriation of Mahapola funds to the tune of Rs. 1 bn. Allegations were directed at Malik Samarawickrema (4) Stealing from an insurance scheme implemented for the benefit of those going for employment in West Asia. The JO accused Thalatha Atukarale of misappropriating funds amounting Rs 1.5 bn (5) Receiving Rs 1.5 bn through the leasing of Hambantota port to China on a 99-year lease. Ranil Wickremesinghe, Malik Samarawickrema and R. Paskaralingam were named the offenders (6) Kabir Hashim was accused of causing a loss of Rs 54 bn by cancelling aircraft ordered from Airbus Industries for the national carrier (7) fraudulent activities pertaining to the release of paddy stocks held by the government. The JO estimated the losses caused to the government at Rs 10 bn. (8) Scam in vehicle parts. Ravil Karunanayake was accused of causing losses amounting to Rs. 6.5 bn, (9 A) Dr. Rajitha Senaratne was accused of leasing of the Modera fisheries harbor and procurement of eight vessels to catch fish, fraudulently, and thereby causing losses up to Rs 1 bn, (9B) The JO also found fault with Dr. Senaratne for perpetrating Rs 1.5 bn fraud in the procurement of medicine and lastly (10) Ranil Wickremesinghe, Malik Samarawickrema, R. Paskaralingam and Charitha Ratwatte were blamed for a massive fraud in the procurement of coal for the Norochcholai coal-fired power plant. That particular fraud was estimated at Rs 5 bn.

Although the JO transformed itself to Sri Lanka Podujana Peramuna (SLPP) later, to successfully contested the 2019 presidential election, none of the above-mentioned cases were investigated. As far as we know, none of those cases had been dealt with during the SLPP rule, from November, 2019, to July, 2022. Faced with an externally backed regime change operation, the SLPP invited Wickremesinghe, who had been named by them in three major corruption cases, to accept the premiership in May, 2022, and presidency in July same year.

So far, there is no indication whether the mentioned JO allegations had received the attention of the CIABOC or the Attorney General of the government. As far as we know of all the politicians and officials, Wickremesinghe is the only one facing imminent threat due to the ongoing case pertaining to him visiting the UK in September, 2023, to join his wife Prof. Maithree at the University of Wolverhampton at her graduation ceremony.

Wickremesinghe has been accused of squandering nearly 17 mn rupees at a time the country was in deep economic turmoil. The Fort Magistrate’s court is scheduled to take up the case on 8 July.

SLPP parliamentary group leader Namal Rajapaksa is also facing a major legal challenge. The former Minister has been indicted on charges of criminal misappropriation of Rs. 70 mn in connection with the controversial Krrish project. The indictments have been forwarded to the Colombo High Court by the Attorney General, alleging that Namal Rajapaksa misappropriated funds by receiving Rs. 70 million from the Indian real estate company for the development of rugby in Sri Lanka.

Yoshitha Rajapaksa, too, has been dealt with by the CIABOC. The Rajapaksas have been accused of lowering qualifications required to join the executive branch of the Navy and then sending him to the Royal Naval Academy in the United Kingdom at taxpayers’ expense. Produced before the Colombo Additional Magistrate, Yoshitha was released on three personal bail bonds of Rs. 5 million each.

Producing Yoshitha before court on 17 June, Deputy Director General of the Bribery Commission, Ruvini Wickramasinghe declared: “”Your Honour, the complaint regarding this incident was received on June 25, 2016. Accordingly, the Commission initiated investigations. The complaint states that the suspect had participated in naval training programmes held in England and Ukraine by misusing government funds, while depriving qualified applicants of such opportunities. At that time, this individual, who is a civilian in the dock today, was also a civilian in 2006 when he was deemed eligible for the Royal Navy Young Officer training at the Royal Naval Academy in the United Kingdom. The opportunities to receive this training are extremely limited. Your Honour, selection to this prestigious course is usually based on being the most outstanding cadet officer during a two-year training period or based on performance during training. However, this suspect, although a civilian in 2006, was proposed and included in the list and was sent for the course in haste.”

The Deputy Director General also stated that Yoshitha Rajapaksa had undergone medical examinations required for overseas training even before being officially recruited into the Navy.

The court was also told that though Sri Lanka previously received scholarships from the UK the Rajapaksa government funded Yoshitha to the tune of Rs 6.2 mn.

Opp. attacks CIABOC

The Opposition has repeatedly attacked the CIABOC with its Director General Ranga Dissanayake being the primary target. Accusing Dissanayake of being a JVPer, the Opposition has repeatedly questioned the conduct of the High Court judge demanding that the CIABOC inquired into the top official’s conduct, especially with regard to the alleged suicide of former Sri Lankan CEO Kapila Chandrasena who had been under investigation pertaining to the receiving of USD 2 mn bribe to facilitate procurement aircraft from Airbus Industrie during Mahinda Rajapaksa’s second term.

Former Foreign Minister Prof. G. L. Peiris, a regular speaker at Flower Road media briefings, alleged that the CIABOC was a political tool in the NPP’s hands.

A section of the Opposition to question the circumstances one-time JVP heavyweight Nandana Gunatilleke died in January this year at the Ragama Teaching Hospital after accusing Dissanayake of pursuing an agenda beneficial to the JVP, a charge denied by the High Court judge. When the writer raised the allegations with Dissanayake, he emphatically denied any wrongdoing on his part https://island.lk/ciaboc-dg-denies-jvp-link/.

The CIABOC has simply ignored accusations directed at its DG who proved through his actions that he really meant high profile public pronouncements against corruption.

Former Deputy Minister and ex-MP Sarana Gunawardena was sentenced to a total of 16 years rigorous imprisonment by the Colombo High Court on June 8, 2026.

During the Yahapalana administration many cases, filed by the CIABOC as well as the Attorney General, were either dismissed or dropped due to lapses on their part. The accused in such cases were ex-MP Sajin Vass Gunawardena, ex-EP Chief Minister Sivanesathurei Chandrakanthan alias Pilleyan, ex-Ministers Johnston Fernando, Rohitha Abeygunawardena, Basil Rajapaksha, Mahindananda Aluthgamage and Janaka Bandara Tennakoon and former AG and CJ Mohan Peiris.

Regardless of Opposition protests, the public appreciate tangible action against corruption. However, the NPP has not been free from serious allegations against it since the last general elections. The release of suspicious 323 containers, plus two containers filled with ice, in January, 2025, followed by the massive coal scam perpetrated in September 2025, loss of over USD 2.5 mn from the Treasury and controversial Aswesuma payments, as well as wealth, accumulated by NPP Ministers as revealed by declarations made to CIABOC, shocked the electorate.

The NPP has failed to counter allegations. The circumstances under which Energy Minister Kumara Jayakody resigned, along with Energy Secretary Udayanga Hemapala, on 17 April, just a week after the NPP defeated the no-confidence motion moved by the Opposition against the Energy Minister. dealt a devastating blow to the NPP’s much touted integrity. The NPP couldn’t explain as to why a person under investigation by the CIABOC for an alleged fraud perpetrated during the Yahapalana government was accommodated in President Dissanayake’s first Cabinet. Indicted before the Colombo High Court, Jayakody’s case commenced last week.

Asset declarations of some NPP Ministers have shocked the country. The SJB has called for CIABOC to investigate them without delay and prove that CIABOC was not only going after the Opposition. Ministers Lal Kantha and Wasantha Samarasinghe are two of the top JVPers who have attracted attention as the Opposition hits back at the government.

SJB MP Mujibur Rahuman said that the JVP/NPP owed an explanation as to how their members amassed so much wealth since 2024 as they repeatedly claimed their inability to meet even their basic needs. But, their asset declarations exposed their blatant lies.

Midweek Review

Geopolitics of the Indian Ocean

Published

3 days ago

2026/06/24

Sahan Weerasooriya

Listening to the Winds, Reading the Waves:

Prof. Gamini Keerawella’s latest publication, Winds and Waves: Geopolitical Currents in the Indian Ocean since 1945 will be launched on 5 August at the Auditorium of the Bandaranaike Centre for International Studies (BCIS). The keynote address will be delivered by Prof. T. V. Paul, James, McGill Professor of Political Science at McGill University, Canada and the former President of the International Studies Association (ISA).

Prof. Keerawella, Professor Emeritus of History at the University of Peradeniya, has dedicated hisbook to the memory of Dr. Newton Gunasinghe, the eminent sociologist and Marxist theoretician who encouraged him to venture beyond disciplinary frontiers. In many respects, this work represents a successful realization of that intellectual endeavour. In her testimonial to back cover of the book, Dr. Radhika Coomaraswamy observes that “Gamini Keerawella offers a nuanced and layered account of the Indian Ocean region’s strategic evolution from the era of decolonization to the contemporary phase of intensifying great-power rivalry. Its distinctive analytical perspective makes it an important contribution to the study of international relations, maritime geopolitics, and regional strategic dynamics.” This assessment accurately captures the significance of the work, and I fully endorse her judgement.

This volume constitutes the final publication of a trilogy that explores the evolving dynamics of international relations from a distinctly Sri Lankan perspective. The first study examined the trajectory of Sri Lanka’s defence and foreign policy, while the second revisited the origins, evolution, and principal constituent elements of international relations as an academic discipline from a Global South perspective. The present work broadens the analytical canvas by tracing the shifting geopolitical contours of the Indian Ocean since 1945 and examining the evolving interplay between great-power competition and regional agency.

Indian Ocean not merely maritime transit space

At the heart of Prof. Keerawella’s analysis is the argument that the Indian Ocean is not merely a maritime space of transit but a living archive whose language is inscribed in tides, trade, and collective memory. To uncover the deeper structures that have shaped the region, he draws on Michel Foucault’s concept of the archaeology of knowledge, probing beneath the visible layers of historical experience to reveal successive strata of thought, exchange, and power. This approach enables him to trace the multiple origins of the Indian Ocean’s geopolitical significance through the sedimented traces of how the ocean has been known, governed, and imagined across time. Complementing this perspective is Fernand Braudel’s concept of the longue durée, which provides the framework for understanding the long-term evolution of Indian Ocean geopolitics. As Keerawella notes, for Braudel, history unfolds not as a single linear sequence but as a layered field of continuity and change, revealing the deeper architecture of the past—the slow yet powerful currents that shape political and economic developments beneath the surface of events (Keerawella 2026: xxiii).Prof. Keerawella further notes that later historians such as K. N. Chaudhuri and M. N. Pearson drew on Braudel’s insights and adapted them to understand the Indian Ocean as a polycentric world.

Prof. Keerawella argues that the terms employed in the title of this work—Winds, Waves, and Currents—evoke the ocean’s dual language of surface movement and underlying structure. In his reading, winds and waves signify motion: the visible and often turbulent forces that carry ships, peoples, commodities, and ideas across shifting maritime frontiers. Currents, by contrast, refer to the deeper and less visible forces that shape historical trajectories and connect coasts and continents through enduring patterns of interaction. As he observes, while winds and waves represent the restless dynamics of the ocean’s surface, currents embody the slower yet more consequential energies that operate beneath it, binding disparate regions into a larger maritime system (2026: xx).

Metaphors and Conceptual Foundation

Building on this conceptual foundation, the author employs winds, waves, and currents not merely as metaphors but also as analytical categories. Winds represent changing strategic directions and geopolitical realignments; waves denote recurring cycles of commerce, conflict, and interaction; and currents symbolize the deep structural forces that connect societies across space and time. Viewed from a distinctly Sri Lankan perspective, the volume demonstrates how a strategically located small state at the centre of the Indian Ocean perceives and navigates this maritime space through its own strategic lens. The book opens by situating Sri Lanka within the intersecting forces of history, geography, and power that have shaped the Indian Ocean world. It advances the notion of a dual strategic consciousness that has informed Sri Lanka’s external engagements: a persistent sense of vulnerability, rooted in colonial experience and geographical exposure, coexisting with a cosmopolitan outlook forged through centuries of maritime exchange. Prof. Keerawella contends that this dual consciousness constitutes the underlying framework through which Sri Lanka has historically interpreted and responded to developments in its external environment.

Winds and Waves is a comprehensive study comprising eleven chapters and an extensive introduction that establishes the analytical foundations of the work by treating the ocean simultaneously as text and method. The opening chapter situates Sri Lanka within the wider Indian Ocean system, tracing the island’s navigation through shifting configurations of power while emphasising the agency of small states. The Indian Ocean is presented not merely as a strategic arena but also as a moral and political space, linking Sri Lanka’s historical experience to the broader aspirations and consciousness of the Global South.

Revisiting British withdrawal

The book revisits Britain’s withdrawal from the Indian Ocean, arguing that it was not simply a consequence of post-war decline but the culmination of deeper structural transformations in the international system. Decolonisation, Afro-Asian nationalism, and the emergence of bipolarity fundamentally altered the regional order and created the conditions for Britain’s retreat. In turn, this withdrawal opened the way for superpower competition, particularly between the United States and the Soviet Union, transforming the Indian Ocean into major theatre of Cold War geopolitics.

A substantial portion of the volume is devoted to examining the policies and strategic trajectories of the major powers. The author traces American engagement from Cold War containment through post-Cold War maritime predominance to contemporary Indo-Pacific formulations, demonstrating that U.S. strategy has evolved through the interaction of structural imperatives and changing strategic discourses. Particular attention is paid to the 2026 U.S.–Iran War, which is interpreted as a transformative event that exposed the limits of military hegemony and accelerated patterns of strategic hedging and multi-alignment among regional actors. The book also explores the Soviet Union’s entry into the Indian Ocean in 1968 and the subsequent re-emergence of Russia under Vladimir Putin through selective naval deployments, arms transfers, and strategic partnerships, illustrating what the author characterises as the recurrent rhythms of great-power engagement in the region.

The rise of China receives extensive treatment as one of the most significant structural developments of the twenty-first century. Through the Belt and Road Initiative, port development projects, and naval modernisation, China has translated growing economic power into expanding strategic influence. The author contrasts Beijing’s assertive posture in the South China Sea with its relatively restrained approach in the Indian Ocean, where economic diplomacy and cooperative security initiatives have assumed greater prominence. Equally significant is the discussion of India’s transformation from a regional power into an emerging global strategic actor. The evolution of Indian maritime strategy—from Nehruvian custodianship to contemporary blue-water ambitions—demonstrates how a rising power navigates structural constraints while expanding its strategic reach. Initiatives such as SAGAR, naval modernization, and deepening partnerships with the United States, Japan, and Australia have positioned India as a central actor in the evolving Indo-Pacific order.

Roles of Japan and EU examined

The volume also examines the roles of Japan and the European Union in shaping the contemporary maritime order. Japan’s transition from post-war restraint to proactive strategic engagement, embodied in the Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) vision, illustrates how middle powers adapt to changing geopolitical realities through coalition-building and maritime capacity enhancement. The European Union’s engagement is portrayed through less visible but nevertheless significant mechanisms, including trade, development cooperation, maritime governance, and norm diffusion, contributing to what the author terms a form of “quiet-making multipolarity” that encourages restraint, stability, and pragmatic cooperation.

Moving beyond conventional geopolitics, the book broadens the analytical framework to address a range of non-traditional security challenges confronting South Asia in general and Sri Lanka in particular. Climate change, piracy, illegal fishing, maritime terrorism, public health vulnerabilities, and digital insecurity are examined as transnational challenges that transcend the capabilities of individual states. The author argues that these issues reveal the limits of unilateral action and underscore the growing importance of cooperation, collective action, institutional innovation, and middle-power leadership in maritime governance.

Prof. Keerawella further situates the Indian Ocean within the wider context of the emerging Asian Century. Asia’s resurgence—driven principally by China and India and reinforced by the dynamism of Southeast Asia—is presented as a major reconfiguration of global power. In this transformation, the Indian Ocean functions as a vital maritime artery connecting energy resources, manufacturing centres, and consumer markets. At the same time, the author cautions against deterministic interpretations, emphasising that the realisation of the Asian Century remains contingent upon how the region responds to persistent inequalities, environmental challenges, governance deficits, and intensifying strategic competition.

Assessing how SL has navigated shifts

The book concludes by returning to Sri Lanka and assessing how the country has navigated contemporary shifts in the regional and global balance of power under the National People’s Power (NPP) government that emerged in the aftermath of the Aragalaya of 2022. The author demonstrates how economic crisis, demands for accountability, and aspirations for a new political culture have reshaped the domestic context within which foreign policy is conducted. Under President Anura Kumara Dissanayake, Sri Lanka is portrayed as pursuing a carefully calibrated strategy that combines engagement with international financial institutions, enhanced cooperation with India in defence and energy sectors, continued economic engagement with China, and functional security relations with the United States. The government’s response to the 2026 U.S.–Iran War—rejecting military access requests from all parties while extending humanitarian assistance—serves as an illustration of the author’s broader argument that strategic flexibility, principled neutrality, and diplomatic agility remain essential for small states navigating an increasingly complex Indian Ocean order.

Taken together, the book advances several interconnected propositions. First, the Indian Ocean is entering an increasingly multipolar era in which power is exercised through complex networks of cooperation, competition, and interdependence rather than rigid alliance structures. Second, small states are neither passive spectators nor mere proxies of great powers; they possess strategic agency and navigate competing pressures through hedging, diversification, and calibrated diplomacy. Third, Sri Lanka’s strategic behaviour—characterised by navigating asymmetry through flexibility and ambiguity—reflects a historically rooted dual consciousness that combines vulnerability with cosmopolitan engagement. Fourth, non-traditional security challenges and environmental governance are no longer peripheral concerns but central components of the evolving regional order.

Need for adaptive navigation

Prof. Keerawella argues that contemporary statecraft in the Indian Ocean requires adaptive navigation rather than rigid alignment. In a fluid and contested maritime environment, survival and influence depend less on resisting structural change than on understanding and responding to it with prudence, flexibility, and strategic clarity. The book therefore offers important insights into how small states can transform structural vulnerability into strategic agency and convert exposure into opportunities for engagement within a changing regional order.

Combining historical depth with contemporary analysis, it provides a nuanced understanding of the interaction between great-power competition, regional transformation, and the strategic choices of smaller states. The book will be of considerable value to students and scholars of international relations, political science, strategic studies, and maritime affairs, while also offering useful perspectives to policymakers, diplomats, and practitioners. Equally important, it opens several promising avenues for future research on the Indian Ocean and the emerging Indo-Pacific order.

Hermeneutic approachs

Methodologically, the study draws upon hermeneutic approaches to examine the geopolitical and maritime environments that shape relationships among states, societies, and historical processes. The result is a work that is both analytically rigorous and intellectually engaging. This review has sought less to evaluate the book in a conventional sense than to introduce its central themes and encourage a wider readership to engage with its arguments. Having highlighted the many merits of the volume, it is worth noting one technical shortcoming: the absence of an index. Given the book’s wide thematic scope and rich empirical content, the inclusion of an index would have significantly enhanced its value as a reference tool for researchers and students alike.

In sum, Prof. Keerawella listens attentively to the winds, reads the waves with analytical precision, and traces the deeper currents that shape the Indian Ocean world. The outcome is Winds and Waves: Geopolitical Currents in the Indian Ocean since 1945, a timely and thought-provoking contribution published by the Bandaranaike Centre for International Studies.

Reviewed by
Dr. Ramesh Ramasamy
Department of Political Science, University
of Peradeniya